Earthquakes, Nongovernmental Organizations, and Governance in

Earthquakes, Nongovernmental Organizations, and Governance
in Haiti
Author(s): Francois Pierre-Louis
Source: Journal of Black Studies , MARCH 2011, Vol. 42, No.
2, The Haiti Earthquake of
2010: The Politics of a Natural Disaster (MARCH 2011), pp.
186-202
Published by: Sage Publications, Inc.
Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/41151335
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Earthquakes,
Nongovernmental
Organizations, and
Governance in Haiti
Journal of Black Studies
42(2) 186-202
©TheAuthor(s)20ll
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sagepub.com/journalsPermissions.nav
DOI: I O.I 177/0021934710395389
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®SAGE

Francois Pierre-Louis1
Abstract
On January 12, 2010, the Haitian people suffered the most
dramatic and
unimaginable catastrophe in the Caribbean in recent times.
More than 222,570
citizens perished as a result of a 7.0 earthquake, and over 1 .3
million are cur-
rently homeless. The city of San Francisco, in California,
United States, had
a similar earthquake in the 1990s, and fewer than 100 people
were killed.
Chile a few months ago had an earthquake that was fár stronger
than Haiti's,
but fewer than 1,000 people were killed. So why did a 7.0
earthquake on
the Richter scale cause so much destruction in Haiti? In this
article, the
author argues that the historical boycott of Haiti's government
in the 1 9th
and 20th centuries by the international community, the constant
internal
struggle among the members of the elite for the control of state
power, and
the weakening of state structures through the creation of
nongovernmental
organizations have weakened the government's capacity to deal
with major
catastrophe and meet the needs of its citizens.
Keywords
Haiti, earthquake, NGOs, USAID, development

'Queens College, City University of New York, Flushing, NY,
USA
Corresponding Author:
Francois Pierre-Louis, Queens College, City University of New
York,
65-30 Kissena Blvd., Flushing, NY 1 1367
Email: [email protected]
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Pierre-Louis 187
On January 12, 2010, Haiti suffered the most dramatic and
unimaginable catas-
trophe in the Caribbean. More than 222,570 citizens perished in
a 7.0 earth-
quake, and over 1.3 million people are currently homeless
(www.usgs.gov).
Although we cannot prevent earthquakes nor hurricanes nor
other natural
disasters from taking place, we know that their impact on our
environment and
the population can be lessened if the right conditions exist. For
example,
San Francisco had a similar earthquake in 1993, and fewer than
100 people
were killed. Chile, a few months after Haiti's catastrophe, had a

massive 8.5 tremor.
Fewer than 1,000 people lost their lives, and not many
buildings collapsed.
So why did a 7.0 earthquake on the Richter scale cause so much
destruction in
Haiti? In this article, I argue that given Haiti's past and the
failure of nongov-
ernmental organizations (NGOs) to address the needs of the
population, with-
out a new paradigm of development the country will not
succeed in rebuilding
itself from the devastating earthquake that took place on
January 12, 2010.
Three months after the devastating earthquake that destroyed
Haiti's capital
and killed more than 222,000 people, the New York Times
published an article
on April 12, 2010, about a Haitian dancer, Fabienne Jean,
whose leg had to be
amputated to save her life (Sontag, 2010). According to the
Times article, when
the story was first published, a huge amount of support was
manifested for
Ms. Jean to help her regain the ability to dance again since that
was her liveli-
hood as a member of the Haitian National Dance Company. The
doctor from
Mt. Sinai Hospital in New York City who saved Ms. Jean's life
wanted her to
travel to the United States for additional care. However, the
NGO that provided
Ms. Jean with the prosthetic wanted her to stay in Port-au-
Prince because they

did not want to lose her for "professional and personal
reasons." In other words,
the NGO wanted to use her as a poster child to raise money for
their agency.
Finally, Ms. Jean decided not to travel to New York City.
This story mirrors Haiti after the devastating earthquake that
destroyed
most of the country's capital and left more than 3 million
people in need of
aid. At the dawn of the 2 1 st century, the country is caught
between the aspira-
tion of the Haitian people to obtain genuine support to rebuild
their lives and
the legacy of foreign interventions, either armed or
humanitarian, that have
contributed to creating a country that is totally dependent on
foreign assis-
tance to function.
Independence and Isolation
In 1804, when Haiti proclaimed its independence from France,
it was the rich-
est colony of the French Empire. Mintz (1995) notes that with
the combina-
tion of cheap land, African labor, and European capital, French
St Domingue,
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1 88 Journal of black Studies 42(2)
which Haiti was known as then, had become the zenith of the
Atlantic slave
system since "it could produce sugar, together with all those
other miraculous
healers of torment, such as rum, tobacco and coffee that
accompany it" (p. 75).
As a result of the wealth that Haiti provided to France, it was
called "la
Perle des Antilles," meaning Jewel of the Caribbean. However,
soon after
the revolutionary war that succeeded in creating the first Black
republic in the
Western Hemisphere, Haiti instantly was isolated by the
international com-
munity under pressure from Napoleon and the French
colonialists who ended
up in the United States, primarily in the Louisiana Territory,
which was still a
French possession. Thomas Jefferson, who is revered as a
freedom fighter and
a great U.S. president, sided with the French establishment to
isolate Haiti
even though the Haitian revolutionary war allowed the United
States to pur-
chase the Louisiana Territory from France, thereby making it
possible for
the United States to expand from coast to coast. Matthewson
(1995) notes

that although Jefferson was in favor of the emancipation of
U.S. slaves, in the
case of Haiti he told his secretary of state, James Madison, that
"the United
States opposed the island's independence under black rule and
wanted to see
French authority restored" (p. 214). The boycott of the first
Black republic in
the Western Hemisphere by France and the international
community from
1804 to 1825 devastated the country's economy, which was
primarily based
on commodities export. Not only did the country's economy
was destroyed,
but also Haiti's infrastructure such as the education system,
roads, and ports col-
lapsed since the country had to rely on the informal market to
trade its goods and
had no access to foreign technology to improve its agriculture
and economic
systems. According to Clement (1979), economic factors during
the period
of 1804 to 1915 had the most profound effect on educational
development in
Haiti. Not only were most of the country's commodities such as
cotton, sug-
arcane, and banana plantations destroyed in the war, but also
Haiti had to pay
for its independence, which sapped the country's national
treasury and caused
a chronic lack of sufficient funds for education.
Indeed, by 1825, as the international movement to abolish
slavery began
to mobilize, citizens in Europe, the United States, and France

decided to rec-
ognize Haiti's independence on the condition that it assumed all
the losses that
the colonialists and French citizens suffered because of the
revolution. France
demanded that the Haitian government pay 150 million French
francs as a
condition to recognize the new nation, an amount that is equal
to $21 billion
today. Haiti had to borrow that money from foreign banks to
pay the French
government. All of the revenues that the Haitian government
collected from
taxes and trade at that time went to pay the debt. It took 80
years for the country
to finish paying it. Instead of using state revenues to build
schools and roads
��131.94.16.10 on Fri, 04 Dec 2020
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Pierre-Louis 189
and develop the country's economy, Haiti had to use all its tax
levies to buy
its independence from France. Haitian historians and
economists as well as
foreign scholars have often traced the roots of Haiti's current

poverty to the
dreadful decision to pay that debt.
The French clergy who "educated" the population during the
colonial era
also left the country after it declared its independence. With
the absence of an
education system and with the boycott of the international
community, which
prevented the new nation from acquiring goods and technology
to improve its
economy, the country felt further behind. Haiti became the
center for mercan-
tilists, pirates, and fortune seekers to engage in all kinds of
shady deals that
they could not do anywhere else (Ardouin, 1958; Benoit, 1954).
As a result,
constant revolutions, military coups, and social, economic, and
political insta-
bility became the model based on which many Haitian leaders
govern. From
the time of the assassination of the founding leader, Jean-
Jacques Dessalines,
in 1 806 to the violent overthrow of the democratically elected
President Jean-
Bertrand Aristide in 1991 and 2004, Haiti never had a long
period in its history
when national interests supported individual ambition. As a
result, the country
suffered several occupations in the past two centuries. Most of
them were to
broker peace between rival sectors whose interests were closely
linked to for-
eign powers. In 1915 the United States occupied Haiti to

