A quick guide to assessing your organization's position in the digital disruption journey. By Chris Bradley and Clayton O’Toole, document from Mc-Kinsey

1. An incumbent’s guide to
digital disruption
Incumbents needn’t be victims of disruption if they recognize the
crucial thresholds in their life cycle, and act in time.
by Chris Bradley and Clayton O’Toole
A decade ago, NorwegianmediagroupSchibstedmadeacourageous
decision:toofferclassifieds—themainrevenuesourceofitsnewspaper
businesses—onlineforfree.Thecompanyhadalreadymadesignificant
Internetinvestmentsbutrealizedthattoestablishapan-Europeandigital
strongholdithadtoraisethestakes.Duringapresentationtoaprospective
Frenchpartner,SchibstedexecutivespointedoutthatexistingEuropean
classifiedssiteshadlimitedtraffic.“Themarketisupforgrabs,”theysaid,
“andweintendtogetit.”1 Today,morethan80percentoftheirearningscome
fromonlineclassifieds.2
Aboutthatsametime,theboardsofotherleadingnewspaperswerealso
weighingtheprospectofadigitalfuture.Nodoubt,likeSchibsted,theyeven
developedanddebatedhypotheticalscenariosinwhichInternetstart-ups
siphonedoffthelucrativeprintclassifiedadstheindustrycalledits“rivers
ofgold.”Maybethesescenariosappearedinsufficientlyalarming—ormaybe
theyweretoodangeroustoevenentertain.Butveryfewnewspapersfollowed
Schibsted’spath.
1
Raf Weverbergh, “8 lessons in how to disrupt yourself from Schibsted,” Whiteboard, whiteboardmag.com.
2
Annual report, Schibsted, 2015, schibsted.com.
May 2016

2. 2
Fromthevantagepointof2016,whenprintmedialieshatteredbyatsunami
ofdigitaldisruption,it’seasytotalkaboutwhomadethe“right”decisionand
whothe“wrong.”Thingsarefarmurkierwhenoneisactuallyinthemidst
ofdisruption’suncertain,oft-hypedearlystages.Inthe1980s,steelgiants
famouslyunderestimatedthepotentialofmini-mills.Inthe1980sand1990s,
thepersonalcomputerputastoptoDigitalEquipmentCorporation,Wang
Laboratories,andotherminicomputermakers.Morerecently,webretailers
havedisruptedphysicalones,andAirbnbandUberTechnologieshave
disruptedlodgingandcartravel,respectively.Theexamplesrunthegamut
fromdatabasesoftwaretoboxedbeef.
Whattheyhaveincommonishowoftenincumbentsfindthemselveson
thewrongsideofabigtrend.Nomatterhowstrongtheiringoingbalance
sheetsandmarketshare—andsometimesbecauseofthoseveryfactors—
incumbentscan’tseemtoholdbackthetide.Thechampionsofdisruption
arefarmoreoftentheattackersthantheestablishedincumbent.Thegood
newsforincumbentsisthatmanyindustriesarestillintheearlydaysofdigital
disruption.Printmedia,travel,andlodgingprovidevaluableillustrationsof
thepathincreasinglymorewillfollow.Formost,it’searlyenoughtorespond.
What’sthesecretofthoseincumbentsthatdosurvive—andsometimeseven
thrive?Oneaspectsurelyrelatestotheabilitytorecognizeandovercomethe
typicalpatternofresponse(orlackthereof)thatcharacterizescompanies
intheincumbent’sposition.Thismostoftenrequiresacuityofforesight3
andawillingnesstorespondboldlybeforeit’stoolate,whichusuallymeans
actingbeforeitisobviousyouhavetodoso.AsReedHastings,theCEOof
Netflix,pointedout(rightashiscompanywasmakingtheleapfromDVDs
tostreaming),mostsuccessfulorganizationsfailtolookfornewthingstheir
customerswantbecausethey’reafraidtohurttheircorebusinesses.Clayton
Christensencalledthisphenomenontheinnovator’sdilemma.Hastings
simplysaid,“Companiesrarelydiefrommovingtoofast,andtheyfrequently
diefrommovingtooslowly.”4
Weareallgreatstrategistsinhindsight.Thequestioniswhattodowhenyou
areinthemiddleofitall,underthereal-worldconstraintsandpressures
ofrunningalarge,moderncompany.Thisarticlelooksatthefourstagesof
disruptionfromanincumbent’sperspective,thebarrierstoovercome,and
thechoicesandresponsesneededateachstage.
