remedial law

1. REMEDIAL LAW REVIEW
CIVIL PROCEDURE
JURISDICTION
1. Russel v. Vistel Gr. 119347
[I]n determining whether an action is one the
subject matter of which is not capable of
pecuniary estimation this Court has adopted the
criterion of first ascertaining the nature of the
principal action or remedy sought. If it is
primarily for the recovery of a sum of money, the
claim is considered capable of pecuniary
estimation, and whether jurisdiction is in the
municipal courts or in instance would depend on
the amount of the claim. However, where the
basic issue is something other than the right to
recover a sum of money, where the money claim
is purely incidental to, or a consequence of, the
principal relief sought, this Court has considered
such where the subject of the litigation may not
be estimated in terms of money, and are
cognizable exclusively by courts of first instance
(now Regional Trial Courts).
2. Cruz v. Tan 87Phil627
To determine whether a complaint for recovery
of possession falls under the jurisdiction of the
MeTC (first level court) or the RTC (second level
court), we are compelled to go over the
allegations of the complaint. The general rule is
that what determines the nature of the action
and the court that has jurisdiction over the case
are the allegations in the complaint. These
cannot be made to depend upon the defenses
set up in the answer or pleadings filed by the
defendant.
This general rule however admits exceptions. In
Ignacio v. CFI of Bulacan, it was held that while
the allegations in the complaint make out a case
for forcible entry, where tenancy is averred by
way of defense and is proved to be the real
issue, the case should be dismissed for lack of
jurisdiction as the case should properly be filed
with the then Court of Agrarian Relations.
The cause of action in a complaint is not what
the designation of the complaint states, but what
the allegations in the body of the complaint
define and describe. The designation or caption
is not controlling, more than the allegations in
the complaint themselves are, for it is not even
an indispensable part of the complaint.
3. Gomez v. Montalban
Basic as a hornbook principle is that jurisdiction
over the subject matter of a case is conferred by
law and determined by the allegations in the
complaint which comprise a concise statement
of the ultimate facts constituting the plaintiffs
cause of action. The nature of an action, as well
as which court or body has jurisdiction over it, is
determined based on the allegations contained
in the complaint of the plaintiff, irrespective of
whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to recover
upon all or some of the claims asserted therein.
The averments in the complaint and the
character of the relief sought are the ones to be
consulted. Once vested by the allegations in the
complaint, jurisdiction also remains vested
irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff is
entitled to recover upon all or some of the claims
asserted therein.
DOCKET FEES
4. Manchester v. Ca gr 75919 may 1987
As reiterated in the Magaspi case the rule is
well-settled "that a case is deemed filed only
upon payment of the docket fee regardless of
the actual date of filing in court .
To put a stop to this irregularity, henceforth all
complaints, petitions, answers and other similar
pleadings should specify the amount of
damages being prayed for not only in the body
of the pleading but also in the prayer, and said
damages shall be considered in the assessment
of the filing fees in any case. Any pleading that
fails to comply with this requirement shall not bib
accepted nor admitted, or shall otherwise be
expunged from the record.
The Court acquires jurisdiction over any case
only upon the payment of the prescribed docket
fee. An amendment of the complaint or similar
pleading will not thereby vest jurisdiction in the
Court, much less the payment of the docket fee
based on the amounts sought in the amended
pleading.
5. Sun insurance v. Asuncion gr 79937-
38
The contention that Manchester cannot apply
retroactively to this case is untenable. Statutes
regulating the procedure of the courts will be
construed as applicable to actions pending and

2. undetermined at the time of their passage.
Procedural laws are retrospective in that sense
and to that extent.
However, in Manchester, petitioner did not pay
any additional docket fee until] the case was
decided by this Court on May 7, 1987. Thus, in
Manchester, due to the fraud committed on the
government, this Court held that the court a quo
did not acquire jurisdiction over the case and
that the amended complaint could not have
been admitted inasmuch as the original
complaint was null and void.
In the present case, a more liberal interpretation
of the rules is called for considering that, unlike
Manchester, private respondent demonstrated
his willingness to abide by the rules by paying
the additional docket fees as required.
Thus, the Court rules as follows:
a. It is not simply the filing of the complaint
or appropriate initiatory pleading, but the
payment of the prescribed docket fee,
that vests a trial court with jurisdiction
over the subject matter or nature of the
action. Where the filing of the initiatory
pleading is not accompanied by
payment of the docket fee, the court
may allow payment of the fee within a
reasonable time but in no case beyond
the applicable prescriptive or
reglementary period.
b. The same rule applies to permissive
counterclaims, third party claims and
similar pleadings, which shall not be
considered filed until and unless the
filing fee prescribed therefor is paid. The
court may also allow payment of said
fee within a reasonable time but also in
no case beyond its applicable
prescriptive or reglementary period.
c. Where the trial court acquires
jurisdiction over a claim by the filing of
the appropriate pleading and payment of
the prescribed filing fee but,
subsequently, the judgment awards a
claim not specified in the pleading, or if
specified the same has been left for
determination by the court, the
additional filing fee therefor shall
constitute a lien on the judgment. It shall
be the responsibility of the Clerk of
Court or his duly authorized deputy to
enforce said lien and assess and collect
the additional fee.
6. Heirs of Renoso Senyor v. Ca 654
scra 1 july 10 2001
The rule is that payment in full of the docket fees
within the prescribed period is mandatory. In
Manchester v. Court of Appeals, it was held that
a court acquires jurisdiction over any case only
upon the payment of the prescribed docket fee.
The strict application of this rule was, however,
relaxed two (2) years after in the case of Sun
Insurance Office, Ltd. v. Asuncion, wherein the
Court decreed that where the initiatory pleading
is not accompanied by the payment of the
docket fee, the court may allow payment of the
fee within a reasonable period of time, but in no
case beyond the applicable prescriptive or
reglementary period. This ruling was made on
the premise that the plaintiff had demonstrated
his willingness to abide by the rules by paying
the additional docket fees required. Thus, in the
more recent case of United Overseas Bank v.
Ros, the Court explained that where the party
does not deliberately intend to defraud the court
in payment of docket fees, and manifests its
willingness to abide by the rules by paying
additional docket fees when required by the
court, the liberal doctrine enunciated in Sun
Insurance Office, Ltd., and not the strict
regulations set in Manchester, will apply. It has
been on record that the Court, in several
instances, allowed the relaxation of the rule on
non-payment of docket fees in order to afford
the parties the opportunity to fully ventilate their
cases on the merits.
In this case, it cannot be denied that the case
was litigated before the RTC and said trial court
had already rendered a decision. While it was at
that level, the matter of non-payment of docket
fees was never an issue. It was only the CA
which motu propio dismissed the case for said
reason.
Considering the foregoing, there is a need to
suspend the strict application of the rules so that
the petitioners would be able to fully and finally
prosecute their claim on the merits at the
appellate level rather than fail to secure justice
on a technicality, for, indeed, the general
objective of procedure is to facilitate the
application of justice to the rival claims of
contending parties, bearing always in mind that
procedure is not to hinder but to promote the
administration of justice.

3. The petitioners, however, are liable for the
difference between the actual fees paid and the
correct payable docket fees to be assessed by
the clerk of court which shall constitute a lien on
the judgment pursuant to Section 2 of Rule 141
which provides:
SEC. 2. Fees in lien. Where the court in its final
judgment awards a claim not alleged, or a relief
different from, or more than that claimed in the
pleading, the party concerned shall pay the
additional fees which shall constitute a lien on
the judgment in satisfaction of said lien. The
clerk of court shall assess and collect the
corresponding fees.
As the Court has taken the position that it would
be grossly unjust if petitioners claim would be
dismissed on a strict application of the
Manchester doctrine, the appropriate action,
under ordinary circumstances, would be for the
Court to remand the case to the CA.
Considering, however, that the case at bench
has been pending for more than 30 years and
the records thereof are already before this
Court, a remand of the case to the CA would
only unnecessarily prolong its resolution. In the
higher interest of substantial justice and to spare
the parties from further delay, the Court will
resolve the case on the merits.
CAUSE OF ACTION
7. Amonoy v. Gutierrez feb 15,2001
Well-settled is the maxim that damage resulting
from the legitimate exercise of a persons rights
is a loss without injury -- damnum absque injuria
-- for which the law gives no remedy.[9] In other
words, one who merely exercises ones rights
does no actionable injury and cannot be held
liable for damages.
Petitioner invokes this legal precept in arguing
that he is not liable for the demolition of
respondents house. He maintains that he was
merely acting in accordance with the Writ of
Demolition ordered by the RTC. We reject this
submission. Damnum absque injuria finds no
application to this case.
Although the acts of petitioner may have been
legally justified at the outset, their continuation
after the issuance of the TRO amounted to an
insidious abuse of his right. Indubitably, his
actions were tainted with bad faith. Had he not
insisted on completing the demolition,
respondents would not have suffered the loss
that engendered the suit before the RTC. Verily,
his acts constituted not only an abuse of a right,
but an invalid exercise of a right that had been
suspended when he received the TRO from this
Court on June 4, 1986. By then, he was no
longer entitled to proceed with the demolition.
Article 19, known to contain what is commonly
referred to as the principle of abuse of rights,
sets certain standards which may be observed
not only in the exercise of ones rights but also in
the performance of ones duties. These
standards are the following: to act with justice; to
give everyone his due; and to observe honesty
and good faith. The law, therefore, recognizes
the primordial limitation on all rights: that in their
exercise, the norms of human conduct set forth
in Article 19 must be observed. A right, though
by itself legal because recognized or granted by
law as such, may nevertheless become the
source of some illegality. When a right is
exercised in a manner which does not conform
with norms enshrined in Article 19 and results in
damage to another, a legal wrong is thereby
committed for which the wrongdoer must be held
responsible x x x.
Clearly then, the demolition of respondents
house by petitioner, despite his receipt of the
TRO, was not only an abuse but also an
unlawful exercise of such right. In insisting on
his alleged right, he wantonly violated this
Courts Order and wittingly caused the
destruction of respondents house.
Obviously, petitioner cannot invoke damnum
absque injuria, a principle premised on the valid
exercise of a right.[14] Anything less or beyond
such exercise will not give rise to the legal
protection that the principle accords. And when
damage or prejudice to another is occasioned
thereby, liability cannot be obscured, much less
abated.
DANUM ABSQUE INJURIA
8. Heirs of Purisima Nala v. Cabansag
G.R. No. 161188 june 13,2008
“Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of
his rights and in the performance of his duties,
act with justice, give everyone his due, and
observe honesty and good faith.
The foregoing provision sets the standards
which may be observed not only in the exercise
of one’s rights but also in the performance of

