A preliminary assessment of the financial feasibility of basic income emily van de walle

A preliminary assessment of the
financial feasibility of basic income
in Belgium
Emily Van de Walle
Academic year 2015-2016
University of Antwerp
Faculty of Applied Economics
Promoter:
Prof. dr. Erreygers G.
Master’s thesis submitted to obtain the
degree of:
Master of Applied Economic Sciences:
Economic Policy

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Preface
Basic income has received much attention in the media in recent years and it was also in
this manner that I was first brought into contact with basic income. Admittedly, at first I
was dubious yet interested in the possible advantages of unconditionally granting all
citizens an income. During my bachelor’s year, I was thrilled to find basic income as one of
the topics for the final task of the bachelor’s project and thus wrote a paper on the
futurology and feasibility of basic income. By reading up on the literature about basic
income, my interest for the proposal had grown but at the same time I found myself
bothered by the lack of transparency in the methodology applied by basic income
proponents to assess how basic income may be possibly financed in Belgium. For this
reason, I decided to take up the challenge to personally assess the financial feasibility of
basic income in Belgium and this master’s dissertation is the final product towards that
end.
I could not have made it through this challenging journey without the support of a number
of people. First, I would like to express my deepest gratitude to my promoter prof. dr.
Erreygers Guido. I am not only grateful for his advice, comments, corrections, and his
guidance, but also for giving me the opportunity to write on a subject that I am passionate
about. Second, I am also thankful to my partner for his unconditional support,
encouragement, and for reading my master’s thesis. Third, I would like to thank my parents
and friends for their support from start to finish.
Emily Van de Walle

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Abstract
The costs of unconditionally granting every citizen an equal fixed monthly income, known
as basic income, are substantial. In Belgium, advocates have attempted to ascertain the
financial feasibility of the proposal; however, the contributions are not only limited in
number but the applied methodology is also lacking in transparency. This dissertation
provides a preliminary assessment of whether basic income is financially feasible in
Belgium for the year 2010. The yearly costs of five basic income proposals including the
costs of the remaining social protection system are estimated. The cost of unconditional
basic income is estimated by multiplying the level of basic income with the number of
beneficiaries and the cost of the social protection system is estimated as prescribed in the
proposal. The basic income proposals covered a range between two extremes, basic income
as a substitute and basic income as a complement to the social protection system. The costs
vary greatly in magnitude depending on the characteristics of each proposal. Proposals
leaning towards the first extreme are naturally more financially feasible due to lower costs
and the opposite is applicable to the second extreme. I suggest a proposal that is financially
feasible as well as socially desirable with respect to beneficiaries of social benefits. The
financing of this proposal was assessed by determining the costs of social benefits that
would be made redundant by implementing basic income. I applied a criterion in which
basic income entirely replaces social benefits that are on average lower than basic income
and partially when higher than the level of basic income. The cost savings on the
replacement of social benefits are determined to be considerable in size and largely
contribute to financing basic income. The financing of the remaining cost of basic income
after accounting for the cost savings is beyond this paper. According to proponents, it is
technically feasible to finance the remaining cost gap with tax reforms. However, besides
improving the techniques to assess the financial feasibility of basic income there are other
concerns that have to be addressed in the context of Belgium, such as political feasibility,
sustainability, distributional effects and behavioral effects which follow from basic income
and the suggested tax reforms. These are the next steps that have to be taken before we can
contemplate implementing basic income in Belgium.

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Executive summary
The proposal that unconditionally grants every citizen an equal fixed monthly income,
known as basic income, has recently received much attention in the media. In Europe, a
growing number of individuals, academics, policymakers, and interest groups have shown
interest in the proposal thanks to the solutions it has to offer in order to overcome a
number of obstacles. With respect to the high unemployment rates, basic income provides
the unemployed a wider scope of opportunities by granting them income security, enabling
individuals to look for a job they desire. Basic income is said to also stimulate
entrepreneurship. Furthermore, the disincentives to work implied by the conditionality of
unemployment benefits are eliminated as basic income is granted regardless of income.
Last but not least, basic income is said to also emancipate the poor and ensures “real
freedom for all” (Van Parijs, 1995). (Groot, 2004, p. 17-21; Soininvaara, 200, p. 7-8)
The contributions to the literature have been steadily increasing, covering a wide range of
topics varying from, but not limited to the social desirability, the political feasibility, and
the financial feasibility of basic income. In Belgium, there has also been a growing interest
in the radical proposal by academics and politicians alike. The contributions, however, are
limited to only a small number of topics and the financial feasibility of basic income is
unfortunately not one of them. Proponents of basic income have only provided rough
calculations of how to finance basic income with a lack of transparency on the
methodologies of how the calculations were obtained. I, therefore, took up the challenge to
provide a preliminary assessment of the financial feasibility of basic income by providing
an answer to the following two research questions in the context of Belgium, given a
dataset of the year 2010: ‘How much would a scheme of basic income cost?’ and ‘How much
are the cost savings that are realized by basic income replacing social benefits?’

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Cost of basic income
Aside from the three main features of every basic income, unconditionality, individuality,
and without means test or work requirement, basic income schemes come in all shapes and
sizes, and as a consequence, so do their costs (Peña-Miguel, De la Peña Esteban, &
Fernandez-Sainz, 2014, p. 96). To acknowledge the variety of basic income proposals, five
basic income proposals are discussed that can be placed between two extremes, the ‘basic-
income-to-substitute-everything’ scheme, a low-cost benchmark, and the ‘basic-income-
purely-as-a-complement’ scheme, a high-cost benchmark (Melzochová & Špecián, 2015 p.
555-556).
The first basic income proposal to be considered is of the extreme ‘basic-income-to-
substitute-everything’ and is determined to be the most financially feasible due to the
substantial cost savings implied by the complete abolishment of the social protection
system. Given a breakeven of the costs of basic income and the current expenditures of the
social protection system of €95 billion in 2010, Belgium can afford to grant every adult
citizen a basic income of €911 per month. However, while the extreme proposal is
financially feasible, a number of vulnerable social groups would be worse off under the
scheme of basic income as the level of certain social benefits are higher than the basic
income level, making the proposal socially undesirable. Accounting for social desirability,
the following three discussed basic income proposals partially maintained the social
protection system and the last proposal, which is by the authors Raventos et al., can be
considered to lean closely to the second extreme, ‘basic-income-purely-as-a-complement’.
Raventos et al. namely set the level of basic income so that it is “topped up to an equal
quantity when the public cash benefit is of a greater amount” (Arcarons, Raventos Pañella
& Torrens Mèlich, 2014, p. 82) for current beneficiaries of social benefits. However, given
the great complement to the social protection system, the scheme has considerable costs
and is considered to be less financially feasible. A trade-off is thus identified between
financial feasibility and social desirability: basic income schemes that incorporate the
ethical principles of the social protection system by granting the socially vulnerable groups
a higher level of basic income, is socially desirable, but leads to higher costs. To enhance
the financial feasibility of the proposal by Raventos et al., I modified the proposal and

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adjusted the level of basic income downwards. This modified proposal grants every adult
€600 per month and every minor €150 per month while ensuring that recipients of social
benefits are at least as well off under the scheme of basic income compared to the current
social protection system. This modified proposal is estimated to cost Belgium €114 billion,
including the cost of health care and the retained social benefits, with a ceteris paribus
assumption for the year 2010. Placing this number in perspective, the total cost is 120% of
what we spent on the social protections system in 2010. The next research question to be
addressed is how to finance this enormous cost. (B.U.B., 2016; FOD Sociale Zekerheid,
2011; Melzochová & Špecián, 2015 p. 555-556)
Financing basic income
There are two main methods through which basic income may be financed, cost savings
and extra government revenues generated through tax reforms. This paper focuses on the
former method, assessing the cost savings that are realized by the replacement of social
benefits by basic income for the modified basic income proposal by Raventos et al. In order
to determine which social benefits are entirely or partially replaced by basic income, I
made a comparison between the average level of social benefits to the level of basic income
while applying the criterion by Raventos et al. that prescribes to entirely replace social
benefits of a lower level by basic income and to partially replace social benefits of a higher
level, up to the level of basic income. So that beneficiaries of social benefits do not receive
the level of basic income on top of what they currently receive. The cost savings that are
realized are concluded to be significant in size. Concerning the modified basic income
proposal by Raventos et al., the cost savings of the proposal is €79 billion, the summation
of the initial total expenditures of all social benefits and health care. The remaining cost gap
of €36 billion can technically be financed through tax reforms suggested by Belgian basic
income proponents. However, the calculations of these tax reforms have to be improved in
quality, applying a transparent and reliable methodology by using micro-simulation models
that allow integrating the behavioral effects as well as the distributional effects of basic
income and the implemented tax reforms. Only then will the picture on the financial
feasibility of basic income truly be complete. (Arcarons et al., 2014)

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Table of Contents
Preface ...................................................................................................................................................... 1
Abstract .................................................................................................................................................... 2
Executive summary .............................................................................................................................. 3
1.Introduction ......................................................................................................................................13
2.Basic income......................................................................................................................................16
2.1 Defining basic income .......................................................................................................................... 16
2.2 Basic income in Europe ....................................................................................................................... 19
2.2.1 The two obstacles.......................................................................................................................... 19
2.2.2 Overcoming the obstacles .......................................................................................................... 22
2.2.3 The administrative efficiency argument............................................................................... 23
2.3 Basic income in Belgium ..................................................................................................................... 24
3.Financial feasibility of basic income.........................................................................................27
3.1 An introductory assessment of the costs of basic income ..................................................... 27
3.2 Review of the literature....................................................................................................................... 31
3.3 Preliminary themes to consider....................................................................................................... 33
3.3.1 Social protection in Belgium ..................................................................................................... 33
3.3.2 The social integration income and the poverty threshold ............................................ 39
3.3.3 The demographics of Belgium.................................................................................................. 41
3.4 Basic income proposals....................................................................................................................... 42
3.4.1 The B.U.B. proposal....................................................................................................................... 44
3.4.2 The Vivant proposal ..................................................................................................................... 48
3.4.3 The proposal by Defeyt ............................................................................................................... 52
3.4.4 The proposal by Raventos et al................................................................................................ 55
3.4.5 A modification of the proposal by Raventos et al. ............................................................ 59
3.4.6 An overview of the considered basic income proposals................................................ 61

