1Crime Analysis UnitTa’Minka WatfordTiffin Univers

1
Crime Analysis Unit
Ta’Minka Watford
Tiffin University
2
Crime Analysis Unit
Introduction
The crime analysis unit is part of the police department. The
compartment is significant
because it helps in identifying and solving all criminal cases.
Different people present in the
crime analysis unit disseminate and receive information
regarding crime and ensure the
instructions are duly followed. The crime analysis unit deals
with offenses entailing dangerous
criminals who have been involved in different allegations
(Sanders & Condon, 2017). Moreover,
the unit has analysts who review every crime case report

presented and help predict the crime
path in the state. It means that the unit will predict the
possibility of criminal cases increasing or
decreasing depending on the crime level reported and acted by
the police officers. The strategy is
essential because the information will assist the police unit in
preparing the necessary actions
required in curbing crime. The primary goal and objective of the
crime analysis unit are to help
in eradicating crime and restoring the standard law and order.
There are different positions within the crime analysis unit. The
first position is the
detective, who is placed in charge of using the given cl ues by
witnesses to apprehend the
culprits. The detective’s responsibility in the unit is to crack the
case and uncover the criminal’s
whereabouts before handing all the evidence to the court
prosecutor. Another position in the
crime analysis unit is the overall chief police (Sanders &
Condon, 2017). The individual is
responsible for the crime and police unit and dispatches orders
that all the present personnel must
respect. All other small departments in the unit are supposed to
report to the police chief. Their

primary responsibility is ensuring that all staff members
comprehend their duties within the
police department and ensure they deal with the presented crime
cases. Another vital member of
the crime analysis unit is the officer. They are essential because
they are dispatched to the crime
3
vicinity to apprehend the culprit and ensure they obtain the
evidence and clues indispensable for
the case.
The crime analysis unit has different job descriptions that the
staffing unit should meet,
including their requirements, training, and experience. For
instance, detectives should be well
trained because their tasks include questioning and associating
with witnesses and victims to
uncover the crime details. The individual should have
significant communication skills to
retrieve the required data (Sanders & Condon, 2017). Another
staffing unit required in CAU is
the technology specialist, who ensures data is well managed
within the department. The first

requirement needed by the personal is prowess in technology
dealings. The mechanism is
significant because of storing the case files and evidence within
the software. Additionally, an
evidence expert is beneficial to the crime analysis unit. Their
primary responsibility is validating
the presented proof and ascertaining if they are relevant to the
presented case, and authorize
investigations.
Sworn officers have disseminated their desire to deliver their
best abilities in working
with the government for the citizen’s benefit. Their role is to
ensure they eradicate all the
pending harm that might negatively implicate the citizens
(Sanders & Condon, 2017). The sworn
officers should ensure that all individuals follow the laws and
regulations encapsulated by the
constitution. It means they should punish the offenders and
ensure victims are served the proper
justice. There are different levels and departments of sworn
officers and are bounded by their
oath to working for the more significant benefit and
development. Non-sworn civilian employees

working in the police department have minimal power, and their
primary role is dealing with
tasks like collecting fingerprints and examining evidence. They
are prohibited from handling fire
guns and are delegated those duties that the sworn officers
cannot accomplish.
4
Hiring sworn officers are beneficial, primarily because of their
tremendous experience
and training in their field expertise. They are trained to
comprehend that they should retain their
services in all the required work posts. For instance, an
organization benefits from hiring sworn
officers through absolute security and protection (Sanders &
Condon, 2017). Moreover, they will
register restored law and order and minimizing criminal
activities around the organization.
Additionally, hiring non-sworn employees is advantageous
because of their tremendous skills in
computer and certification. Sworn officers are deployed to the
field while the civilians are left in
the offices to ensure that they analyze the cases. The primary
advantage is that they facilitate

minimizing the workload for the sworn officers.
Hiring sworn in is a significant risk because they have high
costs and are extremely
difficult to maintain. They are expensive because they require
guns, patrol cars, and surveillance
cameras to accomplish their tasks. They can only be afforded
the federal government and
established organizations requiring high-end security (Sanders
& Condon, 2017). Employing the
non-sworn is risky, especially in the police department, because
they might be targeted to prevent
confidential information if not adequately trained. Therefore,
the police chief should be on the
lookout for some people employed in the crime analyst unit. I
recommend that he should employ
well-trained officers with tremendous skills and experiences in
their assigned department. The
strategy is beneficial since it will account for the massive
financial investment.
5
References

Sanders, C., & Condon, C. (2017). Crime analysis and cognitive
effects: the practice of policing t
through flows of data. Global crime, 18(3), 237-255.
CASES
CASE 34 :: FORD: AN AUTO COMPANY IN TRANSITION
C277
* This case study was prepared by Professor Pauline Assenza of
Western
Connecticut State University; Professor Helaine J. Korn of
Baruch College,
City University of New York; Professor Naga Lakshmi
Damaraju of the Sonoma
State University; and Professor Alan B. Eisner of Pace
University. The purpose
of the case is to stimulate class discussion rather than to
illustrate effective or
ineffective handling of a business situation. Copyright © 2019
Alan B. Eisner.
In January 2019, the Ford Motor Company celebrated as
the F-Series line of pickups became the top-selling trucks
in the United States for the 42nd consecutive year. This
line of trucks also marked 37 years as the best-selling vehi-
cle in the United States overall. In 2018, the F-Series,
which included the Super Duty and the F-150 Raptor, sold
909,330 vehicles—just 30,181 units short of the all-time re-
cord set in 2004.1 Jim Farley, Ford executive vice president
and president, Global Markets, pointed to the F-Series as a
“juggernaut” that “leads the world in sales, capability, and

smart technology, setting the bar others follow.”2 But would
truck sales alone help the increasingly depressed auto mar-
ket, where the overall industry had already seen a drop in
sales of 2.6 percent in the first months of 2019? This was
the biggest decline since the recession of 2009, and there
appeared to be no relief in sight.3 Something would have to
change. Bold leadership was needed.
The ability to anticipate customers’ needs was crucial to
any company’s long-term success, but it was especially im-
portant in the capital-intensive, consumer-driven, globally
competitive automobile industry. As the major players from
Asia, Europe, and the United States jockeyed for position in
the sales of traditional trucks and cars, smaller, more inno-
vative companies such as Tesla, Elio Motors,4 and start-up
Faraday Futures were creating concept cars that addressed
consumers’ interests in alternative fuels, low operational
costs, and self-driving autonomous designs that promised to
leave the passenger free to use in-transit time for other more
productive pursuits. The auto industry was going through a
“significant secular change” that was hard to predict. The
trend seemed to be going toward less car ownership and, as
the industry became more niche focused, rapid technological
changes meant it was essential to be able to refresh the
product portfolio rapidly in order to maintain market share.5
Responding to this trend, Mark Fields, CEO of Ford
from 2014 to 2017, had said Ford would be using innovation
“not only to create advanced new vehicles but also to help
change the way the world moves by solving today’s growing
global transportation challenges.”6 Self-driving cars were
reported to be coming as early as 2019 to the global road-
ways; and Ford Motor Company had made a commitment
to this business, testing its fleet of 100 autonomous cars in
Florida, Pennsylvania, and Michigan.7 But in 2019 Ford