4. one’s duties. When a right is exercised in a
manner which does not conform with the norms
enshrined in Article 19 and results in damage to
another, a legal wrong is thereby committed for
which the wrongdoer must be held responsible.
But a right, though by itself legal because
recognized or granted by law as such, may
nevertheless become the source of some
illegality. A person should be protected only
when he acts in the legitimate exercise of his
right; that is, when he acts with prudence and in
good faith, but not when he acts with negligence
or abuse. There is an abuse of right when it is
exercised only for the purpose of prejudicing or
injuring another. The exercise of a right must be
in accordance with the purpose for which it was
established, and must not be excessive or
unduly harsh; there must be no intention to
injure another.
In order to be liable for damages under the
abuse of rights principle, the following requisites
must concur: (a) the existence of a legal right or
duty; (b) which is exercised in bad faith; and (c)
for the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring
another.
Moreover, respondent failed to show that Nala
and Atty. Del Prado’s acts were done with
the sole intention of prejudicing and injuring
him. It may be true that respondent suffered
mental anguish, serious anxiety and
sleepless nights when he received the
demand letters; however, there is a material
distinction between damages and injury.
Injury is the legal invasion of a legal right
while damage is the hurt, loss or harm
which results from the injury.Thus, there
can be damage without injury in those
instances in which the loss or harm was not
the result of a violation of a legal duty. In
such cases, the consequences must be
borne by the injured person alone; the law
affords no remedy for damages resulting
from an act which does not amount to a
legal injury or wrong. These situations are
often called damnum absque injuria.
Nala was acting well within her rights when she
instructed Atty. Del Prado to send the
demand letters. She had to take all the
necessary legal steps to enforce her
legal/equitable rights over the property
occupied by respondent. One who makes
use of his own legal right does no injury.
Thus, whatever damages are suffered by
respondent should be borne solely by him.”
SPLITTING A SINGLE CAUSE OF ACTION
9. Mariscal v. Ca 311 scra 51
A counterclaim partakes of the nature of a
complaint and/or a cause of action against the
plaintiff in a case. To interpose a cause of action
in a counterclaim and again invoke it in a
complaint against the same person or party
would be splitting a cause of action not
sanctioned by the Rules.
10. Larena v. Villanueva 53 phil 923
The rule is well established that when a lease
provides for the payment of the rent in separate
installments, each installment is an independent
cause of action, though it has been held and is
good law, that in an action upon such a lease for
the recovery of rent, the installments due at the
time the action brought must be included in the
complaint and that failure to do so will constitute
a bar to a subsequent action for the payment of
that rent.

5. 11. Blossom v. Manila gas 55 phil 226
Withal, even if the contract is divisible in its
performance and future periodic deliveries are
not yet due, but the obligor has already
manifested his refusal to comply with his future
periodic obligations, “the contract is entire and
the breach is total”, hence there can only be one
action for damages.
“STANDING” DISTINGUISHED FROM REAL
PARTY-IN-INTEREST
12. Kilos bayan v. Morato 316 phil 652
STANDING is a concept in constitutional law
and here no constitutional question is actually
involved. The more appropriate issue is whether
the petitioners are REAL PARTIES in
INTEREST.
Although both are directed towards ensuring that
only certain parties can maintain an action, the
concept of standing requires an analysis of
broader policy concerns.
Standing maybe brought by concerned citizens,
taxpayers or voters who sue in public interest:
Whether such parties have “alleged such a
personal stake in the outcome of the controversy
xxx”
1) Direct and personal interest;
2) Has sustained or is in immediate danger
of sustained some direct injury and
3) Has been or is about to be denied some
right or privilege.
In the case at bar, there is no showing of
particularized interest or an allegation of public
funds being misspent to make the action of
public interest.
Real party in interest involves only a question
on “Whether he is the party who would be
benefited or injured by the judgment or the party
entitled to the avails of the suit.”
REPRESENTATIVES AS PARTIES
13. Ramos v. Reyes gr 180771 apr
21,2015
The primary reason animal rights advocates and
environmentalists seek to give animals and
inanimate objects standing is due to the need to
comply with the strict requirements in bringing a
suit to court. Our own 1997 Rules of Court
demand that parties to a suit be either natural or
juridical persons, or entities authorized by law. It
further necessitates the action to be brought in
the name of the real party-in-interest, even if
filed by a representative.
It had been suggested by animal rights
advocates and environmentalists that not only
natural and juridical persons should be given
legal standing because of the difficulty for
persons, who cannot show that they by
themselves are real parties-in-interests, to bring
actions in representation of these animals or
inanimate objects. For this reason, many
environmental cases have been dismissed for
failure of the petitioner to show that he/she
would be directly injured or affected by the
outcome of the case. However, in our
jurisdiction, locus standi in environmental cases
has been given a more liberalized approach.
While developments in Philippine legal theory
and jurisprudence have not progressed as far as
Justice Douglas's paradigm of legal standing for
inanimate objects, the current trend moves
towards simplification of procedures and
facilitating court access in environmental cases.
Moreover, even before the Rules of Procedure
for Environmental Cases became effective, this
Court had already taken a permissive position
on the issue of locus standi in environmental
cases. In Oposa, we allowed the suit to be
brought in the name of generations yet unborn
"based on the concept of intergenerational
responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced
and healthful ecology is concerned."56
Furthermore, we said that the right to a balanced
and healthful ecology, a right that does not even
need to be stated in our Constitution as it is
assumed to exist from the inception of
humankind, carries with it the correlative duty to
refrain from impairing the environment.57
In light of the foregoing, the need to give the
Resident Marine Mammals legal standing has
been eliminated by our Rules, which allow any
Filipino citizen, as a steward of nature, to bring a
suit to enforce our environmental laws. It is
worth noting here that the Stewards are joined
as real parties in the Petition and not just in
representation of the named cetacean species.
The Stewards, Ramos and Eisma-Osorio,
having shown in their petition that there may be
possible violations of laws concerning the
habitat of the Resident Marine Mammals, are
therefore declared to possess the legal standing
to file this petition.
SPOUSES AS PARTIES

6. 14. Imperial v. Jaucian apr 14,2004
Petitioner contends that the case against her
should have been dismissed, because her
husband was not included in the proceedings
before the RTC.
We are not persuaded. The husbands non-
joinder does not warrant dismissal, as it is
merely a formal requirement that may be cured
by amendment. Since petitioner alleges that her
husband has already passed away, such an
amendment has thus become moot.
CLASS SUIT
15. Buligbulig Kita v. Sulpicio may
19,1989
In a case of drowning ship, the family of the
victims who died and the survivors in the said
accident cannot file a class suit. They have no
interest whatsoever in the death of other
passengers thus, their interest is individual.
What is proper is a joinder of parties. A joinder
of parties is when there is a common question of
fact or law and that the causes of action arose
out of the same transaction or incident.
16. Oposa v. Factoran 224 scra 12
The children assisted by their parents filed a
case against the Secretary of DENR asking the
court to order the DENR to cancel existing
timber license agreements to preserve all the
remaining forests in the country. They say they
represent their generation and generations yet
unborn.
SUBSTITUTION OF PARTY
17. Napere v. Balabalona jan 31,2008
The rule on substitution of heirs is not a matter
of jurisdiction but a requirement of due process.
The Supreme Court held that it was designed to
ensure that the deceased party is well
represented in the action by his heirs or any of
his appointed legal representative. Non-
compliance with the rules results in the denial of
due process for the heirs who would be
substantially affected by the proceedings
therein.
INDIGENT PARTY
18. Takio v. Valdez jan 28,2008
The guidelines for determining whether a party
qualifies as an indigent litigant are provided for
in Section 19, Rule 141,5 of the Revised Rules
of Court, which reads:
SEC. 19. Indigent litigants exempt from payment
of legal fees. - INDIGENT LITIGANT (A)
WHOSE GROSS INCOME AND THAT OF
THEIR IMMEDIATE FAMILY DO NOT EXCEED
AN AMOUNT DOUBLE THE MONTHLY
MINIMUM WAGE OF AN EMPLOYEE AND (B)
WHO DO NOT OWN REAL PROPERTY WITH
A FAIR MARKET VALUE AS STATED IN THE
CURRENT TAX DECLARATION OF MORE
THAN THREE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS
(P300,000.00) SHALL BE EXEMPT FROM THE
PAYMENT OF LEGAL FEES.
The legal fees shall be a lien on any judgment
rendered in the case favorable to the indigent
unless the court otherwise provides.
To be entitled to the exemption herein provided,
the litigant shall execute an affidavit that he and
his immediate family do not earn a gross income
abovementioned nor they own any real property
with the fair value aforementioned, supported by
an affidavit of a disinterested person attesting to
the truth of the litigant's affidavit. The current tax
declaration, if any, shall be attached to the
litigant's affidavit.
Any falsity in the affidavit of the litigant or
disinterested person shall be sufficient cause to
dismiss the complaint or action or to strike out
the pleading of that party, without prejudice to
whatever criminal liability may have been
incurred.
For purposes of a suit in forma pauperis, an
indigent litigant is not really a pauper, but is
properly a person who is an indigent although
not a public charge, meaning that he has no
property or income sufficient for his support
aside from his labor, even if he is self-supporting
when able to work and in employment.6 The
term "immediate family" includes those
members of the same household who are bound
together by ties of relationship but does not
include those who are living apart from the
particular household of which the individual is a
member.
In the instant cases, petitioners maintain that
respondent's ex parte motion to litigate as an
indigent is defective since it was not
accompanied or supported by the affidavits of
his children, the immediate members of his
family. The argument lacks merit. Section 19

