SlideShare a Scribd company logo
1 of 7
Download to read offline
PSF Case Study: transactions typically have one or more of the following drivers:
1. M&A situation – removing DB pension consideration from the transaction.
2. Business restructuring/refinancing – the DB pension is preventing corporate actions.
3. Overseas parent – an opportune time to take DB pensions off the UK P&L.
4. Active sponsor – worried about increasing pension risks, financial and criminal sanctions from TPR.
5. Concerned trustees – worried about weak or volatile sponsor covenant and protecting member benefits.
6. Pre-insolvency – trying to save the sponsors’ business.
7. PPF+ situation – PSF likely to provide far better member outcomes than a buyout.
Pension Scheme Name Scheme 1 ** Non-competitive situation **
Deal drivers: M&A, Corporate Restructuring
What is the current situation (April 2021) Client is working on the first entity in its stable and will de-pension its
portfolio where possible – both incoming and outgoing businesses.
Assets c.£300m
Funding level on PSF CAB
basis1
90%
Industry Manufacturing
Covenant strength of immediate sponsor Low
Period before a buyout is likely2 Trustee maintaining
solvency level at
74%
Overseas parent No
What is driving the
sponsor/trustee to seek
settlement via PSF?
A large business wishes to sell one of the companies in its portfolio. That company
is a sponsor to a DB scheme. The parent held discussions with various bidders
through Q3/Q4 2020. In Q4 2020, the discussions with the preferred bidder fell
apart, due to the pension liability. Neither side wanted to retain any DB pension
risk. Both would only agree to the deal IF, and only IF:
1. A suitable connected transfer to PSF could be arranged, and
2. The business sale and purchase could be concluded before year-end.
Note: PSF were approached by the seller and three separate bidders keen to
understand the most efficient way to remove DB pension surprises from this
transaction.
Client’s view of the
benefits of a PSF
transaction.
Sponsor/parent:
• Cost – Lowest exit cost. Upfront settlement top-up is offset by the increased
likelihood of a successful sale AND the ability to sell the business at a higher
price, unencumbered of the DB liability.
• Timing – Attracted to PSF’s ability to construct a pension transfer that would
be executed ahead of, or alongside, the business sale.
• Risk – Certainty of FULL risk transfer via a connected employer transaction
followed by a flexible apportionment arrangement.
• Rating – Minor impact on the share price of the parent.
Trustees:
• Security – Stronger and pre-funded covenant with PSF.
• Member outcomes – PSF member bonus element would result in members
receiving 10%-20% higher benefits with PSF.
Next steps? • Parent now wishes to “de-pension” its portfolio businesses.
• Accurate pricing using member data.
• Corporate go/no-go decision on each PSF offer.
• Submit clearance application(s) as soon as PSF passes Phase One approval.
What variations has PSF
been able to construct for
other clients with similar
drivers?
• Member Outcomes – Both with and without member bonus entitlement.
• Funding – Accepting non-cash payments, potentially accepting shares,
physical assets and/or intangibles.
• Deal enhancing – Flexibility to transact with either the buyer or the seller.
• Deal enabling – Certainty of capping pension liability to enable a sale and
purchase agreement to be signed in the knowledge that the PSF transfer
could happen as a post-transaction exercise.
1 PSF capital adequacy basis (CAB) is set with reference to Gilts + 0.5%.
2 The trustees have no financial recourse to the parent and therefore have no expectation of buyout. Scheme is in funding
surplus and company contributions from the sponsor are suspended.
PSF Case Study: transactions typically have one or more of the following drivers:
1. M&A situation – removing DB pension consideration from the transaction.
2. Business restructuring/refinancing – the DB pension is preventing corporate actions.
3. Overseas parent – an opportune time to take DB pensions off the UK P&L.
4. Active sponsor – worried about increasing pension risks, financial and criminal sanctions from TPR.
5. Concerned trustees – worried about weak or volatile sponsor covenant and protecting member benefits.
6. Pre-insolvency – trying to save the sponsors’ business.
7. PPF+ situation – PSF likely to provide far better member outcomes than a buyout.
Pension Scheme Name Scheme 2 ** Now a non-competitive situation **
Deal drivers: Trustees and Sponsor working together
What is the current situation (April 2021) Working towards clearance application
Assets (including buy-in) £500m-
£750m
Funding level on PSF CAB
basis1
109%
Industry Business Services
Covenant strength of immediate sponsor Low
Period before a buyout is likely2 Buyout level is circa
87%
Overseas parent No
What is driving the
sponsor/trustee to seek
settlement via PSF?
Chair of Trustees and Business are working together on settlement. Data cleanse
and benefit specification work was well under way and GMP reserve has been
outlined. Scheme is invested in LDI and liquid bonds and is 100% hedged on
interest rate and inflation changes.
Membership is 63% deferred and there are three benefit sections.
Client’s view of the
benefits of a PSF
transaction.
Sponsor/parent:
• Cost – Lowest exit cost.
• Timing – Wish to remove the DB liability before 2021 year-end.
• Risk – Certainty of FULL risk transfer via a connected employer transaction
followed by a flexible apportionment arrangement.
Trustees:
• Security – Stronger and pre-funded covenant.
• Member outcomes – PSF member bonus element would result in members
receiving 10%-20% higher benefits than scheme benefits with PSF.
Next steps? • Member data is incoming to support full pricing.
• Trustee formal decision in late June.
• Submit clearance application as soon as PSF passes Phase One approval.
What variations has PSF
been able to construct for
other clients with similar
drivers?
• Member Outcomes – Both with and without member bonus entitlement.
• Funding – Accepting non-cash payments, potentially accepting shares,
physical assets and/or intangibles.
• Payment spreading – Up to 3 years (4 accounting periods).
1 PSF capital adequacy basis (CAB) is set with reference to Gilts + 0.5%.
2
Scheme is in funding surplus and company contributions from the sponsor are suspended.
PSF Case Study: transactions typically have one or more of the following drivers:
1. M&A situation – removing DB pension consideration from the transaction.
2. Business restructuring/refinancing – the DB pension is preventing corporate actions.
3. Overseas parent – an opportune time to take DB pensions off the UK P&L.
4. Active sponsor – worried about increasing pension risks, financial and criminal sanctions from TPR.
5. Concerned trustees – worried about weak or volatile sponsor covenant and protecting member benefits.
6. Pre-insolvency – trying to save the sponsors’ business.
7. PPF+ situation – PSF likely to provide far better member outcomes than a buyout.
Pension Scheme Name (avoid codenames) Scheme 3 ** Non-competitive situation **
Deal drivers: Active Sponsor, Overseas Parent, Restructuring, Concerned Trustees
What is the current situation (April 2021) Client is waiting for second wave of PSF deals
Assets £2bn+
Funding level on PSF CAB
basis1
103.5%
Industry Manufacturing
Covenant strength Low
Period before a buyout is likely2 10+ years
Overseas parent Yes
What is driving the
sponsor/trustee to seek
settlement via PSF?
A lot of tension between the two parties:
• Sponsor is facing strategic change. Increasing trustee powers are challenging
the ability of the business to adapt. Seemingly never-ending deficit payments.
• Trustees pushing for more security for members in the face of volatile
covenant, already rated as low.
Pension Manager was researching solutions and consultant proactivity has directed
the focus to this solution.
While buyout is estimated to be at least a decade away, the current level of
contributions would fund a settlement with PSF in 12-13 months.
Client’s view of the
benefits of a PSF
transaction.
Sponsor/parent:
• Cost – Lowest exit cost. 1/10th of the extra funding needed to reach a buyout.
• Timing – Quickest exit path. Immediate end to disputes.
• Risk – Certainty of FULL risk transfer via a connected employer transaction
followed by a flexible apportionment arrangement.
• Rating – Expecting favourable reaction from investors and rating agencies to
unencumbered balance sheet. However, parent does not want to be one of
the early superfund transactions.
• Business – Remove potential interference in dividend policy and restructuring
options.
• Accounting impact – Needs additional and careful management. Likely need
to spread the settlement of liabilities.
Trustees:
• Security – Much higher probability of full pension payment than the current
situation (c. 20% improvement). Marginally less security than a buyout.
• Member outcomes – PSF member bonus element would result in members
receiving 10%-20% higher benefits with PSF.
• Governance/Efficiency – Acceptance that a consolidator will be stronger in
both areas.
• Onboarding – Minimised disruption to members through novation.
Next steps? • Trading environment may trigger Q3 action.
• Otherwise, pre-valuation planning in Q4 to include superfund option.
What variations has PSF
been able to construct for
other clients with similar
drivers?
• Member Outcomes – Both with and without member bonus entitlement.
• Funding – spreading payments, accepting non-cash payments, potentially
accepting physical assets and intangibles.
• Risk transfer certainty – Acquiring the sponsor.
• Accounting impact mitigation – Partial transfer of liabilities spread over 3-4
accounting periods.
• Pragmatics – Flexibility to transact now and then conduct post transaction
exercises (data cleanse, GMP rectification, RPI to CPI changes).
1 PSF capital adequacy basis (CAB) is set with reference to Gilts + 0.5%.
2 The Scheme Actuary’s estimate based on BAU schedule of contributions and/or supported by buyout estimate/quote.
PSF Case Study: transactions typically have one or more of the following drivers:
1. M&A situation – removing DB pension consideration from the transaction.
2. Business restructuring/refinancing – the DB pension is preventing corporate actions.
3. Overseas parent – an opportune time to take DB pensions off the UK P&L.
4. Active sponsor – worried about increasing pension risks, financial and criminal sanctions from TPR.
5. Concerned trustees – worried about weak or volatile sponsor covenant and protecting member benefits.
6. Pre-insolvency – trying to save the sponsors’ business.
7. PPF+ situation – PSF likely to provide far better member outcomes than a buyout.
Pension Scheme Name (avoid codenames) Scheme 4 ** competitive situation **
Deal drivers: Overseas parent planning to exit from the UK
What is the current situation (April 2021) Client considering the viability of all options
Assets c.£400m
Funding level on PSF CAB
basis1
100%
Industry Manufacturing
Covenant strength Low
Period before a buyout is likely2 10+ years
Overseas parent Yes
What is driving the
sponsor/trustee to seek
settlement via PSF?
• Sponsor is facing strategic change and has decided to pull out of the UK
because of Brexit.
• Scheme is underfunded.
• 60% deferred.
• Complicated benefits.
• GMP equalisation reserve estimated.
• Keen to shortlist viable/affordable options asap.
Client’s view of the
benefits of a PSF
transaction.
Sponsor/parent:
• Cost – Lowest exit cost for a clean break which would increase the chances of
a business sale.
• Timing – Quickest exit path.
• Risk – Certainty of FULL risk transfer via a connected employer transaction
followed by a flexible apportionment arrangement.
• Reputation – Doing the right thing to secure members’ benefits before they
exit the UK.
• Rating – Expecting favourable reaction from investors and rating agencies to
unencumbered balance sheet.