was still at least two years away from releasing a long-range
electric vehicle while General Motors (GM) had already
brought the Bolt to market.
Given the increasing disruption in the industry, and the
obligation to return value to understandably concerned inves -
tors, Ford had some significant decisions to make, one of
which was selecting the right leader for this business.
Executive Chairman Bill Ford had said “this is a time of un-
precedented change. And a time of great change, in my mind,
requires a transformational leader.”8 Ford was feeling pres -
sure from investors, who had seen the stock price steadily
decline from a high of over 17.50 in 2014 to a low of under
10.00 in 2017. In 2017, Ford had asked Fields to resign and
promoted Jim Hackett to the CEO position. Hackett, previ-
ously head of Ford Smart Mobility LLC—a subsidiary of
Ford formed to accelerate the company’s plans to design,
build, grow, and invest in emerging mobility services such as
autonomous vehicles—believed in the need for transformation.
Hackett had said “breakthrough technologies are transform-
ing nearly every aspect of the vehicles we build and how
people use them, demanding a rethink of how we design
transportation systems.”9 But Hackett was Ford’s third CEO
in five years. Why was this job so difficult?
Fields had gotten the CEO job in July 2014 after the re-
tirement of Alan Mulally, widely hailed as one of the “five
most significant corporate leaders of the last decade,” and
architect of Ford’s eight-year turnaround from the brink of
bankruptcy in 2006.10 It was Mulally who had created the
vision that drove Ford’s revitalization—“ONE Ford.” The
ONE Ford message was intended to communicate consis-
tency across all departments, all segments of the company,
requiring people to work together as one team, with one
plan, and one goal: “an exciting viable Ford delivering prof-
itable growth for all.”11 Mulally worked to create a culture

of accountability and collaboration across the company.
His vision was to leverage Ford’s unique automotive knowl -
edge and assets to build cars and trucks that people wanted
and valued, and he managed to arrange the financing neces-
sary to pay for it all. The 2009 economic downturn that
caused a financial catastrophe for U.S. automakers trapped
General Motors and Chrysler in emergency government
loans, but Ford was able to avoid bankruptcy because of
Mulally’s actions.
Mulally had groomed Mark Fields as his successor since
2012, instilling confidence among the company’s stakehold-
ers that Ford would be able to continue to be profitable
CASE 34
FORD: AN AUTO COMPANY IN TRANSITION*
Strategic Management: Text and
Cases
C278 CASE 34 :: FORD: AN AUTO COMPANY IN
TRANSITION
Henry Ford of “democratizing technology,” —not just mak-
ing products for people who could afford luxury vehicles,
but using technology to solve problems of mobility and
access, and providing not only products but also transporta-
tion services that made people’s lives better.12 So, although
Ford would always sell cars and trucks, it was also making
big bets in autonomous technology (self-driving cars), elec-
tric vehicles, and other transportation services such as
urban mobility solutions via ride-sharing, bike-sharing, and
customized interior vehicle experiences serving multiple
customer needs.

In 2019, CEO Hackett was sustaining this vision while
migrating from a production line focus on multiple vehicle
types to one where each team was dedicated to a specific
product line and expected to “understand every small detail
of the underlying product and customers they serve.”13 This
was no longer ONE Ford. Under Hackett, Ford was plan-
ning to execute in four strategic areas:
• Develop a winning portfolio that provides products
customers want in the markets where we know we
can win.
• Make propulsion choices that create clean-running
cars without sacrificing power, style, and performance
by creating an entire portfolio of electric vehicles.
• Build a viable autonomous vehicle business by bring-
ing components of autonomous technology together,
designing products such as ride-hailing and delivery
services that are centered on the needs of humans,
providing solutions for city leaders and transportation
planners, as well as vehicle owners.
• Create a set of mobility experiences that encourages
freedom of movement—orchestrating millions of con-
nections across a digital network accessible to all,
equipping our vehicles with software and services that
connect to the smart world around them, and address-
ing the problems of congested cities and roads.
This vision of a seismic shift in personal transportation
was fully supported and even driven by Ford’s executive
chairman Bill Ford, who had championed the concept of
increased mobility back when the only things to invest in
were “parking and municipal ticketing solutions.”14 Now, in

2019, Bill Ford was supporting the company’s movement
beyond selling vehicles to investing heavily in mobility ser-
vices. As the initial architect of this shift, Bill Ford predicted
the company could make increased profit margins on new
services, more than double what it had traditionally made
selling cars and trucks, but the ultimate goal, beyond mak-
ing money, was to improve people’s lives. In doing so, Bill
Ford would be protecting his great-grandfather’s legacy.15
History of the Ford Motor Company
At the beginning of 2019, Ford Motor Company, based in
Dearborn, Michigan, had about 199,000 employees and
61 plants worldwide. It manufactured or distributed the
once Mulally stepped down. Even with this preparation,
CEO Fields had faced an industry affected by general eco-
nomic conditions over which he had little control and a
changing technological and sociocultural environment
where consumer preferences were difficult to predict. And
rivals were coming from unexpected directions. Fields had
to be able to anticipate and address numerous challenges as
he tried to position the company for continued success.
Ultimately, Fields was not able to do so.
Attempts at repositioning Ford had been under way for
many years. In the 1990s, former CEO Jacques Nasser had
emphasized acquisitions to reshape Ford, but day-to-day
business activities were ignored in the process. When
Nasser left in October 2001, Bill Ford, great-grandson of
company founder Henry Ford, took over and emphasized
innovation as a core strategy to reshape Ford. In an attempt
to stem the downward slide at Ford, and perhaps to jump-
start a turnaround, Bill Ford recruited industry outsider
Alan Mulally, who was elected president and chief execu-
tive officer of Ford on September 5, 2006. Mulally, former
head of commercial airplanes at Boeing, was expected to

steer the struggling automaker out of the problems of fall -
ing market share and financial losses. Mulally created his
vision of ONE Ford to reshape the company and in 2009
finally achieved profitability. Mulally was able to sustain
this success past the initial stages of his tenure, and main-
tained profitability up until his retirement in June 2014.
CEO Mark Fields took over, but challenging global con-
ditions meant 2014 year-end profit saw a 56 percent drop
from 2013—meaning Fields had work to do. In 2015, Fields
continued the focus on ONE Ford, highlighting the idea
that Ford could achieve profitable growth for all. By suc-
cessfully launching 16 new global products, opening the last
of 10 new plants to support growth in Asia Pacific, and see-
ing profitable global business unit performance in every
region except South America, Ford had the most profitable
year ever in 2015, and 2016 was just slightly lower, and the
second best ever.
But in 2016 CEO Mark Fields decided to restructure,
creating a new focus and expanding the company’s scope
from vehicles to “mobility,” through business model innova-
tion. In the 2016 income statement, there appeared an
“Other” revenue item for the first time, representing the
newly operational Ford Smart Mobility LLC, a subsidiary
formed to design, build, grow, and invest in emerging mobil -
ity services. Designed to compete like a start-up company,
Ford Smart Mobility LLC was planning to focus solely on
mobility services, and collaborate with start-ups and tech
companies as needed to pursue opportunities. Jim Hackett
was chosen to head up this new division. Hackett, formerly
the CEO of Steelcase, a Michigan furniture company, had
been credited with developing that business into a global
leader, transitioning it from a traditional furniture manufac-
turer into an industry innovator.

