1. 2010
POL SCI -914
Cameron Stearns, Joseph Wantoch
[GREAT LAKES WATER POLICY AND WAUKESHA’S DIVERSION REQUEST]

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There is a great deal of speculation about the future of Waukesha County’s water supply.
Whether or not to tap Lake Michigan for water remains a highly contested issue among residents
and politicians. There are concerns about what the effect of a Lake Michigan diversion to
Waukesha may have on the city of Milwaukee, and the region as a whole. (Hill, 1999) There is
speculation of benefits to one or both municipalities, as well as consequences. In order to be
granted access to Lake Michigan water, Waukesha must gain permission of eight Great Lakes
governors and meet several standards imposed by the Great Lakes Water Compact. Enacted in
2008, the Compact is a marvel of complexity, and by nature of the agreement, intertwines many
levels of government on a considerable scale. In order to better understand the future of Great
Lakes water management, we can examine the history of water policy, current political climate,
previous diversion attempts, and established academic theory to improve the estimated effects of
the potential Waukesha diversion.
History of Water Policy
The Great Lakes are the world’s largest system of surface freshwater, and as the issue of “access
to water” is increasingly thought of as an impending future crisis, a comprehensive policy plan to
protect the natural resource is necessary.
The Great Lakes Water Compact is not the first implementation of water policy concerning the
Great Lakes region. There is a history of intergovernmental agreements dating back to 1909 that
attempt to regulate diversions of water. All of these policy actions were born out of difficulties
and disputes apportioning the water supply. These agreements were spurred on by the need for a
better management system, and also in part, to protect the environment. We can see that the
need for a more comprehensive water-management system increases in accordance with a greater

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sense of environmental protection. Considering the effects of past policy agreements, it is also
possible to speculate about the effectiveness of current and future intergovernmental policies on
managing and protecting water resources.
In 1909, the International Boundary Waters Treaty was signed as an agreement over a method to
settle any future dispute over the waters that border Canada and the United States. Article IV of
the treaty also prohibited pollution by either country. A Joint Commission was then established
to identify the major sources of pollution in the Detroit and Niagara rivers. The Commission
reports a few years later that the “…situation along the frontier is generally chaotic, everywhere
perilous and in some cases, disgraceful.” (Clinton, 2009) This is in reference to pollution of the
Great Lakes. The International Boundary Waters Treaty proves unsuccessful in reducing
pollution. This was primarily because of American and Canadian industrial pollution—
especially during World War II. The United States proved it could not hold its end of the
bargain, and despite several lawsuits, the Canadian government passed legislation that made it
easier for manufacturers to legally pollute rivers and streams. Heavy industrial pollution
continued into the 1970’s. Here we see the environmental impact of a failed agreement. This
example of an intergovernmental agreement also illustrates how a pact may become nullified if
there are not strict standards, or consequences imposed by the other side for breaches of the
agreement.
In 1925, the diversions of Lake Michigan water to Chicago caused a great amount of concern for
surrounding state economies. These concerns stem from Chicago’s destruction of the natural
ecosystem. (Forer, 1961) Chicago had been diverting water from Lake Michigan, along with its
sewage, since 1900. The volume of water diverted increased every year until, in 1925; the U.S.
Federal Government challenged the right of Chicago to obtain water from Lake Michigan