Trustees:
• Security – Much higher probability of full pension payment than the current
situation (c. 25% improvement). Marginally less security than a buyout.
• Member outcomes – PSF member bonus element would result in members
receiving 10%-20% higher benefits than full scheme benefits with PSF.
• Governance/Efficiency – Acceptance that a consolidator will be stronger in
both areas.
• Onboarding – Minimised disruption to members through novation.
Next steps? • Buyout is off the table as too costly. Run-off still being considered but has
many risks.
• If the sponsor is to enable the trustees to fully settle the scheme, then PSF is
in lead position. This is mainly due to:
a. providing the most viable price.
b. the flexibility of PSF’s model in terms of both constitution of the
settlement gap and payment spreading.
• Pressing business issues are taking priority and holding up progress.
What variations has PSF
been able to construct for
other clients with similar
drivers?
• Member Outcomes – Both with and without member bonus entitlement.
• Funding – Spreading payments, accepting non-cash payments, potentially
accepting shares, physical assets and intangibles.
• Streamlining the process/Stretching the available assets – Where multiple
liability cohorts are involved, and the client is in financial distress, PSF has
offered to lead and pass through any favourable pricing from other bidders.
This ensures “best-value” overall and saves on multiple transaction costs,
which benefits the trustees and their members.
• Pragmatics – Can contract now and then conduct post-transaction exercises
afterwards (final data cleanse, GMP rectification, RPI to CPI changes).
1 PSF capital adequacy basis (CAB) is set with reference to Gilts + 0.5%.
2 The Scheme Actuary’s estimate that the solvency level is around 80%.
PSF Case Study: transactions typically have one or more of the following drivers:
1. M&A situation – removing DB pension consideration from the transaction.
2. Business restructuring/refinancing – the DB pension is preventing corporate actions.
3. Overseas parent – an opportune time to take DB pensions off the UK P&L.
4. Active sponsor – worried about increasing pension risks, financial and criminal sanctions from TPR.
5. Concerned trustees – worried about weak or volatile sponsor covenant and protecting member benefits.
6. Pre-insolvency – trying to save the sponsors’ business.
7. PPF+ situation – PSF likely to provide far better member outcomes than a buyout.
Pension Scheme Name (avoid codenames) Scheme 5 ** building the business case **
Deal drivers: Overseas parent – pandemic has changed HQ’s risk tolerances, luckily
starting assets are a lot closer to PSF settlement price than the client
suspected.
What is the current situation (April 2021) Indicative pricing is favourable, moving to member data level pricing.
Assets £50m-
£100m
Funding level on PSF CAB
basis1
101%
Industry Agriculture
Covenant strength Low-Medium
Period before a buyout is likely2 6+ years
Overseas parent Yes
What is driving the
sponsor/trustee to seek
settlement via PSF?
• Pandemic has triggered a change in the HQ’s tolerance to risk and financial
surprises.
• Pension Act 2021 sanctions have added to the general nervousness about the
ongoing risks of the UK DB scheme.
• 63% pensioners.
• GMP equalisation reserve has been estimated.
• This new option has opened new possibilities - Consultant proactivity
anticipated that the 2020 valuation results would show that the scheme is a lot
closer to a PSF settlement price than anyone realised.
Client’s view of the
benefits of a PSF
transaction.
Sponsor/parent:
• Cost – Lowest exit cost for a clean break.
• Timing – Current contribution commitments would reach PSF settlement long
before a buyout. The excess is viewed as wasted resources and unnecessary
by HQ.
• Risk – Certainty of FULL risk transfer via a connected employer transaction
followed by a flexible apportionment arrangement.
• Business – Focus on their business, not the trustees’ business of pensions.
Trustees:
• Security – Much higher probability of full pension payment than the current
situation (c. 15%-20% improvement). Marginally less security than a buyout.
• Member outcomes – the PSF member bonus element would result in
members receiving 10%-20% higher benefits than full scheme benefits with
PSF.
• Retain value – The intent had been to reshape the schemes’ asset portfolio
prior to insured settlement, but that is not necessary with PSF.
• Governance/Efficiency – Acceptance that a consolidator will be stronger in
both areas.
• Onboarding – Minimised disruption to members through novation.
Next steps? • About to price based on full member data to firm up on the timescale and the
necessary steps to reach the transfer price point with PSF.
What variations has PSF
been able to construct for
other clients with similar
drivers?
• Member Outcomes – Both with and without member bonus entitlement.
• Member Options – To help with financing, PSF can structure a deal to
accommodate certain member option exercises to reduce the liabilities as well
as increasing the funding level prior to a PSF transaction (at a lower price).
• Funding – Spreading payments, accepting non-cash payments, potentially
accepting shares, physical assets, and intangibles.
• Pragmatics – Flexibility to transact now and then conduct post transaction
exercises (data cleanse, GMP rectification, RPI to CPI changes).
1 PSF capital adequacy basis (CAB) is set with reference to Gilts + 0.5%.
2 The Scheme Actuary’s estimate that the solvency level is around 85%.
PSF Case Study: transactions typically have one or more of the following drivers:
1. M&A situation – removing DB pension consideration from the transaction.
2. Business restructuring/refinancing – the DB pension is preventing corporate actions.
3. Overseas parent – an opportune time to take DB pensions off the UK P&L.
4. Active sponsor – worried about increasing pension risks, financial and criminal sanctions from TPR.
5. Concerned trustees – worried about weak or volatile sponsor covenant and protecting member benefits.
6. Pre-insolvency – trying to save the sponsors’ business.
7. PPF+ situation – PSF likely to provide far better member outcomes than a buyout.
Pension Scheme Name Scheme 6 ** competitive situation **
Deal drivers: Active sponsor (private equity), Pre-insolvency
What is the current situation (April 2021) Working towards clearance application
Assets (including £200m buy-
in)
c.£200m
Funding level on PSF CAB
basis1
107%
Industry Business Services
Covenant strength of immediate sponsor Very low
Period before a buyout is likely2 No further sponsor
contributions are
available
Overseas parent No – but Private
Equity Owned
What is driving the
sponsor/trustee to seek
settlement via PSF?
Business is struggling. Any further contributions from the sponsor are highly
unlikely. Private equity owner is keen to settle the scheme with a superfund if the
schemes assets on their own are sufficient to do so.
Membership is 57% deferred.
Client’s view of the
benefits of a PSF
transaction.
Sponsor/parent:
• Cost – No further settlement top-up is needed.
• Timing – Wish to off-book the DB scheme asap to focus on turning around the
business.
• Risk – Certainty of FULL risk transfer via a connected employer transaction
followed by a flexible apportionment arrangement.
Trustees:
• Security – Stronger and pre-funded covenant with PSF.
• Member outcomes – PSF member bonus element would result in members
receiving 10%-20% higher benefits than full scheme benefits with PSF.
Next steps? • Member data is incoming to support full and firm pricing.
• Submit clearance application as soon as PSF passes Phase One approval.
What variations has PSF
been able to construct for
other clients with similar
drivers?
• Member Outcomes – Both with and without member bonus entitlement.
• Funding – Accepting non-cash payments, physical assets and/or intangibles.
Unlikely to accept shares without a substantial risk premium.
• Payment spreading – Up to 3 years (4 accounting periods).
1 PSF capital adequacy basis (CAB) is set with reference to Gilts + 0.5%.
2 Scheme is circa 80% funded on solvency basis.
PSF Case Study: transactions typically have one or more of the following drivers:
1. M&A situation – removing DB pension consideration from the transaction.
2. Business restructuring/refinancing – the DB pension is preventing corporate actions.
3. Overseas parent – an opportune time to take DB pensions off the UK P&L.
4. Active sponsor – worried about increasing pension risks, financial and criminal sanctions from TPR.
5. Concerned trustees – worried about weak or volatile sponsor covenant and protecting member benefits.
6. Pre-insolvency – trying to save the sponsors’ business.
7. PPF+ situation – PSF likely to provide far better member outcomes than a buyout.
Pension Scheme Name Scheme 7 ** Non-competitive situation **
Deal drivers: PPF+ situation
What is the current situation (April 2021) Working through Phase Two assessment with TPR as a test case
Assets £500m-
£750m
Funding level on PSF CAB
basis1
110%
Industry Retail
Covenant strength Sponsor is insolvent
Period before a buyout is likely No buyout unless TPR
delay PSF approval
Overseas parent No
What is driving the
sponsor/trustee to seek
settlement via PSF?
Insolvency of the sponsor triggered the DB schemes’ entry into PPF assessment.
PPF assigned PPF panellists to provide guidance on trustee, actuarial and legal
matters the scheme administration was transferred to a PPF assessment panellist.
It was clear early on that the scheme assets were sufficient to provided benefits
above PPF levels and that the scheme would ultimately exit PPF assessment and
not be accepted into the PPF.
Buyout quotations demonstrated that 100% of scheme benefits could NOT be
secured via an insured buyout (10%-15% lower). The trustees approached PSF.
PSF can provide full scheme benefits AND transferring members may additionally
be entitled to the PSF member bonus.
Client’s view of the
benefits of a PSF
transaction.
Trustees:
• Member outcomes – Including the member bonus, PSF likely much higher
benefits than insurer (>20-30%) for a marginally lower level of certainty (<1%).
• Member disruption – Minimised disruption to members through novation of
contracts and phased transition to PSF.
• Protection of Scheme assets – Forced sale of illiquid and other assets that are
unattractive to insurers is no longer required, PSF will underwrite certain
superfund related costs for a very likely PPF+ case.
• Currently working through which risks are to be transferred and which risks will
require run-off insurance.
Next steps? • PPF is happy with the proposed transfer.
• Trustees and TPR are now in agreement on the progress steps.
• Currently using this transaction as one of the test cases with TPR for Phase
Two assessment of superfund transactions.
What variations has PSF
been able to construct for
other clients with similar
drivers?
• Member Outcomes – Both with and without member bonus entitlement.
• Risk transfer certainty – Some flexibility regarding all-risk vs full-risks.
• Pragmatics – Agree terms early on but still capture the data cleanse benefits
of the PPF assessment process.
• Member consent – If member benefits are abated below full scheme benefits,
then a member consent exercise would be needed to affect a transfer to a
superfund. We have constructed a cost underwritten phased “stop and
review” approach to such exercises. Two other schemes have also looked at
this possibility.
• Maximising member outcomes - Where a section 122 notice has not yet been
served and where liability reshaping is needed to reach 100% of scheme
benefits then a scheme rescue via a third-party process could be constructed.
That would also allow trustees to pay any pension payment reductions made
during the assessment period. Trustees retain the superfund transfer option
without obligation.
1
PSF capital adequacy basis (CAB) is set with reference to Gilts + 0.5%.

