1. Maida Omerovic
May 2015
Srebrenica, a “slow­motion” genocide 1
“For peacekeeping soldiers carry arms only to avoid using them; they are military forces but their orders
are to avoid, at almost any cost, the use of force; they are asked in the last resort to risk their own lives
rather than open fire on those between whom they have been sent to keep at peace.” ​ ​Marrack Goulding, 2
former British Diplomat
Introduction and Background
In the summer of 1995, fear and helplessness echoed throughout the mountains of Srebrenica.
Once a tourist destination known for her renowned spa, now a town marked by the atrocities
committed during the early 1990s and specifically the genocide committed in July of 1995.
Srebrenica is a town in eastern Bosnia and was “home to about six thousand people.
Surrounded by forests and rolling green hills, the town had been known even in Roman times
for its silver mine ­­ its name comes from the south Slavic word for silver.” Srebrenica was 3
nothing extraordinary as it was far removed from the sophistication of Sarajevo or any bigger
city in the region. During the 1990s, however, Srebrenica became the “biggest concentration
camp in the world.” 4
While many of the former Soviet states went on to seek democracy and peaceful sovereignty,
the road to independence for some ex­Yugoslav states was not as easy as imagined. Slovenia
was the first republic to seek autonomy. At that time the JNA (Yugoslav National Army)
unsuccessfully attacked the newly formed state. Croatia was next on the list and her sovereignty
was recognized in January of 1991. However, due to a large Serbian population residing
primarily in the Slavonia region, in the north­eastern part of the country, Croatia had little luck
peacefully seeking autonomy. War ravaged the region, and it was clear early on that the conflict
was based on nationalism. There was no regard as to age, gender, whether one had military
status or not ­ everyone was at risk. Villages were burned; women, children, and elderly were
raped and slaughtered. Nonetheless, Croatia, due to her ethnic homogeneity, did not let the war
spread throughout the entire country. While the two mentioned republics were restructuring their
newly formed states, Bosnia, with the support of international community, finally sought
separation in 1992 from the former Yugoslavia as well.
1
LeBor, Adam. ​“Complicity with Evil” The United Nations in the Age of Modern Genocide​. New Haven: Yale
University Press. 2006 (pg. 43)
2
Ibid, 15.
3
Ibid, 38.
4
Ibid, 77.
1

2. What followed was a horror many saw coming. Bosnia’s population was ethnically diverse,
which was not the case in Croatia and Slovenia. While the majority of the populace was Bosniak
(Muslim) there was equally a large number of Serbs and Croats living in the state. Planning and
execution of Bosniaks was easily achievable in Bosnia due to a large number of Serbs holding
prominent positions in the government offices, police, etc. For centuries, Serbia dreamed of
ruling the Balkans. They’ve achieved this by making Belgrade the center of the political
decision­making in the region. With Bosnia’s independence the mission to greater Serbia would
have been eliminated. Hence, the substantial mobilization of Serbian people within Bosnia and
Serbia. Instead of seeking peaceful transitions of independence, “war was a deliberate choice
for the Serbian ruling elite, to maintain its political power and economic privilege. The dark
genius of President Slobodan Milosevic was to unite disparate interest groups as the old
certainties crumbled. National academicians found common cause with army generals to
resurrect ancient irredentist fantasies.” If any of the Serbs refused to cooperate with the 5
nationalist regime, there was no shortage of willing participants to go to war: “the doubters’
ranks would be filled by the paramilitaries, criminals released from prison, armed and funded by
the secret service, free to rape and murder.” 6
Srebrenica is now known for the worst genocide perpetrated on the European soil since WWII,
and all while the world silently watched. However, while the genocide defines monstrosity
executed against civilians, the failure of the UN to protect them taints reputation and credibility
of its mission. The UN’s inability to act accordingly, decisively, and timely, led to the persecution
of thousands of innocent civilians. “The fall of Srebrenica became a damaging symbol of the
United Nations' failure at peacekeeping in a new era of civil wars, and it demonstrated the
inadequacy of a system that allowed political considerations to color military decisions when
troops were under the command of the United Nations.” 7
United Nations Peacekeeping was formed in 1948 shortly after the end of WWII in response to
the Palestinian­Israeli conflict. Their first assignment was “to monitor the Armistice Agreement
between Israel and its Arab neighbours.” The Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) 8
“is dedicated to assisting the Member States and the Secretary­General in their efforts to
maintain international peace and security.” The purpose of the Peacekeepers is not to act as a 9
military, but rather act as mediators and bring peace and security to the area they’re serving.
