SlideShare a Scribd company logo
1 of 19
Download to read offline
Design and Analyze
Secure Networked Systems
5
Prof. Edward Chow @ Colorado Univ.
Note by waegaein@github.com
Software Signing
• Provide ways to verify authenticity and integrity of software
which are distributed via web.
• GPG
GNU Privacy Guard (GnuPG or GPG) is a tool for secure
communication. It can be used to generate public/private key pair.
• PGP
Pretty Good Privacy (PGP) is encryption program that follows
OpenPGP standard for encyption/decryption of data.
Sign Software
1. Finish a version for release.
2. Generate MD5 and SHA1 message digest of the software.
3. Generate PGP signature of the digest, using private key.
4. Distribute the software with the signature.
5. Distribute the public key, which pairs with the private key
used for signing, to key servers.
Sign Software
Key server
Version
for release
Mirror site
Software Author
Sign Software
Key server
Version
for release
Message
DigestHash
e.g.
SHA-256
Mirror site
Software Author
Sign Software
Key server
Version
for release
Message
DigestHash
e.g.
SHA-256
(private key) Mirror site
Software Author
Encrypt
Sign Software
Key server
Version
for release
Message
DigestHash
e.g.
SHA-256
(private key)
Software
Distribution
Mirror site
Software Author
Encrypt
Sign Software
Key server
Upload distribution
Version
for release
Message
DigestHash
e.g.
SHA-256
(private key)
Software
Distribution
Mirror site
Software Author
Encrypt
Sign Software
Software Author Key server
Upload public key
Upload distribution
Version
for release
Message
DigestHash
e.g.
SHA-256
Encrypt
(private key)
Software
Distribution
Mirror site
Verify Software
1. Download software and its signature.
2. Retrieve public key from key server.
3. Decrypt the signature into a digest.
4. Generate a digest by hashing the software.
5. If the two digests are identical, the software is verified.
6. If different, the software or signature is considered to be
altered.
Verify Software
Software User
Key server
Mirror site
Verify Software
Software User
Retrieve public key
Download distribution
Key server
Mirror site
Verify Software
Software User
Retrieve public key
Download distribution
Key server
Mirror site
Verify Software
Software User
Decrypt
(public key)
Retrieve public key
Download distribution
Key server
Mirror site
Verify Software
Software User
Hash
Decrypt
(public key)
Retrieve public key
Download distribution
Key server
Mirror site
Verify Software
Software User
Hash
Decrypt
(public key)
=
Verified / Altered
Retrieve public key
Download distribution
Key server
Mirror site
Mirror Sites
• Voluntarily distribute software releases of other organizations
to provide faster access.
• Not managed by the original author organizations.
• Encouraged to download bundle from mirrors.
• Encouraged to download hash and signatures only from the
original.
PKI vs PGP
• PKI
• uses CA to vet and bind public
keys to user ID.
• takes longer to register/verify
• is centralized thus have SPOF.
• costs fee from CA.
• PGP
• uses Web of Trust (Key servers)
to vet and bind public key to
user ID.
• is hard to revoke keys
• is distributed.
• is free.
Misc. How much is encryption safe?
• SHA-1 was cracked by Google 2017.
• … This took the equivalent processing power as 6,500 years of single-CPU computations and
110 years of single-GPU computations …
• 110 years of single-GPU
== 1 year of 110 GPUs
== 24 hours of 40,150 GPUs
== 1 hour of 963,600 GPUs
== 1 minute of 57,816,000 GPUs
== 10 seconds of 346,896,000 GPUs (== 9,435,571,200,000 KRW for only GPUs…)

More Related Content

What's hot

Your Blacklist is Dead: Why the Future of Command and Control is the Cloud
Your Blacklist is Dead: Why the Future of Command and Control is the CloudYour Blacklist is Dead: Why the Future of Command and Control is the Cloud
Your Blacklist is Dead: Why the Future of Command and Control is the CloudCloudVillage
 
Integrating Icinga 2 and ntopng - Icinga Camp Milan 2019
Integrating Icinga 2 and ntopng - Icinga Camp Milan 2019Integrating Icinga 2 and ntopng - Icinga Camp Milan 2019
Integrating Icinga 2 and ntopng - Icinga Camp Milan 2019Icinga
 
Encode x NEAR: Technical Overview of NEAR 1
Encode x NEAR: Technical Overview of NEAR 1Encode x NEAR: Technical Overview of NEAR 1
Encode x NEAR: Technical Overview of NEAR 1KlaraOrban
 
[muCon2017]DevSecOps: How to Continuously Integrate Security into DevOps
[muCon2017]DevSecOps: How to Continuously Integrate Security into DevOps[muCon2017]DevSecOps: How to Continuously Integrate Security into DevOps
[muCon2017]DevSecOps: How to Continuously Integrate Security into DevOpsDaniel Oh
 