prevent Germany
from taking over after President Vilbrun Guillaume Sam was
dragged from the
national palace and executed. The U.S. army stayed for 19
years and created a
new political and economic class that was completely
subservient to its inter-
ests. By 1957 the new political and economic class that the
United States had
created was running out of steam. It could no longer maintain
the country's
stability and prevent a social explosion since it was unable to
meet the grow-
ing needs of the population. Francois Duvalier, who became
Haiti's president
in 1957 with the blessing of the Eisenhower administration,
used an anti-
communist strategy to maintain power. The decision by the
Kennedy and
Johnson administrations to support the Duvalier regime in the
1960s contrib-
uted to the deterioration of economic and social conditions of
the country since
most skilled Haitians went into exile and very few investments
were made in
the economy.
The Emergence of NGOs
By 1971, when Jean Claude Duvalier (Baby Doc) took over
from his father,
the country's economic conditions had worsened and Haiti was
becoming
more dependent on foreign NGOs to feed its population.
Beginning in 1971,
the international community began to shift its policy of

providing direct aid
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]90
to the government to outsourcing it to NGOs as a means to
combat corruption.
Brinkerhoffand Goldsmith (1988) note that
faced with a national administrative network that lacked
modern skills
and was riddled with corruption, most external agencies in
Haiti in the
1970s and 1980s chose to work around the central
administration, either
by collaborating with NGOs or by setting up autonomous
public bodies
over which they could exercise close oversight, (p. 104)
Therefore, since the administration of Baby Doc Duvalier, the
success of
the government has been measured by how well it gets along
with foreign
NGOs. Staff members spend a lot of time trying to please them
by provid-
ing a welcoming atmosphere for their employees and offering
them special

privileges.
The decision by the donor states to bypass the Haitian
government and
work with the international NGOs has set precedent in the
country that no
successive government has been able to reverse (Brinkerhoff &
Goldsmith,
1988). Following the fall of the Duvalier regime in 1986, the
chaos that arose
gave the international community more reasons to continue to
negotiate with
the NGOs. As a result, there was an increase in the number of
NGOs doing
business in the country. In 1984 the Haitian American
Voluntary Association
estimated that there were between 200 and 300 NGOs working
in Haiti;
10 years later the number had increased to 800 (Pierre Etienne,
1997). By 2010,
no one could give an official number of NGOs functioning in
Haiti. Several
sources have estimated that there are over 10,000 NGOs
working in some
capacity in the country and only 500 are officially registered
with the govern-
ment (The Economist, 2010). It is possible that the number of
NGOs has con-
siderably increased since the earthquake.
NGOs in World's Politics
The level of independence that NGOs began to assume from
governments by
engaging directly in projects and activities that were once the
domain of the

state after World War II was further increased by donor
countries that wanted
to reorient many developing countries' market toward a
neoliberal economy
in the late 1980s and early 1990s. NGOs that were strictly
limited to provid-
ing humanitarian assistance were now being engaged by donor
countries in
programs dealing with civil society issues such as democracy
enhancement,
conflict resolution, and economic projects. When NGOs strictly
engage in
activities that complement the work of the state, they are seen
as an extension
��131.94.16.10 on Fri, 04 Dec 2020
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Pierre-Louis 191
of the state, and their role then is to help it meet its many
social and economic
obligations. Landim (1996) notes that an important aspect
about NGOs is
that "their actions are very much based on the social, political,
and economic
contexts of the countries in which they operate" (p. 208). For a
long time NGO
actions were seen as helping weak nation-states consolidate

their domestic power.
Wapner (1995) noted that during the 1960s and 1970s, NGOs
received tremen-
dous attention from scholars who perceived NGOs as an
extension of state
power. Since genuine political activity was perceived to occur
in the interac-
tion of nation-states, the author remarked that "NGOs became
important, but
only because they influenced state behavior" (p. 319).
But the mission and objectives of NGOs began to change by the
end of the
cold war. Many of them began to compete with the state by
addressing key
state issues such as governance, corruption, and legitimacy. As
a result, NGOs
were not only influencing state's behavior but also, in many
instances, used as
substitutes by international institutions and donor countries to
implement pro-
grams that were once administered by the state. Reimann
(2006) notes that
compared to the level of cooperation in the 1 950s and 1 960s,
the United Nations
since the 1980s has not only funded NGOs to implement UN
projects but also
funded their attendance at UN conferences. Similar policy was
implemented
by the World Bank, which has increased NGO participation in
its projects
from 6% in 1988 to 50% in the late 1990s (Reimann, 2006).
As a result of their increased participation at international
conferences
and their partnerships with international institutions such as the

World Bank,
the character of these meetings has also changed. Bessis (1994)
argues that
the very presence of all kinds of NGOs at the World
Conference on Human
Rights in Vienna in 1994 showed that they have "emerged as
both the agents
and the exponents of the new divisions that are redrawing the
international
landscape" (p. 12). Otto (1996) has also argued that the
participation of NGOs
at international conferences has "introduced a new dynamic of
embryonic
participatory democracy to the global community and to the
shaping of inter-
national law" (p. 107).
Although Otto, Bessis, et al. argue that the participation of
NGOs at inter-
national conferences reinforced participatory democracy, others
have noted
that their role is to carry on the neoliberal agenda that emerged
from indus-
trialized countries after the end of the cold war (Schuller,
2009; Fisher, 1 997).
The neoliberal agenda includes an open market economy,
liberalization of
tariffs, and the privatization of key government functions.
Since many donor
states did not trust certain governments to restructure their
economy to the
demand of the neoliberal agenda, they encouraged the
proliferation of NGOs
through funding and other support to replace government in
functions that

��131.94.16.10 on Fri, 04 Dec 2020
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m
they once fulfilled. As Reimann (2006) argues NGOs would not
be able to
survive without material resources. In addition to private
donations and gov-
ernmental support, the survival of many NGOs would not have
been possible
without institutional partners such as the U.S. Agency for
International
Development (US AID), the World Bank, the United Nations,
and International
Monetary Fund. In 1980, the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and
Development estimated the number of international NGOs at
1,600. In 1993,
13 years later, there were more than 2,970 NGOs with annual
expenditures of
more than $5.7 billion (Edwards & Hulme, 1996). Currently,
the number of
registered NGOs has been estimated to be over 40,000 (Anheier
et al., 2001).
NGOs are civil society institutions that are often supported by
intergovern-
mental organizations (IGOs) and private citizens.
Instead of being mere extensions of the nation-state, NGOs
tend to perceive

themselves as separate from it and according to Matthews
(1997) are competing
with it for constituencies. She argues that national governments
are losing
not only autonomy in the global economy but also their ability
to implement
national policies due to the increasing capacity of NGOs
through the develop-
ment of modern communication to build constituencies of their
own and estab-
lish direct connections to people around the world. Matthews
notes that there are
only a few countries that are still ruled by authoritarian
regimes where NGOs
have not yet been able to influence public policy. In many
others, their role and
influence have exploded in the past decade, and they have been
able to push
around even the largest governments.
NGOs have pushed states to consider domestic public opinion
in other
countries before adopting national policies, and they have
given citizens across
borders the opportunity to influence issues that were once
restricted to govern-
ments. For example, no one can deny the considerable
influence NGOs had on
the environmental agreement that was signed among states in
1992.
With the broader independent base of public support that
environmental

groups command, NGOs set the original goal of negotiating an
agreement
to control greenhouse gases long before governments were
ready to do
so, proposed most of its structure and content, and lobbied and
mobilized
public pressure to force through a pact that virtually no one
else thought
possible when the talks began. (Matthews, 1997, p. 55)
The president of the Sudan, Omar Bashir, was accused by
several humanitarian
NGOs of committing crimes against humanity in 2009 (Agence
France-
Presse, 2009). Although no state has yet taken the initiative to
arrest or press
charges against President Bashir, the mere action of being
accused by these
��131.94.16.10 on Fri, 04 Dec 2020
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Pierre-Louis 193
NGOs has not only embarrassed the Sudanese government but
also forced
several Western countries to distance themselves from the
regime.
NGOs in Haiti

