160127§2.14-cv-212 objection to recommendation, 1st Amended, motions #Chicaugon

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OBJECTION TO RECOMMENDATION & 1ST AMENDED COMPLAINT, JURY DEMAND - PAGE 1 OF 21
Lindsay Ross, in pro per
2885 Sanford Ave SW #20348, Grandville, MI 49418
310-892-7883 <Gospel of Luke 11:52: Woe to you> experts.in.the.law@gmail.com
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN, NORTHERN DIVISION
LINDSAY ROSS,
Plaintiff,
vs.
COUNTY OF IRON, TIM AHO, DAVID
ANDRESKI, TONY ANDRESKI INC, DAVID
ARCAND, RYAN BOEHMKE, JAMES
BRENNAN III, RAYMOND COATES,
LINDA CROSS, JEFF DOHL, HANNAH L.
GOODMAN, CARL LIND, JOHN
MELCHIORI, PATTI PERETTO, C. JOSEPH
SCHWEDLER, TONY SERBINSKI, STEVEN
J. TINTI, MARK VALESANO, SUSAN
ANDRESKI WILLIAMS, LORI WILLMAN,
and DOES 1-10 inclusive,
Defendants.
Hannah Goodman (P75697), Steve Tinti
(P36308), P.O.Box 98, Crystal Falls, MI 49920,
906-875-7451, info@sjtintilaw.com
Case No.: 2.14-cv-212
Hon. R. Allan Edgar, Judge
Hon. Timothy P. Greeley, Magistrate Judge
229 Federal Bldg, 202 W Washington St, PO
Box 698, Marquette MI 49855, (906) 226-2021
OBJECTION TO RECOMMENDATION &
1ST AMENDED COMPLAINT, JURY
DEMAND
Index of authorities
Cases
Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. V. Coalition for Econ. Equity, 950 F.2d 1401 (9th
Cir. 1991) ................................................................................................................................ 5
Citicorp Servs., 712 F.Supp. 749 (N.D.Cal. 1989) ..................................................................... 5
Elrod v Burns, 427 US 347 (1976) ............................................................................................. 5
Goldie's Bookstore v. Superior Ct., 739 F.2d 466 (9th Cir. 1984)............................................. 5
Guiterrez v. Mun. Cl., F.2d 1031 (9th Cir. 1988), vacated as moot, 490 U.S. 1016 .................. 5
Justin v City of Los Angeles, CV0012352LGBAIJX, 2000 WL 1808426 at *10 (C.D.Cal. Dec.
5, 2000) (unpublished) (https://casetext.com/case/justin-v-city-of-los-angeles).................... 5
Kincaidv. City of Fresno, No. L:06-cv-1445 OWW SMS, 2006 WL 3542732 at *38 (E.D.Cal.
Dec. 8, 2006)........................................................................................................................... 5
Lavan v. City of Los Angeles, 797 F.Supp.2d 1005 (C.D.Cal. 2011) ..................................... 5, 6
Monell v. N.Y. City Dept. Of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978) ..................................... 8, 15

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Oreland Equipment Co. V. Copco Steel & Engineering Corp., 310 Mich. 6, 16 N.W.2d 646,
1944 Mich. LEXIS 401 (Mich. 1944)................................................................................... 18
Preminger v. Principi, 422 F.3d 815 (9th Cir. 2005)................................................................... 6
Soldal v. Cook County, 506 U.S. 56 (1992)................................................................................ 6
United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109 (1984)......................................................................... 6
Mich. Comp. Laws
440.2716(1), (2) ........................................................................................................................ 18
750.73(1)................................................................................................................................... 11
750.424...................................................................................................................................... 11
750.356(1)(a), (g)...................................................................................................................... 13
750.411h(1)(a)........................................................................................................................... 14
750.528...................................................................................................................................... 13
750.356(1)(a)............................................................................................................................. 15
Michigan Court Rules
2.205(A) .................................................................................................................................... 19
2.602(D)(1) ............................................................................................................................... 12
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
5(a)(1)(B), (D)........................................................................................................................... 19
11(a) .......................................................................................................................................... 19
19(a) .......................................................................................................................................... 19
34(a)(1)(B), (B)......................................................................................................................... 18
United States Code
28 § 1331, 1343(a), and 1367 ................................................................................................... 17
42 § 1983................................................................................................. 3, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16
42 § 1988................................................................................................................................... 17
United States Constitutional Amendments
1st......................................................................................................................................... 5, 6, 7
4th..................................................................................................... 3, 5, 6, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16
5th................................................................................................................................................. 6
14th................................................................................................... 3, 5, 6, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16
Other sources
11A Charles Alan Wright et al., Federal Practice & Procedure § 2948.1 (2d ed. 1995).......... 4

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contents
Introduction..................................................................................................................................... 3
Date by which an objection to the recommendation must be served.............................................. 4
Objections to Magistrate Greeley’s recommendation..................................................................... 4
Motion to disqualify Magistrate Judge Greeley.............................................................................. 7
Motion to serve amended complaint............................................................................................... 7
Motion for delivery....................................................................................................................... 17
Motion for production of Ross’ personal property ....................................................................... 18
Motion to add defendant Lori Willman ........................................................................................ 19
Proof of Service ............................................................................................................................ 19
Verification and signature............................................................................................................. 19
Order ............................................................................................................................................. 20
Exhibits marked in the text as “Πx” are at: http://goo.gl/6qc5DU & http://1drv.ms/1nrznUy
Introduction
Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Ross filed this action against David Andreski, the above-named
persons, and their county. Magistrate Judge Greeley ordered against Ross’ saying that his
request for a temporary restraining order and/or preliminary injunction, preventing the
scheduled sale by Defendants of his personal property on October 17, 2014… fails to
establish a substantial likelihood of success on the merits and does not establish that
Plaintiff will suffer irreparable harm if the requested relief is not granted.… bears a heavy
burden… which requires an amount in controversy of greater than $75,000.… Plaintiff
[sic] claim does not meet this threshold. Moreover, nowhere in Plaintiff’s pleadings does
he specify the nature of the property at issue1 or any specific facts indicating that he
would suffer irreparable harm absent relief.… the record fails to establish a substantial
likelihood of success with respect to Plaintiff’s claims, nor [sic] has Plaintiff established
that he will suffer irreparable harm absent injunctive relief.… [And] Plaintiff has failed to
meet the heavy burden establishing the need for injunctive relief (Order Πx 141010)
Greeley “recommends that this case be dismissed for lack of prosecution.” (Πx 160108)
1 Though the 14th Amendment does not qualify its protection by “the nature of the property”,
Greeley can satisfy his curiosity by reviewing defendants’ “Inventory” of items they unlawfully
seized from Ross (with annotations by him) which is included in the attached proposed order.