The foundation of their mission was to work in inter­state conflicts, as the old belief still persisted
that war only happens between states. With the fall of the Soviet Union, which also brought the
end of the Cold War, conflicts increasingly emerged within states, and civil wars ravaged
nations. “Until the wars of the 1990s, most traditional UN peacekeeping operations had three
criteria: the force was inserted only after the conflict was over, with the consent of the warring
5
Lebor, 25.
6
Ibid, 25.
7
http://www.nytimes.com/1999/11/16/world/un­details­its­failure­to­stop­95­bosnia­massacre.html
8
http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/operations/history.shtml
9
http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/about/dpko/
2

3. parties and its troops, was armed only with light weapons, and would fire only in self­defense.” 10
UN peacekeeping efforts were not adequately prepared to deal with any type of conflict,
nevermind their readiness to embark on bringing peace between neighbors living in the same
state.
The purpose of this paper is to look at the failure of UN Peacekeepers to protect the civilians
from what is now known as one of the worst atrocities committed against humankind since the
WWII holocaust. Specifically, I want to focus on the inability of the Security Council to provide
clear communication and to act based on the information they were receiving from the ground.
Safe Area and Fall of Srebrenica
The word genocide was first introduced by a Polish lawyer named Rafael Lemkin. His usage of
the word first appeared in his work “Axis Rule in Occupied Europe: Laws of Occupation,
Analysis of Government, Proposals of Redress,” and it was his “detailed analysis of Nazi
occupation.” While his definition of genocide was well defined, UN General Assembly 11
broadened the meaning even more. They define genocide as “any of the following acts
committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial, or religious
group, as such: a) Killing members of the group; b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to
members of the group; c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring
about its physical destruction in whole or in part; d) Imposing measures intended to prevent
births within the group; e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.” “The 12
Contracting Parties confirm that genocide, whether committed in time of peace or in time of war,
is a crime under international law which they undertake to prevent and to punish.” In terms of 13
defining genocide in Bosnia counts a, b, c, and d were violated. Nonetheless, Security Council
avoids under all measures to define genocide during a conflict, because they then have the
“obligation to try and stop it.” This was true in Rwanda in 1994, and also in Srebrenica in 1995. 14
The Security Council has five permanent members: China, France, Russia, UK, and United
States. These five members have the veto power. The ten non­permanent members are elected
by General Assembly for a two year term. The Security Council's primary responsibility [is] for
the maintenance of international peace and security. The Security Council takes the lead in
determining the existence of a threat to the peace or act of aggression. It calls upon the parties
to a dispute to settle it by peaceful means and recommends methods of adjustment or terms of
settlement. In some cases, the Security Council can resort to imposing sanctions or even
authorize the use of force to maintain or restore international peace and security. 15
10
LeBor, 13.
11
LeBor, 11.
12
Ibid, 12.
13
Ibid, 12­13.
14
Ibid, 13.
15
http://www.un.org/en/sc/
3

4. It is not always the case that the Security Council’s responsibilities align with the needs civilians
in conflict states are facing as we have seen happening in Bosnia. People in Srebrenica had
been living under extreme conditions since the onset of the war in 1992. Due to her
geographical location and the proximity to the Serbian border, Srebrenica was a perfect target.