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without the consent of the surrounding state governments. In a series of lawsuits the surrounding
states claimed that they would suffer economic loss of major fishing and other industries because
of the extreme use and pollution caused by the city of Chicago. Chicago actually lies outside of
the Great Lakes Basin, and is therefore not eligible for water under the Great Lakes Water
Compact. However, Chicago had been using the lake water long before the compact was
established. This series of “water wars” against the city caused the U.S. Supreme Court to
dramatically reduce Chicago’s limit on water usage. However, it was not until 1967, after
decades of negotiation, that the Supreme Court limited Chicago’s usage to 2,100 million gallons
per day (21 MGD). In 1980, the decree was amended to include town lying just outside Chicago
as well. Fourteen years later, it had been revealed that Chicago had actually used more that 14%
of maximum allowed usage per year—since 1980. Consequently, Chicago’s water usage was
reduced by 14% for the next 14 years. (EPA, 2009)
By 1972, environmental issues were becoming more prevalent, and the United States and Canada
signed the Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement. This provided the framework for restoring
and protecting the biological, physical, and chemical makeup of the Great Lakes Basin. Both
Canada and the United states were concerned that pollution being caused on one side was
inflicting environmental damage on the other. The IJC reported that there indeed was industrial
pollution being caused by both Canada and the US, and both countries were affected. (Donahue,
1999) The agreement was considered to be “unprecedented in scope” The agreement spawned
the Great Lakes Water Quality Board, which was composed of members of the US federal, state,
and Canadian provincial governments. This board gave two specific assignments to the IJC;
first, to examine impacts of poor water quality on land-based industries, and to measure water
contamination in Lake Huron and Superior. In 1978, the agreement was significantly amended,

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and was redirected toward eliminating any toxic substance from entering the Great Lakes. This
is the first time we can see policy taking a more regional approach to the health of the Great
Lakes, as emphasis was not only put on toxic substances entering the Lakes directly, but on
substances being leaked into the larger geographical region of the Great Lakes Basin.
Many policy measures during the 1980’s, such as the Clean Water Act, were merely extensions
of the the Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement of 1972. The agreement and it extensions are
considered to be success stories, as they have led to the increase in quality of sewage treatment
facilities, lowering of phosphate levels (an oxygen depleting pollutant), and the reduction of
agricultural contamination from runoff. All of this led to massive improvements in Lake Erie’s
water quality.
One of the most significant policy developments of the 1980’s was the Great Lakes Charter of
1985. This was implemented to include all Great Lakes states and Canadian provinces in the
decision to allow water diversions of 5 MGD or more. Although this action was not legally
binding, and subsequently ineffective, it is here we begin to see the kind of agreement that will
eventually become the “Great Lakes- St. Lawrence River Basin Water Resources Compact.”
In the 1990’s and early 2000’s, the United States and Canada made strides toward achieving a
comprehensive policy for the regulation of diversions. In 2001, the Great Lakes Charter Annex
provided a basis for regulating future agreements regarding water diversions and the exportation
of water from the Great Lakes. Finally, after seven years of reconciliation among U.S. states,
Canadian provinces, large corporations, non-profits, scientists, environmental groups, municipal
governments, water management agencies, lawyers, and the general public, produced The Great
Lakes- St. Lawrence River Basin Water Resources Compact (also known as the Great Lakes

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Water Compact). Signed into law by President Bush on October 3, 2008, it is the most complex
water management intergovernmental agreement to date.
The Compact takes a regional approach to environmental management. There are plenty of
successful implementations of regional or bioregional approaches to ecosystem management;
however this is on a larger scale, and involves more levels of government than most. It involves
the Federal, State, and hundreds of local municipal governments. These governments are all
located within the Great Lakes Basin, which is the geographical portion of land which drains into
a larger body of water. The agreement gives these governments the exclusive rights to access the
water—thereby managing the amount of water which can be diverted from the lakes. It also
provides standards and provisions that must be followed in order to sustain lake levels. All who
are granted access to the water are required to meet these standards. There is a procedure that
must be followed if a certain municipality which either straddles, or lies outside of the Great
Lakes Basin must abide by, if they are to receive Great Lakes water as well. One of the major
restrictive policies of the compact requires that all eight United States governors unanimously
approve the diversion. Needless to say, a local government applying for water must make quite a
convincing case for it. There have been past diversions of water that have not had to live up to
such standards, and we must examine them in detail in order to better predict the ramifications of
future diversions—such as the one proposed to Waukesha.
Policy and Previous Diversions
In order to better understand why the policy of the Great Lakes Water compact exists, and why it
is important, we must also examine what can possibly happen when governments fail to put
policy into action. The Aral Sea, located between the countries of Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and

