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¿El siglo de China? por Alicia García-Herrero

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Charla de Alicia García-Herrero en la 10ª sesión del Observatorio EOI de Economía Global.
Alicia García-Herrero es Economista Jefe para Asia Pacífico en Natixis, basada en Hong Kong, así como investigadora en dos think-tanks europeos (BRUEGEL basado en Bruselas y Real Instituto el Cano basado en Madrid).

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¿El siglo de China? por Alicia García-Herrero

  1. 1. El siglo de China? Alicia Garcia Herrero +852 3900 8680 – alicia.garciaherrero@natixis.com
  2. 2. C2 - Internal Natixis 2 1. EL SIGLO XXI ES DE ASIA, CON CHINA EN EL CENTRO 2. AUNQUE CON TIEMPOS MÁS DIFÍCILES PARA EL LIDERAZGO DE CHINA a) Empeoramiento del entorno económico global b) Con presión creciente de EE.UU. c) Y una fuerte desaceleración estructural 3. ¿QUÉ PUEDE HACER EUROPA? 4. CONCLUSIONES SUMMARY
  3. 3. C2 - Internal Natixis 1 EL SIGLO XXI ES DE ASIA, CON CHINA EN EL CENTRO 3
  4. 4. C2 - Internal Natixis 4 Change 2015-2025 Contribución al crecimiento mundial In billones de dólares amiercanos En miles de millones de dólares americanos 14.4 8.3 4.6 2.7 0.4 15 10 5 0 5 10 15 2020 15 10 5 0 5 10 15 China India US Europe Japan Source: Natixis (21%) (18%) (10%) (6%) (1% ) China, seguido de la India son ya los grandes protagonistas mundiales en términos de aportación al crecimiento mundial 2100 636 626 582 490 455 537 440 356 4000 3000 2000 1000 0 1000 2000 3000 4000 (4.7%) (0.9%)
  5. 5. C2 - Internal Natixis 5 Direct Investment Portfolio Investment Banking Flow (Other Investment) Reserves Posición de inversion internacional (en miles de millones de dolares) Asia es el mayor acreedor externo, liderada por Japón, China, Taiwán, Hong Kong, Singapur y Corea. EE.UU. el mayor deudor -1,998 -1,529 -10,000 -8,000 -6,000 -4,000 -2,000 0 2,000 4,000 6,000 8,000 2006 2017 Europe 2,820 5,814 -10,000 -8,000 -6,000 -4,000 -2,000 0 2,000 4,000 6,000 8,000 2006 2017 APAC -1,868 -7,338 -10,000 -8,000 -6,000 -4,000 -2,000 0 2,000 4,000 6,000 8,000 2006 2017 US
  6. 6. C2 - Internal Natixis Asia es también el líder en la fabricación de manufacturas, liderado por China Asia’s manufacturing output – share of world production 0 20 40 60 80 100 2005 2015 2025 2025 Share of world growth Asia Euro area Latin America and Caribbean North America Rest of world China India Rest of Asia Sources: Natixis World Asia 6
  7. 7. C2 - Internal Natixis 7 También Asia alberga la mayor parte de las grandes empresas a nivel mundial, la mayoría de ellas chinas. 126 110 202 120 52 30 0 50 100 150 200 250 US Europe Asia Fortune 500 (Total 2018) Source: Fortune 500, Natixis As of July,2018 Rest of Asia Japan China 152 179 131 40 67 24 0 50 100 150 200 250 US Europe Asia Fortune 500 (Total 2008) Source: Fortune 500, Natixis Rest of Asia Japan China
  8. 8. C2 - Internal Natixis . 2 AUNQUE CON TIEMPOS MÁS DIFÍCILES PARA EL LIDERAZGO DE CHINA 8
  9. 9. C2 - Internal Natixis 9 2017 2018 a) El entorno económico mundial se está deteriorando con un fuerte aumento en la aversión al riesgo Natixis risk perception index (in bp)
  10. 10. C2 - Internal Natixis 10 US sanctions Trade war Trade Brexit and Italy EM Turbulence US Sanctions European Geopolitical Risks US-China Trade War Mayor número de riesgos sistémicos a nivel mundial. EM Turbulence
  11. 11. C2 - Internal Natixis b) A principios de 2018 EE.UU inició una guerra comercial contra China que continúa 11 Type of Product Solar panels/ Steel / Intellectual Property Intellectual Property Washing machines Aluminum (1102 products valued at USD 50bn) (6031 products valued at USD 200bn) Rules Section 201 Section 232 Section 301 Section 301 Import Relief for Domestic Industries National security Intellectual property laws Intellectual property laws Effective Date Feb 7th, 2018 Mar 23rd, 2019 25% additional duty effective on July 6th for 818 products (worth 34bn) included in the proposed list on Apr 6th, 2018, and 284 products (worth 16bn) effective on Aug 23rd, 2018 Sep 24th, 2018, and increased to 25% on Jan 1st, 2019 Exemption “GSP-Eligible” developing nations1 Australia, Argentina, Brazil and South Korea2 Targeted at China Targeted at China Applied to China √ √ √ √ Retaliation from China N/A Tariffs on $3 billion of 128 products including pork, fruit, nuts and wine of up to 25% 25% duty effective on July 6 for 545 products valued at about $34 billion and 114 products valued at about $16 billion with no effective date announced Tariffs on $60bn US imports Truce agreed to negotiate On Dec 1st 2018 at the G20 sidelines, additional tariff from 10% to 25% was deferred for 90 days N.B. 1 Philippines and Thailand are not excluded, even though theySource: Natixis, U.S. Government