The enclave in and around Srebrenica was declared a “safe area” by the UN in 1993. Within
the UN compound, the Security Council played a word game to define the meaning of “safe
area”. Resolution 819, which was passed on April 16, 1993 by the Security Council, defined
‘safe area’ as an area “which should be free from any armed attack or any other hostile act.” 16
This particular euphemism “was something different from ‘protected area, which demanded
robust defense, as would a ‘haven’. The declaration that Srebrenica “should”, rather than “shall”,
be safe, was also particular. After all, everywhere in the world “should” remain safe. But “shall”
would have implied a duty to ensure that it did.” Some of the member nations “were in favor of 17
the safe areas because actually safe areas were a totally meaningless concept.” 18
The fate of the refugees and inhabitants of Srebrenica was apparent early on. General Ratko
Mladic never believed in the Geneva Conventions, nor did he care much about violating the
international law. It became evident “who was in charge at Srebrenica, the United Nation’s first
“safe area” in Bosnia: The Serbs.” This proves to be true when General Mladic broke the 19
resolution 781, which was established in October of 1992 and called for no­fly zone. “There 20
were extremely strict limitations on when NATO planes might open fire, and the Serbs ignored
the ban: when on 9 April General Ratko Mladic attended a meeting with General Philippe
Morillon of UNPROFOR, he arrived by a helicopter. [...] The Bosnian Serbs had not been
defeated [or challenged] by the West, nor even engaged. There was no credible threat of force,
so there was no reason for General Mladic to respect the status of safe area.” General Mladic 21
inconspicuously tested how far he could go, and when he was convinced that there were no
repercussions against his actions, he knew he could do as he pleased.
In March of 1994, some 570 Dutch battalion (Dutchbat) replaced the Canadian peacekeepers in
and around Srebrenica. Their main objective was “to deter attacks, as outlined in the 22
resolution of spring 1993; to facilitate humanitarian aid; and to demilitarize the enclave.” While 23
the objectives were clear, the preparation of the Dutch peacekeepers was not properly
executed. The training constituted of showing them videos which “showed actors in white robes
and turbans clicking prayer beats and shouting, “You are disturbing our prayers” and “Allah will
punish you.” Serbian soldiers in the videos screamed and stamped their feet and wore
Russian­style fur hats.” Their training was more suitable to roam the streets in the Middle East 24
16
LeBor, 40.
17
Ibid, 41.
18
Ibid, 41.
19
Ibid, 43.
20
Ibid, 46.
21
Ibid, 46.
22
Ibid, 71.
23
Ibid, 72.
24
LeBor, 72.
4

5. than in Bosnia as they also were instructed to avoid any contact with the women. It turned out
Muslims in Bosnia did not wear ‘white robes and turbans’, Serbs did not wear ‘fur hats’, and
women did not walk around covered in veils. This failed start of the mission was an indication 25
how the peacekeeping would proceed and eventually lead to disaster. 26
As aforementioned, peacekeepers can only fire arms in self­defense. However, according to
UN’s Charter Chapter VII: Action with respect to threats to the peace, breaches of the peace,
and acts of aggression, Article 40, 41, and 42 call for different measures:
“Article 40 allows Security Council to call on the offending parties to comply with
‘provisional measures’ to stop conflicts. If these are not observed, article 41 provides for
such nonmilitary measures as economic, financial, and cultural sanctions against the
offending state. If these prove insufficient, article 42 states that the Council “may take
such actions by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore
international peace and security. Such action may include demonstrations, blockade,
and other operations by air, sea, or land forces of Members of the United Nations.” 27
While the Security Council could determine their actions “on a case­by­case basis and in
cooperation with relevant regional organizations as appropriate, should peaceful means be
inadequate and national authorities are manifestly failing to protect their population from
genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity,” they “avoided a formal
right to humanitarian action, yet left open the possibility that military intervention could be
authorized if [they] had the political will.” As it turned out, the Security Council had no political 28
will and ‘national authorities’ had no power to prevent the genocide. Had the UN been quick to
react to the repeated calls for air support, as it is outlined in Article 42, not only would the
peacekeepers have saved their dignity, integrity and credence, but they would have also saved
thousands from being executed and ethnically cleansed.