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Turkmenistan in Eastern Europe, is considered to be one of the worst environmental disaster
zones in the world. Since the 1960’s, there have been many water diversions from the Aral Sea
that has directly resulted in a striking depletion of water levels. So much water has been diverted
that it has exposed much of the underlying sea bed. The grainy sea floor is highly susceptible to
wind, and dust storm activity within the region has increased dramatically. Besides the
destruction of thousands of acres of agriculture, dust mixed with pesticides that were formally
used to grow crops now blow in the wind. The harmful health impacts of the dust are staggering.
Statistics show there have been large increases in prenatal death, lung cancer, anemia, and
interstitial lung disease in the areas downwind of the Aral Sea. The environmental destruction
and rapid depletion of this natural resource has had a domino effect on public health, local
economies, and food production. This is considered to be one of the worst environmental
disasters of the twentieth-century. In the case of the Aral Sea, the results may be extreme, but it
exemplifies the kind of harm that can be caused by careless water diversions, and lack of
governmental policy to regulate them. It also illustrates that the environment can deteriorate
rapidly, and the need for conservation policy is urgent.

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The need for water conservation policy is
not only a concern of environmentalists and
political leaders with a “green” agenda; it is
also a widely held position of the general
public—more particular, the residents
within the Greater Milwaukee-Waukesha
Metro Area. A survey conducted in October
of 2008 by the University of Wisconsin
Survey Center shows that 83% of poll
people not living within lakeshore
communities are in support of the Compact,
and 77% of people who do reside in
lakeshore communities are in support of the Compact. The decrease in percentage for residents
living in lakeside communities is surprising, since one might think these residents would be more
apt to policy protecting water resources. Republicans and Democrats are almost equally in favor
of the compact, 83% to 76% respectively. The higher percentage of Republicans in favor of
more government regulation may also go against one’s intuition, however more Democrat voting
communities were surveyed than Republican. In any event, it is safe to say the need for water
conservation and sustainability of the Great Lakes is an issue that Wisconsin residents feel
strongly about.
Policy concerning water resources is a complicated web of bureaucracy. There is a substantial
overarching opinion that administration and current laws are deficient in dealing with this issue.
As we can see within the current issue of diversion of Lake Michigan water to Waukesha

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County, the most effective means to create policy may not be to rely on public officials to
produce effective governance of water resources; but rather to view the issues within the interest
of the public (Consent, 20XX). This method may seem to be contrary to the current state of
affairs but may offer a more sustained approach to local governance. In many instances the
participation of the public can go a long way at having policy buy-in to a political framework.
To gain a better understanding of diversion requests, an examination of actual requests should
help to better understand the requisite elements of approval that are not arbitrary in nature. In
many cases political decisions may seem convoluted and in the case of water diversion
legislation, that is certainly no exception. Water diversion approvals and denials can seem to
hang by a thread with unanimous approval of governments required in many cases. All parties
must approve the diversion as it pertains to the great lakes compact which adds multiple hurdles
for the requesting government to negotiate. In a case in which an improperly completed
assessment or an overly aggressive request was made, it would most likely result in rejection.
However, the approved requests are not the only instances that will help to illustrate the
complexities of such water diversion requests.
In the early 1991 Lowell Indiana made a request to divert Lake Michigan water for public
drinking water and other public uses. The existing groundwater that was being used had
critically high levels of fluoride that presented a public health problem. It is not unusual for
groundwater sources to have high levels of hard chemicals that require treatment, or in this case
the procurement of an alternative source. The request would have Lake Michigan water sources
supplied to Lowell Indiana which is approximately 5 miles outside of the Great Lakes Basin by a
pipeline that would be approximately 14 miles long. The request initially requested
approximately 3.7 gallons of water a day and was later reduced to about 1.7 million gallons per

