Deltec Outlook - China - February 2015

Deltec Outlook: China – February 2015
2
Contacts
Atul Lele, CFA
alele@deltecinv.com
+1 (242) 302 4135
David Munoz
dmunoz@deltecinv.com
+1 (242) 302 4116
Vivienne Watts
vwatts@deltecinv.com
+1 (242) 302 4155
David Frazer
dfrazer@deltecinv.com
+1 (242) 302 4156

3
Contents
1. Snapshot 4
2. Economic Growth 6
3. Exports 9
4. Fixed Asset Investment 11
5. Financial Stability 16
6. Equities 22
7. Long Term 24
8. Recent Stimulus Measures 26
9. Disclosures 30

4
Snapshot
A significant rally in Chinese equities has diverted attention from otherwise significant problems across the
broader economy, and more specifically, the banking system. Whilst exports are likely to recover, domestic demand,
property and fixed asset investment are likely to remain weak. Whilst policy stimulus has been forthcoming to
support overall growth against cyclical and structure headwinds, it also masks a series of liquidity issues.
Ultimately, this cyclical weakness is likely to be reflected in Equities, whilst deteriorating fixed asset investment
and demographic structural drivers are likely to have longer term implications for asset prices.
 Leading indicators of broad economic growth are the most negative since at least 2012, and in selected cases since the
2009 financial crisis.
 A stronger US consumption environment commencing late Q1 2015 is likely to result in stronger exports in the coming
period, although exports to the rest of world are likely to remain lackluster. Against this, domestic demand remains
weak.
 Fixed asset investment remains supported only through government stimulus driven infrastructure. Property markets
remain weak, and supply continued to rise despite weak demand.
 Hot money outflows from the economy are at the highest levels ever, capitalizing on an overvalued currency and more
attractive opportunities outside of China, As such, withdrawals from the conventional banking system are accelerating
which, when coupled with rising non-performing loans, presents significant risks to the banking system, all of which is
evident in deteriorating indicators of financial stability.
 Longer term, the goal to transform the economy from investment to consumption driven remains challenging, and
demographic factors are likely to limit potential growth.
 Recent stimulus measures have been significant, however their efficacy remains to be seen in an environment of cyclical
deleveraging and structural reforms
Continued over…

5
Snapshot
Investment Implications:
This view has Tactical Investment Implications for Country Allocation; Equities Sector Allocation and; Currency
Allocation.
 Country Allocation: Preference for Developed Markets over Emerging Markets. We recommend short / underweight
positions in China, and continue to avoid those economies that are heavily exposed to Commodity prices, including
Australia, Canada, Brazil and oil producing Emerging Markets.
 Equities Sector Allocation: From an Equities Sector Allocation perspective, within China, this environment is positive
for Defensive sectors and particularly negative for Financials, Property and Commodities. Within Commodity
economies, we have a preference for defensive, yield exposed sectors, and those exposures that benefit from a weaker
currency.
 Currencies: Preference for USD and GBP over the EUR, JPY, EMFX, AUD and CAD. In isolation, weaker Chinese growth is
likely to compound the weakness already being experienced in commodity markets due to slowing USD liquidity growth.
This environment will place downwards pressure on the currencies of Commodity economies such as AUD, CAD and
BRL, as the decline in national incomes will force these economies to cut interest rates further to stimulate economic
growth.

6
Economic Growth
 Short term rates remain under upwards pressure,
despite significant PBoC stimulus
 Yield curve has become more inverted over the past
quarter
 Yield curve consistent with weaker growth
Short Term Rates
Yield Curve
Sources: Bloomberg, Deltec International Group
-3%
-2%
-1%
0%
1%
2%
3%
1998 2001 2004 2007 2010 2013 2016
Yield Curve
0%
1%
2%
3%
4%
5%
2003 2006 2009 2012 2015
3 Month Government Bill Rates