7. clearly states that it is the litigant alone who shall
execute the affidavit.The Rule does not require
that all members of the litigant's immediate
family must likewise execute sworn statements
in support of the petition. Expressio unius est
exclusio alterius.
19. Algora v. Naga city oct 30,2006
Section 21. Indigent party.—A party may be
authorized to litigate his action, claim or defense
as an indigent if the court, upon an ex parte
application and hearing, is satisfied that the
party is one who has no money or property
sufficient and available for food, shelter and
basic necessities for himself and his family.
Such authority shall include an exemption from
payment of docket and other lawful fees, and of
transcripts of stenographic notes which the court
may order to be furnished him. The amount of
the docket and other lawful fees which the
indigent was exempted from paying shall be a
lien on any judgment rendered in the case
favorable to the indigent, unless the court
otherwise provides.
Any adverse party may contest the grant of such
authority at any time before judgment is
rendered by the trial court. If the court should
determine after hearing that the party declared
as an indigent is in fact a person with sufficient
income or property, the proper docket and other
lawful fees shall be assessed and collected by
the clerk of court. If payment is not made within
the time fixed by the court, execution shall issue
for the payment thereof, without prejudice to
such other sanctions as the court may impose.
VENUE OF ACTIONS
20. El Hogar filipino v. Seva 57 phil 873
In volume 42, page 31, section 1528, of Corpus
Juris, there is the following statement:
PROPERTY IN SEVERAL COUNTIES. —
Although there is contrary authority, where tracts
of land situated in different counties are
embraced in one mortgage, the proper court of
either county has jurisdiction to foreclose the
mortgage and order the sale of all the land.
Several mortgages securing an entire debt are
in effect one and may be foreclosed in any
county in which part of the land lies, . . . .
It has already been held, therefore, that when
various parcels of land or real property situate in
different provinces, are included in one
mortgage contract, the Court of First Instance of
the province wherein they are situated or a part
thereof is situated, has jurisdiction to take
cognizance of an action for the foreclosure of
said mortgage, and the judgment therein
rendered may be executed in all the other
provinces wherever the mortgaged real property
may be found.
21. Mijares v. Picho 101 phil 142
There is a misjoinder of causes of action in the
present case not only as regards venue but also
as regards the defendants. The first cause of
action stated in the complaint refers to the
annulment of a deed of sale of certain real
properties situated in the province of Negros
Occidental, and of a deed of donation inter vivos
of another set of real properties situated in the
province of Cebu. They therefore refer to two
different transactions which affect properties
situated in two different provinces. The venue
has therefore been improperly laid as regards
the properties in Negros Occidental. With regard
to the second cause of action, the deed of sale
which is sought to be annulled was made in
favor of one of the defendants whereas the deed
of donation was made in favor of another
defendant, and there is nothing from which it
may be inferred that the two defendants have a
common interest that may be joined in one
cause of action. On the contrary, their interest is
distinct and separate. They cannot therefore be
joined in one cause of action.
22. Auction v. Luyabin feb 12, 2007
In the instant case, the stipulation in the parties
agreement, i.e., all Court litigation procedures
shall be conducted in the appropriate Courts of
Valenzuela City, Metro Manila, evidently lacks
the restrictive and qualifying words that will limit
venue exclusively to the RTC of Valenzuela City.
Hence, the Valenzuela courts should only be
considered as an additional choice of venue to
those mentioned under Section 2, Rule 4 of the
Rules of Court. Accordingly, the present case for
damages may be filed with the (a) RTC of
Valenzuela City as stipulated in the bidding
agreement; (b) RTC of Bulanao, Tabuk, Kalinga
which has jurisdiction over the residence of
respondent (plaintiff); or with the (c) RTC of
Valenzuela City which has jurisdiction over the
business address of petitioner (defendant). The

8. filing of the complaint in the RTC of Bulanao,
Tabuk, Kalinga, is therefore proper, respondent
being a resident of Tabuk, Kalinga.
NEGATIVE PREGNANT
23. Guevara v. Eyala aug 6,2007
It should be noted that in his Answer dated 17
October 2002, respondent through counsel
made the following statements to wit:
Respondent specifically denies having [ever]
flaunted an adulterous relationship with Irene as
alleged in paragraph [14] of the Complaint, the
truth of the matter being [that] their relationship
was low profile and known only to immediate
members of their respective families . . . , and
Respondent specifically denies the allegations in
paragraph 19 of the complaint, the reason being
that under the circumstances the acts of the
respondents with respect to his purely personal
and low profile relationship with Irene is neither
under scandalous circumstances nor tantamount
to grossly immoral conduct . . .
Indeed, from respondents ANSWER, he does
not deny carrying on an adulterous relationship
with Irene, adultery being defined under Art. 333
of the Revised Penal Code as that committed by
any married woman who shall have sexual
intercourse with a man not her husband and by
the man who has carnal knowledge of her,
knowing her to be married, even if the marriage
be subsequently declared void.[26] (Italics
supplied) What respondent denies is having
flaunted such relationship, he maintaining that it
was low profile and known only to the immediate
members of their respective families.
In other words, respondents denial is a
negative pregnant.
A denial pregnant with the admission of the
substantial facts in the pleading responded
to which are not squarely denied. It was in
effect an admission of the averments it was
directed at. Stated otherwise, a negative
pregnant is a form of negative expression which
carries with it in affirmation or at least an
implication of some kind favorable to the
adverse party. It is a denial pregnant with an
admission of the substantial facts alleged in the
pleading. Where a fact is alleged with qualifying
or modifying language and the words of the
allegation as so qualified or modified are literally
denied, it has been held that the qualifying
circumstances alone are denied while the fact
itself is admitted.(Citations omitted; emphasis
and underscoring supplied)
THIRD PARTY COMPLAINT
24. Saludaga vs Feu april 30,2008
The third-party complaint is, therefore, a
procedural device whereby a 'third party' who is
neither a party nor privy to the act or deed
complained of by the plaintiff, may be brought
into the case with leave of court, by the
defendant, who acts as third-party plaintiff to
enforce against such third-party defendant a
right for contribution, indemnity, subrogation or
any other relief, in respect of the plaintiff's claim.
The third-party complaint is actually independent
of and separate and distinct from the plaintiff's
complaint. Were it not for this provision of the
Rules of Court, it would have to be filed
independently and separately from the original
complaint by the defendant against the third-
party. But the Rules permit defendant to bring in
a third-party defendant or so to speak, to litigate
his separate cause of action in respect of
plaintiff's claim against a third-party in the
original and principal case with the object of
avoiding circuitry of action and unnecessary
proliferation of law suits and of disposing
expeditiously in one litigation the entire subject
matter arising from one particular set of facts.
25. Tayao v. Mendoza apr 12,2005
A third-party complaint is actually a complaint
independent of, and separate and distinct from
the plaintiffs complaint. Were it not for Rule 6,
Section 11 of the Rules of Court, such third-
party complaint would have to be filed
independently and separately from the original
complaint by the defendant against the third-
party defendant. The purpose is to avoid
circuitry of action and unnecessary proliferation
of law suits and of disposing expeditiously in one
litigation all the matters arising from one
particular set of facts.[12] The trial court is
vested with discretion whether or not to allow the
defendant to file a third-party complaint. As
such, the defendant has no vested right to file a
third-party complaint.
Petitioners insistence that his third-party
complaint was a direct attack on the free patent

9. and OCT No. RP-4176 under Sections 48 and
103 of Pres. Decree No. 1529 is futile.
It appears that the petitioner did not seek leave
of court to file a third-party complaint against the
public respondent. Indeed, the trial court did not
even resolve the motion to dismiss the third-
party complaint filed by the public respondent,
and proceeded to render its decision in favor of
the latter. Furthermore, the petitioner failed to
raise, in the RTC, the issue of whether or not his
third-party complaint against the public
respondent was proper. Neither did he do so in
the CA. In fact, the petitioner declared in his
petition in the CA that
The petitioner concedes that the lower courts
correctly dismissed the third-party complaint in
the petitioners amended answer against the
Director of Lands. The said third-party complaint
indeed partakes of the nature of proceedings for
cancellation of patents and titles issued under
the Republic Land Law and for reversion thereof
to the public domain, which the Solicitor General
has the exclusive authority to initiate.
In any event, the third-party complaint could not
have prospered, on the additional ground that
the petitioner failed to implead the private
respondents three (3) sisters who were the co-
owners of the subject property. They were
indispensable parties to the petitioners action for
the nullification of OCT No. RP-4176 and its
derivative title and the reconveyance of the
property to him by the said co-owners.
26. PCIDC Finance Inc. v. UCPB
Insurance Co. Jul 4, 2008
Thus, the rule remains the same: a sale, lease,
or financial lease, for that matter, that is not
registered with the Land Transportation Office,
still does not bind third persons who are
aggrieved in tortious incidents, for the latter
need only to rely on the public registration of a
motor vehicle as conclusive evidence of
ownership.30 A lease such as the one involved
in the instant case is an encumbrance in
contemplation of law, which needs to be
registered in order for it to bind third parties.31
Under this policy, the evil sought to be avoided
is the exacerbation of the suffering of victims of
tragic vehicular accidents in not being able to
identify a guilty party. A contrary ruling will not
serve the ends of justice. The failure to register
a lease, sale, transfer or encumbrance, should
not benefit the parties responsible, to the
prejudice of innocent victims.
This ruling may appear too severe and
unpalatable to leasing and financing companies,
but the Court believes that petitioner and other
companies so situated are not entirely left
without recourse. They may resort to third-party
complaints against their lessees or whoever are
the actual operators of their vehicles.
CERTIFICATION AGAINST FORUM
SHOPPING
27. Pacquing v. Coca cola jan 31,2008
While the general rule is that the certificate of
non-forum shopping must be signed by all the
plaintiffs in a case and the signature of only one
of them is insufficient, the Court has stressed
that the rules on forum shopping, which were
designed to promote and facilitate the orderly
administration of justice, should not be
interpreted with such absolute literalness as to
subvert its own ultimate and legitimate objective.
Strict compliance with the provision regarding
the certificate of non-forum shopping
underscores its mandatory nature in that the
certification cannot be altogether dispensed with
or its requirements completely disregarded. It
does not, however, prohibit substantial
compliance therewith under justifiable
circumstances, considering especially that
although it is obligatory, it is not jurisdictional.
In recent decisions, the Court has consistently
held that when all the petitioners share a
common interest and invoke a common cause of
action or defense, the signature of only one of
them in the certification against forum shopping
substantially complies with the rules.
In the same vein, this is also true in the instant
case where petitioners have filed their case as a
collective group, sharing a common interest and
having a common single cause of action against
respondent. Accordingly, the signatures of five
of the eight petitioners in the Petition for
Certiorari before the CA constitute substantial
compliance with the rules.
28. Cagayan valley v. Com of Internal rev
feb 13,2008
In sum, we have held that the following officials
or employees of the company can sign the
verification and certification without need of a
board resolution: (1) the Chairperson of the