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day (Heinmiller, 2007). Despite its close proximity to Lake Michigan and the need of the
citizens for clean drinking water, the request was ultimately denied. The denial came in the form
of a veto by the then Michigan governor John Engler. The reasons for the denial were focused
on the lack of alternative solutions being examined. Engler argued that Lowell could remedy the
water shortage by drilling new wells outside of the Great Lakes Basin and that the diversion was
not essential for them to have potable water. As a result groundwater remained the primary
supply for drinking water in Lowell.
A key element to water diversion requests and the approval thereof is the notion of full return.
Essentially full return is the principle that all water diverted from the basin be returned to the
basin with requisite waste treatment being performed before return. With the above example,
Lowell Indiana did not include the full return doctrine in their request which is part of the reason
that the request was denied. They later added the full return policy but one could conclude that
the damage was already done as the proposal appeared to not be well thought through by Engler
by not including full return or better discounting alternatives to diversion. Since that instance,
proposals for diversion have included full return as a cornerstone of any request before anything
is submitted for review. Full return ensures that the water levels from the supplying water body
will not be lowered by the diversion and there will be no net loss. Although the quality of the
return water is a main determinant of the overall supply quality, the actual level will be
sustained. In addition, most water return policies will stipulate that the water must be treated
suitably for return to the supplying body.
In contrast to the Lowell Indiana diversion request, two similarly situated communities (close to
the great lakes basin but still outside) had their requests approved. Both Pleasant Prairie
Wisconsin and Akron Ohio included a full return policy before making their final requests for

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diversion. In the case of Pleasant Prairie, the initial request did not have a full return policy and
as a result was going to be halted during the construction of the diversion infrastructure until the
full return policy was included within the language of the agreement so that a suitable
infrastructure plan for return water was in place. Pleasant Prairie straddles the continental divide
in the most southeastern corner of Wisconsin. They needed to seek an alternate source for
potable water because the groundwater had toxic levels of radium, more than 4 times the federal
maximum (Noone, 2006). In 1989 the diversion was approved and in 1990 the diversion began
in the amount of approximately 3.2 million gallons a day. The return infrastructure was not
required initially but will be required to be functional by 2011, returning the same volume
diverted after treatment through the Kenosha Water Utility. Despite the fact that this diversion
request preceded the request of Lowell Indiana and initially did not have a full return policy in
place, they were approved. In addition, the Pleasant Prairie diversion request was over 50%
more volume than that of the Lowell request. This apparent inequity may call into question the
overall equity in water resource protection and how uniform its application is.
In the case of Akron Ohio, in 1998, a request for water diversion of 4.8 million gallons a day was
approved for public use. Although the approved amount is over double that of the rejected
Lowell request, only .32 million gallons a day are currently used (GLWI, 2008). The request for
Akron had stipulations about full return from its very inception. Having the full return element
helped to gain approval of all Great Lakes Governors as well as the fact that Akron narrowly
resides within the great lakes basin (see figure 4).

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Figure
4: Map of Great Lakes Basin
Another diversion request that bears mentioning is the more recent approval of Lake Michigan
water to the city of New Berlin, WI. The city of New Berlin requested an average 2.38 million
gallons a day to essentially replace the amount that was being obtained through groundwater
sources west of the subcontinental divide (WI DNR). A major factor when considering the
diversion request is that the city of New Berlin is a straddling community which means that the
city is situated on (or straddles) both sides of the subcontinental divide. A straddling community
is afforded a unique advantage within the Great Lakes Compact because diversion requests that
are from straddling communities do not require the approval of the other compact states

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governors. Ultimately the request was granted and New Berlin is now able to divert up to 2.14
million gallons a day, a slight reduction from their application amount (WI DNR). Because of
the terms of the compact, full return was a part of the diversion request from its inception. Partly
because of the compliance to the full return doctrine, as well as local water conservation efforts,
the diversion was approved and the city continues to be supplied with Lake Michigan water by
the city of Milwaukee. The treated wastewater is returned via MMSD.
With respect to the aforementioned requests for diversion, it is hard to clearly understand why
the Lowell case was rejected by comparison with the other requests. It brings into focus a key
element of intergovernmental relations and the power that each of the states and provinces hold.
Without unanimous approval, no diversion is allowed which provides massive veto power to
each governor. It is this power balance that can offer some interesting interplays between the
states and provinces. In order for a mutually beneficial result to be had, the political players
must work cohesively to ensure a favorable outcome. In many cases a vote in favor of a
diversion plan may not be ideal for a particular state but a later political favor for one’s own
diversion request can create a quid pro quo situation. The only exception to this concept is the
state of Michigan which lies entirely within the Great Lakes Basin and is somewhat immune to
veto leveraging. Any diversion from the lakes by Michigan will result in a net zero reduction in
the basin which politically puts Michigan in a driver’s seat if there were one to have.
Conversely, Michigan will still need approval for any diversions that they would seek so they
must temper any veto with a calculated political approach.
Local Issues and Political Climate