7
Economic Growth
 PMI New Order consistent with a significant decline
in GDP growth in the near term, to sub 6% levels
 Baltic Dry Index is consistent with a significant
decline in industrial production growth in the near
term, to sub-7% levels
PMI New Orders vs GDP
Baltic Dry Index vs Industrial Production
5.0
6.0
7.0
8.0
9.0
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
1991 1994 1997 2000 2003 2006 2009 2012 2015
YoY% Change in Chinese Industrial Production (Left)
Log Baltic Dry Index (Right)
30
40
50
60
70
80
-6%
0%
6%
12%
18%
24%
2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016
Annualized QoQ% Change in Real GDP (Left)
PMI New Orders (Right, Led 3 Months)

8
Economic Growth
 Yield curve consistent with a decrease in fixed asset
investment over the coming period
 Fixed asset investment growth rates are likely to
remain below the prior decade averages
 Yield curve is consistent with a decline in growth
from current levels
Yield Curve vs Steel Production Growth
Yield Curve vs Electricity Output Growth
-3%
-2%
-1%
0%
1%
2%
3%
-12%
-6%
0%
6%
12%
18%
24%
30%
1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 2013 2015
YoY% Change in Electricity Output (Left) China Yield Curve (Right)
-3%
-2%
-1%
0%
1%
2%
3%
4%
-20%
-10%
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014
YoY% Change in Steel Production (Left) Yield Curve (Right, Led 9 Months)

9
Exports
 China New Export Orders are levels below where US
ISM Imports suggest they should be, dragged down
by slower non-US import demand.
 Rising US consumption and imports is likely to be
supportive of Chinese exports
 Exports have been a key driver of growth in recent
quarters, however this may be set to decline further.
 New Export Orders remain below the decade
average
China PMI New Export Orders vs US ISM Imports Index
Chinese PMI New Export Orders
25
35
45
55
65
2005 2007 2009 2011 2013 2015
Chinese PMI: New Export Orders Average
40
45
50
55
60
65
2005 2007 2009 2011 2013 2015
Chinese PMI: New Export Orders US ISM Imports Index (Led 1 Month)

10
Exports
 US ISM Imports consistent with increase in export
growth to the US
US ISM Imports Index vs Chinese Exports to World
US ISM Imports Index vs Chinese Exports to the US
 US ISM Imports consistent with increase in Chinese
Export growth to the World
 European and Emerging Market consumption
growth remains a risk to Chinese export growth
 Exports remain the one area of potential strength
within the economy
-50%
-25%
0%
25%
50%
75%
40
45
50
55
60
65
2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014
US ISM Imports Index (Left, Led 3 Months)
Growth in Chinese Exports to US (Right)
40
45
50
55
60
65
-50%
-25%
0%
25%
50%
75%
2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014
Chinese Exports Growth (Left) US ISM Imports Index (Right, Led 3 Months)

11
Fixed Asset Investment
 Change in New Property prices across 70 Chinese
cities
 Since Q1 2014, New Property prices have declined
across nearly all major cities
China Existing Property Prices
China New Property Prices
 Change in Existing Property prices across 70
Chinese cities
 Since Q1 2014, Existing Property prices have
declined across about 60 cities
 A slight recover in selected cities is being
experienced
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
Dec-11 Jul-12 Feb-13 Sep-13 Apr-14 Nov-14
New Monthly Increase New Monthly Unchanged New Monthly Decrease
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
Dec-11 Jul-12 Feb-13 Sep-13 Apr-14 Nov-14
Existing Monthly Increase Existing Monthly Unchanged Existing Monthly Decrease

12
 Steel consumption growth momentum has
stabilized, although remains at levels consistent
with flat steel production growth momentum
 Property accounts for >40% of steel consumption
 Absent any large increases in infrastructure (25% of
consumption), the outlook for steel consumption
will be driven by property markets
 Residential property is the cyclical factor for steel
production
Steel Production vs Steel Consumption Growth
Momentum
Sources of Chinese Steel Consumption
Residential
Property, 24%
Other Property,
18%
Infrastructure,
25%
Machinery, 15%
Autos, 6%
White Goods,
2%
Other, 10%
-30%
-20%
-10%
0%
10%
20%
-20%
-15%
-10%
-5%
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Steel Production Growth Momentum (Left)
Steel Consumption Growth Momentum (Right)