More Related Content

What's hot

Executive Compensation Checklist for New and Experienced Board Members (Credi...
Executive Compensation Checklist for New and Experienced Board Members (Credi...Executive Compensation Checklist for New and Experienced Board Members (Credi...
Executive Compensation Checklist for New and Experienced Board Members (Credi...NAFCU Services Corporation
 
determinants of corporate dividend policy
determinants of corporate dividend policydeterminants of corporate dividend policy
determinants of corporate dividend policyArfan Afzal
 
RiskMetrics Policy Updates 20091208
RiskMetrics Policy Updates 20091208RiskMetrics Policy Updates 20091208
RiskMetrics Policy Updates 20091208Edward Hauder
 
Chapter 17 Strategic Cost Management
Chapter  17 Strategic Cost ManagementChapter  17 Strategic Cost Management
Chapter 17 Strategic Cost ManagementJeromeVillena1
 
Client Alert: July 2010
Client Alert: July 2010Client Alert: July 2010
Client Alert: July 2010SES Advisors
 
Pcf 2 dividend policy 10 11
Pcf 2  dividend policy 10 11Pcf 2  dividend policy 10 11
Pcf 2 dividend policy 10 11FCGNUK
 
Five Common Questions About Deferred Compensation
Five Common Questions About Deferred CompensationFive Common Questions About Deferred Compensation
Five Common Questions About Deferred CompensationCBIZ, Inc.
 
Key Employee Incentive and Retention Plans | Creating a Motivated Management ...
Key Employee Incentive and Retention Plans | Creating a Motivated Management ...Key Employee Incentive and Retention Plans | Creating a Motivated Management ...
Key Employee Incentive and Retention Plans | Creating a Motivated Management ...CBIZ, Inc.
 
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Executive Compensa...
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Executive Compensa...Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Executive Compensa...
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Executive Compensa...Edward Hauder
 
Equity Incentives and Bonus Plans for Employees, Consultants & Advisors
Equity Incentives and Bonus Plans for Employees, Consultants & AdvisorsEquity Incentives and Bonus Plans for Employees, Consultants & Advisors
Equity Incentives and Bonus Plans for Employees, Consultants & AdvisorsChirag Charlie Patel, PMP
 
Meeting 2 - Leverage Ratios (Financial Reporting and Analysis)
Meeting 2 - Leverage Ratios (Financial Reporting and Analysis)Meeting 2 - Leverage Ratios (Financial Reporting and Analysis)
Meeting 2 - Leverage Ratios (Financial Reporting and Analysis)Albina Gaisina
 
Sources of finance
Sources of financeSources of finance
Sources of financeRohit pathak
 
S&p view of uae new regulation 8 jun15
S&p view of uae new regulation 8 jun15S&p view of uae new regulation 8 jun15
S&p view of uae new regulation 8 jun15Aftab Hasan
 

What's hot (19)

Executive Compensation Checklist for New and Experienced Board Members (Credi...
Executive Compensation Checklist for New and Experienced Board Members (Credi...Executive Compensation Checklist for New and Experienced Board Members (Credi...
Executive Compensation Checklist for New and Experienced Board Members (Credi...
 
determinants of corporate dividend policy
determinants of corporate dividend policydeterminants of corporate dividend policy
determinants of corporate dividend policy
 
RiskMetrics Policy Updates 20091208
RiskMetrics Policy Updates 20091208RiskMetrics Policy Updates 20091208
RiskMetrics Policy Updates 20091208
 