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Ross objects and moves the court to disqualify Greeley, to amend Ross’ complaint, to
compel defendants’ to deliver Ross’ personal property in their possession, to produce Ross’
property as discovery evidence, and to add defendant Lori Willman.
Date by which an objection to the recommendation must be served
Greeley further wrote that “[o]bjections… must be served on opposing parties and filed
with the Clerk of the Court within fourteen (14) days of receipt of this Report and
Recommendation.” Id.
Mailboxforwarding.com, at the address in the caption which Ross provides for service of
process, received it on the 12th (Πx 160112), notified Ross, scanned it, and provided it to him on
the following day (Πx 160113). Thus, Ross’ “receipt of this Report and Recommendation” was
on the 13th. Therefore his objection to it must be postmarked before January 27, 2016.
Objections to Magistrate Greeley’s recommendation
A typical homeless person, Ross, like “Lazarus, covered with sores” (Luke 16:20), “bears
a heavy burden” (Order, p. 2: 1st ¶) of parasites: lawyers2, police, and other “experts in the law”
(Luke 11). “[M]eet the heavy burden” (Order, p. 3: 2nd ¶) on him in this case; it is the bias of the
Court’s long-time gatekeeper, Magistrate Greeley, who irrelevantly and prejudicially notes that
Ross is “proceeding pro se.” (Id., p.3: 1st ¶)
“Woe to you experts in the law, because you have taken away the key to knowledge.
You yourselves have not entered, and you have hindered those who were entering.” Luke 11:52
Greeley “hindered” Ross by withholding the Court’s knowledge that
[w]hen an alleged deprivation of a constitutional right is involved, most courts hold that
no further showing of irreparable injury is necessary." 11A Charles Alan Wright et al.,
Federal Practice & Procedure § 2948.1 (2d ed. 1995) Thus, "an alleged constitutional
2 Sheldon Nahmod, author of the treatise on § 1983, spoke to Ross and referred him to the
foremost civil rights attorney in Chicago, who represented him as follows:
Is Lindsay Ross a little bit different than you and I? I guess so. He is a little bit different
than [sic] us. I guess you take your plaintiff's the way you find them… My God, if I were
wishing, ladies and gentlemen, I wished that we were all back to October 7, 1995, and put
a good head on the shoulders of Mr. Schoolmaster [the arresting officer] and have him
not make up a law and let this man drive to California. I would never have met the man,
and I would probably be happy. John B. Murphey, plaintiff’s attorney, April 16, 1998,
closing statement in trial of Ross v City of Evanston, 96 C 6042 (ND Ill, 1998)

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infringement will often alone constitute irreparable harm." Associated Gen. Contractors
of Cal., Inc. v. Coalition for Econ. Equity, 950 F.2d 1401, 1412 (9th Cir. 1991).…
citing Goldie's Bookstore v. Superior Ct., 739 F.2d 466, 472 (9th Cir. 1984). In this case, we
need not determine whether… allegations would be entitled to such a presumption” Id.
Relying on Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc., supra., which the 6th Circuit has
not ruled contrary to, the risk of irreparable harm has been assumed where, as here, the
defendants did not notify Ross, held no hearing, continue to deprive Ross of his property, and
have clearly violated the law. See: Justin v City of Los Angeles, CV0012352LGBAIJX, 2000
WL 1808426 at *10 (C.D.Cal. Dec. 5, 2000) (unpublished) (https://casetext.com/case/justin-v-
city-of-los-angeles); Kincaidv. City of Fresno, No. l:06-cv-1445 OWW SMS, 2006 WL 3542732
at *38 (E.D.Cal. Dec. 8, 2006) (unpublished) (attached as Exhibit 2); Lavan v. City of Los
Angeles, 797 F.Supp.2d 1005, 1019 (C.D.Cal. 2011). Here as in those cases, the "process, or
lack thereof, creates not just the risk, but the certainty of erroneous deprivation." Kincaid v. City
of Fresno, No. l:06-cv-1445 OWW SMS, 2006 WL 3542732 at *38 (E.D.Cal. Dec. 8, 2006).
The U.S. Supreme Court has specifically stated that “the loss of First Amendment
freedoms [to property here] for even minimal periods of time, unquestionably constitutes
irreparable injury.” Elrod v Burns, 427 US 347 (1976). Thus insofar as the First Amendment is
implicated, irreparable harm is rightfully presumed.
Equity favors Ross in his interest in protecting his property and/or his expression, by
means of such property, of protected speech represented by his occupation of his land.
unlawful seizure… [is], in itself, an injury that the law will not tolerate." Pamela Kincaid
v. City of Fresno, No. l:06-cv-1445 OWW SMS, 2006 WL 3542732 at *40 (E.D.Cal. Dec.
8, 2006) {citing Associated Gen. Contractors, supra., Guiterrez v. Mun. Cl., F.2d 1031,
1045 (9th Cir. 1988), vacated as moot, 490 U.S. 1016; Citicorp Servs., 712 F.Supp. 749,
753 (N.D.Cal. 1989)).
The U.S. Constitution protects Ross' property, despite his homelessness, as an expression
of his protected speech:
the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments protect homeless persons from government
seizure and summary destruction of their unabandoned, but momentarily unattended,
personal property. Lavan v. City of Los Angeles, 693 F.3d 1022, 1024 (9th Cir. 2012)
destruction of homeless people’s property causes a variety of other legally significant
harms. In their operations, homeless people lose… shelter from the elements; clothing,…
documents and other personal papers; the tools by which they try to make a meager