3
For McKinsey’s analysis of the economic sources of digital disruption, see Angus Dawson, Martin Hirt, and Jay
Scanlan, “The economic essentials of digital strategy,” McKinsey Quarterly, March 2016, McKinsey.com.
4
Netflix Media Center, “An explanation and some reflections,” blog entry by Reed Hastings, September 18, 2011,
media.netflix.com.

3. 3
WHERE YOU ARE AND WHAT YOU NEED
ItmayhelptoviewthesestagesonanS-curve(exhibit).Atfirst,young
companiesstrugglewithuncertaintybutareagileandwillingtoexperiment.
Atthistime,companiesprizelearningandoptionalityandworktoward
creatingvaluebasedontheexpectationoffutureearnings.Thenewmodel
thenneedstoreachsomecriticalmasstobecomeagoingconcern.Asthey
mature—thatis,becomeincumbents—mind-setsandrealitieschange.The
establishedcompanieslockinroutinesandprocesses.Theyironoutand
standardizevariabilityamidgrowingorganizationalcomplexity.Inthe
questforefficiency,theyweedoutstrategicoptionsandrewardexecutives
forsteadyresults.Themeasureofsuccessisnowdeliveryofconsistent,
growingcashflowsinthehereandnow.Theoption-richexpectancy
offuturegainisreplacedbythetreadmillofcontinuallyescalating
performanceexpectations.
Exhibit
Incumbent’s
business
model
Disruption introduces an incumbent to a new journey.
QWeb 2016
Incumbent response
Exhibit 1 of 2
Disruption is …
Incumbent’s move
Common barrier
Detectable Clear Inevitable New normal
Acuity Action Acceleration Adaptation
Myopia Avoidance
of pain
Inertia Fit
New business
model
Faint signals
with lots of
noise
Emergence
of a validated
model
Critical mass
of adoption
achieved
At scale and
mature
Profit
Time
Decisive
impact
Negligible
impact

4. 4
Inadisruption,thecompanyheadingtowardthetopoftheoldS-curve
confrontsanewbusinessmodelatthebottomofanewS-curve.Thecircle
ofcreativedestructionisrenewed,butthistimetheshoeisontheotherfoot.
Twoprimarychallengesemerge.ThefirstistorecognizethenewS-curve,
whichstartswithasmallslope,andoften-unimpressiveprofitability,and
atfirstdoesnotdemandattention.Afterall,mostcompanieshaveshown
theyareverygoodatdealingwithobviousemergencies,rapidlycorralling
resourcesandactingdecisively.Buttheystruggletodealwiththeslow,quiet
riseofanuncertainthreatthatdoesnotannounceitself.Second,thesame
factorsthathelpcompaniesoperatestronglytowardthetopofanS-curve
oftenhinderthematthebottomofanewone.Becausedifferentmodesof
operationarerequired,it’shardtodotherightthing—evenwhenyouthink
youknowwhattherightthingmightbe.
Thissimplifiedmodel,ofanewS-curvecrashingslowmotionintoanold
one,givesusawaytolookattheproblemfromtheincumbent’sperspective,
andtoappreciatetheactualchallengeseachmomentpresentsalongthe
way.Inthefirststage,thenewS-curveisnotyetacurveatall.Inthesecond,
thenewbusinessmodelgetsvalidated,butitsimpactisnotforcefulenough
tofundamentallybendtheperformancetrajectoryoftheincumbent.In
thethirdstage,however,thenewmodelgainsacriticalmassanditsimpact
isclearlyfelt.Inthefourth,thenewmodelbecomesthenewnormalasit
reachesitsownmaturity.
Let’sstepthroughthesestagesinsequenceandseewhatisgoingon.
STAGE ONE: SIGNALS AMIDST THE NOISE
Inthelate1990s,PolyGramwasoneoftheworld’stoprecordlabels,with
arosterboastingBobMarley,U2,andtopclassicalartists.But,in1998,
CornelisBoonstra,CEOofPolyGram’sDutchparent,KoninklijkePhilips,
flewtoNewYork,metwithGoldmanSachs,andarrangedtosellPolyGram
toSeagramfor$10.6billion.Why?BecauseBoonstrahadcomeacross
researchshowingthatconsumerswereusingthenewrecordableCD-ROM
technology(whichPhilipscoinvented)largelyforonepurpose:tocopy
music.Inhindsight,thisisagoodexampleofhow,intheearlystagesof
disruption,demandbeginsto“purify”andlosethedistortionsimposedonit
bybusinesses.5
TheMP3formathadbarelybeeninvented,NapsterwasameregleaminSean
Parker’seye,andPolyGramwasridingatthetopofitsS-curve—butBoonstra
5
Dawson, Hirt, and Scanlan, “The economic essentials of digital strategy.”