CEO Fields reminded investors of the company’s long-
term legacy, pointing to a history going back to founder
Cases
C279
average age of light vehicles on U.S. roads was over
12 years, with domestic nameplate vehicles 3.6 years older
than foreign ones.19 Partly due to this, replacement demand
was forecasted to stay fairly f lat. Any increase in sales
would be aided by an improvement in the general economic
situation, reduced gasoline prices, and lower interest rates
for car loans. However, sales in U.S. markets had not be-
longed only to U.S. manufacturers for some time.
In the United States, Ford’s market share had dropped
over time—from almost 25 percent in 1999 to 14.4 percent in
2018,20 with major blows to market share in the light-vehicle
segment. Going into 2019, Ford claimed the third spot in the
U.S. market, just behind Toyota (see Exhibit 1).
Originally dominated by the “Big 3” Detroit-based car
companies—Ford, General Motors, and Fiat/Chrysler —
competition in the United States had intensified since the
1980s, when Japanese carmakers began gaining a foothold
in the market. To counter the problem of being viewed as
foreign, Japanese companies Nissan, Toyota, and Honda
had set up production facilities in the United States and
thus gained acceptance from American consumers. Produc-
tion quality and lean production were judged to be the ma-
jor weapons that Japanese carmakers used to gain an

advantage over American carmakers. Starting in 2003, be-
cause of innovative production processes that yielded better
quality for American consumers, Toyota vehicles had un-
questionably become “a better value proposition” than
Detroit’s products.21
Back in 1999, Ford Motor Company had been in good
shape, having attained a U.S. market share of 24.8 percent,
and had seen profits reach a remarkable $7.2 billion ($5.86
per share) with pre-tax income of $11 billion. At that time
people even speculated that Ford would soon overtake
General Motors as the world’s number-one automobile
manufacturer.22 But soon Toyota, through its innovative
technology, management philosophy of continuous im-
provement, and cost arbitrage due to its presence in multi -
ple geographic locations, was threatening to overtake GM
and Ford.
In addition, unfortunately, the profits at Ford in 1999
had come at the expense of not investing in Ford’s future.
Jacques Nasser, the CEO at that time, had focused on cor-
porate acquisition and diversification rather than new vehi -
cle development. By the time Chairman Bill Ford had
stepped in and fired Nasser in 2001, Ford was seeing decline
in both market share and profitability. By 2005, market
share had dropped to 18.6 percent and Ford had skidded out
of control, losing $1.6 billion (pre-tax) in North American
profits. It was obvious Ford needed a change in order to
adapt and survive. Since taking the CEO position in 2001,
Bill Ford had tried several times to find a qualified succes -
sor, claiming that to undertake major changes in Ford’s dys-
functional culture, an outsider might be more qualified than
even the most proficient auto industry insider.23
In 2006, Alan Mulally was selected as the new CEO
and was expected to accomplish “nothing less than

automotive brands Ford and Lincoln across six continents,
and provided financial services via Ford Motor Credit. It
was also aggressively pursuing emerging opportunities with
investments in electrification, autonomous vehicles, and
consumer mobility. It was the only company in the industry
where the company name still honored the vision and
innovative legacy of its founder, Henry Ford.
American engineer and industrial icon Henry Ford had
been a true innovator. He did not invent the automobile or
the assembly line, but through his ability to recognize op-
portunities, articulate a vision, and inspire others to join
him in fulfilling that vision, he was responsible for making
significant changes in the trajectory of the automobile
industry and even in the history of manufacturing in
America. Starting with the invention of the self-propelled
Quadricycle in 1896, Ford had developed other vehicles—
primarily racing cars—which attracted a series of interested
investors. In 1903, 12 investors backed him in the creation
of a company to build and sell horseless carriages, and Ford
Motor Company was born.
Starting with the Model A, the company had produced
a series of successful vehicles, but in 1908 Henry Ford
wanted to create a better, cheaper “motorcar for the great
multitude.”16 Working with a group of hand-picked em-
ployees, he designed the Model T. The design was so suc-
cessful, and demand so great that Ford decided to
investigate methods for increasing production and lower-
ing costs. Borrowing concepts from other industries, by
1913 Ford had developed a moving assembly line for auto-
mobile manufacture. Although the work was so demand-
ing that it created high employee turnover, the production
process was significantly more efficient, reducing chassis
assembly time from 12 ½ hours to 2 hours 40 minutes. In

1904, Ford expanded into Canada, and by 1925 Ford had
assembly plants in Europe, Argentina, South Africa, and
Australia. By the end of 1919, Ford was producing 50 per-
cent of all the cars in the United States, and the assembly
line disruption in the industry had led to the demise of
most of Ford’s rivals.17
The Automotive Industry
and Ford Leadership Changes
The automotive industry in the United States had always
been a highly competitive, cyclical business. By 2019 there
was a wide variety of product offerings from a growing
number of manufacturers, including the electric car lineup
from Tesla Motors, self-styled as “not just an automaker,
but also a technology and design company with a focus on
energy innovation.”18 The total number of cars and trucks
sold to retail buyers, or “industry demand,” varied substan-
tially from year to year depending on general economic situ-
ations, the cost of purchasing and operating cars and
trucks, and the availability of credit and fuel. Because cars
and trucks were durable items, consumers could wait to
replace them and, based on the most recent report, the
Cases
TRANSITION
Mulally had set three priorities—first, to determine the
brands Ford would offer; second to be “best in class for all
its vehicles”; and third to make sure that those vehicles
would be accepted and adapt[able] by consumers around
the globe: “If a model was developed for the U.S. market, it