Management compensation 2007
Management compensation 2007Management compensation 2007
Management compensation 2007
 
Cf report
Cf reportCf report
Cf report
 
Chapter 17 Strategic Cost Management
Chapter  17 Strategic Cost ManagementChapter  17 Strategic Cost Management
Chapter 17 Strategic Cost Management
 
Client Alert: July 2010
Client Alert: July 2010Client Alert: July 2010
Client Alert: July 2010
 
Dividend issues
Dividend issuesDividend issues
Dividend issues
 
Hedge fund manager insurance policy outline
Hedge fund manager insurance policy outlineHedge fund manager insurance policy outline
Hedge fund manager insurance policy outline
 
cl50_RealizablePay
cl50_RealizablePaycl50_RealizablePay
cl50_RealizablePay
 
Dividend policy
Dividend policyDividend policy
Dividend policy
 
Pcf 2 dividend policy 10 11
Pcf 2  dividend policy 10 11Pcf 2  dividend policy 10 11
Pcf 2 dividend policy 10 11
 
Five Common Questions About Deferred Compensation
Five Common Questions About Deferred CompensationFive Common Questions About Deferred Compensation
Five Common Questions About Deferred Compensation
 
Key Employee Incentive and Retention Plans | Creating a Motivated Management ...
Key Employee Incentive and Retention Plans | Creating a Motivated Management ...Key Employee Incentive and Retention Plans | Creating a Motivated Management ...
Key Employee Incentive and Retention Plans | Creating a Motivated Management ...
 
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Executive Compensa...
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Executive Compensa...Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Executive Compensa...
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Executive Compensa...
 
Equity Incentives and Bonus Plans for Employees, Consultants & Advisors
Equity Incentives and Bonus Plans for Employees, Consultants & AdvisorsEquity Incentives and Bonus Plans for Employees, Consultants & Advisors
Equity Incentives and Bonus Plans for Employees, Consultants & Advisors
 
Meeting 2 - Leverage Ratios (Financial Reporting and Analysis)
Meeting 2 - Leverage Ratios (Financial Reporting and Analysis)Meeting 2 - Leverage Ratios (Financial Reporting and Analysis)
Meeting 2 - Leverage Ratios (Financial Reporting and Analysis)
 
Sources of finance
Sources of financeSources of finance
Sources of finance
 
S&p view of uae new regulation 8 jun15
S&p view of uae new regulation 8 jun15S&p view of uae new regulation 8 jun15
S&p view of uae new regulation 8 jun15
 

Similar to Seven case studies of live Pension SuperFund transactions (27 April 2021)

Gary Squires - db and the decline curve
Gary Squires  - db and the decline curveGary Squires  - db and the decline curve
Gary Squires - db and the decline curveGary Squires
 
Defined benefits presentation 1
Defined benefits presentation 1Defined benefits presentation 1
Defined benefits presentation 1New Level Research
 
Investment decisions
Investment decisionsInvestment decisions
Investment decisionsPPTMBA1
 
caiib_fmmodbacs_nov08 module finance.ppt
caiib_fmmodbacs_nov08 module finance.pptcaiib_fmmodbacs_nov08 module finance.ppt
caiib_fmmodbacs_nov08 module finance.pptMajedAlshawafi1
 
Non-Qualified Deferred Compensation Programs for Private Companies
Non-Qualified Deferred Compensation Programs for Private CompaniesNon-Qualified Deferred Compensation Programs for Private Companies
Non-Qualified Deferred Compensation Programs for Private CompaniesSkoda Minotti
 
Dividend decision in financial management and decision making
Dividend decision in financial management and decision makingDividend decision in financial management and decision making
Dividend decision in financial management and decision makingshrutisingh143670
 
Pensions pensions conference slides
Pensions pensions conference slidesPensions pensions conference slides
Pensions pensions conference slidesBlake Morgan
 
Client Alert: November 2011
Client Alert: November 2011Client Alert: November 2011
Client Alert: November 2011SES Advisors
 
Financial Management- Dividend decision and Working capital management
Financial Management- Dividend decision and Working capital managementFinancial Management- Dividend decision and Working capital management
Financial Management- Dividend decision and Working capital managementUmamaheswari Gopal
 
M-3 (TP-2) (1).pdf
M-3 (TP-2) (1).pdfM-3 (TP-2) (1).pdf
M-3 (TP-2) (1).pdfRuthikaSv789
 
Introduction to Financial Management.docx
Introduction to Financial Management.docxIntroduction to Financial Management.docx
Introduction to Financial Management.docxrobelynverano
 
CF Chapter - 3 Dividend Policy.pptx
CF Chapter - 3 Dividend Policy.pptxCF Chapter - 3 Dividend Policy.pptx
CF Chapter - 3 Dividend Policy.pptxHussenMahammed1
 
Dividend Policy and Procedure
Dividend Policy and ProcedureDividend Policy and Procedure
Dividend Policy and ProcedureSundar B N
 
Retirement Reform Presentation 2015_11_13 SW
Retirement Reform Presentation 2015_11_13 SWRetirement Reform Presentation 2015_11_13 SW
Retirement Reform Presentation 2015_11_13 SWStacey Whitwam
 
Dividend Decisions
Dividend DecisionsDividend Decisions
Dividend DecisionsKaushik Deb
 
Dividend decisions
Dividend decisionsDividend decisions
Dividend decisionspadmach8
 
17 and 18 SME FINANCE - Monitoring.pptx
17 and 18 SME FINANCE - Monitoring.pptx17 and 18 SME FINANCE - Monitoring.pptx
17 and 18 SME FINANCE - Monitoring.pptxVbsReddy2
 

Similar to Seven case studies of live Pension SuperFund transactions (27 April 2021) (20)

Gary Squires - db and the decline curve
Gary Squires  - db and the decline curveGary Squires  - db and the decline curve
Gary Squires - db and the decline curve
 
Defined benefits presentation 1
Defined benefits presentation 1Defined benefits presentation 1
Defined benefits presentation 1
 
Investment decisions
Investment decisionsInvestment decisions
Investment decisions
 
caiib_fmmodbacs_nov08 module finance.ppt
caiib_fmmodbacs_nov08 module finance.pptcaiib_fmmodbacs_nov08 module finance.ppt
caiib_fmmodbacs_nov08 module finance.ppt
 
Non-Qualified Deferred Compensation Programs for Private Companies
Non-Qualified Deferred Compensation Programs for Private CompaniesNon-Qualified Deferred Compensation Programs for Private Companies
Non-Qualified Deferred Compensation Programs for Private Companies
 
Dividend decision in financial management and decision making
Dividend decision in financial management and decision makingDividend decision in financial management and decision making
Dividend decision in financial management and decision making
 
Pensions pensions conference slides
Pensions pensions conference slidesPensions pensions conference slides
Pensions pensions conference slides
 
Client Alert: November 2011
Client Alert: November 2011Client Alert: November 2011
Client Alert: November 2011
 
Financial Management- Dividend decision and Working capital management
Financial Management- Dividend decision and Working capital managementFinancial Management- Dividend decision and Working capital management
Financial Management- Dividend decision and Working capital management
 
Dividend policy
Dividend policyDividend policy
Dividend policy
 
M-3 (TP-2) (1).pdf
M-3 (TP-2) (1).pdfM-3 (TP-2) (1).pdf
M-3 (TP-2) (1).pdf
 
Introduction to Financial Management.docx
Introduction to Financial Management.docxIntroduction to Financial Management.docx
Introduction to Financial Management.docx
 
CF Chapter - 3 Dividend Policy.pptx
CF Chapter - 3 Dividend Policy.pptxCF Chapter - 3 Dividend Policy.pptx
CF Chapter - 3 Dividend Policy.pptx
 
Warner body works
Warner body worksWarner body works
Warner body works
 
Dividend Policy and Procedure
Dividend Policy and ProcedureDividend Policy and Procedure
Dividend Policy and Procedure
 
Aswathy s
Aswathy sAswathy s
Aswathy s
 
Retirement Reform Presentation 2015_11_13 SW
Retirement Reform Presentation 2015_11_13 SWRetirement Reform Presentation 2015_11_13 SW
Retirement Reform Presentation 2015_11_13 SW
 
Dividend Decisions
Dividend DecisionsDividend Decisions
Dividend Decisions
 
Dividend decisions
Dividend decisionsDividend decisions
Dividend decisions
 
17 and 18 SME FINANCE - Monitoring.pptx
17 and 18 SME FINANCE - Monitoring.pptx17 and 18 SME FINANCE - Monitoring.pptx
17 and 18 SME FINANCE - Monitoring.pptx
 

