2. A dissertation submitted to
Tongji University in conformity with the requirements for
The dual degree in International Relations
The impact of the U.S. pivot to Asia on China’s
foreign policy toward Myanmar
Candidate: BERRY Julien
Student Number: 1593286
School/Department: School of Political Science and
International Relations
Discipline: Law
Major: International Relations
Supervisor: Prof. Wang Chuanxing.
June 1st, 2016
6. Acknowledgements
The realization of a thesis is not always a long quiet river. Yet, certain people greatly helped
this research to reach its destination. In this regard, I first would like to thank my supervisor,
Professor Wang Chuanxing whose precious advises and time have been fundamental to achieve
this work. I also would like to thank my co-supervisor Professor Thierry Kellner for his useful
insights.
I thank Professor Men Honghua, Professor Hu Zhiyong and Doctor Zhou Shixin who were very
kind to give their precious time and arguments for my interviews. I am also grateful to Professor
Rasmus Bertelsen for the great opportunity I was given to assist to an interesting venue on
Myanmar on his behalf.
I also want to show my gratitude to Cai Yongshuai for the time he spent reviewing my Chinese
abstract.
Finally, I would like to thank my colleagues, flatemates and friends Manfredi Tedesco and
Yannick De Brouwer for sharing their ideas on my research and to have shown interest in it.
7. i
Executive summary
This thesis focuses on the impact of the rapprochement between the United States and Myanmar
on China’s foreign policy towards Myanmar. In 2009, after a long period of strong isolation
policy, the incoming American government decided to reach back with Myanmar, but the
relationship between Washington and Naypyidaw really began to improve by 2011. This rapid
warming of ties is, inter alia, illustrated by the visits of Hillary Clinton and Barack Obama to
Naypyidaw, respectively in 2011 and 2012. Until then, Myanmar heavily relied on China. There
is an important gap in the literature since most of the works focusing on the impact of the recent
rapprochement between Naypyidaw and Washington on China-Myanmar relations mostly
investigate this issue through the lens of Myanmar, while very few sought to aboard this issue
on the perspective of China’s foreign policy. Yet, asking how Beijing reacts when Washington
tries to improve its relations with a country which almost entirely relied on China, and which
is located in its direct periphery appears to be an important question.
In order to analyze a possible recalibration in China’s foreign policy towards Myanmar, we
need a particular lens through which we will aboard this issue. We have therefore chosen to
base this thesis upon the assumptions of the offensive realism. On this, John Mearsheimer has
been influential for the theoretical background of this thesis. But, more specifically, the
perspective we use is the one of geopolitics. In this approach, the political importance given to
a certain country, is directly related to its important strategic location. We see Myanmar as a
geopolitical pivot where China and the United States are two geopolitical players quietly
struggling for influence on this country.
We also posed two hypotheses: first, we argue that the US-Myanmar political rapprochement
triggered China’s re-engagement toward Myanmar. Engagement is a tool of foreign policy
which encompasses the use of incentives aiming to shape the behavior of a certain country.
When we started to review the literature on the concept of engagement, we saw that it is difficult
to talk about engagement between two countries already enjoying close relations like Myanmar
and China. Yet, China-Myanmar relationship became more troubled by mid-2011. This is why
we use the term of re-engagement. Browsing several papers on this tool of foreign policy, we
also found that the incentives offered by the engaging country are often assorted with credible
penalties if the target country does not cooperate. This is why, our second hypothesis poses that
this rapprochement initiated China’s strategic coercion toward Myanmar. Strategic coercion
8. ii
refers to the threat of the use force in an attempt to shape the behavior of a target country. In
order to infirm or confirm these two hypotheses, we opted for a methodology combining
documentary research and interviews with experts on the field of China-Myanmar relations,
allowing us to collect primary and secondary data. For this research, we mainly collected
qualitative information, but in order to strengthen our arguments, quantitative data have been
collected as well.
The review of the historical background of China-Myanmar modern relationship is important
to understand the current relations between these two countries. Hence, we have chosen to start
the development of this thesis by analyzing the historical background of China-Myanmar
relations on the particular perspective of geopolitics. In this part, we see that over the past 60
years Myanmar’s geopolitical value fluctuated for China, but the strategic location of this
country remains a critical for China. During the Cold War, China used Myanmar as a buffer
state enabling Beijing to breach out the American containment strategy. Nowadays, Myanmar
allows China to partially resolve the Strait of Malacca’s dilemma, and could also allow China
to projects its navy to the Indian Ocean.
Secondly, we analyze the rapprochement between the United States and Myanmar, and we
attempt to frame it into the broader context of the US pivot to Asia policy, seen by China as a
new containment strategy. The United States’ government claims that the review of its policy
toward Myanmar has nothing to do with China, and was thought with humanitarian concerns.
However, aside of certain evidences, various observers agree that the American rapprochement
with Myanmar encompasses geopolitical thoughts, and was made with China in mind.
The last section aims to demonstrate our set of hypotheses. The first hypothesis is partially
confirmed. We found that China did not re-engage its partner on the economic and military
dimensions. On the one hand, Myanmar appeared to be a more risky market for large Chinese
investments since certain major Chinese projects encountered difficulties with Myanmar’s
government: the projects of the Letpadaung copper mine and the Myistone dam. Thus, China
lowered its flows of foreign direct investments in this country. On the other hand, if the military
dimension is still an important component of China-Myanmar relationship, we did not find that
China used this particular dimension in order to re-engage its partner. However, China did re-
engage Myanmar with its position in the peace talks between an armed rebel group and the
central government. The proposal of this incentive is directly related to the rapprochement
between Naypyidaw and Washington. It has the goal to encourage Myanmar to follow China’s
national interest, and not to get to close to the United States.
9. iii
The second hypothesis cannot be confirmed or infirmed. During this research, we gathered
information indicating that China uses strategic coercion toward Myanmar in order to compete
with the United States. Certain sources support that China is providing moral, financial and
military support for another ethnic rebel group of Myanmar: the United Wa State Army. In the
opinion of those supporting this argument, such support would deter Myanmar to further
balance its relations westward. However convincing, the diversity of the sources remains low
and the rigor of a scientific work does not allow us to draw any definitive conclusion on this
second hypothesis.
It appears that the new mode of relations between the United States and Myanmar impacted
China’s foreign policy toward Myanmar. From an optimistic approach on its relations with
Naypyidaw, with the hope to turn this country into a strategic friend, certain setbacks related to
the new American presence in Myanmar made China adopt a more cautious approach on certain
aspects of its relationship with this country. For example, the Chinese investments in this
country have started to decrease by the end of 2011. But, On the other hand, the new geopolitical
competition with the United States made China more inclined to offer incentives to Myanmar
exceeding the traditional scope of its relationship with this country. In this rare occasion, China
offered to play the good offices in a domestic conflict of a sovereign nation.
We sought to stay coherent with our theoretical framework but it sometimes led to put important
elements aside of the research. Taking these elements in account could lead to a different
conclusion. For example, structural realism assumes that states are opaque units, and this
assumption did not allow us to analyze some aspects of China’s foreign policy toward Myanmar
at the sub unit level. Yet, some information indicate that US-Myanmar political rapprochement
played a role in the development of party to party relations between China and Myanmar.
Perhaps, future researches on the impact of the rapprochement between Myanmar and the
United States on China’s foreign policy toward Myanmar, could adopt a different theoretical
framework, and bring complementary insights on this question.
Looking ahead, making sure that Myanmar does not align its foreign policy with the United
States will remain an important strategic concern for China. However, the traditional non
alignment policy of Myanmar makes it unlikely. On the other hand, now that Myanmar enjoy
a better international environment, it seems unlikely that China will be able to turn this country
into a strategic pawn. However, Myanmar will remain an important source of raw materials
fueling China’s growth, and China will also remain an important provider of foreign direct
10. iv
investments. The interdependency will still characterize the Pauk-Phaw relationship, but China
will probably have to lower its geopolitical aspirations in Myanmar.