Haiti's biggest donor is US AID. US AID is an
intergovernmental agency that
is involved in every sector that the Haitian government should
be engaged in:
from building schools to providing drugs to health care clinics
and preventing
HTV. Instead of channeling the funds directly to the Haitian
government to imple-
ment these programs, USAID often invites NGOs to apply for
these grants and
provide these services on behalf of the Haitian government.
Since the Haitian
government authorizes these organizations to operate only in
the country,
it has little oversight of them, and often these NGOs do not feel
accountable
to the government because their funding is not coming from it.
In 2006 following the election of President Rene Převal after
the second
overthrow of President Aristide in 2004, Prime Minister
Jacques Edouard Alexis,
who was chosen by the newly elected president, decided to
engage the donor
community in a new paradigm regarding the way international
aid is given and
administered in Haiti. This new paradigm included the
following: more gov-
ernment oversight of the aid by holding NGOs accountable to
projects that
have been signed on by the government; a gradual transfer of
project imple-

mentation from NGO to state agencies; the reinforcement of
state agencies by
recruiting, training, and nurturing national and international
experts to increase
the state's capacity to execute the projects and a systematic
anticorruption
campaign; and the alignment of projects that are being
implemented in the
country with the government's budgetary and developmental
priorities.
In 2007, USAID committed to invest $245 million in Haiti. The
amount
was earmarked for all sectors in the country and was broken
down into differ-
ent agencies. Table 1 provides an overview of the agencies that
receive the
bulk of the funding.
As one can read in the table, USAID is involved in practically
all spheres
of Haitian society and works with the key ministries of the
country. For every
ministry, there is also a parallel NGO that executes the
program. In addition to
distributing the funds to the NGOs, USAID also divided the
funding for the
same project among several local NGOs. Some of these NGOs
have been in
Haiti since the Duvalier regime and have played a major role in
the transforma-
tion of Haitian's society from an agrarian self-sufficient

economy to a depen-
dent country. The Cooperative for American Relief Everywhere
(CARE) is a
prime example of the nefarious effect of NGOs on Haitian
society. CARE is
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]94
Table I . Distribution of U.S. Agency for International
Development Funding
to NGOs working in Haiti, With the Name of the Project and
the Parallel
Government Ministry (2007)
Government
Project Name Ministry NGOs Amount (US$)
Investments and Commerce Chemonics 1 ,6 1 4,650
Trade International
Port Security Finance Caribbean Central 2,350,000
American Action
Economic Finance U.S. Treasury 250,000
Development Department

Micro-credit Sogebank and 697,350
Capital Bank
Energy United Nations 4,1000,000
Office for Projects
Services
Support to Small and DAI 4, 1 1 3,000
Medium Businesses
Health Ministry of MSPP 12,936,754
Health (MSPP)
Primary Education Minister of Education 5,42 1 ,097
Education Development
(MENFP) Center (EDC)
Education MENFP EDC 5,539,575
Higher Education MENFP American Council 2,298, 1 3 1
on Education
Food Security (a) Agriculture, Catholic Relief 6,692,357
Environment Services
and Health
Food Security (b) Agriculture, Save the Children 3,24 1 ,996
Environment
and Health
Food Security (c) Agriculture, World Vision 2,832,8 1 1
Environment International
and Health

Food Security (d) Agriculture, Cooperative for 5, 1 50,000
Environment American Relief
and Health Everywhere
Governance and Interior Associates in Rural 2,000,000
Decentralization Development
(continued)
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Pierre-Louis
Table I. (continued)
Government
Project Name Ministry NGOs Amount (US$)
Human Rights Justice Pan American 1,121 ,877
Development
Foundation
Governance/Support State University of 1 ,586,000
to Parliament New York
Electoral Council OAS 1,240,000
Support to Judges Justice National Center for 5,470,644
and the Court State Courts

System
Program to Fight Heritage Foundation 850,640
Corruption for Haiti
Program Against Finance Systems Research 2,034,813
Corruption and Applications
Corporation
International, Inc.
Short-Term Finance CHF International 30,250,000
Employment
Program to Promote International 44,546,390
Peace-Democratic Organization for
Governance Migration
Support to Private Agencies 1 ,885, 1 74
Civil Society Collaborating
Organizations Together
Technical Assistance All ministries Center for Training 1
,967,890
to the Haitian and Technical
Government Assistance
Program to Prevent Health Plan International 1 ,294,000
AIDS (a)
Program to Prevent Health World Vision 1 ,250, 1 8 1
AIDS (b) International
Program to Fight Health World Concern 3,005,405
AIDS

Abbreviations: DAI = Development Alternatives, Inc.; OAS =
Organization of American States.
Source: http://www.usaid.gov/ht/.
one of the oldest NGOs in Haiti. It began to operate in the
country after the
1954 Hurricane Hazel, which destroyed the country's cash
crops of coffee,
cocoa, and plantains in the southeast. In 1966 CARE moved to
the northwest
of Haiti, where it began to implement community development
activities
��131.94.16.10 on Fri, 04 Dec 2020
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m
(www.care.org). The development activities that CARE
mentioned were pri-
marily a program called Food for Work. As part of the
international community's
strategy to decrease Haiti's dependence on subsistence
agriculture and cash crops,
the government of Jean Claude Duvalier in agreement with
NGOs began to
encourage Haitian peasants to migrate to Port-au-Prince to seek
employment in

the assembly industries that were being built. The Food for
Work program was
a means of paying peasants for building roads and installing
drinkable water
systems in rural communities and then paid them through
surplus food that was
donated by the United States, Canada, and other countries. The
impact of this
program in the northwest of Haiti was a massive exodus of
peasants from the
countryside to urban areas. Peasants began to abandon their
land since the
surplus food that was dumped in the market was cheaper than
the food locally
produced. Since they were also attracted by the factory jobs in
Port-au-Prince,
they preferred to settle there instead of eking out a living off
the land.
Although the program appeared innovative at the time that
CARE was
implementing it, the truth was that after a while it could not
employ all those
who wanted a job. Land in the northwest was abandoned, and
many peasants
who could not make it to Port-au-Prince left the country by
boat to the United
States and other Caribbean islands. The refugee and boat
people crisis that
erupted in the United States in the 1980s was a direct result
ofthat policy.
Grassroots International (1997) revealed in a report that

emphasized the mech-
anism through which USAID feeds dependency in Haiti that
[Haitian officials] revealed consistent complaints that foreign
aid pro-
grams, generally implemented by private agencies such as
CARE and
the Pan American Development Foundation (PADF) largely by
pass
relevant Haitian governmental entities, often putting resulting
devel-
opment projects at odds with stated national, regional, and
local pri-
orities, (p. 2)
Dewind and Kinley (1988) in their seminal work on migration
and poverty in
Haiti concluded that it was the U.S. policy of encouraging
Haitian govern-
ments to forego investments in the rural, health, and education
sectors that
led to the refugee crisis of the 1980s.
ACDI
After the overthrow of President Aristide by the United States
and France,
the Canadian government increased its foreign aid to Haiti to
support the
government of Gerard Latortue that replaced Aristide in 2004.
Haiti became
��131.94.16.10 on Fri, 04 Dec 2020

04:52:01 UTC��
Pierre-Louis 197
the second largest recipient of Canadian aid after Afghanistan
in 2004. Like
the Americans, the Canadians have their own agency to
distribute, monitor,
and supervise the aid. ACDI, which is the Canadian Agency for
International
Development, is the key IGO that coordinates all the aid that
the Canadian
government provides to Haiti. After President Převal took
office in May 2006,
Haiti received a number of Canadian public officials including
the prime min-
ister, who stated that Canada was firmly committed to helping
stabilize Haiti
by providing money for good governance and combat
corruption. A few months
later, in November, the Canadian government announced that it
had granted
Haiti $7.2 million to modernize its public administration. The
grant was to
be given over a period of 5 years (Rock, 2007). In addition to
aid to reform
public administration, Canada also provided money for
education, road
building, and health. ACDI, which administers the Canadian
aid, is not obli-
gated to report to Haitian officials how its funds are used and

whether the proj-
ects are implemented.
The European Union
The European Union practically suspended all its aid to Haiti
under the Aristide
regime. After the departure of President Aristide in 2004, the
European Union,
like other foreign donors, resumed its aid. At the beginning the
aid consisted
primarily of money to support the presidential and
parliamentary elections that
were scheduled for 2006. For example the European Union
provided 18 million
to the Electoral Council for the elections. Additional money
was given to
develop and support the pacification of Cite Soleil, which was
the seat of
violence during the transitional period of 2004-2006. Cite
Soleil is the largest
urban poor dwelling in the country and where the fiercest battle
took place
between President Aristide partisans and UN peacekeeping
forces that occu-
pied Haiti in 2004.
The Haitian government's Ministry of Planning is the agency
responsible
to monitor and license all the foreign NGOs that work in the
country. There is
a special unit in the Ministry in charge of monitoring them.
However, that unit
has no idea how many NGOs are operating in the country and
the scope of

their activities. As the years have passed, things have gotten
worse. In an inter-
view with the southeast regional planning director of the
Ministry of Planning,
the latter admitted that his greatest frustration was that there
were a number
of foreign NGOs operating in his department without his
knowledge and that
some of these organizations were doing the same activities in
the same locality.
None of them shared their plans with the ministry and his
department (Pierre-
Louis, 2000).
��131.94.16.10 on Fri, 04 Dec 2020
04:52:01 UTC��
m
The lack of coordination and planning was well illustrated with
Hurricane
Noel, which hit the country in November 2007. The hurricane
damaged several
towns and villages in the country, primarily the town of
Cabaret to the north
of Port-au-Prince. The storm not only destroyed homes and
schools but also
wiped out peasants' crops. The government had no idea which
NGO was