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3.5 Financing basic income........................................................................................................................ 64
3.5.1 The modified basic income proposal by Raventos et al. ................................................ 64
3.5.2 Savings on social benefits........................................................................................................... 66
3.5.3 Additional financing measures................................................................................................. 70
3.5.4 Sustainability................................................................................................................................... 73
3.6 Topics for further research................................................................................................................ 75
4.Conclusion..........................................................................................................................................78
Bibliography .........................................................................................................................................80
Appendices ............................................................................................................................................91
Part A - Figures............................................................................................................................................... 91
Part B – Tables................................................................................................................................................ 92
Part C - The key figures on social protection expenditures.......................................................... 95
Part D – Statistical figures of social benefits.....................................................................................106
Part E – Cost estimations of the basic income proposals.............................................................126

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List of figures and tables
Figures..........................................................................................................................................................
Figure 1: Basic income versus conventional minimum income schemes .....................................
Figure 2: Long-term unemployment rate, total % of unemployed, 2000 – 2015 ......................
Figure 3: Unemployment rate, total % of labor force, 2000 - 2015.................................................
Figure 4: A comparison of the total expenditures on social protection and the cost of a
basic income proposal at the level of the social integration income, in million euro,
Belgium, 2000-2013...........................................................................................................................................
Figure 5: A Belgian subdivision of the Belgian social protection system......................................
Figure 6: A European subdivision (ESSPROS) of the social protection expenditures..............
Figure 7: Social protection expenditures, in percentages (%), Belgium, 2010...........................
Figure 8: The evolution of the monthly social integration income and the monthly
poverty threshold in Belgium, in euro......................................................................................................
Figure 9: Basic income proposals placed between two extremes....................................................
Figure 10: Total yearly cost of the considered basic income proposals, including social
benefits and health care if applicable, in million euro, Belgium, 2010 ..........................................
Figure 11: Total yearly cost of the modified basic income proposal by Raventos et al., in
million euro, Belgium, 2010............................................................................................................................
Figure 12: Comparison of the cost savings and the grand total cost of the basic income
proposal by Raventos et al., in million euro, Belgium, 2010 ..............................................................
Figure 13: The Laffer curve.............................................................................................................................
Appendix: Part A - Figures………………………………………………………………………………………….
Figure A1: Slope of the linear functions: total expenditures on social protection and the
cost of the basic income based on the social integration income, in million euro, Belgium,
2000-2013..............................................................................................................................................................

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Tables...........................................................................................................................................................
Table 1: Social protection expenditures, in euro, Belgium, 2009-2010.........................................
Table 2: The age structure of Belgium in four categories, population on 1 January 2010.....
Table 3: The B.U.B. proposal, Belgium, 2010............................................................................................
Table 4: The Vivant proposal, Belgium, 2002 and 2010......................................................................
Table 5: The proposal by Defeyt, Belgium, 2010 and 2016................................................................
Table 6: The proposal by Raventos et al., Belgium, 2010....................................................................
Table 7: A modification of the proposal by Raventos et al., Belgium, 2010 .................................
Appendix: Part B - Tables…………………………………………………………………………………………….
Table B1: Gross domestic product (GDP), total general government expenditures, total
general government revenues, total expenditures on social protection (ESSPROS), in
million euros (current prices), Belgium, 2000-2013 ............................................................................
Table B2: Monthly social integration income for the category of single persons and the
calculated yearly social integration income of single persons, in euro, Belgium, 2000-
2013..........................................................................................................................................................................
Table B3: Calculation of the yearly cost of the basic income proposal based on the yearly
social integration income of single persons, Belgium, 2000-2013..................................................
Appendix: Part C - The key figures on social protection expenditures ………………………..
Table C1: Expenditures in the context of health care, in euro, 2009-2010 .................................
Table C2: Expenditures for incapacity to work, physical injuries and disability, in euro,
2009-2010 ............................................................................................................................................................
Table C3: Expenditures for old age, in euro, 2009-2010.....................................................................
Table C4: Expenditures for survivors, in euro, 2009-2010 ................................................................
Table C5: Expenditures for family/children, in euro, 2009-2010....................................................

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Table C6: Expenditures for unemployment, in euro, 2009-2010.....................................................
Table C7: Expenditures for labor market policy and activation policy, in euro, 2009-2010.
Table C8: Expenditures for social integration and social assistance, in euro, 2009-2010.....
Appendix: Part D - Statistical figures on social benefits …………………….………………………..
Table D1: Statistical figures for primary incapacity, Belgium, 2010...............................................
Table D2: Statistical figures for invalidity, Belgium, 2010 .................................................................
Table D3: Statistical figures for disability, Belgium, 2010 ..................................................................
Table D4: Statistical figures for occupational diseases, permanent incapacity for work,
Belgium, 2010.......................................................................................................................................................
Table D5: Statistical figures for occupational diseases, temporary incapacity for work,
Belgium, 2010.......................................................................................................................................................
Table D6: Statistical figures for accidents at work, allowances and compensations for
victims with permanent injuries, Belgium, 2010....................................................................................
Table D7: Statistical figures for accidents at work, annuities for victims with permanent
injuries, Belgium, 2010 .....................................................................................................................................
Table D8: Statistical figures for retirement pensions Belgium, 2010.............................................
Table D9: Statistical figures for income guarantee for the elderly, Belgium, 2010...................
Table D10: Statistical figures for old age annuities, Belgium, 2010................................................
Table D11: Statistical figures for survivor’s pensions, Belgium, 2010...........................................
Table D12: Statistical figures for yearly compensation to survivors whose spouse has
passed away due to an accident at work, Belgium, 2010 ....................................................................
Table D13: Statistical figures for yearly compensation to survivors whose spouse has
passed away due to an occupational disease, Belgium, 2010............................................................
Table D14: Statistical figures for family benefits, Belgium, 2010 ....................................................
Table D15: Age structure of eligible children, Belgium, 2010...........................................................

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Table D16: Statistical figures for maternity leave, Belgium, 2010...................................................
Table D17: Statistical figures for work removal of pregnant women, Belgium, 2010 .............
Table D18: Statistical figures for paternity leave, Belgium, 2010....................................................
Table D19: Statistical figures for adoption leave, Belgium, 2010.....................................................
Table D20: Statistical figures for parental leave, Belgium, 2010......................................................
Table D21: Statistical figures for maternity fee and adoption fee, Belgium, 2010 ....................
Table D22: Statistical figures for tide-over benefits for seafarers, Belgium, 2010....................
Table D23: Statistical figures for compensated unemployment, Belgium, 2010 .......................
Table D24: Statistical figures for temporary unemployment, Belgium, 2010.............................
Table D25: Statistical figures for bankruptcy insurance for the self-employed, Belgium,
2010..........................................................................................................................................................................
Table D26: Statistical figures for social integration income, Belgium, 2010 ...............................
Table D27: Statistical figures for social assistance (financial aid), Belgium, 2010....................
Table D28: Statistical figures for full-time early retirement pensions, Belgium, 2010 ...........
Table D29: Statistical figures for part-time early retirement pensions, Belgium, 2010 .........
Table D30: Statistical figures for early retirement pensions for seafarers, Belgium, 2010...
Table D31: Statistical figures for career interruption, Belgium, 2010 ...........................................
Table D32: Statistical figures for time credit, Belgium, 2010 ............................................................
Table D33: Statistical figures for leave for medical assistance, Belgium, 2010..........................
Table D34: Statistical figures for leave for palliative care, Belgium, 2010...................................

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Appendix: Part E - Cost estimations of the basic income proposals……………………...……..
Table E1: Regular recurring social benefits, comparison on a monthly basis, in euro,
Belgium, 2010.......................................................................................................................................................
Table E2: Regular recurring social benefits, taking time off work, comparison on a yearly
basis, in euro, Belgium, 2010..........................................................................................................................
Table E3: Exceptional one-time and yearly recurring social benefits, comparison on a
yearly basis, in euro, Belgium, 2010 ............................................................................................................
Table E4: Basic income proposal by Raventos et al. – Social integration income – Total
costs of basic income and retained social benefits.................................................................................
Table E5: Basic income proposal by Raventos et al. – Poverty threshold – Total costs of
basic income and retained social benefits.................................................................................................
Table E6: A modification of the proposal by Raventos et al. - Total costs of basic income
and retained social benefits ............................................................................................................................
Table E7: List of references, categorized by the type of data.............................................................

