ILC Future of Ageing 2022 - Prof. Louise Haagh.pptx
1. ECONOMIC SECURITY FROM A SYSTEMIC
PERSPECTIVE – Prof. Louise Haagh – University of
York
FUTURE OF AGEING 2022 – A VISION FOR THE NEXT
25 YEARS
International longevity centre, London
November 24th 2022
2. Institutional challenges & opportunities for reform.
Improving social protection design is linked with other challenges
Enhancing occupational investment / stability along with rethinking design of
social protection
holistic approach needed
FOCUS:
Systemic Perspective On Social And Economic Protection Systems Through The
Life Course.
3. RECOMMENDATIONS –
Inauguration of new WHO Department For Social Determinants Of Health
POLICY COHERENCE AND OVERSIGHT FOR HEALTH
WHO as Health Auditor – good and bad policy designs
Agenda – Good Governance for Health – build new architecture
Multi-level global governance for health – governance coherence for health
Louise Haagh, Key-note inaugural at the foundation of the Department for Social Determinants of Health, World
Health Organisation, led session on “Welfare state innovation: universal basic income and services”, Geneva, 12th
September 2019
https://www.who.int/social_determinants/strategic-meeting/en/
2019, Louise Haagh and Barbara Rohregger, Universal basic income policies and their potential for
addressing health inequities, World Health Organisation, 2019,
June. https://www.euro.who.int/__data/assets/pdf_file/0008/404387/20190606-h1015-ubi-policies-
en.pdf?ua=1
4. CHARACTERI
STICS
Universal…………..it is given to all people in society
Permanent………..on a long-term basis
Periodic……………..regular transfer
Unconditional……without any strings attached
Individual…………..money is given on an individual basis
SIMILAR PROPOSALS IN THE UK: The Weekly National Allowance. New Economics Foundation.
£50 per week, for anyone earning less than 125.000K.
Use existing benefit spending and the personal tax allowance.
Incorporates some components of UBI
UNIVERSAL BASIC INCOME - components
THE UK’s INCOME SECURITY SYSTEM HAS DESIGN DEFICITS
- Does not cater to all groups – no effective wage-linked component
- Exclusively reliant on central tax finance (in Denmark nearly 2/3 of income support is from contributory –wage-linked system)
- Not (effectively) aligned with education or occupational planning / mediation - employment transitions are not
skills-led
NEW CHALENGES - SOCIAL PROTECTION DESIGN
5. 2007
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1.2
1.4
1.6
1.8
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6
BENEFIT ADMINISTRATION
LOW Spending in GDP HIGH
HIGH
TRAINING and other
active measures
Spending in GDP
LOW
S. Korea
Sweden
Denmark
Austria
US
Finland
Portugal
Australia
Spain
Elaborated from OECD 2011
Ireland
New Zealand
Italy
Hungary
Germany
Holland
Norway
France
Canada
Belgium
Czech R.
Japan
x. Percentage of GDP spent on public benefit administration and placement services, 2007.
Y. Training, employment incentives, supported employment and rehabilitation, direct job creation, start-up incentives, spending in GDP 2007.
Chile
UK
Poland
Source: Haagh, L. 2019 The Developmental Social Contract and Basic Income in Denmark, Social Policy and Society, Cambridge University Press, 18, (2),
OECD COUNTRY SPEND ON BENEFIT ADMINISTRATION TRAINING – PRE- 2007/8 FINANCIAL CRISIS
6. 2014
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1.2
1.4
1.6
1.8
0 0.05 0.1 0.15 0.2 0.25 0.3 0.35 0.4 0.45 0.5
HIGH
TRAINING and other
active measures
Spending in GDP
LOW
S. Korea
Sweden
Denmark
Austria
US
Finland
Portugal
Australia
Spain
Elaborated from OECD 2016
Ireland
New Zealand
Italy
Hungary
Germany
Holland
Norway
France
Canada
Belgium
Japan
x. Percentage of GDP spent on public benefit administration and placement services, 2014.