intervening in the town. A few weeks after the hurricane, on a
return trip to
Haiti from New York, a UNICEF worker who was sitting next
to me mentioned
that UNICEF had projects in Cabaret. In addition to UNICEF, I
found out that
Oxfam too was helping rebuild the irrigation canals in Cabaret
and had been
involved in that area for several years. All of this was news not
only to me
(I was working with the prime minister) but also to his staff
members, who
were unaware of where and what the majority of the NGOs did
in the country.
Although the government is unaware of the activities of most
NGOs in the coun-
try, it is nevertheless held accountable by the population when
a hurricane or
other disaster occurs. Often, the NGOs that are funded to
intervene disappear
or change their activities. In 2008, after the three hurricanes
that destroyed the
city of Gonaives in the Artibonite region, the population
blamed the govern-
ment for its ineptitude and the work that the NGOs were doing
in the city,
which contributed to the destruction.
The NGO Sector After the Earthquake
The earthquake that struck Haiti on January 12, 2010,
epitomizes all the symp-

toms that existed in the country in relation to the way
international NGOs oper-
ate in the country. Three days after the earthquake, the
government of Rene
Převal was unable to either communicate with the population or
provide any
form of assistance. Although the government lost 17 of its 18
ministries and
most of the media were also affected, the reality was that two
radio stations
were constantly on the air, keeping in touch with the
population and seeking
assistance for those who were pinned down under the rubble.
The failure to
communicate with the population was blamed on the president's
lack of lead-
ership and the fact that the government had no contingency
plan to address
any catastrophe in the country. There was no emergency
management system
in place that could be rapidly activated. Port-au-Prince, the
Haitian capital, was
an urban jungle where residents built homes wherever they
wanted. Since 1971
with the neoliberal agenda imposed by foreign donors, the
mantra has been
"less government is better." Therefore, governmental agencies
that used to
supervise construction in the city have been stripped of their
staff. Junior
state employees take government jobs in order to gain enough
experience to
work for NGOs, which pay them better and also provide
material and career

��131.94.16.10 on Fri, 04 Dec 2020
04:52:01 UTC��
Pierre-Louis 199
advancement. Canada, as part of its policy to increase the
number of skilled
individuals in the country, has been offering residency to any
Haitian profes-
sional that had a valid university degree. Several state
employees have taken
advantage of this program to emigrate to Canada. The Haitian
government,
which was already experiencing a deficit of qualified
employees, was further
depleted of its manpower.
The politics of allowing the NGOs to control key sectors in the
country
finally showed its limitations on January 12, 2010. It was not
until Friday
morning, 3 days after the tremor, that international aid began to
appear on the
streets of Port-au-Prince. Most of the aid at the beginning was
coming from the
Dominican Republic, Cuba, and Venezuela. NGOs such as the
Red Cross and
Doctors Without Borders were more visible since they provided
health care
assistance to the people immediately. However, they could not

address the
other needs of the population such as establishing order,
distributing food, and
ensuring citizens' safety.
Postearthquake Policy
Instead of using the earthquake to rethink their aid policy in
Haiti, the donor
countries continue to support the same failed approach. A
recent USAID report
on the Haitian earthquake showed that most of the aid from the
international
community went to the same organizations that have been in
the country
for years. More than a million Haitians were still living in
makeshift shelters
6 months after the earthquake, and there are no real plans to
move them anytime
soon despite the fact that over $1 billion has been collected.
Although for decades studies have shown the limited abilities
of NGOs to
create wealth and promote development, that model is still
being endorsed by
donor countries. However, the devastating earthquake in Haiti
has put more
pressure on Haiti's leaders to rethink that approach. As Birdsall
(2008) notes,
The problems with aid quality matter tremendously because
research
indicates that they reduce considerably the effective value of
the aid that
is transferred, and in the most aid-dependent countries may
well mean

that the way the "business of aid" is conducted actually
undermines
those countries' long term development prospects, (p. 516)
When the earthquake hit Port-au-Prince on January 12, 2010, it
exposed all
the fault lines that existed in the country's institutions as a
result of the histori-
cal boycott of the new nation and the systematic weakening of
state authority.
Therefore, the destruction was not only physical but also
emotional. The only
��131.94.16.10 on Fri, 04 Dec 2020
04:52:01 UTC��
200
international airport in the country was damaged and unable to
receive large
airplanes that wanted to bring in relief. Even when the planes
landed, there was
no coordination of the aid. As each NGO began to grab a sector
of the territory
that was affected by the earthquake, competition for resources
and turf hege-
mony began to erupt among them. John Holmes, the
coordinator of the UN

Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, criticized
his employees
for failing to adequately manage the relief effort in Haiti after
the quake.
He lamented the lack of coordination on the ground among the
NGOs which
resulted in an inefficient management of the crisis in Haiti
(Lynch, 2010).
The aftermath of the earthquake prompted the United Nations
and other agen-
cies to coordinate their aid to Haiti by creating an Interim
Reconstruction
Commission. The agency, which is run jointly by the president
of Haiti and
the special UN envoy, Bill Clinton, has been given mandates to
collect
funds and coordinate all the reconstruction projects in the
country. Since
its creation in March 2010, over $5 billion has been pledged by
donor coun-
tries. So far, it has received only $150 million, and President
Clinton is hav-
ing a hard time getting the NGOs to work together on projects
that the
commission has identified. The difficulties that the agency was
already facing
a few months after the earthquake showed that Haiti was
beginning to revert
to business as usual. The more than 200,000 people who lost
their lives as a
result of bad governance and neoliberal policy will soon be
forgotten when all
the rubble is collected and dumped unless the people organize
to change the
current paradigm.

Declaration of Conflicting Interests
The author declared no potential conflicts of interest with
respect to the authorship
and/or publication of this article.
Funding
The author disclosed receipt of the following financial support
for the research and/
or authorship of this article: research for this article was
supported by a grant from
PSC- CUNY.
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Pierre-Louis 20 1
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202 Journal of Black Studies 42(2)
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Bio
Francois Pierre-Louis is associate professor of political science
at Queens College,
City University of New York. His interests are citizen
participation and urban and

comparative politics. He is the author of Haitians in New York
City: Transnationalism
and Hometown Associations. His articles have appeared in US
Catholics, Wadabagei,
Journal of Haitian Studies, and Education and Urban Society.
��131.94.16.10 on Fri, 04 Dec 2020
04:52:01 UTC��
Contentsp. [186]p. 187p. 188p. 189p. 190p. 191p. 192p. 193p.
194p. 195p. 196p. 197p. 198p. 199p. 200p. 201p. 202Issue
Table of ContentsJournal of Black Studies, Vol. 42, No. 2
(MARCH 2011) pp. 127-287Front MatterThe Haiti Earthquake
of 2010: The Politics of a Natural Disaster [pp. 127-130]Section
1: The State, Neoliberal Policies, and NGOsAnatomy of a
Haitian Tragedy: When the Fury Of Nature Meets the Debility
of the State [pp. 131-157]Haiti in the Aftermath of the
Earthquake: The Politics of Catastrophe [pp. 158-
185]Earthquakes, Nongovernmental Organizations, and
Governance in Haiti [pp. 186-202]Section 2: The Role of
TransnationalismTransnationalism in the Aftermath of the Haiti
Earthquake: Reinforcing Ties and Second-Generation Identity
[pp. 203-224]A Commitment Amidst Shared Hardship: Haitian
Transnational Migrants and Remittances [pp. 225-246]Section
3: Vodou and Haitian Cultural DignityThe Earthquake, the
Missionaries, and the Future of Vodou [pp. 247-
263]þÿ�þ�ÿ��A�� M��a��n��-
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��2��6��4��-��2��7��5��]Section 4:
Unifying NarrativesHaiti: Three Analytical Narratives of Crisis
and Recovery [pp. 276-287]Back Matter
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The Students' Rebellion in Chile:
Occupy Protest or Classic Social
Movement?
Cesar Guzman-Concha a b
a Department of Political Science, Radboud University,
Nijmegen,
The Netherlands
b Center for Area Studies, Freie Universität, Berlin, Germany
Version of record first published: 06 Aug 2012
To cite this article: Cesar Guzman-Concha (2012): The
Students' Rebellion in Chile: Occupy Protest
or Classic Social Movement?, Social Movement Studies: Journal
of Social, Cultural and Political
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The Students’ Rebellion in Chile: Occupy
Protest or Classic Social Movement?
CESAR GUZMAN-CONCHA
Department of Political Science, Radboud University,