摘要
本论文重点研究了美国和缅甸的邦交关系对中国对缅甸外交政策的影响。2009 年，经过长时间
的隔离政策，美国政府决定和与缅甸建立外交关系，华盛顿政府与内比都政府之间的关系从 2011
开始改善。两国关系从希拉里·克林顿和奥巴马分别在 2011 年和 2012 年访问缅甸后迅速升温。在
此之前，缅甸严重依赖中国。关于这方面的研究还是一片空白，因为很多文献都是通过缅甸人的视
角重点研究美国与缅甸邦交关系对于中国与缅甸邦交关系的影响，但是却没有人探讨美国与缅甸的
邦交关系对于中国外交政策的影响。然而，分析北京政府如何处理华盛顿政府试图改善与此前与几
乎完全依赖、并且位于中国周边的缅甸之间的关系这一现状，以及他们的应对措施，都成了一个很
重要的问题。
为了分析中国的外交政策对缅甸政策的调整，我们要重新审视这个问题。故此，我们选择了以
进攻性现实主义为假设基础。对此，本论文以约翰·米尔斯海默研究为理论背景。但是，更具体地
说，我们是用地缘政治的方法来进行分析。在此方法中，对某一国家政治重视的程度，与该国家的
地理位置相联系。我们看到缅甸作为一个地缘政治的支点，中国和美国这个政治玩家都悄悄地争取
影响这个国家。
我们还提出两个假设：第一，我们认为美国与缅甸的邦交触发中国改变对缅甸外交政策。政治
盟约是外交政策的一种工具，它包含了运用激励机制，旨在塑造某个国家的行为。当我们重新回顾
文献中关于政治盟约的概念，我们很难定义中缅两国间政治盟约，因为两者曾都很享受这种亲密关
系。然而到 2011 年中期，缅甸与中国的关系却变得更加复杂。这就是为什么我们使用了重新政治
联姻这个术语。政治联姻主导国提供给目标国相关优惠福利，但是如果目标国不配合的话，主导国
会采取很严厉的制裁措施。政治联姻初期，中国对缅甸的邦交战略具有强制性。强制战略是以武力
威胁为基础对目标国的战略策略进行影响。为了验证或检验这两个假设，我们查阅了中国与缅甸关
系的相关文献并采访了这一方面的相关专家，我们得到了第一手资料。关于这篇论文，我们主要搜
集了相关方面的信息，同时也搜集到了相关的数据资料，以便加强论文的论据。
对中国与缅甸两个国家的关系和背景进行历史分析有助于理解两个国家现在的关系。因此本论
文是以分析地缘整治为重点展开的。在这方面，我们分析了在过去 60 年中，对于中国来说，缅甸
地缘政治价值具有波动性，但是由于地缘战略，缅甸成为一个对中国来说很关键的国家。在冷战期
间，缅甸成为一个帮助北京摆脱美国牵制的缓冲带国家。现如今缅甸允许中国参与马六甲海峡部分
危机调停，以及允许中国军舰进入印度洋。
第二个假设条件是，我们分析了美国与缅甸的邦交关系，我们尝试把它归类到美国重返亚洲的
政治策略框架中，但是对于中国来说，这是一个新的对华牵制策略。虽然美国政府发言人说人此策
略与中国无关，主要是担心此地区的人权状况。然而，我们不难发现，有很多证据表明，以及不同
的观察员都表示美国与缅甸的邦交关系与中国相关，并且是以地缘政治为目的的。
论文的最后一部分主要阐述我们相关假设条件的设置。第一个假设条件被部分证明了。我们发
现中国与缅甸没有在经济上和军事上重新进行政治联姻。自从中国在缅甸投资的两大项目——莱比
塘铜矿和密松水电站——缅甸已成为对中国大额投资的危险国家。中国降低了对缅甸国家投资的份
额。换句话来说，如果军事领域合作关系是两国关系的主要组成部分，中国没必要通过军事施压重
新建立合作关系。然而中国通过与缅甸内部的武装分子和中央政府的和平谈判来建立新的合作关系。
此项提议的诱因是与内比都和华盛顿建立合作关系相关。中国政府鼓励缅甸跟着中国的国家利益走，
并且不要靠近美国。
第二个论点没有被验证。在研究过程中，我们们搜集到了有关中国对缅甸采用强制政策从而和
美国进行竞争相关信息。有些资料显示中国通过对缅甸另外一个少说民族武装分子——佤邦联合军
12. vi
Abstract
By 2011, the United States and Myanmar greatly improved their relations. Few authors sought
to investigate the impact of the U.S-Myanmar political rapprochement on China’s foreign
policy toward this country. We investigate the issue through the broad theoretical framework
of structural realism, but we consider this question on the particular angle of a geopolitical
competition between the United States and China over Myanmar. We use a methodology
composed of documentary research and interviews, allowing us to collect primary and
secondary data. On the one hand, we find that this rapprochement triggered China’s selective
re-engagement towards Myanmar. On the other hand, we are unable to clearly confirm, or
infirm if this rapprochement triggered China’s strategic coercion towards Myanmar.
Keywords: U.S. pivot to Asia, China’s foreign policy, Myanmar
13. vii
Table of contents
1. Introduction...................................................................................................................1
2. State of the art ...............................................................................................................7
3. Historical background of modern China-Myanmar relations...................................11
3.1 Myanmar as a buffer state for China: 1950-1972 ....................................................11
3.2 The downgrading of Myanmar’s geopolitical importance for China: 1972-1988.....15
3.3 From geo-economics to geopolitical considerations: 1988-2011 .............................16
4. The U.S pivot to Asia and the political rapprochement with Myanmar ...................24
4.1 The U.S pivot to Asia .............................................................................................24
4.2 The political rapprochement between the United States and Myanmar.........................26
5. China’s foreign policy toward Myanmar: between re-engagement and strategic
coercion?.............................................................................................................................32
5.1 First hypothesis: China’s re-engagement toward Myanmar..........................................32
5.1.1 Political re-engagement...................................................................................32
5.1.2 Economic re-engagement ................................................................................39
5.1.3 Military re-engagement...................................................................................42
5.2 Second hypothesis: China’s strategic coercion toward Myanmar. ................................47
6. Conclusion ...................................................................................................................51
7. Bibliography ................................................................................................................54
8. Appendices...................................................................................................................63
14. 1
1. Introduction
The strategic location of Myanmar, or Burma1
has for a long time triggered power rivalries for
influence over this country. Lying at the tri-junction of East Asia, South Asia and South East
Asia, Myanmar constitutes a bridge linking China, India and the Southeast Asian nations. The
large coastal façade of Myanmar gives access to the Indian Ocean trough the Bay of Bengal
and the Andaman Sea, and is fueling China’s strategic interests for this country.
In 2009, after a long period of isolation policy, the incoming Obama’s administration decided
to review its approach toward Myanmar, breaking the long-standing international remoteness
of this country. Until then, Myanmar heavily relied on China. The relations between
Washington and Naypyidaw substantially improved by 2011. Among other things, the visits of
Hillary Clinton and Barack Obama to this country, respectively in 2011 and 2012, highlighted
this new path in their bilateral relations. But, despite the humanitarian rhetoric attached to this
change of approach, the United States’ rapprochement with Myanmar is not devoid of strategic
thoughts, and was, at the contrary, made with China very much in mind. In 2011, President
Obama said that the United States would pivot to Asia. This “pivot”, or the American
rebalancing, encompasses economic, diplomatic and military components and is regarded by
China as a new containment policy. The papers consulted for the exploratory research on the
topic of China-Myanmar relationship and the U.S pivot, provided several convincing facts
supporting that U.S-Myanmar political rapprochement should be placed into the broader frame
of the US pivot.
As we investigated the topic of the US pivot to Asia and the relations between Myanmar and
the United States, we found several gaps in the literature. Most of the authors working on this
topic aboard the issue on the perspective of Myanmar and very few of them sought to focus on
China’s perspective. For example, numerous works sought to determine whether Myanmar, as
1
The military junta changed the name of Burma into the name of Myanmar in 1989. Nowadays, the use of Burma
or Myanmar may reflects a particular political position. However, this is not the object of this thesis. We will use
the name of Myanmar for this thesis, and we justify this choice by the fact that the name Burma is not commonly
used in China.
15. 2
it seeks to improve its relationship with the United States, is balancing westward or simply
hedging. Nonetheless, Myanmar retains a critical importance for China. According to Steinberg
and Fan: “Strategically, as in the field of real estate, the geographical position determines the
price. When a great power is perceived to control Southeast Asia, it menaces China’s security.”2
Thus, we would like to answer this research question: “On the angle of geopolitical competition,
how has the US-Myanmar political rapprochement affected China’s foreign policy toward
Myanmar?”
In order to analyze the impact of the rapprochement between Myanmar and the United States
on China’s foreign policy toward Myanmar, we need a particular theoretical lens. We have
chosen to use a realist inspired approach. We justify this choice by the fact that Myanmar is
now subject to a geopolitical competition in which Beijing and Washington see each other as
rivals and compete for influence on Myanmar. Realism is not a unique theory, it can be divided
into three distinct paradigms: classical realism, structural realism and neo-classical realism.
Among all their differences, classical realism and structural realism paradigms mainly differ on
the reason they attribute for the pursuit of power by states. For the classical realism, the human
nature, in the Hobbesian sense, explains for a large part why states are seeking to maximize
their power in the international system. For the structural realism, it is the anarchic structure of
the international system that mainly explains why states seek to be as powerful as possible.3
The neoclassical realism is inspired by the classical realism because it poses that the foreign
policy of a state is dictated by its relative power capabilities. But on the other hand, neoclassical
realism poses that the impact of power capabilities on foreign policy is complex and should be
translated trough intervening variables such as domestic factors.4
This thesis will be based upon the structural realism assumptions. Kenneth Waltz and John. J.
Mearsheimer are two influential figures of the structural realism. Waltz is a defensive realist
while Mearsheimer is an offensive one. The main difference between these two postures of
structural realism is that offensive realism argues that if the states have the capabilities, they
will seize the power. While defensive realism argues that the states should get the right amount
of power to ensure their survival, and that acquiring as much power as possible is not the goal
itself. For the defensive realists, maintaining the balance of power will ensure peaceful
2
STEINBERG, D.I., & FAN, H., Modern China-Myanmar Relations: Dilemmas of mutual dependence, Nordic
Institute of Asian Studies Press, Copenhagen, 2012, p. 303.
3
DONNELLY, J., Realism and International Relations, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2000, p.11.
4
KITCHEN, N., “Systemic pressures and domestic ideas: a neoclassical realist model of grand strategy
formation”, Review of international studies, Vol. 36, No.1, 2010, p. 117
16. 3
stability.5
We will approach this thesis with the offensive posture since, in our opinion, it
describes better the idea of competition between the United States and China. John
Mearsheimer says that: “[There is] this increase of security competition with China which try
to dominate Asia and with the Unites States and China’s neighbors which will try to prevent
China from dominating Asia.”6
Mearsheimer explains that the structural realism has five main assumptions about the
international system: 1) the states are the main actors in international politics, and there is no
higher authority above them. In other words, the structure of the international system is
characterized by anarchy. 2) All states have military capabilities. 3) A state can never be certain
of the intentions of another. 4) Survival is the first priority of all states. 5) States are rational
actors and use rational strategy in order to ensure their own survival.7
These five assumptions
on the international system have three consequences. First, the states mistrust each other.
Second, they are in a situation where they need to ensure their own security. And finally the
states seek to maximize their power because it is the best way to achieve security.8
Within this theoretical framework, the particular perspective that will be used in this thesis is
the one of geopolitics. Defining the concept of geopolitics is a complicated task. Perhaps
Brzezinski is the author who offers the best definition of it. For him geopolitics is: “[…] the
combination of geographic and political factors determining the condition of a state or a region,
and emphasizing the influence of geography on politics.”9
In this approach, the political
importance of a certain area is directly related to its strategical importance. We see Myanmar
through the lens of its important strategical position, which therefore triggers a geopolitical
competition between two major strategic players in Asia Pacific: China and the United States.