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income; and items of immeasurable sentimental value. The irreparable harm from the[ir]
practices also includes the harm to homeless people’s security and dignity. Id. At *40.
Regarding the public’s interest in Ross’ case, “all citizens have a stake in upholding the
Constitution” and they have “concerns [that] are implicated when a constitutional right has been
violated.” Preminger v. Principi, 422 F.3d 815, 826 (9th Cir. 2005). Ross’ prosecution of this
case would advance this shared interest of enforcing the Constitution’s guarantees and
reinforcing this “[n]ation’s basic commitment to foster the dignity and well-being of all persons
within its borders.” Goldberg 397 U.S. at 264-65.
Defendants' actions and omissions have violated and continue to violate Ross
“constitutional rights under the First, Fourth, Fifth (the "takings clause"), and the Fourteenth
Amendments of the U.S. Constitution. Each of these rights is either specifically identified in the
Fourteenth Amendment or is nonetheless incorporated against the states by the Fourteenth
Amendment.” Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925) (First Amendment); Mapp v. Ohio, 367
U.S. 643 (1961) (Fourth Amendment); Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad Co. v. City of
Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897) (takings clause).
Common-law torts and equitable remedies such as conversion, replevin, and trespass to
chattels condemn and redress the exact actions taken against Ross by defendants in this case.
Accordingly, the federal courts have been intolerant of the type of conduct challenged here.
Defendants have violated Ross' Fourth Amendment rights. "A 'seizure of property occurs
when there is some meaningful interference with an individual's possessory interests in that
property.'" Lavan, 693 F.3d at 1027 {quoting United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113
(1984)).3
3 Although Ross clearly has a reasonable expectation of privacy in the property seized in this
case, he would prevail even were there no such expectation. This Court need not make that
determination, however. It is not necessary because the constitutional standard is [only] whether
there was ‘some meaningful interference’ with Plaintiffs’ possessory interest.’” Id. At 1028.
And, the Supreme Court has clarified that the Fourth Amendment protects possessory and liberty
interests even when privacy rights are not implicated.” Id. (citing Soldal v. Cook County, 506
U.S. 56, 63-64 & n. 8 (1992)).

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Defendants have violated Ross' First Amendment rights. His seized property expressed
his ownership of his land. His loss of his personal property unconstitutionally silenced his
protected speech. Ross has a strong likelihood of success on the merits.
Humanity will benefit from Ross being allowed to fight again4 for what Greeley phrased
as: “success with respect” (Order, Πx141010, page 3: 3rd line).
Motion to disqualify Magistrate Judge Greeley
Plaintiff incorporates and restates his above paragraphs as if fully set forth below.
Pursuant to 28 U.S. Code § 455(b)(1) Ross submits that the magistrate judge’s denial of
his motion for a temporary injunction, to prevent defendants’ planned sale of his personal
property, represents a withholding of the law’s established power to protect him under the very
circumstances which were and are present in this case. Further, qualifying “the nature of the
property at issue” can only be discriminatory. Ross would therefore ask Greeley to “disqualify
himself in [these] proceeding[s] in which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned.”
Motion to serve amended complaint
Ross submits his following “1st Amended Complaint” which includes additional claims
based on defendants’ actions since his original filing.
Plaintiff Lindsay Clark Ross is a homeless man in California,
Defendants are: David Andreski, 726 Pentoga Trail, Crystal Falls (hereinafter referred to
as “Andreski”); Tony Andreski, Inc, PO Box 372, Iron River; David Arcand, 751 Pentoga Trail,
Crystal Falls; Jeff Dohl, 1 East Genesee St, Iron River; John Melchiori, 592 Pentoga Trail,
Crystal Falls; Hannah Goodman and Steven J. Tinti of 201 S. 5th Street, Crystal Falls; Ryan
Boehmke, Linda Cross, and C. Joseph Schwedler, all of 2 South Sixth Street, Suite 18, Crystal
Falls.
“Lindsay C. Ross scored a victory for the underdog, his lawyer said, when a federal jury took
just three hours… to return a verdict against [police who had seized his property] awarding Ross
$45,000 in damages in connection with [their seizure of the very same] 1982 Chevy van” which
defendants in the present case have also seized. Truly the freedom that it represents, which Ross
had enjoyed until that case, obsesses you experts in the law. (Evanston Told to Pay for Arrest in
Unabomber Case, Chicago Tribune (April 16, 1998), http://articles.chicagotribune.com/1998-04-
16/news/9804160279_1_ross-attorney-officers-proficiency)