The days leading up to the fall of the town and eventually to the genocide left people to face
their worst fears. The Dutchbat abandoned their posts; they were disarmed and humiliated by
the BSA. Due to the Dutchbat’s fear, it seemed as if there was a compliance between the
peacekeepers and the Serbs. They handed over readily the people who were in the compound
even after they’d witness killing and knew anyone leaving the UN base was entering into the
death chamber. “It was they [Dutchbat] who forced Muslim families from the UN compound, then
handed over their blue peacekeeping helmets to the Serbs, who later used them to trick the
Muslims who had fled to the hills into giving themselves up.” 29
25
Ibid, 72.
26
Ibid, 72.
27
Ibid, 14.
28
Weiss, Thomas G. et al. ​The United Nations and Changing World Politics​. Boulder: Westview Press, 7th
Edition, 2010, 132­133.
29
http://www.theguardian.com/theguardian/1999/nov/17/features11
5

6. But the blame does not only lie on the Dutchbat. It was the decisions made by French General
Janvier who was senior commander to secretary general Boutros Ghali and Akashi general
secretary’s top envoy in Bosnia who refused to comply with repeated requests from the
commanders in Srebrenica. Akashi believed that the UN should maintain its neutrality and this
became “more important than its actual mission,” where the UN “would rather be true to its
principles than get anything done, be effective, or play a positive role. The United Nations is
about the principle of being neutral.” According to a former UNPROFOR civil affairs officer 30
“Akashi and his staff were highly selective about the flow of the information to New York, quick
to call attention to misdemeanors by the Bosnian army while downplaying Serb felonies, [...] if
any reports detailing Serb misdeeds managed to get through the bureaucracy, UNPROFOR
Zagreb made a concerted effort to massage them so that what they sent to New York always
maintained the ‘all three sides are guilty’ premise and thus staved off the pressure for air
strikes.” 31
The unwillingness to help residents in Srebrenica was evident when Colonel Karremans
requested air strikes just a day before the fall of Srebrenica on July 10. He “requested air
attacks from the senior soldier in Bosnia, the French general, Bertrand Janvier. The Frenchman
showed a startling indifference to the plight of Srebrenica. Several times he refused permission.
Then, as the situation reached crisis point on July 11, he declined to allow Nato planes to bomb
the Serbs because Karremans had used the wrong request form. He was of course playing for
time, doing anything rather taking direct action, which he believed would inflame the Serbs.” 32
There were many mishaps in this information exchange. Karremans had waited until the last
minute to make the request, believing that “the BSA will not be able to seize the enclave in the
short term,” and Janvier’s unwillingness to grant Karremans request. The disinclination to do 33
anything seemed as if those making decisions did not deal with the loss of human lives, it was
more of a game.
The UN peacekeepers biggest loss of credibility with the Muslim population and the Bosnian
Serb Army was due to constant miscommunication between the peacekeepers and those in
charge. As the BSA was advancing into the enclave, Dutchbat ensured the Muslim leaders that
NATO will attack no matter what. “The anxious Dutch troops were informed by their
commanding officers that the UN had given an ultimatum to the Serbs: ‘The BSA must withdraw
starting from 06.00 hrs; failure to do so will result in large­scale air strikes.’” This is where the 34
miscommunication involved since “Janvier and Akashi had decided no such ultimatum. They
had only agreed that if the Dutch were attacked, actively attacking Serb forces, or ‘smoking
guns’, could be bombed from the air. This misunderstanding was compounded by another. The
Dutchbat commanders, as well as Sector North East, believed that, no matter what, there would
30
LeBor, 34­35.
31
Ibid, 84.
32
http://www.theguardian.com/theguardian/1999/nov/17/features11
33
Honig, Jan Willem and Norbert Both. ​Srebrenica: Record of a War Crime​. New York: Penguin Group,
1996. pg. 9.
34
Ibid, 21.