Considering the U.S-Myanmar political rapprochement, Myoe argues that: “From a geopolitical
perspective, Myanmar could be considered as a geopolitical pivot that could dictate the behavior
of a geostrategic player like China.”10
Geostrategic players can be defined as “[…] states that
5
STORER, B., “Sino-Burmese Relations As Viewed Through Three Lenses”, Brussels Journal of International
Studies, Vol. 4, 2007, p. 71.
6
OPEN-EDU., “Structural realism-international relations,” 3 October 2014, [Video file], retrieved from:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RXllDh6rD18
7
TOFT, P., “John J. Mearsheimer: an offensive realist between geopolitics and power”, Journal of International
Relations and Development, Vol. 8, 2005, p.383.
8
Ibidem.
9
VERNIER, P., “Main theoretical currents in geopolitical taught in the twentieth century”, L’espace Politique,
Vol 12, No.3, 2011, p.1.
10
MYOE, M. A., “Myanmar’s China policy since 2011: Determinants and Directions”, Journal of Current
Southeast Asian Affairs, Vol.34, No.2, 2015, p.26.
17. 4
have the capacity and the national will to exercise power or influence beyond their borders in
order to alter the existing geopolitical state of affairs.”11
On the other hand, a geopolitical pivot
may be defined as: “[…] the states whose importance is derived not from their power and
motivation but rather from their sensitive location and from the consequences of their
potentially vulnerable condition for the behavior of geostrategic players.”12
With its recent political rapprochement with the United States, Myanmar is now in a situation
where it can play the role of a geopolitical pivot. And as Brzezinski explains: “Sometimes, the
very existence of a geopolitical pivot can be said to have very significant political and cultural
consequence for a more active neighboring geostrategic player.”13
In order to answer to our
research question, we pose two hypotheses:
H1: The U.S-Myanmar political rapprochement has triggered China’s re-engagement
toward Myanmar
H2: The U.S-Myanmar political rapprochement has triggered China’s strategic
coercion toward Myanmar.
In this thesis, we pose that that re-engagement and strategic coercion are two sides of one coin
being used by Beijing in order to influence the behavior of Myanmar in the perspective of a
geopolitical competition with the United States. We argue that China is using a dual strategy,
also known as “carrot and stick” strategy which encompasses both incentives and coercion
aiming to refrain a further political rapprochement between Naypyidaw and Washington, which
could endanger China’s national security and its strategic interests.
Engagement is a tool of foreign policy of an initiating state that encompasses the use of non-
coercive means in order to influence the behavior of a target state. According to Johnston &
Ross: “In practice, engagement may be distinguished from other policies, not so much by its
goals but by its means: it relies on the promise of rewards rather than the threat of punishment
to influence the targets behavior.”14
ForHirschman, the strategic cultivation of interdependence
11
BRZEZINSKI, Z., The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy and its Geostrategic Imperatives, New York,
Basic books, 1997, p.40.
12
Ibidem.
13
Ibidem.
14
JOHNSTON, I. A. & ROSS, R.S., “Engaging China: The management of an emerging power”, Politics in Asia,
1999, p.14.
18. 5
would reshape less powerful states’ behavior. Thus, the weaker states would therefore reorient
their foreign policy in better accordance with the stronger state.15
In function of the incentives, or rewards employed, engagement is said to be political,
economic or military.16
These three dimensions of engagement will be analyzed in order to
demonstrate the impact of the political rapprochement between America and Myanmar on
China’s foreign policy. It is also necessary to precise that we use the term of re-engagement in
the first hypothesis because engagement, per se, is usually not a strategy employed between
states that already enjoy close relationship, like China and Myanmar. Nevertheless, there is a
consensus among scholars working in the field of Myanmar-China relationship that Beijing and
Naypyidaw have taken their distances by mid- 2011. For example, Yun Sun argues that: “2011
marked a year of significant setbacks for China’s relationship with Myanmar.”17
However, according to the literature on the concept of engagement, the incentives rarely come
alone. Haas & O’Sullivan pose that “To be most effectives incentives offered in engagement
strategies almost always need to be accompanied by credible penalties.”18
Therefore, the second
hypothesis uses the term of strategic coercion, which is defined as: “A bargaining tactic that
relies explicitly or implicitly on the threat of force.”19
With the strategic coercion: “The
coercive power is aimed at influencing the other side’s behavior, primarily through its
expectations.”20
Thus, this strategic coercion is at the odds of brute force and rather consists in
showing a credible stick without actually using it. Engagement and coercion share the common
objective to influence a state’s behavior, but these concepts differ in the means they use to
achieve their objective: the first uses incentives, while the second uses the threat of force.
For this thesis, we opted to base the methodology both on documentary research, and on
interviews in order to collect secondary as well as primary data. Concerning the documentary
research, we have collected information from various sources: journalists, Chinese and
Myanmar’s officials, political analysts and scholars. We also used a large range of mediums:
monographs, scientific articles, newspapers, working papers, official reports, official and other
15
MASTUNDO, M., “Economic engagement strategies: theory and practice”, paper prepared for Interdependence
and Conflict, for submission to University of Michigan Press, 2011, p.3.
16
HAASS, R. N. & O’SULLIVAN, M. L., “Terms of Engagement: Alternatives to Punitive Policies”, Survival,
Vol.42, No.2, 2000, p.2.
17
SUN, Y., “China’s strategic misjudgment on Myanmar”, Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs, Vol.31,
No.1, 2012, p.74.
18
HAASS, R. N. & O’SULLIVAN, M. L., Loc. cit., p.10.
19
SLANTCHE, L. B., “Introduction to international relations. Lecture 8: deterrence and compellence.” University
of California, Department of Political Science, San Diego, 2 May 2015, p.1.
20
Ibidem.
19. 6
websites. In order to strengthen our arguments, we also used quantitative information. For
example, we analyze the arms trade between China and Myanmar on the basis of a quantitative
indicator (Trade Indicator Value) which gives a clear picture of trends in weapons transfers
from China to Myanmar over time.
However, analyzing China’s foreign policy almost obligatory requires to balance the opinions
of Western sources with Chinese ones. Yet, numerous Chinese works are not translated into
English. It may sometime constitute a barrier for certain researches made outside of China and
result in biased studies. Hence, studying in China constitutes an opportunity to provide a diverse
cross-section of ideas. We have therefore chosen to conduct semi-structured interviews with
Chinese scholars specialized on the field of China-Myanmar relations. Once conducted, the
interviews have been transcribed. 21
This type of interview is useful because open ended
questions allow the interviewee to raise issues that were not previously taken into consideration
by the interviewer. Aside of the interviews, we proceeded to e-mail exchanges whit experts able
to shed lights on the remaining question marks.
Now, that the research question, the hypothesis, the theoretical framework as well as the
methodology have been explicated, this thesis will be structured as follows: first we review the
literature on the topic of the US pivot to Asia and China-Myanmar relationship. Second, we
retrace the history of China-Myanmar relations since the establishment of their diplomatic
relations, on the particular angle of geopolitics. Third, we introduce the rapprochement between
the United States and Myanmar, establish how this rapprochement might be framed into the
U.S. pivot to Asia policy, and what lies behind the humanitarian rhetoric. Fourth, we seek to
demonstrate our two hypotheses prior to answer to our research question. And finally, we draw
a conclusion resuming our main findings as well as the theoretical limitations of this thesis.
21
The transcriptions of the interview are in the appendices’ section. Please, see appendices n°1and n°2. One of
the interviewee did not give its consent to record the interview. Hence, there is no transcription of this interview.
20. 7
2. State of the art
Since the announcement by the Barack Obama’s administration of the U.S pivot to Asia, in
2011, a lot of scholars have focused on this new strategy which has economic, security and
political goals. For Hafsa Khalid: “Pivot to Asia or more specifically U.S rebalancing,
demonstrates the realization of American strategic thinking towards the threat which Beijing
poses to Washington not only diplomatically but also economically.”22
In his paper, Khalid
compares the old “Hub-and-Spoke” strategy which had the very precise goal to contain Soviet
rise in Asia with the new U.S strategy aiming to contain China’s rise in Asia. The old strategy
relied very much on creating: “[…] close bilateral diplomatic and military links with core allies
to offer effective deterrence against the Soviet rise in Asia.”23
The actual strategy also aims to
contain China and is referred as a “spoke to spoke” strategy. The American role within this
strategy mainly consists to act as a facilitator and inhibiter by promoting its alliance and the
cooperation among Asian nations in order to share the costs of balancing China’s rise.24
Some scholars have focused on the China’s response to the American pivot. For J. A. Reis25
, in
response to the U.S rebalancing initiative, China has undertaken two policies. It can be summed
up as stick and carrot strategy. In the one hand, China provides incentives to Central Asian
countries and Southeast Asian countries, promoting the establishment of the “two silk roads”,
as well as others projects of investments and infrastructures. On the other hand, China
reinforced its assertive policy toward Eastern Asian countries. So, China is using a stick against
the countries more inclined to stand with the U.S, and carrot for the countries which are more
inclined for cooperation. Szczudlik-Tatar shares the same view of the Chinese dual response,
that she calls “two track diplomacy.”26
She also insists on the fact that the future “Chinese
Marshall Plan” is a mean to limit the cooperation of Southeast Asian states with the United
States.
During the 1990’s and the first decade of the present century, much of the papers, articles, books
on Myanmar-China relationship were centered on the study of the so-called alignment between
22
KHALID, H., “Pivot to Asia; US strategy to contain China or to rebalance Asia?” The Washington review of
Turkish and Eurasian affairs, 2015, p.2.
23
Ibid., p.9.
24
Ibid., p.10.