Y. Training, employment incentives, supported employment and rehabilitation, direct job creation, start-up incentives, spending in GDP 2014.
Slovak Rep.
Chile
Poland
BENEFIT ADMINISTRATION
LOW Spending in GDP HIGH
Source: Haagh, L. 2019 The Developmental Social Contract and Basic Income in Denmark, Social Policy and Society, Cambridge University Press, 18, (2),
OECD COUNTRY SPEND ON BENEFIT ADMINISTRATION TRAINING – ADJUSTMENT
7. THE UK’S SPENDING CHALLENGE
DENMARK
1980. 2015. Change
%. %. %
Family. 2.74. 3.44. + 26
Health. 5.08. 6.67 + 31
Housing. 0.37. 0.70. + 89
Incap. 4.09. 4.01. - 8
Old Age 7.84. 10.23 + 30
Other* 3.70 1.47. - 60
Survivor 0.14. 2.02. +
1,387
Unemp.. 0. 0. 0.
ALMP. 0.11. 2.05 + 1.700
UNITED KINGDOM
1980. 2015. Change
%. %. %
Family 2.18 3.47 + 60
Health. 4.41. 7.70 + 75
Housing. 0.13. 1.53 + 1,090
Incap. 0.95 1.85 + 96
Old Age 3.99 6.53 + 64
Other 0.6 0.1 - 83
Survivor 1.66 0.05 - 97
Unemp.. 1.15 0.17 - 85
ALMP. 0.51. 0.19 - 64
OECD
1980. 2015. Change
%. %. %
Family. 1.44 1.97. + 37
Health. 4.09. 5.31 + 30
Housing. 0.21. 0.32 + 55
Incap. 2.12 1.93 - 9
Old Age 4.84 7.03 + 45
Other 0.37 0.49 + 32
Survivor 0.97 0.86 - 9
Unemp.. 0.59 0.68 + 15
ALMP. 0.23. 0.44. + 96
Denmark U.K. OECD
KEY POINTS:
1. U.K spending is transfer heavy: family, pensions, housing, relative to active labour market policies.
2. Some of this is due to lack of capacity and inequitable (reliance of costly agency staff in some sectors of health and low-paid staff in other
sectors).
3. Some spend subsidizes private sector provision (housing).
8. __________________
__________________
__________________
____
______________________
________________
0 0 O
0 ()
IIIIII
IIIIIIIII I_I_I_I_I_I_I_I_I_I
_I_I__I_I_I_I__I_I
_I_I_I_I_I_I_I_I_I
__I__
IIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIII
IIIIII
________________
__
The two purple diamonds add to Korpi and Palme, 1998 – The Paradox of Redistribution, American Sociological Review, 1998), p.667
Targeted
Basic Security Voluntary state subsidized
Encompassing
Corporatist
I_I_I_I_I_I_I_I_I(
)_I_(_)_( _)
)_I_I_I_(_)II_I_I_I
_I_I_I_I_I_I_I_I_(_
)I_I_I_I_I_I_I
Encompassing + BI Voluntary Encompassing + BI
Incorporation systems
Sources Haagh, L. 2019 , ‘The Developmental Social Contract and Basic Income in Denmark, Social Policy and Society, Cambridge University Press, 18, (2), pp. 301-317.
Targeted
UK’S DESIGN CHALLENGE – CASE OF INCOME SECURITY
9. NEXT 25 YEARS..?
THREE PATHWAYS TO LIFE COURSE ECONOMIC SECURITY
RECOMMENDATIONS FROM A DESIGN PERSPECTIVE
1. CONSOLIDATE MINIMUM INCOME SECURITY: UNIVERSAL FLOOR and TOP-UP
2. BUILD LIFE-LONG CONTRIBUTORY SYSTEMS (PENSIONS – COMPULSORY? /
UNEMPLOYMNT – VOLUNTARY? Multi-source funding for care.