needed to be adaptable to car buyers in other countries.”27
Mulally said that the “real opportunity going forward is to
integrate and leverage our Ford assets around the world”
and decide on the best mix of brands in the company’s port-
folio.28 The “best mix of brands” was addressed going into
2011. Brands such as Jaguar, Land Rover, Aston Martin,
and Volvo were all sold off, and the Mercury brand was
discontinued. Ford also had an equity interest in Mazda
Motor Corporation, which it reduced substantially in 2010,
retaining only a 3.5 percent share of ownership; it was
finally sold off in 2015. This left the company with only the
Ford and Lincoln brands, but the Lincoln offerings had
struggled against Cadillac and other rivals for the luxury
car market.
In 2014, thanks to Mulally’s vision and perseverance,
Ford maintained its position. Ford had introduced 24 vehi -
cles around the world, but although still profitable, net in-
come was down $4 billion from 2013. Even though Ford
maintained its number two position in Europe, behind
Volkswagen, major losses had occurred in that sector, pri-
marily due to Russian economic instabilities. South America
had also seen losses due to currency devaluation and
undoing a strongly entrenched management system put
into place by Henry Ford II almost 40 years ago”—a system
of regional fiefdoms around the world that had sapped the
company’s ability to compete in a global industry, a system
that Chairman Bill Ford could not or would not unwind by
himself.24
Mulally set his own priorities for fixing Ford: Ford
needed to pay more attention to cutting costs and trans-
forming the way it did business than to traditional measure-
ments such as market share.25 The vision was to have a
smaller and more profitable Ford. The overall strategy was

to use restructuring as a tool to obtain operating profitabil-
ity at lower volume and create a mix of products that better
appealed to the market.
By 2011, Ford had closed or sold a quarter of its plants
and cut its global workforce by more than a third. It also
slashed labor and healthcare costs, plowing the money back
into the design of some well-received new products, like the
Ford Fusion sedan and Ford Edge crossover. This put Ford
in a better position to compete, especially taking into con-
sideration that General Motors and Chrysler had filed for
bankruptcy in 2009, and Toyota had recently announced a
major recall of its vehicles for “unintended acceleration”
problems.26 Ford’s sales grew at double the rate of the rest
of the industry in 2010, but entering 2011 its rivals’ prob-
lems seemed to be in the rearview mirror, and General
Motors, especially, was on the rebound.
Subaru Corporation
3.94%
Volkswagen Group
(excluding Lamborghini)
3.69%
Market share
Toyota Motor Corporation
14.63%
Ford Motor Company
14.44%
FCA/Chrysler
Group

12.98%
Nissan Motor
Company/
Mitsubishi
9.35%
General Motors
17.02%
Honda Motor Company
9.1%
Hyundai-Kia
7.42%
Tesla
1.15%
Mazda
1.74%
BMW
Group
2.06%
Daimler
2.06%
EXHIBIT 1 Sales and Share of U.S. Total Market by
Manufacturer, 2018
Source: statista.com

Cases
C281
Starting in 2016, CEO Fields had begun restructuring,
and the cash f low ref lected this (see Exhibit 4). The
forecast for 2017 had projected total automotive operat-
ing cash f low remaining positive through 2018, with the
overall cash balance expected to stay at or above the
company’s minimum target of $20 billion.31 This did not
happen.
However, Ford had made good use of cash in the past,
most recently acquiring the iconic Michigan Central Station
in Detroit’s historic Corktown neighborhood. Chairman Bill
Ford planned to transform this former railroad station into
the centerpiece of a vibrant new campus “where Ford and its
partners will work on autonomous and electric vehicle busi -
nesses, and design solutions for a transportation operating
system that makes mobility convenient and accessible.”32
changing government rules. In addition, Ford’s push into
Asia-Pacific, specifically China, was behind schedule.
North American sales, while still strong, had resulted in op-
erating margin reductions due to recalls and costs associ -
ated with the relaunch of the F-150. The one bright spot
was in financial services. Ford Motor Credit, the financing
company that loans people money to buy new cars, saw its
best results since 2011.29
Going into 2015 the financials, especially the balance
sheet, appeared strong and because of this the company

was able to reinstate and subsequently boost the dividend
to shareholders, rewarding those investors who had stayed
the course. However, this did not last. From 2016 into 2019,
the financials began to falter. CEO Hackett admitted 2018
was a “disappointing year.”30 (see Exhibits 2 and 3.)
For the years ended December 31,
2016 2017 2018
Revenues
Automotive $141,546 $145,653 $148,294
Ford Credit 10,253 11,113 12,018
Mobility 1 10 26
Total revenues 151,800 156,776 160,338
Costs and expenses
Cost of sales 126,195 131,321 136,269
Selling, administrative, and other expenses 10,972 11,527
11,403
Ford Credit interest, operating, and other expenses 8,847 9,047
9,463
Total costs and expenses 146,014 151,895 157,135
Interest expense on Automotive debt 894 1,133 1,171
Interest expense on Other debt 57 57 57

Other income/(loss), net 169 3,267 2,247
Equity in net income of affiliated companies 1,780 1,201 123
Income before income taxes 6,784 8,159 4,345
Provision for/(Benefit from) income taxes 2,184 402 650
Net income 4,600 7,757 3,695
Less: Income/(Loss) attributable to noncontrolling interests 11
26 18
Net income attributable to Ford Motor Company $ 4,589 $ 7,731
$ 3,677
EARNINGS PER SHARE ATTRIBUTABLE TO FORD MOTOR
COMPANY COMMON AND CLASS B STOCK
Basic income $ 1.16 $ 1.94 $0.93
Diluted income 1.15 1.93 0.92
Note: Figures in millions, except per-share amounts; year-end
December 31.
Source: Annual Report. Ford Motor Company, December 31,
2018.
EXHIBIT 2 Ford Motor Company and Subsidiaries:
Consolidated Income Statement
Cases

TRANSITION
December 31,
2017
December 31,
2018
ASSETS
Cash and cash equivalents $ 18,492 $ 16,718
Marketable securities 20,435 17,233
Ford Credit finance receivables, net 52,210 54,353
Trade and other receivables, less allowances of $412 and $94
10,599 11,195
Inventories 11,176 11,220
Other assets 3,889 3,930
Total current assets 116,801 114,649
Ford Credit finance receivables, net 56,182 55,544
Net investment in operating leases 28,235 29,119
Net property 35,327 36,178
Equity in net assets of affiliated companies 3,085 2,709
Deferred income taxes 10,762 10,412

Other assets 8,104 7,929
Total assets $258,496 $256,540
LIABILITIES
Payables $ 23,282 $ 21,520
Other liabilities and deferred revenue 19,697 20,556
Automotive debt payable within one year 3,356 2,314
Ford Credit debt payable within one year 48,265 51,179
Total current liabilities 94,600 95,569
Other liabilities and deferred revenue 24,711 23,588
Automotive long-term debt 12,575 11,233
Ford Credit long-term debt 89,492 88,887
Other long-term debt 599 600
Deferred income taxes 815 597
Total liabilities 222,792 220,474
Redeemable noncontrolling interest 98 100
EQUITY
Common Stock, par value $.01 per share (4,000 million shares
issued of 6 billion authorized) 40 40