  12. 12. C2 - Internal Natixis Pero es mucho mas que una guerra comercial: EE.UU intenta contener el desarrollo económico de China 12 Capital goods 29% Consumption goods 22% Intermediate goods 48% Not Classified 1% Decomposition of US' imports from China under the 200 billion tariff list Source: Natixis, USTIC 6 49 68 5032 25 13 55 26 32 36 7 1 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% US June (50bn) US July (200bn) China (50bn) China (60bn) A comparison of the US-China targeted products released in June and July (%) Very High High Medium Low Source: Natixis, USITC, UN Comtrade • El primer paquete de USD 50 mil millones destinado a impedir que China exporte productos finales de mayor calidad que compitan con los Estados Unidos • El segundo se centra en alejar la cadena de valor de China (reafirmación o deslocalización en otras geografías)
  13. 13. C2 - Internal Natixis China ha sido fuertemente penalizada en el mercado de valores (incluso en RMB por algún tiempo). El impacto mas reciente sobre EE.UU. les ha llevado a la actual negociación 13 5.75 6.00 6.25 6.50 6.75 7.00 7.25 2,400 2,600 2,800 3,000 3,200 3,400 3,600 Jan-18 Feb-18 Mar-18 Apr-18 May-18 Jun-18 Jul-18 Aug-18 Sep-18 Oct-18 Nov-18 Dec-18 Jan-19 Feb-19 S&P 500 Index Shanghai Composite Index USDCNY (rhs) US: tariffs on washing machines and solar cells US: tariffs on aluminum and steel China: retaliate on 106 products US: Review $50 bn Chinese imports Talks kicked off in Beijing US: Impose 25% tariffs on $50 bn products US: tariffs on $34 bn first China: retaliation US: unveils 10% tariffs on $200 bn products, with 25% to come by Jan 2019 China: announced tariffs on $60bn US imports Market Reaction Source: Bloomberg, Natixis US: Correction in corporate profits Three-month truce agreed at G20 sidelines
  14. 14. C2 - Internal Natixis c) China también hace frentea una fuerte desaceleración estructural. Envejecimiento y bajo retorno de la inversión como razones clave. 14 0 200 400 600 800 1 000 1 200 1 400 1 600 China's population (mn) Old Young Working age Source: UN's projections, NATIXIS 6.1 6.0 7.0 6.4 6.8 8.7 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 2015 2016 2017 Return on Capital China Global Source: Natixis • Envejecimiento • Disminución de la productividad. • Menor retorno de la inversión • Cada vez más endeudamiento La esperanza está en: • Rebalando el modelo de crecimiento a favor del consumo • Innovación • Continuación de nuevos mercados
  15. 15. C2 - Internal Natixis Source: HKTDC Key figures of B&R countries Value Why is this important? Total population 4.4 billions 63% of world population Total GDP USD 21 trillion 29% of global economy 15 La escala de la Iniciativa de la Nueva Ruta de la Seda parece gigantesca, incluso para una gran economía como China
  16. 16. C2 - Internal Natixis 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 Russia Other Asia ASEAN Africa Europe Belt & Road Investments by Country (bn USD) Energy Rail Industrial Park Materials Port Road Source: Natixis *Confirmed and highly likely projects included. Telecom 0% Road 2% Port 3% Materials 5% Industrial Park 6% Rail 41% Energy 43% Belt & Road Investments by Industry Source: Natixis *Confirmed and highly likely projects included. 16 Pero el financiamiento de tal proyecto será extremadamente costoso puesto que, por el momento, se concentra en los recursos de los grandes bancos públicos chinos
  17. 17. C2 - Internal Natixis 17 Probablemente si… Algunos analistas temen un aterrizaje forzoso y / o una crisis financiera por varias razones: • Sobreendeudamiento en aumento para mentener el crecimiento • La sobrecapacidad pesa sobre las ganancias corporativas y, en consecuencia, sobre el retorno de la inversión • Pero los acreedores no reaccionan evitando la posibilidad de una crisis ¿Por qué? Dadas las dificultades estructurales de China y el deterioro del entorno externo, ¿tendrá éxito China?