25
REIS, J. A., “China’s dual response to the US pivot“, Asia times, Jan 2014,
http//www.atimes.com/atimes/China/CHIN-01-240114.html., (consulted the 20 November 2015)
26
SZCZUDLIK-TATAR, J., “China’s response to the United states’ Asia-Pacific strategy”, policy paper, No. 41,
2012, p. 4
21. 8
the two neighbors.27
Both countries have been criticized by the international community:
Myanmar for its human rights abuses and China for its unconditional support to the junta. This
idea of alignment was so intense that certain scholars claimed that Myanmar was a pawn or a
satellite of China.28
In parallel of this conception of total alignment, have sparked numerous
unfunded accusations, over China-Myanmar’s military ties. For example, some observers
supported that China had military bases in coastal Myanmar, which it never had.29
By the end of the first decade of the present century, external and internal factors to Myanmar
brought important changes in this country, as well as on its relationship with China. First, the
United States sought to adapt its approach toward Myanmar, more or less at the same time as it
started to pivot toward Asia Pacific. Second, the junta, aware that it could not hold the power
forever, initiated the democratization process. Deprived of influence on the decision making’s
process since the military coup led by Ne Win, the civil society suddenly recovered a certain
amount of power. These changes brought new spotlights on the study of China-Myanmar
relationship.
David Steinberg and Hongwei Fan30
are two influential authors in the field of China-Myanmar
relationship. Their book: Modern China-Myanmar relations: Dilemmas of mutual dependence,
is often quoted by various scholars who focus on the study of this important relationship. This
monography offers a balanced and global analysis of the evolution of the relations between the
two countries, between 1949 and 2012.
Most of the recent works on Myanmar-China relations focus on the impact of Myanmar’s
domestic changes, and their effects on Naypyidaw’s foreign policy toward Beijing. Thus, the
main part of the works on Myanmar-China relationship after 2011 is primarily focused on
Myanmar’s perspective and not on China’s one. Scholars have both been focusing on causes
and effects of Myanmar’s foreign policy change toward China. Maung Aung Myoe31
is one of
the scholars working on this issue. His central point is that Myanmar has been balancing its
relations between Beijing and Washington because it sought to acquire more strategic room of
27
See, for example: HAAKE, J., “The nature and management of Myanmar’s alignment with China: the
SLORC/SPDC years”, Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs, Vol.30, No.2, 2011, pp. 105-140
28
EGRETEAU, R. & JAGAN., L, Soldiers and diplomacy in Burma: Understanding the Foreign Relations of the
Burmese Praetorian State. NUS Press, Singapore, 2013, p. 241.
29
See: SELTH, A., “China military bases in Burma: the explosion of a myth”, Griffith Asia Institute, Regional
Outlook working paper No.10, 2007, 32p.
30
STEINBERG, D.I., & FAN, H., Modern China-Myanmar Relations: Dilemmas of mutual dependence, Nordic
Institute of Asian Studies Press, Copenhagen, 2012, 480p.
31
MYOE, M. A., “ Myanmar’s China policy since 2011: Determinants and Directions”, Journal of Current
Southeast Asian Affairs, Vol. 34, No. 2, 2015, pp. 21-54.
22. 9
maneuverability with its powerful neighbor. Three factors appears to have played a role in the
recalibration of Naypyidaw’s foreign policy toward Beijing: “[…] the growing anti-China
sentiment in Myanmar, growing concern over China’s interference in Myanmar affairs, and the
rapprochement with the United States.”32
On the other hand, among those who have recently studied China-Myanmar relations on
Beijing’s perspective, it is important to underline that several scholars have in common to focus
on the impact of the domestic political change of Myanmar on China’s foreign policy. Sun,33
Li& Char34
, are some of these authors. They agree that the political reforms in Myanmar have
increased the weight of the public opinion in Myanmar’s foreign policy choices. This growing
importance of the civil society in shaping Myanmar government’s decision, coupled with the
growing anti-Chinese sentiment among the Burmese, led to certain setbacks between
Naypyidaw and Beijing, such as the cancelation of the Myistone dam project or the controversy
on the Letpadaung copper mine. It pushed China to activate its public diplomacy in order to
attenuate the negative images of its companies operating in the country.
If the domestic political change appears to be the main factor taken in account to explain the
recalibration of China’s foreign policy toward Myanmar, there has also been a few works
focusing on the impact of the political rapprochement between the United States and Myanmar
on Beijing’s foreign policy toward Naypyidaw. On this perspective, some key authors have
provided remarkable insight for this thesis. Jonathan Chow finds that despite a very close
relationship between China and Myanmar, the recent rapprochement between Naypyidaw and
Washington is an important complication for bilateral relations.35
For him, despite the rhetoric
according to which the People’s Republic of China has no objections with improvements with
Myanmar, the reality is different. China is conscious that this situation is challenging its
interests.36
Jürgen Haacke focuses on what Myanmar became a site of strategic competition
between U.S and China. 37
According to him, the review of the American policy toward
Myanmar in 2009, did not threatened the structural position of Beijing in Myanmar at first, but
32
MYOE, M.A., Loc. cit., p. 21.
33
SUN, Y., “China and the changing Myanmar”, Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs, Vol. 31, No. 4, 2012,
pp.51-77.
34
LI, C. & CHAR, J., “China Myanmar relations since Naypyidaw’s political transition: How Beijing can balance
short-term interests and long-term values.” RSIS working paper, No. 288, S. Rajaratnam School of International
Studies, Singapore, 16 March 2015. 24p.
35
CHOW, J. T., “Keeping a comfortable distance: Myanmar’s reforms, the American Pivot to Asia and
implications for Southeast Asia”, The Asian Institute for policies studies, Issue brief No. 18, 2012. p.3.
36
Ibid., p.8.
37
HAACKE, J., “Myanmar: Now a site for Sino-US geopolitical competition”, IDEAS reports-special report,
2012, pp. 53-60
23. 10
it has taken an unexpected proportion by 2011. This author has similar conclusions than Chow,
as he puts: “The Chinese government may voice understanding for Myanmar efforts to diversify
its international partners, but nevertheless will find any move toward possible alignment
between Washington and Naypyidaw difficult to accept in practice.”38
On the other hand, Haacke, brings important insights on the hidden reasons for a political
rapprochement of the United States with Myanmar, and noted a certain gap between discourse
and intentions. According to him, the American administration has always suggested the idea
that its defrosting initiative toward Myanmar was fundamentally about promoting democracy
and human rights in this country. But for Haacke, it also serves strategic objectives. The
rapprochement was made with China’s rise very much in mind and it has to be included in the
broader strategy of the U.S pivot to Asia.39
Yun Sun40
adopts a similar realist perspective. She examines the Chinese and the American
relations with Myanmar within the broader frame of China-U.S competition. Sun puts that:
“China has perceived new American interests in engaging Myanmar as a threat to their
established role in the country and has tended to view the dynamic in zero sum competitive
terms.”41
Yet, if this author insists on a competitive realist frame, she argues that Sino-American
cooperation in Myanmar if difficult in practice is still possible. She argues that Myanmar could
be a good candidate for such cooperation since the U.S and China share common interests as
they both care about peace, stability and development in Myanmar.42
However, there is still an apparent gap in the literature. Nonetheless useful, few of the
previously quoted works sought to analyze the impacts of the steady improvement between
Naypyidaw-Washington relationships on Beijing’s foreign policy per se. They either treat the
U.S-Myanmar political rapprochement’s factor as being simply one intervening variable
impacting China’s foreign policy toward Myanmar, or do not investigate the impacts of such
rapprochement at all. Thus none of these authors have tried to give a global and in depth picture
of China’s foreign policy recalibration toward Myanmar on the perspective of geopolitical
competition between China and the United States.
38
Ibid., p.58.
39
Ibid., p.56.
40
SUN, Y., “Myanmar in U.S-China relations”, Great powers in changing Myanmar, Issue brief No. 3, 2014, 14p.
41
Ibid., p.11.
42
Ibid., p.8.
24. 11
3. Historical background of modern China-Myanmar
relations
The purpose of this section is to analyze the wax and wane of the modern Sino-Myanmar
relationship through a geopolitical perspective. Geopolitics is a central element to explain the
modern development of this bilateral relationship, it will therefore be used as the stem of the
further development while other perspectives or considerations will be added to complete our
understanding on the evolution of the relationship between Myanmar and China. The
geographic position of Myanmar at the tri-junction of China, Southeast Asia and South Asia
has always played an important role in China’s foreign policy. During the Qing dynasty, China
was already looking to the Indian Ocean through the prism of Myanmar. However, we will see
that because of external and domestic factors to both countries, Myanmar not always had the
same geopolitical value for China.
This section is divided into three subsections. Each reflects a different trend in the geopolitical
importance of Myanmar to China. The first describes a period during which Myanmar had a
vital role for China since it constituted a gap in the American containment policy of the People’s
Republic of China. The second explains the downgrading of the geopolitical value of Myanmar
for China. And the third subsection focus on the period following the foundation of the State
Law and Order Restauration Council (SLORC), during which the strategic interests of China in
the country loaded the geopolitical value of Myanmar passing from an economic and political
friend to a potential strategic partner in Beijing’s expectations. At least, before a series of
setback in part due to the recent political rapprochement between Myanmar and the United
states.
3.1 Myanmar as a buffer state for China: 1950-1972
Myanmar was the first non-communist country to recognize the People’s Republic of China
after its proclamation in 1949. By doing that, Rangoon hoped to reach the favors of the new
communist government. Rangoon and Beijing established diplomatic relations in the 8th
June
1950. Despite this diplomatic effort, the relationship between the two countries remained
particularly cold until 1954.43
43
STEINBERG, D.I., & FAN, H., Op. cit., p.20.
25. 12
This coldness in the early Sino-Burmese relationship finds its explanation in the way both sides
looked at each other. China perceived the outside world through ideological lenses. In the early
Chinese Communist Party’s conception, the world was divided into two camps: the socialist
countries and the imperialist ones. In this configuration, there was no third way. Consequently,
because Burma had decided to be non-aligned with either of the two blocs, it could only be
regarded by China as being in the western camp. At this time, Beijing had no trust for what it
considered to be imperialist countries.44
On the other hand, Rangoon also had its doubts about
the Chinese intentions. Burma was worried by the possibility of a Chinese invasion of its
northern territory, bordering China. This suspicion also fed the need for Myanmar to balance
its relationship with the western camp. Thus, both sides were particularly mistrustful of each
other.45
Meanwhile, the United States were very active in Asia Pacific region, and signed several
defense agreements in order to undertake a strategy of encirclement of China and all the
communist countries in Asia. In 1954, the Chinese Communist Party changed the orientation
of its foreign policy and decided to adopt a realistic approach of foreign relations as China was
facing serious concerns about its national security. Hence, it was decided by the CCP to break
the U.S strategic encirclement by seeking the support of Asian and African countries, and
particularly those located at its periphery.46
In this new configuration, Beijing could not afford
to keep its doctrinal perception of the world any longer. If at first China had an antagonist
attitude toward the non-aligned countries, it soon changed when it sought to vitalize what it was
now seen as areas of peace.47
The geopolitical importance of Myanmar as a buffer state explains
that the shift in Beijing’s foreign policy was particularly significant toward this country. At this
time, the ideological considerations became less important than the geopolitical ones.