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1. Introduction
The idea of unconditionally granting a benefit to every citizen (or resident) at a regular
interval, a basic income, can be traced back as early as 1797 to the plan of the agrarian
radical, Thomas Spence, in The Rights of Infants. Spence propagated “the ownership of
natural resources, such as land, by local parish communities, who would then proceed to
lease these resources to the highest bidder. [The obtained revenues would contribute to
the financing of] public goods, the national government, and the residual income would be
distributed equally between all members of the parish at quarterly intervals” (Cunliffe &
Erreygers, 2004, p.81), clearly indicating a scheme of basic income. (Cunliffe & Erreygers,
2004, p. 81; Melzochová & Špecián, 2015, p. 550)
The concept of basic income is thus far from being a novel idea in contemporary society. As
a matter of fact, proposals of basic income have kept reappearing throughout the past two
centuries and notably; according to Cunliffe & Erreygers (2004, p. xiii) this has occurred
independently. The appealing characteristics of basic income have again led basic income
to resurface as strong as ever in the twenty-first century. This can be witnessed from the
promising upcoming experiments concerning basic income, such as in Finland, the recently
rejected but meaningful referendum of Switzerland, and the numerous discussions
surrounding basic income by academics, policymakers, and interest groups all over the
world (Agence France-Presse, 2016; Cunliffe & Erreygers, 2004, p. xiii; Soininvaara, 2000;
Laterza, 2015, p. 7).
However, the appealing concept of basic income nevertheless warrants a comprehensive
analysis: basic income remains as radical as it was back in 1797. Namely, the
unconditionality aspect of basic income is grandly opposed to conventional minimum
income schemes which are conditional of nature. This causes basic income to be considered
as “a threat to the primacy of paid work, as the central source of legitimate security”
(Soininvaara, 2000, p. 7). (Cunliffe & Erreygers, 2004, p. 81; Solow, 2000, p. ix)

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A first traditional approach towards analyzing basic income, according to Solow (2000, p.
ix-x), would be to address the question of the feasibility of basic income on the one hand,
and that of the desirability of basic income and its consequences on the other. Although
both questions are vital in assessing the potential of basic income as a reformation of the
existing social protection system, the focus of this paper will lie on the former aspect: the
financial feasibility of basic income.
Specifically, this paper wishes to contribute to the debate of financial feasibility, by
providing answers to the following two research questions in the context of Belgium: ‘How
much would a scheme of basic income cost?’ and ‘How much are the cost savings that are
realized by basic income replacing social benefits?’
The first research question is a natural starting point when assessing the financial
feasibility of basic income. Basic income proposals come in all shapes and sizes, and
consequently so do the costs of basic income. For this reason, static cost estimations will
be provided for a range of basic income proposals for Belgium. Additionally, the current
social protection system will be analyzed and its costs will be compared to those of the
various basic income schemes in order to have a better perspective of the magnitude of the
costs. (Melzochová & Špecián, 2015, p.554-556)
The second research question contributes directly to the financial feasibility of basic
income. Basic income is namely financed by two methods. On the one hand, the cost savings
realized by basic income replacing social benefits reduces the total costs of basic income.
On the other hand, the remaining costs of basic income are principally financed by a tax
reform. (Monnier & Vercellone, 2014, p. 71-73)
The cost savings are dependent on the specific basic income scheme, but generally,
proponents at least advocate for a partial replacement of social benefits due to the
implausibility of simultaneously sustaining the costs of the social protection system and a
scheme of basic income. In order to concretely assess the cost savings, a criterion is
required to distinguish social benefits that are retained and social benefits that are

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dissolved with the introduction of basic income. The criterion prescribed by Raventos et al.,
which instructs to completely replace social benefits of a lower level than basic income and
to partially replace social benefits of a higher level than basic income, will be applied for a
specific basic income scheme (Arcarons, Raventos Pañella & Torrens Mèlich, 2014, p. 82).
After accounting for cost savings, the next step is to finance the remaining cost gap. The
most conventional method is to generate extra revenue by tax reforms. A number of tax
reforms suggested by Belgian proponents of basic income will be presented. A formal
analysis of these tax reforms is beyond the scope of this paper; however, this is a step that
needs to be taken in order to complete the picture on financing basic income.
In order to provide an answer to these research questions, the paper is largely composed of
two chapters.
The first chapter allows an understanding of basic income by providing a definition of basic
income as well as by emphasizing its particularities by comparing basic income to
conventional minimum income schemes. Furthermore, the most relevant arguments for
basic income in Europe are discussed before situating the basic income debate in the
context of the political and academic sphere of Belgium.
The second chapter focuses on the financial feasibility of basic income. First, a literature
review will be presented and a number of preliminary themes will be covered, building
towards the cost estimations for a range of basic income proposals for Belgium.
Subsequently, the financing of the cost of basic income will be analyzed. The two research
questions will be addressed and an answer will be formulated in this chapter.

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2. Basic income
2.1 Defining basic income
Hereby, I introduce two accessible definitions of basic income which jointly reflect the
cornerstone of every basic income proposal.
The first definition of basic income put forward by the Basic Income Earth Network (n.d. a)
draws special attention to three features which distinguish basic income from conventional
minimum income guarantees (Peña-Miguel, De la Peña Esteban, & Fernandez-Sainz, 2014,
p.96):
1.) Unconditionality; “basic income is to be considered a fundamental right”
(Melzochová & Špecián, 2015, p.551) regardless of a person’s background.
2.) Individuality; basic income is granted to every individual citizen (or resident)
irrespective of their household situation. (Melzochová & Špecián, 2015, p.551)
3.) Without means test or work requirement; further emphasizes that unconditionality
also implies that basic income is unconditional on any (work) requirement or
income level.
In comparison to conventional minimum income schemes which are conditional of nature,
these three features are exactly the opposite (Frazer & Marlier, 2009, p. 8; Peña-Miguel et
al., 2014, p. 96). A schematic overview is given in Figure 1. To illustrate; the requirements
of receiving a social integration income, a benefit received by individuals enabling them to
meet an income of subsistence level, clearly adheres to the following three opposite
characteristics in Belgium (Vlaanderen, n.d. a):
“A basic income is an income unconditionally granted to all on an individual basis, without
means test or work requirement” (BIEN, n.d. a).
“A universal basic income [is] an income paid by a government, at a uniform level and at
regular intervals, to each adult member of society” (Van Parijs, 2001, p.5).

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1.) Conditionality; the social integration income is only granted to individuals of legal
age with a Belgian nationality, with Belgium being the factual country of residence,
with an income below subsistence level and fulfillment of the means test.
2.) Dependent on the household situation; the amount received depends on which
category the individual belongs to: a situation of cohabitation (spouse or legal
cohabitant) , a situation of cohabitation attached to family responsibilities (e.g.
taking care of a minor) or a one-person household.
3.) With means test or work requirement; verifying that the individual has first exerted
all possible options (e.g. first relying on other possible social benefit schemes) and is
yet unable to earn an income above subsistence level. An additional condition is that
the individual is willing (if able) to work if an opportunity were to present itself.
Figure 1: Basic income versus conventional minimum income schemes
Note: The arrows pointing in opposite directions are illustrative in showing that the characteristics of
basic income vis-à-vis conventional minimum income schemes (e.g. integration income and
unemployment benefits) are the opposite of one another.
Source: Own creation based on Peña-Miguel, De la Peña Esteban, & Fernandez-Sainz, (2014,
p. 96).

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The specifications of each basic income proposal, however, (e.g. the exact level of the basic
income, the precise target audience of basic income, whether basic income is
supplementary to the social protection system…) may differ across diverse basic income
proposals. The diversity of these particularities will be illustrated by a range of basic
income proposals, which are discussed in chapter 3 of the paper. (Melzochová & Špecián,
2015, p. 554-555)
The following section first elaborates on the arguments for basic income on European soil
and proceeds by zooming in on the basic income debate in Belgium.
2.2 Basic income in Europe
The current topical reappearance of basic income in Europe, according to Soininvaara
(2000, p. 7-8), is thanks to the solutions offered by basic income in order to overcome two
obstacles faced by the present European welfare systems.
2.2.1 The two obstacles
The first obstacle is the trend of growing structural unemployment with the unskilled
struggling to obtain a job due to a mismatch between labor demand and supply
(Soininvaara, 2000, p.8) (C.W., 2014). This trend has already been occurring in advanced
economies for a number of decades and is expected to continue growing in the future due
to the threat that evolving technology poses for low-skilled jobs (C.W., 2014; Rotman,
2013). The long-term unemployment rates in Figure 2 suggest that especially Europe (EU-
28) seems to be greatly affected, with the EU-28 average being consistently higher than the
OECD average, which in turn is consistently higher than the rates of the United States for
the time span of 2000 to 2015 (OECD, 2016a). Belgium is no exception and seems to suffer
from long-term unemployment rates even higher than the EU-28 average (OECD, 2016a).
High long-term unemployment rates are problematic for various reasons. Besides being an
indicator of inefficient operating labor markets, long-term unemployed individuals are

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shown “to have poorer health than average [due to mental and material stress] and [these
high rates] squeeze the social security budgets” (C.W., 2014). (OECD, 2016a)
Additional to having a greater percentage of long-term unemployed, Europe bears high
unemployment rates relative to the rest of the OECD and the United States. This is shown in
Figure 3. Note that although the current trend of the European Union is strongly influenced
by the extremely high unemployment rates of Greece and Spain, with respective
unemployment rates being 24.9% and 22.06% in 2015, all countries belonging to the
European Union are in all cases, except for two member states being Germany and the
Figure 2: Long-term unemployment rate, total % of unemployed, 2000 – 2015
Note: “The long-term unemployment rate refers to the proportion of people who have been
unemployed for 12 months or more among all unemployed” (OECD, 2016a).While the indicator itself
is relevant, it may also be considered as a proxy for structural unemployment as there is a tendency
of long-term unemployment turning into structural unemployment (C.W., 2014).
Source: OECD, (2016a).