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All defendants are residents of Michigan, except for: Susan Andreski Williams, 5975
Riverside Drive, Melbourne Beach, FL.
Monell defendants are: Mark Valesano, 2 South Sixth Street, Suite 18, Crystal Falls;
Iron County, Michigan, 2 South Sixth Street, Suite 7, Crystal Falls; Commissioners: Tim Aho,
565 Rock Crusher Road, PO Box 93, Crystal Falls; James Brennan III, 123 Noren Road, Iron
River; Raymond Coates, 504 Maple, Iron River; Carl Lind, 216 Lincoln Avenue, Crystal Falls;
and Patti Peretto, 967 Hiawatha Road, Iron River
Defendants (fictitiously named) Does are individual actors whose true names are
unknown to Ross, who would amend this complaint to allege their true names and capacities
when ascertained. Ross believes, and thereon alleges, that each of the fictitiously named
defendants is responsible for the acts complained of herein.
Each of the defendant employees of Iron County were, at the relevant times, acting within
the course and scope of his employment at the time that he engaged in the complained of actions
and was acting under color of state law as an employee, agent, and representative of every other
defendant.
Each of the defendants, at the relevant times, was an agent, servant, or employee of each
of the remaining defendants acting under color of state law, and was at all times acting within the
time, purpose and scope of said agency or employment, and was acting with the express or
implied knowledge, permission or consent of the remaining Defendants, and each of them. Each
of the Defendants held out the other as hers/his/its authorized representative and each of the
Defendants ratified the conduct of each other Defendant. At the relevant times Does 1-10 were
and are Defendants whose identity is unknown at this time who supervised, controlled, or were
in some manner responsible for the activities alleged herein and proximately caused Ross’
damages.
Facts are that Ross sued Andreski and in his complaint he referred to the FBI’s
investigation of him as the only suspect ever publically-named in “The Unabomber” case, in
which an intelligent man’s building of a cabin in the woods was of interest to the bureau.
On Friday, October 15, 2010 Tinti filed Andreski’s reply to Ross’ suit. The following
Monday morning Andreski and sheriff’s deputy Ryan Boehmke attended the burning of Ross’
cabin in the woods, his only home, along with his shed full of books nearby. Informed by a
neighbor, Ross called Fire Marshal Jeffrey Sepala 5 days afterward and later swore in court

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papers to having heard Sepala tell him that he was suspicious of Andreski and disturbed by his
behavior. A state natural resources officer and the chief of police for Caspian, the nearest
municipality, had also attended the fire and they referred Ross inquiries to Boehmke, who told
Ross that the land where the fire occurred was not his. Ross mailed and e-mailed the State
Police, who investigate fires, but after they had asked him for more information and Ross told
them of Andreski’s desire for his land, they failed to respond to his repeated communications.
Arriving from California, Ross went to the site with sheriff’s deputy Wade Cross (defendant
Linda’s husband) who suggested that the fire might have been caused by “spontaneous
combustion of books.”
Returning to California, Ross visited his parents in Illinois on the day before
Thanksgiving. They rejected him and he has not seen them since.
At trial Andreski testified to his personal witness that Ross’ house had existed but 3 years
before it burned. Ross provided to the court papers (Πx 951007) that he had gotten from the FBI
in 1997, in discovery for Ross v City of Evanston, which describe Ross’ house in its unique and
improvisational method of construction, as having been built in 1994. Judge Schwedler and 3
women appellate judges faulted Ross for failing to get a note from his parents5 stating that he had
built his house when he had said that he did.
Having not communicated with Wade Cross since the fire almost 3 years earlier, Ross
asked him about his investigation. Cross was immediately and intensely hostile to Ross. Before
Ross fled the sheriff’s building in fear of arrest or harm, he heard Cross say that he had spoken
only to his fellow deputy Boehmke.
Never asking Ross for $211.59 (for Andreski’s costs on appeal) nor serving him with
notice of a claim, Hannah Goodman moved (Πx 140912) Judge Schwedler to sign, without a
public hearing (ROA, Πx 140925), her order to seize Ross’ personal property which was on his
land,.
Ryan Boehmke signed, and Linda Cross notarized, the “Sheriff’s Affidavit of Service”
(Πx 140902) wherein he
5 Ross has obtained from his parents’ their affidavits (Πx 150923.1 and 150923.2) which
corroborate the FBI and contradict David Andreski.

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states that he… as an appointed officer of the court to serve this process by leave of the
Court he personally delivered a copy of a Request + Order to Seize Property upon Gov.
Lot 3 & 5 Sec. 12 T 42 N, R 34 W at Indian Lake in the Township of Mastodon, MI., on
the 26th day of August, 2014
Ryan Boehmke served this process on no one.
Andreski paid $5,240 (according to Serbinski’s invoice contained in (Πx 141103) to
Tony Serbinski to dismantle Ross’ second, remaining, shed which was sound and intact on his
land, to take Ross’ ChevyVan, Pioneer aluminum boat, “scrap metal” (Id.), and anything else,
artificial, that they found on his land and loaded it into the bucket of a “skidsteer”, thence into
the bed of a dump truck by which they took Ross’ belongings to the property of John Melchiori.
“On August 26, 2014, the Iron County, Michigan Sheriff’s Department supervised the
removal of personal property located on the subject property,” (Πx 140917), Goodman wrote,
before she belatedly mailed to Ross notice of her motion: “Proof of Mailing of Request & Order
to Seize Property” (Πx 140829). Mark Valesano (whose wife works as a secretary for Tinti &
Goodman) wrote in his “Notice of Sale of Personal Property under Order to Seize Property” that
he “[would] auction this property as the law directs”, and attached “Appraisal” (Πx 140829) in
which David Arcand and Jeff Dohl judged “the total value of this personal property at $150.00”.
Goodman told Ross to “take immediate action to retrieve the personal property from its
current storage location so that [Andreski] may avoid the additional costs of storage.” (Πx
140929) That would refer to the $40/month rental, on “a white van” and other items in “sheriff’s
impound”, which Melchori mentioned when Ross phoned him, before Melchiori became silent
then terminated the call, while Ross pleaded for information on how he might recover his
belongings. Ross’ monthly checks to Melchiori, for that amount, have gone unpaid.
Ross filed this action and mailed to each of the then defendants, including Melchiori,
copies of his original “Complaint”, bearing his same address for service of process that is on this
document.
Hannah Goodman verified in March that Ross “was awarded his personal property
currently stored at [Melchiori’s property at] 100 Axle Drive, Caspian, Michigan, and [Ross] was
ordered to take possession of it.” (Πx 150318, “Appellees’ Motion to Dismiss Appeal and Brief
in Support”, page 13: 2nd ¶, filed in Ross v Andreski, Court of Appeals #325531, underline
added)