13
 Supply growth is still exceeding demand growth
 Property demand growth has declined significantly,
yet property supply growth remain elevated
 Property demand indicates that property supply is
likely to decline from current growth rates
Property Demand-Supply Ratio Growth
Property Demand Growth vs Property Supply Growth
-50%
-25%
0%
25%
50%
75%
1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 2013 2015
YoY% Change in Floor Space Demand; SA; 3M Rolling Average
YoY% Change in Floor Space Supply; SA; 3M Rolling Average
-40%
-20%
0%
20%
40%
2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014
YoY% Change in Floor Space Demand-Supply Ratio; 3M Rolling Average

14
 Property supply consistent with declining steel
consumption growth
 Property demand consistent with lower steel
consumption growth
Property Supply vs Steel Consumption
Property Demand vs Steel Consumption
-50%
0%
50%
100%
-25%
0%
25%
50%
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
YoY% Change in Steel Consumption (Left)
YoY% Change in Floor Space Demand (Right)
-25%
0%
25%
50%
-25%
0%
25%
50%
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
YoY% Change in Floor Space Supply (Right)

15
 Steel consumption growth consistent with lower
steel production growth
 Property demand-supply ratio consistent with flat
steel consumption growth
Steel Consumption vs Steel Production
Property Demand-Supply vs Steel Consumption
-50%
0%
50%
100%
-25%
0%
25%
50%
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
YoY% Change in Property Demand-Supply Ratio
-30%
-15%
0%
15%
30%
45%
60%
75%
-20%
-10%
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
YoY% Change in Steel Production (Left)
YoY% Change in Steel Consumption (Right)

16
Financial Stability
 FX Reserves growth is declining significantly
 Trade has recovered
 FDI has remained flat
 Hot Money is flowing out of China at record levels
 New Loans data consistent with lower Chinese
copper imports
 Commodities have been used extensively for
financing
 Price volatility in commodity markets is likely to be
both a sign of, and exacerbate, financial instability in
China
 Deleveraging is likely to beget further deleveraging
Contribution to FX Reserves Growth
New Loans vs Copper Imports
150
250
350
450
550
0
5,000
10,000
15,000
20,000
2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 2013 2015
China Monthly New Loans (Left) China Monthly Copper Imports (Right)
-500
-400
-300
-200
-100
0
100
200
300
2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 2013 2015
Trade FDI Hot Money Change in FX Reserves

17
Financial Stability
 Hot money flowed out in Q2 and Q3 at record levels
 Hot money is likely to have flowed out in Q4 as
global excess liquidity growth contracted further
 Hot money flows are pro cyclical
 Hot money flows are linked to US Quantitative
Easing, and other central bank liquidity programs
 The combination of the US raising interest rates,
global excess liquidity growth slowing and
structurally slower growth in China is likely to lead
to even greater hot money flows out of China
 An overvalued RMB is further exacerbating hot
money outflows
Recent Hot Money Flows
Hot Money Flows through time
-500
-400
-300
-200
-100
0
100
200
300
Jan-01 Jan-03 Jan-05 Jan-07 Jan-09 Jan-11 Jan-13 Jan-15
Hot Money
-500
-400
-300
-200
-100
0
100
200
300
Apr-12 Oct-12 Apr-13 Oct-13 Apr-14 Oct-14 Apr-15
Hot Money

18
Financial Stability
 Inflation is falling, and may spur the PBoC to more
broad based simulative actions in the first quarter.
 Money market rates have risen above normal levels
 The PBoC has shifted from targeted stimulus to
manage funding stresses, to broad based stimulus
PMI Input Prices vs PPI Inflation
Short Term Money Market Rates
-1%
0%
1%
2%
3%
4%
2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 2013 2015
3 Month SHIBOR - China Sovereign Bill Spread Average +/- 1 S.D.
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
-12%
-8%
-4%
0%
4%
8%
12%
2005 2007 2009 2011 2013 2015
YoY% Change in PPI (Left) PMI Input Prices (Right, Led 3 Months)