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Czech Republic, higher than those of the United States in 2015 (figure not shown). For the
specific case of Belgium, the unemployment rates have been fluctuating around 8% for the
past decade, with a percentage of 8.48 in 2015. (OECD, 2016b)
High levels of unemployment translate to low incomes on the unemployed which in turn
leads to an increased level of government spending on social benefits and decreased tax
revenues (Eurostat, 2016a). The unemployment rates and its effect on the government
revenues, the main source of funding basic income, through personal income taxes form an
important aspect of financing basic income. Although this aspect is beyond the paper, an
assessment thereof is recommended for further research.
Figure 3: Unemployment rate, total % of labor force, 2000 - 2015
Note: “The unemployment rate is the number of unemployed people as a percentage of the labor
force. The labor force consists of the unemployed plus those in paid or self-employment” (OECD,
2016b).
Source: OECD, (2016b).

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The second obstacle lies in the incompatibility between incentives to enter the labor
market and conditions attached to unemployment benefits (Soininvaara, 2000, p. 8). “The
social income transfers in the European systems [are namely] diminishing as earned
income rises” (Soininvaara, 2000, p.8) with the typical dis-incentivizing outcome of
individuals losing these benefits completely when joining the workforce. In the Belgian
labor market, individuals who are unwillingly unemployed and fulfill the minimum amount
of days of paid employment have the right to request an unemployment benefit (RVA,
2015; Vlaanderen, n.d. b). The level of the unemployment benefit received is again of
conditional nature as it depends on the individual’s household situation, the individual’s
most recent paycheck, their employment history and the duration of unemployment due to
the benefits being of digressive nature (RVA, 2016). In this case, the mismatch is reflected
by receiving a lower level of unemployment benefits if the individual belongs to a
household in which their partner has income and the complete loss of unemployment
benefits when obtaining a job (RVA, 2016).
2.2.2 Overcoming the obstacles
Basic income provides a solution in order to overcome both these obstacles and is the
reason why basic income has received much attention in Europe (Soininvaara, 2000, p. 7-
9).
First, basic income alleviates the problem of high unemployment rates not by decreasing
these rates but rather by offering the unemployed a wider scope of opportunities. Van
Parijs (2004, p. 17-21), a well-known Belgian proponent of basic income, argues that basic
income enables individuals to comfortably look for a desirable job corresponding to their
capabilities and preferences, perhaps, more importantly, it also stimulates
entrepreneurship due to lower failure anxiety, encourages individuals to engage in training
and sharpen their existing skillset, facilitating the possibility to “take a break between two
jobs and reducing working time” (Van Parijs, 2004, p.19). This reduction in working time,
in turn, will allow individuals to dedicate themselves to academic research, volunteer work,
domestic work and charity. Furthermore, proponents argue that basic income empowers

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the position of employees in negotiations leading to improved working conditions.
(Melzochová & Špeciána, 2015, p. 551-552)
Second, basic income is expected to eliminate the disincentives to work as unlike with
unemployment benefits, individuals do not lose this guaranteed income when deciding to
join the workforce. Basic income detaches the relationship between the amount of support
and the earned income. (Soininvaara, 2000, p. 8)
2.2.3 The administrative efficiency argument
Next to these policy-oriented arguments for basic income, the argument of basic income
emancipating the poor, and the classic ethical argument by Van Parijs (1995) of basic
income ensuring “real freedom for all”, there is another argument which is of particular
interest when considering the financial feasibility of basic income: the efficiency
implications brought forward by the characteristics of basic income. (Melzochová &
Špeciána, 2015, p. 551; Soininvaara, 2000, p. 8)
As basic income is unconditional without a means-test or work requirement, proponents
argue that basic income economizes on administration costs compared to other income
support schemes: there is no longer a need to verify whether an individual is eligible for
income support or not and there is no urge of cheating under the scheme of basic income. It
goes without saying that the more complex the initial social protection system set in place
is, the more savings that accumulate on administration costs when substituting the former
system by a simplified and more transparent scheme of basic income. This is a significant
argument in the European context considering how the social safety net in advanced
economies, such as in Western Europe and the Scandinavian countries, has grown into a
complex construct. However, while basic income may be more administratively efficient in
comparison to conditional income support schemes, the extent of its efficiency should be
still put under scrutiny. (De Wispelaere & Stirton, 2011, p. 115-116, p. 125-126;
Melzochová & Špeciána, 2015, p. 551)

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Overall, the two aforementioned obstacles and the complexity of the social safety net faced
by Europe are also concerns shared by Belgium: Belgium had an unemployment rate of
8.48% in 2015 and 51.7% of those individuals were unemployed for longer than twelve
months (OECD, 2016a; OECD, 2016b). Furthermore, Belgium is known to have a very
elaborate social security net (Belgium, n.d. a). This makes Belgium ripe for considering
basic income. The next section focuses on the academic and political attention that basic
income has received in Belgium.
2.3 Basic income in Belgium
In Belgium, the topic of basic income first emerged in academic and intellectual circles,
before receiving attention in the field of politics. (Vanderborght, 2000, p. 277)
Among the Belgian scholars who have delved into basic income, Philippe Van Parijs stands
out the most, being a firm proponent of basic income and one of the founders of Basic
Income Earth Network (BIEN, n.d. b). Van Parijs (1995) is especially known for his book
“Real Freedom For All”, in which he argues that capitalism has introduced inequalities in
our society which he deems as unacceptable. To fight against these inequalities, Van Parijs
places freedom on a pedestal and specifically advocates for “real-libertarianism, or real-
freedom-for-all”, which is different from formal freedom as he describes “real freedom not
only [being] a matter of having the right to do what one might want to do, but also a matter
of having the means for doing it” (Van Parijs, 1995, p.4). Van Parijs further argues that the
regime which best incorporates this type of freedom is “the highest sustainable
unconditional income”(Van Parijs, 1995, p.30), with the level of basic income set
sufficiently high to guarantee the means to put an end to the inequalities imposed by
capitalism and ensure real freedom.
In politics, there is a division of proponents versus opponents of basic income not only
between political parties and labor unions but also between individuals within a single
party or union. (Evenepoel, 2016)

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First, regarding the political parties, there are currently only two Belgian small-scale
political parties of which the members have collectively agreed to explicitly take up basic
income in their program: Piratenpartij and B.U.B. (Belgische Unie – Union Belge) (B.U.B.,
2016; Piratenpartij, 2014). Other parties who have supported basic income in the past are
Vivant and two green parties, ECOLO and AGALEV (Vanderborght, 2000). Furthermore, a
number of individuals belonging to the well-known parties, Open VLD and sp.a, have shown
interest in the radical proposal, although their personal interest does not necessarily
correspond to their affiliation (Cornillie & Kherbache, 2016; “Open VLD: Basisinkomen”
2015).
Piratenpartij (2014, p. 19, own translation) contended through their program of 2014 that
“labor should be more than just a mean to obtain income, and should instead primarily
contribute to the self-realization of individuals”. Piratenpartij pleads for basic income as
the long-term solution towards achieving that goal. “As a first step, the party implores an
assessment of the feasibility of implementing and financing basic income on European and
Belgian soil while accounting for the administrative efficiency brought upon by
bureaucratic simplification” (Piratenpartij, 2014, p. 19, own translation).
The party urging for a unified Belgium, B.U.B. (2016, p.10), is a supporter of basic income in
order to guarantee an equal treatment of all Belgians. They propose a scheme of basic
income at a subsistence level of €800 per month, which is to be implemented as a complete
substitute for existing social benefits. Similar to Piratenpartij, B.U.B. emphasizes the
administrative efficiency argument as a method of partially financing basic income, which
is maximized by abolishing the current social protection system. The basic income proposal
by B.U.B. is one of the proposals of which I will assess the costs.
“The green parties ECOLO and AGALEV supported basic income since the mid-1980s.
Compared to ECOLO who considered basic income as a medium-term objective more
belonging to the theoretical horizon than a policy proposal, the support by AGALEV was
more outspoken as it was promoted as a short-term reform” (Vanderborght, 2000, p.276).
The parties’ resolute support, however, is a remnant of the past. Groen left the name of its

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predecessor AGALEV behind with the idea of basic income in 2003 (Groen, n.d.; Llc, 2003).
In comparison with AGALEV’s commitment to basic income, today Groen (n.d.) merely
labels basic income as an interesting proposal worth exploring on the long-term. For the
case of ECOLO, the already limited presence of basic income seems like it will further
disappear into the background as the idea was mainly upheld by the economist Philippe
Defeyt who recently retired in March 2016 (Dupriez & Khattabi, 2016). The resolute
proponent of basic income, however, is still going strong as he independently released a
concrete basic income proposal as of June 2016 (Van Horenbeek & Wauters, 2016). A cost
estimation of his proposal will be provided.
Vivant, although currently retired from the political scene, is a unique party with a sole
focus on basic income. The basic income proposal made public by Vivant is well-developed
compared to its counterparts and will therefore be elaborated upon next to other basic
income proposals, such as those by B.U.B. and Defeyt. (Vanderborght, 2000; Vivant, n.d.)
Notable individuals who have shown their interest for basic income and are requesting for
a thorough investigation are, but not limited to, Nele Lijnen, federal parliament member of
Open VLD, Yasmine Kherbache, Flemish parliament member of sp.a, Jan Cornillie, director
of the research affiliation of sp.a, and Karel Van Eetvelt, the managing director of an
organization supporting entrepreneurs, UNIZO. (Cornillie & Kherbache, 2016; Evenepoel,
2016; “Open VLD: Basisinkomen” 2015).
Second, the same divide can also be found in the labor unions. For example, the socialist
labor union, ABVV, disapproves of basic income due to the threat it poses to the current
social protection system. Another labor union, ACV, however, is rather favorable of basic
income and considers the proposal a negotiable matter. (Evenepoel, 2016)
All things considered, the limited political interest in the radical reform, which is primarily
restricted to small-scale parties and certain individuals, shows the current limitations of
the political feasibility of basic income in Belgium. Different parties and individuals,
however, request for more research. As a reaction to these demands, this paper would like

