1. Docket No. 14-11703-CC
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
THOMAS ALLEN CHESLEY,
Appellant
v.
SUSAN K. WOODARD, CHAPTER 7 TRUSTEE,
Appellee
On Appeal from The United States District Court
For The Middle District of Florida, Tampa Division
Docket No. 8:13-cv-3238-T-33
BRIEF OF APPELLEE SUSAN K. WOODARD, CHAPTER 7 TRUSTEE
HERBERT R. DONICA, ESQ.
Florida Bar No. 841870
DONICA LAW FIRM, P.A.
106 S. Tampania Avenue, Suite 250
Tampa, FL 33609
herb@donicalaw.com
(813) 878-9790 Telephone
(813) 878-9746 Facsimile
Attorney for Appellee/Chapter 7 Trustee
2. i
Chesley v. Woodard
Case No.14-11703-CC
APPELLEE’S CERTIFICATE OF INTERESTED PERSONS
AND CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT
Pursuant to the Rule 26.1 Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, and Local
Rules 26.1-1 and 28-1 (b), Appellee files this Certificate identifying Interested
Persons:
Campbell, John, Creditor and Appellee
Chesley, Thomas S., Appellant
Covington, Virginia M. Hernandez, District Court Appellate Judge
Donica, Herbert R., Attorney for Chapter 7 Trustee Susan K. Woodard, Appellee
Hooi, Michael J., Attorney for John Campbell
Lambers, Benjamin, Assistant United States Trustee, Middle District of Florida
May, K. Rodney, Bankruptcy Trial Judge
McEwen, Catherine Peek, Bankruptcy Trial Judge
Woodard, Susan K., Chapter 7 Trustee, Appellee
Pursuant to the Rule 26.1 Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure, and Local Rules
26.1-1 and 28-I(b), Appellee files this Corporate Disclosure Statement: Appellee is
an individual person. Accordingly, there are no parent corporations or any publicly
held corporations which own 10% or more of relevant corporate stock required to
be disclosed under these rules
3. ii
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
TABLE OF CONTENTS…………………………………………………………..ii
TABLE OF CITATIONS………………………………………………………….iv
STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT…………………………..…vi
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT…...…………………………………………...…vi
TRUSTEE’S ADOPTION OF PORTIONS OF CHESLEY’S INITIAL
BRIEF..…………………………………………………………………………...vii
A. STATEMENT OF THE BASIS OF APPELLATE JURISDICITION….,,.vii
B. STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED…………………………..vii
STATEMENT OF THE CASE….…………………………...………………….…1
STANDARD OF REVIEW……………………………………………………...…1
SUMMARY OF TRUSTEE’S ARGUMENT…………………..……………….…2
ARGUMENT……………………………………………………………………….3
I. Chesley’s General Release Settlement Agreement with Parts Depot Is Not a
Disability Income Benefit..........................................................................…4