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In April, at the Boron, CA, Post Office, Ross found a notice of Certified Mail™ which
had been held for him the previous December, before being returned to Melchiori. Ross phoned
Melchiori’s business and, though he had left neither a message nor a number to reply to, missed
3 subsequent calls originating at the number of Melchiori’s business. The next day Ross phoned
him again and, following Melchiori’s confirmation of his identity, Melchiori remained silent for
6 minutes until terminating the call, having listened to Ross’ renewed pleading for information
on his personal property and expressions of mortal fear of the defendants.
Willman solicited (Πx 150819) and, on August 19 , 2015, received Ross’ payment (Πx
150914) for transcripts of hearings relevant to the seizure of his personal property as well as his
ownership of his land, which she has not provided.
“Primary Insomnia” was diagnosed in Ross, by a physician on October 6, 2014, for
which he has received psychological counseling and continues to receive medical treatment.
1st cause of action: Second degree arson, pursuant to Michigan Penal Code § 750.73(1),
violating Ross’ civil rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983; 4th & 14th Amendments; against all
defendants
Ross incorporates each and every preceding paragraph as though fully set forth herein.
Defendants “maliciously burn[ed], damage[d], or destroy[ed] by fire or explosive [Ross’]
dwelling” and “its contents” (Πx 101119) in order to suppress his exercise of the right of free
speech under the First Amendment, and to deprive him of property without due process of law
under the Fourteenth Amendment.
Defendants intended that their brutality would intimidate those who might support Ross’
claims to own his land. Such impressionable people are Ross’ parents whose revilement of him,
in the aftermath of the fire, and their continuing alienation from him, are a direct and proximate
result of defendants’ afore-described actions.
2nd cause of action: Subornation of perjury, pursuant to Michigan Penal Code § 750.424,
violating Ross’ civil rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983; 4th & 14th Amendments; against David
Andreski, Steven J. Tinti, and Does
Defendants, “by procuring”, through negotiation with Fire Marshal Jeffrey Seppala,
under their threat of his liability for defamation based on his candid comments to Ross 5 days
after the fire, regarding Andreski’s behavior and language at the scene, produced incredible

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affidavits of matching tortured prose which provided defendant Schwedler specious justification
for his ruling against Ross’ interest in real estate.
3rd cause of action: violation of civil procedure, pursuant to Michigan Court Rules §
2.107(A)(1), (B)(3), (C), violating Ross’ civil rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983; 4th & 14th
Amendments; against C. Joseph Schwedler, Hannah L. Goodman, and Steven J. Tinti
The officer-of-the-court defendants produced an unlawful order to seize Ross’ property
by failing to notify him; he “who ha[d] filed a pleading, an appearance, [and] motion[s, he who
had to] be served with a copy of every paper later filed in the action.… [, and he who, as] a party
prosecut[ing] the action on his… own behalf, service of papers [had to] be made on the [him] by
delivery or by mailing to [him] at the address stated in [his] pleadings.”
4th cause of action: violation of civil procedure, pursuant to Michigan Court Rules §
2.602(D)(1), violating Ross’ civil rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983; 4th & 14th Amendments;
against Hannah L. Goodman, and Steven J. Tinti
Defendants’ attorneys, acting in support of state official’s efforts to unlawfully dispossess
Ross of his land, after “securing the signing of the… order [to seize Ross’ personal property,
failed to] serve a copy” on him.
5th cause of action: violation of civil procedure, pursuant to Michigan Court Rules §
2.107(C), (C)(2)(b), violating Ross’ civil rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983; 4th & 14th
Amendments; against Ryan Boehmke, and Mark Valesano
Boehmke, supervised by Valesano, failed in his duty to notify Ross of the order to seize
his property “by delivery or by mailing to” him, or by “leaving it at [his] usual residence with
some person”. Linda Cross knew, or should have known, that the affidavit of service on which
she notarized Boehmke’s signature was defective and failed to establish proof of service.
6th cause of action: Larceny, pursuant to Michigan Penal Code § 750.356(1)(a), (g),
violating Ross’ civil rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983; 4th & 14th Amendments; against all
defendants

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Each and every defendant knew that they he or she was engaged in a scheme to
“commit[] larceny by stealing” Ross’ personal property, his “money, goods,… chattels… or
scrap metal”; under an unlawful order produced with neither notice to him nor hearing before the
public; in order to eliminate his evidence of his occupation of the land, as well as any evidence
of their aforementioned arson; with the intention of oppressing Ross’ speech, through his
occupation of his land by his personal property, expressing his ownership of his land.
Linda Cross knew, or should have known, that the affidavit of service, on which she
notarized Boehmke’s signature, was an instrument employed to falsely justify the perpetration of
larceny.
David Arcand and Jeff Dohl knew, or should have known, that the affidavits which they
signed, estimating the value of Ross’ seized personal property at $150 (against a debt of
$211.59), were instruments employed to falsely justifying the seizure of Ross’ personal property
and then, after consuming its value by their estimation, his land (but for Andreski’s grace in
accepting Ross’ payment of the newly-revealed debt).
Tony Serbinski’s noting on his bill (Πx 141103, p20), for “Removal of scrap metal and
other material”, that the “owner of the removed material is liable for payment”, suggests a
hedging of his confidence in the authority of the Doe defendant who hired him to conduct the
seizure. His total billing of $5,240, including his cost for vehicles which were to contain items
which defendants had estimated to be worth $150, rented at $85/day for 50 days, mocks
defendants’ pretext of collecting $211.59 for Andreski’s costs on appeal.
Melchiori’s thorough knowledge of the larceny is suggested by Serbinski’s note that
“This does not include cost of storage at Johns [sic, Melchiori’s] Auto”.
7th cause of action: destroying property, pursuant to Michigan Penal Code § 750.528,
violating Ross’ civil rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983; 4th & 14th Amendments; against Ryan
Boehmke, Tony Serbinski, Mark Valesano, and Does
Defendants unlawfully assembled, in trespass, on Ross’ land for the purpose of
unlawfully seizing his personal property which, according to their “Inventory” (Πx 140919),
included the component building materials of his shed which they demolished, pulled down, and
completely destroyed.