26 | P a g e
to partially contribute with a focus on financial feasibility, which is the topic for the
remainder of the paper. (Evenepoel, 2016; Vanderborght, 2000)
3. Financial feasibility of basic income
3.1 An introductory assessment of the costs of basic income
According to the Dutch historian, Rutger Bergman (2014, p. 44-45, own translation), “for
the first time in history, we are rich enough to afford a generous scheme of basic income”.
Bergman validates his argument by the following reasoning, which is re-interpreted for
Belgium in the year 2010.
In 2010, Belgium had a gross domestic product (GDP) of €356 billion (Eurostat, 2016b).
The Belgian government expenditures consisted of €195 billion and €107 billion thereof
were social expenditures1, as identified by the European System of Integrated Social
Protection Statistics (ESSPROS – see in detail later) (Eurostat, 2016c, 2016d). A simple
basic income scheme would be to endow the aforementioned social integration income of
the category of single persons to every Belgian eighteen years or older (B.U.B., 2016, p. 10).
With 8,625,750 eligible recipients of basic income and the average monthly social
integration income at the level of €731 for a single person in 2010, this proposal would
cost €76 billion (FOD Economie, K.M.O., Middenstand en Energie, 2011; POD
Maatschappelijke Integratie, 2016; and own calculations). Given that the social
expenditures of 2010 were €107 billion, completely substituting the current social
protection system by the proposed scheme of basic income, would even lead to a positive
difference of €32 billion (Eurostat, 2016d; and own calculations). The remaining amount is
high enough to retain the system of health care, which cost €29 billion in 2010.
Alternatively, policymakers can even choose for a higher level of basic income, €1037 per
month, by making a breakeven between the cost of the proposed basic income scheme and
the social protection expenditures (Eurostat, 2016d; and own calculations).
1
The social expenditures are as identified by the European System of Integration Social Protection
Statistics (ESSPROS). This will be discussed in further detail in the subsection 3.3.1 Social protection in
Belgium.

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Figure 4: A comparison of the total expenditures on social protection and the cost of a
basic income proposal at the level of the social integration income, in million euro,
Belgium, 2000-2013
Note: (1) The observations of all five series are annual. (2) The cost of basic income is calculated by
multiplying the number of Belgian citizens who are 18 years or older by the yearly social integration
income of the category of single persons. (3) The corresponding tables, which include an overview
of the data as well as the computations of the suggested basic income proposal, can be found in
Table B1, Table B2, and Table B3 of the appendix.
Source: Own creation based on Eurostat (2016b, 2016c, 2016d); FOD Economie, K.M.O.,
Middenstand en Energie (2011); POD Maatschappelijke Integratie (2016); Steunpunt
tot bestrijding van armoede, bestaansonzekerheid en sociale uitsluiting, (2016); and
my own calculations.

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Figure 4 provides a graphical illustration of the abovementioned indicators (GDP, total
general government expenditures and revenues, total expenditures on social protection
according to ESSPROS) and the cost of the proposed basic income scheme for Belgium
annually re-calculated for the years 2000-2013. Note that the annual recalculation of the
basic income scheme attached to the social integration income incorporates the change in
population (of Belgian citizens eighteen years or older) and the effect of inflation as the
social integration income is regularly revised upwards to ensure equal purchasing power
over time (FOD Economie, K.M.O., Middenstand en Energie, 2011; POD Maatschappelijke
Integratie, 2016).
If the social protection system were to be substituted by a basic income scheme, which
provides all Belgian citizens eighteen years or older the social integration income of the
year in question, at first glance there is a promising outlook that this basic income scheme
is financially feasible as the trend of expenditures of social protection lies higher than the
trend of the cost of the basic income proposal for all years from 2000 until 2013.
Furthermore, Figure 4 also shows that the gap between the expenditures of social
protection and the cost of the basic income proposal widens as the years go by.
Alternatively, the slope of the former is steeper than the latter.2 In other words, the average
growth of the expenditures of social protection is greater than the average growth of the
cost of the basic income proposal.1 This finding suggests that, even if the government
cannot afford a (generous) scheme of basic income scheme today, it may be able to do so in
the future. The improved position of the Belgian government to afford more expensive
policies, such as the basic income proposal, over time is thanks to the (generally) positive
growth rate of real GDP (Eurostat, 2016e): the higher the GDP, the higher the general
government revenues (due to the design of tax collection) and the higher the expenditures
on social protection may be.
2 This statement is confirmed by a visual and a corresponding mathematical exercise which can be found
in Figure A1 of the appendix.

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Overall, these findings of Figure 4 imply a positive notion of the financial feasibility of basic
income: the suggested basic income proposal based on social integration income is most
definitely financially feasible if it were to substitute the social protection system and if a
(generous) basic income proposal is not financially feasible today, it may become feasible
in the future thanks to the positive real growth of GDP (Eurostat, 2016e).
Nevertheless, this is only a simple and at the same time extreme basic income proposal
which completely abolishes the current social protection system to make way for basic
income, making it the most financially feasible variant of basic income. There are, however,
other basic income proposals worth examining. Especially considering the fact that the
basic income proposal based on the social integration income might be a system in which
we treat everyone equally, it might not be the most ethical system as it also implies that
equal treatment is granted to the sick and to the healthy. For this reason, more complex
basic income proposals which incorporate the ethical principles of social protection and
their respective costs will also be discussed. (Melzochová & Špecián, 2015, p. 554)
Next to these proposals, this chapter about the financial feasibility of basic income covers
the following subjects.
First, a literature review of the contributions to the financing of basic income will be given.
While the contributions on European scale are numerous with a number of publications
applying a reliable and valid research method, the contributions in Belgium are lacking and
are limited to back-of-the-envelope calculations.
Second, relevant material concerning the social protection system, the social integration
income, the poverty threshold, and the demographics of Belgium will be covered. Being
informed about the expenditure posts and the social benefits of the social protection
system will enable understanding of which social measures will cease to exist and which
social groups will receive a lower amount of benefits with a substitution of the social
protection system by basic income. The social integration income and the poverty
threshold will also be addressed as many proponents, such as Philippe Van Parijs, argue for

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a basic income of a sustainable level, a level sufficiently high to cover one’s basic needs,
lifting people out of poverty and optimally ensuring people “real freedom” (Van Parijs,
1995, p.4; 2004, p. 11-13). The demographics of Belgium will briefly be discussed as data of
the age pyramid is needed in order to calculate the cost of basic income.
Third, different basic income proposals and their corresponding cost estimations will be
presented in order to put emphasis on the fact that the financial feasibility of basic income
should be evaluated on a case-by-case basis as basic income proposals may differ greatly.
As a personal contribution, I will provide the means to obtain a relatively accurate cost
estimation of the intriguing basic income proposal by Raventos et al. (Melzochová &
Špecián, 2015, p. 554)
Fourth, as a follow up to the basic income proposals, the financing of basic income will be
discussed. The focus will lie on obtaining a refined estimation of the cost savings which are
realized by the replacement of social benefits by basic income.
Fifth and finally, I will point out the limitations of the static approach and suggest an
alternative approach for further research.
3.2 Review of the literature
Starting from back-of-the-envelope calculations and progressing to estimations provided
by micro-simulation models, the field of financing basic income has positively made
headway over the past decade. The measures by which basic income may be financed have
furthermore been creative and diverse. (Raventos, 2007, p. 156)
There are two principal steps by which basic income can be financed. The first step
requires an assessment of the cost savings which are realized by the replacement of social
benefits by basic income. In the second step, additional measures have to be found in order

31 | P a g e
to close the remaining cost gap after accounting for the cost savings. These measures
consist primarily of tax reforms. (Monnier & Vercellone, 2014, p. 71-73)
The literature largely focuses on tax measures and the progress in the field of financing
basic income is also mainly due to advancements in the evaluation of tax measures. Tax
measures were first assessed by back-of-the-envelope calculations but have evolved to
micro-simulation models. Micro-simulation models are highly endorsed for three reasons.
The first reason is based on the grounds that these models generate accurate cost
estimations of the tax revenues implied by the proposed tax reform (Raventos, 2007, p.
157). The second reason is that micro-simulation enables an assessment of the
consequences of basic income on inequality, progressivity, and redistribution (Arcarons,
Raventos Pañella & Torrens Mèlich, 2014, p. 87). The third reason is that micro-simulation
models are able to integrate the behavioral effects, such as on labor, caused by basic
income and a tax reform (Colombo, Schnabel, & Schubert, 2008, p. 26). Micro-simulation
models have been employed to assess the financial feasibility of basic income in a number
of European countries. Belgium, however, is not one of them. Research on financing basic
income has been limited to static cost estimations (Defeyt, 2016, p. 9; Cornillie, 2015;
Panorama, 2014; Tirez, 2014b; Vivant, n.d.).
While the two aforementioned steps of financing basic income are recognized by the
literature, the literature neglects to provide accurate cost estimations of the cost savings.
In Europe as well as in Belgium, the cost savings are generally estimated by simply
assuming that basic income will completely replace a number of social benefits if not all,
without a closer inspection of the differences between the current levels of social benefits
and the level of basic income (Colombo, Schnabel, & Schubert, 2008, p. 6; Cornillie, 2015;
Defeyt, 2016, p. 9; Panorama, 2014; Tirez, 2014b). Fortunately, a number of basic income
proponents are more attentive and acknowledge the insightful criterion of completely
replacing social benefits of a lower level by basic income on the one hand and partially
replacing social benefits of a higher level by basic income on the other hand (Arcarons,
Raventos Pañella & Torrens Mèlich, 2014, p. 80; Tirez, 2014b). These proponents, however,
do not actually apply the criterion (Tirez, 2014b) or do not provide an explanation or the