II. The Proceeds of the Settlement Proceeds Were Not Paid “Under A Policy Or
Contract Of Life, Health, Accident, Or Other Insurance Of Whatever
Form.”…………………………………………………………………….....6
III. Chesley Has Failed To Show That Any Findings of Fact Made By The
Lower Courts Are Clearly Erroneous……………………………………….9
A. The Jury Verdict Form………………………………………………10
B. The Hartford Insurance Policy…………………...………………….11
4. iii
C. Other Arguments…………………………………………………….12
1. Goldenberg v. Sawczak, 791 So. 2d 1078 (Fla. 2001)……….12
2. In re Benedict, 88 B.R. 387 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1988)………..13
3. Zuckerman v. Hofrichter & Quiat, P.A., 646 So. 2d 187 (Fla.
1994)………………………………………………………….13
IV. Issues Raised Within Chesley's Brief Not Requiring Argument……..........14
CONCLUSION…………………………………………………………………...15
CERTIFICATE Of SERVICE……………………………………………..……..17
5. iv
TABLE OF CITATIONS
Cases
Burger King Corp. v. Mason,
855 F.2d 779, 781 (11th
Cir. 1988)…………………………………………..2
Florida Ass’n of Rehab. Facilities, Inc. v. State of Fla. Dept. of Health &
Rehabilitative Services,
225 F.3d 1208, 1216 (‘11th
Circ. 2000)………………………………...…1-2
Goldenberg v. Sawczak,
791 So. 2d 1078 (Fla. 2001)……..……………………...……………....12-13
In re Benedict,
88 B.R. 387 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1988)……………………………………....13
In re Optical Technologies, Inc.,
425 F.3d 1294, 1299-1300 (11th
Cir. 2005)………………………………….1
Lykes Bros., Inc. v. United States Army Corps of Engr's,
64 F.3d 630 (11th Cir.1995)………………………………………............1-2
United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co.,
333 U.S. 364 (68 S. Ct. 525 92 L. Ed. 746 (1948)…………………....…...1-2
Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc.,
395 U.S. 100 89 S. Ct. 1562, 23 L. Ed. 2d 129 (1969)……………………...9
Zuckerman v. Hofrichter & Quiat, P.A.,
646 So. 2d 187 (Fla. 1994)……………………..……………………….13-14
Statutes
Fed. R. Bankr. P. 8013.…………………………………………………………..1, 2
Fla. Stat. § 222.11…………………………………………………………………13
Fla. Stat. § 222.14…………………………..………………………………….12-13
7. vi
STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT
The Appellee does not request oral argument as the issues presented in this appeal
are straightforward and resolved by settled law. The briefs present adequate
arguments such that oral argument would not provide any additional assistance to
this Court.
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
The Appellant, Thomas A. Chesley, will be referred to as "Chesley." The Appellee,
Susan K Woodward, Chapter 7 Trustee, will be referred to as "Trustee."
References to pages in Chesley's Initial Brief will be made in the following format:
Chesley’s Brief (page numbers). The United States Bankruptcy Court for the
Middle District of Florida will be referred to as the "Bankruptcy Court." The
United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida will be referred to as
the "District Court." Citations to documents in Chesley's Appendix will be made in
the following format: “App. Vol. (No.) Document (No.) Page (No.)” Citations to
documents in the Trustee's Supplemental Appendix will be made in the following
format: “Supp. App. Document (No.) Page (No.)”
8. vii
TRUSTEE’S ADOPTION OF PORTIONS OF THE APPELLANT’S
INITIAL BRIEF
The Appellee, SUSAN K. WOODARD, CHAPTER 7 TRUSTEE
(hereinafter “Trustee”), hereby adopts and incorporates into her Appellee’s Reply
Brief, the following sections of the Appellant’s Initial Brief (hereinafter
“Chesley’s Brief”):
A. STATEMENT OF THE BASIS OF APPELLATE JURISDICITION,
(Chesley’s Brief, p. 1) and
B. STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED (Id.)
9. 1
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The Trustee hereby adopts and incorporates into her Appellee’s Reply Brief
Chesley’s Statement Of The Case, (Chesley’s Brief, Pgs. 1-5) except for certain
assertions of “facts” on page 4 wherein Chesley states that the personal injury
settlement “was compensation Appellant [sic] for injuries sustained from the
collision, as lost earning capacity, past medical expenses, future medical expenses
and past lost wages or earning capacity.” There is no support within the record that
Chesley's recovery was based on specific items of damages. The personal injury
settlement was paid after negotiations between the parties resulting in the
execution of the “Release of Claims.” This document simply recites that the
payment of $1,200,000 to Chesley was the consideration for the release. (App. Vol.
III Pt. 2, 421-1, p. 28) No other basis for the payment is referenced in the Release
of Claims.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The appeal from the District Court’s decision, sitting as an appellate court, is
subject to an independent review of the factual and legal determinations of the
Bankruptcy Court using the same standards of review employed by the District
Court. In re Optical Technologies, Inc., 425 F.3d 1294, 1299-1300 (11th
Cir. 2005)
The standard of review of a decision to affirm a denial of a motion for
reconsideration is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Florida Ass’n of Rehab.
10. 2
Facilities, Inc. v. State of Fla. Dept. of Health & Rehabilitative Services, 225 F.3d
1208, 1216 (‘11th
Circ. 2000). The appellate court will not reverse the decision of a
lower court “unless there is a definite and firm conviction that the court below
committed a clear error of judgment.” Burger King Corp. v. Mason, 855 F.2d 779,
781 (11th
Cir. 1988).
To the extent that Chesley challenges the lower courts’ findings of facts, the
standard of review in this case is well settled: “[F]indings of fact, whether based on
oral or documentary evidence, shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous.” Fed.