New Products Overview: Use Cases and Demos
New Products Overview: Use Cases and DemosNew Products Overview: Use Cases and Demos
New Products Overview: Use Cases and DemosCaitlin Magat
 
Building security into the pipelines
Building security into the pipelinesBuilding security into the pipelines
Building security into the pipelinesVandana Verma
 
Network Intelligence for a secured Network (2014-03-12)
Network Intelligence for a secured Network (2014-03-12)Network Intelligence for a secured Network (2014-03-12)
Network Intelligence for a secured Network (2014-03-12)Andreas Taudte
 
Beyond the Pentest: How C2, Internal Pivoting, and Data Exfiltration Show Tru...
Beyond the Pentest: How C2, Internal Pivoting, and Data Exfiltration Show Tru...Beyond the Pentest: How C2, Internal Pivoting, and Data Exfiltration Show Tru...
Beyond the Pentest: How C2, Internal Pivoting, and Data Exfiltration Show Tru...Beau Bullock
 
Practical Guide to Securing Kubernetes
Practical Guide to Securing KubernetesPractical Guide to Securing Kubernetes
Practical Guide to Securing KubernetesLacework
 
Investigating, Mitigating and Preventing Cyber Attacks with Security Analytics
Investigating, Mitigating and Preventing Cyber Attacks with Security AnalyticsInvestigating, Mitigating and Preventing Cyber Attacks with Security Analytics
Investigating, Mitigating and Preventing Cyber Attacks with Security AnalyticsIBMGovernmentCA
 
An Adversarial View of SaaS Malware Sandboxes
An Adversarial View of SaaS Malware SandboxesAn Adversarial View of SaaS Malware Sandboxes
An Adversarial View of SaaS Malware SandboxesJason Trost
 
CNIT 128 3. Attacking iOS Applications (Part 1)
CNIT 128 3. Attacking iOS Applications (Part 1)CNIT 128 3. Attacking iOS Applications (Part 1)
CNIT 128 3. Attacking iOS Applications (Part 1)Sam Bowne
 
Prowler: BlackHat Europe Arsenal 2018
Prowler: BlackHat Europe Arsenal 2018Prowler: BlackHat Europe Arsenal 2018
Prowler: BlackHat Europe Arsenal 2018Toni de la Fuente
 
Building layers of defense for your application
Building layers of defense for your applicationBuilding layers of defense for your application
Building layers of defense for your applicationVMware Tanzu
 
Compliance as Code Everywhere
Compliance as Code EverywhereCompliance as Code Everywhere
Compliance as Code EverywhereMatt Ray
 
Pentest Apocalypse
Pentest ApocalypsePentest Apocalypse
Pentest ApocalypseBeau Bullock
 
BlueHat v18 || Tales from the soc - real-world attacks seen through azure atp...
BlueHat v18 || Tales from the soc - real-world attacks seen through azure atp...BlueHat v18 || Tales from the soc - real-world attacks seen through azure atp...
BlueHat v18 || Tales from the soc - real-world attacks seen through azure atp...BlueHat Security Conference
 

What's hot (20)

Secrets as Code
Secrets as CodeSecrets as Code
Secrets as Code
 
Your Blacklist is Dead: Why the Future of Command and Control is the Cloud
Your Blacklist is Dead: Why the Future of Command and Control is the CloudYour Blacklist is Dead: Why the Future of Command and Control is the Cloud
Your Blacklist is Dead: Why the Future of Command and Control is the Cloud
 
Integrating Icinga 2 and ntopng - Icinga Camp Milan 2019
Integrating Icinga 2 and ntopng - Icinga Camp Milan 2019Integrating Icinga 2 and ntopng - Icinga Camp Milan 2019
Integrating Icinga 2 and ntopng - Icinga Camp Milan 2019
 
Encode x NEAR: Technical Overview of NEAR 1
Encode x NEAR: Technical Overview of NEAR 1Encode x NEAR: Technical Overview of NEAR 1
Encode x NEAR: Technical Overview of NEAR 1
 
[muCon2017]DevSecOps: How to Continuously Integrate Security into DevOps
[muCon2017]DevSecOps: How to Continuously Integrate Security into DevOps[muCon2017]DevSecOps: How to Continuously Integrate Security into DevOps
[muCon2017]DevSecOps: How to Continuously Integrate Security into DevOps
 
New Products Overview: Use Cases and Demos
New Products Overview: Use Cases and DemosNew Products Overview: Use Cases and Demos
New Products Overview: Use Cases and Demos
 
Building security into the pipelines
Building security into the pipelinesBuilding security into the pipelines
Building security into the pipelines
 
Major project presentation
Major project presentationMajor project presentation
Major project presentation
 
Network Intelligence for a secured Network (2014-03-12)
Network Intelligence for a secured Network (2014-03-12)Network Intelligence for a secured Network (2014-03-12)
Network Intelligence for a secured Network (2014-03-12)
 
Beyond the Pentest: How C2, Internal Pivoting, and Data Exfiltration Show Tru...
Beyond the Pentest: How C2, Internal Pivoting, and Data Exfiltration Show Tru...Beyond the Pentest: How C2, Internal Pivoting, and Data Exfiltration Show Tru...
Beyond the Pentest: How C2, Internal Pivoting, and Data Exfiltration Show Tru...
 
