In 2019, a dam built to hold waste from a nearby iron ore mine owned by the Vale Mining Company (Vale) in Brumadinho, Brazil, collapsed, killing 270 people. The tsunami of mud was so powerful that it overturned houses, mangled trucks, and ripped off the scalps of some of the people buried under the toxic mix of water and mining waste. It also caused vast environmental damage. After prosecutors investigating the disaster found evidence that safety reports were fabricated, they charged 16 officials of Vale, including Vale's chief executive, Fabio Schvartsman, with homicide. Five people at TUV SUD, the German auditing company that certified the minewaste dam as safe months before it gave way, were also charged with homicide. A report issued by an independent commission hired by Vale attested that Vale executives knew about the safety risks at the dam for over a decade and had received multiple warnings, especially in 2015 after a similar dam partly owned by Vale burst, leaving 19 dead. Investigators characterized the relationship between Vale and TUV SUD as one of "pressure, collusion, compensation, and a conflict of interests." Makoto Namba, a senior engineering inspector at TUV SUD, found evidence indicating potentially risky conditions at the dam, saying, "Everything suggests (the dam) won't pass a key safety test." Namba later told police that he felt pressured by a Vale official to sign a safety certificate and worried that failing to sign the certificate would jeopardize his career. Without the signed certificate, Vale would have had to halt its adjacent mining operations, which were estimated to produce more than $1 million worth of iron ore a day. Hundreds of people could have lost their jobs, and the report would have triggered a mass evacuation of local communities. TUV SUD certified the dam's safety six months before the collapse and again three months later, after another auditing and certification company, fired by Vale, had warned that the dam was structurally unsound. TUV SUD employees expressed worry about losing contracts with Vale, its major client, if their reports did not verify the dam's safety. Olavo Coelho, a 63-year-old long-time Vale employee, told reporters he worried about the safety of a dam and pointed out cracks, leaks, and dark stains in the structure to Vale engineers. He urged Vale executives to evacuate the suite. "He was ignored," said Coelho's daughter. Wilson Jose Ferreira, a 55-year-old machine operator, said he tried to warn his bosses about the growing number of leaks in the dam. "They paid little attention to us, they didn't believe what we were saying." Several other mine workers warned their bosses at Vale that the dam was about to collapse. Supervisors reportedly brushed aside these concerns, citing fears about extra expenditures that could cost the company more than $1 , 000 to fix the foundation. A Vale spokesperson said the company allowed employees to file anonymous complaints but did not receive m.

1. In 2019, a dam built to hold waste from a nearby iron ore mine owned by the Vale Mining
Company (Vale) in Brumadinho, Brazil, collapsed, killing 270 people. The tsunami of mud was
so powerful that it overturned houses, mangled trucks, and ripped off the scalps of some of the
people buried under the toxic mix of water and mining waste. It also caused vast environmental
damage. After prosecutors investigating the disaster found evidence that safety reports were
fabricated, they charged 16 officials of Vale, including Vale's chief executive, Fabio
Schvartsman, with homicide. Five people at TUV SUD, the German auditing company that
certified the minewaste dam as safe months before it gave way, were also charged with
homicide. A report issued by an independent commission hired by Vale attested that Vale
executives knew about the safety risks at the dam for over a decade and had received multiple
warnings, especially in 2015 after a similar dam partly owned by Vale burst, leaving 19 dead.