R. Bankr. P. 8013. “For a factual finding to be clearly erroneous, this court, after
reviewing all of the evidence, must be 'left with the definite and firm conviction
that a mistake has been committed.’” Lykes Bros., Inc. v. U.S. Army Corps of
Engineers, 64 F.3d 630, 634 (11th Cir. 1995) (citing United States v. U.S. Gypsum
Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395, 68 S. Ct. 525, 542, 92 L. Ed. 746 (1948)
Chesley’s challenges to the conclusions of law of both lower courts on the
basis of their application of their factual findings to Florida and bankruptcy law
regarding his claim to an exemption in the proceeds of his personal injury lawsuit
is reviewed de novo.
SUMMARY OF THE TRUSTEE’S ARGUMENT
Both the Bankruptcy Court Order Granting Trustee’s Motion for Summary
Judgment on Trustee’s Amended Trustee’s Objection to Debtor’s Property
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Claimed as Exempt on Amended Schedule C (App. Vol. III Pt. 2, 445 p. 8 and
App. Vol. 1, 461 p. 167) and the District Court Order affirming the Bankruptcy
Court’s Order (District Court Order p. 1) are fully supported by the appropriate
application of Florida Statutes, case law and the record facts in this case. The only
error referenced by Chesley is the Bankruptcy Court's application of long settled
Florida exemption law to the evidence introduced by Chesley. The legal arguments
of Chesley provide no basis for a change in the existing law. The Bankruptcy
Court’s Order should be affirmed.
ARGUMENT
Proceeds paid to Chesley as the result of a negotiated settlement of a tort
claim, as expressed in the written settlement agreement, do not qualify for
exemption from creditors under Florida law. Florida Statute § 222.18 provides an
exemption for “disability income benefits under any policy or contract of life,
health, accident, or other insurance of whatever form.” District Court Judge
Covington determined that for this exemption to apply, the proceeds at issue (a)
must be a disability income benefit, and (2) they must have been paid to Chesley
under a policy or contract. (District Court Order pp. 17-18) Neither element of this
statutory exemption is met in this instance. Bankruptcy Court Judge McEwen
made the same determination in denying Chesley’s Motion for Reconsideration.
(App. Vol. III Pt. 2, 445 p. 8 and App. Vol. 1, 461 p. 167)
12. 4
I. Chesley’s General Release Settlement Agreement with Parts Depot Is
Not a Disability Income Benefit.
The proceeds at issue were received by Chesley pursuant to the terms of a
general release settlement (the “Agreement”) negotiated between Chesley and
Parts Depot. The Agreement states on its face that the agreed-upon payment was
being made to Chesley as consideration in exchange for a general release from a
tort claim against Parts Depot. (App. Vol. III Pt. 2, 421-1, p. 28) Nothing in the
Agreement provides any specific allocation for the proceeds with respect to any
specific type of damages, such as lost earnings, property damage, or medical
expenses. Further, nothing in the Agreement characterizes the proceeds as a
disability income benefit. (Id.) In addition, the Agreement makes no mention of
Chesley’s specific injuries or any resulting disability. (Id.) The check that was
issued to Chesley as payment pursuant to the Agreement states on the check stub
that the nature of the payment was a “BODILY INJURY SETTLEMENT,” and no
reference is made to a disability income benefit. (Supp. App., D-1-19 p. 12).
Chesley did not provide any support or evidence to the Bankruptcy Court to
show that the Agreement was intended to be a disability income benefit, or was
intended to serve as anything other than consideration in exchange for general
release of a tort claim. After reviewing the Bankruptcy Court’s record, District
Court Judge Covington determined that “the Court has reviewed the general
release settlement contained in the record, and finds that the document fails to
13. 5
provide an allocated breakdown of what the proceeds are to represent” (District
Court Order p.18); that “it is apparent that the parties to the general release
settlement did not contemplate that the proceeds would represent disability income
benefits.” (Id. p. 19), and that “[t]he record is devoid of any support illustrating
that the general release settlement contemplated the proceeds be derived from a
disability insurance policy or to represent disability income benefits.” (Id. pp.. 23-
24). Chesley has not argued that these factual determinations were clearly
erroneous nor has he referred to any portion of the record that would support the
conclusion he urges. The District Court’s findings of fact are consistent with the
Bankruptcy Court’s factual determinations. (App. Vol. III Pt. 2, 445 p. 8 and App.