Practical Guide to Securing Kubernetes
Practical Guide to Securing KubernetesPractical Guide to Securing Kubernetes
Practical Guide to Securing Kubernetes
 
Investigating, Mitigating and Preventing Cyber Attacks with Security Analytics
Investigating, Mitigating and Preventing Cyber Attacks with Security AnalyticsInvestigating, Mitigating and Preventing Cyber Attacks with Security Analytics
Investigating, Mitigating and Preventing Cyber Attacks with Security Analytics
 
An Adversarial View of SaaS Malware Sandboxes
An Adversarial View of SaaS Malware SandboxesAn Adversarial View of SaaS Malware Sandboxes
An Adversarial View of SaaS Malware Sandboxes
 
CNIT 128 3. Attacking iOS Applications (Part 1)
CNIT 128 3. Attacking iOS Applications (Part 1)CNIT 128 3. Attacking iOS Applications (Part 1)
CNIT 128 3. Attacking iOS Applications (Part 1)
 
Prowler: BlackHat Europe Arsenal 2018
Prowler: BlackHat Europe Arsenal 2018Prowler: BlackHat Europe Arsenal 2018
Prowler: BlackHat Europe Arsenal 2018
 
Building layers of defense for your application
Building layers of defense for your applicationBuilding layers of defense for your application
Building layers of defense for your application
 
Shamoon
ShamoonShamoon
Shamoon
 
Compliance as Code Everywhere
Compliance as Code EverywhereCompliance as Code Everywhere
Compliance as Code Everywhere
 
Pentest Apocalypse
Pentest ApocalypsePentest Apocalypse
Pentest Apocalypse
 
BlueHat v18 || Tales from the soc - real-world attacks seen through azure atp...
BlueHat v18 || Tales from the soc - real-world attacks seen through azure atp...BlueHat v18 || Tales from the soc - real-world attacks seen through azure atp...
BlueHat v18 || Tales from the soc - real-world attacks seen through azure atp...
 

Similar to Design and Analyze Secure Networked Systems - 5

[CB19] tknk_scanner v2:community-based integrated malware identification syst...
[CB19] tknk_scanner v2:community-based integrated malware identification syst...[CB19] tknk_scanner v2:community-based integrated malware identification syst...
[CB19] tknk_scanner v2:community-based integrated malware identification syst...CODE BLUE
 
Securing Source Code on Endpoints
Securing Source Code on EndpointsSecuring Source Code on Endpoints
Securing Source Code on Endpointsthomashelsley
 
Oh The Places You'll Sign.pdf
Oh The Places You'll Sign.pdfOh The Places You'll Sign.pdf
Oh The Places You'll Sign.pdfLibbySchulze
 
Network security-primer-9544
Network security-primer-9544Network security-primer-9544
Network security-primer-9544Hfz Mushtaq
 
Open source technology
Open source technologyOpen source technology
Open source technologyaparnaz1
 
Implementing Microservices Security Patterns & Protocols with Spring
Implementing Microservices Security Patterns & Protocols with SpringImplementing Microservices Security Patterns & Protocols with Spring
Implementing Microservices Security Patterns & Protocols with SpringVMware Tanzu
 
BlackDuck Suite
BlackDuck SuiteBlackDuck Suite
BlackDuck Suitejeff cheng
 
CryptoGraphy Module in Mulesoft
CryptoGraphy Module in MulesoftCryptoGraphy Module in Mulesoft
CryptoGraphy Module in Mulesoftshyamraj55
 
Abusing bleeding edge web standards for appsec glory
Abusing bleeding edge web standards for appsec gloryAbusing bleeding edge web standards for appsec glory
Abusing bleeding edge web standards for appsec gloryPriyanka Aash
 
Open source software governance with DejaCode
Open source software governance with DejaCodeOpen source software governance with DejaCode
Open source software governance with DejaCodenexB Inc.
 