Recently uploaded

High Class Call Girls Nashik Maya 7001305949 Independent Escort Service Nashik
High Class Call Girls Nashik Maya 7001305949 Independent Escort Service NashikHigh Class Call Girls Nashik Maya 7001305949 Independent Escort Service Nashik
High Class Call Girls Nashik Maya 7001305949 Independent Escort Service NashikCall Girls in Nagpur High Profile
 
Booking open Available Pune Call Girls Talegaon Dabhade 6297143586 Call Hot ...
Booking open Available Pune Call Girls Talegaon Dabhade  6297143586 Call Hot ...Booking open Available Pune Call Girls Talegaon Dabhade  6297143586 Call Hot ...
Booking open Available Pune Call Girls Talegaon Dabhade 6297143586 Call Hot ...Call Girls in Nagpur High Profile
 
20240429 Calibre April 2024 Investor Presentation.pdf
20240429 Calibre April 2024 Investor Presentation.pdf20240429 Calibre April 2024 Investor Presentation.pdf
20240429 Calibre April 2024 Investor Presentation.pdfAdnet Communications
 
Call Girls Service Nagpur Maya Call 7001035870 Meet With Nagpur Escorts
Call Girls Service Nagpur Maya Call 7001035870 Meet With Nagpur EscortsCall Girls Service Nagpur Maya Call 7001035870 Meet With Nagpur Escorts
Call Girls Service Nagpur Maya Call 7001035870 Meet With Nagpur Escortsranjana rawat
 
The Economic History of the U.S. Lecture 30.pdf
The Economic History of the U.S. Lecture 30.pdfThe Economic History of the U.S. Lecture 30.pdf
The Economic History of the U.S. Lecture 30.pdfGale Pooley
 
02_Fabio Colombo_Accenture_MeetupDora&Cybersecurity.pptx
02_Fabio Colombo_Accenture_MeetupDora&Cybersecurity.pptx02_Fabio Colombo_Accenture_MeetupDora&Cybersecurity.pptx
02_Fabio Colombo_Accenture_MeetupDora&Cybersecurity.pptxFinTech Belgium
 
The Economic History of the U.S. Lecture 17.pdf
The Economic History of the U.S. Lecture 17.pdfThe Economic History of the U.S. Lecture 17.pdf
The Economic History of the U.S. Lecture 17.pdfGale Pooley
 
Best VIP Call Girls Noida Sector 18 Call Me: 8448380779
Best VIP Call Girls Noida Sector 18 Call Me: 8448380779Best VIP Call Girls Noida Sector 18 Call Me: 8448380779
Best VIP Call Girls Noida Sector 18 Call Me: 8448380779Delhi Call girls
 
The Economic History of the U.S. Lecture 19.pdf
The Economic History of the U.S. Lecture 19.pdfThe Economic History of the U.S. Lecture 19.pdf
The Economic History of the U.S. Lecture 19.pdfGale Pooley
 
Independent Call Girl Number in Kurla Mumbai📲 Pooja Nehwal 9892124323 💞 Full ...
Independent Call Girl Number in Kurla Mumbai📲 Pooja Nehwal 9892124323 💞 Full ...Independent Call Girl Number in Kurla Mumbai📲 Pooja Nehwal 9892124323 💞 Full ...
Independent Call Girl Number in Kurla Mumbai📲 Pooja Nehwal 9892124323 💞 Full ...Pooja Nehwal
 
The Economic History of the U.S. Lecture 18.pdf
The Economic History of the U.S. Lecture 18.pdfThe Economic History of the U.S. Lecture 18.pdf
The Economic History of the U.S. Lecture 18.pdfGale Pooley
 
(ANIKA) Budhwar Peth Call Girls Just Call 7001035870 [ Cash on Delivery ] Pun...
(ANIKA) Budhwar Peth Call Girls Just Call 7001035870 [ Cash on Delivery ] Pun...(ANIKA) Budhwar Peth Call Girls Just Call 7001035870 [ Cash on Delivery ] Pun...
(ANIKA) Budhwar Peth Call Girls Just Call 7001035870 [ Cash on Delivery ] Pun...ranjana rawat
 
00_Main ppt_MeetupDORA&CyberSecurity.pptx
00_Main ppt_MeetupDORA&CyberSecurity.pptx00_Main ppt_MeetupDORA&CyberSecurity.pptx
00_Main ppt_MeetupDORA&CyberSecurity.pptxFinTech Belgium
 
TEST BANK For Corporate Finance, 13th Edition By Stephen Ross, Randolph Weste...
TEST BANK For Corporate Finance, 13th Edition By Stephen Ross, Randolph Weste...TEST BANK For Corporate Finance, 13th Edition By Stephen Ross, Randolph Weste...
TEST BANK For Corporate Finance, 13th Edition By Stephen Ross, Randolph Weste...ssifa0344
 
Top Rated Pune Call Girls Viman Nagar ⟟ 6297143586 ⟟ Call Me For Genuine Sex...
Top Rated  Pune Call Girls Viman Nagar ⟟ 6297143586 ⟟ Call Me For Genuine Sex...Top Rated  Pune Call Girls Viman Nagar ⟟ 6297143586 ⟟ Call Me For Genuine Sex...
Top Rated Pune Call Girls Viman Nagar ⟟ 6297143586 ⟟ Call Me For Genuine Sex...Call Girls in Nagpur High Profile
 
The Economic History of the U.S. Lecture 25.pdf
The Economic History of the U.S. Lecture 25.pdfThe Economic History of the U.S. Lecture 25.pdf
The Economic History of the U.S. Lecture 25.pdfGale Pooley
 
Solution Manual for Principles of Corporate Finance 14th Edition by Richard B...
Solution Manual for Principles of Corporate Finance 14th Edition by Richard B...Solution Manual for Principles of Corporate Finance 14th Edition by Richard B...
Solution Manual for Principles of Corporate Finance 14th Edition by Richard B...ssifa0344
 
The Economic History of the U.S. Lecture 23.pdf
The Economic History of the U.S. Lecture 23.pdfThe Economic History of the U.S. Lecture 23.pdf
The Economic History of the U.S. Lecture 23.pdfGale Pooley
 

Recently uploaded (20)

High Class Call Girls Nashik Maya 7001305949 Independent Escort Service Nashik
High Class Call Girls Nashik Maya 7001305949 Independent Escort Service NashikHigh Class Call Girls Nashik Maya 7001305949 Independent Escort Service Nashik
High Class Call Girls Nashik Maya 7001305949 Independent Escort Service Nashik
 
Booking open Available Pune Call Girls Talegaon Dabhade 6297143586 Call Hot ...
Booking open Available Pune Call Girls Talegaon Dabhade  6297143586 Call Hot ...Booking open Available Pune Call Girls Talegaon Dabhade  6297143586 Call Hot ...
Booking open Available Pune Call Girls Talegaon Dabhade 6297143586 Call Hot ...
 
20240429 Calibre April 2024 Investor Presentation.pdf
20240429 Calibre April 2024 Investor Presentation.pdf20240429 Calibre April 2024 Investor Presentation.pdf
20240429 Calibre April 2024 Investor Presentation.pdf
 
Call Girls Service Nagpur Maya Call 7001035870 Meet With Nagpur Escorts
Call Girls Service Nagpur Maya Call 7001035870 Meet With Nagpur EscortsCall Girls Service Nagpur Maya Call 7001035870 Meet With Nagpur Escorts
Call Girls Service Nagpur Maya Call 7001035870 Meet With Nagpur Escorts
 
The Economic History of the U.S. Lecture 30.pdf
The Economic History of the U.S. Lecture 30.pdfThe Economic History of the U.S. Lecture 30.pdf
The Economic History of the U.S. Lecture 30.pdf
 
02_Fabio Colombo_Accenture_MeetupDora&Cybersecurity.pptx
02_Fabio Colombo_Accenture_MeetupDora&Cybersecurity.pptx02_Fabio Colombo_Accenture_MeetupDora&Cybersecurity.pptx
02_Fabio Colombo_Accenture_MeetupDora&Cybersecurity.pptx
 
The Economic History of the U.S. Lecture 17.pdf
The Economic History of the U.S. Lecture 17.pdfThe Economic History of the U.S. Lecture 17.pdf
The Economic History of the U.S. Lecture 17.pdf
 
