1. Daniel Little
12/9/2014
On the Future of Syria
Since the Arab Spring in 2011, the revolutions that bloomed across the Middle East once
filled with hope have slowly withered, notably in Syria. The uprising that took place almost four
years ago continues today as a bloody stalemate, with no reasonable hope of a near end in sight.
An array of socio, political, and economic factors are impeding Syria’s chances for a successful
resolution and recovery to the conflict that plagues its land, mainly it’s; refugee problem, the
fragmented factions, and third party intervention. Combined, these three elements bear grim
tidings for Syria’s future.
The mass protests across Syria triggered a brutal crackdown by the Syrian government
and the ensuing revolution and humanitarian catastrophe. Not only are there around 190,000
people reported dead, some 10.8 million people are in dire need of humanitarian assistance
locked in Syria. The most serious issue however is that more than 10 million Syrians are
believed to have been forced out of their homes and communities, approximately 45% of the
population. Frustratingly not able to receive the same help as a refugee, 6.5 million are internally
displaced within Syria (Syria Regional Refugee Response, website). With no significant force
tipping the tides foreseeable in the near future, the refugee count will continue to rise and the war
will continue to ravage civilian’s homes and lives. What is most troubling is the lack of
international assistance and aid, as just five countries (Turkey, Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq, and Egypt)
have been sheltering 95% of all the refugees, while twenty seven countries in the European
Union have pledged a total of resettlement places equaling only 0.17% of the number of refugees
in the main host countries. Russia, China, and the six countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council
2. have pledged zero resettlements. If this trend continues to escalate regional problems with arise
from the lack of resources to support all of the refugees, and spread across the Middle East.
Each opposing side in the Syrian Civil War is comprised of multiple groups, and then
subdivisions within those groups. Opposing the Assad Regime are various rebel factions,
specifically there is the Free Syrian Army (FSA), a group of defected Syrian Armed Forces
officers and most funded by the United States. Fighting amongst these factions are radical groups
like ISIS and Al-Nusra, who have ties with Al-Qaeda. The lack of control in Syria has developed
a hotbed for extremism, proven with the quickness of the Islamic States success establishing the
alleged new Islamic Caliphate spanning both Syria and Iraq, symbolically breaking down the old
ideas of Sykes-Picot. The unsought of these religious factions like ISIL cause many to mistake
this civil war for a sectarian conflict between the many ethnic groups of Syria and the religious
differences of the Sunni’s and Shia. This thinking is false and damaging, “while the Syrian civil
war isn't yet a sectarian conflict, the discussion itself could make it one”. The real people on the
ground don’t conform to the stereotypes policymakers promote; many are ethnically mixed and
hold multiple allegiances, not conforming to the sectarian stereotypes policymakers promote. But
with increased talks of a sectarian conflict in media, that could increase the Syrian mentality of
defining themselves in such rigid terms and then turn into an actual sectarian conflict. This is
what the Assad regime wants, it is more acceptable to fight in a civil war then against non-
violent protestors, and the stigma that accompanies the sectarian conflict only encourages his
portrayal as the figure of order against an endless cycle of violence.
Lastly third party intervention from nations surprisingly lengthens conflicts instead of shortening
them. Interventions shift the balance of power and affect the levels of violence employed by
combatants. Changes in the balance of power sometimes influence regimes prowess for violence
3. towards its civilian population, as it might be more desperate if weakened. President Hafez
Assad showed what he is capable of doing in order to hold onto his thrown in 1982, besieging
the town of Hama for 27 days killing thousands. Also, the aid that is sent oversea to these
supposed “moderate” rebels, could actually be funding radical sub groups within the umbrella
organization, in fact recently at a lecture with Reese Erlich, he told us that the US government
was already shifting away from funding the FSA after finding more extremist connections. The
funding from third parties further divide factions as they compete for the valuable aid, fighting
amongst themselves instead of the regime, the original purpose of the uprising. President
Obamas announcement of a “no boots on the ground” foreign policy/intervention plan will
continue to fan the flame that has ignited in Syria, and as it continues to burn, we will wait and
watch as it spreads across the region.