Open source technologies
Open source technologiesOpen source technologies
Open source technologiesBrizGo
 
ZKorum: Building the Next Generation eAgora powered by SSI
ZKorum: Building the Next Generation eAgora powered by SSIZKorum: Building the Next Generation eAgora powered by SSI
ZKorum: Building the Next Generation eAgora powered by SSISSIMeetup
 
Cyanogen Platform SDK
Cyanogen Platform SDKCyanogen Platform SDK
Cyanogen Platform SDKAdnan Begovic
 
StHack 2014 - Jerome "@funoverip" Nokin Turning your managed av into my botnet
StHack 2014 - Jerome "@funoverip" Nokin  Turning your managed av into my botnetStHack 2014 - Jerome "@funoverip" Nokin  Turning your managed av into my botnet
StHack 2014 - Jerome "@funoverip" Nokin Turning your managed av into my botnetStHack
 
Open Source & What It Means For Self-Sovereign Identity (SSI)
Open Source & What It Means For Self-Sovereign Identity (SSI)Open Source & What It Means For Self-Sovereign Identity (SSI)
Open Source & What It Means For Self-Sovereign Identity (SSI)Evernym
 
Safeguarding artifact integrity in your Software Supply Chain
Safeguarding artifact integrity in your Software Supply ChainSafeguarding artifact integrity in your Software Supply Chain
Safeguarding artifact integrity in your Software Supply ChainGiovanni Galloro
 
Open Source, Sourceforge Projects, & Apache Foundation
Open Source, Sourceforge Projects, & Apache FoundationOpen Source, Sourceforge Projects, & Apache Foundation
Open Source, Sourceforge Projects, & Apache FoundationMohammad Kotb
 

Similar to Design and Analyze Secure Networked Systems - 5 (20)

[CB19] tknk_scanner v2:community-based integrated malware identification syst...
[CB19] tknk_scanner v2:community-based integrated malware identification syst...[CB19] tknk_scanner v2:community-based integrated malware identification syst...
[CB19] tknk_scanner v2:community-based integrated malware identification syst...
 
Securing Source Code on Endpoints
Securing Source Code on EndpointsSecuring Source Code on Endpoints
Securing Source Code on Endpoints
 
Oh The Places You'll Sign.pdf
Oh The Places You'll Sign.pdfOh The Places You'll Sign.pdf
Oh The Places You'll Sign.pdf
 
Network security-primer-9544
Network security-primer-9544Network security-primer-9544
Network security-primer-9544
 
Open source technology
Open source technologyOpen source technology
Open source technology
 
Node.js Module: I Choose You!
Node.js Module: I Choose You!Node.js Module: I Choose You!
Node.js Module: I Choose You!
 
Password Pusher Media Resources
Password Pusher Media ResourcesPassword Pusher Media Resources
Password Pusher Media Resources
 
presentation_finals
presentation_finalspresentation_finals
presentation_finals
 
Implementing Microservices Security Patterns & Protocols with Spring
Implementing Microservices Security Patterns & Protocols with SpringImplementing Microservices Security Patterns & Protocols with Spring
Implementing Microservices Security Patterns & Protocols with Spring
 
BlackDuck Suite
BlackDuck SuiteBlackDuck Suite
BlackDuck Suite
 
CryptoGraphy Module in Mulesoft
CryptoGraphy Module in MulesoftCryptoGraphy Module in Mulesoft
CryptoGraphy Module in Mulesoft
 
Abusing bleeding edge web standards for appsec glory
Abusing bleeding edge web standards for appsec gloryAbusing bleeding edge web standards for appsec glory
Abusing bleeding edge web standards for appsec glory
 
Open source software governance with DejaCode
Open source software governance with DejaCodeOpen source software governance with DejaCode
Open source software governance with DejaCode
 
Open source technologies
Open source technologiesOpen source technologies
Open source technologies
 
ZKorum: Building the Next Generation eAgora powered by SSI
ZKorum: Building the Next Generation eAgora powered by SSIZKorum: Building the Next Generation eAgora powered by SSI
ZKorum: Building the Next Generation eAgora powered by SSI
 
Cyanogen Platform SDK
Cyanogen Platform SDKCyanogen Platform SDK
Cyanogen Platform SDK
 
StHack 2014 - Jerome "@funoverip" Nokin Turning your managed av into my botnet
StHack 2014 - Jerome "@funoverip" Nokin  Turning your managed av into my botnetStHack 2014 - Jerome "@funoverip" Nokin  Turning your managed av into my botnet
StHack 2014 - Jerome "@funoverip" Nokin Turning your managed av into my botnet
 
Open Source & What It Means For Self-Sovereign Identity (SSI)
Open Source & What It Means For Self-Sovereign Identity (SSI)Open Source & What It Means For Self-Sovereign Identity (SSI)
Open Source & What It Means For Self-Sovereign Identity (SSI)
 
Safeguarding artifact integrity in your Software Supply Chain
Safeguarding artifact integrity in your Software Supply ChainSafeguarding artifact integrity in your Software Supply Chain
Safeguarding artifact integrity in your Software Supply Chain
 