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8th cause of action: Stalking, pursuant to Michigan Penal Code § 750.411h(1)(a), violating
Ross’ civil rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983; 4th & 14th Amendments; against John Melchiori
Defendant, by his intentionally-misdirected mailing so as to assure that a person will miss
a letter yet learn that it had been returned, by his repeated and uninvited telephoning, only, by his
remaining silent once contact is made, by his listening to pleas for help and mercy, and then by
his hanging-up, having said nothing but to acknowledge his identity, and by his continued
possession of one’s personal belongings against that person’s wishes and against a court order,
even one obtained by his partners in acquiring those belongings, is engaged in a “‘Course of
conduct’[,] a pattern of conduct composed of a series of 2 or more separate noncontinuous acts
evidencing a continuity of purpose[, causing Ross] ‘Emotional distress’[,] significant mental
suffering or distress that [did], but does not necessarily, require medical or other professional
treatment or counseling. [This] ‘Harassment’… directed toward [Ross] include[d]… repeated or
continuing unconsented contact that would cause a reasonable individual to suffer emotional
distress and that actually causes the victim to suffer emotional distress… [and was] conduct that
serve[d no] legitimate purpose. [This] “Stalking” [was] a willful course of conduct involving
repeated or continuing harassment of [Ross] that would cause a reasonable person to feel
terrorized, frightened, intimidated, threatened, harassed, or molested and that actually cause[d
Ross] to feel terrorized, frightened, intimidated, threatened, harassed, or molested. [This]
‘Unconsented contact’ means any contact with [Ross] that is initiated or continued without [his]
consent or in disregard of that [his] expressed desire that the contact be… discontinued.
Unconsented contact includes, but is not limited to, any of the following:… Entering onto or
remaining on [personal] property owned, leased, or occupied by that individual [and of a nature,
such as a van, which is capable of being occupied as a dwelling and has in fact been used by him
as his dwelling, from 1986 to 2007;] Contacting [Ross] by telephone[;] Placing an object on, or
delivering an object to, property owned,… by [Ross,] who is the target of a willful course of
conduct involving repeated or continuing harassment.”
9th cause of action: violation of court rule, Michigan Appellate Rules § 7.210(3)(a), violating
Ross’ civil rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983; 4th & 14th Amendments; against Lori Willman

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Willman solicited from Ross, and received from him, payment in full for 2 court hearing
transcripts which he needed for his appeal of her employer Schwedler’s ruling, but she has
neither provided them nor communicated with him since his check to her was paid (Πx 150828).
Willman failed in her “Duties of Court Reporter… [by not] furnish[ing] a certificate
stating: that the transcript has been ordered, that payment for the transcript has been made… that
it will be filed… [and] the estimated number of pages for each of the proceedings requested…
The transcript must be filed” but Willman, in cooperation with the other defendants, has not done
so, in order to foil Ross’ assertion of his rights in Michigan’s Court of Appeals. “A court
reporter or recorder failing to comply with the requirements of these rules is subject to
disciplinary action by the courts, including punishment for contempt of court”.
10th cause of action: Larceny: $60, Michigan Penal Code § 750.356(1)(a), violating Ross’
civil rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983; 4th & 14th Amendments; against Lori Willman
Willman solicited (Πx 150819) from Ross, and received from him, payment in full for 2 court
hearing transcripts which he needed for his appeal of her employer Schwedler’s ruling, but she
has neither provided them nor communicated with him since his check to her was paid (Πx
150914).
11th cause of action: failure to supervise (Monell claim), violating Ross’ civil rights under
42 U.S.C. § 1983; 4th & 14th Amendments; against Tim Aho, James Brennan III, Raymond
Coates, Carl Lind, Patti Peretto, C. Joseph Schwedler, Mark Valesano, and Iron County
Pursuant to Monell v. N.Y. City Dept. of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978), Iron
County, the commissioner defendants: Tim Aho, James Brennan III, Raymond Coates, Carl Lind,
and Patti Peretto, C. Joseph Schwedler, Mark Valesano, and/or Does, are liable for Ross’
damages as set forth herein, because their policies, practices, and/or customs caused Ross’
damages.
At all times herein mentioned, defendants Iron County, commissioner defendants: Tim
Aho, James Brennan III, Raymond Coates, Carl Lind, and Patti Peretto, C. Joseph Schwedler,
Mark Valesano, and/or Does 1-10, maintained a custom, policy, and practice to allow violation
of civil rights, including the seizure of personal property of undesireables. Actions done in