Vol. 1, 461 p. 167)
Bankruptcy Court Judge McEwen sought and took testimony in open court
from the attorney who negotiated the Agreement on behalf of Chesley. The
attorney informed the Bankruptcy Court that “[t]he premise of the settlement was
that the lump-sum payment would be made to Chesley which was negotiated and
agreed upon in exchange for the indemnification and release…There was never
any discussion about a disability clause [emphasis added].” (App. Vol. 1, 495, pp.
110-111). Chesley disputes the nature of this colloquy, arguing that that the Judge
“hollered” at Chesley’s former attorney, somehow causing Chesley’s former
attorney to “stop [his] truthful statement” and “change[] his statement knowing that
14. 6
the Judge did not wanting [sic] the actual complete statement in the record.”
(Chesley’s Brief p. 17). There is no support for Chesley’s suggestion, as the partial
statement made by his attorney before the judge interrupted him was consistent
with his post-waiver statements. (App. Vol. 1, 495 pp. 110-111).
As a result of this fact-finding, both the Bankruptcy Court and the District
Court found that Chesley was unable to meet the required first element of Florida
Statute § 222.18 because he could not show that the proceeds were a disability
income benefit. (App. Vol. III Pt. 2, 445 p. 8, App. Vol. 1, 461 p. 167 and District
Court Order p. 1)
II. The Proceeds of the Settlement Were Not Paid “Under A Policy Or
Contract Of Life, Health, Accident, Or Other Insurance Of Whatever
Form.”
Both Courts found that Chesley was also unable to meet the second element
of Florida Statute § 222.18. (App. Vol. III Pt. 2, 445 p. 8, App. Vol. 1, 461 p. 167
and District Court Order p. 1)
The proceeds paid to Chesley as consideration in exchange for his release of
claims against Parts Depot were paid by Hartford Fire Insurance Company
(“Hartford”), Parts Depot’s insurance carrier. (App. Vol. 3 Pt. 1, 449-1, p. 12)
Both the Bankruptcy Court (App. Vol. III Pt. 2, 445 p. 8 and App. Vol. 1, 461 p.
167) and the District Court (District Court Order pp. 17-18) held that this payment
15. 7
falls short of the statutory requirement that such payment be made “under a policy”
in order to qualify for the statutory exemption. (Fla. Stat. § 222.18)
For proceeds to have been considered paid “under a policy,” thus satisfying
the language of the statute, the proceeds must be paid by an insurer to the insured
in compliance with the terms of an insurance agreement between both parties.
(Citation here?) In this instance, Chesley was never a party to the Hartford policy.
The payment at issue was distributed to Chesley from (not under) a casualty policy
issued by Hartford (the insurer) to Parts Depot (the insured); thus, the payment at
issue was not made to Chesley “under the policy” because it was not made as the
result of any insurance agreement between Chesley and Hartford “under which”
terms had been invoked mandating payment from Hartford to Chesley. Rather,
this payment was made to Chesley “from” the policy between Parts Depot and
Hartford as the result of Parts Depot’s agreement with Hartford to insure Parts
Depot against possible tort liability. Chesley was unable to show to either the
Bankruptcy Court or District Court any facts or law which supported his
contention that a payment by the tortfeasor’s insurance carrier qualified as a
payment “under a policy” for disability income purposes.
During oral argument on the Trustee’s motion for summary judgment on
August 20, 2013, Bankruptcy Judge McEwen asked to see this Hartford policy,
telling Chesley that “insurance benefits are for prescribed things. I want to see the
16. 8
sentence in the policy [emphasis added].” (App. Vol. 1, 495 p. 105) Chesley filed
his Motion for Reconsideration on October 4, 2013 (App. Vol. 3 Pt. 1, 449 p. 2)
and furnished a copy of the policy. At a continued hearing held on October 28,
2013, Judge McEwen found as a matter of fact that it contained no specific
disability income benefit provision. (App. Vol. 1,296 p. 161) Instead, the terms of
the policy provided that the insurer “will pay all sums an ‘insured’ legally must
pay as damages because of ‘bodily injury’ or ‘property damage’.” (App. Vol. 3 Pt.