Open Source, Sourceforge Projects, & Apache Foundation
Open Source, Sourceforge Projects, & Apache FoundationOpen Source, Sourceforge Projects, & Apache Foundation
Open Source, Sourceforge Projects, & Apache Foundation
 

More from Don Kim

Clean Code - 5
Clean Code - 5Clean Code - 5
Clean Code - 5Don Kim
 
Clean Code - 4
Clean Code - 4Clean Code - 4
Clean Code - 4Don Kim
 
Clean Code - 3
Clean Code - 3Clean Code - 3
Clean Code - 3Don Kim
 
Clean Code - 2
Clean Code - 2Clean Code - 2
Clean Code - 2Don Kim
 
Clean Code - 1
Clean Code - 1Clean Code - 1
Clean Code - 1Don Kim
 
Design and Analyze Secure Networked Systems - 7
Design and Analyze Secure Networked Systems - 7Design and Analyze Secure Networked Systems - 7
Design and Analyze Secure Networked Systems - 7Don Kim
 
Design and Analyze Secure Networked Systems - 6
Design and Analyze Secure Networked Systems - 6Design and Analyze Secure Networked Systems - 6
Design and Analyze Secure Networked Systems - 6Don Kim
 
Design and Analyze Secure Networked Systems - 3
Design and Analyze Secure Networked Systems - 3Design and Analyze Secure Networked Systems - 3
Design and Analyze Secure Networked Systems - 3Don Kim
 
Design and Analyze Secure Networked Systems - 2
Design and Analyze Secure Networked Systems - 2Design and Analyze Secure Networked Systems - 2
Design and Analyze Secure Networked Systems - 2Don Kim
 
Design and Analyze Secure Networked Systems - 1
Design and Analyze Secure Networked Systems - 1Design and Analyze Secure Networked Systems - 1
Design and Analyze Secure Networked Systems - 1Don Kim
 

More from Don Kim (10)

Clean Code - 5
Clean Code - 5Clean Code - 5
Clean Code - 5
 
Clean Code - 4
Clean Code - 4Clean Code - 4
Clean Code - 4
 
Clean Code - 3
Clean Code - 3Clean Code - 3
Clean Code - 3
 
Clean Code - 2
Clean Code - 2Clean Code - 2
Clean Code - 2
 
Clean Code - 1
Clean Code - 1Clean Code - 1
Clean Code - 1
 
Design and Analyze Secure Networked Systems - 7
Design and Analyze Secure Networked Systems - 7Design and Analyze Secure Networked Systems - 7
Design and Analyze Secure Networked Systems - 7
 
Design and Analyze Secure Networked Systems - 6
Design and Analyze Secure Networked Systems - 6Design and Analyze Secure Networked Systems - 6
Design and Analyze Secure Networked Systems - 6
 
Design and Analyze Secure Networked Systems - 3
Design and Analyze Secure Networked Systems - 3Design and Analyze Secure Networked Systems - 3
Design and Analyze Secure Networked Systems - 3
 
Design and Analyze Secure Networked Systems - 2
Design and Analyze Secure Networked Systems - 2Design and Analyze Secure Networked Systems - 2
Design and Analyze Secure Networked Systems - 2
 
Design and Analyze Secure Networked Systems - 1
Design and Analyze Secure Networked Systems - 1Design and Analyze Secure Networked Systems - 1
Design and Analyze Secure Networked Systems - 1
 

Recently uploaded

Alluxio Monthly Webinar | Cloud-Native Model Training on Distributed Data
Alluxio Monthly Webinar | Cloud-Native Model Training on Distributed DataAlluxio Monthly Webinar | Cloud-Native Model Training on Distributed Data
Alluxio Monthly Webinar | Cloud-Native Model Training on Distributed DataAlluxio, Inc.
 
Call Girls in Naraina Delhi 💯Call Us 🔝8264348440🔝
Call Girls in Naraina Delhi 💯Call Us 🔝8264348440🔝Call Girls in Naraina Delhi 💯Call Us 🔝8264348440🔝
Call Girls in Naraina Delhi 💯Call Us 🔝8264348440🔝soniya singh
 
Steps To Getting Up And Running Quickly With MyTimeClock Employee Scheduling ...
Steps To Getting Up And Running Quickly With MyTimeClock Employee Scheduling ...Steps To Getting Up And Running Quickly With MyTimeClock Employee Scheduling ...
Steps To Getting Up And Running Quickly With MyTimeClock Employee Scheduling ...MyIntelliSource, Inc.
 