Nijmegen, The Netherlands and Center for Area Studies,
Freie Universität Berlin, Germany
ABSTRACT This article gives an overview of the trajectory,
components and repertory of the
Chilean students’ movement, which staged a series of protests
during 2011. Although it started by
contesting inequalities in the education system, the movement
soon evolved into a challenge to the
authoritarian character of political institutions, sharing similar
goals with protests elsewhere around
the world—including radical economical and political
democratization. Should we therefore see the
Chile students’ protests as an Occupy-type protest? By
analyzing the main interpretations over the
movement, this article argues that the Occupy label is
insufficient to understand the specificity of the
conflict. In Chile, protests did not occur through small groups
coordinated by loose networks; instead,
they were spurred by traditional student organizations. This
created a scenario of social unrest that
resembles classical forms of contention, and in that respect
differs from Occupy Wall Street, the
indignados or the Arab Spring. This case shows that despite the
crisis of neoliberal governance
forming a common historical backdrop, the modularity (how?)
and the composition (who?) of the
movement are better explained by the historical configuration of
national political systems.
KEY WORDS: Chile, students’ movement, occupy movement,
education, protest
Is the Chile students’ rebellion an Occupy-type protest? In
2011, when thousands of

protestors occupied public squares in New York, Madrid,
London and other cities
worldwide, Chilean students were also on the streets. While the
former demonstrated on
behalf of the ‘99%’ affected by the economic crisis that
followed the financial collapse in
the developed world, the latter struggled for free education,
more state involvement in the
education system and political reforms. Is the Chilean case an
example of the same
movement that took place in advanced countries? Were these
disparate protests
movements connected, and if so, in what ways?
This article analyzes the students’ uprising in Chile. It describes
the main characteristics
of the movement, and assesses some of the interpretations of the
movement that have been
influential in the national public debate. These accounts have
paid attention to one of the
following aspects: a rebellion of the indebted middle classes; a
mobilization against the
rightward shift in government; the higher cost of repression; the
importance of information

and communications technologies for catalyzing collective
action on an extraordinary
scale. Comparison with the worldwide wave of Occupy protests
highlights important
1474-2837 Print/1474-2829 Online/12/00001-8 q 2012 Taylor &
Francis
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14742837.2012.710748
Corresponding Address: Cesar Guzman-Concha, Center for Area
Studies, Freie Universität Berlin, Germany.
Email: [email protected]
Social Movement Studies,
iFirst article, 1–8, 2012
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http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14742837.2012.710748
differences between Chilean protesters and other exemplary
cases of popular dissent that

have occurred more or less simultaneously. However, for
Chilean activists, protest
movements in other countries represented a source of
inspiration and reinforced their
morale. The great attention that these protests enjoyed in
mainstream media enhanced the
resonance of the motives and claims of Chilean students.
Collective action arises in presence of grievances,
opportunities, identity, emotions and
embeddedness (Klandermans et al. 2008). I argue here that the
combined effect of these
factors explains the emergence and magnitude of the students’
movement in Chile.
Therefore, no single variable can account for this large protest
movement. The movement
is the result of the combination of long-term historical factors
with causes that relate to the
political process, and the presence of triggers. Thus, the local
context explains crucial
characteristics (e.g. modularity, composition) of this episode of
civil unrest. These factors
can be summarized as follows: (1) a long-standing failing
education system at all three
levels. The lack of regulation of the private sector, combined

with the extension of a state-
sponsored private market of college loans, has only improved
access at the expense of
quality and has furthermore increased the indebtedness of
families. This has fed the streets
with disgruntled students; (2) the turn in government that
allowed a right-wing coalition to
take office 20 years after the end of Pinochet’s dictatorship in
1990, which reinforced the
perception that the political regime was unresponsive; (3) for
decades the identity of the
students’ movement has been oppositional, clearly left-leaning
and rooted in the tradition
of the historic students’ movements of the 1920s, the 1960s and
the 1980s. Such an
identity has been a major source of collective action; (4) strong
feelings of injustice and
indignation arose among the young as their grievances were not
properly addressed by
successive governments. The perceived futility of any attempt
to negotiate has spread
feelings of disillusion; (5) The students’ unions are historically
rooted and legitimized by
their own constituency and the wider public. They have been a

key resource for socializing
ideas and claims, organizing and leading the protest, effectively
communicating their
demands and persuading public opinion. These organizations are
the reservoir of the
movement’s memories, which facilitate its reproduction over
time.
Examining these five factors together enables us to go beyond
local accounts of the
movement, which tend to be unidimensional, insofar as they put
the weight of the
explanation on single factors; and/or manifest a structuralist
bias, insofar as they often
dismiss the relevance of factors other than indebtedness and the
historic deterioration of
the education system. However, although it is argued here that
the Chilean protest
movement is rooted in the national context, this does not imply
that it was indifferent to
similar events in other countries. In fact, students benefited
from the international wave of
protest, in particular the demonstrations in Western countries.
In a similar vein, the events
in Chile enhanced the geographical range of the wave of protest,

giving both activists and
observers grounds to speak of a far-reaching movement.
The Conflict
In the last days of April 2011, the Confederation of Chilean
Students (CONFECH)
announced a national day of protest to be held on 12 May. With
the support of other civil
society organizations, 15,000 marched in Santiago under the
slogan ‘there is no future
without quality public education’. The main demands concerned
an increase of funding for
the university system, a comprehensive reform of access
mechanisms and the
2 C. Guzman-Concha
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democratization of university governance. This and subsequent
demonstrations were
intended to influence the public agenda on the eve of the annual
presidential address to
parliament, which takes place every year on 21 May, detailing
the contents of the
government’s legislative initiatives for the coming year. On 21
May, over 20,000 gathered
outside parliament, calling on the government to address the
problems of the education
system. As the president’s speech ignored their demands, the
students declared their
intention to intensify their campaign of protest. In a press
conference, Camila Vallejo,
CONFECH’s spokesperson and the head of the students’ union
at the Universidad de
Chile, announced new rallies and the threat of indefinite strike
if the government did not
meet their demands.
While the education secretary declared that those mobilized
were an ‘ideologized
minority’ and that students ‘have gone too far’, secondary
students joined in the movement.

The demands of the secondary students corresponded with those
of their fellows in college:
free education, the proscription of for-profit schools and greater
public investments
to improve Chile’s disastrous public school system. On 9 June,
26 schools were taken over
by students and most of the public universities went on strike or
had their buildings
occupied. By the end of July, nearly 140 schools were occupied
in Santiago alone.
Marches on 16 and 30 June refuted the government’s
expectation that after a few
demonstrations the movement would fade away: over 100,000
people demonstrated in
Santiago and there were massive rallies in all the major cities.
The students were joined in
these rallies by the main national labor union (CUT) and public-
sector workers, MPs from
opposition parties, chancellors and faculty members of the main
public universities and
even well-known television personalities. These events became
Chile’s largest
demonstrations since 1990.
The impressive support for the movement and its own collapse

in popularity led the
government to believe that, not having anything to gain from
the conflict, repression
combined with the radicalization of some fringes of the
movement would lead to its
exhaustion. Yet increased government repression provoked
widespread public indigna-
tion, strengthening the movement. The national day of protest
on 5 August resulted in the
arrests of over 900 demonstrators nationwide, 14 wounded (two
of whom were police
officers) and the transformation of downtown Santiago into a
site of clashes between
students and police. The disproportion of the police reaction
produced a revival of an old
piece from the Chilean repertory of protest: cacelorazo, banging
cooking pans, frequently
used during the struggles against Pinochet’s dictatorship. This
time, cacelorazo denounced
President Piñera’s handling of the education problem.
‘Cacelorazo’ was the world’s
trending topic on Twitter that night.
Between its first announcement in June and the last round of
negotiations in September,

the government offered slight increases in the education budget
and a further expansion of
vouchers and subsidies aimed at lowering the interest rate on
student loans. These
proposals eased the worst effects of the prevailing model, but
were not aimed at changing
the underlying principles that have shaped the system over the
past three decades, namely:
subsidizing demand, the key role of the private sector and free
competition (between
schools and colleges) as the mechanism of regulation and
quality achievement.
The unwavering position of the government combined with the
persistency of the
protesters led to the realization that there were no available
mechanisms to resolve these
sorts of disputes. The movement countered by proposing a
referendum. But with the
exception of very specific circumstances, the Constitution does
not provide for direct
The Students’ Rebellion in Chile 3
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democracy procedures (though municipalities are able to hold
referendums). What started
out as a conflict over education policies thus became a major
political problem. The
students’ movement asked why certain matters could not be
deliberated and decided
beyond the boundaries of those groups with access to political
institutions. In effect, by
questioning the consensus of the elite that has governed the
country for 20 years—that
same consensus that enabled the transition to democracy in
1988 – 1989—students called
for new institutional arrangements to improve the democratic
system.
The Same Wave of Protest?
Some analysts argue that protests in the Arab region and several
advanced economies are

expressions of a global phenomenon. This is not only because of
their simultaneity, but also
because they share modes (massive demonstrations in central
public spaces), goals
(democratization, egalitarianism) and actors (young,
unaffiliated to traditional organiz-
ations). However, a closer look shows that in many countries
popular discontent with the
economic crisis started earlier (e.g. Greece, Icel and) and
involved traditional actors such as
labor unions and Left parties (e.g. Spain, Greece, France).
Moreover, it should be noted that
despite shared aspirations, those mobilized in the streets of
Arab cities protest against
political oppression derived from (post)colonial cleavages,
while demonstrators in
advanced economies conveyed their anger against austerity
measures and inequality.
Chilean protesters claim to have affinity with the crowds that
filled the streets voicing
their discontent in many countries during the last year.
However, these cases differ in
crucial aspects:

(1) Context: Occupy and the indignados emerge from a
prolonged economic crisis,
while the Chilean movement is not the response to such a
collapse;
(2) Composition: in Chile the leading actors are traditional
student organizations,
while in advanced countries it is a heterogeneous mix of small
and rather new
groups of young, white, middle-class background coordinated
by loose
networks;
(3) Repertory: while Occupy and the indignados adopted the
forms seen in the
Arab Spring (prolonged occupation of central squares), Chilean
students relied
very much on rallies and demonstrations.
To be sure, a widespread climate of social unrest benefits any
individual movement.
Chilean students took advantage of indignados and Occupy in
that these movements
reinforced their position within public opinion, legitimizing the
justness of their demands
and boosting their morale. As these protests took place
simultaneously and enjoyed major

media coverage, the students’ movement could present itself as
the local branch of a general
claim against inequality and the lack of democratic
accountability of elites. This effect was
possible as the students’ movement framed its objectives in
terms of a moral economy that
was alike—though not identical—to the one put forward by
protest movements in advanced
countries. In this respect, it is important to note that the wave of
movements of 2011 differs
from the New Social Movements-type in that these are
distributional: they want to
democratize access to wealth and resources. Therefore, this
would indicate a mutation of
the underlying cleavage that was at the basis of the wave of
protest of the 1970s and 1980s.
While new social movements struggled against the threats posed
by increasing
bureaucratization (that’s why they sought autonomy,
recognition and participation), the
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current protest wave origins from the rapid deterioration of
socioeconomic conditions for
large sectors previously protected by Keynesian welfare
arrangements.
Grievances
The Chilean education system is the outcome of the reforms
carried out during Pinochet’s
rule (1973 – 1990). These reforms created a market of education
at all levels (primary,
secondary and higher education), with family spending
becoming a major source of
funding for the system. At pre-primary level, Chile’s share of
private funding is 31%
(above the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development (OECD) average of
20%), while in higher education private sources account for
84% of the funding (well

above the OECD average of 27%; OECD, 2008). Private
universities have proliferated
over the past two decades, accounting for an impressive
broadening of access to higher
education. But since regulation is weak, there is a huge
disparity in terms of quality. The
labor market has reacted accordingly by devaluing some
diplomas and/or by lowering
salaries in oversupplied professions. As three-quarters of the
universities are private, they
have absorbed a large part of the increasing demand. Though
nominally forbidden, many
are profit-seeking businesses. Both private and public
universities collect most of their
income from tuition fees, which have increased by more than
60% (in current dollars) over
the past decade. Higher education in Chile is one of the most
expensive worldwide in
proportion to GDP per capita. The rising costs combined with
high interest rates have led a
great proportion of students to default on their loans. The length
of academic programs, 5
years in many careers or 7 years in medicine, aggravates the
debt-burden. It also

contributes to the fact that a significant share of students leave
college with no degree but
considerable debt. As for the school system, while rich families
educate their children in
high-quality private schools, poor families send their children
to badly run public schools.
This has been described as a ‘system of class segregation’
(OECD, 2004) and ‘educational
apartheid’ (Waissbluth, 2011).
Is hardship in the education system deeper and more grievous
than in other domains?
Why did this major outburst not come from the labor
movement? Some have suggested
that the quality of education system grievances explain why
Chilean democracy was not
contested by the usual suspects. Yet it has also been well
documented that unregulated
labor markets are a major cause of Chile’s stark inequalities.
Nonetheless, research in
contentious politics has shown that grievances in themselves do
not explain protest. To
account for the differences of mobilization capacity between
these two movements, we

should look at the organizational strength and leadership
legitimacy of each. Unions are
weak (unionization is at a record low of around 10%), divided
(two national labor unions
have emerged in recent years, debilitating the historic CUT),
fragmented (forced to
negotiate labor contracts only at the firm level) and
delegitimized among their
constituency (their leaders have been accused of
mismanagement, petty corruption and
inefficacy). When students organizations are observed a
different picture emerges.
Opportunities
Since the democratic re-establishment in 1990, the teachers’
union (Colegio de
Profesores) and students’ unions from traditional, public
universities have been very active
in calling for reforms to the education system. Student
organizations have usually staged
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protest campaigns at the start of the academic year (March). The
intensity and duration of
these protests vary, yet they reach momentum in May – June. In
2006, an unexpected actor
entered the scene: secondary students. In the so-called
‘Penguins’ Revolution’ (because of
pupil uniforms), thousands of schoolchildren mobilized around
a comprehensive list of
demands that ranged from free bus travel passes to the re-
nationalization of public schools
(which were under municipal management due to reforms
implemented during Pinochet’s
regime), creating a political crisis in Michelle Bachelet’s
center-left administration. The
May 2011 protests successfully revitalized the historic demands
made by secondary
students.
Piñera’s right-wing administration looked at the movement

contemptuously. The
government believed that it would exhaust itself after a few
weeks. This erroneous
assessment would prove costly. Its response was defensive,
based on a mix of scorn and
repression. More generally, some observers have stated that the
rise to power of the right-
wing coalition freed constituents that had been loyal to the
center-left administrations. The
ranks of the students’ movement would have been fueled by this
formerly disciplined
crowd. Others have suggested that the collapse of the legitimacy
of the whole political elite
would have encouraged the search for new channels of political
participation. Although
further research is required to test these hypotheses, it seems
problematic to suggest that the
young protestors (aged 15 – 25) were in some way affiliated
with the established political
parties of the center-left (via the political culture of their
parents?). Furthermore, surveys
have confirmed that disengagement from party politics has
steadily grown since the 1990s.
As for unconventional forms of political participation, data

confirm that they have
prospered since the arrival of Piñera’s administration. In 2010,
according to the Chilean
police, there was a 50% increase in events of public order and a
130% increase in the
number participating in those events (with respect to the
previous year). This contradicts a
widespread belief that popular protest would have receded due
to a change of expectations
in the wake of the enormous earthquake and tsunami that hit the
country just days before
Piñera took office. In 2011 the increase in the number of events
and in the number of
participants was extraordinary, 188 per cent and 292 per cent,
respectively (Carabineros de
Chile, 2011). This confirms the historical significance of the
students’ movement and
corroborates the idea that the change in government contributed
to the rise of
unconventional political participation.
Political Culture: Identity, Resources, Embeddedness
History explains the presence of strong oppositional identities
in the students’ movement.