  18. 18. C2 - Internal Natixis 18 261.2% in Q1 18 0 50 100 150 200 250 300 0 50 100 150 200 250 300 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 China: Credit to GDP (%) Corporate Household Government Source: BIS, Natixis Aunque la deuda es elevada, los acreedores son los propios chinos, especialmente los hogares. La deuda externa es muy limitada. 0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 China: External Debt to GDP (%) Sources: Natixis, CEIC
  19. 19. C2 - Internal Natixis 0 20 40 60 80 100 China (2) China (1) Bank ownership (% of total assets), most recent year State Private Domestic Foreign Source: Natixis, World Bank 19 SOE holds the majority of assets Los principales acreedores (hogares) estan mal informados y limitados en sus inversiones, especialmente fuera del país por los controles de capital. Los intermediarios de sus ahorros, los bancos, son en su mayoría corporaciones estatales, lo que aumenta aun mas la estabilidad del modelo a pesar de la deuda Central SOE 41% Local SOE 21% POE 38% By Ownership (2017) Source: Natixis
  20. 20. C2 - Internal Natixis 3 ¿QUÉ PUEDE HACER EUROPA? 20
  21. 21. C2 - Internal Natixis Europa es cada vez más relevante para China a medida que Estados Unidos presiona a China. Esto es cierto para el comercio pero también para la inversión. 21 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018H1 Destination of the overseas completed M&A (The percentage by deal value) US EU (exl. UK) UK Europe (exl. EU and UK) Belt and Road (exl. EU) Other countries Source: Mergermarket, AEI, NATIXIS
  22. 22. C2 - Internal Natixis China también está acelerando su progreso tecnológico gracias a acquisiciones en Europa 22 Source: Mergermarket, AEI, NATIXIS 0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100% 2013 2017 2018H1 2013 2017 2018H1 2013 2017 2018H1 2013 2017 2018H1 2013 2017 2018H1 2013 2017 2018H1 2013 2017 2018H1 2013 2017 2018H1 2013 2017 2018H1 2013 2017 2018H1 2013 2017 2018H1 2013 2017 2018H1 2013 2017 2018H1 Agriculture Chemicals & Materials Consumer Energy Entertainment Financials Health Care ICT Industrial Infrastructure Real Estate Utilities Others Regional and sectoral distribution of China's overseas M&As (The percentage by deal value) US EU (exl. UK) UK Europe (exl. EU and UK) Belt and Road (exl.EU) Other countries 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 2013 2017 2018H1 2013 2017 2018H1 2013 2017 2018H1 2013 2017 2018H1 2013 2017 2018H1 2013 2017 2018H1 2013 2017 2018H1 2013 2017 2018H1 2013 2017 2018H1 2013 2017 2018H1 2013 2017 2018H1 2013 2017 2018H1 2013 2017 2018H1 Agriculture Chemicals & Materials Consumer Energy Entertainment Financials Health Care ICT Industrial Infrastructure Real Estate Utilities Others Regional and sectoral distribution of China's overseas completed M&A By deal value (USD bn) US EU (exl. UK) UK Europe (exl. EU and UK) Belt and Road (exl.EU) Other countries
  23. 23. C2 - Internal Natixis Sin embargo, Europa es percibida como cada vez más débil por China. 23 • Desde el punto de vista de China, el Brexit ha debilitado a Europa, y también la situación en Italia. • Las fuertes diferencias en actitudes hacia China muestran las divisiones entre los países europeos.