What are the features of Vehicle Tracking System?
What are the features of Vehicle Tracking System?What are the features of Vehicle Tracking System?
What are the features of Vehicle Tracking System?Watsoo Telematics
 
Russian Call Girls in Karol Bagh Aasnvi ➡️ 8264348440 💋📞 Independent Escort S...
Russian Call Girls in Karol Bagh Aasnvi ➡️ 8264348440 💋📞 Independent Escort S...Russian Call Girls in Karol Bagh Aasnvi ➡️ 8264348440 💋📞 Independent Escort S...
Russian Call Girls in Karol Bagh Aasnvi ➡️ 8264348440 💋📞 Independent Escort S...soniya singh
 
Project Based Learning (A.I).pptx detail explanation
Project Based Learning (A.I).pptx detail explanationProject Based Learning (A.I).pptx detail explanation
Project Based Learning (A.I).pptx detail explanationkaushalgiri8080
 
Salesforce Certified Field Service Consultant
Salesforce Certified Field Service ConsultantSalesforce Certified Field Service Consultant
Salesforce Certified Field Service ConsultantAxelRicardoTrocheRiq
 
ODSC - Batch to Stream workshop - integration of Apache Spark, Cassandra, Pos...
ODSC - Batch to Stream workshop - integration of Apache Spark, Cassandra, Pos...ODSC - Batch to Stream workshop - integration of Apache Spark, Cassandra, Pos...
ODSC - Batch to Stream workshop - integration of Apache Spark, Cassandra, Pos...Christina Lin
 
The Essentials of Digital Experience Monitoring_ A Comprehensive Guide.pdf
The Essentials of Digital Experience Monitoring_ A Comprehensive Guide.pdfThe Essentials of Digital Experience Monitoring_ A Comprehensive Guide.pdf
The Essentials of Digital Experience Monitoring_ A Comprehensive Guide.pdfkalichargn70th171
 
办理学位证(UQ文凭证书)昆士兰大学毕业证成绩单原版一模一样
办理学位证(UQ文凭证书)昆士兰大学毕业证成绩单原版一模一样办理学位证(UQ文凭证书)昆士兰大学毕业证成绩单原版一模一样
办理学位证(UQ文凭证书)昆士兰大学毕业证成绩单原版一模一样umasea
 
Professional Resume Template for Software Developers
Professional Resume Template for Software DevelopersProfessional Resume Template for Software Developers
Professional Resume Template for Software DevelopersVinodh Ram
 
chapter--4-software-project-planning.ppt
chapter--4-software-project-planning.pptchapter--4-software-project-planning.ppt
chapter--4-software-project-planning.pptkotipi9215
 
Try MyIntelliAccount Cloud Accounting Software As A Service Solution Risk Fre...
Try MyIntelliAccount Cloud Accounting Software As A Service Solution Risk Fre...Try MyIntelliAccount Cloud Accounting Software As A Service Solution Risk Fre...
Try MyIntelliAccount Cloud Accounting Software As A Service Solution Risk Fre...MyIntelliSource, Inc.
 
Automate your Kamailio Test Calls - Kamailio World 2024
Automate your Kamailio Test Calls - Kamailio World 2024Automate your Kamailio Test Calls - Kamailio World 2024
Automate your Kamailio Test Calls - Kamailio World 2024Andreas Granig
 
Building Real-Time Data Pipelines: Stream & Batch Processing workshop Slide
Building Real-Time Data Pipelines: Stream & Batch Processing workshop SlideBuilding Real-Time Data Pipelines: Stream & Batch Processing workshop Slide
Building Real-Time Data Pipelines: Stream & Batch Processing workshop SlideChristina Lin
 
cybersecurity notes for mca students for learning
cybersecurity notes for mca students for learningcybersecurity notes for mca students for learning
cybersecurity notes for mca students for learningVitsRangannavar
 
XpertSolvers: Your Partner in Building Innovative Software Solutions
XpertSolvers: Your Partner in Building Innovative Software SolutionsXpertSolvers: Your Partner in Building Innovative Software Solutions
XpertSolvers: Your Partner in Building Innovative Software SolutionsMehedi Hasan Shohan
 
why an Opensea Clone Script might be your perfect match.pdf
why an Opensea Clone Script might be your perfect match.pdfwhy an Opensea Clone Script might be your perfect match.pdf
why an Opensea Clone Script might be your perfect match.pdfjoe51371421
 
BATTLEFIELD ORM: TIPS, TACTICS AND STRATEGIES FOR CONQUERING YOUR DATABASE
BATTLEFIELD ORM: TIPS, TACTICS AND STRATEGIES FOR CONQUERING YOUR DATABASEBATTLEFIELD ORM: TIPS, TACTICS AND STRATEGIES FOR CONQUERING YOUR DATABASE
BATTLEFIELD ORM: TIPS, TACTICS AND STRATEGIES FOR CONQUERING YOUR DATABASEOrtus Solutions, Corp
 