6

7. be massive air strikes against all of the forty targets they had identified the previous day and
anything new that moved.” 35
Conclusion
It is evident that the UN was not adequately equipped to deal with mass atrocities committed in
Bosnia, and specifically in protecting civilians in Srebrenica. Decision­making was based on
political preference and on a glimmer of hope that the Bosnian Serb Army would not execute
what they were set to do. Only a few days before the fall of Srebrenica and repeated shelling
around the enclave, “Lieutenant­Colonel Karremans at this stage did not believe that the safe
area was under serious threat.” This assumption was declared on July 7, only four days before 36
the fall of Srebrenica and the genocide. “In his [Karremans] assessment of the situation on
Friday evening, he stated that the Serb activities were ‘attempts to provoke and intimidate ABiH
and Dutchbat. He did not expect the ‘seizure of OPs and/or parts of the enclave’.” In his 37
opinion, “the Bosnian Serb Army (BSA) would try ‘to neutralize’ the Bosnian Army ‘in the long
run’, but ‘due to shortage of infantry,’ [...] ‘the BSA will not be able to seize the enclave in the
short term’.” What Karremans failed to realize is that usurp assault of Srebrenica and the 38
execution of civilians was “carefully planned, and meticulously realized.” 39
The executions of civilians were not considered a threat at the time. They were viewed as
heat­of­the moment actions and not as coordinated killings that took extensive logistical
planning. “The killings of Srebrenica were not carried out by battle­enraged soldiers who had
seen their comrades die. This was cold­blooded, methodical slaughter, planned and organized
in great detail, for executing almost eight thousand men and boys demands extensive logistical
preparation.” As soon as Srebrenica fell, buses arrived at the scene and men and boys were 40
separated from the women and girls. The killing of the men and boys was even more
systematically executed. “The Bosnian Serbs killed their prisoners by rifle and machine­gun fire.
They threw grenades at men locked inside buildings. Many enjoyed their work. The prisoners
were made to walk through two lines of Serb soldiers. The Serbs broke their bones with
crowbars and chopped them with axes before slitting their throats. They beat the prisoners,
taunted them, shot them in the limbs to prolong their agony.” The men on the buses were 41
taken out and shot in the back while their hands were bound. The Serbs killed around 1,200
men in just one day.
Upon Mladic’s arrival in Srebrenica, he congratulated his soldiers for the work they’ve done.
“Straight to Bratunac. Troops go straight to Bratunac!” “Straight to Potocari. The Turks have run
35
Honig, 21.
36
Ibid, 8.
37
Ibid, 8­9.
38
Ibid, 9.
39
LeBor, 25
40
Ibid, 118.
41
Ibid, 117.
7

8. away.” He is recorded giving the town to the Serbian people as a gift: “We are here, on July 11 42
1995, in Serb Srebrenica. On the eve of yet another great Serb holiday, we give this town to
Serb people as a gift. Finally, after the rebellion against the Dahis, the time has come to take
revenge on the Turks in this region.” The reference is to the battle of the Serb uprising against 43
the Turkish mercenaries known as Dahis on July 13, 1804. It is no surprise that execution of
over 8,000 muslim men and boys took place exactly on the day of the Serbian intifada.
While the Security Council deliberated and celebrated their failures, innocent civilians suffered
due to their inadequacy. “The Security Council lacked both the necessary vision and the
understanding of how to respond to genocidal violence.” It is clear that they had not learned 44
anything from their past, that the genocide in Rwanda did not entice them to react more
effectively and strategically. They even tried to blame the Bosnian government’s lack of hosting
skills. “United Nations visitors to Pale were plied with roast lamb, slivovitz, and wine. Meeting
with the Bosnian Serb leadership began in the afternoon and lasted for hours, the Serbs often
descending into drunken near­chaos,” whereas the Bosnian “ministers greeted their visitors with
drawn faces and bitter expressions. They sat in cold, dark rooms with the windows blown out
and served Tang, a powdered orange drink.” Bosnians were disliked because they “don’t wear 45
uniforms [and are] always whining and complaining. But the Serbs were the winners, and they
were good hosts.” 46
If only the Security Council ordered the air strike to hit the targets identified on ground, a mass
atrocity would have been prevented. Their responsibility to “resort to imposing sanctions or even
authorize the use of force to maintain or restore international peace and security,” only applies if
it’s beneficial to their needs.
42
http://www.bbc.com/news/world­europe­18099008
43
Ibid.
44
LeBor, 56.
45
Ibid, 78.
46
Ibid, 78.
8