  24. 24. C2 - Internal Natixis En cuanto al objetivo externo, China debe presionar por alianzas como respuesta a la búsqueda de Estados Unidos de aislar a China. 24 Más allá de 16 + 1, el sur de Europa se está alineando con China CEEC- China (“16+1”)
  25. 25. C2 - Internal Natixis . 4 CONCLUSIONES 25
  26. 26. C2 - Internal Natixis A medida que China se acerca a la cima, las tensiones son siempre más fuertes con EE. UU. China tiene a favor su mayor crecimiento y menor dependencia de deuda externa, pero EE.UU. tiene la moneda reserva 26 0 50 100 150 200 250 300 13 14 15 16 17 China Debt-to-GDP (%) China Total Debt US Total Debt China External Debt US External Debt Sources: Natixis, CEIC, BIS -2 0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 01 03 05 07 09 11 13 15 17 19 21 23 25 27 29 China and the US GDP growth rate: forecast (%) China US Sources: Natixis Forecast, Bloomberg ?
  27. 27. C2 - Internal Natixis En conclusión 27 • La situación de China ha empeorado claramente en 2018 como consecuencia de: o Su propia desaceleración estructural o Y la contención de EE.UU. que comenzó con una guerra comercial y continúa en muchas otras formas. • Sin embargo, esto no significa que China ya no será la economía más grande del mundo. • Su capacidad de recuperación económica puede ser mayor que la de los Estados Unidos. • Aun así, China se enfrenta a un creciente riesgo político por un modelo puesto que su existencia cada vez enfrentara mas trabas en el mundo Occidental • En cualquier caso, y a pesar de la guerra comercial, China es, y seguirá siendo, un mercado demasiado grande para ser ignorado.
  28. 28. C2 - Internal Natixis ALICIA GARCÍA HERRERO 28 Alicia García-Herrero es Economista Jefe para Asia Pacífico en Natixis, basada en Hong Kong así como investigadora en dos think-tanks europeos (BRUEGEL basado en Bruselas y Real Instituto el Cano basado en Madrid). Alicia es profesora en la Universidad de Ciencias y Tecnología de Hong Kong (HKUST) y asesora para distintas organizaciones internacionales y empresas (Banco Asiático de desarrollo y Autoridad Monetaria de Hong Kong, entre otros). Finalmente, Alicia es miembro del Consejo de Administración del Hong Kong Forum y co-fundadora de Bright Hong Kong. En este contexto, la actividad de difusión de ideas de Alicia ha sido reconocida recientemente al ser nombrada TOP 10 LINKEDIN VOICE para Economía y Finanzas de Linkedin. Anteriormente Alicia desempeñó los siguientes puestos: Economista Jefe de Mercados Emergentes en Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria (BBVA), miembro del programa de investigación para Asia del Banco Internacional de Pagos en Hong Kong (BIS); directora de la División de Economía Internacional del Banco de España; miembro del Consejo del Comité Ejecutivo del Banco Central Europeo (BCE), Economista Jefe de Mercados Emergentes del Banco Santander y economista en el Fondo Monetario Internacional (FMI). Alicia siempre ha combinado su carrera en los sectores público y privado con un compromiso con la investigación y la enseñanza aplicada (antes de HKUST, fue profesora en la Universidad John Hokpins y Carlos III). Alicia cuenta con un doctorado en Economía por la Universidad George Washington y ha publicado más de 200 artículos en revistas y libros especializados con más de 2.000 citas. Para conocer mejor la actividad investigadora de Alicia puede dirigirse a ResearchGate. Finalmente, Alicia también es muy activa en los medios de comunicación internacionales y en la redes sociales. Puede seguir sus ideas i artículos en (LinkedIn & Twitter) JEFE ECONOMISTA, ASIA PACÍFICA
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