Advancing Engineering with AI through the Next Generation of Strategic Projec...
Advancing Engineering with AI through the Next Generation of Strategic Projec...Advancing Engineering with AI through the Next Generation of Strategic Projec...
Advancing Engineering with AI through the Next Generation of Strategic Projec...OnePlan Solutions
 

Recently uploaded (20)

Alluxio Monthly Webinar | Cloud-Native Model Training on Distributed Data
Alluxio Monthly Webinar | Cloud-Native Model Training on Distributed DataAlluxio Monthly Webinar | Cloud-Native Model Training on Distributed Data
Alluxio Monthly Webinar | Cloud-Native Model Training on Distributed Data
 
Call Girls in Naraina Delhi 💯Call Us 🔝8264348440🔝
Call Girls in Naraina Delhi 💯Call Us 🔝8264348440🔝Call Girls in Naraina Delhi 💯Call Us 🔝8264348440🔝
Call Girls in Naraina Delhi 💯Call Us 🔝8264348440🔝
 
Steps To Getting Up And Running Quickly With MyTimeClock Employee Scheduling ...
Steps To Getting Up And Running Quickly With MyTimeClock Employee Scheduling ...Steps To Getting Up And Running Quickly With MyTimeClock Employee Scheduling ...
Steps To Getting Up And Running Quickly With MyTimeClock Employee Scheduling ...
 
What are the features of Vehicle Tracking System?
What are the features of Vehicle Tracking System?What are the features of Vehicle Tracking System?
What are the features of Vehicle Tracking System?
 
Russian Call Girls in Karol Bagh Aasnvi ➡️ 8264348440 💋📞 Independent Escort S...
Russian Call Girls in Karol Bagh Aasnvi ➡️ 8264348440 💋📞 Independent Escort S...Russian Call Girls in Karol Bagh Aasnvi ➡️ 8264348440 💋📞 Independent Escort S...
Russian Call Girls in Karol Bagh Aasnvi ➡️ 8264348440 💋📞 Independent Escort S...
 
Project Based Learning (A.I).pptx detail explanation
Project Based Learning (A.I).pptx detail explanationProject Based Learning (A.I).pptx detail explanation
Project Based Learning (A.I).pptx detail explanation
 
Salesforce Certified Field Service Consultant
Salesforce Certified Field Service ConsultantSalesforce Certified Field Service Consultant
Salesforce Certified Field Service Consultant
 
ODSC - Batch to Stream workshop - integration of Apache Spark, Cassandra, Pos...
ODSC - Batch to Stream workshop - integration of Apache Spark, Cassandra, Pos...ODSC - Batch to Stream workshop - integration of Apache Spark, Cassandra, Pos...
ODSC - Batch to Stream workshop - integration of Apache Spark, Cassandra, Pos...
 
The Essentials of Digital Experience Monitoring_ A Comprehensive Guide.pdf
The Essentials of Digital Experience Monitoring_ A Comprehensive Guide.pdfThe Essentials of Digital Experience Monitoring_ A Comprehensive Guide.pdf
The Essentials of Digital Experience Monitoring_ A Comprehensive Guide.pdf
 
办理学位证(UQ文凭证书)昆士兰大学毕业证成绩单原版一模一样
办理学位证(UQ文凭证书)昆士兰大学毕业证成绩单原版一模一样办理学位证(UQ文凭证书)昆士兰大学毕业证成绩单原版一模一样
办理学位证(UQ文凭证书)昆士兰大学毕业证成绩单原版一模一样
 
Professional Resume Template for Software Developers
Professional Resume Template for Software DevelopersProfessional Resume Template for Software Developers
Professional Resume Template for Software Developers
 
chapter--4-software-project-planning.ppt
chapter--4-software-project-planning.pptchapter--4-software-project-planning.ppt
chapter--4-software-project-planning.ppt
 
Try MyIntelliAccount Cloud Accounting Software As A Service Solution Risk Fre...
Try MyIntelliAccount Cloud Accounting Software As A Service Solution Risk Fre...Try MyIntelliAccount Cloud Accounting Software As A Service Solution Risk Fre...
Try MyIntelliAccount Cloud Accounting Software As A Service Solution Risk Fre...
 
Automate your Kamailio Test Calls - Kamailio World 2024
Automate your Kamailio Test Calls - Kamailio World 2024Automate your Kamailio Test Calls - Kamailio World 2024
Automate your Kamailio Test Calls - Kamailio World 2024
 
Building Real-Time Data Pipelines: Stream & Batch Processing workshop Slide
Building Real-Time Data Pipelines: Stream & Batch Processing workshop SlideBuilding Real-Time Data Pipelines: Stream & Batch Processing workshop Slide
Building Real-Time Data Pipelines: Stream & Batch Processing workshop Slide
 
cybersecurity notes for mca students for learning
cybersecurity notes for mca students for learningcybersecurity notes for mca students for learning
cybersecurity notes for mca students for learning
 