Class B Stock, par value $.01 per share (71 million shares
issued of 530 million authorized) 1 1
Capital in excess of par value of stock 21,843 22,006
Retained earnings 21,906 22,668
Accumulated other comprehensive income/(loss) (Note 21)
(6,959) (7,366)
Treasury stock (1,253) (1,417)
Total equity attributable to Ford Motor Company 35,578 35,932
Equity attributable to non-controlling interests 28 34
Total equity 35,606 35,966
Total liabilities and equity $258,496 $256,540
EXHIBIT 3 Ford Motor Company and Subsidiaries: Sector
Balance Sheets
Note: Figures in millions.
2018.
Cases
C283

For the years ended December 31,
2016 2017 2018
Cash flows from operating activities
Net income $ 4,600 $ 7,757 $ 3,695
Depreciation and tooling amortization 9,023 9,122 9,280
Other amortization (306) (669) (972)
Provision for credit and insurance losses 672 717 609
Pension and other postretirement employee benefits (“OPEB”)
expense/(income) 2,667 (608) 400
Equity investment (earnings)/losses in excess of dividends
received (178) 240 206
Foreign currency adjustments 283 (403) 529
Net (gain)/loss on changes in investments in affiliates (139) (7)
(42)
Stock compensation 210 246 191
Net change in wholesale and other receivables (1,449) (836)
(2,408)
Provision for deferred income taxes 1,473 (350) (197)
Decrease/(Increase) in accounts receivable and other assets
(2,855) (2,297) (2,239)
Decrease/(Increase) in inventory (803) (970) (828)
Increase/(Decrease) in accounts payable and accrued and other
liabilities 6,595 6,089 6,781
Other 57 65 17
Net cash provided by/(used in) operating activities 19,850
18,096 15,022
Cash flows from investing activities
Capital spending (6,992) (7,049) (7,785)
Acquisitions of finance receivables and operating leases
(56,007) (59,354) (62,924)
Collections of finance receivables and operating leases 38,834
44,641 50,880
Purchases of marketable and other securities (31,428) (27,567)

(17,140)
Sales and maturities of marketable and other securities 29,354
29,898 20,527
Settlements of derivatives 825 100 358
Other 112 (29) (177)
Net cash provided by/(used in) investing activities (25,302)
(19,360) (16,261)
Cash flows from financing activities
Cash dividends (3,376) (2,584) (2,905)
Purchases of common stock (145) (131) (164)
Net changes in short-term debt 3,864 1,229 (2,819)
Proceeds from issuance of long-term debt 45,961 45,801 50,130
Principal payments on long-term debt (38,797) (40,770)
(44,172)
Other (107) (151) (192)
Net cash provided by/(used in) financing activities 7,400 3,394
(122)
Effect of exchange rate changes on cash, cash equivalents, and
restricted cash (265) 489 (370)
Net increase/(decrease) in cash, cash equivalents, and restricted
cash $ 1,683 $ 2,619 $ (1,731)
Cash, cash equivalents, and restricted cash at January 1 $
14,336 $ 16,019 $ 18,638
Net increase/(decrease) in cash, cash equivalents, and restricted
cash 1,683 2,619 (1,731)
Cash, cash equivalents, and restricted cash at December 31 $
16,019 $ 18,638 $ 16,907
EXHIBIT 4 Ford Motor Company and Subsidiaries: Sector
Statements of Cash Flows
Note: Figures in millions; year-end December 31.

2018.
Cases
TRANSITION
trucks were still the best-selling vehicle, by far. See Exhibit 5
for shifting vehicle sales figures in the U.S. market.
In 2018, partly because of this change in consumer
preference, CEO Hackett had decided to make some drastic
changes in the Ford lineup. Ford would be exiting the car
market, no longer selling any sedans, and offering only the
Mustang and a redesigned Focus crossover that would not be
available in the United States. In the United States, the Fiesta
subcompact, the Fusion midsize sedan, and the C-Max van
would be phased out in 2019 and 2020. The last Taurus large
sedan rolled off the production line in March 2019.
Globalizing the Ford Brand
Under the ONE Ford vision, Mulally had globalized the Ford
brand, meaning that all Ford vehicles competing in global seg-
ments would be the same in North America, Europe, and
Asia.37 The company had been looking for a reduction of com-
plexity, and thus costs, in the purchasing and manufacturing
processes. The idea was to deliver more vehicles worldwide
from fewer platforms and to maximize the use of common
parts and systems. However, each year posed new challenges.
Heading into 2019, the global marketplace for automo-

biles was uncertain for all manufacturers, and each geo-
graphical segment had its issues. Both North American and
European auto sales were subject to political uncertainty,
due to policy shifts in government, and Brexit issues in the
UK. The Chinese and larger Asian market was still growing,
although starting to slow, especially with questions of tariffs
looming for U.S. manufacturers. For Ford, tariffs had cost
more than $750 million in 2018. Eastern European eco-
nomic concerns, especially in Russia, made this a difficult
area to manage. South American government regulations
and currency fluctuations impacted growth there.38
The need for a global strategy was driving all major
auto manufacturers to reduce the number of vehicle plat-
forms, while simultaneously adding models in response
to consumer preferences. In addition, partnering with lo-
cal producers and manufacturers made it easier to deal
with local barriers to entry, as long as these relationships
could be mutually managed. Although the increased com-
plexity raised costs, this more f lexible approach allowed
for improved product commonality and increased vol-
ume. As components could be shared between cars and
platforms, this also reduced the number of suppliers.
Ford had reduced its supplier base from 1,150 to 750.39
Although seemingly a positive, this could also prove
costly if a major supplier had a problem, as had occurred
with Japanese air bag manufacturer Takata.40 Although
many other manufacturers were similarly affected, Ford
had had to recall 850,000 vehicles for airbag problems, at
a cost of $500 million.41
For Ford, 2018 saw the worst global performance in
10 years, primarily driven by a drop of more than 40 per -
cent in China. Only South America and Middle East and
Africa regions saw better results than in the prior year (see
Exhibit 6).