1, 449-1 p. 24).
Chesley argues, as he did before both Judge McEwen and Judge Covington,
that a Florida statutory definition classifies as “vehicle insurance” a liability
insurance contract which incorporates a provision for disability benefits for people
struck by that vehicle (Fla. Stat. § 624.605(1)(a)). However, this argument is
relevant only if there is a dispute as to whether the Hartford policy is “vehicle
insurance” under Florida law; the definition cannot and does not transform these
general release settlement proceeds into a disability income benefit. The
beneficiary under the policy was not Chesley, but Parts Depot, which had
purchased the policy to cover its potential liability relating to third party damages.
Both the Bankruptcy Court and the District Court found that Chesley failed
to show that the settlement was paid “under a policy or contract of life, health,
accident, or other insurance of whatever form” as required by plain language
17. 9
Florida Statute § 624.605(1)(a). (App. Vol. III Pt. 2, 445 p. 8, App. Vol. 1, 461 p.
167 and District Court Order pp. 17-18)
Judge Covington held that “the record before the Court failed to establish
that the general release settlement satisfied these two requirements” and that “there
is no genuine dispute as to whether the proceeds from the general release
settlement are not exempt under Fla. Stat. § 222.18.” (District Court Order p. 18).
III. Chesley Has Failed To Show That Any Findings Of Fact Made By The
Lower Courts Are Clearly Erroneous.
In Chesley’s Brief, he asks this Court for a de novo review of the application
of law to the findings of fact made by both the Bankruptcy Court and District
Court. The standard of review advocated by Chesley is incorrect. It is well settled
law that a lower court’s factual determinations are subject to the standard of
“clearly erroneous.” The Supreme Court has held that “in applying the clearly
erroneous standard to the findings of a district court sitting without a jury,
appellate courts must constantly have in mind that their function is not to decide
factual issues de novo.” Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S.
100, 123, 89 S. Ct. 1562, 1576, 23 L. Ed. 2d 129 (1969) “The authority of an
appellate court, when reviewing the findings of a judge as well as those of a jury, is
circumscribed by the deference it must give to decisions of the trier of the fact,
who is usually in a superior position to appraise and weigh the evidence.” (Id.)
18. 10
Chesley has not made any reference to the record that would support different
conclusions than the determinations of the lower courts.
A. The Jury Verdict Form.
Chesley argues that a jury verdict form (App. Vol. 3, Pt. 2, 323-1 p. 73) from
the civil trial on his tort claim indicates a jury finding of disability. Chesley then
asks this Court to conclude that this supports his contention that the Agreement
was a disability income benefit exempt under Florida Stat. § 222.18. Yet this jury
verdict form in fact contains no mention of any jury finding of disability; nor does
it indicate any belief that Chesley suffered any permanent injury as the result of the
accident at issue. (Id.). When Chesley made this argument to the Bankruptcy
Court, Judge McEwen told him that “if somebody wanted to have a special verdict
form with disability benefits in it, they should've written it that way. We don't know
what the jury thought [emphasis added].” (App. Vol. 1, 495 p. 103). The District
Court, in ruling that the Agreement was a negotiated transaction with consideration
in exchange for a release of claim. In doing so, Judge Covington pointed out that
“the Court is mindful that the special verdict form was not the basis of the personal
injury settlement.” (District Court Order p. 18). Chesley ostensibly now asks that
this Court simply disregard both of these lower court findings of fact, as well as the
plain language of the jury verdict form, to support his claim that the Agreement
was actually a disability income benefit. Chesley makes no argument or reference
19. 11
to any factual or legal support that could be taken as a contention that both of the
lower court findings are clearly erroneous or an abuse of discretion.
B. The Hartford Insurance Policy
Chesley argues that the insurance policy issued to Parts Depot by Hartford
(App. Vol. 3 Pt. 1, 449-1 p. 12) contains provisions covering liability incurred by
the insured for “‘bodily injury’ or ‘property damage’.” Chesley argues that since
this policy contains both of these provisions, it falls under a definition of “vehicle
insurance” as provided by Fla. Stat. § 624.605(1)(a). Chesley then argues, as he did
to both the District Court and the Bankruptcy Court, that as that same Florida
statutory definition extends its scope to also incorporate insurance policies which
provide “disability benefits,” that the Agreement--or any general release settlement
agreement--funded by the policy can be construed as a “disability income benefit.”