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Waukesha County currently has high levels radium in their wells which they draw their drinking
water from. Needless to say, these levels are dangerous, and exceed EPA imposed limits.
Therefore, Waukesha must devise a plan to solve the problem. The option highly sought by
Waukesha is to obtain water from Lake Michigan. If this is achieved, Waukesha will become the
first location outside of the geographical Great Lakes Basin to receive water from Lake Michigan
since the enactment of the Great Lakes Compact. While other diversion approvals occurred,
none have occurred since the compact became law. This compact is the most recently
implemented form of water management policy in the region, and a painstaking institutional
arrangement between states and provinces. This intergovernmental agreement assures that
Waukesha’s quest for water will be an uphill political and bureaucratic process.
The request for diversion to Waukesha is a complicated matter that has a substantial impact on
multiple layers of government. The city government of Waukesha has concluded that the
diversion of Lake Michigan water will be the most economical option available. The Great
Lakes Compact requires that no reasonable alternative be available, and to this end Waukesha
has conducted research and based on their conclusions the only viable alternative to water

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treatment or additional ground water sources is the procurement of Lake Michigan water.
Figure 5: Population and Water Usage
Despite the fact that Waukesha has a continued drop in usage as evidenced by their shrinking
consumption of water (see Figure 5), their request for diversion is estimating a usage of over 12
million gallons a day beyond 2035 while at present, the demand is less than 7 million gallons a
day (SEWRPC, 2008). In part, the request for water illustrates the intent by Waukesha to further
develop the area likely by courting industry. If the estimates were based strictly on limited or
moderate developments, the water volume request would likely be projected much lower. It
would appear then that a major consideration with respect to the request is the amount of
expected development that is to take place. Based on the projections a substantial amount of
industry is expected

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There are three primary methods for return water flow that are being proposed and
considered by Waukesha. Each of the return methods offers a different monetary as well as
environmental cost. The cost of water diversion in this instance is substantial and the different
costs can be seen in Figure 6 below. These options are all on the table and do meet the full
return doctrine
Figure 6: Return flow cost comparison
Figure 7: Underwood Creek return flow

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Figure 8: Root River return flow
Figure 9: Direct return to Lake Michigan

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(Alternatives overlooked) While there are many instances of water pollution that require
remediation for sustained population – current proposal application – lacking alternatives
(Fractious resource management)
Figure 6: Local water usage (Ruekert & Mielke, Inc. and SEWRPC)

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Local political climate and government issues complicate the Waukesha diversion, and tend to
convolute the original intentions of the Great Lakes Compact. Several Waukesha public officials,
such as Water Utility General Manager Dan Duchniak, were in support of the Great Lakes
Compact before it was signed into law. It might seem contradictory that Duchniak, along with
others, would be supportive of an agreement that would make it more difficult for Waukesha to
obtain water from a larger source, however, a new source might mean a loss of control, and a
job, for people like Duchniak and other people employed by Waukesha utility management
services.
(May 13, 2010 – While the City of Waukesha has notified the Department of their intent to
submit an application for a diversion from the Great Lakes Basin under the Great Lakes – St.
Lawrence River Basin Water Resources Compact, the Department has not yet received such an
application.)