The hope was that Corktown would serve as a magnet for
talent and a catalyst for change. However, CEO Hackett
reminded investors the company would not meet its finan-
cial targets for 2018 and also would not be able to reach the
proposed 8 percent profit margin goal set for 2020.
Ford and the Automobile Industry
Changing Product Mix
Going into 2019, the entire automobile industry was facing
disruption, but this was not unusual. For instance, the 2009
global economic downturn and financial crisis had had a
significant impact on global sales volumes in the auto
industry—the once-profitable business of manufacturing
and selling trucks and SUVs was facing change. Especially
in the United States, oil prices had been fluctuating, mak-
ing it difficult to anticipate consumer demand. By 2010,
this had caused a shift in consumers’ car-buying habits,
reducing the demand for large vehicles.
The core strategy at Ford at that time had centered on
a change in products, shifting to smaller and more fuel-
efficient cars. Ford had imported European-made small ve-
hicles, the European Focus and Fiesta, into North America.
It also converted three truck-manufacturing plants to small-
car production.33 The Ford and Lincoln lines were up-
graded, emphasizing fuel-economy improvement and the
introduction of hybrid cars. In 2012, Ford launched six new
Ford hybrid cars in North America. In 2014, Ford began
producing its first hybrid electric car in Europe. And by
2015, Ford was the world’s second largest manufacturer of
hybrids, after Toyota.34
By late 2015 gas prices had reduced enough to spur in-
terest in SUVs once again. This trend should have been
good for Ford, given their branding emphasis on the F-150,

Edge, Escape, and Explorer, but Ford and other U.S. manu-
facturers still had large inventories of smaller vehicles on
dealer lots. U.S. auto manufacturers, including Ford, had to
adjust once again to meet the demand for crossover vehi -
cles. The smaller crossovers and SUVs now had greatly im-
proved fuel economy and were attractive to consumers due
to their versatility, while the smaller sedan and compact
owners were an older demographic, and less likely to be
impulse buyers.
These kinds of fluctuations in the industry meant auto-
mobile executives had to keep close track of trends and
maximize their ability to adjust to demand.35 In 2015, Ford
relaunched the F-150 and further developed 15 other global
products. 2016 saw the launch of the F-150 Raptor high-
performance off-road pickup truck, and a significant invest-
ment in Ford’s hybrid fleet. By 2018, Ford had become the
top-selling plug-in hybrid brand in the United States, and
was second in overall U.S. electrified vehicle sales,36 but the
Ford F-Series pickup was still the best-selling vehicle in the
United States.
By 2018 the demand for cars, especially the large sedans,
had pretty much dried up, while crossovers and especially
small SUVs had seen double-digit growth. But the light-duty
Cases
C285
Regarding global growth, in Asia Pacific, Ford had de-
veloped two car plants and had joint agreements with

Mahindra in India, seeing a profit in that market for the
first time in 2018, but Ford also knew it needed to ad-
dress challenges in China.42 Sales growth in this region
was critical, given that Ford was late to the China market.
For all manufacturers, growth in China was a challenge,
but for U.S. automakers Chinese market share had
dropped to just 10.7 percent, down from 12 percent in
2017. GM, who had abandoned India, had a higher brand
penetration in China than Ford did, but Chinese manu-
facturers were continuing to offer consumers a lot of op-
tions. Ford had introduced the Mustang and Taurus in
China during 2016, and saw strong sales of these perfor-
mance vehicles. In 2017, Ford began exporting the all -new
F-150 Raptor to China, making it the first high-performance
off-road pickup truck to be offered there. Going into
2019, Ford was planning to produce some brands,
Tuesday, April 03, 2018
Segment totals, ranked by Mar unit sales
Mar 2018
% Change from
Mar’17 YTD
% Change from
YTD
Cars 555,625 −9.2 1,374,507 −10.8
Midsize 231,529 −13.4 580,263 −14.5
Small 238,056 −7.7 579,198 −10.8
Luxury 86,029 −0.9 215,006 0.7

Large 11 −57.7 40 −64.0
Light-duty trucks 1,097,904 16.3 2,736,038 9.8
Pickup 260,949 7.9 653,891 2.8
Crossover 572,829 27.0 1,415,954 18.2
Minivan 48,325 5.2 126,145 2.7
Small Van 6,984 0.8 17,799 2.1
Large Van 34,809 0.1 85,662 0.4
Midsize SUV 82,140 −7.4 220,338 −6.6
Large SUV 30,820 7.3 78,730 −1.4
Small SUV 35,107 45.6 75,328 27.9
Luxury SUV 25,941 19.2 62,191 9.7
Total SUV/Crossover 746,837 21.6 1,852,541 13.7
Total SUV 174,008 6.6 436,587 1.2
Total Crossover 572,829 27.0 1,415,954 18.2
EXHIBIT 5 U.S. Vehicle Sales by Segment as of April 2018
Source: The Wall Street Journal and
www.motorintelligence.com,
http://www.wsj.com/mdc/public/page/2_3022-
autosales.html#autosalesD.

EXHIBIT 6 Ford Performance by Region, Earnings Before
Interest and Taxes ($ millions)
Source: Ford 10K
Earnings
2018
Change from
2017 to 2018
North America $7,607 $ (450)
South America (678) 75
Europe (398) (765)
Middle East & Africa (7) 239
Asia Pacific (1,102) (1,761)
Total Automotive $5,422 $(2,662)
Cases
TRANSITION
software firm Argo AI. Ford had acquired an app-based,
crowd-sourced, ride-sharing service, Chariot, but subse-
quently shut it down in 2019. Ford had teamed up with
Motivate, the global leader in bike-sharing to include the
FordPass mobility network in the Ford GoBike commuting

transportation option. Through its innovation and research
centers, Ford was also developing strategies in fleet and data
management, route and journey planning, and telematics,
using artificial intelligence and robotics, all in an effort to
help solve congestion and help move people more efficiently
in urban environments.47 In an attempt to gain some com-
petitive advantage, and adopt a leaner business model, Ford
had also formed a strategic alliance with Volkswagon to
jointly produce vans and pickup trucks, further developing
electric and autonomous vehicles. This move by both global
auto companies was seen as “a strategically defensive move
to share vehicle architecture-related expenses in an attempt
to offset the intensifying competitive pressures and escalat-
ing costs facing the auto industry over the next decade.”48
These fundamental changes in the industry required
leadership that could anticipate trends and allocate re-
sources wisely, all while crafting a vision for the future that
could inspire all relevant stakeholders to support and pro-
mote the company’s success. Alan Mulally’s ONE Ford
slogan, focused on operational synergies, had helped the
automaker avoid bankruptcy and return to a position of
financial strength in the industry. Mark Fields’s shift had
seemed to be toward TWO Fords, refocusing the company
into both an automaker and a transportation services pro-
vider. This included plans to offer electric vehicles and ex-
periment with ways to provide innovative solutions to
transportation and mobility problems in cities across the
globe.49 Hackett was continuing this dual approach, and
restructured the company, promoting Joe Hinrichs to pres-
ident of global automotive operations, while giving Jim
Farley responsibility for Ford’s self-driving unit as presi-
dent of new business, technology, and strategy. This opera-
tional split confirmed that Mulally’s original ONE Ford
vision was no longer a good fit for current conditions, and
would position either Hinrichs or Farley as a possible suc-

