1. Introduction
Method Results
Discussion
References.
Manipulation Checks:
For the implicit condition, participants thought Beyoncé was a good singer, t(19) = 5.60, p <
.0005, and (M = 6.90, SD = 1.52). The explicit condition also thought Beyoncé was a good
singer, t(19)=8.876, p < .0005, and (M=7.45, SD= 1.23). The no comparison group liked the
chair, t(19) = 5.805, p<.0005.
In addition, participants indicate that they are worse singers than Beyoncé when they are
compared explicitly, X^2 (19, N=20)= 16.2, p< .0005. However, the participants in the
implicit condition are not picking a side, X^2 (19, N=20)= .800, p<.0005.
We are constantly told to not compare ourselves with others, but it might just depend
on how we choose to do so! In a now-retracted article, Stapel & Suls (2004)
suggested that making a comparison to a person in general might lead us to think we
differ from them, while comparing to them on a specific dimension might make us
think we are similar. Given a lack of direct evidence for this assertion, and the fact
that it appeared to contradict current social comparison models, we decided to
replicate Stapel & Suls (2004) design.
Sixty Gordon College students were given either an implicit, explicit or control
condition. In the explicit and implicit condition, we primed the participants with a
picture of Beyoncé. We then asked the explicit group, “Do you think you are better or
worse than Beyoncé at singing?” For the implicit group we asked the question, “Do
you think you are better or worse than Beyoncé in general?” The control condition
was showed a picture of a kitchen chair. All participants then gave an objective self-
evaluation of their singing ability.
Stapel & Suls (2004) findings were not replicated, with no mean difference in self-
evaluation between conditions. These findings are not due to low power or design
flaws. Overall, the paradigm worked as expected. People think that Beyoncé is a
good singer and know they are worse singers than Beyoncé. However, this did not
influence people’s self-evaluations on how they would fare in American Idol. We
suggest that Stapel’s results should not be replicated given current models of social
comparison and our current failure to replicate his results.
Participants:
• We recruited 60 students, both male and female, by asking peers around Gordon’s campus to
participate
• Participants were assigned to one of the three groups: explicit social comparison, implicit social
comparison, or no-comparison control group.
Procedure:
Participants in all three groups then gave an objective self-evaluation of their singing ability. This was done
on a 9-point rating scale based on how far they thought they would make it on American Idol
.
1) Stapel & Suls (2004) findings were not statistically significant, with no mean difference in
self-evaluation between conditions.
2) These findings are not due to low power or design flaws.
3) Overall, the paradigm worked as expected: people thought that Beyoncé is a good singer
and know that they are worse singers than Beyoncé (shown in manipulation checks).
4) The implicit and explicit conditions did not influence people’s self-evaluations of how they
would fare in American Idol. Therefore, how people are primed dimensionally (implicitly
vs. explicitly) does not influence people’s self-evaluations.
In conclusion, we suggest that Stapel’s results are incorrect and
should not be replicated in the future due to our current failure
to replicate his results and other known theories that are in
direct contrast with Stapel’s theory.
Förster, J., Liberman, N., & Kuschel, S. (2008). The effect of global versus local processing
styles on assimilation versus contrast in social judgment. Journal Of Personality And Social
Psychology, 94(4), 579-599. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.94.4.579
Markman, K. D., & McMullen, M. N. (2003). A reflection and evaluation model of comparative
thinking. Personality And Social Psychology Review, 7(3), 244-267. doi:10.1207/
S15327957PSPR0703_04
Mussweiler, T. (2003). 'Everything is relative': Comparison processes in social judgment: The
2002 Jaspars Lecture. European Journal Of Social Psychology, 33(6), 719-733.
doi:10.1002/ejsp.169
Schwarz, N., & Bless, H. (1992). Constructing reality and its alternatives: An inclusion/exclusion
model of assimilation and contrast effects in social judgment. In L. L. Martin and A.
Tesser (Eds.), The construction of social judgments (pp. 217–245). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.
Schwarz, N., & Bless, H. (2007). Mental construal processes: The inclusion/exclusion model. In
D. A. Stapel & J. Suls (Eds.), Assimilation and contrast in social psychology (pp. 119–142).
New York: Psychological Press.
Stapel, D. A., & Blanton, H. (2004). From Seeing to Being: Subliminal Social Comparisons
Affect Implicit and Explicit Self-Evaluations. Journal Of Personality And Social
Psychology, 87(4), 468-481. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.87.4.468
Abstract
Most human thought processes are comparative in nature, because comparison is
needed for evaluation (Mussweiler, 2003). In evaluation, we can either think of
ourselves as similar (assimilation) or different (contrast) to the target. A few main
theories predict factors that yield assimilation:
• IEM- less rigid boundaries (Schwarz & Bless, 1992, 2007)
• REM- experimental thinking (Markman & McMullen, 2003)
• GLOMO- global processing (Förster, 2008)
• SAM- similarity testing within initial assessment
(Mussweiler, 2003)
Stapel & Suls’ (2004) Interpretive Comparison Model (ICM) predicted the opposite
of Mussweiler.
Stapel claims that comparison occurs as a result of the way individuals are
dimensionally primed, either explicitly (assimilation) or implicitly (contrast).
However, Stapel’s 2004 publication was retracted for
fraud in 2011 and therefore we are replicating his data.
Explicit Condition:
Do you think you are better of a
singer or worse of a singer than
Beyoncé?
(n=20)
Implicit Condition:
Do you think you are better or
worse than Beyoncé in general?
(n=20)
No Comparison:
No initial priming question
(n=20)
Main Analysis:
Finally, there was not a significant difference in how people self-evaluated based on
difference in priming, F(2, 57) = .581, p = .56. We can reject Stapel’s results.
Emily Hansen
emily.hansen@gordon.edu
Shannon Petersen
shannon.petersen@gordon.edu
Juliane McManus
juliane.mcmanus@gordon.edu
Contact Us.