Hence, China and Myanmar started to have more interactions and entered in the Pauk-Phaw48
era. However, as Steinberg & Fan put it: “Its [China’s] perception of Rangoon did not change
even when the two countries maintained cordial relations. Beijing Burma’s policy shift in 1954
was nothing more than opportunistic and pragmatic when facing the increasingly national
44
Ibid., p.17.
45
Ibid., p.20.
46
Ibid., p.29.
47
Ibidem.
48
Pauk-Phaw is a Burmese word often used when describing the relationship between Myanmar and China
between 1954 and 1967, as well as the period following 1989. Translated in english, it means: fraternal.
26. 13
security pressures caused by the U.S.”49
Regardless of the motivations, during the following 12
years, Rangoon would progressively become one of the closest Asian partner of China.50
Yet, the Pauk-Phaw relationship would not last forever. As the Sino-Burmese relations were at
their apogee by 1960-1961, significant internal political changes occurred in both countries.
These changes would soon bring an intense perturbation in the “fraternal” relationship between
Rangoon and Beijing.51
In the second of March 1962, the Myanmar’s authorities were removed from power by a
military coup led by Ne Win. This putsch announced the long-standing military ruling in
Myanmar.52
Despite this regime change, Beijing sought to maintain the Pauk-Phaw relationship
with its neighbor, and it recognized almost directly the new government.
Rapidly after Ne Win took power, he proclaimed the Burmese Way to Socialism. The
subsequent application of his socialist program had disastrous consequences for the country,
later turning it into one of the poorest of the planet. In the same time, Ne Win sought to
drastically diminish all the foreign influences in Myanmar, from China as well as the western
countries one. Subsequently of the application of Ne Win’s program, internal tensions raised in
the country, but Beijing, well aware that a destitution of Ne Win would bring a leadership closer
to the West, shown energetic support for the new dictatorship.53
The Chinese Communist Party perceived Burmese Way to Socialism as being entirely fake: “A
bureaucratic capitalism with the outward appearances of socialism.” 54
Although its quiet
ideological disapprobation of the new Myanmar’s regime, the strategic importance of Myanmar
remained more important. China was committed to its realistic foreign policy and sought to
maintain good relations with Myanmar.55
In 1966, the Chinese Cultural Revolution brought important changes in China, as well in its
foreign policy. It shifted again to a policy aiming to: “counter imperialism, revisionism, and all
the reactionaries of various countries, and supporting and aiding the revolutionary movement
in Asia, Africa and Latin America.” 56
With this doctrinal movement, the ideological
49
Ibid., p.14.
50
Ibid., p.34.
51
Ibid., p.41.
52
Ibid., p 70.
53
Ibid., p.86
54
Ibid., p.82.
55
Ibidem.
56
Ibid., p.91.
27. 14
considerations gained more weight in the Chinese foreign policy, and were in consequence
detrimental to realist considerations such as geopolitics. Even though this new shift was not
directly perceived in China’s policy toward Myanmar, it would soon become an important
factor shaping the bilateral relationship.
The Cultural Revolution was not only limited to the Chinese territory, it also spread in Asia and
particularly in the areas where there were large Chinese communities, and Myanmar was one
of those. Therefore, this country could hardly escape the spreading, to some extent, of the
Cultural Revolution in its soil. But, the Ne Win’s government had little patience with the
penetration of the Revolution since it had adopted a policy aiming to diminish all foreign
influences. As a matter of fact, the raising of tensions was unavoidable as China’s revolutionary
foreign policy was entering in conflict with Ne Win’s willingness of pushing forward
independency toward foreign influences.57
As this revolution gradually increased its penetration into the Chinese community of Myanmar,
tensions started to raise in the country. In reaction, it led to the most serious anti-Chinese event
in modern Sino-Myanmar history: the anti-Chinese riots of 1967.58
The Chinese people living
in the country, and their properties were the target of all sorts of violence and ultimately several
people died.
This event led to a series of strong Chinese counter-measures and popular demonstrations
against Myanmar. Briefly, China was asking public apologies from the Burmese authorities
among other appropriate measures aiming to avoid this kind of incidents in the future. While
ideologically disapproving Ne Win’s regime, China had sought, until then, to privileged
friendly relations with Myanmar because of its geopolitical importance. 59
However, as
Rangoon refused to fulfill the Chinese demands, Beijing became more radical in its Myanmar’s
policy. Consequently, in the direct line of its revolutionary policy, the Chinese Communist
Party started to openly support the Burmese Communist Party (BCP) in its armed struggle
against the official government. China began to supply the BCP with weapons, training
advisors, logistic, finances, etc.60
57
Ibid., p.92.
58
Ibid., p.93.
59
FAN, H., “China–Burma Geopolitical Relations in the Cold War”, Current Journal of Southeast Asian Affairs,
Vol.31, No.1, 2012, p.20.
60
STEINBERG, D.I., & FAN, H., Op. cit., p.105.
28. 15
1967 meant the end of the so-called Pauk-Phaw era between China and Myanmar. However,
the bilateral relations were fully renormalized in 1971. The rapidity of the renormalization can
be explained because on the one hand, Rangoon still wanted to pursue a policy of non-alignment
and did not want to further irritate its most powerful neighbor.61
And on the other hand, for
China, the Sino-Soviet dispute and the phobia of an attack from Moscow coupled with the
international isolation caused by the Cultural Revolution, led to a necessary change in the
PRC’s foreign policy. It returned to a practical foreign policy: “A shift in China’s foreign policy
from fanaticism to realism.”62
3.2 The downgrading of Myanmar’s geopolitical importance for
China: 1972-1988
Despite the full reestablishment of the relations in 1971, mistrust remained between the two
neighbors. Hence, from 1972 to 1988, the relations between Myanmar and China entered in a
cordial era, mainly characterized by the attempts from both sides to erase cicatrices from 1967.63
Somehow, Rangoon had lost its strategic importance to China. The clash between China and
the Soviet Union had the immediate consequence of a review of the China’s US policy. The
Soviet Union presented a greater danger to the Chinese interests than the American imperialists.
The rapprochement between China and the United States caused a major change in the Asian
geopolitical configuration.64
America gave up on its policy of encirclement of China and, as a
consequence, its allies started to establish relations with the PRC.65
This broad strategic change
also meant the downgrading of Myanmar’s importance in Chinese foreign policy. This country
was no longer a buffer state that would help China to counter the American containment policy.
By the end of the 1970’s, China had radically changed its perception of the world. The Chinese
Communist Party defined peace and development as two major themes of its policy.66
It was
also the time when Beijing decided to focus its economic modernization, and the: “Isolated and
61
Ibid., p.125.
62
Ibid., p.129.
63
Ibid., p.131.
64
Ibid., p.148.
65
Ibidem.
66
Ibid., p.150.
29. 16
economically backward Burma, which had adopted closed doors policy was not important to
China.”67
In 1988, a country wide pro-democratic uprising directed against Ne Win’s government
occurred in Myanmar. This large movement was strongly suppressed by the Tatmadaw.68
Subsequently, the military junta grabbed the power and created the State Law and Order
Restauration Council (SLORC) leading to a second era of military leadership in Myanmar. The
bloody repression of the pro-democratic movement was widely sanctioned by the international
community and ultimately led to the suspension of international aid and assistance, which
Myanmar heavily relied on.
This regime change coincides with the decline and, then, the collapse of the Soviet Union which
led to the emergence of the United States as the world’s sole power. By 1990, the Chinese
scholars started to talk about the notion of “multipolarity” as opposed to the American
“unipolarity.” A shift in the Chinese foreign policy which was officially confirmed by Jiang
Zemin in 1992 during the XIV Communist Party’s Congress. As Pascal Cabestan says: “In
other words, the United States, became (once again) the main external threat for China.”69
3.3 From geo-economics to geopolitical considerations: 1988-
2011
The fear from a new containment has certainly played a role in upgrading Myanmar’s
importance for China. But the first cause explaining Chinese regain of interest for this county
was economical, not strategical. The important natural resources of Myanmar were essential
for the economic growth of China and especially for the modernization of the province of
Yunnan. The geographical proximity of Myanmar made it a natural spot for Chinese
investments and business developments. Anyway, as we will see, some important strategic
considerations soon came to converge with the economic ones.
The incident of Tiananmen, which occurred one year after the military junta took the power in
Myanmar, strongly isolated Beijing on the international scene. The CCP and the SLORC had
in common their search of international contacts and supports, as both of them were heavily
67
Ibid., p.151.
68
The Tatmadaw is the name of the Myanmar’s armed forces.
69
CABESTAN, J, P., La politique internationale de la Chine, Les Presses de SciencesPo., Paris, 2010, p.41
(personale translation).
30. 17
criticized by the western countries.70
This feature is also a factor that explains the regain of
importance of the Sino-Myanmar relationship. Moreover, in 1989, the collapse of the Burmese
Communist Party removed the main point of disagreement between China and Myanmar. It
split in four main armed ethnic groups: the United Wa State Army (UWSA); the Myanmar
National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA); the Shan State Army East (SSA-E); the New
Democratic Army-Kachin (NDA-K).71
The international isolation of the SLORC pushed their leaders to modify the longstanding
Myanmar non alignment’s policy. It was decided to: “turn to foreign sources to obtain the means
of enforcing law and order and to compensate its major constituency: the Tatmadaw.”72
From
an oblique neutral foreign policy, Myanmar changed its strategy by initiating what would soon
become a strong reliance on China and triggered a turning point in Sino-Myanmar relationship.