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The Concern of Sprawl and Continued Decline of the City
Many political leaders and environmentalists view Waukesha’s interest in a Lake Michigan
diversion as a threat to the ecological health of the Great Lakes Basin. There are also critics of
the diversion that view it as a license for greater suburban sprawl, which would only add to
Milwaukee’s woes by attracting water-intensive industries, and moving economic development
out of the city. A common tool for local governments to restrict growth of urban areas is to limit
accessibility to essential services—such as water and sewer services. (Hanson and Jacobs, 1989)
It seems the city of Milwaukee could possibly use this tool to restrict the growth of Waukesha, if
it is in their best interest to do so. It is a very real possibility that a diversion to Waukesha would
further increase suburban sprawl, and produce an unsustainable growth pattern detrimental to the
natural environment. Sprawl encourages the increase of greenhouse gases, and can easily
contaminate water supplies by increasing the amount of storm water runoff from paved surfaces.
The possibility of water contamination is extremely serious, as consequences could reach to the
entire Great Lakes Basin. The decision to allow a diversion must be viewed through the lens of
economic and environmental sustainability.
In order to better predict the outcomes of Waukesha’s diversion, we can analyze the outcomes of
the Chicago diversion from both an environmental and economic prospective. Is there evidence
to suggest that Chicago’s access to Lake Michigan’s water has produced negative effects on
surrounding State economies? Convincing arguments can be presented each way. The first way
to examine the question is to compare the rate of economic growth to that of other metro areas
which border the Great Lakes. Currently, Chicago is considered one of the most successful of
the Midwestern “rustbelt” cities. This is largely due to a reinventing of the economy, after the
decline of industrial and manufacturing jobs which began to leave Midwest cities in a hurry

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during the 1970’s. Meanwhile, the Great Lakes cities of Detroit, Cleveland, and Buffalo have
the highest poverty rates of any U.S. city. While the rest of the Great Lakes cities have suffered
great economic loss at the hand of globalization, Chicago thrived by merging into the global
economy. On its face, the argument that Chicago has been successful in a global economy
because of its access to Lake Michigan as a water resource may seem a bit farfetched. However,
we can see that industry growth in Chicago has increased dramatically in the years after it began
using lake water to pump it’s sewage down the Ohio River. It is also important not to
underestimate the effect of Chicago’s low water rates on industry location. As most other
Midwestern cities charge a higher rate for commercial water use, Chicago charges the same low
rate to industries as it does to residents. Considering all of these points, we must assume that
Lake Michigan played vital role in transforming Chicago into a global center of commerce that
enabled a transition into the global marketplace.
Figure 2: Timeline of industry growth in Chicago.

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Figure 3: A global comparison of Chicago’s water rate.
Has Chicago’s success contributed to the hardships of other Great Lakes cities? In order to
answer this question, we must examine some environmental effects of the Chicago diversion.
The primary environmental consequence of the Chicago diversion is a lowering of lake levels.
Even small decreases in lake levels change shorelines and beaches—which, in turn, would affect
property values. Studies have shown that decreases in water levels leave boat access properties,
and shipping access above the water line thereby decreasing shorefront property values.
Hydropower is also decreased by lower lake levels. The decreased amount of hydropower has a
ripple effect, raising the price of energy, and compromising any energy intensive industry. The
University of Wisconsin-Madison has conducted studies that show water diversions greater than
10,000 cubic feet per second result, have an aggregate annual impact between 60 and 100 million
dollars. However, in 1967 the United States Supreme Court ordered that a limit of 3,200 cubic
feet of water per second be imposed upon the Chicago diversion. This has planners scrambling
to find new aquifers to accommodate a population growth of nearly 35% in Cook County by
2030. 3,200 feet of water per second still has a significant environmental impact. As the lake
water is pumped out of the basin, and then though a network of rivers, it has a negative impact
on local ecosystems. As the water moves faster and faster down these channels, erosion
becomes a problem- which can also lead to flooding. It also has a negative impact on native fish
and creates conditions for invasive species to infiltrate. These environmental and economic
detriments present the issue of imposing limits on future development for areas with diversions
outside of the Great Lakes Basin.
As mentioned before hydropower is affected by a small decrease in water levels. New York and
Michigan rank first and second respectively in hydroelectric production. Chicago does not