5. 5
detectedthefirstsignsoftransformationalchangeanddecidedtoactswiftly
anddecisively.Withinadecade,compact-discandDVDsalesintheUnited
Statesdroppedbymorethan80percent.Similarly,TelecomNewZealand
foresawthedeterioratingeconomicsofitsYellowPagesbusinessandsoldits
directoriesbusinessin2007for$2.2billion(anine-timerevenuemultiple)6
whilenumerousothertelecomcompaniesheldonuntilthebusinesseswere
nearlyworthless.7
Thenewspaperindustryhadnoshortageofsimilarsignals.Asearlyas1964,
mediatheoristMarshallMcLuhanobservedthattheindustry’sreliance
onclassifiedadsandstock-marketquotesmadeitvulnerable:“Shouldan
alternativesourceofeasyaccesstosuchdiversedailyinformationbefound,
thepresswillfold.”TheriseoftheInternetcreatedjustsuchasource,and
start-upssuchaseBayopenedanewwayforpeopletolistgoodsforsale
withouttheuseofnewspaperads.Schibstedwasoneoftheearliestmedia
companiestobothanticipatethethreatandactontheopportunity.Asearly
as1999,thecompanybecameconvincedthat“TheInternetismadefor
classifieds,andclassifiedsaremadefortheInternet.”8
It’snotsurprisingthatmostotherspublishersdidn’treact.Atthisearlystage
ofdisruption,incumbentsfeelbarelyanyimpactontheircorebusinesses
exceptinthedistantperiphery.Inshort,theydon’t“need”toact.Ittakesrare
acuitytomakeapreemptivemove,likelyinthefaceofconflictingdemands
fromstakeholders.What’smore,itcanbedifficulttoworkoutwhichtrends
toignoreandwhichtoreactto.
Gainingsharperinsight,andescapingthemyopiaofthisfirststage,requires
incumbentstochallengetheirown“story”andtodisruptlong-standing(and
sometimesimplicit)beliefsabouthowtomakemoneyinagivenindustry.
Asourcolleaguesputitinarecentarticle,“Thesegoverningbeliefsreflect
widelysharednotionsaboutcustomerpreferences,theroleoftechnology,
regulation,costdrivers,andthebasisofcompetitionanddifferentiation.They
areoftenconsideredinviolable—untilsomeonecomesalongtoviolatethem.”9
Theprocessofreframingthesegoverningbeliefsinvolvesidentifyingan
industry’sforemostnotionaboutvaluecreationandthenturningitonits
headtofindnewformsandmechanismsforcreatingvalue.
6
Annual report, Telecom New Zealand, 2006, investors.sparknz.co.nz.
7
“Telecom gets $2 billion for Yellow Pages,” New Zealand Herald, March 26, 2007, nzherald.co.nz.
8
Ken Doctor, “Schibsted’s stunning classifieds and services business,” Neiman Lab, February 14, 2012,
neimanlab.org.
9
Marc de Jong and Menno van Dijk, “Disrupting beliefs: A new approach to business-model innovation,”
McKinsey Quarterly, July 2015, McKinsey.com.

6. 6
STAGE TWO: CHANGE TAKES HOLD
Thetrendisnowclear.Thecoretechnologicalandeconomicdrivershave
beenvalidated.Atthispoint,it’sessentialforestablishedcompaniesto
committonurturingnewinitiativessothattheycanestablishfootholdsin
thenewsphere.Moreimportant,theyneedtoensurethatnewventureshave
autonomyfromthecorebusiness,evenifthegoalsofthetwooperations
conflict.Theideaistoactbeforeonehasto.
Butwithdisruption’simpactstillnotbigenoughtodampenearnings
momentum,motivationisoftenmissing.Evenasonlineclassifiedsforcars
andrealestatebegantotakeoffandCraigslistgainedmomentum,most
newspaperpublisherslackedasenseofurgencybecausetheirownmarket
shareremainedlargelyunaffected.Andit’snotlikethenewplayerswere
makingmillions(yet).Therewasnoperformanceenvy.