19
Financial Stability
 Net deposit growth has turned negative across small
banks, consistent with large withdrawals
 Net deposit growth has slowed significantly across
large banks, consistent with large withdrawals
Small Banks Deposit Levels
Large Banks Deposit Levels
40,000
45,000
50,000
55,000
60,000
2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Chinese Large State Owned Banks: Total Deposits (Billions)
2,000
3,000
4,000
5,000
6,000
7,000
2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Chinese (Small & Medium) State Owned Banks Personal Deposits (Billions)

20
Financial Stability
 Entrusted loans are inter-company loans facilitated
by commercial banks without loans appearing on
the bank’s balance sheet.
 This form of non-bank loan activity also surged at
the end of 2014.
 The Shadow Banking sector saw a resurgence at the
end of December as funds exited the traditional
banking system
 Trust firms are the largest sector of China’s non-
bank lending system.
Entrusted Loans
Trust Loans
-200
-100
0
100
200
300
400
500
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Trust Loans
-100
0
100
200
300
400
500
2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014
China Entrusted Loans

21
Financial Stability
 Shadow bank lending raised the total level of
financing in the economy towards the end of 2014.
 The Shadow Banking sector was targeted by
officials during 2014, and lending flattened until the
December when it rose sharply.
Aggregate Financing
Shadow Banking Lending Index
0
5000
10000
15000
20000
25000
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
China Shadow Bank Lending Index
-500
0
500
1000
1500
2000
2500
3000
2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014
China Aggregate Financing

22
Equities
 Chinese Equities have experienced the largest single
quarter appreciation since the financial crisis in Q4
2014
 Chinese equities have risen significantly despite a
deterioration in economic conditions
 Equities price appreciation is likely due to money
flows into the asset class out of the banking system
Quarterly Equities Performance
Chinese Equities
-30%
-20%
-10%
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
Dec-09
Jun-10
Dec-10
Jun-11
Dec-11
Jun-12
Dec-12
Jun-13
Dec-13
Jun-14
Dec-14
% Quarterly Change in Shanghai Composite Index
1500
2000
2500
3000
3500
Jan-10 Jan-11 Jan-12 Jan-13 Jan-14 Jan-15
Shanghai Composite Index - Past 5 Years

23
Equities
 Chinese banks have largely underperformed the
rising market over the past 3 months
 Chinese banks have underperformed the rising
market over the past year
3 Month Rolling Market Performance vs Sectors
Yearly Rolling Market Performance vs Sectors
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
ShanghaiComposite
Commerce
Conglomerate
Industrials
Utilities
Property
BankofChina
ChinaConstruction
Bank
AgriculturalBankof
China
Industrialand
CommericalBank…
0%
20%
40%
60%
ShanghaiComposite
Commerce
Conglomerate
Industrials
Utilities
Property
BankofChina
ChinaConstruction
Bank
AgriculturalBankof
China
Industrialand
CommericalBank…

24
Long Term
0.0%
5.0%
10.0%
15.0%
20.0% US
Europe
HongKong
Japan
SouthKorea
India
Russia
Singapore
Australlia
Malaysia
China Exports (%)
 China’s growth remains heavily reliant on developed
economy growth, and consumption
 Stabilization or growth in Europe, and continued
stable US consumption is key to China’s near term
growth outlook
Gross Fixed Capital Formation vs FAI vs Savings
China Exports by Country
20%
40%
60%
80%
1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012
FAI (%GDP) GFCF (% GDP) Saving (% GDP)
 The rebalancing from investment to consumption is
not occurring
 Any rebalancing will be difficult to achieve,
smoothly