3. MAKING TREND-SETTING (PUBLIC) OCCUPATIONS more OCCUPATIONAL
(Through a combined investment –regulatory approach)
12. MULTIVARIATE DEVELOPMENTAL SOURCES OF INTRINSIC WORK
MOTIVATION, SÃO PAULO
Source: L. HAAGH, World Development: Working-
Life, Well-Being and Welfare Reform, 2011, Volume
39, Issue 3, March 2011, Pages 450-473.
11
PROPOSITION: Modern states need to mimic the multivariate security structure that currently only those best able to compete through
schooling and labour market systems are able to attain.
Individuals motivated to work by combinations
of opportunity and economic security - UK does
not have effective wage-linked security
13. CANADA 1970S:
GUARANTEED ANNUAL
INCOME
FIELD EXPERIMENT:
HOSPITALIZATION RATE,
8.5 % DECLINE
BETWEEN 1974-1978,
MENTAL HEALTH A
MAJOR COMPONENT
16
Source: The Town with No Poverty: The Health Effects of a Canadian Guaranteed Annual Income Field Experiment, Evelyn L. Forget,
Canadian Public Policy – vol. xxxvii, no. 3 2011
EVIDENCE OF HEALTH IMPACT of Guaranteed Annual Income
14. EXPERIMENTATION SET IN CONTEXT OF L-TERM REFORM FOR
POLICY COHERENCE
Local/national experiments should:
1. Align closely with health stakeholders in monitoring, experiment design
2. Define health broadly as well-being, incl. in relational terms
A. Focus on impacts of economic and positional stability
B. Use a multi-factorial frame when evaluating impacts of diff. sources of
econ. security and opp.
3. Ensure to use multiple constituencies/districts – not exclusively income
assistance
recipients
Louise Haagh WHO 2019 c – not to be reproduced
15. BASIC INCOME – WHAT IS IT?
“A basic income is a periodic cash payment unconditionally delivered to all on an individual basis, without means test or
work requirement.” BIEN (Basic Income Earth Network - http://basicincome.org/)
Life-long, permanent basic security structure
At stake: reach & terms of income security, supporting other systems (education, occupation), creating different incentives
HOW SHALL WE THINK ABOUT IT?
* An alternative foundation for the architecture of income security to the one we have
1. From periodic intervention to constitutive stability in health and social policy
2. Address persistent old and new design flaws in the welfare state
3. Providing a basis for policy coherence for human development
Part of a case for humanist justice and governance, based on evidence we have that permanent basic income security could be
a constituent and a part of a stable institutional architecture of human development
WHY IS BASIC INCOME ON THE AGENDA?
Louise Haagh WHO 2019 c – not to be reproduced
16. LEVELS OF
HEALTH IMPACT
OF BASIC
INCOME
Individual Level:
Mental health, Supporting Intrinsic motivation, sense of security/control,
empowerment
Systemic Society Level:
Generating a foundation for comprehensive economic security system, senses of
belonging, security in society, inclusion and social participation, and accountability,
build/rebuild universal welfare state
Policy Level:
Lowering public sector costs linked with poverty/insecurity to the health sector,
supporting preventative health interventions, impact more direct but not confined to
the lower part of the gradient only (proportional and universal effect)
Limitations: These effects are conditional on other change in the policy environment
(fiscal capability/political preferences, economic policy)
Louise Haagh WHO 2019 c – not to be reproduced
17. EXPERIMENTATION SET IN CONTEXT OF L-TERM REFORM FOR
POLICY COHERENCE
Local/national experiments should:
1. Align closely with health stakeholders in monitoring, experiment design
2. Define health broadly as well-being, incl. in relational terms
A. Focus on impacts of economic and positional stability
B. Use a multi-factorial frame when evaluating impacts of diff. sources of
econ. security and opp.
3. Ensure to use multiple constituencies/districts – not exclusively income
assistance
recipients
Louise Haagh WHO 2019 c – not to be reproduced