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calculations of how the criterion was respected (Arcarons, Raventos Pañella & Torrens
Mèlich, 2014, p. 82). For this reason, I would like to make a contribution to the literature by
effectively applying this criterion for Belgium with data from 2010. I will obtain an
estimation of cost savings which is comparatively more accurate than estimations provided
in the literature. But before I do so, there are a number of preliminary themes that first
have to be considered before cost estimations can be made.
3.3 Preliminary themes to consider
3.3.1 Social protection in Belgium
The Belgian social protection system is an elaborate construct that needs to be
decomposed in order to make a financial comparison between the expenditures of the
current social protection system and the expenditures resulting from the concrete basic
income proposals.
A first typical Belgian way of subdividing the Belgian social protection system is by
“distinguishing two systems: the ‘classical sectors’ of social security [on the one hand] and
‘social assistance’ [on the other]. [The former system], the ‘classical sectors’ of social
security, contains seven sectors: (1) old-age and survivor's pensions; (2) unemployment;
(3) insurance for accidents at work; (4) insurance for occupational diseases; (5) family
benefits; (6) compulsory insurance for medical care and benefits; and (7) annual vacation.
The ‘classical sectors’ of social security can be further sub-divided into three systems based
on the type of occupation: (1) a system for salaried persons, (2) a system for self-employed
persons, and (3) a system for civil servants (of the Belgian federal government). [The
financing as well as the requirements to receive a benefit differ in these three sub-systems.
The latter system of ‘social assistance’ exists of:] (1) integration income; (2) income
guarantee for the elderly; (3) guaranteed family benefits; and (4) benefits for disabled
persons” (FPS Social Security, 2015, p.7). A schematic overview of this subdivision can be
found in Figure 5.

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This is, however, only one way of presenting the Belgian Social Protection System (FPS
Social Security, 2015). Different governmental institutions and different publications
administer distinct subdivisions and contents of the social protection system, leading to a
discordance of data on social protection expenditures. This complication is also
acknowledged by the Federal Public Services (FPS) Social Security as they called a halt to
disclosing the total social expenditures encompassing all governmental institutions in the
post-2010 publications of “Key Figures” (FOD Sociale Zekerheid, 2012, 2013). As quoted in
these recent publications: “The alert reader will notice that the division into themes and
the content [of the social security expenditures] differ in comparison to publications by
other institutions (The Parliament, The Institute for National Accounts, Eurostat, the
Federal Planning Bureau,…). For this reason, we did not make a total expenditure of the
different themes” (FOD Sociale Zekerheid, 2012, p. 3; FOD Sociale Zekerheid, 2013, p. 3;
own translation).
Figure 5: A Belgian subdivision of the Belgian social protection system
Source: FPS Social Security, (2015, p. 7).
Social
assistance
The Belgian
Social Protection
System
1) Old-age and survivor's pensions
2) Unemployment
3) Insurance for accidents at work
4) Insurance for occupational diseases
5) Family benefits
6) Compulsory insurance for medical
care and benefits
7) Annual vacation
Salaried
persons
Self-
employed
Civil
servants
1) Integration income
2) Income guarantee for the elderly
3) Guaranteed family benefits
4) Benefits for disabled persons
of social security
Classical
sectors

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Furthermore, the Sixth State Reform, which was agreed upon in 2011, has also hindered
the unification of data on social expenditures across different governmental levels. This is a
consequence of the resulting reformation of the social protection system, which transferred
a number of responsibilities from the federal level to the three communities (Flemish,
French, and German speaking) and the Common Community Commission of the Brussels
Capital Region. The family allowances scheme, the allowance for assistance to the elderly
(with the disabilities), for example, were transferred. “As of 1 July 2014, these benefits fall
within the responsibility of the four federated entities, but, the management is still
temporarily being carried out by the federal institutions” (FPS Social Security, 2015, p. 13).
(Belgium, n.d. b).
Taking this discordance of data into consideration, the following analysis of the social
protection expenditures will be restricted to data provided by the FPS Social Security of
Belgium for the years 2007 – 2010, stemming from the 2010 edition of “Key figures” and
the corresponding Vade Mecum publication (FOD Sociale Zekerheid, 2010a, 2011). This
dataset may be considered as outdated. However, after exploring various publications by
different institutions, I have determined that this dataset fulfills most of the requirements
for calculating the cost estimation of the concrete basic income proposals, considering it
includes a total overview of the social expenditures across different governmental levels as
well as the corresponding number of beneficiaries per benefit (FOD Sociale Zekerheid,
2011).
The selected dataset by the FPS Social Security of Belgium provides data for the years
2007-2011 (FOD Sociale Zekerheid, 2010a, 2011). Out of these years of which data is
provided, the year 2010 is chosen to assess the financial feasibility of basic income. For this
reason, figures have been and will be reported for the year 2010. However, using data from
the year 2010 may create doubt of whether conclusions based on the financial feasibility of
basic income in the year 2010 may simply be extended to later years, such as the year
2016. In order to clear this doubt I make a crucial, but a plausible hypothesis that if a
specific basic income proposal is deemed to be financially feasible for the year 2010, that
the same conclusion can be made for years thereafter. The plausibility of this hypothesis is

35 | P a g e
derived from the earlier presented argument that the Belgian government can afford more
expensive policies in years to come thanks to the positive growth rate of real GDP
(Eurostat, 2016e).
The chosen dataset categorizes the social expenditures to a large extent according to the
European System of Integrated Social Protection Statistics (ESSPROS). ESSPROS makes a
distinction between the social expenditures arising from administration, social risks, and
other expenditures. An overview of the ESSPROS and the eight social risks is displayed in
Figure 6. (Eurostat, 2012; FOD Sociale Zekerheid, 2012b)
Figure 6: A European subdivision (ESSPROS) of the social protection expenditures
Source: Own creation based on Eurostat, (2012, p. 10) and FOD Sociale Zekerheid
(2012b, p. 34).
Social Protection
Expenditures
(ESSPROS)
Admini
-stration
costs
Social
Risks
Other
Expenditures
1) Health care
2) Disability
3) Old age
4) Survivors
5) Family/children
6) Unemployment
7) Housing
8) Social exclusion not elsewhere
classified

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The social protection expenditures, as given by the dataset of choice, are shown in Figure 7
and Table 1. The only difference between the social risks of the ESSPROS (see Figure 6)
and the social risks foreseen in the dataset (see Figure 7) is that the latter excludes housing
but includes the expenditures from the labor market and employment policy. (Eurostat,
2012; FOD Sociale Zekerheid, 2012b)
Figure 7: Social protection expenditures, in percentages (%), Belgium, 2010
Note: The social risks incorporated in the chosen dataset are: “(1) Health care;
(2) Incapacity to work, physical injuries and disability; (3) Old age; (4) Survivors;
(5) Family/children; (6) Unemployment; (7) Labor market and employment policy; and (8) Social
expenditures not elsewhere classified. The social expenditures spent on protecting the Belgian
population from these social risks contribute to 91% of the total social expenditures” (FOD Sociale
Zekerheid, 2011, p. 10-11).
Source: FOD Sociale Zekerheid, (2011, p. 10-11).

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A more elaborate overview of the social protection expenditures and the corresponding
number of beneficiaries can be found in part C of the appendix: ‘The key figures on social
protection expenditures’. Additionally, supplementary statistical figures of the social
benefits were generated based on part C of the appendix. These statistical figures and a
description of the considered social benefits can be found in part D of the appendix:
‘Statistical figures of social benefits’. This data is indispensable when making cost
estimations for basic income proposals which are complementary to a number of existing
social benefits and when assessing the cost savings which are the result of basic income
replacing social benefits. (FOD Sociale Zekerheid, 2011, 2012, 2013)
Table 1: Social protection expenditures, in euro, Belgium, 2009-2010
Expenditures 2009 2010
Social Risks 82,327,905,730 86,271,994,852
Health Care 22,121,948,000 22,826,873,000
Incapacity to work,
physical injuries and
disability
6,560,742,796 7,007,413,254
Old age 24,635,164,576 25,570,435,628
Survivors 6,341,373,393 6,422,739,610
Family/children 5,503,830,431 5,667,694,544
Unemployment 7,843,883,473 7,789,568,706
Labor market and
activation policy
3,631,492,082 4,074,405,570
Social expenditures not
elsewhere classified
5,689,470,979 6,912,864,540
Administration costs 2,253,940,889 2,313,359,060
Other expenditures 5,298,139,671 5,661,323,761
Total expenditures 89,879,986,290 94,246,677,673
Source: FOD Sociale Zekerheid, (2011 p. 10; 2012; 2013).