25
Long Term
 Demographic factors for China are unfavorable, in
large part due to the aftershock of the one child
policy
Working Age Population Growth
Working Age Populations
Sources: United Nations, Deltec International Group
 Working age population is likely to decline annually
through to 2050
50%
55%
60%
65%
70%
75%
1950
1955
1960
1965
1970
1975
1980
1985
1990
1995
2000
2005
2010
2015
2020
2025
2030
2035
2040
2045
2050
Australia US Europe Japan
China Other Asia Oil Bloc Commodities Bloc
-1.2%
-0.6%
0.0%
0.6%
1.2%
OilBloc
OtherAsia
Australia
US
CommoditiesBloc
China
Europe
Japan

26
Recent Stimulus Measures
Monetary Stimulus
22 April 2014:
 Reserve Requirement Ratio (RRR) for Rural Commercial Banks Decreased 2 Percentage Points and Rural Credit
Cooperative Unions Decreased 0.5 Percentage Points
22 May 2014: RMB300 billion (US$48.1 billion)
 Relending Quota, Earmarked for Low-Income Housing
16 June 2014: RMB100 billion (US$16 billion)
 Relending Quota, Earmarked for Agriculture and Small Businesses
16 June 2014:
 Reserve Requirement Ratio (RRR) for Rural Commercial Banks Decreased 50 bps
30 June 2014: RMB1 trillion (US$162 billion)
 Completed 3-Year Loan to China Development Bank (including prior relending quotas)
30 June 2014:
 Change in Bank Loan-to-Deposit Calculation to Include Negotiable Certificates of Deposit Sold to Companies or
Individuals, and to Exclude Loans Advanced to Small Enterprises and the Rural Sector that are Backed by Bonds.
8 August 2014: RMB12 billion (US$2 billion)
 Increase in the Maximum Size of its Rediscount Operations for Small Businesses & Agriculture Sector
Q2 2014 – Q1 2015 Stimulus Measures
Sources: Bloomberg, Newswires, PBoC, Deltec International Group

27
Monetary Stimulus (continued)
27 August 2014: RMB20 billion (US$3.26 billion)
 Relending Quota for Rural Financial Institutions
16 September 2014: RMB500 billion (US$81 billion)
 3- Month Bank Injection through its Standing Loan Facility*
18 September 2014:
 14 Day Repurchase Agreement Cut 0.20 Percentage Points to 3.5%
13 October 2014:
 14 Day Repurchase Agreement Cut 0.10 Percentage Points to 3.4%
31 October 2014: RMB269.5 billion (US $44 billion)
 Bank Liquidity Injection through MLF**
21 November 2014:
 One-year Lending Rate Cut 0.40 Percentage Points to 5.6%
 One-year Deposit Rate Cut 0.25 Percentage Points to 2.75%
10 December 2014: RMB 400 billion (US $65 billion)
 Central bank injection into the country’s banking system to invigorate credit market.

28
Monetary Stimulus (continued)
16 January 2015: RMB50 billion (US $8.1 billion)
 Relending Quota, Earmarked for Farmers and Small Businesses
21 January 2015: RMB50 billion (US $8.1 billion)
 Bank Liquidity Injection to mid and small-sized banks through MLF
21 January 2015: RMB269.5 billion (US $44 billion)
 MLF loans issued in October rolled over as they expired
4 February 2015: RMB500 billion (US $81 billion)
 Reserve Requirement Ratio (RRR) Decreased 0.5 Percentage Points for all commercial banks
 For commercial banks with significant SME portfolios, an additional .05 Percentage Points will be given
 The Agricultural Development Bank of China will receive an additional 4% RRR cut.
*The Standing Lending Facility (SLF) of the PBOC is a liquidity injection tool, wherein small and medium sized financial institutions may request loans from the bank to be repaid within
1-3 months, with interest rates decided on a case by case basis. Introduced this year, the facility was created to smoothen out liquidity fluctuations in credit markets; it is heavily used
ahead of national holidays.
**The Mid-term Lending Facility (MLF) is an alternative liquidity injection tool that is also known as Pledged Supplementary Lending (PSL). Borrowers must present collateral to access
the loan. This monetary tool is meant to guide medium-term interest rates, with a repayment period of 3 months to 1 year.