ButSchibsteddidfindthenecessarymotivation.“Whenthedot-combubble
burst,wecontinuedtoinvest,inspiteofthefactthatwedidn’tknowhow
weweregoingtomakemoneyonline,”recallsthen-CEOKjellAamot.“We
alsoallowedthenewproductstocompetewiththeoldproducts.”10 Offering
freeonlineclassifiedsdirectlycannibalizeditsnewspaperbusiness,but
Schibstedwaswillingtotaketherisk.Thecompanydidn’tjustact;it
actedradically.
Now,let’sopenlyacknowledgehowharditisforacompany’sleadersto
committosupportingexperimentalventureswhenthebusinessisclimbing
theS-curve.WhenNetflixdisrupteditselfin2011byshiftingfocusfrom
DVDstostreaming,itssharepricedroppedby80percent.Fewboardsand
investorscanhandlethatkindofpainwhenthenear-termneedisdebatable.
Thevaguelonger-termthreatjustdoesn’tseemasdangerousasthe
immediatehardship.Afterall,incumbentshaveexistingrevenuestreamsto
protect—start-upsonlyhaveupsidetocapture.Additionally,management
teamsaremorecomfortabledevelopingstrategiesforbusinessestheyknow
howtooperate,andarenaturallyreluctanttoenteranewgamewithrules
theydon’tunderstand.
Theupshot:mostincumbentsdabble,makingsmallinvestmentsthatwon’t
flattentheircurrentS-curveandguardagainstcannibalization.Usually,
theyfocustooheavilyonfindingsynergies(alwayslookingforefficiency)
ratherthanfosteringradicalexperimentation.Theillusionthatthisdabbling
10
See “CBS case competition 2009 case video. Schibsted classified media,” February 25, 2009, youtube.com.

7. 7
isgettingyouintothegameisalltootemptingtobelieve.Manynewspapers
builtonlineadd-onstotheirclassifiedbusinesses,butfewwerewillingtorisk
cannibalizingthetraditionalrevenuestreams,whichatthispointwerestill
farbiggerandmoreprofitable.Andremember,atthistime,Schibstedhad
notyetbeenrewardedforitsearlyaction:itsresultslookedprettysimilarto
itspeers.
Intime,ofcourse,bolderactionbecomesnecessary,andexecutivesmust
committonurturingpotentiallydilutiveandsmallnext-horizonbusinesses
inapipelineofinitiatives.Managingsuchaportfoliorequireshightolerance
forambiguity,anditrequiresexecutivestoadapttoshiftingconditions,both
insideandoutsidethecompany,evenastheaspirationtodeliverfavorable
outcomesforshareholdersremainsconstant.11 Thedifficultyisthetendency
toprotectthecoreattheexpenseoftheperiphery.Notonlyaretherestrong,
short-termfinancialincentivestoprotectthecore,butit’salsooftenpainful
toshiftfocusfromcorebusinessesinwhichonehas,understandablyenough,
anemotionalaswellasafinancialinvestment.
Nosmallpartofthechallengeistoacceptthatthepreviousstatusquo
isnolongerthebaseline.GroceryretailerAldihasdisruptednumerous
incumbentsgloballywithitslow-pricemodel.Aldi’sfuturesuccesswas
visiblewhileAldiwasstillnascentinthemarket.Yetmanyincumbent
supermarketschosetoavoidthenear-termpainofsharpeningentryprice
pointsandimprovingtheirprivate-labelbrands.Inhindsight,thosemoves
wouldhavebeenhighlynet-present-valuepositivewithrespecttoavoided
loss—asAldihascontinueditsstronggrowthacrossthreecontinents.
STAGE THREE: THE INEVITABLE TRANSFORMATION
Bynow,thefutureispoundingonthedoor.Thenewmodelhasproved
superiortotheold,atleastforsomecriticalmassofadopters,andthe
industryisinmotiontowardit.Atthisstageofdisruption,toaccelerateits
owntransformation,theincumbent’schallengeliesinaggressivelyshifting
resourcestothenewself-competingventuresitnurturedinstagetwo.Think
ofitastreatingnewbusinesseslikeventure-capitalinvestmentsthatonly
payoffiftheyscalerapidly,whiletheoldonesaresubjecttoaprivate-equity-
styleworkout.