Best VIP Call Girls Noida Sector 18 Call Me: 8448380779
Best VIP Call Girls Noida Sector 18 Call Me: 8448380779Best VIP Call Girls Noida Sector 18 Call Me: 8448380779
Best VIP Call Girls Noida Sector 18 Call Me: 8448380779
 
(INDIRA) Call Girl Mumbai Call Now 8250077686 Mumbai Escorts 24x7
(INDIRA) Call Girl Mumbai Call Now 8250077686 Mumbai Escorts 24x7(INDIRA) Call Girl Mumbai Call Now 8250077686 Mumbai Escorts 24x7
(INDIRA) Call Girl Mumbai Call Now 8250077686 Mumbai Escorts 24x7
 
The Economic History of the U.S. Lecture 19.pdf
The Economic History of the U.S. Lecture 19.pdfThe Economic History of the U.S. Lecture 19.pdf
The Economic History of the U.S. Lecture 19.pdf
 
Independent Call Girl Number in Kurla Mumbai📲 Pooja Nehwal 9892124323 💞 Full ...
Independent Call Girl Number in Kurla Mumbai📲 Pooja Nehwal 9892124323 💞 Full ...Independent Call Girl Number in Kurla Mumbai📲 Pooja Nehwal 9892124323 💞 Full ...
Independent Call Girl Number in Kurla Mumbai📲 Pooja Nehwal 9892124323 💞 Full ...
 
The Economic History of the U.S. Lecture 18.pdf
The Economic History of the U.S. Lecture 18.pdfThe Economic History of the U.S. Lecture 18.pdf
The Economic History of the U.S. Lecture 18.pdf
 
(ANIKA) Budhwar Peth Call Girls Just Call 7001035870 [ Cash on Delivery ] Pun...
(ANIKA) Budhwar Peth Call Girls Just Call 7001035870 [ Cash on Delivery ] Pun...(ANIKA) Budhwar Peth Call Girls Just Call 7001035870 [ Cash on Delivery ] Pun...
(ANIKA) Budhwar Peth Call Girls Just Call 7001035870 [ Cash on Delivery ] Pun...
 
00_Main ppt_MeetupDORA&CyberSecurity.pptx
00_Main ppt_MeetupDORA&CyberSecurity.pptx00_Main ppt_MeetupDORA&CyberSecurity.pptx
00_Main ppt_MeetupDORA&CyberSecurity.pptx
 
Commercial Bank Economic Capsule - April 2024
Commercial Bank Economic Capsule - April 2024Commercial Bank Economic Capsule - April 2024
Commercial Bank Economic Capsule - April 2024
 
TEST BANK For Corporate Finance, 13th Edition By Stephen Ross, Randolph Weste...
TEST BANK For Corporate Finance, 13th Edition By Stephen Ross, Randolph Weste...TEST BANK For Corporate Finance, 13th Edition By Stephen Ross, Randolph Weste...
TEST BANK For Corporate Finance, 13th Edition By Stephen Ross, Randolph Weste...
 
Top Rated Pune Call Girls Viman Nagar ⟟ 6297143586 ⟟ Call Me For Genuine Sex...
Top Rated  Pune Call Girls Viman Nagar ⟟ 6297143586 ⟟ Call Me For Genuine Sex...Top Rated  Pune Call Girls Viman Nagar ⟟ 6297143586 ⟟ Call Me For Genuine Sex...
Top Rated Pune Call Girls Viman Nagar ⟟ 6297143586 ⟟ Call Me For Genuine Sex...
 
The Economic History of the U.S. Lecture 25.pdf
The Economic History of the U.S. Lecture 25.pdfThe Economic History of the U.S. Lecture 25.pdf
The Economic History of the U.S. Lecture 25.pdf
 
Solution Manual for Principles of Corporate Finance 14th Edition by Richard B...
Solution Manual for Principles of Corporate Finance 14th Edition by Richard B...Solution Manual for Principles of Corporate Finance 14th Edition by Richard B...
Solution Manual for Principles of Corporate Finance 14th Edition by Richard B...
 
The Economic History of the U.S. Lecture 23.pdf
The Economic History of the U.S. Lecture 23.pdfThe Economic History of the U.S. Lecture 23.pdf
The Economic History of the U.S. Lecture 23.pdf
 

Seven case studies of live Pension SuperFund transactions (27 April 2021)