During the next two decades, in parallel of a renewal of important personal diplomacy, Beijing
assisted the junta trough three means: economically, militarily and diplomatically in exchange
for its abundant natural resources.
China soon became the closest partner of Myanmar. But at the same time, Naypyidaw realized
that the over reliance on China could be detrimental to its interests. The SPDC, by the end of
the 1990’s initiated a hedging strategy by diversifying its relations with India, Japan and Russia.
The accession of Myanmar to the Association of South East Asian Nations in 1997 was also
thought with the concern of over dependence on China.73
Nevertheless, despite this hedging
strategy, the Sino-Myanmar ties greatly increased and the relationship progressively became
more asymmetrical as the first decade of the 21th century took its course.
As the pressures from the external environment were rising, the fear from an American invasion
was deeply anchored in the junta’s leadership. There was also the fear from a possibility of the
border insurgents groups to be supported by the foreign powers in order to overthrow the
SLORC.74
Thus, for the military junta, modernizing the army became a priority. Myanmar was
very dependent on the Chinese military assistance for the modernization of the Tatmadaw.
Beijing became the major provider of training, weapons, and infrastructural support. According
70
SUTTER, R., “ Myanmar in Contemporary Chinese foreign policy- Strengthening common grounds,
managing differences”, Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs, Vol.31, No.1, p.43.
71
YI, H., “Myanmar’s policy toward the rising China since 1989”, RCAPS working papers, 2013, p.9.
72
ARNOTT, D., “China Myanmar relations”, in Challenges to democratization in Burma: Perspectives on
multilateral and bilateral responses, International Institute for democracy and international assistance (IDEA),
2001, p.69
73
YI H., Loc. cit., p.11.
74
HAAKE, J., “The nature and management of Myanmar’s alignment with China: the SLORC/SPDC years”,
Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs, Vol.30, No.2, 2011, p.116.
31. 18
to Yi: “The military aid from China reinforced the Myanmar Tatmadaw to transform itself from
a small, weak counterinsurgency force into a powerful defense force capable of major
conventional operations.”75
Because Myanmar could not count on international technical and financial assistance, and could
not get this assistance from another regional power than China, and that the last one was
counting on the Myanmar resources to fuel its growth, it was decided to foster bilateral
economic cooperation. 76
Thus, China started to realize large scale investments, mostly
composed of industrial and infrastructure projects that the Burmese authorities were unable to
achieve themselves, and which would provide better access to Myanmar resources such a gas
and hydroelectric power.77
According to Haacke: “In the mid 2000’s, mining, hydropower and
energy exploration became thus the major sectors of cooperation.”78
With the dramatic Chinese growth, strategic thoughts will increase the weight of the
geopolitical importance of Myanmar for China. In 1993, the previously self-sufficient China
became an oil importer.79
Since then, the oil’s consumption of the country has steadily increased,
and has grown from the simple to the double in nearly two decades.80
In order to sustain its
economic rise, China needs energy. In fact, economic growth and energy supply (and thus
consumption) are two related variables. Over the 1990s and then the first decade of the present
century, China became increasingly dependent on oil imports from Africa and the Middle
East.81
The imported oil from these regions have to transit via sea routes, and are therefore going
through the Indian Ocean to Chinese ports in the Pacific Ocean. It is estimated that around 85
percent of its oil imports are passing through the Indian Ocean.82
As a result, China is very
dependent on sea lines of communication. Since the end of the Second World War, and the
capitulation of Japan, the US Navy controls the coastal East and Southeast Asia.83
Besides,
some chock points like the Strait of Malacca, also controlled by the American Pacific fleet, are
binding itinerary for Chinese oil tankers.
75
YI, H., Loc. Cit., p.10.
76
HAAKE, J., Loc. Cit., p.115.
77
YI, H., Loc. Cit. p. 9.
78
HAACKE, J., Loc. Cit., p.115.
79
DENEMARK, A., PATEL, N., “China’s Arrival: A Strategic Framework for a Global Relationship”, Working
paper, Center for a New American Security, September 2009, p.49.
80
Ibidem.
81
Ibidem.
82
ARZ, W., “Geostrategische Bedeutung von Birma/Myanmar nimmt zu”, Eurasisches Magazin, 5 August 2011,
[Online] http://www.eurasischesmagazin.de/artikel/Myanmar-gewinnt-an-geopolitischer-Bedeutung/20110805
(consulted the 25 April 2016).
83
Ibidem.
32. 19
China did not directly consider this situation as a security issue, but by the beginning of the
2000’s, it realized that this over-reliance on energy imports was a vulnerability that the United
States could exploit in case of conflict. This issue pushed the CCP to adapt its concept of
security and started to talk about energy security.84
In 2003, at the Central Economic World
Conference, Hu Jintao talked for the first time about oil security.85
For our concern, this new kind of security implied two things: first, the sea lines of
communication into the Indian Ocean have to be protected. Therefore, China has to be able to
project naval power into the Indian Ocean, and achieve a “two Oceans” strategy. This is also
how was born the “string of pearl” strategy aiming to safeguard the Chinese maritime roads
into the Indian Ocean by the creation of a chain of ports in friendly countries such as: Pakistan
(Gwadar), Sri Lanka (Hambantota), Bangladesh (Chita Gay).86
Second, there was a need to find
alternatives roads in order to avoid to go through the chock points controlled by the US Navy.
Myanmar is a key pawn in this strategy because its geographical situation gives to China a
strategic transit corridor to the Indian Ocean. In this regard, the most important example of
Sino- Burmese cooperation in Myanmar, encompassing high strategical concerns for China, are
the oil and gas pipelines linking Kyaukphyu deep sea port (in the Bay of Bengal) to Kunming
(in the Yunnan province). Initially, the project was thought by Yunnan’s academics in 2004,
but it only reached a definitive agreement between the two governments in 2009. Four fifth of
Chinese imported oil has to transit through the Strait of Malacca,87
a chicken neck located
between Singapore, Malaysia and Indonesia. As we said earlier, this Strait is controlled by the
U.S Navy, and the PLA’s Navy cannot militarily afford to secure it. In case of conflict, Beijing
would be cut off from a large part of its energy imports. These investments of 2.54935 billion
USD88
have the primordial strategic interest to partially counter the so-called dilemma of
Malacca. Indeed, China cannot entirely resolve its problem of over-reliance on sea line oil
transportation by this way, because it is estimated that the pipelines could only reduce around
10 percent of the oil, with 12 million tons per year, transiting through the Strait of Malacca to
China.89
84
STEINBERG, D.I., & FAN, H., Op. cit., p.164.
85
Ibid., p.165.
86
ARZ, W., Loc.cit.
87
STEINBERG, D.I., & FAN, H., Op. cit., p.168.
88
Ibid., p.171.
89
Ibid., p.173.
33. 20
Since the State Law and Order Restauration Council took the control of Myanmar, China has
played the role of the biggest diplomatic backer of the regime. China is reluctant to the
international community’s and foreign powers’ interferences in domestic matters from other
countries, and has also been criticized by the west, and particularly with Tiananmen. Thus, it
finds common ground with nations subject to external pressures, and uses its position at the
United Nation Security Council (UNSC) to lessen the impositions of sanctions.90
In 2007, the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC)91
decided to remove its subsidies
on the price of fuel. It led to a mass demonstration, called the Saffron Revolution, led by
thousands of Buddhist monks. The government repressed the civilian protest with a strong
brutality. The event produced widespread sanctions from the international community.
Consequently, the United States and United Kingdoms proposed a draft resolution at the United
Nation Security Council in order to react to the junta’s crackdown.92
China vetoed it and sought
to play the intermediate between Naypyidaw93
and the international community. One year later,
a cyclone divested Myanmar. The refusal of the Myanmar’s administration to accept the
international assistance increase the side effects of the disaster and approximatively 140 000
people94
perished. Despite the regain of international criticisms, China still strongly backed the
military regime. The Chinese support for the junta during the first decade of the 21th century is
similar to the one offered to the Ne Win administration in the 1960’s. In both cases, the
geopolitical importance of Myanmar was more important than China’s disapprobation on the
way both administrations were handling their domestic issues.
In 2009, the junta announced that it would move to a civilian administration and held national
elections on the 7 November 2010. If it seemed sudden and unexpected for western observers,
a transition to a civilian government was imagined long before by the junta, well aware that it
could not hold the power forever.95
The political transition was truly planned and announced in
2003, when the military administration promised a “seven step road map toward disciplined
democracy.” But prior moving to a civilian government, the junta had to find an acceptable way
out. According to Gaens: “For the military, a gradual shift toward a tailored democratization
90
SUTTER, R., Loc. cit., p.30.
91
In 1997, the State Law and Order Restauration council (SLORC) renamed itself State Peace and Development
Council (SPDC).
92
Ibid., p.44.
93
The capital of Myanmar was moved from Rangoon to Naypyidaw in November 2005.
94
Ibid., p.45.
95
GAENS, B., “Political change in Myanmar: filtering the murky waters of disciplined democracy”, FIIA Working
Papers, February 2013, p.8.