Makingthistoughshiftrequiressurmountingtheinertiathatcanafflict
companieseveninthebestoftimes.12Infact,ourexperiencesuggests
11
Lowell L. Bryan, “Just-in-time strategy for a turbulent world,” McKinsey Quarterly, June 2002, McKinsey.com.
12
Stephen Hall, Dan Lovallo, and Reinier Musters, “How to put your money where your strategy is,” McKinsey
Quarterly, March 2012, McKinsey.com.

8. 8
stagethreeisthehardestoneforincumbentstonavigate.Ascompany
performancestartstosuffer,tighteningupbudgets,establishedcompanies
naturallytendtocutbackevenfurtheronperipheralactivitieswhile
focusingonthecore.Thetopdecisionmakers,whousuallycomefromthe
biggestbusinesscenters,resisthavingtheirstill-profitable(thoughmore
sluggishlygrowing)domainsstarvedofresourcesinfavorofunproven
upstarts.Asaresult,leadershipoftenunderinvestsinnewinitiatives,even
asitimposeshighperformancehurdlesonthem.Legacybusinessescontinue
toreceivethelion’sshareofresourcesinstead.Bythistime,theveryforces
causingpressureinthecoremakethebusinessevenlesswillingandableto
addressthoseforces.Thereflextoconserveresourceskicksinjustwhenyou
mostneedtoaggressivelyreallocateandinvest.
Boardsplayasignificantroleinthisaswell.Fartoooften,boardsare
unwilling(orunable)tochangetheirviewofbaselineperformance,further
exacerbatingtheproblem.Oftenaboard’s(understandable)reaction
toreducedperformanceistopushmanagementevenhardertoachieve
ambitiousgoalswithinthecurrentmodel,ignoringtheneedforamore
fundamentalchange.Thisonlyworsensproblemsinthefuture.
Furthercomplicatingmatters,incumbentswithinitiallystrongpositions
cantakefalsecomfortatthisstage,becausetheweakerplayersinthe
industrygethithardestfirst.Thenarrative“itisnothappeningtous”isall
tootemptingtobelieve.Thekeyistomonitorcloselytheunderlyingdrivers,
notjustthehindsightoffinancialoutcomes.Asthetalegoes,“Idon’thave
tooutrunthebear...Ijusthavetooutrunyou.”Exceptwhenitcomesto
disruption,thatstrategymerelybuystime.Ifthebearkeepsrunning,itwill
gettoyou,too.
Thetypicaltraditionalnewspaperoperator,likewise,wasn’tblindtoashift
takingplace,butitrarelymanagedtomountaresponsethatwassufficiently
aggressive.OnenotableexceptionwasformerdigitallaggardAxelSpringer.
TheGermanmediacompanywas“amereInternetmidget,”accordingto
FinancialTimesDeutschland,untilitleaptintoactionin2005.Itwentona
shoppingspree,acquiring67digitalpropertiesandlaunching90initiatives
ofitsownby2013.13 LikeSchibsted,itsawthevaluepoolsmovingtoonline
classifiedsandmadetheleap.Thelessonisthatincumbentscanwineven
withalatestart,providedthattheythrowthemselvesinwholly.Today,digital
mediacontributes70percentofAxelSpringer’searningsbeforeinterest,
taxes,depreciation,andamortization.Thecorehasbecometheperiphery.
13
Raf Weverbergh, “Strategy: How Axel Springer calculated and then bought its way to European digital
dominance,” Whiteboard, whiteboardmag.com.

9. 9
Togeneratetheaccelerationneededatthisstageofthegame,incumbents
mustembarkonacourageousandunremittingreallocationofresources
fromtheoldtothenewmodel—andshowawillingnesstorunnewbusinesses
differently(andoftenseparately)fromtheoldones.Perhapsnothing
underlinesthispointmorethanAxelSpringer’s2013divestmentofsome
ofitsstrongestlegacyprint-mediaproducts,whichaccountedforabout15
percentofitssales,toGermany’snumber-threeprint-mediaplayer,Funke
Mediengruppe.Theseproducts,suchastheBerlinerMorgenpost,ownedby
AxelSpringersince1959,werepreviouslyacorepartofthecorporateDNA
andemblemsofitsjournalisticculture.Butnomore.Theyrealizedthatthe
futurevalueofthebusinesswasnotjustaboutthecontinuationoftoday’s
earningsbutratherreliedonthecreationofaneweconomicengine.