10. Board of Directors, (2) the President of a
corporation, (3) the General Manager or Acting
General Manager, (4) Personnel Officer, and (5)
an Employment Specialist in a labor case.
While the above cases do not provide a
complete listing of authorized signatories to the
verification and certification required by the
rules, the determination of the sufficiency of the
authority was done on a case to case basis. The
rationale applied in the foregoing cases is to
justify the authority of corporate officers or
representatives of the corporation to sign the
verification or certificate against forum shopping,
being in a position to verify the truthfulness and
correctness of the allegations in the petition.
29. Travel Crop. Vs. NLRC
The President of the corporation can sign the
verification and certification without need of a
board resolution.
VERIFICATION
30. Vallacar transit v. Katubig
may30,2011
A pleading need not be verified, unless there is
a law or rule specifically requiring the same.
Examples of pleadings that require verification
are:
(1) All pleadings filed in civil cases under the
1991 Revised Rules on Summary Procedure;
(2) Petition for review from the Regional Trial
Court to the Supreme Court raising only
questions of law under Rule 41, Section 2;
(3) Petition for review of the decision of the
Regional Trial Court to the Court of Appeals
under Rule 42, Section 1;
(4) Petition for review from quasi-judicial bodies
to the Court of Appeals under Rule 43, Section
5;
(5) Petition for review before the Supreme Court
under Rule 45, Section 1;
(6)Petition for annulment of judgments or final
orders and resolutions under Rule 47, Section
4;
(7) complaint for injunction under Rule 58,
Section 4;
(8) Application for preliminary injunction or
temporary restraining order under Rule 58,
Section 4;
(9) Application for appointment of a receiver
under Rule 59, Section 1;
(10) Application for support pendente lite under
Rule 61, Section 1;
(11) Petition for certiorari against the judgments,
final orders or resolutions of constitutional
commissions under Rule
64, Section 2;
(12) Petition for certiorari, prohibition, and
mandamus under Rule 65, Sections 1 to 3;
(13) Petition for quo warranto under Rule 66,
Section 1;
(14) Complaint for expropriation under Rule 67,
Section 1;
(15) Petition for indirect contempt under Rule 71,
Section 4, all from the 1997 Rules of Court;
(16) All complaints or petitions involving intra-
corporate controversies under the Interim Rules
of Procedure on Intra-Corporate Controversies;
(17) Complaint or petition for rehabilitation and
suspension of payment under the Interim Rules
on Corporate Rehabilitation; and
(18) Petition for declaration of absolute nullity of
void marriages and annulment of voidable
marriages as well as petition for summary
proceedings under the Family Code.
All complaints, petitions, applications, and other
initiatory pleadings must be accompanied by a
certificate against forum shopping.
Verification, like in most cases required by the
rules of procedure, is a formal, not jurisdictional,
requirement, and mainly intended to secure an
assurance that matters which are alleged are
done in good faith or are true and correct and
not of mere speculation. When circumstances
warrant, the court may simply order the
correction of unverified pleadings or act on it and
waive strict compliance with the rules in order
that the ends of justice may thereby be served.
GENERAL ADMISSION
31. Capital motors v. Yabut 32 scra 1
One of the modes of specific denial
contemplated in Section 10, Rule 8, is a denial
by stating that the defendant is without
knowledge or information sufficient to form a
belief as to the truth of a material averment in
the complaint. The rule authorizing an answer to
the effect that the defendant has no knowledge
or information sufficient to form a belief as to the

11. truth of an averment and giving such answer the
effect of a denial, does not apply where the fact
as to which want of knowledge is asserted, is so
plainly and necessarily within the defendant's
knowledge that his averment of ignorance must
be palpably untrue.
RESIDUAL PREROGATIVE
32. Katon v. Palanca jr. Sept 7,2004
Residual prerogative refers to the power that the
trial court, in the exercise of its original
jurisdiction, may still validly exercise even after
perfection of an appeal. It follows that such
powers are not possessed by an appellate court.
The residual jurisdiction of trial courts is
available at a stage in which the court is
normally deemed to have lost jurisdiction over
the case or the subject matter involved in the
appeal. This stage is reached upon the
perfection of the appeals by the parties or upon
the approval of the records on appeal, but prior
to the transmittal of the original records or the
records on appeal. In either instance, the trial
court still retains its so-called residual jurisdiction
to issue protective orders, approve
compromises, permit appeals of indigent
litigants, order execution pending appeal, and
allow the withdrawal of the appeal.
DEFAULT ORDER
33. Gomez v. Montalban mar 14,2008
Remedies available to a party declared in
default:
a) The defendant in default may, at any time
after discovery thereof and before judgment, file
a motion, under oath, to set aside the order of
default on the ground that his failure to answer
was due to fraud, accident, mistake or
excusable negligence, and that he has a
meritorious defense (Sec. 3, Rule 18 [now Sec.
3(b), Rule 9]);
b) If the judgment has already been rendered
when the defendant discovered the default, but
before the same has become final and
executory, he may file a motion for new trial
under Section 1 (a) of Rule 37;
c) If the defendant discovered the default after
the judgment has become final and executory,
he may file a petition for relief under Section 2
[now Section 1] of Rule 38; and
d) He may also appeal from the judgment
rendered against him as contrary to the
evidence or to the law, even if no petition to set
aside the order of default has been presented by
him (Sec. 2, Rule 41).
34. Heirs mangkiat v. Ca aug 20,2008
Summons must be served upon a party for valid
judgment to be rendered against him. This not
only comports with basic procedural law but the
constitutional postulate of due process. The
disputable presumption that an official duty has
been regularly performed will not apply where it
is patent from the sheriff's or server's return that
it is defective.
Rule 14, Section 13 of the 1997 Rules of
Procedure provides:
SECTION 13. Service upon public
corporations. - When the defendant is
the Republic of the Philippines, service
may be effected on the Solicitor
General; in case of a province, city or
municipality, or like public corporations,
service may be effected on its executive
head, or on such other officer or officers
as the law or the court may direct.23
It is clear under the Rules that where the
defendant is the Republic of the Philippines,
service of summons must be made on the
Solicitor General.
Further, we likewise affirm the decision of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 60770,
setting aside the partial decision of the trial court
for having been issued with grave abuse of
discretion. It ruled that when the trial court
declared the BUTEL in default, allowed
petitioners to present their evidence ex
parte and rendered a partial decision holding
that petitioners are the owners of the subject
property, such was tantamount to prejudging the
case against respondent JDC. The trial court
ruled that petitioners validly acquired the subject
parcel of land without any consideration of the
evidence that respondent JDC may present to
substantiate its claim of ownership over its

12. aliquot part of the subject property. The trial
court should have followed the Rules of Court in
this situation. Sec. 3(c) of Rule 9 states that
when a pleading asserting a claim states a
common cause of action against several
defending parties, some of whom answer and
the others fail to do so, the court shall try the
case against all upon the answers thus filed and
render judgment upon the evidence
presented. Therefore, the answer filed by a
defendant inure to the benefit of all the
defendants, defaulted or not, and all of them
share a common fate in the action. It is not
within the authority of the trial court to divide the
case before it by first hearing it ex parte as
against the defaulted defendant and rendering a
default judgment (in the instant case, partial
decision) against it, then proceeding to hear the
case, as to the non-defaulted defendant. This
deprives the defaulted defendant of due process
as it is denied the benefit of the answer and the
evidence which could have been presented by
its non-defaulted co-defendant.
35. Lim tanho v. Ramonite aug 29,1975
The fundamental purpose of pre-trial, aside from
affording the parties every opportunity to
compromise or settle their differences, is for the
court to be apprised of the unsettled issues
between the parties and of their respective
evidence relative thereto, to the end that it may
take corresponding measures that would
abbreviate the trial as much as possible and the
judge may be able to ascertain the facts with the
least observance of technical rules. In other
words whatever is said or done by the parties or
their counsel at the pre- trial serves to put the
judge on notice of their respective basic
positions, in order that in appropriate cases he
may, if necessary in the interest of justice and a
more accurate determination of the facts, make
inquiries about or require clarifications of matters
taken up at the pre-trial, before finally resolving
any issue of fact or of law. In brief, the pre-trial
constitutes part and parcel of the proceedings,
and hence, matters dealt with therein may not
be disregarded in the process of decision
making. Otherwise, the real essence of
compulsory pre-trial would be insignificant and
worthless.
AMMENDMENT OF PLEADINGS
36. Swagman hotel v. Ca apr 8,2005 gr
161135
Section 5 thereof applies to situations wherein
evidence not within the issues raised in the
pleadings is presented by the parties during the
trial, and to conform to such evidence the
pleadings are subsequently amended on motion
of a party. Thus, a complaint which fails to state
a cause of action may be cured by evidence
presented during the trial.
However, the curing effect under Section 5 is
applicable only if a cause of action in fact exists
at the time the complaint is filed, but the
complaint is defective for failure to allege the
essential facts. For example, if a complaint failed
to allege the fulfillment of a condition precedent
upon which the cause of action depends,
evidence showing that such condition had
already been fulfilled when the complaint was
filed may be presented during the trial, and the
complaint may accordingly be amended
thereafter.[13] Thus, in Roces v. Jalandoni,[14]
this Court upheld the trial court in taking
cognizance of an otherwise defective complaint
which was later cured by the testimony of the
plaintiff during the trial. In that case, there was in
fact a cause of action and the only problem was
the insufficiency of the allegations in the
complaint. This ruling was reiterated in Pascua
v. Court of Appeals.[15]
It thus follows that a complaint whose cause of
action has not yet accrued cannot be cured or
remedied by an amended or supplemental
pleading alleging the existence or accrual of a
cause of action while the case is pending.[16]
Such an action is prematurely brought and is,
therefore, a groundless suit, which should be
dismissed by the court upon proper motion
seasonably filed by the defendant. The
underlying reason for this rule is that a person
should not be summoned before the public
tribunals to answer for complaints which are
immature.
37. Santi v. Clarabal gr 173195 feb
22,2010
In cases where the claim for damages is the
main cause of action, or one of the causes of
action, the amount of such claim shall be
considered in determining the jurisdiction of the
court.
38. Gumabay v. Paralig 77 scra 258
Defendants' theory that new summons shoud
have been issued for the amended complaint is
untenable. The trial court ahd already acquired