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violation of Ross’ civil rights under color of state law constituted a systematic custom, policy,
practice and procedure instituted for denial of the civil rights of Ross and others.
It was the policy and/or custom of Iron County, the commissioner defendants, and Sheriff
Valesano to inadequately supervise and train its officers in conducting seizures of personal
property, including the failure to adequately supervise and train defendant deputies Boehmke,
Cross, and Does, thereby failing to adequately discourage constitutional violations on the part of
its deputies.
As a result of the above-described policies and or customs, deputies Boehmke, Cross, and
Does, believed that their actions would not be investigated or sanctioned, and would be tolerated
and accepted.
The above-described policies or customs demonstrated a deliberate indifference on the
part of the policy makers of Iron County, the commissioner defendants, Sheriff Valesano, and
Does, to the constitutional rights of persons within their jurisdiction, and were the cause of the
violations of Ross’ civil rights as alleged herein.
As a direct and proximate result of the conduct of Iron County, the commissioner
defendants, Sheriff Valesano, and Does, and each of them, Ross suffered the following damages
for which he may recover:
12th cause of action: negligence, violating Ross’ civil rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983; 4th &
14th Amendments; against all defendants
Defendants owed a duty of care toward Ross and were required to use reasonable
diligence to ensure that his rights not be violated, that his buildings not be destroyed, and that his
personal property not be damaged. Their actions and omissions were negligent and reckless,
including but not limited to: failure to know the law or to apply what knowledge they had; failure
to properly hire, train, supervise, and/or discipline employees including the individual
defendants; failure to appreciate the peril to the community of a cabal’s isolating of one
unpopular member for special treatment which they would not inflict on one with a higher
degree of social acceptance; failure to select appropriate methods for their collecting of Ross’
personal property, ie: with a bucket loader and a dump truck; failure to pause and to contemplate
the effects of their actions; and failure to cease their relevant actions.

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As a direct and legal result of their acts and omissions, Ross has suffered damages,
including, without limitation: emotional distress, insomnia, loss of familial relationship, loss of
property, medical expenses, costs of suit, and other pecuniary losses not yet ascertained.
Defendants, as a result of their conduct, are liable for Ross’ losses, either because they
were integral participants in the misconduct or because they failed to intervene when they had
the duty to do so to prevent these violations.
Ross is informed and believes and thereon alleges that the acts of the individual
defendants were willful, malicious, intentional, oppressive, reckless, and/or were done in willful
and conscious disregard of his rights and welfare, thereby justifying the awarding of punitive and
exemplary damages in the amount to be determined at time of trial.
Defendants are sued in their individual capacities.
Ross demands a jury trial.
This Court has jurisdiction in this matter, pursuant to 28 USC § 1331, 1343(a), and 1367;
and on the grounds that: diversity of citizenship exists between plaintiff: Lindsay Clark Ross,
born in 1958, a homeless man in California (his ZIP: 49418 address on pleadings is provided by
MailboxForwarding.com), and each of the defendants who reside in Michigan; and that
Damages in excess of $75,000 are claimed by plaintiff.
Wherefore: Ross’ relief requested, is for his: known actual damages, of $16.89, are for
Iron County’s assessment of a $15 late fee, plus $1.89 interest, paid by Ross (in his efforts to
recover his personal property from defendants), on a debt which defendants have never presented
as payable; compensatory damages exceeding $75,000, include $30,000 for his house, his
library and their contents + $40,000 for damage to trees and shrubbery on his land + $10,000 for
his time lost to his physician-diagnosed “Primary Insomnia” which is due to the meanness of
defendants in their seizure of his personal property + $20,000 for the value he would have found
by spending summers at his home which defendants have destroyed and frightened him away
from + $3,000,000 for Ross’ recovery of his personal property, health, and livelihood; punitive
damages of $30,000,000 justified by the hazard of defendants’ example to children, of bullying
based on resentment of a person’s intelligence; attorney’s fees & costs pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §
1988; and such other relief as the Court may find appropriate.
Motion for delivery

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As defendants describe in their “Motion to Confirm” (Πx 141103) they ordered Ross’
specific performance of certain actions relevant to his desire to recover his personal property
from them. Likewise defendants specific performance should be ordered by the Court for the
same purpose.
Pursuant to Michigan statute § 440.2716(1): “Specific performance may be decreed
where the goods are unique or in other proper circumstances. [And] (2) The decree for specific
performance may include such terms as to… damages, or other relief as the court may deem just.”
Pursuant to Michigan statute § 440.2716(1), (2): “Specific performance may be
decreed… as the court may deem just.”
’[A] court of equity could decree specific performance of a contract to deliver
specific or ascertained goods. Oreland Equipment Co. v. Copco Steel &
Engineering Corp., 310 Mich. 6, 16 N.W.2d 646, 1944 Mich. LEXIS 401 (Mich.
1944)
Defendants, having conducted photographic surveillance of Ross’ occupation of his land, and
having heard his testimony regarding his transportation of his personal property to California,
and their simply putting back what they have taken being unrealistic, could have expected that an
outcome of their seizure of it could call for their being compelled to deliver it to where they
knew that Ross would have it.
Wherefore: Ross requests entry of an order that defendants deliver Ross’ personal
property in their possession, including, but not limited to, those items listed on their inventory in
their “Motion to Confirm Seizure of Property, Release of Judgment Funds, Release of Other
Funds and Affirm Satisfaction of Judgment”, filed November 3, 2014 in Ross v Andreski, I10-
4329-CH (Πx 141103), by delivering them to: 41357 Delco Drive, San Bernardino County (near
Boron), California, within 90 days.
Motion for production of Ross’ personal property
Ross requests an order pursuant to FRCP, Rule 34(a)(1)(B), (b)(B) that defendants
“produce and permit [Ross] to inspect,…[or] test… [the] items in the [defendants’] possession,
custody, or control:… designated [,by their having been seized from Ross,] tangible things” of
his that are in their possession, including, but not limited to, those items listed on their inventory
in their “Motion to Confirm Seizure of Property, Release of Judgment Funds, Release of Other
Funds and Affirm Satisfaction of Judgment”, filed November 3, 2014 in Ross v Andreski, I10-