29
Fiscal Measures
6 November 2014: RMB 693 billion (US $113 billion)
 National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) approved several infrastructure projects including 7 new
railway construction projects and three airports
5 January 2015: RMB 7 trillion (US $1.1 trillion)
 Central government will accelerate the approval of 300 investment projects focused on oil/gas pipelines, health, clean
energy, transportation and mining in 2015, though only a portion will be spent in 2015.
4 February 2015: RMB 15 trillion (US $2.4 trillion)
 Fourteen Chinese provinces announce plans to invest in major infrastructure projects, though only a portion will be
spent in 2015.

31
Disclosures
This report may contain material that is not directed to, or intended for distribution to or use by, any person or entity who is a citizen or resident of or located in any locality, state,
country or other jurisdiction where such distribution, publication, availability or use would be contrary to law or regulation or which would subject Deltec International Group (its
subsidiaries, affiliates and successors including, but not limited to, Deltec Bank & Trust Limited, Deltec Investment Advisers Limited, Deltec Capital Limited, Deltec Capital Asset
Management Limited, Deltec Capital Group Limited, Deltec Wealth Management and Clairmont Trust) ("DIG")) to any registration or licensing requirement within such jurisdiction. All
material presented in this report, unless specifically indicated otherwise, is under copyright to DIG. None of the material, nor its content, nor any copy of it, may be altered in any way,
transmitted to, copied or distributed to any other party, without the prior express written permission of DIG.
The information, tools and material presented in this report are provided to you by DIG for information purposes only and are not to be used or considered as an offer or the solicitation
of an offer to sell or to buy or subscribe for securities or other financial instruments. DIG may not have taken any steps to ensure that the securities referred to in this report are suitable
for any particular investor. DIG will not treat recipients of this report as its customers by virtue of their receiving this report. The investments and services contained or referred to in
this report may not be suitable for you and it is recommended that you consult an independent investment advisor if you are in doubt about such investments or investment services.
Nothing in this report constitutes investment, legal, accounting or tax advice, or a representation that any investment or strategy is suitable or appropriate to your individual
circumstances, or otherwise constitutes a personal recommendation to you. DIG does not advise on the tax consequences of investments and you are advised to contact an independent
tax adviser.
Information and opinions presented in this report have been obtained or derived from sources believed by DIG to be reliable, but DIG makes no representation as to their accuracy or
completeness. DIG accepts no liability for loss arising from the use of the material presented in this report, except that this exclusion of liability does not apply to the extent that such
liability arises under specific statutes or regulations applicable to DIG. This report is not to be relied upon in substitution for the exercise of independent judgment. DIG may have issued,
and may in the future issue, other communications that are inconsistent with, and reach different conclusions from, the information presented in this report. Those communications
reflect the different assumptions, views and analytical methods of the analysts who prepared them and DIG is under no obligation to ensure that such other communications are brought
to the attention of any recipient of this report.
DIG may, to the extent permitted by law, participate or invest in financing transactions with the issuer(s) of the securities referred to in this report, perform services for or solicit
business from such issuers, and/or have a position or holding, or other material interest, or effect transactions, in such securities or options thereon, or other investments related
thereto. In addition, it may make markets in the securities mentioned in the material presented in this report. Some investments referred to in this report will be offered solely by a
single entity and in the case of some investments solely by DIG, or an associate of DIG or DIG may be the only market maker in such investments.
Past performance should not be taken as an indication or guarantee of future performance, and no representation or warranty, express or implied, is made regarding future performance.
Information, opinions and estimates contained in this report reflect a judgment at its original date of publication by DIG and are subject to change without notice. The price, value of and
income from any of the securities or financial instruments mentioned in this report can fall as well as rise. The value of securities and financial instruments is subject to exchange rate
fluctuation that may have a positive or adverse effect on the price or income of such securities or financial instruments. Investors in securities such as ADR's, the values of which are
influenced by currency volatility, effectively assume this risk. Structured securities are complex instruments, typically involve a high degree of risk and are intended for sale only to
sophisticated investors who are capable of understanding and assuming the risks involved. The market value of any structured security may be affected by changes in economic,
financial and political factors (including, but not limited to, spot and forward interest and exchange rates), time to maturity, market conditions and volatility, and the credit quality of any
issuer or reference issuer. Any investor interested in purchasing a structured product should conduct their own investigation and analysis of the product and consult with their own
professional advisers as to the risks involved in making such a purchase. Some investments discussed in this report may have a high level of volatility. High volatility investments may
experience sudden and large falls in their value causing losses when that investment is realised. Those losses may equal your original investment. Indeed, in the case of some
investments the potential losses may exceed the amount of initial investment and, in such circumstances, you may be required to pay more money to support those losses. Income yields
from investments may fluctuate and, in consequence, initial capital paid to make the investment may be used as part of that income yield. Some investments may not be readily
realisable and it may be difficult to sell or realise those investments, similarly it may prove difficult for you to obtain reliable information about the value, or risks, to which such an
investment is exposed. This report may provide the addresses of, or contain hyperlinks to, websites. Except to the extent to which the report refers to website material of DIG, DIG has
not reviewed any such site and takes no responsibility for the content contained therein. Such address or hyperlink is provided solely for your convenience and information and the
content of any such website does not in any way form part of this document. Accessing such website or following such link through this report or DIG’s website shall be at your own risk.