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withstand to suffer any economic loss by affecting this hydroelectric market. The other industry
most heavily affected by a decrease in water levels is manufacturing. It is necessary to examine
the loss of manufacturing jobs from the Great Lakes region, and speculate on how a lower lake
level may have indirectly given Chicago an advantage in entering the global economy. Although
valid arguments can be made either way, we must at least consider the possibility in order to
better define the ramifications of future diversion.
According to many academic investigations, Milwaukee’s denial of a Lake Michigan diversion
would not mean eliminating growth in Waukesha permanently. If Milwaukee denies a diversion,
Waukesha could get water from another municipality—one eager to strike a deal and boost
public funds. Is it truly within Milwaukee’s interest to deny a diversion? The answer may be
more complicated than a simple case-study analysis can provide. The benefits of a Lake
Michigan diversion can be most easily seen though the adoption of a regional view of economic
development.
The Milwaukee Journal-Sentinel has published articles that offer reasons for why allowing
Waukesha access to water might be beneficial. As other states look to Wisconsin as a potential
state to provide drinking water through Lake Michigan, the move to allow Waukesha access to
water may bring them one step closer to receiving water themselves—thereby making
Milwaukee a place of great importance, and attracting economic development to the region.
Other academics have noted that, although economic growth must take place and be maintained
within ecological limits, environmental protection and economic development can be
complimentary issues and not antagonistic processes. (Downs, 1999) By combining resources,
such as the water from Lake Michigan, this may spur economic development of the region as a
whole, and begin to expunge societal division lines that reinforce inefficient local decision

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making policies. It is upon this basis that the decision to expand water provision into Waukesha
is a step toward the sustainability of Milwaukee, and the region as a whole.
According to these theories, this might be exactly why the City of Milwaukee should be happy to
sell the access to water to the surrounding suburbs. In a case of “if you can’t beat ‘em, join
‘em,” The city of Milwaukee may look to the future, and consider not just their own urban
boundary—but the growth of the entire metropolitan area. After all, the suburbs will indeed
contain most of the future growth in the area. City government may also want to adopt a more
regional viewpoint, and consider integrating with the suburbs in as many ways possible to ensure
the future prosperity of the city. Obvious use of access fees, and taxes on the use of water, could
help the city make much-needed repairs and upgrades to infrastructure. If Milwaukee really
wants to attain the status as a world leader in the provision of water, as local political leaders
have recently implied, perhaps it should not always view growth outside the city boundary as a
detriment to itself.
In Conclusion
Within the light of history of Great Lakes water management policy, the strength and precision
of the Great Lakes Compact will decide the future ramifications of a Waukesha diversion. If
Waukesha can resist the temptation to develop beyond its infrastructure capacity, it may avoid
the proliferation of industrial pollution—consequences of the inadequate policy implementation
of the International Boundary Waters Treaty of 1909. As the Chicago Supreme Court Decree of
1967 has shown us, the IJC, or other federal regulating agencies may need to intervene before the
point of crisis, and set legally binding limits of Waukesha water usage. It must be a point to
ensure Waukesha is regulated with legally enforceable standards, as to not lead same