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4329-CH (Πx 141103), by delivering them to: 41357 Delco Drive, San Bernardino County (near
Boron), California, within 90 days.
Motion to add defendant Lori Willman
Pursuant to FRCP 19(a), and Michigan Court Rule 2.205(A), for her actions which
damage Ross’ interests relevant to the matters at issue, her “presence in the action is essential to
permit the court to render complete relief”
Proof of Service
Defendants are “represented by an attorney” and, pursuant to FRCP Rule 5(a)(1)(B), (D);
(b)(1), (2)(C), this “paper is served under this rule by: mailing it to the person's last known
address” by placing true copies thereof in sealed envelopes, with sufficient postage affixed
thereto, addressed to Hannah Goodman esq, 201 S. 5th Street, PO Box 98, Crystal Falls, MI
49920, and depositing said envelope in a mailbox in California.
I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the United States of America, that the
above is true and correct.
Verification and signature
I, the plaintiff, Lindsay Clark Ross, have reviewed the Complaint and the Motion for
Restraining Order with Expedited Consideration Requested. Regarding the allegations of which
I have personal knowledge, I believe them to be true. Regarding the allegations of which I do
not have personal knowledge, I believe them to be true based on specified information,
documents, or both.
The foregoing document is hereby signed and certified pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(a).
Dated 2014 January 26 by Lindsay Clark Ross, in Los Angeles California
2885 Sanford Ave SW #20348, Grandville, MI 49418
310-892-7883
experts.in.the.law@gmail.com #Chicaugon Chicaugon.com

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Order
Defendants shall deliver Ross’ personal property in their possession, including, but not
limited to, those items listed on their inventory in their “Motion to Confirm Seizure of Property,
Release of Judgment Funds, Release of Other Funds and Affirm Satisfaction of Judgment”, filed
November 3, 2014 in Ross v Andreski, I10-4329-CH (Πx 141103), by delivering them to: 41357
Delco Drive, San Bernardino County (near Boron), California, within 90 days.
Item Sheriff’s description and count Ross’ recollections, of November 2014
1. Large steel sign post 1 Texaco service station stanchion, 1963-style
2. Auto engine, 524807-7 1 Studebaker, 1950, 6-cylinder
3. Auto axle 1 Studebaker, 1950
4. Sink 1 pedestal and basin, iron, 1926
5. Bathtub 1 Kohler, 1926, long, corner-style, iron
6. Oil can 1
7. Compressor motor 1 McCullough 2-stroke generator set, green
8. Transmission 1 Chrysler 727, 1965
9. Corrugated tin (several pieces) steel panels from roof of Ross’ buildings
10. Burned tool boxes 4 burned in cabin fire
11. Wheel barrow 1 steel tub, black
12. Row boat, tag #9059542, 1 Pioneer brand, aluminum
boat #MC0625AJ
13. Life preservers 4 orange
14. Car frame 1 Ford, Model: T
15. Plastic chairs 2 white
16. Plastic table 1 white
17. White Chevy van, 1 Chevrolet 1982 (title, Πx 860912), G-20,
#20-IGCE625F7C7137538 VIN: 1GCEG25F7C7137538
18. Dismantled boat trailer 1 Calkins brand; steel, with axle, wheels, tires
19. Outboard motor 1 red and white
20. Fishing pole 1
21. Camouflage netting 1
22. 3.5 horse power Honda 1
motor GX 110 pump
23. Cassette boom box 3
24. Kenmore dehumidifier 4
25. Television sets 4 Zenith, steel housing (2); RCA, plastic (1)
26. 17 gallon hot water heater 1 short-style
27. Panasonic microwave oven 2
28. Golf caddy 1
29. Miscellaneous scrap wood (many pieces) braced shed, composed of items #42, 49
30. Wood veneered doors 12 from Forest Park High School
31. Outboard motor gasoline tanks 2 steel, painted red
32. Push self-propelled 6 horse 1

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power lawnmower
33. Small charcoal grill 1 Lil’ Smokey brand
34. Broken wheel barrow 1 steel tub, rusted
35. Car seat springs 2 Studebaker, 1950
36. Miscellaneous empty (several)
l-gallon plastic milk jugs
37. Miscellaneous plastic 25 contained item #63
Vitamin containers
38. Tail car lamps 2
39. Non-motorized push 1
lawnmower
40. Steel gas cans 3
41. Snow blower with 1 Sears, Craftsman brand
no engine
42. Steel roofing 8 roof of shed built in 2008
43. Tires and wheels 10 Studebaker, 1950 (5); 1947 split-rims (4)
44. Plastic 1’ x1’ x4’ tall shelves 3 white
45. Steel 2-drawer file cabinet 1
46. Empty tin cans (hundreds) contained item #62
47. 30 gallon bags of water- 4
damaged clothing
48. 50 gallon trash bags of 6
water-damaged paper
49. Steel shelving 7 integral to Ross’ 2008 shed structure
50. Rakes and small shovels (several)
51. Craggier [sic] ss wheels, 15" 4 Cragar brand, Super Sport, 1980
52. Miscellaneous steel tubes (several)
53. Rubber garden hoses (several)
54. 2’ x2’ cardboard box with 1
picture frames inside
55. Furnace fan 1
56. Power craft gas motor 1 Montgomery Wards, 1970, Powercraft,
1-cyl, vertical shaft, with transmission
57. Miscellaneous automobile (several)
parts and trim
58. Speaker systems 2
59. Small electric fans 6
60. Small plastic shop-vac 3
61. Automobile carburetors 5 GM Quadrajet and Chevrolet 2-barrels (3)
62. Nuts, bolts, screws (several) contained in cans, item #46
63. Electronic devices (several) in Akro brand, steel cabinets
_______________ ___________________________________ _____________
date signature of judge bar number

160127§2.14-cv-212 objection to recommendation, 1st Amended, motions #Chicaugon

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