34. 21
process had to go hand in hand with the protection of their own interests and those of their
families. Their impunity and avoidance of accountability for crimes committed therefore had
to be inscribed constitutionally.”96
Since the beginning of its announcement, China welcomed the steps for political transition to a
civilian government. At many occasion Beijing also pushed to accelerate steps for democracy,
since it was very much in favor for such process. Even if it meant to reestablish some links with
the West, China found certain incentives for a civilian government in Myanmar. First, the strong
Chinese diplomatic support of the junta had the direct consequence that China exposed itself to
international criticisms. For example, after the Saffron Revolution, calls for the boycott of the
Chinese Olympic Games raised around the world. Thus, with this shift to a civilian
administration China would not be criticized anymore for its support to Myanmar.97
Second, China was supporting alone the burden of helping the modernization of Myanmar, thus
sharing this cost with the West- and especially with the U.S- was welcome by China. Besides,
Beijing did not expect any major political change, nor a strong rapprochement with the West
that could threatened its strategical interest. As Sun puts it: “In China’s original analysis, the
new Myanmar’s government would be only marginally and negligibly different from the
military government and after its legitimacy was strengthened by the elections, Naypyidaw
would embark on a long journey of slow political changes and economic reforms.”98
In 2011, showing China’s interest for stability and the continuity of its economic privileges, as
well as Chinese enthusiasm in the democratization process in Myanmar, Jia Qinglin, an
important member of the politburo travelled to Myanmar in order to congratulate the newly
elected President, Then Sein.99
In May, Sino-Myanmar relations evolved to a “comprehensive
strategic partnership.” If, for the last two decades, Beijing sought to avoid the term strategic
because it did not want to feed the suspicion of the West and India, it was the first time that the
Chinese Communist Party referred to the Sino-Myanmar relationship as being strategical.100
Furthermore, one of the four main component of this partnership was to increase the “mutual
96
Ibid., p.9.
97
STEINBERG, D.I., & FAN, H., Op. cit., p.359.
98
SUN, Y., “China and the changing Myanmar”, Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs, Vol. 31, No. 4, 2012,
p.58.
99
SUTTER, R., Loc. cit., p.46.
100
SUN, Y., “China’s strategic misjudgment on Myanmar”, Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs, Vol.31,
No.1, 2012, p.80.
35. 22
strategic support.” This partnership points out that China was expecting that this relation would
grow “closer and closer.”101
Although Beijing has used this partnership as a diplomatic tool for a longtime and that some
would argue that there is nothing new about that (after all, China has signed strategic
partnerships with countries like France), it is quiet surprising that it waited that long to signed
a strategic partnership with a country with which it has such an important relationship. Sun
explains that: “The coincidence of the timing (the partnership was established directly after the
election of a new civilian government) is a clear indication of China’s changing perception of
Myanmar from a political and economic friend (under the junta) to a strategic partner (under
the legitimate civilian government).”102
The introduction, the same year, of the “bridgehead strategy” by the Chinese Communist Party
is strongly related to the Chinese expectation to increase the strategical value of the Sino-
Burmese relationship. The goal of the bridgehead strategy is to turn the province of Yunnan
into a strategic passageway for the Chinese strategic engagement to the Indian Ocean.103
We
talked earlier about the oil and gas pipelines relying Kunming to Kyaukphyu’s deep water port
on the perspective of energy security. Besides that, there is an agreement between both countries
to build transport and communication infrastructures (highway and railway) along the pipelines
linking the Bay of Bengal to the inner province of Yunnan. When these infrastructures will be
achieved, Beijing believes that it will acquire an outlet in the Indian Ocean.104
This “bridgehead strategy” has to be included into the broader frame of “the two ocean
strategy.” If some Chinese analysts have insisted on the geo-economics aspects of the
bridgehead, it also encompasses high geopolitical expectations: it will be a Chinese gateway to
the Indian Ocean that will diminish its overreliance on the Pacific; increase the Chinese
influence on South and Southeast Asian nations; and act as a counterbalancing tool toward the
Indian influence in these areas.105
However, certain effects resulting from the political transition in Myanmar quickly came to
prove Beijing wrong on its previous assumptions that it was only a little more than a rebranding
of the military junta and that real changes would take long to materialize. Even tough Myanmar
101
Ibidem.
102
Ibid., p.81.
103
Ibid., p.83.
104
FAN, H., “China look south: China-Myanmar transport corridor,” Ritsumeikan International Affairs, Vol.10,
2011, p.51.
105
Ibid., p.60.
36. 23
had initiated a political dialogue with the United States by 2009, and that China initially
welcomed it, by 2011 the U.S-Myanmar political rapprochement started to take an unexpected
trend. The same year, the construction of Myistone dam, a very large Chinese infrastructure
project worth US $ 3.6 billion106
was suspended by Then Sein. This event was astonishing for
China since it never imagined that Myanmar would risk to anger its most important political
and economic partner by canceling a project of this importance.107
It is important to underline that the Chinese Communist Party mostly attributed this setback to
one external factor: the political rapprochement with Myanmar and the United States. Even
though the project was polemical, China could not believe that the public opinion had played
an important role in shaping the new government’s decision. To China, the dam was the
collateral damage of the Myanmar’s quest of rewards from America by proving that: “Myanmar
was not a client state of China and truly represent people.”108
This could only reinforce the hunch
that the new American policy toward Myanmar was part of a geopolitical plan with the goal to
undermine Chinese strategic interests and influence in Myanmar. 109
Later, the leak of
confidential documents form the U.S embassy in Naypyidaw proved that Washington had
funded the anti- Myistone activities of certain NGO’s in Myanmar, confirming China’s doubts
on the well-funded of the recent American presence there.110
China’s foreign policy toward Myanmar sometimes greatly fluctuated, but nonetheless, the
geographic importance of Myanmar has always been in the center of Chinese leadership’s
attention. During the past twenty years, China managed to create close links with Naypyidaw,
and, at the end of the first decade of the present century, Beijing’s expectations to realize its
“two ocean” dream through the prism of Myanmar were high. Yet, the rapid development of
the political rapprochement between Myanmar and the United States shed shadow on the bright
Chinese geopolitical future in Myanmar, and opened the door for a geopolitical competition
with its greatest front runner: the United States.
106
SUN, Y., “China, Myanmar face Myitsone dam the truths”, Asia Times, speaking freely, 19th
February 2014,
(online): http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Southeast_Asia/SEA-01-190214.html, (consulted the 9 May 2016).
107
SUN, Y., “China’s strategic misjudgment on Myanmar”, Loc. cit., p.85.
108
Ibidem.
109
Ibidem.
110
Foreign staff, “WikiLeaks cables: Americans funded groups that stalled Burma dam project”, The Guardian,
30 September 2011, [Online] http://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/sep/30/us-embassy-cables-burma-
myitsone-dam(consulted the 10 March 2015).
37. 24
4. The U.S pivot to Asia and the political rapprochement
with Myanmar
The purpose of this section is to establish the existing links between the U.S. pivot policy and
the review of the American policy toward Myanmar. It is composed by two subsections: the
first one aims to globally introduce the American pivot policy. The second subsection will
explore the U.S-Myanmar political rapprochement and its underlying geopolitical interests,
behind the official humanitarian rhetoric.
4.1 The U.S pivot to Asia
When the Obama’s administration took office, in January 2009, the United States were
suffering ten years of unproductive work in the Asia-Pacific region. This was mostly due to the
lack of attention of the Bush’s administration for this area. Indeed, “the war on terror”, as the
central element of the American foreign policy agenda after the 9/11, did not help. America
seemed to be more preoccupied by threats than strategic thinking, and was: “to a large extent,
disconnected from regional trends, perceptions and realities.”111
This political vacuum offered a
royal way for a Chinese charm offensive in Asia Pacific which progressively weakened the old
“hub and spokes” network of alliances that America was enjoying in the region.
In 2011, it was decided by the American administration to adopt a strategy aiming to reinforce
its leadership in Asia Pacific. Four major developments led to this new policy. First, the growing
importance of Asia Pacific region for the economic future of the United States. Second, China’s
rise and its growing military presence in the area. Third, the end of the military operations in
Iraq and Afghanistan. Finally, the willingness to reaffirm the American commitment to Asian
nations.112
Hence, the American foreign policy was rebalanced from Middle East to Asia Pacific. In
November 2011, while he was doing a speech at the Australian Parliament House, President
Obama stated: “As president, I have, therefore, made a deliberate and strategic decision - as a
111
FIORI, A., PASSERI, A., “Hedging in search of a new triangle of non-alignment: Myanmar between China
and the US”, SISP Conference, Florence, 12-14 September 2013. p. 2.
112
MANYIN, M.E., & al. “Pivot to the Pacific? The Obama Administration ‘s rebalancing toward Asia.” Report
for Congress, Congressional Research Service, Report No. 42448, 2012, p.2.
38. 25
Pacific nation, the United States will play a larger and long-term role in shaping this region and
its future, by upholding core principles and in close partnership with our allies and friends.”113
Obama’s administration identified six lines of action that would restore a strong American
leadership in the area: “1) Strengthening bilateral security alliance; 2) Deepening US working
relationship with emerging powers; 3) Engaging with regional multilateral institutions 4)
Expending trade and investments 5) Forging a broad based military presence 6) Promoting
democracy and human rights.”114
The U.S pivot is in fact a global package containing economic, diplomatic and notably military
aspects. Over the past 5 years, the American administration has taken several important steps
implementing its rebalancing strategy. For instance, the U.S have launched the Transpacific
Partnership as a new investment and trade platform for Asia Pacific. America has also stationed
2500 soldiers in Australia and coastal battleships in Singapore. The U.S diplomacy toward
Asian nations has been particularly reactivated. As part of this revitalization, the United States
have also sought to take a deeper involvement in maritime security issues by stressing its
concerns about freedom of navigation -with a particular focus on the South China Sea disputes,
and has set these issues at the agenda of the East Asian Summit (EAS). In 2012, The U.S
Department of Defense announced that around 60 percent of the American navy resources will
be relocated into the Asia-Pacific.115
With the dramatic rise of China in economic as well as in military domain, Asia Pacific turned
into a nodal point for geopolitical changes. Twenty years of double digit economic growth and
heavy investments in military capabilities made Beijing a serious regional power.116
Despite
Washington claims that the pivot is not directed toward a particular country, few would doubt
that the pivot is an attempt to influence Beijing’s foreign policy choices by shaping the regional
environment through alliances network. In the last section, we referred to the American
containment strategy toward China during the Cold War. Nowadays, Chinese analysts and
scholars emphasize the geopolitical component of this new strategy, claiming that its first goal
is to contain China.117
If the western scholars writing on the pivot to Asia do not usually insist
113
Office of the Press Secretary, “Remarks by the president Obama to the Australian Parliament” The White
House website. https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/11/17/remarks-president-obama-australian-
parliament ( consulted the 22th February 2016)
114
HAACKE, J., “Myanmar: Now a site for Sino-US geopolitical competition”, Loc. cit., p.55.