  • 1. PSF Case Study: transactions typically have one or more of the following drivers: 1. M&A situation – removing DB pension consideration from the transaction. 2. Business restructuring/refinancing – the DB pension is preventing corporate actions. 3. Overseas parent – an opportune time to take DB pensions off the UK P&L. 4. Active sponsor – worried about increasing pension risks, financial and criminal sanctions from TPR. 5. Concerned trustees – worried about weak or volatile sponsor covenant and protecting member benefits. 6. Pre-insolvency – trying to save the sponsors’ business. 7. PPF+ situation – PSF likely to provide far better member outcomes than a buyout. Pension Scheme Name Scheme 1 ** Non-competitive situation ** Deal drivers: M&A, Corporate Restructuring What is the current situation (April 2021) Client is working on the first entity in its stable and will de-pension its portfolio where possible – both incoming and outgoing businesses. Assets c.£300m Funding level on PSF CAB basis1 90% Industry Manufacturing Covenant strength of immediate sponsor Low Period before a buyout is likely2 Trustee maintaining solvency level at 74% Overseas parent No What is driving the sponsor/trustee to seek settlement via PSF? A large business wishes to sell one of the companies in its portfolio. That company is a sponsor to a DB scheme. The parent held discussions with various bidders through Q3/Q4 2020. In Q4 2020, the discussions with the preferred bidder fell apart, due to the pension liability. Neither side wanted to retain any DB pension risk. Both would only agree to the deal IF, and only IF: 1. A suitable connected transfer to PSF could be arranged, and 2. The business sale and purchase could be concluded before year-end. Note: PSF were approached by the seller and three separate bidders keen to understand the most efficient way to remove DB pension surprises from this transaction. Client’s view of the benefits of a PSF transaction. Sponsor/parent: • Cost – Lowest exit cost. Upfront settlement top-up is offset by the increased likelihood of a successful sale AND the ability to sell the business at a higher price, unencumbered of the DB liability. • Timing – Attracted to PSF’s ability to construct a pension transfer that would be executed ahead of, or alongside, the business sale. • Risk – Certainty of FULL risk transfer via a connected employer transaction followed by a flexible apportionment arrangement. • Rating – Minor impact on the share price of the parent. Trustees: • Security – Stronger and pre-funded covenant with PSF. • Member outcomes – PSF member bonus element would result in members receiving 10%-20% higher benefits with PSF. Next steps? • Parent now wishes to “de-pension” its portfolio businesses. • Accurate pricing using member data. • Corporate go/no-go decision on each PSF offer. • Submit clearance application(s) as soon as PSF passes Phase One approval. What variations has PSF been able to construct for other clients with similar drivers? • Member Outcomes – Both with and without member bonus entitlement. • Funding – Accepting non-cash payments, potentially accepting shares, physical assets and/or intangibles. • Deal enhancing – Flexibility to transact with either the buyer or the seller. • Deal enabling – Certainty of capping pension liability to enable a sale and purchase agreement to be signed in the knowledge that the PSF transfer could happen as a post-transaction exercise. 1 PSF capital adequacy basis (CAB) is set with reference to Gilts + 0.5%. 2 The trustees have no financial recourse to the parent and therefore have no expectation of buyout. Scheme is in funding surplus and company contributions from the sponsor are suspended.
  • 2. PSF Case Study: transactions typically have one or more of the following drivers: 1. M&A situation – removing DB pension consideration from the transaction. 2. Business restructuring/refinancing – the DB pension is preventing corporate actions. 3. Overseas parent – an opportune time to take DB pensions off the UK P&L. 4. Active sponsor – worried about increasing pension risks, financial and criminal sanctions from TPR. 5. Concerned trustees – worried about weak or volatile sponsor covenant and protecting member benefits. 6. Pre-insolvency – trying to save the sponsors’ business. 7. PPF+ situation – PSF likely to provide far better member outcomes than a buyout. Pension Scheme Name Scheme 2 ** Now a non-competitive situation ** Deal drivers: Trustees and Sponsor working together What is the current situation (April 2021) Working towards clearance application Assets (including buy-in) £500m- £750m Funding level on PSF CAB basis1 109% Industry Business Services Covenant strength of immediate sponsor Low Period before a buyout is likely2 Buyout level is circa 87% Overseas parent No What is driving the sponsor/trustee to seek settlement via PSF? Chair of Trustees and Business are working together on settlement. Data cleanse and benefit specification work was well under way and GMP reserve has been outlined. Scheme is invested in LDI and liquid bonds and is 100% hedged on interest rate and inflation changes. Membership is 63% deferred and there are three benefit sections. Client’s view of the benefits of a PSF transaction. Sponsor/parent: • Cost – Lowest exit cost. • Timing – Wish to remove the DB liability before 2021 year-end. • Risk – Certainty of FULL risk transfer via a connected employer transaction followed by a flexible apportionment arrangement. Trustees: • Security – Stronger and pre-funded covenant. • Member outcomes – PSF member bonus element would result in members receiving 10%-20% higher benefits than scheme benefits with PSF. Next steps? • Member data is incoming to support full pricing. • Trustee formal decision in late June. • Submit clearance application as soon as PSF passes Phase One approval. What variations has PSF been able to construct for other clients with similar drivers? • Member Outcomes – Both with and without member bonus entitlement. • Funding – Accepting non-cash payments, potentially accepting shares, physical assets and/or intangibles. • Payment spreading – Up to 3 years (4 accounting periods). 1 PSF capital adequacy basis (CAB) is set with reference to Gilts + 0.5%. 2 Scheme is in funding surplus and company contributions from the sponsor are suspended.
  • 3. PSF Case Study: transactions typically have one or more of the following drivers: 1. M&A situation – removing DB pension consideration from the transaction. 2. Business restructuring/refinancing – the DB pension is preventing corporate actions. 3. Overseas parent – an opportune time to take DB pensions off the UK P&L. 4. Active sponsor – worried about increasing pension risks, financial and criminal sanctions from TPR. 5. Concerned trustees – worried about weak or volatile sponsor covenant and protecting member benefits. 6. Pre-insolvency – trying to save the sponsors’ business. 7. PPF+ situation – PSF likely to provide far better member outcomes than a buyout. Pension Scheme Name (avoid codenames) Scheme 3 ** Non-competitive situation ** Deal drivers: Active Sponsor, Overseas Parent, Restructuring, Concerned Trustees What is the current situation (April 2021) Client is waiting for second wave of PSF deals Assets £2bn+ Funding level on PSF CAB basis1 103.5% Industry Manufacturing Covenant strength Low Period before a buyout is likely2 10+ years Overseas parent Yes What is driving the sponsor/trustee to seek settlement via PSF? A lot of tension between the two parties: • Sponsor is facing strategic change. Increasing trustee powers are challenging the ability of the business to adapt. Seemingly never-ending deficit payments. • Trustees pushing for more security for members in the face of volatile covenant, already rated as low. Pension Manager was researching solutions and consultant proactivity has directed the focus to this solution. While buyout is estimated to be at least a decade away, the current level of contributions would fund a settlement with PSF in 12-13 months. Client’s view of the benefits of a PSF transaction. Sponsor/parent: • Cost – Lowest exit cost. 1/10th of the extra funding needed to reach a buyout. • Timing – Quickest exit path. Immediate end to disputes. • Risk – Certainty of FULL risk transfer via a connected employer transaction followed by a flexible apportionment arrangement. • Rating – Expecting favourable reaction from investors and rating agencies to unencumbered balance sheet. However, parent does not want to be one of the early superfund transactions. • Business – Remove potential interference in dividend policy and restructuring options. • Accounting impact – Needs additional and careful management. Likely need to spread the settlement of liabilities. Trustees: • Security – Much higher probability of full pension payment than the current situation (c. 20% improvement). Marginally less security than a buyout. • Member outcomes – PSF member bonus element would result in members receiving 10%-20% higher benefits with PSF. • Governance/Efficiency – Acceptance that a consolidator will be stronger in both areas. • Onboarding – Minimised disruption to members through novation. Next steps? • Trading environment may trigger Q3 action. • Otherwise, pre-valuation planning in Q4 to include superfund option. What variations has PSF been able to construct for other clients with similar drivers? • Member Outcomes – Both with and without member bonus entitlement. • Funding – spreading payments, accepting non-cash payments, potentially accepting physical assets and intangibles. • Risk transfer certainty – Acquiring the sponsor. • Accounting impact mitigation – Partial transfer of liabilities spread over 3-4 accounting periods. • Pragmatics – Flexibility to transact now and then conduct post transaction exercises (data cleanse, GMP rectification, RPI to CPI changes). 1 PSF capital adequacy basis (CAB) is set with reference to Gilts + 0.5%. 2 The Scheme Actuary’s estimate based on BAU schedule of contributions and/or supported by buyout estimate/quote.
  • 4. PSF Case Study: transactions typically have one or more of the following drivers: 1. M&A situation – removing DB pension consideration from the transaction. 2. Business restructuring/refinancing – the DB pension is preventing corporate actions. 3. Overseas parent – an opportune time to take DB pensions off the UK P&L. 4. Active sponsor – worried about increasing pension risks, financial and criminal sanctions from TPR. 5. Concerned trustees – worried about weak or volatile sponsor covenant and protecting member benefits. 6. Pre-insolvency – trying to save the sponsors’ business. 7. PPF+ situation – PSF likely to provide far better member outcomes than a buyout. Pension Scheme Name (avoid codenames) Scheme 4 ** competitive situation ** Deal drivers: Overseas parent planning to exit from the UK What is the current situation (April 2021) Client considering the viability of all options Assets c.£400m Funding level on PSF CAB basis1 100% Industry Manufacturing Covenant strength Low Period before a buyout is likely2 10+ years Overseas parent Yes What is driving the sponsor/trustee to seek settlement via PSF? • Sponsor is facing strategic change and has decided to pull out of the UK because of Brexit. • Scheme is underfunded. • 60% deferred. • Complicated benefits. • GMP equalisation reserve estimated. • Keen to shortlist viable/affordable options asap. Client’s view of the benefits of a PSF transaction. Sponsor/parent: • Cost – Lowest exit cost for a clean break which would increase the chances of a business sale. • Timing – Quickest exit path. • Risk – Certainty of FULL risk transfer via a connected employer transaction followed by a flexible apportionment arrangement. • Reputation – Doing the right thing to secure members’ benefits before they exit the UK. • Rating – Expecting favourable reaction from investors and rating agencies to unencumbered balance sheet. Trustees: • Security – Much higher probability of full pension payment than the current situation (c. 25% improvement). Marginally less security than a buyout. • Member outcomes – PSF member bonus element would result in members receiving 10%-20% higher benefits than full scheme benefits with PSF. • Governance/Efficiency – Acceptance that a consolidator will be stronger in both areas. • Onboarding – Minimised disruption to members through novation. Next steps? • Buyout is off the table as too costly. Run-off still being considered but has many risks. • If the sponsor is to enable the trustees to fully settle the scheme, then PSF is in lead position. This is mainly due to: a. providing the most viable price. b. the flexibility of PSF’s model in terms of both constitution of the settlement gap and payment spreading. • Pressing business issues are taking priority and holding up progress. What variations has PSF been able to construct for other clients with similar drivers? • Member Outcomes – Both with and without member bonus entitlement. • Funding – Spreading payments, accepting non-cash payments, potentially accepting shares, physical assets and intangibles. • Streamlining the process/Stretching the available assets – Where multiple liability cohorts are involved, and the client is in financial distress, PSF has offered to lead and pass through any favourable pricing from other bidders. This ensures “best-value” overall and saves on multiple transaction costs, which benefits the trustees and their members. • Pragmatics – Can contract now and then conduct post-transaction exercises afterwards (final data cleanse, GMP rectification, RPI to CPI changes). 1 PSF capital adequacy basis (CAB) is set with reference to Gilts + 0.5%. 2 The Scheme Actuary’s estimate that the solvency level is around 80%.