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3.3.2 The social integration income and the poverty threshold
The level of the social integration income and the poverty threshold are often quoted in
basic income proposals as they constitute a formal reference point of what is considered an
amount sufficiently high to make ends meet (Melzochová & Špecián, 2015, p. 555). Philippe
Van Parijs, for example, argues for a basic income of a sustainable level, a level sufficiently
high to cover one’s basic needs, lifting people out of poverty and optimally ensuring
people’s “real freedom" (Van Parijs, 1995, p.4; 2004, p. 11-13).
On the one hand, the social integration income, formerly known as the subsistence
minimum, is a minimum-income that is guaranteed by the government to eligible
individuals who do not possess the means or ability to provide for themselves. On
September 2010, the social integration income was €740 per month for single persons.
(FPS Social Security, 2015, p. 159; POD Maatschappelijke Integratie, 2016; Steunpunt tot
bestrijding van armoede, bestaansonzekerheid en sociale uitsluiting, 2016)
On the other hand, the poverty threshold indicates an income level under which people are
at risk of poverty. The monetary level of the poverty threshold is conventionally set at
“60% of the median disposable income at the individual level” in the European Union (FOD
Economie, K.M.O., Middenstand en Energie, 2016). In 2010, the poverty threshold was set
to €973 per month for a single person, under which 14.6% of the Belgian population were
at risk of poverty. (FOD Economie, K.M.O., Middenstand en Energie, 2016; Steunpunt tot
bestrijding van armoede, bestaansonzekerheid en sociale uitsluiting, 2016).
The evolution of the monthly level of the social integration income and the monthly
poverty threshold in Belgium is shown in Figure 8. The level for the category of single
persons is shown for both concepts, as it best incorporates the individuality characteristic
of basic income opposed to the dependency on the household situation of conventional
minimum-income schemes. Figure 8 shows that the level of the poverty threshold is
consistently (on average €222) higher than the level of the social integration income. The
implication of this observation is that while the government does provide aid to those in

39 | P a g e
need with the social integration income, the level is considered insufficient to lift people
out of poverty according to the poverty threshold. (FOD Economie, K.M.O., Middenstand en
Energie, 2016; Peña-Miguel et al., 2014, p. 96; POD Maatschappelijke Integratie, 2016)
Figure 8: The evolution of the monthly social integration income and the monthly poverty
threshold in Belgium, in euro
Note: (1) The figure displays the evolution of the social integration income (1990-2016) and the poverty
threshold (2004-2015) for the category of a single person. While the social integration income is
regularly revised upwards due to inflation, the poverty threshold evolves with the median disposable
income. (2) The dots indicate the observations. (3) Note that the adjustment of the social integration
income and the poverty threshold does not occur gradually, but rather in a stair-stepped manner.
Source: Own creation based on FOD Economie, K.M.O., Middenstand en Energie, (2016);
POD Maatschappelijke Integratie, (2016); and Steunpunt tot bestrijding van armoede,
bestaansonzekerheid en sociale uitsluiting, (2016).
Jan-10
973.2
Jan-15
1082.7
2

40 | P a g e
3.3.3 The demographics of Belgium
As in other developed countries, Belgium is characterized by a demographic trend in which
the population ages over time due to the combination of low birth rates and a higher life
expectancy. (Melzochová & Špecián, 2015, p. 552; FOD Sociale Zekerheid, 2012, p. 41)
The age structure of Belgium placed into four age categories, in which the level of basic
income may differ, is displayed in Table 2. A distinction is made between children (0-17
years), young adults (18-24 years), adults (25-64 years), and the elderly (+65 years). These
figures on the Belgian age structure are fundamental when computing the cost of basic
income as the population structure of the country partially determines the magnitude of
the cost of basic income. (Statistics Belgium, n.d.; Vivant, n.d., p. 42)
Table 2: The age structure of Belgium in four categories, population on 1 January 2010
Age In absolute numbers In percentages (%)
Minors 0-17 years
Young adults 18-24 years
Adults 25-64 years
Elderly +65 years
2,214,156
929,428
5,836,162
1,860,159
20.43
8.57
53.84
17.16
Total 10,839,905 100
Source: Statistics Belgium, (n.d.).

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3.4 Basic income proposals
The financial feasibility of basic income should be judged on a case-by-case basis as the
features of each basic income proposal, such as the level of basic income, the target
audience of basic income, and whether basic income is (partially) complementary to the
current social protection system, have a direct impact on the cost structure. For this reason,
a variety of basic income proposals will be considered. These basic income proposals will
be applied to Belgium for the year 2010, using the chosen dataset of social protection
expenditures (FOD Sociale Zekerheid, 2011, p. 10) and a static cost estimation will be
provided ceteris paribus. In addition, a cost comparison to the current social expenditures
will take place, as when it comes to financing a basic income scheme, the first target of cost
savings is generally the social protection system. Many proponents of basic income namely
replace social benefits by basic income, leading to the cost savings in these benefits.
Regarding the calculations of the cost estimations of the basic income proposals and the
manner in which the basic income levels were revised for the year 2010, I would like to
refer the reader to part E of the appendix. (Melzochová & Špecián, 2015, p. 554)
Based on whether basic income is complementary or substitutable to the current social
protection system, Melzochová & Špecián (2015) identified that basic income schemes can
be placed between two extremes: “basic-income-to-substitute-everything” [versus] “basic-
income-purely-as-a-complement” (Melzochová & Špecián, 2015, p. 554). This is illustrated
Figure 9: Basic income proposals placed between two extremes
Source: Own creation based on Melzochová & Špecián, (2015, p. 554).
Basic-income-to
-substitute-everything
Low-cost benchmark
Basic-income-purely
-as-a-complement
High-cost benchmark

42 | P a g e
in Figure 9. The former scheme involves “completely dissolving all the public support not
only on public security but also on health insurance and supplant all this with basic
income” (Melzochová & Špecián, 2015, p. 554). The latter scheme simply involves adding
“basic income as an additional measure complementing the existing system” (Melzochová
& Špecián, 2015, p. 554). With respect to financial feasibility, the two extremes are
respectively considered to be a “low-cost benchmark [on the one hand and a] high-cost
benchmark” (Melzochová & Špecián, 2015, p. 554) on the other hand. Given that the social
protection system cost Belgium €94 billion in 2010 (FOD Sociale Zekerheid, 2011, p. 10-
11), a ‘basic-income-purely-as-a-complement’ scheme would cost €94 billion more than a
‘basic-income-to-substitute-everything’ scheme in 2010, ceteris paribus. The
impracticability of financing the tremendous costs of a “basic-income-purely-as-a-
complement” scheme is the major reason why nobody sincerely advocates such a scheme.
For this reason, the following basic income proposals will only cover the most financially
feasible scheme of “basic-income-to-substitute-everything” and a number of basic income
proposals which are situated between the two extremes. (Melzochová & Špecián, 2015, p.
554)
3.4.1 The B.U.B. proposal
The basic income proposal by the Belgian political party, B.U.B., in their 2016 (p. 10)
program is an example of a ‘basic-income-to-substitute-everything’ scheme. As quoted in
their program, the party supports “the principle of an unconditional basic income as a
substitute for the various existing benefits (unemployment benefits, old age pensions,
family benefits, disability and sickness benefits, reimbursement of health care costs etc.)”
(B.U.B., 2016, p. 10). The proposed level of basic income is at the subsistence minimum,
suggestively at the height of the social integration income which was at €731 for a single
person in 2010 (POD Maatschappelijke Integratie, 2016). “This basic income is to be given
to every Belgian citizen and every individual belonging to the European Union, living in
Belgium, who is 18 years old or older” (B.U.B., 2016, p. 10). Note that the individuals
belonging to the European Union are excluded in the following analysis, in order to
accommodate comparison over the different basic income proposals.

43 | P a g e
The basic-income-to-substitute-everything scheme is the most financially feasible basic
income proposal. The specific proposal by B.U.B. would ‘only’ cost €76 billion, which is
according to the statistics provided by the FPS Social Security €19 billion less than what
was spent on the social protection system in 2010. In fact, Belgium can even afford to grant
every citizen who is at least eighteen years old a basic income as high as €911 per month in
the case of a breakeven between the costs of basic income and the expenditures of the
social protection system. This level, however, still falls short of the poverty threshold which
was at the level of €973 per month in January 2010. The alternative basic income scheme
of providing very Belgian citizen above the age of 18 the poverty threshold would cost
€101 billion, which necessitates looking beyond the social protection system for financing.
Table 3 shows an overview of the aforementioned costs, as well as a cost comparison to the
present social protection system. (FOD Sociale Zekerheid, 2011, 2012, 2013; Melzochová &
Špecián, 2015, p. 555-556; Statistics Belgium, n.d.; and own calculations)
Table 3: The B.U.B. proposal, Belgium, 2010
Scheme Monthly cash grant (€)
Adults / Minors
Yearly expenditures
(million €)
Cost comparison
(BI scheme as % of
present social protection
expenditures)
Social
integration
income
730.63 / 0 75,627 80.24
Poverty
threshold
973.20 / 0 100,735 106.88
Breakeven 910.52 / 0 94,247 100
Source: Own creation based on Melzochová & Špecián, (2015, p. 555-556), B.U.B. (2016, p.
10), and my own calculations.