13. jurisdiction over the person of the defendants
when they were served with summons on the
basis of the original complaint and when they
appeared and filed a motion to dismiss.
They were personally served with a copy of the
amended complaint. The trial court ordered
them two times to answer that complaint. Under
those circumtances, there is no basis for
defendants' contention that the trial court should
have oredered orf making of fetish of a
technically. (See Ong Peng vs. Custodio, 111
Phil. 382, 385; Republic vs. Ker & Co., Ltd., 64
O.G. 3761, 18 SCRA 207).
Defendants' two lawyers were given plenty to
time to answer the amended complaint. Their
failure to answer was inexcusable. The answer
attached to their petition for relief form judgment
does not contain any meritorious defense.
39. Mercadel vs. DBP 332 SCRA 82
Assuming arguendo that the MERCADERs
failed to file the supplemental pleading, evidence
relative to the lease-purchase option may be
legitimately admitted by the trial court in
conformity with Section 5, Rule 10 of the Rules
of Court which states:
Section 5. Amendment to conform to or
authorize presentation of evidence. -- When
issues not raised by the pleadings are tried by
express or implied consent of the parties, they
shall be treated in all respects, as if they had
been raised in the pleadings. Such amendment
of the pleadings as may be necessary to cause
them to conform to the evidence and to raise
these issues may be made upon motion of any
party at any time, even after judgment; but
failure so to amend does not affect the result of
the trial of these issues. If evidence is objected
to at the trial on the ground that it is not
within the issues made by the pleadings, the
court may allow the pleadings to be
amended and shall do so freely when the
presentation of the merits of the action will
be subserved thereby and the objecting
party fails to satisfy the court that the
admission of such evidence would prejudice
him in maintaining his action or defense
upon the merits. The court may grant a
continuance to enable the objecting party to
meet such evidence. (emphasis supplied)
This provision envisions two scenarios -- first,
when evidence is introduced on an issue not
alleged in the pleadings and no objection was
interjected and second, when evidence is
offered again, on an issue not alleged in the
pleadings but this time an objection was
interpolated. We are concerned with the second
scenario. In Co Tiamco v. Diaz, the Court held
that "when evidence is offered on a matter not
alleged in the pleadings, the court may admit it
even against the objection of the adverse party,
where the latter fails to satisfy the court that the
admission of the evidence would prejudice him
in maintaining his defense upon the merits, and
the court may grant him a continuance to enable
him to meet the new situation created by the
evidence. Of course, the court, before allowing
the evidence, as a matter of formality, should
allow an amendment of the pleading, xxx And,
furthermore, where the failure to order an
amendment does not appear to have caused
surprise or prejudice to the objecting party, it
may be allowed as a harmless error. Well-known
is the rule that departures from procedure may
be forgiven where they do not appear to have
impaired the substantial rights of the parties."
EXTENSION OF TIME TO PLEAD
40. Paramount ins v. A.c. Ordoñez corp
aug 6,2008
There was no grave abuse of discretion when
the Metropolitan Trial Court admitted respondent
corporations Answer. Although it was filed
beyond the extension period requested by
respondent corporation, however, Sec. 11,
Rule 11 grants discretion to the trial court to
allow an answer or other pleading to be filed
after the reglementary period, upon motion
and on such terms as may be just. An
answer should be admitted where it had
been filed before the defendant was declared
in default and no prejudice is caused to
plaintiff. The hornbook rule is that default
judgments are generally disfavored.
SUMMONS
41. Sagana vs. Francisco 602 SCRA 184
The petition is meritorious. Under the
circumstances obtaining in this case, we find
there was proper substituted service of
summons upon the respondent.

14. Section 8 of Rule 14 of the old Revised Rules of
Court, the rules of procedure then in force at the
time summons was served, provided:
Section 8. Substituted service. – If the defendant
cannot be served within a reasonable time as
provided in the preceding section [personal
service on defendant], service may be effected
(a) by leaving copies of the summons at the
defendant’s residence with some person of
suitable age and discretion then residing therein,
or (b) by leaving the copies at defendant’s office
or regular place of business with some
competent person in charge thereof.
Jurisprudence has long established that for
substituted service of summons to be valid, the
following must be demonstrated: (a) that
personal service of summons within a
reasonable time was impossible; (b) that efforts
were exerted to locate the party; and (c) that the
summons was served upon a person of
sufficient age and discretion residing at the
party's residence or upon a competent person in
charge of the party's office or regular place of
business.30
It is likewise required that the
pertinent facts proving these circumstances be
stated in the proof of service or in the officer's
return.31
In this case, personal service of summons was
twice attempted by the trial court, although
unsuccessfully. In the first attempt, the resident
of the house refused to receive the summons;
worse, he would not even give his name. In the
second attempt, respondent’s own brother
refused to sign for receipt of the summons, and
then later claimed that he never received a copy,
despite his participation in the proceedings. The
trial court also thrice attempted to contact the
respondent through his place of work, but to no
avail. These diligent efforts to locate the
respondent were noted in the first sheriff's
return, the process server's notation, as well as
the records of the case.
xxx
…an overly strict application of the Rules is not
warranted in this case, as it would clearly
frustrate the spirit of the law as well as do
injustice to the parties, who have been waiting
for almost 15 years for a resolution of this case.
xxx
The purpose of summons is two-fold: to acquire
jurisdiction over the person of the defendant and
to notify the defendant that an action has been
commenced so that he may be given an
opportunity to be heard on the claim against
him. Under the circumstances of this case, we
find that respondent was duly apprised of the
action against him and had every opportunity to
answer the charges made by the petitioner.
However, since respondent refused to disclose
his true address, it was impossible to personally
serve summons upon him. Considering that
respondent could not have received summons
because of his own pretenses, and has failed to
provide an explanation of his purported "new"
residence, he must now bear the consequences.
42. Pagalaran vs. Ballatan et al. 13 Phil.
135
When a party is duly served with a summons,
although no copy of the complaint be attached to
the summons, he should appear and plead to
the jurisdiction of the court. Nonappearance will
justify the entry of judgment by default. Failure to
attach the complaint is a mere technical defect
and the service of summons vests jurisdiction in
the court over the defendant who may thereby
be declare in default for failure to file an answer.
43. Atkins Kroll & Co. vs. Domingo
44Phil680
It is also conclusive that the final judgment which
was rendered is based upon and follows the
amended complaint. If the defendant had
appeared in the action, service of the amended
complaint upon him in the manner and form
stated would have been sufficient. But the
defendant never did appear in the action until he
filed his motion to set aside and vacate the
judgment. For such reason, the service of the
amended complaint upon his sixteen-year-old
son by the attorney for the plaintiff was not
sufficient to give the court jurisdiction over the
defendant as to any new matter alleged in the
amended complaint. Under the facts shown
here, the amended complaint and summons
should have been served upon the defendant
with the same formalities as the original
complaint and summons. Hence, the service of
the amended complaint made by the attorney for
the plaintiff is not valid and did not give the court
jurisdiction to render judgment upon the
amended complaint.
44. Manotoc vs. CA 499 SCRA 21

15. Requirements to effect a valid substituted
service:
(1) Impossibility of Prompt Personal
Service
The party relying on substituted service
or the sheriff must show that defendant
cannot be served promptly or there is
impossibility of prompt
service. 22
Section 8, Rule 14 provides
that the plaintiff or the sheriff is given a
"reasonable time" to serve the summons
to the defendant in person, but no
specific time frame is mentioned.
"Reasonable time" is defined as "so
much time as is necessary under the
circumstances for a reasonably prudent
and diligent man to do, conveniently,
what the contract or duty requires that
should be done, having a regard for the
rights and possibility of loss, if any[,] to
the other party."xxx…
To the plaintiff, "reasonable time" means
no more than seven (7) days since an
expeditious processing of a complaint is
what a plaintiff wants. To the sheriff,
"reasonable time" means 15 to 30 days
because at the end of the month, it is a
practice for the branch clerk of court to
require the sheriff to submit a return of
the summons assigned to the sheriff for
service. The Sheriff’s Return provides
data to the Clerk of Court, which the
clerk uses in the Monthly Report of
Cases to be submitted to the Office of
the Court Administrator within the first
ten (10) days of the succeeding month.
Thus, one month from the issuance of
summons can be considered
"reasonable time" with regard to
personal service on the defendant.
xxx
…since the defendant is expected to try
to avoid and evade service of summons,
the sheriff must be resourceful,
persevering, canny, and diligent in
serving the process on the defendant.
For substituted service of summons to
be available, there must be several
attempts by the sheriff to personally
serve the summons within a reasonable
period [of one month] which eventually
resulted in failure to prove impossibility
of prompt service. "Several attempts"
means at least three (3) tries,
preferably on at least two different
dates. In addition, the sheriff must
cite why such efforts were
unsuccessful. It is only then that
impossibility of service can be
confirmed or accepted.
(2) Specific Details in the Return
The sheriff must describe in the Return
of Summons the facts and
circumstances surrounding the
attempted personal service. The efforts
made to find the defendant and the
reasons behind the failure must be
clearly narrated in detail in the
Return. The date and time of the
attempts on personal service, the
inquiries made to locate the
defendant, the name/s of the
occupants of the alleged residence or
house of defendant and all other acts
done, though futile, to serve the
summons on defendant must be
specified in the Return to justify
substituted service.
(3) A Person of Suitable Age and
Discretion
The sheriff must therefore determine if
the person found in the alleged dwelling
or residence of defendant is of legal
age, what the recipient's relationship
with the defendant is, and whether said
person comprehends the significance of
the receipt of the summons and his duty
to immediately deliver it to the defendant
or at least notify the defendant of said
receipt of summons. These matters
must be clearly and specifically
described in the Return of Summons.
(Emphases and underscoring supplied)
(4) A Competent Person in Charge
If the substituted service will be done at
defendant’s office or regular place of
business, then it should be served on a
competent person in charge of the
place. Thus, the person on whom the
substituted service will be made must be
the one managing the office or business
of defendant, such as the president or
manager; and such individual must have
sufficient knowledge to understand the
obligation of the defendant in the
summons, its importance, and the
prejudicial effects arising from inaction