115
PANT, H. V., & JOSHI, Y., “The American Pivot and the Indian Navy”, Naval War College Review, Vol.68,
No.1, 2014, p.48.
116
Ibid., p.49.
117
LIAO, K., “The Pentagon and the Pivot”, Survival, Vol.55, No.3, 2013, p.95.
39. 26
very much on the idea of containment, it is somehow deeply anchored in numerous Chinese
works. As Xiang says with humor: “Of course Washington never admits that this amounts to a
containment strategy but, if something looks like a duck, quacks like a duck and walks like a
duck, it is a duck.”118
Regarding the geopolitical situation in Southeast Asia, the American pivot has generated more
tensions and more competition between Washington and Beijing in the region than before. To
some extent, the increase of the U.S diplomatic, financial, and security resources in Southeast
Asia was equally responded by China that has also stepped up efforts to strengthen its relations
with Southeast Asian nations. For Wu: “It was the US pivot that caused China to give even
higher priority and devote more resources to the (Southeast Asian) region.”119
4.2 The political rapprochement between the United States and
Myanmar
During the last two decades, the relationship between Rangoon and Washington was mostly
driven by humanitarian concerns and the willingness of Washington to reestablish democracy
in Myanmar. The relations between the two countries progressively degraded after the
repression of the countrywide pro-democratic demonstration against the Burma Socialist
Program Party by Myanmar’s military and the subsequent establishment of the State Law and
Order Restauration Council. In 1990, the Junta cancelled the results of the legislative elections
after the victory of the National League for Democracy (NLD) led by Aung San Suu Kyi, who
was impeached to exercise her role of prime minister of Myanmar and placed in house arrest.120
Following these events, Washington decided to downgrade the diplomatic relationship from
ambassadors to chargé d’affaires. Due to human right violations and democratic embezzlement,
it was decided by the Reagan administration, and maintained under the presidencies of H. W.
Bush and B. Clinton, to suspend the small military and economic aid program and to impose
sanctions such as bans on trade.121
118
XIANG, L., “China and the Pivot”, Survival, Vol.54, No.4, 2012, p.117.
119
WU, X., “Not backing down: China responds to the US rebalance to Asia”, Global Asia, Vol.7, No.4, winter
2012, p.20.
120
LEE, K.L., & al. “China’s Realpolitik Engagement with Myanmar”, China Security, Vol. 5, No.1, 2009, p.103.
121
FIORI, A., PASSERI, A., Loc. cit., p.19.
40. 27
In 2005, under the presidency of G.W. Bush, the previous hardline got reinforced when
Condoleezza Rice and the Senate ranked Burma second in the “outpost of tyranny.”122
In 2007,
the relations between Myanmar and the United States reached their lowest level when
Naypyidaw orchestrated the suppression of the Buddhists monks during the Saffron Revolution.
Following the junta’s harsh repression of this popular uprising, the United States managed to
set Myanmar at the agenda of the United Nations Security Council, and proposed to take
concrete steps against the military junta. However, the draft resolution was double vetoed by
China and Russia. During this period, there has been no bilateral trade between both states.123
However, these two decades have proven to be inefficient and more harmful than beneficial to
the people of Myanmar. Thus, when the Obama administration arrived to office in 2009, the
old stance toward Myanmar changed from political isolation to pragmatic engagement.124
The
central idea of this pragmatic engagement was that United States should influence the political
developments in Myanmar by initiating senior level discussions with the Junta.125
This policy review toward Myanmar was first announced in February 2009, while the Secretary
of State, Hillary Clinton, was visiting Indonesia. From this moment started high official
discussions between the U.S government and the Junta. That year, Stephen Blake, director of
the Office for Mainland Southeast Asia at the U.S State Department, met with several senior
officials from Myanmar.126
In August, the U.S senator Jim Webb went to Myanmar and had
discussions with Then Sein. Myanmar, well aware of its heavy reliance on China, welcomed
this initiative. A gain of strategic room to maneuver, coupled to the financial incentives due to
possible release of economic sanctions, made Myanmar more inclined to engage in talks with
the United States.127
These high level meetings, in parallel with the insurances of change from the authorities of
Myanmar, have set a favorable ground for further contacts between the two countries. In
September 2009, the State Department made another announcement, which stated that there
will be further discussions with the senior officials of the military junta, while the sanctions
122
Ibidem.
123
Ibidem.
124
Ibidem.
125
HAACKE, J., “The United States and Myanmar: From antagonists to security partners?” Journal of Current
Southeast Asian Affairs, Vol.34, No.2, 2015, p.59.
126
MYOE, M. A., “ Myanmar’s China policy since 2011: Determinants and Directions”, Journal of Current
Southeast Asian Affairs, Vol. 34, No. 2, 2015, p.35.
127
PENEAU, D., “Should Beijing Worry about Warming Relations between Burma and the United States?”, China
Perspectives, [Online] URL: http:// chinaperspectives.revues.org/6192, 2013, No. 2013-2, p.77 (Consulted the 09
May 2016).
41. 28
would remain.128
Moreover, Hillary Clinton affirmed that the U.S as well as the EU would
vacate the sanctions toward Myanmar, if the country was carrying out serious reforms.129
The second round of intense talks finally led to the appointment of Dereck Mitchell as the first
special representative and coordinator of the United States for Myanmar with the rank of
ambassador, 130
breaking with the past two decades of charge d’affaires and publically
indicating a serious warming in bilateral relations. In December 2011, Hillary Clinton paid an
historical visit to Myanmar, and she was told by the newly elected President, Then Sein, that
Naypyidaw would go through political reforms and would re-connect with the international
community. The year after, Then Sein took several measures highly appreciated by Washington
and the international community: the release of political prisoners, the roadmap for peace
between the central government and the ethnic minorities, as well as the subsequent ceasefires
arrangements, and most of all the possibility for Suu Kyi to participate to the national
elections. 131
The same year, Clinton said that both countries would initiate diplomatic
normalization and exchange ambassadors.132
Since then, US- Myanmar relations have grown significantly. Inter alia, a major sign of this
development is the visit of Barack Obama in Myanmar in 2012. He was the first U.S. president
who ever had visited the country. While he was at the University of Yangon for a speech, he
said: “When I took office as a president, I sent a message to those governments who ruled by
fear. We will extend a hand if you are willing to unclench your fist. So today, I have come to
keep my promise and extend the hand of friendship.”133
The visit of the President Obama,
initiated a new shift in the attitude of Washington toward Myanmar, as Haacke says: “[…]from
a relatively cautious approach towards Naypyidaw focusing on “action-for-action”, to a position
where Washington aims to play a major supporting role in helping to deliver Myanmar’s
political, economic and social reforms.”134
Confident that Myanmar would carry on the changes, the U.S. have taken several initiatives to
help the country to push the reforms forward: vacating significant aid funds for healthcare and
economic development; the provision of various financial and law trainings; the activation of
the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) with a multi-million
128
MYOE, M. A., Loc. cit., p.35.
129
Ibidem.
130
Ibidem.
131
HAACKE, J., “The United States and Myanmar: From antagonists to security partners?” Loc. cit., p.60.
132
MYOE, M. A., Loc. cit., p.35.
133
Ibid, p.36.
134
HAACKE, J., “The United States and Myanmar: From antagonists to security partners?” Loc. cit. p.63.
42. 29
program; the demonstration of the advantages of the American democratic system as well as
the advancement of human and civil rights. 135
If the rapprochement was careful at the
beginning, it has taken a dramatic trend since 2011, and has simultaneously be seen by Beijing
as a sabotage of its strategic interests and influence in Myanmar. According to Sun: “The speed
and depth of U.S.-Myanmar rapprochement greatly exceeded China’s original expectations.”136
The new U.S. policy toward Myanmar also encompasses military and economic components.
In 2012, Leon Panetta, the American Secretary of Defense, announced that its administration
was ready to build military ties with Myanmar.137
In 2012, for the first time, Naypyidaw was
invited to join the Cobra-Gold operation, the largest multinational military exercise in the
Region Asia Pacific. Myanmar’s army thus sent two of its officers as observers in February
2013.138
The same year, the President Then Sein visited the United States. At this occasion,
both countries signed a Trade and Investment Framework, showing the mutual interest that
Myanmar and America have in expending trade and investments which each other.139
As a
proof, the total trade in goods between Myanmar and the United States increased from 65. 7
million USD in 2012 to 371.2 million USD in 2015.140
To sum up, two elements have been decisive to the improvement of the U.S– Myanmar
relations. First, the adoption by Washington in 2009 of the pragmatic engagement conducted
by the incoming Obama administration. Second, the comprehensive reforms in Myanmar,
initiated in 2011 by the President Thein Sein.
It is undeniable that the shift in the US policy toward Burma was thought with humanitarian
concerns. However, there is also little doubts that other interests were at stakes. When the
American policy toward Southeast Asian nations was seen as directly undertaken with concerns
about PRC, Obama’s administration sought to express that its pragmatic policy toward
Myanmar was not about China, but rather about the promotion of democracy and human rights
135
Ibidem.
136
SUN, Y., “Myanmar in U.S-China relations”, Great powers in changing Myanmar, Issue brief No. 3, 2014,
p.4.
137
BALDOR, L. C., “Panetta open to military relations with Myanmar” U.S.News, 2 June 2012, [Online]
http://www.usnews.com/news/world/articles/2012/06/02/panetta-open-to-military-relations-with-myanmar,
(consulted the 5 March 2016).
138
SHAERF, D., “Burma observers participate in US-led military exercise in Thailand”, Voice of America,
February 19, 2012, [Online] http://www.voanews.com/content/burma-observers-participate-in-us-led-military-
exercies-in-thailand/1601193.html, (consulted the 2 March 2016).
139
Ibidem.
140
UNITED STATES CENSUS BUREAU, “Trade in goods with Burma”, Website of United States Census
Bureau, [Online] https://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/balance/c5460.html (consulted the 23 February 2016).