44 | P a g e
In this basic income scheme, everybody would receive the same sum and would thus be
treated equally, irrespective of their gender, race, household situation, status of
employment… However, is it truly appropriate to simply grant everyone the same amount
of money? In other words, is it socially desirable and correct to treat two different
individuals, say a healthy person and a disabled person, one and the same? The answer is
undeniably no. Following the wisdom of Amartya Sen’s capability approach, I am convinced
that one of the motives of basic income should be not to equalize the functionings, which
are “certain beings and doings that together constitute what makes a life valuable”
(Robeyns, 2011), but to respect the choice of the individual and instead equalize
capabilities, which are “a person’s real freedoms or opportunities to achieve functionings”
(Robeyns, 2011) (Odekon, 2015, p. 513). For example, if both a healthy person and a
disabled person were to be given the same amount of resources, e.g. the same level of basic
income, with these given resources the healthy person would be able to achieve more
functionings than a disabled person. In order to equalize the capabilities between the two
individuals, it is necessary to divert more resources to the disabled person and thus grant
the people who are most vulnerable in society a higher level of basic income. The current
social protection system acknowledges this and therefore diverts resources to the
vulnerable social groups, such as the sick, the disabled, the unwillingly unemployed and the
old. Thus while the basic income scheme by B.U.B. might be a system in which we treat
everyone equally, it is not the most equitable system. Furthermore, the basic-income-to-
substitute-everything scheme might be the most financially feasible, but again it is not the
most socially desirable system. We should thus strive for a basic income scheme that is
socially desirable yet financially feasible, a scheme which accommodates an equality of
opportunities. For this reason, many supporters push for basic income schemes which are
partially complementary to the social protection system. This is especially the case if basic
income is not at a sustainable level. (Van Parijs, 2004, p. 14)

45 | P a g e
In addition, I would like to draw attention to the fact that there exists a trade-off between
financial feasibility and social desirability. Basic income schemes that incorporate the
ethical principles of the social protection system by granting the socially vulnerable groups
a higher level of basic income, is socially desirable but leads to higher costs. The higher
costs are explained by two reasons.
First, the fact that a selective number of individuals receive a higher level of basic income
without changing the level of basic income for the remainder population evidently
increases the cost compared to the case in which everyone receives an equal level of basic
income. Naturally, a cost-reducing measure would be to decrease the level of basic income
for the remainder of the population. Alternatively, one can reduce the current levels of the
maintained social benefits for vulnerable social groups (Groot, 2004, p. 14) or subject the
social benefits to a ceiling which they may not exceed. (Defeyt, 2016)
Second, there is an opposition between basic income schemes which are substitutable and
basic income schemes which are complementary to the social protection system. While the
former basic income scheme incorporates the aspect of ‘unconditionality’, the latter basic
income scheme re-introduces ‘conditionality’ due to the need to verify whether the
individual in question meets the conditions to acquire a higher level of basic income, as
currently is the case with the social protection system. The latter basic income scheme has
higher administration costs because the efficiency gains on administration can no longer be
maximized as these are the result of a basic income scheme which is purely unconditional.
Possible cost-reducing measures in this regard would be to keep “conditional transfers in
simplified forms” (Groot, 2004, p. 14). (De Wispelaere & Stirton, 2011)
Overall, finding the balance between financial feasibility and social desirability brings us to
the following basic income proposals, which are more complex, more ethical, but also more
challenging to finance.

46 | P a g e
3.4.2 The Vivant proposal
The basic income proposal by Vivant (n.d.) can be to a large extent considered as a ‘basic-
income-to-substitute-everything’ scheme (Melzochová & Špeciána, 2015, p. 554-555). The
political party proposes basic income as a substitute for currently existing social benefits,
such as “retirement pensions, unemployment benefits, the social integration income, family
benefits, scholarships, compensations for career interruption, …”(Vivant, n.d., p. 8, own
translation). There are, however, two crucial aspects that differentiate Vivant’s proposal
from the pure basic-income-to-substitute-everything scheme of B.U.B. (2016, p. 10).
First, Vivant (n.d., p. 42) introduced a diversified basic income scheme with the levels of
basic income increasing throughout the four different age categories. The suggested
monthly levels of basic income for the year 2002 (2010) were €135 (€163) for minors,
€400 (€482) for young adults, €540 (€651) for adults, and €800 (€964) for seniors. In
total, the basic income proposal would cost €60 billion (€77 billion). This diversified basic
income scheme is opposed to the uniform basic income scheme by B.U.B. (2016, p. 10) that
grants every Belgian adult an equal amount of basic income.
Second, while B.U.B. (2016, p. 10) replaces health care and other social benefits by basic
income, Vivant (n.d., p. 9) believes that health care should be maintained and health
insurance should become unconditional just as basic income. According to the political
party, the persons who currently do not receive health care are limited in number and the
implied additional costs are modest compared to the current budget of health care. Vivant
further argues that the administration costs will decrease greatly by modifying the
conditional health insurance to one that is unconditional, as there is no longer a need to
verify whether an individual has the right to health care. As a result, Vivant suggests that
the cost savings should even out the extra implied costs, bringing about heath care
expenditures that are unchanged in level. Assuming Vivant’s suggestion is correct, the cost
of health care would remain at €23 billion for the year 2010. (Vivant, n.d., p. 9)

47 | P a g e
These two aspects contribute to the social desirability of Vivant’s basic income proposal.
The diversified basic income scheme across the different age categories provides seniors a
higher level of basic income as it substitutes their retirement pensions. Minors are also
given a basic income of which the level is approximated by the level of family benefits.
Furthermore, young adults receive a level of basic income, which is less than of adults but
more than of minors, that allows them to pursue higher education. Lastly, the sick are
protected thanks to unconditional health insurance. (Vivant, n.d. p. 7-24)
Table 4: The Vivant proposal, Belgium, 2002 and 2010
Scheme Monthly cash grant (€)
Minors / Young adults
Adults / Elderly
Yearly expenditures
(million €)
Cost comparison
(BI scheme as % of
present social protection
expenditures)
Unconditional
basic income
(2002)
135 / 400
540 / 800
60,249 N.A.
Unconditional
basic income
(2010)
162.65 / 481.93
650.63 / 963.85
76,776 81.46
Health care
(2010)
N.A. 22,827 24.22
Basic income
proposal and
health care
(2010)
N.A. 99,603 105.68
Note: The dataset provided by FOD Sociale Zekerheid (2011, 2012, 2013) does not cover the year 2002,
thus no cost comparison is made for this year. I refrained myself from using data on social protection
expenditures provided by other sources as there is a wide diversity of which social categories are to be
included and which not.
Source: Own creation based on Melzochová & Špecián, (2015, p. 555-556), Vivant (n.d.),
and my own calculations.

48 | P a g e
In total, Vivant’s basic income proposal and unconditional system of health care would cost
€100 billion for the year 2010. The costs of Vivant’s proposal would exceed the social
protection expenditures by €5 billion (5.68%). At a first glance, the proposal by Vivant can
be thus considered as one that is financially feasible if their proposal were to replace the
social protection system of Belgium and if additional funds are sought for the remaining €5
billion. An overview of the preceding costs and cost comparisons is given in Table 4. (FOD
Sociale Zekerheid, 2011, 2012, 2013; Vivant, n.d.; and own calculations)
Lastly, I would like to make two remarks. First, I have only presented what Vivant had
planned regarding the basic income scheme and the social protection system. Vivant’s
political proposal, however, includes more policy proposals, such as a reform of the labor
market. Second, Vivant’s basic income proposal also includes a transition phase that
imposes different costs in comparison to the final phase. During this transition phase,
recipients should be able to retain their benefits if the level thereof is higher than the level
of basic income. The transition phase plays an important role for the political feasibility:
with basic income being a radical reform in comparison to the existing social protection
system, it cannot be simply implemented overnight. Implementing such a phase smoothens
the transition from the current social protection system to a scheme of basic income,
allowing for the people to adjust and thus leading to higher political feasibility. The costs
from this transition phase will not be considered. However, as will be seen in the upcoming
basic income proposals, the basic income proposal by Raventos et al. is comparable to the
transition phase of Vivant, thus we will still have an idea of the temporary high costs of
such a transition phase. But overall to simplify the analysis I have only addressed the cost
implications of the final phase. (Melzochová & Špecián, 2015, p. 553-554; Vivant, n.d., p.7-
18)

49 | P a g e
3.4.3 The proposal by Defeyt
An unconditional basic income of €600 for every adult Belgian citizen, yet maintaining a
number of social benefits for socially vulnerable groups, this is the core of the basic income
proposal for Belgium that the economist Philippe Defeyt (2016) recently made public in a
lecture staged by the Belgian Financial Forum. Defeyt advocates for a basic income scheme
that is complementary to a reformed version of the current social protection system. (Van
Horenbeek & Wauters, 2016)
In Defeyt’s basic income proposal for the year 2016 (2010), Defeyt unconditionally grants
€600 (€542) to every adult and €300 (€271) to every minor.3 Furthermore, on top of the
€600 (€542), he proposes an additional incentive premium of €250 (€226) for individuals
who are job hunting but do not meet the requirements to receive unemployment benefits,
such as fresh graduates and persons who have worked less than the minimum required
amount. (Defeyt, 2016, p. 1-2; Van Horenbeek & Wauters, 2016)
Next to a scheme of unconditional basic income, Defeyt’s proposition also includes a reform
of the social protection system. Concretely, he proposes to “establish insurance against the
risks of life, [which includes], unemployment insurance, health insurance (health care and
allowances), retirement assurance, and allocations to disabled persons” (Defeyt, 2016, p. 2,
own translation). The social benefits arising from these insurances would be granted above
basic income and they would be computed in a similar manner as today. They would be in
function of a certain percentage of the income that is lost and if desirable the social benefits
would also comply with a predetermined minimum and maximum level. There are
however two important differences. First, the percentages are lower than what is now the
case since an unconditional basic income is also received. Second, a distinction is no longer
made between the different household categories. Instead of having different
3 The numbers outside brackets are disclosed by Philippe Defeyt (2016) for the year 2016. The numbers
between brackets are the approximated equivalent amounts for the year 2010, which I have personally
calculated. It is equivalent in the sense that both numbers approximately imply an equal purchasing
power. The approximation is accomplished by applying a formula which incorporates the health index.
The approximation can be found in part E of the appendix.

A preliminary assessment of the financial feasibility of basic income emily van de walle

A preliminary assessment of the financial feasibility of basic income emily van de walle

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