1. On the Brink
Tyler Drumheller
On the eveningbefore ColinPowell’s notorious speechtothe UnitedNationsregardingthe threatfrom
SaddamHussein’sIraq, CIA DirectorGeorge TenettelephonedhisChiefof Europe TylerDrumhellerto
discussthe text. Atthe endof the conversationDrumhellerrepeatedawarningthatthe “Curveball”
reportingpassedonbythe German BND wasnot reliable andshouldnotbe usedinthe address. Tenet
laughedandtoldhimnot to worry. The followingday,asDrumhellerwatchedfromhiscorneroffice on
the fifthfloorof CIA headquarters,Powell outlinedthe case forwarwithIraq usingthe Curveball
material asthe centerpiece of hisargument. Drumheller,aveteranof 30 yearsinthe fieldas a CIA case
officer,wasstunned,askinghischief of staff if theyhadperhapsfailedtosendforwardthe corrections
to Powell’sspeechmade three daysearly;she laughedandsaid,ohwe sentthe correctedversion,they
justignoredyou.
At the same time,Drumhellerreflectedonthe informationjustobtainedbyone of hisbest,andmost
colorful officersfromahighlevel penetrationof the Iraqi government;reportingthatconfirmedhis
doubtsaboutCurveball,statingunequivocallythat,inreal terms,Saddamhadno nuclearor biological
weaponsprograms,andonlyrudimentaryandunreliablestocksof poisongas. Tenetandthe officers
runningthe invasionof Iraqdismissedthisbecause itdidnotfittheirpreconceptions,however;atthat
momentDrumheller’smanwasona whirlwindadventure inJakartaandCairofollowinguponthe
material. Atthispointthe Chief of the NearEast, whose nickname inthe service wasIago,toldhimto
call off the trip,sayingthat“you guysjustdon’tget it,thisis nolongeraboutintel,itisabout regime
change. Sure we may not findWMD in the way described,butwhenwe marchintoBaghdadwe will
findsomething,andfranklynoone will give adamn. Whenthiskicksoff we are goingto have us a
hootenanny.” AtthatmomentDrumhellerrealizedthat hisdaysinthe CIA,all of the yearsin Africa,
Europe,andthe East were goingtoendunhappily,he reflectedthatitwaskindof funnythatsuccessful
careersin the agencyalwaysseemtoendon some note of controversyandfrustration.
Move forwardtwoyears,February2005, Drumhellerispreparingtoretire at52 outof frustrationwith
the Bush administrationandthe entire affair. He iscalledtotestifybeforethe Silverman –Robb
Commissiononthe WMD issue and the start of the war, whichhad now turnedintoa bloodydisaster.
He tellsthe story,ashe alwaysdoes,withoutmakinganyjudgments. Atthe endSenatorMcCain said,
“so theyjustcherrypickedthe intel.” Leavingthe sessionDrumhellerisstoppedbyone of the
committee stafferswhoasksif he wantsto see the testimonyof TenetandhisdeputyJohnMclaughlin.
Havinghad close personal relationshipswithbothmenhe isshockedtosee that neitherone remembers
any warnings,orany of the conflictingintelligence. He now knew whatpeople meantwhentheysaid
your bloodrunscold. Tenetremembersnowarnings,andnevermentionsthe Powell phonecall,while
Mclaughlindenieshavingspoken tohiminlate January2003 whenDrumhellertoldhimthatthe

2. Curveball material mightwellbe afabrication;towhichMclaughlinsaid;“ohmy,I hope not,that is the
onlytangible material we have.”
Whenthe Silverman - Robbreportis publishedTenetandMclaughlin,supportedbyrepublicanmembers
of congressandtheirstaffs attack Drumheller,accuse himof creatinga storyto make himself look
better. Laterin hisbookTenetdedicates9pagesto a convolutedrebuttalof Drumheller’sstatements
and a personal attack. In the endeveryone knowsthe story,asitcomesout inbitsand pieces,and
everythingDrumhellerandhisassistantssaidwasproventrue. Theyalsofindthatthe secondreport
fromthe cabinetmemberwas suppressed fortwoyears;a reportthat if ithad come out may have
blockedBritishparticipationinthe invasionof Iraq(now the subjectof a BBC documentary.) Drumheller
wentonwithhislife,seeinghisargumentincreasinglyacceptedasthe storybehindthe invasion.
Howeverthe argumentsagainsthisactions continue,the commonthemedeteriorating; sowouldyou
rather have Saddamstill inpower.
As Chief of Europe Drumhellerparticipatedinthe earlybuildupforthe Iraq war, evenpriorto9/11;
workingtoidentifythe real nature of the Iraqi threatthroughTurkeyand WesternEurope. Thisbegan
at the mid-nightdinnerwithTenetandthe leadersof the BritishIntelligence servicesonSeptember12,
2001, continuingthe followingSundaywithCoferBlackatthe Britishembassy,where the Britswere
giventhe warplan. Atthe firstmeetingthe seniorBritishofficerpresenturged Tenettofocusonal
Qai’daand notbe distractedbyIraq. Tenetsaidthathe andPowell agreedbutaddedthatthiswasnot
the feelinginthe restof the administration. Astheyleftthe meetingaseniorBritquietly described;“all
quite blood-curdling.”
As time movedontowardthe eventsof the fall 2002, DrumhellersupportedTenetatmanysessions,
includingthe July20, 2002 DowningStreetmemomeetings withthe Chief of SIS. Astime wentonhe
saw thatthe matterwas beingdrivenbypreconceptions,political andbureaucraticinertia,anda
maddeningdesiretotell the Presidentwhathe wantedtohear. Inthe end,havingnaivelyassumedthat
if he reportedaccuratelyregardingCurveballandthe Cabinetsource,he wouldcarryouthisprofessional
responsibility,C/Eurfoundhimself andasmall groupof supportersstandingagainstthe weightof the
entire US government;asMclaughlin wasquotedassaying toone dissentinganalyst, the baron
reportingtosupportthe operationisverylow,while the baronintelligence thatmightstandagainstitis
unbelievablyhigh. ThiswentagainsteverythingDrumhellerhadlearnedinhiscarrier,puttinghimat
oddswiththe institutionthathadshapedhislife.
Andin the endhe is hauntedbythe thousandsof deadand woundedAmericansandIraqis;wondering
whatelse he couldhave done.