In the 1960s, left-wing parties recruited new members from the
student population. Their
organizations in both secondary and higher education were truly
leaders’ factories. This
tradition survived the brutal repression of the dictatorship.
University students were at the
forefront of the opposition to Pinochet’s regime. Schoolchildren
were also very active,
especially in a group of institutions of secondary education
known as ‘liceos
emblemáticos’, emblematic schools. These were high-quality
state-run schools founded
in the beginning of the twentieth century to educate the growing
middle classes. In the
1980s, secondary students contributed to the popular struggle
against Pinochet by
engaging in memorable schools occupations.
Although after 1990 several civil society organizations
underwent crises, the main
student organizations managed to maintain their role and
became a front in which the
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opposition to neoliberal policies was expressed. Most of the left
parties (from the
Communists to the radical left) have stakes in the movement.
The fact that most of their
leaders have come from these organizations illustrates the
argument. These groups learn
from the movement just as much as they aim to guide it.
Therefore, the 2011 students’
movement did not appear from nowhere. It benefited from
former experiences and the
organizational network students created for many years. History
provided identity and
demands, but it also framed the struggle within the boundaries
of a well-known repertoire
of conflict.
Conclusions

Compared to the struggles staged in the USA and Europe during
2011, Chilean social
unrest resembles classic forms of contention and in that respect
it differs from those cases.
It has been argued that the timing, modularity, composition and
political program of the
Chilean students’ movement can be explained by looking at the
national context.
However, from a longue durée approach we have learned that
the same world-processes
are behind different national outcomes (e.g. Silver, 2003). For
instance, the diffusion of
neoliberal ideas among political elites in Western European
countries and the substantial
cuts to social-economic rights might also contribute to explain
this phenomenon. Indeed,
in the Latin American context, only Chile was the stage of large
demonstrations during the
last year. In this region, those countries that departed from
neoliberalism (most notably -
but not only- Brazil and Argentina) did not experience such
large wave of protest. Further
comparative research would be necessary to corroborate
whether the crisis of the

neoliberal policies explains the differences in protest behavior
in Latin American
countries.
The students’ movement has been historically a powerful
political force in several
countries. Students are numerous and not difficult to organize,
especially when strong and
legitimized organizations are headed by charismatic and well -
prepared leaders. Internet
and social networking tools have facilitated their quick
coordination, as evidenced in some
demonstrations during the year. But since these tools have been
available for some years,
their role is not sufficient to explain the magnitude/timing of
civil unrest. I have argued
here that to understand this phenomenon in Chile we should
consider the combined effect
of long-standing grievances, unresponsive and closed political
institutions, historically
rooted and well-equipped organizations, whose members share
strong feelings of injustice
and disillusion.
These characteristics have brought about a large movement

whose particularities are
nevertheless entrenched in global processes. Although
simultaneity of protest is to a
large extent an unexpected outcome that is beyond the command
of protestors, once it
has occurred it benefits single movements only if they are able
to frame their struggles in
common ideas. However, as other experiences have proved,
these efforts do not
guarantee more resonance and legitimacy. For instance, it has
been argued that the
frames of the alter-globalization movement did not resonate
well in working-class
contexts, or in peripheral countries such as those of Eastern
Europe and Latin America
(Gagyi, 2012). From the perspective of social movement theory,
this suggests that a
transnational wave of protest is not necessarily a resource for
domestic movements.
Instead, it could turn into a limitation impeding local
mobilizations from gaining
prominence.

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In particular, this article has shown that the Chilean students’
movement has a specific
context, composition and repertoire. But the fact that grievances
come from different
generative processes and that the political systems in which
these protests took place are
diverse, do not impede activists from seeking connections,
learning from each other and
reinforcing their own position within national settings. Whether
these linkages would be
fruitful for the fortunes of these movements in the future
remains to be seen.
References
Carabineros de Chile (2011) Control del Orden Público 2011,
Presentación ante Comisión de Derechos Humanos

Cámara de Diputados. Unpublished report, (Santiago, Chile).
Gagyi, A. (2012) Occupy Wall Street? Position-blindness in the
New Leftist Revolution, Journal of Critical
Globalization Studies, 5, pp. 143 – 148.
Klandermans, B., van der Toorn, J. & van Stekelenburg, J.
(2008) Embeddedness and identity: How immigrants
turn grievances into action, American Sociological Review,
73(6), pp. 992 – 1012.
OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development) (2004) Chile: Reviews of National
Education Policies (Paris: OECD).
OECD (2008) Chile: Education at a Glance (Paris: OECD).
Silver, B. (2003) Forces of Labor. Workers’ Movements and
Globalization Since 1870 (New York: Cambridge).
Waissbluth, M. (2011) Las “Mejores” escuelas de Chile,
Available at http://blog.latercera.com/blog/mwaissbluth/
entry/las_mejores_escuelas_de_chile (accessed 29 March 2012).
Cesar Guzman-Concha is postdoctoral researcher in the Center
for Area Studies, in Freie
Universität Berlin (Germany), and is also affiliated to the
Department of Political Science
of Radboud University Nijmegen (The Netherlands). He studied

sociology and history in
the University of Chile (Santiago), and earned a PhD in
Sociology from the University of
Barcelona. His main research interests are contentious politics
and protest, social
movements, and political parties.
8 C. Guzman-Concha
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https://www.researchgate.net/publication/239800770
THE BIDEN PLAN TO BUILD SECURITY AND PROSPERITY
IN PARTNERSHIP WITH THE PEOPLE OF CENTRAL
AMERICA

“The challenges ahead are formidable. But if the political will
exists, there is no reason Central America cannot become the
next great success story of the Western Hemisphere.”
—Vice President Joe Biden
The people of the United States and Central America have a
strong and abiding friendship. We are bound together not just
by proximity, but by our shared history and values, and the
deeply rooted connections of family and friends that
inextricably link our futures. These ties are an essential part of
our strength, and they should never be diminished or taken for
granted.
Yet, from the first moments of announcing his candidacy for
president, Trump has insulted and bullied our closest neighbors,
and demonized as less-than-human migrants and the people of
our partner nations throughout the region. He has governed
through fear and division at home, and abandoned U.S.
leadership in the region. It’s not just a moral outrage, it’s a
complete failure of American global leadership that is
exacerbating challenges in our own region and making the
people of the United States less secure.
The Western Hemisphere has the potential to be secure,
democratic, and prosperous from the northern reaches of Canada
all the way to the southern tip of Chile. Critical to achieving
this goal is ensuring that the nations of Central America–
especially El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras, the Northern
Triangle countries–are strong, secure, and capable of delivering
futures of opportunity for their own people.
Currently, the Northern Triangle faces enormous challenges
from violence, transnational criminal organizations, poverty,
and corrupt and ineffective public institutions. This is forcing
too many families, unaccompanied children, and adults to make
an untenable choice: leave behind everything they know and
undertake a dangerous journey to seek a better life, or stay and
live under the constant threat of violence, persecution,
hopelessness, or even death. Trump’s response has been to enact
draconian immigration policies that seek to undo our asylum

and refugee laws, coupled with severe reductions in our foreign
assistance to the region. Trump has failed to address the
challenge of irregular migration and abandoned our commitment
to human rights and our democratic values in the process. And,
we see the results of his dangerous and erratic decisions every
day in the humanitarian crisis at our border.
Joe Biden knows that the most effective and sustainable way to
reduce migration from the Northern Triangle is to
comprehensively address its root causes–the factors pushing
people to leave their countries in the first place–because he’s
done it before. As the point-person for the Obama-Biden
Administration to address the surge of unaccompanied minors
from the Northern Triangle in 2014, Biden successfully built
consensus among Democrats and Republicans in Congress in
favor of a multi-year strategy to reduce irregular migration, and
secured $750 million to support reforms in the region. Biden’s
strategy engaged the leaders of the region to take responsibility
for improving economic prosperity through poverty reduction
and regional integration programs, deepened security
cooperation to reduce gang violence and combat transnational
criminal organizations, and strengthened institutions through
technical assistance that improved governance and transparent
fiscal management. The Biden approach reduced violence and
helped to ensure that families and children remained in their
home countries. Despite this success, since assuming office, the
Trump Administration has delayed, reduced, or diverted
assistance to Central America–a counterproductive policy that
has been rejected by congressional leaders on both sides of the
aisle.
As president, Biden will immediately do away with the Trump
Administration’s draconian immigration policies and galvanize
international action to address the poverty and insecurity
driving migrants from the Northern Triangle to the United
States. Central American governments and societies have a
primary responsibility to address the drivers of emigration in
their own countries, but the depth of the necessary reforms

require sustained international assistance and cooperation.
Renewed U.S. leadership is desperately needed, and must be
complemented by private sector investment, the support of the
international donor community, and a commitment by regional
governments to undertake fundamental reforms.
As president, Joe Biden will renew a robust commitment to U.S.
leadership in the region and pursue a comprehensive strategy
for Central America by:
· Developing a comprehensive four-year, $4 billion regional
strategy to address factors driving migration from Central
America;
· Mobilizing private investment in the region;
· Improving security and rule of law;
· Addressing endemic corruption;
· Prioritizing poverty reduction and economic development.
A COMPREHENSIVE FOUR-YEAR, $4 BILLION REGIONAL
STRATEGY
The people of the region understand that addressing these
challenges in a sustainable way demands systemic change and
reforms across many sectors of society in the Northern
Triangle–and that sort of change requires a serious investment
of political will and resources at every level. It requires the
sustained commitment from the leaders and peoples of El
Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras, and as they step up, the
United States should be there to offer support and partnership.
It is in the direct interest of the United States to help drive that
change with a comprehensive strategy of U.S. support for
regional initiatives and engagement at the highest levels of our
government.
As president, Biden will renew the U.S. commitment to tackling
the root causes driving migration with an integrated, four-year,
$4 billion regional strategy that:
· Requires countries to allocate a substantial amount of their
own resources and undertake significant, concrete, and
verifiable reforms;
· Places strong conditions for verifiable progress to ensure that