XpertSolvers: Your Partner in Building Innovative Software Solutions
XpertSolvers: Your Partner in Building Innovative Software SolutionsXpertSolvers: Your Partner in Building Innovative Software Solutions
XpertSolvers: Your Partner in Building Innovative Software Solutions
 
why an Opensea Clone Script might be your perfect match.pdf
why an Opensea Clone Script might be your perfect match.pdfwhy an Opensea Clone Script might be your perfect match.pdf
why an Opensea Clone Script might be your perfect match.pdf
 
BATTLEFIELD ORM: TIPS, TACTICS AND STRATEGIES FOR CONQUERING YOUR DATABASE
BATTLEFIELD ORM: TIPS, TACTICS AND STRATEGIES FOR CONQUERING YOUR DATABASEBATTLEFIELD ORM: TIPS, TACTICS AND STRATEGIES FOR CONQUERING YOUR DATABASE
BATTLEFIELD ORM: TIPS, TACTICS AND STRATEGIES FOR CONQUERING YOUR DATABASE
 
Advancing Engineering with AI through the Next Generation of Strategic Projec...
Advancing Engineering with AI through the Next Generation of Strategic Projec...Advancing Engineering with AI through the Next Generation of Strategic Projec...
Advancing Engineering with AI through the Next Generation of Strategic Projec...
 

Design and Analyze Secure Networked Systems - 5

  • 1. Design and Analyze Secure Networked Systems 5 Prof. Edward Chow @ Colorado Univ. Note by waegaein@github.com
  • 2. Software Signing • Provide ways to verify authenticity and integrity of software which are distributed via web. • GPG GNU Privacy Guard (GnuPG or GPG) is a tool for secure communication. It can be used to generate public/private key pair. • PGP Pretty Good Privacy (PGP) is encryption program that follows OpenPGP standard for encyption/decryption of data.
  • 3. Sign Software 1. Finish a version for release. 2. Generate MD5 and SHA1 message digest of the software. 3. Generate PGP signature of the digest, using private key. 4. Distribute the software with the signature. 5. Distribute the public key, which pairs with the private key used for signing, to key servers.
  • 4. Sign Software Key server Version for release Mirror site Software Author
  • 5. Sign Software Key server Version for release Message DigestHash e.g. SHA-256 Mirror site Software Author
  • 6. Sign Software Key server Version for release Message DigestHash e.g. SHA-256 (private key) Mirror site Software Author Encrypt
  • 7. Sign Software Key server Version for release Message DigestHash e.g. SHA-256 (private key) Software Distribution Mirror site Software Author Encrypt
  • 8. Sign Software Key server Upload distribution Version for release Message DigestHash e.g. SHA-256 (private key) Software Distribution Mirror site Software Author Encrypt
  • 9. Sign Software Software Author Key server Upload public key Upload distribution Version for release Message DigestHash e.g. SHA-256 Encrypt (private key) Software Distribution Mirror site
  • 10. Verify Software 1. Download software and its signature. 2. Retrieve public key from key server. 3. Decrypt the signature into a digest. 4. Generate a digest by hashing the software. 5. If the two digests are identical, the software is verified. 6. If different, the software or signature is considered to be altered.
  • 11. Verify Software Software User Key server Mirror site
  • 12. Verify Software Software User Retrieve public key Download distribution Key server Mirror site
  • 13. Verify Software Software User Retrieve public key Download distribution Key server Mirror site
  • 14. Verify Software Software User Decrypt (public key) Retrieve public key Download distribution Key server Mirror site
  • 15. Verify Software Software User Hash Decrypt (public key) Retrieve public key Download distribution Key server Mirror site
  • 16. Verify Software Software User Hash Decrypt (public key) = Verified / Altered Retrieve public key Download distribution Key server Mirror site
  • 17. Mirror Sites • Voluntarily distribute software releases of other organizations to provide faster access. • Not managed by the original author organizations. • Encouraged to download bundle from mirrors. • Encouraged to download hash and signatures only from the original.
  • 18. PKI vs PGP • PKI • uses CA to vet and bind public keys to user ID. • takes longer to register/verify • is centralized thus have SPOF. • costs fee from CA. • PGP • uses Web of Trust (Key servers) to vet and bind public key to user ID. • is hard to revoke keys • is distributed. • is free.
  • 19. Misc. How much is encryption safe? • SHA-1 was cracked by Google 2017. • … This took the equivalent processing power as 6,500 years of single-CPU computations and 110 years of single-GPU computations … • 110 years of single-GPU == 1 year of 110 GPUs == 24 hours of 40,150 GPUs == 1 hour of 963,600 GPUs == 1 minute of 57,816,000 GPUs == 10 seconds of 346,896,000 GPUs (== 9,435,571,200,000 KRW for only GPUs…)