During Bankruptcy Court proceedings, Judge McEwen told Chesley that
“I’m going to confine my inquiry to what [Fla. Stat. § 222.18] says. It says I
have to be looking at a policy, any kind of policy that provides a disability
benefit. And that’s why I need to see the policy…I don’t have a record that
says that your settlement comes from an insurance policy that provides
disability settlement benefits…Is that phrase anywhere in the policy?”
(App. Vol. 1, 495 pp. 93-94).
At a subsequent hearing, after Chesley had located and submitted a copy of the
policy to the Bankruptcy Court, Judge McEwen asked Chesley, “Show me in the
Hartford [policy] where it says that disability income benefits are covered…Show
me what paragraph it is.” (App. Vol. 1, 496 p. 159). After Chesley conceded that
20. 12
“a disability policy isn’t…explicitly stated in the Hartford policy” (Id.), Judge
McEwen concluded that “[the] policy does not provide disability benefits” and
rejected the argument. (Id., p. 161).
C. Other Arguments.
Chesley also cites several cases which, he claims, support his assertion that
the Agreement was actually a disability income benefit. However, these cases have
been previously submitted by Chesley to both the Bankruptcy Court and the
District Court, both of which rejected each case as inapplicable.
1. Goldenberg v. Sawczak, 791 So. 2d 1078 (Fla. 2001)
Chesley argues that under Goldenberg, the Florida Supreme Court held that
the words “of whatever form” as found in Fla. Stat. § 222.18 should be construed
to include “moneys received from settling a lawsuit that concerned whether there
was coverage under a disability policy” as an exempt disability income benefit.
(Chesley’s Brief p. 7).
Both the Bankruptcy Court and the District Court rejected this argument.
The Bankruptcy Court noted that “[i]n Goldenberg it looks like there was a [Fla.
Stat. §] 222.14 issue. That does not have any relevance to what we’re dealing with
here…It has to be a disability income benefit under a policy.” (App. Vol. 1, 495 p.
90). The District Court also noted that Goldenberg “dealt with a certified question
21. 13
involving Fla. Stat. § 222.14, which Chesley concedes is inapplicable to the instant
action [emphasis added].” (District Court Order p. 20)
2. In re Benedict, 88 B.R. 387 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1988)
Chesley argues that under Benedict,
“the debtor received a settlement from a personal injury action [sic] prior to
the bankruptcy petition filing.…[that] consisted of a structured settlement
agreement as opposed to the common practice in a personal injury settlement
consisting of a lump sum payment…[T]he Court ruled against the Trustee’s
objection to Debtor’s claimed exemptions that were claimed against a
personal injury settlement.” (Chesley’s Brief p. 10).
When Chesley cited Benedict at a Bankruptcy Court hearing, Judge
McEwen responded by pointing out that “[t]he words of the statute say I have to be
looking at a policy that provides disability income benefits.” (App. Vol. 1, 495 p.
91) The District Court’s opinion went into greater depth:
“The bankruptcy court was challenged with the question of ‘whether an
annuity issued pursuant to a structured settlement agreement and § 130 of
the Internal Revenue Code may be claimed as exempt under Florida law and
the Bankruptcy Code.” [citation omitted] In making its determination that
annuities issued pursuant to terms of structured settlements could be exempt,
the Court focused on the exemptions provided in Fla. Stat. §§ 222.14 and
222.11, which are inapplicable to the present action.” (District Court Order
pp. 20-21)
3. Zuckerman v. Hofrichter & Quiat, P.A., 646 So. 2d 187
(Fla. 1994)
Chesley argues that in Zuckerman, “The Supreme Court of Florida…granted
[a Fla. Stat. § 222.18] exemption to moneys received in a lump sum payment
22. 14
pursuant to a settlement agreement as opposed to a Court judgment” (Chesley’s
Brief p. 10) and “that exemption status is not dependent on the form of
payment…nor does it discriminate between monies paid pursuant to settlement or
otherwise.” (Id. at 10).
The Bankruptcy Court found Zuckerman distinguishable, holding that
“Zuckerman was receiving benefits under his own disability insurance policy and
he sued the insurer because the insurer stopped the benefits…The question of some
other policy is not presented. There was no dispute about the nature of the policy
and Zuckerman thus does not provide a reason for a decision in this case.” (App.