32
Disclosures
Please note that this research was originally prepared and issued by DIG solelyfor distribution to their market professionals and institutional investor customers. Recipients who are not
market professionals or institutional investor customers of DIG should seek the advice of their independent financial advisor prior to taking any investment decision based on this report
or for any necessary explanation of its contents. If this report is being distributed by a financial institution other than Deltec Investment Advisers Limited, or its affiliates, that financial
institution is solely responsible for distribution. This report does not constitute investment advice by DIG to the clients of the distributing financial institution, and neither Deltec
Investment Advisers Limited, its affiliates, and their respective officers, directors and employees accept any liability whatsoever for any direct or consequential loss arising from their use
of this report or its content.
This research may not conform to relevant U.S. or Canadian disclosure requirements. or to the relevant requirements of any other jurisdiction, many of which have their own disclosure
requirements. Further, this research report may relate to investments or services of a person outside of the UK or to other matters which are not regulated by the FCA or in respect of
which the protections of the FCA for retail clients and/or the Financial Services Compensation Scheme may not be available, and further details as to where this may be the case are
available upon request in respect of this report. DIG may provide various services to US municipal entities or obligated persons ("municipalities"), including suggesting individual
transactions or trades and entering into such transactions. Any services DIG provides to municipalities are not viewed as “advice” within the meaning of Section 975 of the Dodd-Frank
Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act. DIG is providing any such services and related information solely on an arm’s length basis and not as an advisor or fiduciary to the
municipality. In connection with the provision of the any such services, there is no agreement, direct or indirect, between any municipality (including the officials, management,
employees or agents thereof) and DIG for DIG to provide advice to the municipality. Municipalities should consult with their financial, accounting and legal advisors regarding any such
services provided by DIG. In addition, DIG is not acting for direct or indirect compensation to solicit the municipality on behalf of an unaffiliated broker, dealer, municipal securities
dealer, municipal advisor, or investment adviser for the purpose of obtaining or retaining an engagement by the municipality for or in connection with Municipal Financial Products, the
issuance of municipal securities, or of an investment adviser to provide investment advisory services to or on behalf of the municipality.

Deltec Outlook - China - February 2015

Recommended

Recommended

More Related Content

What's hot

What's hot (19)

Viewers also liked

Viewers also liked (12)

Similar to Deltec Outlook - China - February 2015

Similar to Deltec Outlook - China - February 2015 (20)

Deltec Outlook - China - February 2015