cessor to Hackett.50 Hackett had given leaders at various
levels in the company the ability to choose how the work
would get done, hoping to increase level of innovation and
leverage talent.51
Unfortunately, investors were not sure about any of this:
Ford’s stock had fallen by about 40 percent since Mulally’s
departure. One analyst pointed out what others were say-
ing: “They have a lot of the right initiatives; they’re doing
something in every box. The difference from the Mulally
days is there isn’t a single message that is more than just
public-relations, tying it all together.”52 Fields had tried to
position the company to take on rivals from other indus-
tries, and investors had wondered what bike-sharing and
artificial intelligence had to do with the car business. As
had most U.S. automobile manufacturers, Ford under
Hackett had taken steps to remove sedans from the auto
especially the Ford Explorer and some Lincoln vehicles,
using local Chinese supply chain and assembly partners.
Ford had also created a new SUV, the Territory, specifi -
cally for this market.43
Ford was taking a new look at how to address global
growth. Europe, once a good market for Ford, had seen
market share drop from over 8 percent in 2010 to barely
6.5 percent in 2018. Although Europe was a strong market
for commercial vehicles, the shift would be made from
smaller cars to SUVs, crossovers, and electrified vehicles.
In addition, CEO Hackett had made the decision to close
factories in Europe, cutting thousands of jobs in Germany,
Spain, and the UK, and would review its joint venture in
Russia.44
Unlike its rival General Motors, Ford was addressing
performance issues worldwide through cost-cutting strate-

gies and changes to the product mix, while GM’s CEO
Mary Barra had abandoned the “growth-at-all-costs strat-
egy,” and closed money-losing operations in Russia and
South Africa. In 2018, GM had exited Europe by selling off
its German-based Open Vauxhall subsidiary to France’s
PSA Group. In North America, GM was shutting down
three plants. And, just like Ford, GM was consolidating its
car lineup, stopping production of the Chevrolet Cruze and
Impala, and the Volt plug-in hybrid, and discontinuing the
Buick LaCrosse, Cadillac XTS, and CT6.45 Belt-tightening
was occurring all over.
Looking Ahead
Ford Motor Company was the sixth-largest automobile manu-
facturer in the world, but like all others who produced a multi -
vehicle lineup, Ford was facing considerable uncertainty.
Global markets were hard to predict and countries were in-
creasing regulatory requirements for safety and environmental
impact. All vehicles were seeing an increase in the amount of
onboard technology that required a shift in both engineering
and manufacturing priorities. Worldwide manufacturers were
making design changes that allowed more lean production
and consolidation of suppliers, and consumers were changing
how they purchased vehicles and rethinking what they wanted
from the transportation experience overall.46
Several marked shifts in the overall landscape were oc-
curring: the interest, worldwide, in electric or alternative-
fueled vehicles; the development of autonomously
controlled cars that were also personally connected to a
user who might not be the driver; and the reduction in de-
mand for actual automobile ownership in favor of rental or
on-demand transportation options. These shifts created
opportunities but also challenges for entrenched car
manufacturers.

Partnerships were inevitable: GM was partnering with
Lyft, and Ford with Uber, which had tried out the Ford Fu-
sion autonomous vehicle. Ford had put Amazon’s virtual
digital assistant Alexa in its cars. Ford had invested in Velo-
dyne, a company that developed lidar remote-sensing tech-
nology for self-driving cars, and in artificial intelligence
Cases
C287
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In 2019, Hackett was also proceeding with an $11 billion
global restructuring effort in an attempt to reposition Ford
for success once again, but at this point the industry was
forcing all manufacturers to ask some basic questions: “Do
people want to own their cars or share them? Drive them or
have them driven?”53
Ford and other global automobile companies were bet-
ting on the “mobility” trend to bring new products and ser-
vices to a depressed market, but how might this really work?
Henry Ford had the initial vision of disruption in personal
transportation. Would the 21st century version of Ford
Motor Company be as successful?
ENDNOTES
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3. Muller, D. 2019. Sales off to weakest start in 5 years.
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5-years.
4. Elio Motors has focused on very small, economical concept
cars,
and even though they anticipate that by 2022 under 35 percent
of
new-car sales will be passenger vehicles and more than 65
percent
will be trucks and SUVs, they still believe their three-wheeled
safe,
environmental-friendly vehicle will fill a useful niche. See
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5. Neto, A. 2019. Ford is a truck company with a truck-sized
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SeekingAlpha, May 16,
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shift-from-japan-s-takata.
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falls 7.5%.
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http://www.detroitnews.com/story/
business/autos/ford/2014/09/29/ford-recall-will-cost-
million/16441255/.
42. Shah, A. 2018. Ford goes local in India, aims for bigger
slice of
competitive market. Reuters, November 5,
https://www.reuters.com/
article/us-ford-motor-india-strategy-focus/ford-goes-local-in-
india-aims-
for-bigger-slice-of-competitive-market-idUSKCN1NB07P.
43. Ferris, R. 2019. Ford’s 5 big fixes for its troubled
international
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https://www.cnbc.com/2019/01/24/
fords-5-big-fixes-for-its-troubled-international-business.html.
44. Behrmann, E. 2019. Ford’s global cost purge hits Europe
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https://www.ttnews.

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gm-plant-closing-production-cars/.
Cases
Running Head:
TECHNOLOGY NEEDS OF CRIME ANALYSIS UNIT

Taminka Watford
Tiffin University
Introduction

Our police department is focused on eliminating crime in
the community. The main crimes in the community include
sexual assault, robbery, burglary, motor vehicle theft among
others. A crime analysis unit is helpful in the police department
as it would help gather information on the rates of crime and the
types of crime so that the department can come up with the right
responses for the crimes. The main purpose of the crime
analysis unit is to aid in short-term and long-term solutions to
the crimes within the communication and to achieve this there is
a need to have software and hardware to aid in the process of
data collection and analysis.
Technology needs of the crime analysis unit
The unit will require both hardware and software to use in
the detection of crimes and analysis of information. First, the
unit needs Gunshot Detection Systems in the areas of the
community where there have been more shootings. This type of
system will help in detecting where the gun shoots come from
(David & Suruliandi, 2017). The GDS will work with a
microphone technology that helps in capturing the gunshot
sounds and will help the police department respond immediately
to shootings and could cost around $20,000 to install in a few
selected areas.
The unit also requires a set of hardware which includes
laptops, desktops, monitors, that will help make the crime
analysis unit offices complete. The purchase of computers and
other hardware in the offices could cost around $10,000. The
hardware will help in data analysis and the creation of reports.
Once the unit has gathered data about crime in the community
they can use the hardware to analyze what crimes have
increased, what have been reduced and to also help evaluate
what strategies have worked and areas that need to be improved.
The crime analysis unit will also need a digital video
recording system that integrates the data from all the cameras
into one central controlling location. The recording system can
cost the unit $10,000 but it is worth it. The digital recording
system will help capture some of the crimes that take place