  • 5. PSF Case Study: transactions typically have one or more of the following drivers: 1. M&A situation – removing DB pension consideration from the transaction. 2. Business restructuring/refinancing – the DB pension is preventing corporate actions. 3. Overseas parent – an opportune time to take DB pensions off the UK P&L. 4. Active sponsor – worried about increasing pension risks, financial and criminal sanctions from TPR. 5. Concerned trustees – worried about weak or volatile sponsor covenant and protecting member benefits. 6. Pre-insolvency – trying to save the sponsors’ business. 7. PPF+ situation – PSF likely to provide far better member outcomes than a buyout. Pension Scheme Name (avoid codenames) Scheme 5 ** building the business case ** Deal drivers: Overseas parent – pandemic has changed HQ’s risk tolerances, luckily starting assets are a lot closer to PSF settlement price than the client suspected. What is the current situation (April 2021) Indicative pricing is favourable, moving to member data level pricing. Assets £50m- £100m Funding level on PSF CAB basis1 101% Industry Agriculture Covenant strength Low-Medium Period before a buyout is likely2 6+ years Overseas parent Yes What is driving the sponsor/trustee to seek settlement via PSF? • Pandemic has triggered a change in the HQ’s tolerance to risk and financial surprises. • Pension Act 2021 sanctions have added to the general nervousness about the ongoing risks of the UK DB scheme. • 63% pensioners. • GMP equalisation reserve has been estimated. • This new option has opened new possibilities - Consultant proactivity anticipated that the 2020 valuation results would show that the scheme is a lot closer to a PSF settlement price than anyone realised. Client’s view of the benefits of a PSF transaction. Sponsor/parent: • Cost – Lowest exit cost for a clean break. • Timing – Current contribution commitments would reach PSF settlement long before a buyout. The excess is viewed as wasted resources and unnecessary by HQ. • Risk – Certainty of FULL risk transfer via a connected employer transaction followed by a flexible apportionment arrangement. • Business – Focus on their business, not the trustees’ business of pensions. Trustees: • Security – Much higher probability of full pension payment than the current situation (c. 15%-20% improvement). Marginally less security than a buyout. • Member outcomes – the PSF member bonus element would result in members receiving 10%-20% higher benefits than full scheme benefits with PSF. • Retain value – The intent had been to reshape the schemes’ asset portfolio prior to insured settlement, but that is not necessary with PSF. • Governance/Efficiency – Acceptance that a consolidator will be stronger in both areas. • Onboarding – Minimised disruption to members through novation. Next steps? • About to price based on full member data to firm up on the timescale and the necessary steps to reach the transfer price point with PSF. What variations has PSF been able to construct for other clients with similar drivers? • Member Outcomes – Both with and without member bonus entitlement. • Member Options – To help with financing, PSF can structure a deal to accommodate certain member option exercises to reduce the liabilities as well as increasing the funding level prior to a PSF transaction (at a lower price). • Funding – Spreading payments, accepting non-cash payments, potentially accepting shares, physical assets, and intangibles. • Pragmatics – Flexibility to transact now and then conduct post transaction exercises (data cleanse, GMP rectification, RPI to CPI changes). 1 PSF capital adequacy basis (CAB) is set with reference to Gilts + 0.5%. 2 The Scheme Actuary’s estimate that the solvency level is around 85%.
  • 6. PSF Case Study: transactions typically have one or more of the following drivers: 1. M&A situation – removing DB pension consideration from the transaction. 2. Business restructuring/refinancing – the DB pension is preventing corporate actions. 3. Overseas parent – an opportune time to take DB pensions off the UK P&L. 4. Active sponsor – worried about increasing pension risks, financial and criminal sanctions from TPR. 5. Concerned trustees – worried about weak or volatile sponsor covenant and protecting member benefits. 6. Pre-insolvency – trying to save the sponsors’ business. 7. PPF+ situation – PSF likely to provide far better member outcomes than a buyout. Pension Scheme Name Scheme 6 ** competitive situation ** Deal drivers: Active sponsor (private equity), Pre-insolvency What is the current situation (April 2021) Working towards clearance application Assets (including £200m buy- in) c.£200m Funding level on PSF CAB basis1 107% Industry Business Services Covenant strength of immediate sponsor Very low Period before a buyout is likely2 No further sponsor contributions are available Overseas parent No – but Private Equity Owned What is driving the sponsor/trustee to seek settlement via PSF? Business is struggling. Any further contributions from the sponsor are highly unlikely. Private equity owner is keen to settle the scheme with a superfund if the schemes assets on their own are sufficient to do so. Membership is 57% deferred. Client’s view of the benefits of a PSF transaction. Sponsor/parent: • Cost – No further settlement top-up is needed. • Timing – Wish to off-book the DB scheme asap to focus on turning around the business. • Risk – Certainty of FULL risk transfer via a connected employer transaction followed by a flexible apportionment arrangement. Trustees: • Security – Stronger and pre-funded covenant with PSF. • Member outcomes – PSF member bonus element would result in members receiving 10%-20% higher benefits than full scheme benefits with PSF. Next steps? • Member data is incoming to support full and firm pricing. • Submit clearance application as soon as PSF passes Phase One approval. What variations has PSF been able to construct for other clients with similar drivers? • Member Outcomes – Both with and without member bonus entitlement. • Funding – Accepting non-cash payments, physical assets and/or intangibles. Unlikely to accept shares without a substantial risk premium. • Payment spreading – Up to 3 years (4 accounting periods). 1 PSF capital adequacy basis (CAB) is set with reference to Gilts + 0.5%. 2 Scheme is circa 80% funded on solvency basis.
  • 7. PSF Case Study: transactions typically have one or more of the following drivers: 1. M&A situation – removing DB pension consideration from the transaction. 2. Business restructuring/refinancing – the DB pension is preventing corporate actions. 3. Overseas parent – an opportune time to take DB pensions off the UK P&L. 4. Active sponsor – worried about increasing pension risks, financial and criminal sanctions from TPR. 5. Concerned trustees – worried about weak or volatile sponsor covenant and protecting member benefits. 6. Pre-insolvency – trying to save the sponsors’ business. 7. PPF+ situation – PSF likely to provide far better member outcomes than a buyout. Pension Scheme Name Scheme 7 ** Non-competitive situation ** Deal drivers: PPF+ situation What is the current situation (April 2021) Working through Phase Two assessment with TPR as a test case Assets £500m- £750m Funding level on PSF CAB basis1 110% Industry Retail Covenant strength Sponsor is insolvent Period before a buyout is likely No buyout unless TPR delay PSF approval Overseas parent No What is driving the sponsor/trustee to seek settlement via PSF? Insolvency of the sponsor triggered the DB schemes’ entry into PPF assessment. PPF assigned PPF panellists to provide guidance on trustee, actuarial and legal matters the scheme administration was transferred to a PPF assessment panellist. It was clear early on that the scheme assets were sufficient to provided benefits above PPF levels and that the scheme would ultimately exit PPF assessment and not be accepted into the PPF. Buyout quotations demonstrated that 100% of scheme benefits could NOT be secured via an insured buyout (10%-15% lower). The trustees approached PSF. PSF can provide full scheme benefits AND transferring members may additionally be entitled to the PSF member bonus. Client’s view of the benefits of a PSF transaction. Trustees: • Member outcomes – Including the member bonus, PSF likely much higher benefits than insurer (>20-30%) for a marginally lower level of certainty (<1%). • Member disruption – Minimised disruption to members through novation of contracts and phased transition to PSF. • Protection of Scheme assets – Forced sale of illiquid and other assets that are unattractive to insurers is no longer required, PSF will underwrite certain superfund related costs for a very likely PPF+ case. • Currently working through which risks are to be transferred and which risks will require run-off insurance. Next steps? • PPF is happy with the proposed transfer. • Trustees and TPR are now in agreement on the progress steps. • Currently using this transaction as one of the test cases with TPR for Phase Two assessment of superfund transactions. What variations has PSF been able to construct for other clients with similar drivers? • Member Outcomes – Both with and without member bonus entitlement. • Risk transfer certainty – Some flexibility regarding all-risk vs full-risks. • Pragmatics – Agree terms early on but still capture the data cleanse benefits of the PPF assessment process. • Member consent – If member benefits are abated below full scheme benefits, then a member consent exercise would be needed to affect a transfer to a superfund. We have constructed a cost underwritten phased “stop and review” approach to such exercises. Two other schemes have also looked at this possibility. • Maximising member outcomes - Where a section 122 notice has not yet been served and where liability reshaping is needed to reach 100% of scheme benefits then a scheme rescue via a third-party process could be constructed. That would also allow trustees to pay any pension payment reductions made during the assessment period. Trustees retain the superfund transfer option without obligation. 1 PSF capital adequacy basis (CAB) is set with reference to Gilts + 0.5%.