Investigators characterized the relationship between Vale and TUV SUD as one of "pressure,
collusion, compensation, and a conflict of interests." Makoto Namba, a senior engineering
inspector at TUV SUD, found evidence indicating potentially risky conditions at the dam,
saying, "Everything suggests (the dam) won't pass a key safety test." Namba later told police that
he felt pressured by a Vale official to sign a safety certificate and worried that failing to sign the
certificate would jeopardize his career. Without the signed certificate, Vale would have had to
halt its adjacent mining operations, which were estimated to produce more than $1 million worth
of iron ore a day. Hundreds of people could have lost their jobs, and the report would have
triggered a mass evacuation of local communities. TUV SUD certified the dam's safety six
months before the collapse and again three months later, after another auditing and certification
company, fired by Vale, had warned that the dam was structurally unsound. TUV SUD
employees expressed worry about losing contracts with Vale, its major client, if their reports did
not verify the dam's safety. Olavo Coelho, a 63-year-old long-time Vale employee, told reporters
he worried about the safety of a dam and pointed out cracks, leaks, and dark stains in the
structure to Vale engineers. He urged Vale executives to evacuate the suite. "He was ignored,"
said Coelho's daughter. Wilson Jose Ferreira, a 55-year-old machine operator, said he tried to
warn his bosses about the growing number of leaks in the dam. "They paid little attention to us,
they didn't believe what we were saying." Several other mine workers warned their bosses at
Vale that the dam was about to collapse. Supervisors reportedly brushed aside these concerns,
citing fears about extra expenditures that could cost the company more than $1 , 000 to fix the
foundation. A Vale spokesperson said the company allowed employees to file anonymous
complaints but did not receive messages from staff warning about the dam. An internal company
document showed that Vale mapped out areas that would be affected if some of its dams burst.
The document estimated that the Brumadinho dam could cost the company about $1.5 billion if it
burst and more than 100 people could die. Lawyers defending Vale denied the allegations that
the dam's managers and engineers cut back on safety measures or knew the dam could collapse,
noting they would have been risking their own lives. Relatives of workers buried by the mudslide
said they presumed a warning siren would go off, giving them time to escape. In the months
before the collapse, Vale held a practice evacuation for mine workers and residents. Participants
were told where to run if the siren went off and how many minutes they would have to get to a
safety point if the dam ruptured. "My friend's daughter was distraught. They told her she had two
minutes but she couldn't run it in less than five," said Anastacia do Carmo Silva, whose son
Cleiton was working in the mine's vehicle workshop when the mud hit. Cleiton was very athletic,
and he easily reached the safety point in the training session. But not one siren was heard the day
of the Vale dam collapse, and Cleiton was killed. His body so mangled that he could only be

2. identified by his DNA. Like many small towns in the region, Brumadinho relied heavily on
mining. This may explain why some employees were hesitant to express their concerns over the
dam's safety. Some community members said they might have died in the country's poor public
hospitals if not for the private health insurance offered by Vale to its employees and family
members. "We talked about the problems at the dam a lot among ourselves, but people were
afraid of raising the issues with the bosses," said Helio Goncalves, a retired Vale worker. "There
is no way what happened in Brumadinho can be treated as an accident," said Marcelo Kokke,
prosecutor with the Federal Attorney General Office who investigated the tragedy. "If preventive
measures had been taken in a consistent way, the disaster could have been avoided, or at least it
wouldn't have taken on the proportions that it did." Prosecutors believed the company's profit-
sharing system may have encouraged some managers to keep costs down. Under this
arrangement, managers received an annual bonus of several times their monthly salary,
depending on the company's performance. Prosecutors believe that this compensation system and
the frequent rotation of staff were partly to blame for the sequence of events that led to the
disaster. Vale denied that the profit-sharing system gave staff an incentive to reduce dam
management costs, saying that the pay was dependent, among other things, on health and safety
standards. One contractor at the Brumadinho mine recalled how he asked a manager for
equipment to improve drainage at the dam that would cost about $1 , 200 . The manager denied
the request and said jokingly that he would be fired if he approved it. After the dam collapsed,
Vale and TUV SUD said they were cooperating in the investigation and conducting their own
inquiries. TUV SUD released a statement saying there was "heightened uncertainty" about
whether the safety audits provided a reliable declaration of the stability of the dam. A Vale
spokesperson said the company relied on the contractors it hired and their employees. "Vale is
committed to FIGURE 6.1 The Components of Ethical Climates a) Using Figure 6.1, how would
you classify the ethical climate at Vale? In what way did it contribute to the mine collapse? What
ethical climate might have prevented the dam collapse? b) What ethical safeguards were present
at Vale at the time of the dam collapse? Why did they not prevent the dam collapse? c) What
additional ethical safeguards were needed at Vale that could have prevented, or mitigated the
harms from, the dam collapse? d) What role did the relationship between Vale and TUV SUD
play in the dam disaster? Did TUV SUD have a conflict of interest, and if so, what was the
conflict? e) Why did Vale's employees and members of the community not advocate effectively
for improvements in the dam's safety?