Whenincumbentslackthein-housecapabilitytobuildnewbusinesses,they
mustlooktoacquiretheminstead.Herethechallengeistotimeacquisitions
somewherebetweenwherethebusinessmodelisprovedbutvaluationshave
yettobecometoohigh—allwhilemakingsuretheincumbentisa“natural
bestowner”ofthenewbusinessesitacquires.Examplesofthisapproachin
thefinancialsectorincludeBBVA’sacquisitionofSimpleandCapitalOne’s
acquisitionofthedesignfirmAdaptivePath.
STAGE FOUR: ADAPTING TO THE NEW NORMAL
Inthislatestage,thedisruptionhasreachedapointwhencompanieshave
nochoicebuttoacceptreality:theindustryhasfundamentallychanged.For
incumbents,theircostbaseisn’tinlinewiththenew(likelymuchshallower)
profitpools,theirearningsarecavingin,andtheyfindthemselvespoorly
positionedtotakeastrongmarketposition.
Thisiswhereprintmediaisnow.Theclassifieds’“riversofgold”havedried
up,makingsurvivalthefirstpriority,andsustainabilityandgrowththe
second.In2013,theCEOofAustraliamediacompanyFairfaxMediatold
theInternationalNewsMediaAssociationWorldCongress,“Weknowthat
atsometimeinthefuture,wewillbepredominantlydigitalordigital-only
inourmetropolitanmarkets.”14 True,somelegacymastheadshavecreated
powerfulonlinenewspropertieswithhightraffic,butdisplayadvertising
andpaywallsaloneareforthemostpartnotenoughtogenerateathriving
revenueline,andsocialaggregationsitesarecontinuingtodriveunbundling.
Typicalmediafirmshavehadtoundertakethemultiplepainfulwavesof
restructuringandconsolidationthatmaybeneededwhiletheyseedgrowth
andlookforwaystomonetizetheirbrands.
14
Clive Mathieson, “Fairfax chief Greg Hywood sizes up the end of papers,” The Australian, May 1, 2013,
theaustralian.com.au.

10. 10
Fortheincumbentswho,likeAxelSpringerandSchibsted,havemadethe
leap,theadaptationphasebringsnewchallenges.Havingbecomemajority
digitalbusinesses,they’refullyexposedtothevolatilityandpacethatcomes
withtheterritory.Thatis,theiradaptationresponseislessaone-timeevent
thanaprocessofcontinualself-disruption.ThinkofFacebookupending
itsbusinessmodeltogo“mobilefirst.”15 Youcan’tbesatisfiedwiththefirst
pivot—youhavetobepreparedtokeepdoingit.
Insomecases,incumbents’capabilitiesaresohighlytiedtotheoldbusiness
modelthatrebirththroughrestructuringisunlikelytowork,andanexitis
thebestwaytopreservevalue.EastmanKodakCompany,forexample,may
havebeenbetteroffleavingthephotographybusinessmuchfaster,because
itsnumerousstrategiesallfailedtosaveit.Whenabusinessisbuiltona
legacytechnologythatiscategoricallydifferentfromthenewstandard,even
perfectforesightofthedemiseoffilmorCDswouldnothavesolvedthecore
problemthatthedigitalreplacementisfundamentallylessprofitable.
Thesimplefactisthatnewprofitpoolsmaynotbeasdeepaspriorones(as
manynewspaperpublishershavecometobelieve).Thechallengeistoadapt
andstructurallyrealigncostbasestothenewrealityofprofitpools,and
acceptthatthe“newnormal”likelyincludesfarfewer“riversofgold.”
Therealityis,mostindustriesarestillinstagesone,two,andthree.That’s
whytheearlyexperiencesofmedia,music,andtravelcompaniescanprove
sovaluable.Thesefirstindustriestotransitiontoadigitalrealityhighlight
thesocialandhumanchallengesthatbytheirnatureapplytocompaniesin
mosteveryindustryandgeography.
Chris Bradley is a principal in McKinsey’s Sydney office, where Clayton O’Toole is a consultant.
The authors wish to thank Adam Bird, Jules Carrigan, Angus Dawson, Dennis Ducro, and Jay
Scanlan for their contributions to this article
Copyright © 2016 McKinsey Company. All rights reserved.
15
Jessica Guynn, “Facebook soars as ‘mobile first’ company,” USA Today, January 28, 2015, usatoday.com.