16. on the summons. Again, these details
must be contained in the Return.
It has been stated and restated that substituted
service of summons must faithfully and strictly
comply with the prescribed requirements and in
the circumstances authorized by the rules.
45. Yuk Ling Ong vs. Co G.R. No. 206653
February 25, 2015
The server’s return utterly lacks sufficient detail
of the attempts undertaken by the process
server to personally serve the summons on
petitioner. The server simply made a general
statement that summons was effected after
several futile attempts to serve the same
personally. The server did not state the specific
number of attempts made to perform the
personal service of summons; the dates and the
corresponding time the attempts were made;
and the underlying reason for each unsuccessful
service. He did not explain either if there were
inquiries made to locate the petitioner, who was
the defendant in the case. These important acts
to serve the summons on petitioner, though
futile, must be specified in the return to justify
substituted service.
The server’s return did not describe in detail the
person who received the summons, on behalf of
petitioner. It simply stated that the summons
was received “by Mr. Roly Espinosa of sufficient
age and discretion, the Security Officer thereat.”
It did not expound on the competence of the
security officer to receive the summons.
Thus in this case, there Court sustained that
there was an invalid substituted service of
summons. The process server’s return only
contained a general statement that substituted
service was resorted to “after several futile
attempts to serve the same personally,” without
stating the dates and reasons of the failed
attempts.
The stricter rule in substituted service of
summons was meant to address “[t]he
numerous claims of irregularities in substituted
service which have spawned the filing of a great
number of unnecessary special civil actions of
certiorari and appeals to higher courts, resulting
in prolonged litigation and wasteful legal
expenses.
46. Belen vs. Chavez March 26, 2008
As a general rule, when a party is represented
by counsel of record, service of orders and
notices must be made upon said attorney and
notice to the client and to any other lawyer, not
the counsel of record, is not notice in law. The
exception to this rule is when service upon the
party himself has been ordered by the court.[15]
In cases where service was made on the
counsel of record at his given address, notice
sent to petitioner itself is not even necessary.
In the instant case, a copy of the RTC decision
was sent first to Atty. Alcantara, petitioners
counsel of record. However, the same was
returned unserved in view of the demise of Atty.
Alcantara. Thus, a copy was subsequently sent
to petitioners last known address in San
Gregorio, Alaminos, Laguna, which was
received by a certain Leopoldo Avecilla.
Undoubtedly, upon the death of Atty. Alcantara,
the lawyer-client relationship between him and
petitioners has ceased, thus, the service of the
RTC decision on him is ineffective and did not
bind petitioners.
The subsequent service on petitioners purported
last known address by registered mail is also
defective because it does not comply with the
requisites under the aforequoted Section 7 of
Rule 13 on service by registered mail. Section 7
of Rule 13 contemplates service at the present
address of the party and not at any other
address of the party. Service at the partys
former address or his last known address or any
address other than his present address does not
qualify as substantial compliance with the
requirements of Section 7, Rule 13. Therefore,
service by registered mail presupposes that the
present address of the party is known and if the
person who receives the same is not the
addressee, he must be duly authorized by the
former to receive the paper on behalf of the
party.
Since the filing of the complaint, petitioners
could not be physically found in the country
because they had already become permanent
residents of California, U.S.A. It has been
established during the trial that petitioners are
former residents of Alaminos, Laguna, contrary
to the averment in the complaint that they reside
and may be served with court processes thereat.
The service of the RTC decision at their former

17. address in Alaminos, Laguna is defective and
does not bind petitioners.
47. Robinson vs. Miralles 510 SCRA 718
For substituted service to be justified, the
following circumstances must be clearly
established: (a) personal service of summons
within a reasonable time was impossible; (b)
efforts were exerted to locate the party; and (c)
the summons was served upon a person of
sufficient age and discretion residing at the
party’s residence or upon a competent person in
charge of the party’s office or place of business.
Failure to do so would invalidate all subsequent
proceedings on jurisdictional grounds.
Petitioner contends that the service of summons
upon the subdivision security guard is not in
compliance with Section 7, Rule 14 since he is
not related to her or staying at her residence.
Moreover, he is not duly authorized to receive
summons for the residents of the village. Hence,
the substituted service of summons is not valid
and that the trial court never acquired jurisdiction
over her person.
We have ruled that the statutory requirements of
substituted service must be followed strictly,
faithfully, and fully and any substituted service
other than that authorized by the Rules is
considered ineffective. However, we frown upon
an overly strict application of the Rules. It is the
spirit, rather than the letter of the procedural
rules, that governs.
In his Return, Sheriff Potente declared that he
was refused entry by the security guard in
Alabang Hills twice. The latter informed him
that petitioner prohibits him from allowing
anybody to proceed to her residence whenever
she is out. Obviously, it was impossible for the
sheriff to effect personal or substituted service of
summons upon petitioner. We note that she
failed to controvert the sheriff’s declaration. Nor
did she deny having received the summons
through the security guard.
Considering her strict instruction to the security
guard, she must bear its consequences. Thus,
we agree with the trial court that summons has
been properly served upon petitioner and
that it has acquired jurisdiction over her.
48. Paramount ins v. A.c. Ordoñez corp
aug 6,2008 supra
Section 11, Rule 14 sets out an exclusive
enumeration of the officers who can receive
summons on behalf of a corporation.
Service of summons to someone other than
the corporation’s president, managing
partner, general manager, corporate
secretary, treasurer, and in-house counsel,
is not valid.
The designation of persons or officers who are
authorized to receive summons for a domestic
corporation or partnership is limited and more
clearly specified in the new rule. The phrase
‘agent, or any of its directors’ has been
conspicuously deleted.8 Moreover, the
argument of substantial compliance is no longer
compelling. We have ruled that the new rule, as
opposed to Section 13, Rule 14 of the 1964
Rules of Court, is restricted, limited and
exclusive, following the rule in statutory
construction that expressio unios est exclusio
alterius. Had the Rules of Court Revision
Committee intended to liberalize the rule on
service of summons, it could have done so in
clear and concise language. Absent a manifest
intent to liberalize the rule, strict compliance with
Section 11, Rule 14 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure is required. Thus, the service of
summons to respondent corporation’s Receiving
Section through Samuel D. Marcoleta is
defective and not binding to said corporation.
49. Cathay Metal Corp. vs. Laguna West
Multi-purpose Cooperative Corp. G.R.
172204 July 2, 2014
Republic Act No. 6938 of 1990 or the
Cooperative Code of the Philippines provides
that cooperatives are mandated to have an
official postal address to which notices shall be
sent, thus:
Art. 52. Address. – Every cooperative shall have
an official postal address to which all notices
and communications shall be sent. Such
address and every change thereof shall be
registered with the Cooperative Development
Authority.
This provision was retained in Article 51 of
RepublicAct No. 9520 or the Philippine
Cooperative Codeof 2008. Article 51 provides:
Art. 51. Address. Every cooperativeshall have
an official postal address to which all notices

18. and communications shall be sent. Such
address and every change thereof shall be
registered with the Authority.
Relying on the above provision, petitioner
argued that respondent was sufficiently served
with summons and a copy of its petition for
cancellation of annotations because it allegedly
sent these documents to respondent’s official
address as registered with the Cooperative
Development Authority. Petitioner further argued
that the Rules of Procedure cannot trump the
Cooperative Code with respect to notices. This
is because the Cooperative Code is substantive
law, as opposed to the Rules of Procedure,
which pertains only to matters of procedure.
Petitioner is mistaken.
The promulgation of the Rules of Procedure is
among the powers vested only in this court.
Article VIII, Section 5(5) provides:
Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the
following powers:
. . . .(5) Promulgate rules concerning the
protection and enforcement of constitutional
rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in all
courts, the admission to the practice of law,the
integrated bar, and legal assistance to the
underprivileged.Such rules shall provide a
simplified and inexpensive procedure for the
speedy disposition of cases, shall be uniform for
all courts of the same grade, and shall not
diminish, increase, or modifysubstantive rights.
Rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-
judicial bodies shall remain effective unless
disapproved by the Supreme Court.
This means that on matters relating to
procedures in court, it shall be the Rules of
Procedure that will govern. Proper court
procedures shall be determined by the Rules
as promulgated by this court.
Service of notices and summons on interested
parties in a civil, criminal, or special proceeding
is court procedure. Hence, it shall be governed
by the Rules of Procedure.
A Cooperative Code provision requiring
cooperatives to have an official address to
which all notices and communications shall
be sent cannot take the place of the rules on
summons under the Rules of Court
concerning a court proceeding.
This is not to say that the notices cannot be sent
to cooperatives in accordance with the
Cooperative Code. Notices may be sent to a
cooperative’s official address. However, service
of notices sent to the official address in
accordance with the Cooperative Code may not
be used as a defense for violations of
procedures, specially when such violation
affects another party’s rights.
Hence, petitioner cannot use respondent's
failure to amend its Articles of Incorporation to
reflect its new address as an excuse from
sending or attempting to send to respondent
copies of the petition and the summons. The
Rules of Court provides that notices should be
sent to the enumerated officers. Petitioner failed
to do this. No notice was ever sent to any of the
enumerated officers.
Petitioner insists that it should not be made to
inquire further as to the whereabouts of
respondent after the attempt to serve the
summons by registered mail to respondent’s
address as allegedly indicated in its Articles of
Incorporation. The Rules does not provide that it
needs to do so. However, it provides for service
by publication. Service by publication is
available when the whereabouts of the
defendant is unknown. Section 14, Rule 14 of
the Rules of Court provides:
Sec. 14. Service upon defendant whose identity
or whereabouts are unknown. – In any action
where the defendant is designated as an
unknown owner, or the like, or whenever his
whereabouts are unknown and cannot be
ascertained by diligent inquiry, service may, by
leave of court, be effected upon him by
publication in a newspaper of general circulation
and in such places and for such time as the
court may order. (Emphasis supplied)
This is not a matter of acquiring jurisdiction over
the person of respondent since this is an action
in rem. In an action in rem, jurisdiction over the
person is not required as long as there is
jurisdiction over the res. This case involves the
issue of fair play and ensuring that parties are
accorded due process.