Vol. 1, 495 p. 89-90). The District Court, in considering Zuckerman, concurred,
stating: “in the instant case, Chesley has not demonstrated that the proceeds of the
general release settlement were derived from a disability insurance policy or were
specifically for disability income benefits, as occurred in Zuckerman.” (District
Court Order p. 20).
IV. Issues Raised Within Chesley’s Brief Not Requiring Argument.
On pages 8, 17, 18, 20, 22 and 25 of his brief, Chesley presents argument for
an exemption pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 522(d). The District Court determined that
Chesley had abandoned those claims before the Bankruptcy Court and also with
respect to the appeal to the District Court. (District Court Order, p. 13 n.3)
23. 15
On page 16 of his brief, Chesley states that the Chapter 7 Trustee filed
no objection to his claim of exemption and made no argument at the hearing
on the Chapter 13 Trustee's motion for summary judgment. The hearing was
held on August 20, 2013 and the Order Granting the Trustee’s Motion for
Summary Judgment was entered on September 23, 2013. The Chapter 7
Trustee was appointed when the case was converted on November 8, 2013.
There was no reason for the Chapter 7 Trustee to object to Chesley's
exemptions as the matter had been decided prior to the Trustee’s
appointment. (Supp. App., 482, p.29)
On page 16 of his brief, Chesley incorrectly recites a statement from the
Trustee’s brief filed in the District Court appellate proceeding. The statement
appears on page 3, lines 11-12, Doc. 18 and actually reads "the jury verdict was
not the basis of the personal injury settlement." (emphasis added) Contrary to
Chesley's argument, there is no inconsistency in the positions taken by the Chapter
7 Trustee and the Chapter 13 Trustee. (Supp App., D-18 p. 19)
The Trustee respectfully requests that this Court not consider these issues as
properly before the Court.
CONCLUSION
The law concerning exemptions under F.S. 222.18 is clear and settled. A
debtor claiming an exemption under F.S. 222.18 for a personal injury settlement
24. 16
must be able to show that the settlement was comprised of a disability benefit paid
"under a policy or contract of life, health, accident or other insurance . . . .” The
legal arguments of Chesley provide no basis for a change in the existing law. The
District Court’s Order affirming the Bankruptcy Court’s Order should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted this 24th
day of August, 2014.
DONICA LAW FIRM, P.A.
Counsel for Trustee
106 S. Tampania Ave., Suite 250
Tampa, FL 33609-3256
Tele. (813) 878-9790 Fax: (813) 878-9746
E-mail: herb@donicalaw.com
______________________________
Herbert R. Donica, Esq.
Florida Bar No. 841870
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE WITH FED RULES
Certificate of Compliance With Type-Volume Limitation,
Typeface Requirements, and Type Style Requirements
1. This brief complies with the page limitation of Fed. R. Bankr. P. 8010(c)
because:
[X] this brief contains 15 pages, excluding the parts of the brief
exempted by Fed. R. Bankr. P. 8010(c), and/or
1. This brief complies with the typeface requirements of Fed. R. App. P.
32(a)(5) and the type style requirements of Fed. R. App. P. 32(a)(6)
because:
25. 17
[X] this brief has been prepared in a proportionally spaced typeface
using Microsoft Office in “TIMES NEW ROMAN, 14 POINT”
Dated: August 25, 2014.
_____________________________
HERBERT R. DONICA, ESQ.
Florida Bar No. 841870
Attorney for Appellee/Chapter 7 Trustee
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing
was furnished, electronically and/or by U.S. Mail to, Thomas Allen Chesley,
6543 Morrell Court, Wesley Chapel, FL 33544,; Ben Lambers, Esquire, c/o US
Trustee's Office 501 East Polk Street, Suite 1200, Tampa, Florida 33602 John
W. Campbell, Esquire, 100 N. Tampa St., Ste. 350, Tampa, FL 33601, Michael
J. Hooi, Esquire, c/o Stichter, Riedel, Blain & Prosser, P.A., 110 East Madison
Street, Suite 200, Tampa, Florida 33602-4718 on this 25th
day of August, 2014.
Herbert R. Donica, Esq.