along the roads and streets such as motor vehicle theft and
assault. The use of a digital recording system will ensure that it
is easy for the police to identify the faces of the people who are
found committing crimes (Kim et al., 2018). The digital
recording systems are especially very effective in monitoring
road traffic and the crimes that take place on the road.
Also, the crime analysis unit can invest in 3D imaging
technology for crime scenes. Most units usually use sketches in
evaluating the crime scene and drawing conclusions from the
scenes. With 3D imaging technology, the unit will be able to
gather more information related to a particular crime scene
(Dong, 2018). The company will also need predictive analytics
software. With such software, the unit will be able to predict
future crime rates with the existing information and data. The
software can help understand the trends and come up with
strategies to ensure that crime rates go down.
Conclusion
Technology is very important in the crime analysis process
as it will make it easy for the members to make sense out of the
data and numbers collected from the field using computer
devices. The unit will need technology that makes it easier to
capture information on crime such as 3D imaging software and
video recording systems. The unit can also benefit from a
detection system for shootings so that every shooting in the
streets is detected early and the police can respond promptly to
such cases.
References
David, H., & Suruliandi, A. (2017). SURVEY ON CRIME
ANALYSIS AND PREDICTION
USING DATA MINING TECHNIQUES. ICTACT journal
on soft computing, 7(3).
Dong, C. A. I. (2018). Design and Research of Crime Analysis
and Early Warning
System. Academic Journal of Computing & Information
Science, 1(1).

Kim, S., Joshi, P., Kalsi, P. S., & Taheri, P. (2018, November).
Crime analysis through machine
learning. In 2018 IEEE 9th Annual Information Technology,
Electronics and Mobile Communication Conference
(IEMCON) (pp. 415-420). IEEE.
Running Head: CRIME ANALYSIS 1
CRIME ANALYSIS
TaMinka Watford
Tiffin University
2
CRIME ANALYSIS
Introduction
Our police department has 12000 members who are equipped to
maintain law and order
and protect the community members. The department also helps
prevent crime and maintain
peace in the community through the elimination of crime. The
police department is made up of
different ages, but the police department's more significant
proportion is between 18 years- 40
years. The police department comprises 60% males and 40% and

is working towards achieving
gender equality. The department has diversity, 50% of the
population comprises whites, and the
other 50% includes Hispanics and Black Americans. The
department is made of 9000 sworn
officers, while the rest are civilian employees. The population
of the jurisdiction has been
increasing over the past few years.
Crime Analysis
Crime in the community is very prevalent. Most people live in
fear of certain types of
crime, including shootings, murder, sexual assault, robbery with
violence, motor vehicle theft,
and burglary. Unfortunately, despite the efforts the department
has made to help the community
have law and order, the crime rates in the community were
higher in 2020 compared to 2021,
with more cases of theft and d that can be associated with the
harsh economic conditions due to
the ongoing pandemic. The crime rates are currently at 31%,
and the crimes that have higher
rates include motor vehicle theft which has become very
common lately, robbery with violence,

and shootings (Ling et al., 2021). Unfortunately, the department
also faces uniform crime
allegations where the police officers have been involved in
sexual harassment and shootings of
innocent citizens, and racial discrimination. The number of such
cases reported stands at 500
annually, and the department is working on eliminating such
incidences.
3
CRIME ANALYSIS
Crime Analysis unit
A Crime Analysis Unit would be very beneficial to the police
department so much and
will positively impact the department's efficiency and
effectiveness. The unit will help collect
and analyze crime information on the main primary crimes that
affect the community. The
analysis unit will help rank the different crimes on the
seriousness and the areas which are more
prone so that the department can assign more officers to the
areas (Sanders & Condon, 2017).
The crime analysis unit will help the department predict crime
rates depending on past data and

come up with appropriate interventions. The unit will help
conduct various types of crime
analysis, including tactical crime analysis, strategic crime
analysis, and administrative crime
analysis. The different types of analysis will play different roles
in the department.
Tactical crime analysis will help analyze the immediate
criminal offenses to develop
quick responses for the crimes. The tactical information will
help track criminal offenders and
the provision of investigative lead for the police officers in the
department to solve crimes faster
and easier (Belur, J., & Johnson, 2018). The strategic analysis
by this unit will help offer
solutions to ongoing problems and offer information that will
help come up with patrolling
schedules and the allocation of resources to the various areas.
The information will also help
identify unusual crime activities in the department and escalate
crimes in particular seasons.
Finally, the crime analysis unit will offer administrative
analysis, which will provide solutions
for long-range problems. The information will help in budgeting
purposes of the department and

ensure the department's preparedness at all times.
4
CRIME ANALYSIS
References
Belur, J., & Johnson, S. (2018). Is crime analysis at the heart of
policing practice? A case
study. Policing and society, 28(7), 768-786.
Ling, C. P., Noor, N. M. M., & Mohd, F. (2017). Knowledge
representation model for crime
analysis. Procedia computer science, 116, 484-491.
Sanders, C., & Condon, C. (2017). Crime analysis and cognitive
effects: the practice of policing t
hrough flows of data. Global crime, 18(3), 237-255.
Introduction
This week you will submit your PowerPoint audio/video
presentation to management on the
benefits of creating a crime analysis unit for a police
department.
During the course, you submitted written drafts of the project
sections. For this assignment, you

will incorporate all the instructor feedback you receive and
create a final PowerPoint audio/video
presentation.
Activity Instructions
This activity will tie together everything you have learned
throughout this course. You will be
taking the role of a crime analysis advocate. Your goal is to
“sell” the idea of forming a crime
analysis unit to your fictional police chief.
Using the assignments from Weeks 1-6, provide the following
information:
Introduce your fictional police department. How many sworn
officers do you have? What is the
population of your city? What is the crime rate? How many
UCR Part I Crimes occur per year?
What does crime analysis do for us, in terms of crime
prevention and situational awareness?
Why should we do crime analysis? Make a connection between
the use of crime analysis and
effective policing.
Recommend crime analysis software for the unit. What types are
needed? Then, justify the
expense. Why spend the money? What benefit is there?
What positions must we create within our crime analysis unit?
What is the role of each position?
What should a candidate for each role possess, in terms of
training, education and
competencies?
Should we assign police officers to fill roles within the crime
analysis unit? Or, should we hire
non-sworn civilian staff? Why?

In your conclusion, summarize your findings and provide your
recommendation.
Writing and Submission Requirements
20-30 slides (Including Introduction and Conclusion Slides)
Presentation must be at least 15 minutes in length
Any photo, video, or other image used that is not created by the
student must be cited.
Must include a references page in APA format.
For standard requirements, review the Discussion and Written
Assignment Expectations.
For grading, review the Project Presentation Grading Rubric.
Tips for Success
For Activity 3.3: Situational Awareness and Crime Prevention
Presentation you practiced
working with the audio/video features of PowerPoint. Review
the PowerPoint Tutorial and if you
have problems contact your instructor.

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