19. 50. Rebollido et al vs. CA G.R. No. 81123
February 28, 1989
Where the defendant still existed as a
corporation when the cause of action accrued,
summons may properly be served on it even if at
the time of the issuance and receipt of summons
it had already been dissolved, a defendant
corporation is subject to suit even if dissolved,
as contemplated in Sec. 122 of the Corporation
Code. It should, therefore, be amenable to such
coercive process which may be served through
any of the persons mentioned in Sec.13 now
(Sec.11)
51. Global Business Holiday Inc. vs.
Surecomp Software, B.V G.R. No.
173463 October 13, 2010
A corporation has a legal status only within the
state or territory in which it was organized. For
this reason, a corporation organized in another
country has no personality to file suits in
the Philippines. In order to subject a foreign
corporation doing business in the country to the
jurisdiction of our courts, it must acquire a
license from the Securities and Exchange
Commission and appoint an agent for service of
process. Without such license, it cannot institute
a suit in the Philippines.
The exception to this rule is the doctrine of
estoppel. Global is estopped from challenging
Surecomps capacity to sue.
A foreign corporation doing business in
the Philippines without license may sue in
Philippine courts a Filipino citizen or a Philippine
entity that had contracted with and benefited
from it. A party is estopped from challenging the
personality of a corporation after having
acknowledged the same by entering into a
contract with it. The principle is applied to
prevent a person contracting with a foreign
corporation from later taking advantage of its
noncompliance with the statutes, chiefly in cases
where such person has received the benefits of
the contract.
52. Cariaga Jr. vs. Malaya 143 SCRA 441
L-48375 August 13, 1986
Under Section 17, extraterritorial service of
summons is proper: (1) when the action affects
the personal status of the plaintiff; (2) when the
action relates to, or the subject of which is,
property within the Philippines, in which the
defendant has or claims a lien or interest, actual
or contingent; (3) when the relief demanded in
such an action consists, wholly or in part, in
excluding the defendant from any interest in
property located in the Philippines; and (4) when
defendant non-resident's property has been
attached within the Philippines (Sec. 17, Rule
14, Rules of Court).
In any of such four cases, the service of
summons may, with leave of court, be effected
out of the Philippines in three ways: (1) by
personal service; (2) by publication in a
newspaper of general circulation in such places
and for such time as the court may order, in
which case a copy of the summons and order of
the court should be sent by registered mail to
the last known address of the defendant; and (3)
in any other manner which the court may deem
sufficient. The third mode of extraterritorial
service of summons was substantially complied
with in this case.
There is no question that the requirement of due
process has been met as shown by the fact that
defendants actually received the summonses
and copies of the complaint and as evidenced
by the Registry Return Cards marked as Annex
A-1 (page 56-Record) and Annex B-1. Whatever
defect there may have been in the service of
summons was aptly corrected by the court a quo
in its assailed order dated January 16, 1978,
which gave said defendants ninety (90) days
from receipt of order within which to file their
responsive pleadings. Defendants have no
reason to complain that they were unaware of
the action filed against them or claim that they
were denied due process.
53. Sahagun vs. CA 198 SCRA 44 G.R.
No. 78328 June 3, 1991
We repeat, service of summons on a
nonresident defendant who is not found in the
country is required, not for purposes of
physically acquiring jurisdiction over his person
but simply in pursuance of the requirements of
fair play, so that he may be informed of the
pendency of the action against him and the
possibility that property in the Philippines
belonging to him or in which he has an interest
may be subjected to a judgment in favor of a
resident, and that he may thereby be accorded
an opportunity to defend in the action, if he be
so minded. The only relief that may be granted
in such an action against such a nonresident

20. defendant, who does not choose to submit
himself to the jurisdiction of the Philippine court,
is limited to the res.
However, despite our holding that publication in
the Philippines is sufficient, the service of
summons in this case is still defective, there
being no showing that copies of the summons
and the amended complaint were duly served at
the defendant's last known correct address by
registered mail, as a complement to the
publication30
and in compliance with the order of
the lower court dated January 10, 1986,31
as
hereinbefore noted. The failure to strictly comply
correctly with the requirements of the rules
regarding the mailing of copies of the summons
and the order for its publication is a fatal defect
in the service of summons.
54. Citizens Insurance Surety vs.
Malencio Herrera L-32170 March 31,
1971
We agree with respondent Judge that the action
of plaintiff petitioner, being in personam, the
Court could not validly acquire jurisdiction on a
non-appearing defendant, absent a personal
service of summons within the forum. We have
explicitly so ruled in Pantaleon v. Asuncion, 105
Phil. 765, pointing out without such personal
service, any judgment on a non-appearing
defendant would be violative of due process. In
the aforecited case this Court, through Justice
Roberto Concepcion, now Chief Justice, ruled
as follows: . . . "It is a well-settled principle of
Constitutional Law that, in an action strictly in
personam, like the one at bar, personal service
of summons, within the forum, is essential to the
acquisition of jurisdiction over the person of the
defendant, who does not voluntary submit
himself to the authority of the court. In other
words, summons by publication cannot —
consistently with the due process clause in the
Bill of Rights — confer upon the court jurisdiction
over said defendants.’Due process of law
requires personal service to support a personal
judgment, and, when the proceeding is strictly in
personam brought to determine the personal
rights and obligations of the parties, personal
service within the state or a voluntary
appearance in the case is essential to the
acquisition of jurisdiction so as to constitute
compliance with the constitutional requirement
of due process. . . .’Although a state legislature
has more control over the form of service on its
own residents than nonresidents, it has been
held that in actions in personam . . . service by
publication on resident defendants who are
personally within the state and can be found
therein is not "due process of law," and statute
allowing it is unconstitutional.’ (16A C.J.S., pp.
786, 789; Emphasis our)"
55. Habaña vs. Hon. Vamenta
33SCRA569
Service of summons is required even if the
defendant is aware of the filing of the action
against him because his knowledge of the
existence of the case is not one of the modes by
which a court acquires jurisdiction over the
defendant.
56. Gomez vs. CA 420SCRA98
In actions in rem or quasi in rem, jurisdiction
over the person of the defendant is not a
prerequisite to confer jurisdiction on the court
provided that the court acquires jurisdiction over
the res, although summons must be served
upon the defendant in order to satisfy the due
process requirements.
57. Santos Jr. vs. PNOC Exploration
Corp. September 23, 2008
Moreover, even assuming that the service of
summons was defective, the trial court
acquired jurisdiction over the person of
petitioner by his own voluntary appearance
in the action against him. In this connection,
Section 20, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court states:
SEC. 20. Voluntary appearance. The
defendants voluntary appearance in the
action shall be equivalent to service of
summons. The inclusion in a motion to dismiss
of other grounds aside from lack of jurisdiction
over the person of the defendant shall not be
deemed a voluntary appearance. (emphasis
supplied)
Petitioner voluntarily appeared in the action
when he filed the Omnibus Motion for
Reconsideration and to Admit Attached
Answer. This was equivalent to service of
summons and vested the trial court with
jurisdiction over the person of petitioner.
58. Valmonte vs. CA 252 SCRA 92
In an action in personam, personal service of
summons or, if this is not possible and he
cannot be personally served, substituted
service, as provided in Rule 14, 7-8 is essential

21. for the acquisition by the court of jurisdiction
over the person of a defendant who does not
voluntarily submit himself to the authority of the
court. If defendant cannot be served with
summons because he is temporarily abroad, but
otherwise he is a Philippine resident, service of
summons may, by leave of court, be made by
publication. Otherwise stated, a resident
defendant in an action in personam, who cannot
be personally served with summons, may be
summoned either by means of substituted
service in accordance with Rule 14, 8 or by
publication as provided in 17 and 18 of the same
Rule.
In all of these cases, it should be noted,
defendant must be a resident of
the Philippines, otherwise an
action in personam cannot be brought because
jurisdiction over his person is essential to make
a binding decision.
On the other hand, if the action
is in rem or quasi in rem, jurisdiction over the
person of the defendant is not essential for
giving the court jurisdiction so long as the court
acquires jurisdiction over the res. If the
defendant is a nonresident and he is not found
in the country, summons may be
served exterritorially in accordance with Rule 14,
17. In such cases, what gives the court
jurisdiction in an action in rem or quasi in rem is
that it has jurisdiction over the res, i.e. the
personal status of the plaintiff who is domiciled
in the Philippines or the property litigated or
attached.
Service of summons in the manner provided in
17 is not for the purpose of vesting it with
jurisdiction but for complying with the
requirements of fair play or due process, so that
he will be informed of the pendency of the action
against him and the possibility that property in
the Philippines belonging to him or in which he
has an interest may be subjected to a judgment
in favor of the plaintiff and he can thereby take
steps to protect his interest if he is so minded.
As petitioner Lourdes A. Valmonte is a
nonresident who is not found in the Philippines,
service of summons on her must be in
accordance with Rule 14, 17. Such service, to
be effective outside the Philippines, must be
made either (1) by personal service; (2) by
publication in a newspaper of general circulation
in such places and for such time as the court
may order, in which case a copy of the
summons and order of the court should be sent
by registered mail to the last known add Since in
the case at bar, the service of summons upon
petitioner Lourdes A. Valmonte was not done by
means of any of the first two modes, the
question is whether the service on her attorney,
petitioner Alfredo D. Valmonte, can be justified
under the third mode, namely, in any ... manner
the court may deem sufficient. We hold it
cannot. This mode of service, like the first two,
must be made outside the Philippines, such as
through the Philippine Embassy in the foreign
country where the defendant resides. Moreover,
there are several reasons why the service of
summons on Atty. Alfredo A. Valmonte cannot
be considered a valid service of summons on
petitioner Lourdes A. Valmonte. In the first
place, service of summons on petitioner Alfredo
D. Valmonte was not made upon the order of the
court as required by Rule 14, 17 and certainly
was not a mode deemed sufficient by the court
which in fact refused to consider the service to
be valid and on that basis declare petitioner
Lourdes A. Valmonte in default for her failure to
file an answer. In the second place, service in
the attempted manner on petitioner was not
made upon prior leave of the trial court as
required also in Rule 14, 17. As provided in 19,
such leave must be applied for by motion in
writing, supported by affidavit of the plaintiff or
some person on his behalf and setting forth the
grounds for the application.ress of the
defendant; or (3) in any other manner which the
court may deem sufficient.
59. Montefalcon vs. Vasquez June 17,
2008
In this case, we agree that the substituted
service in Taguig was valid and justified
because previous attempts were made by the
sheriffs to serve the summons, but to no avail.
Diligent efforts were evidently exerted in the
conduct of the concerned sheriffs in the
performance of their official duty. Also, the
person who received the alias summons was of
suitable age and discretion, then residing at
Vasquez's dwelling. There is no quarrel that it
was really Vasquez's residence, as evidenced
by his employment contract, executed under the
supervision and authority of the Philippine
Overseas Employment Administration (POEA).
Vasquez cannot deny that in his contract of
employment and seafarer's information sheet,