U.S. taxpayer funds are used effectively;
· Puts combating corruption at the heart of U.S. policy in
Central America;
· Marshals private sector investment, including through public-
private partnerships, to supplement government funds;
· Invests primarily in civil society organizations that are on the
frontlines of addressing root causes;
· Renews efforts to work constructively with Mexico, Canada,
and other regional partners from Central and South America;
and
· Recognizes the central role of women as a powerful force for
development.
To pay for this investment in the future of our region, Biden
will reprioritize money away from the Department of Homeland
Security’s budget for detention, which has skyrocketed under
Trump’s inhumane and unnecessary policies, in favor of more
effective and cost-efficient alternatives to detention. The
savings from not locking migrants away like criminals or
separating families will be much better used to improve
conditions in the region and help people feel safe in their home
countries.
MOBILIZING PRIVATE INVESTMENT IN THE REGION
Alone, government investment and generous foreign aid are
insufficient to stimulate the kind of economic opportunity the
people of Central America need to build stable, secure, middle
class futures. Ultimately, economies will only grow sustainably
by attracting greater private investment–both from international
sources, and from their citizens being willing to invest at
home.
A Biden administration will harness private sector investment to
promote economic stability and job creation in Central America
by:
· Working with multilateral development banks, such as the
World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB),
to develop infrastructure and promote foreign investment by
engaging with the private sector in a cost-effective and

competitive manner. The United States has historically been a
significant funder of these international organizations, and we
should use our role and investments to ensure that these
institutions focus on Central America as a priority.
· Reducing the barriers to private sector investment by
prioritizing strengthening the rule of law with increased judicial
capacity and improving the competitiveness of the Northern
Triangle market by modernizing and standardizing customs
procedures.
· Directing the U.S. Trade Representative and the Commerce
Department to evaluate whether the countries of Central
America are abiding by their commitments under DR-CAFTA,
including ensuring that labor practices do not disadvantage
competition. Maximizing our trade and commercial deals also
generates greater economic opportunities for U.S. businesses
and investors. The U.S. is the primary source of foreign direct
investment in Central America.
· Bolstering microfinance and financial inclusive banking in
Central America with a priority on programs that empower
women. Remittances from family members sending money home
constitutes a larger share of the GDP in some Northern Triangle
countries than foreign direct investment, accounting for more
than 10 percent of GDP in Guatemala and approaching 20
percent in El Salvador and Honduras. As president, Biden will
create mechanisms to help remittance recipients, especially
women, invest in and start small businesses.
· Focusing economic development efforts on modernizing the
Northern Triangle’s power grids, ports, and roads, so that local
industries can compete globally. In the short term, Biden will
join efforts to double the capacity of SIEPAC, the Central
American Electrical Interconnection System, to generate
electricity for the region.
IMPROVING SECURITY AND THE RULE OF LAW
Families will continue to flee the region if they and their
children are not safe in their home communities. They will not
try to start a business. They will not invest in their future.

Violence and a lack of faith in the capacity of the region’s
security services are an enormous barrier to progress in the
Northern Triangle. Strengthening security and establishing
confidence in the rule of law are the cornerstones for all the
other reforms that are needed in the Northern Triangle.
Improving both is in the direct interest of people throughout the
region and the United States.
A Biden Administration will tackle regional security challenges
by:
· Supporting reforms at the national level to fight corruption in
the security services and strengthen the judiciary. Investing in
improving professional standards and training for police and
security forces in the region is key to ensuring that public
safety, in partnership with communities, is prioritized.
· Backing violence reduction programs and job training
programs that prevent youth from joining dangerous criminal
gangs in the first place. These efforts will build on the latest
evidence-based practices worldwide to reduce violence with
data-driven programs that target high-risk offenders through
violence interruption; cognitive, behavioral, and family therapy;
juvenile justice reform; restorative justice; and workforce
development.
· Providing technical assistance to judges and prosecutors to
help authorities more effectively combat financial crimes.
· Ensuring access to justice and support services for victims of
domestic violence. Domestic and intra-family violence continue
to be a major problem in the Northern Triangle countries and a
driver of migration, particularly for women and children. Biden
will restore full access to asylum for domestic violence
victims, while also strengthening prosecutors’ abilities to
pursue domestic violence cases and put perpetrators behind
bars.
ADDRESSING ENDEMIC CORRUPTION
Central America will never be able to mobilize private
investment on the scale necessary or deliver the services its
people need without also addressing corruption. Corruption

prevents nations from governing effectively, siphons off
resources needed for critical investments in things like
infrastructure and education, drives away outside investment,
creates crises of legitimacy in fragile democracies, and leaves
countries vulnerable to organized crime. It is a cancer that is
eating away at the countries of the Northern Triangle and
preventing them from making meaningful progress on any of
their other key challenges. As the most corrupt Administration
in modern American history, Trump has undercut U.S. moral
leadership on this issue, and his efforts to combat corruption
anywhere in the world have been woefully inadequate to
nonexistent.
A long-time vocal proponent of anti-corruption efforts around
the world, including in the Northern Triangle, as president,
Biden will treat anti-corruption in the Northern Triangle as a
top priority by:
· Revoking visas to the United States and freezing assets of
corrupt individuals from El Salvador, Guatemala, and
Honduras.
· Increasing the presence of U.S. Justice and Treasury
Department attachés at our Embassies in Central America to
better fight organized crime and illicit activity, and creating a
new office as part of the Treasury Department’s Office of
Foreign Asset Control (OFAC) to investigate corruption in the
Northern Triangle.
· Prioritizing additional funding to train prosecutors in
specialized anti-corruption policies and procedures.
· Supporting existing anti-corruption mechanisms while also
working with partners to create a regional commission to fight
corruption, build more robust domestic institutions, and help
local prosecutors pursue corruption. To ensure long-term
sustainability and success, Biden will also enlist the support of
international organizations, such as the United Nations, the
Organization of American States, and the Organisation for
Economic Co-operation and Development, that already have
anti-corruption efforts in place.

PRIORITIZING POVERTY REDUCTION AND ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT
Progress depends on creating a stronger security environment,
but it cannot be the sole focus of our efforts in the region.
Investing in economic development and the potential of the
people of the region is critical for long-term success.
Unfortunately, Trump doesn’t understand that U.S. development
aid is a vital investment not just in the success of the region,
but in our own future security and prosperity.
A Biden Administration will prioritize poverty reduction and
development by:
· Addressing food insecurity as a root cause of migration by
investing in programs that combat malnutrition in the Northern
Triangle, particularly in Guatemala’s Western Highlands and
in the dry corridor along the Pacific coast of Central America.
· Strengthening U.S. investments in reintegrating returning
migrants to ensure these individuals do not once again
undertake the dangerous trek north. Biden will work with the
private and non-profit sector in the Northern Triangle to target
these individuals for job training and prevention programs,
many of whom have gained valuable skills – including English-
language skills.
· Prioritizing developing human capital. Biden will work with
the public and private sectors to provide training opportunities
for youth in the region, while also supporting more scholarships
to bring Central American students to study in the United
States.
· Providing technical assistance through the U.S. Agency for
International Development and the Department of the Treasury
to support tax reforms and enforcement. The Northern Triangle
governments struggle to meet basic governance challenges such
as securing their countries against criminal gang activity,
mitigating the effects of extreme poverty, or building stronger
educational systems. With increased tax revenue, the countries
of the Northern Triangle can invest more of their own money in
combating insecurity and strengthening economic development.

· Developing in coordination with countries throughout the
region a comprehensive strategy to address the effects of the
climate crisis. In our own hemisphere, climate change is already
undermining security and prosperity, as well as driving
increased migration. Biden’s strategy to meet the greatest
threats and create opportunities includes a focus on the
Caribbean and the Northern Triangle to promote transitions to
clean energy as well as climate change adaptation and
resilience.
REVISTA DE CIENCIA POLÍTICA / VOLUMEN 39 / N° 2 /
2019 / 265-284
Guatemala 2018: FacinG a constitutional crossroad
Guatemala 2018: frente a una encrucijada constitucional
KATE BRANNUM
American Public University System, USA
ABSTRACT
Guatemalan politics were dominated in 2018 by political strife
between the Jim-
my Morales administration and the International Commission
against Impunity
in Guatemala (CICIG). The most pressing issues in Guatemala
continue to be co-
rruption and the weakness of the rule-of-law. The year began
with but guarded
optimism that CICIG could continue its work despite worries
about the President’s
commitment to democracy, but ended with a constitutional

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