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shortcomings of the 1985 Great Lakes Charter. Without strict monitoring and usage limits based
on Waukesha’s current size, the rise industry could quickly lead to over-consumption. The Great
Lakes Water Quality Agreement managed to successfully set new environmental standards. The
current Great Lakes Compact is attempting to do the same thing through the use of policy
legislation. A diversion outside the Great Lakes basin could possibly cause unprecedented
environmental issues, and as new concerns continue to manifest, the Compact will prove its
worth by spawning the same types of environmental policy successes—such as the Clean Water
Act of the 1980’s. As the Waukesha diversion would be the first of its kind, it will test the
capacity of the Great Lakes Compact to evolve into the most effective piece of water policy
legislation to date.
As we have seen, viewing the Waukesha diversion through the lens of sustainability does not
necessarily mean the sacrifice of regional growth and economic development. However, the
City of Milwaukee will most likely not gain any short term-benefits from further development in
Waukesha—unless the two municipalities can agree on a creative contract that will allow for the
much-needed improvement of city services. As this is unlikely to come from a purely financial
contract with Waukesha (Peterson, 2008), and considering the contentious political climate, the
long-term benefits of regional development may prove to be mute. For the sake of argument, if
the municipalities were able to come to an agreement which benefits both in the long and short-
term, would the diversion be an environmental detriment? Again, the answer lies within the
untested strength of the Great Lakes Compact. Although the compact has the benefit of a
century of policy-making hindsight, many have a reasonable concern that Waukesha will be
unable to limit its future development, and contribute to the problem of suburban sprawl. If

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doubts are based upon the history of Waukesha’s achievement in creating sustainable
development, the disquiet of critics is well-justified.

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Annotated Bibliography:
Hill, James P.; “The New Politics of Great Lakes Water Diversion: A Canada-Michigan
Interface; The Toledo Journal of Great Lakes' Law, Science & Policy, Fall 1999
Wriiten in 1999, this article by James Hill outlines the consequences of future Great Lakes Water
Diversions, focusing heavily on exportations from Canada, and the relationship of Michigan and
Canada within present water policy.
Hanson, Mark E.; Jacobs, Harvey M. “Private Sewage System Impacts in Wisconsin:
Implications For”; American Planning Association. Journal of the American Planning
Association. Spring 1989 ABI/INFORM Global; pg. 169
This article describes how certain tools, such as zoning, sewer, and city services, are to be used
by local governments to control growth in urban areas. These tools, however, do not
permanently control development.
Forer, L.G.; “Water Supply: Suggested Federal Regulation” Harvard Law Review, 196;
pp. 332-349; Vol. 75, No. 2 (Dec., 1961),
Written in 1961, this article describes the poor conditions of the Great Lakes from an
environmental prospective. He details the country’s “water shortage” problem, and largely
points the finger at Chicago industry, and the lack of comprehensive water policy at the federal
level.
Clinton, Hillary; “Remarks at the 100th Anniversary of the Boundary Waters Treaty”
(Speech) US Department of State; Rainbow Bridge, Niagara Falls; June 13, 2009
In this speech by Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton, Praise is given to the relationship
between Canada and the United States on the 100 year anniversary of the treaty. She speaks of
all the progress made on water policy and environmental legislation between the two countries.
EPA; “State of the Great Lakes - 2009”;
This report goes over the main problems currently facing the Great Lakes states as water levels
continue to decrease. The report refers to over-consumption of water, and measures taken to
remediate past causes of lowering lake-levels. This is divided into separate sections for each
indicator. The section detailing indicator #7056 refers to the Chicago diversion and how it was
over consuming water for years.
Downs, Anthony; “Some Realities about Sprawl and Urban Decline”; Housing Policy
Debate, the Brookings Institution, Volume 10, Issue 4 Fannie Mae Foundation 1999
Downs describes why not all suburban sprawl is bad. He also asserts that the proliferation of
sprawl does not necessarily mean neglect to the environment. The article mostly focuses on
suburban housing.
Donahue, Michael; “The Case for Good Government: Why a Comprehensive Review of
the Great Lakes Water Compact is Needed”; Toledo Journal of Great Lakes' Law, Science &
Policy (Vol. 2 No. 1, Fall 1999).

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This article reviews the provisions made in the 1972 Water Quality Agreement in terms of it’s
current effectiveness in meeting new environmental challenges. He cites specific events that
acted as catalysts towards creation of the Agreement, and relates them to new emerging
environmental issues.
Peterson, Anne; “The Utilization of Interlocal Service Agreements, Reshaping The Local
Government Landscape”; August 7, 2008
This paper, written in 2008, discusses the incentives and reasons why local governments
are most likely to benefit from agreements with each other; as well as why some agreements
(such as one between Waukesha and Milwaukee) are unlikely to take place.