22. both bearing POEA's letterhead, his address in
Metro Manila was what was correctly mentioned
in the alias summons that Bejer received. She
must have informed Vasquez one way or
another of the suit upon his return in October
2000 after finishing his nine-month contract with
Fathom Ship Management.
"Residence" is the place where the person
named in the summons is living at the time when
the service is made, even though he may be
temporarily out of the country at the time. A
plaintiff is merely required to know the
defendant's residence, office or regular business
place. He need not know where a resident
defendant actually is at the very moment of filing
suit. He is not even duty-bound to ensure that
the person upon whom service was actually
made delivers the summons to the defendant or
informs him about it. The law presumes that for
him. It is immaterial that defendant does not
receive actual notice.
Between Vasquez's self-serving assertion that
he only came to know of the case when his
mother told him about the trial court's decision
and the sheriff's return on the substituted service
which carries a presumption of regularity, the
latter is undoubtedly deserving of more faith and
credit. The sheriff's certificate of service of
summons is prima facie evidence of the facts set
out in it. Only clear and convincing evidence
may overcome its presumption of regularity.
Given the circumstances in the present case, we
agree that the presumption of regularity in the
performance of duty on the part of the sheriff
stands.
SERVICE OF PLEADINGS
60. PLDT vs. NLRC 128 SCRA 402
In modern multi-storied buildings, there may be
several hundred rooms with hundreds of
different employees discharging different
functions. A receiving clerk in a given mailing
section may not know the difference between a
notice to a lawyer and the thousands of other
communications received by her either by mail
or through personal or commercial messengers
and may not act accordingly. Service upon a
lawyer must be effected at the exact given
address of the lawyer and not in the vicinity or at
a general receiving section for an entire multi-
storied building with many offices. It is apparent
therefore that respondent National Labor
Relations Commission committed error in
holding that the appeal was interposed beyond
the reglementary period. The March 23, 1981
service cannot be deemed as notice in law to
petitioner. The ten (10) working days within
which to perfect an appeal should be computed
from March 26, 1981 when the decision was
served thru the receiving clerk of the office were
counsel works.
MOTION TO DISMISS
61. Zulueta vs. Pan American World
Airways Inc. January 8, 1978
It has been held that even if the claim in the
complaint was below the jurisdictional limit for
then CFI, if the defendant, instead of moving to
dismiss, filed a counterclaim for P12,000 which
was then within the exclusive original jurisdiction
of said CFI, such counterclaim cured the defect
in the complaint.
62. Tambunting vs. Ong August 11, 1950
It involves a case between a mortgagor and a
mortgagee. Mortgagor filed a case against the
mortgagee. The nature of the action is
annulment of mortgage contract – annulment of
real estate mortgage. While their action was
pending, the mortgagee filed another action
against the mortgagor and the action is
foreclosure of the same mortgage. The
mortgagor, the plaintiff in the first case filed a
motion to dismiss the second case on the
ground of litis pendentia. The SC ruled that
There is no litis pendencia in this case. the
fourth requisite is missing because the fourth
requisite is regardless of who wins in the first
case, it will bar the second case. But here, the
second case would be barred if the mortgagor
wins but if the mortgagee wins, the second case
will not be barred. So the fourth element is not
present.
63. Francisco vs. Vda. Blas 93Phil1
This case involves 2 action of quieting of title
and accion publiciana. Is there litis pendentia in
this case? The SC affirmed. In the determination
of this question, we should bear in mind that, as
said in 30 Am. Jur., 919, "the application of the
doctrine of res judicata to identical causes of

23. action does not depend upon the identity or
differences in the forms of the two actions. A
judgement upon the merits bars a subsequent
suit upon the same cause, though brought in the
different form of action, and a party therefore,
cannot be varying the form of action or adopting
a different method of presenting his case,
escape the operation of the principle that one
and the same cause of action shall not be twice
litigated." Our conclusion therefore, is that there
is in the three cases identity of parties, cause of
action and relief, so that a decision in the first
two would be res judicata for the third.
64. Sea Land Incorporated vs. CA
327SCRA135
Resolving first the issue of failure to state a
cause of action, respondent Court of Appeals
did not err in reading the Complaint of Florex
and respondent AMMLs Answer together with
the Third Party Complaint to determine whether
a cause of action is properly alleged. In Fil-
Estate Golf and Development, Inc. vs. Court of
Appeals, this Court ruled that in the
determination of whether or not the complaint
states a cause of action, the annexes attached
to the complaint may be considered, they being
parts of the complaint.
65. Rioferio vs. CA January 13, 2004
Whether the heirs have legal standing to
prosecute the rights belonging to the deceased
subsequent to the commencement of the
administration proceedings?
Petitioners vehemently fault the lower court for
denying their motion to set the case for
preliminary hearing on their affirmative defense
that the proper party to bring the action is the
estate of the decedent and not the respondents.
It must be stressed that the holding of a
preliminary hearing on an affirmative defense
lies in the discretion of the court. This is clear
from the Rules of Court, thus:
SEC. 5. Pleadings grounds as affirmative
defenses.- Any of the grounds for dismissal
provided for in this rule, except improper venue,
may be pleaded as an affirmative defense, and
a preliminary hearing may be had thereon as if a
motion to dismiss had been filed.(Emphasis
supplied.)
Certainly, the incorporation of the word may in
the provision is clearly indicative of the optional
character of the preliminary hearing. The word
denotes discretion and cannot be construed as
having a mandatory effect. Subsequently, the
electivity of the proceeding was firmed up
beyond cavil by the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure with the inclusion of the phrase in the
discretion of the Court, apart from the retention
of the word may in Section 6,in Rule 16 thereof.
66. De la Sala et al vs. Sarnate
110SCRA255
It is of no moment that the lower court had
already denied the bank’s first motion to dismiss
(wherein res judicata was pleaded) when the
latter order sustaining the bank’s second motion
to dismiss was issued; because as already
stated, the same plea of res judicata was
included as a special defense in the bank’s
answer to the third party complaint. The order
of the denial of the first motion to dismiss
being merely interlocutory, the lower court
could at any time thereafter, acting on the
special defense of res judicata pleaded in the
bank’s answer, reconsider and reverse its first
order and issue another dismissing the third-
party complaint, under its inherent power "to
amend and control its process and orders so as
to make them conformable to law and justice"
(Sec. 5 [g] Rule 124, Rules of Court).
DISMISSAL OF ACTIONS
67. Dael vs. Beltran April 30, 2008
SECTION 1. Dismissal
upon notice by plaintiff. A
complaint may be dismissed by
the plaintiff by filing a notice of
dismissal at any time before
service of the answer or of a
motion for summary
judgment. Upon such notice
being filed, the court shall issue
an order confirming the
dismissal. Unless otherwise
stated in the notice, the
dismissal is without
prejudice, except that a notice
operates as an adjudication
upon the merits when filed by a
plaintiff who has once dismissed
in a competent court an action
based on or including the same
claim. [Emphasis supplied.]

24. Under this provision, it is mandatory that the trial
court issue an order confirming such dismissal
and, unless otherwise stated in the notice, the
dismissal is without prejudice and could be
accomplished by the plaintiff through mere
notice of dismissal, and not through motion
subject to approval by the court. Dismissal
is ipso facto upon notice, and without prejudice
unless otherwise stated in the notice. The trial
court has no choice but to consider the
complaint as dismissed, since the plaintiff may
opt for such dismissal as a matter of right,
regardless of the ground.
Respondents argue that the Motion to Dismiss
they filed precedes the Notice of Dismissal filed
by petitioner and hence, the trial court correctly
gave it precedence and ruled based on the
motion. This argument is erroneous. Section 1 of
Rule 17 does not encompass a Motion to
Dismiss. The provision specifically provides that
a plaintiff may file a notice of dismissal before
service of the answer or a motion for summary
judgment. Thus, upon the filing of the Notice
of Dismissal by the plaintiff, the Motion to
Dismiss filed by respondents became moot
and academic and the trial court should have
dismissed the case without prejudice based
on the Notice of Dismissal filed by the
petitioner.
Moreover, to allow the case to be
dismissed with prejudice would erroneously
result in res judicata and imply that petitioner
can no longer file a case against respondents
without giving him a chance to present evidence
to prove otherwise.
68. Ortigas & Co. vs. Velasco 234 SCRA
485
RULE 23
69. Paarellaga vs. CA October 31, 2008
Deposition is chiefly a mode of discovery, the
primary function of which is to supplement the
pleadings for the purpose of disclosing the real
points of dispute between the parties and
affording an adequate factual basis during the
preparation for trial. It should be allowed absent
any showing that taking it would prejudice any
party. It is accorded a broad and liberal
treatment and the liberty of a party to make
discovery is well-nigh unrestricted if the matters
inquired into are otherwise relevant and not
privileged, and the inquiry is made in good faith
and within the bounds of law. It is allowed as a
departure from the accepted and usual judicial
proceedings of examining witnesses in open
court where their demeanor could be observed
by the trial judge, consistent with the principle of
promoting just, speedy and inexpensive
disposition of every action and proceeding; and
provided it is taken in accordance with the
provisions of the Rules of Court, i.e., with leave
of court if summons have been served, and
without such leave if an answer has been
submitted; and provided further that a
circumstance for its admissibility exists.
There is nothing in the Rules of Court or in
jurisprudence which restricts a deposition to the
sole function of being a mode of discovery
before trial. Under certain conditions and for
certain limited purposes, it may be taken even
after trial has commenced and may be used
without the deponent being actually called to the
witness stand. There is no rule that limits
deposition-taking only to the period of pre-trial or
before it; no prohibition exists against the taking
of depositions after pre-trial.
70. San Luis vs. Roxas March 3, 2008
ISSUE: whether Section 1, Rule 23 of the Rules
of Court allows a non-resident foreign
corporation the privilege of having all its
witnesses, all of whom are foreigners, to testify
through deposition upon written interrogatories
taken outside the Philippines to prove an oral
contract, in order to avoid further delay.
Unequivocally, the rule does not make any
distinction or restriction as to who can avail of
deposition. The fact that private respondent is a
non-resident foreign corporation is immaterial.
The rule clearly provides that the testimony of
any person may be taken by deposition upon