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Multipolarity and the Lack of Leadership in the Middle East
Cyril Mehanna
December 2015

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Introduction
‘You don’t despair about something like the Middle East, you just do the best you can’ said
P.J. O’Rourke. So do not despair. The instability that hits the region is but the expression of
natural revolution, natural fight for freedom. The uprisings of 2011, also called the Arab
Spring, have shaken the region, now on the verge of evolution and on the road towards
freedom and peace. The (authoritarian) regimes governing the Middle Eastern countries were
challenged by protests that emerged in the name of freedom and dignity. Some regimes fell,
other resisted, and some are still fighting for power. These protests led to democracy in
countries like Tunisia, to reforms in countries like Morocco, but to war in countries like Syria.
The different consequences are a symbol of the region’s diversity, even in the types of
regimes. In fact, the Middle East is a very diversified region. Many religions are represented
in the region (Muslims, Christians, jews…); as well as different cultures (Turkish, Persian,
Arab, Berber…); and the different dialects or even languages are not to be forgotten.
Ideologies also play an important role in the region’s diversity: nasserism, baathism,
Islamism, Pan-arabism…
Add to all this that the region was for a long time manipulated by outside powers (Ottomans,
French and British, the US…). All this multiculturalism is coupled with the region multiple
assets: oil, water, the Suez Canal, the centre between the East and the West… No wonder the
outside powers manipulated the region. However, the Middle Eastern countries did not know
how to make of multiculturalism a strength, and couldn’t make good use of their advantages,
which led the region towards instability, conflicts, and inevitably, protests. ‘The region’s
plural populations, its income differential, its diverse yet authoritarian regimes, its religion or
indeed its historical genesis’ (Gaub, 2015) are all factors that can help explain the protests of
2011. The recent years were also characterized by demographic changes, economic problems,
dysfunctional societies, crisis of political legitimacy and Islam nationalism. The Arab Spring,
fuelled by these numerous factors was first a fight for political freedom and social prosperity,
but quickly turned into a chaotic revolution, civil wars (as in Syria) and a fight for power. As
the Kuwaiti emir Sabah al-Sabah said (in Cambanis, 2015) ‘A four-year phase of chaos and
instability, which some called the Arab Spring, shook our region’s security and eroded our
stability’.
The events since 2011 reaffirmed the importance of multipolarity in the Middle East but left
a vacuum in the region. Indeed, if ‘the Middle East is currently in a situation of both power
multipolarity and ideological multipolarity’ (Gause, 2015), this multipolarity is uncontrolled
because of a lack of leadership. And since the uprisings and the regime changes in the region,
the lack of leadership and the multipolarity are the main cause of today’s instability. There is
no balance of power; there is no dominant ideological principle; there are no clear alliances;
there are many conflicts, many issues, and many new actors. There is no more in the Middle
East a balance of power logic. The supposed Turkish-Saudi-Israeli alignment to counter Iran
never existed; the External powers are not united (in their politics towards the Middle East);
the Iran Nuclear Deal transformed the strategies; minorities and ideologies are evolving in
parallel with the Shi’a-Sunni opposition; and no leader is present to control these events or
restore any logic.
This report will consider ideology as defined by the philosopher Martin Seliger (1976): ‘sets
of ideas by which men posit, explain and justify ends and means of organised social action,
and specifically political action, irrespective of whether such actions aims to preserve, amend,
uproot or rebuild a given order’.
The region is in a new and uncontrolled dimension. It is difficult to predict the future of the
Middle Eastern states and figure out who (or what) will resolve the issues by leading the
region. The problem remains that ‘All states are too weak to dominate the system, but are

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strong enough to prevent others from doing so’ (Gaub, 2015). However, it is easy to identify
the causes of the problems and their solutions. This report underlying assumption is that the
lack of leadership coupled with the multipolarity in the region is the cause for instability and
conflict. In fact, the uprisings of 2011 brought down the existing leaders without replacing
them, reorganised the region without any plan and created new actors. This report will try and
demonstrate the idea that the lack of leadership and the multipolarity are not only the result of
the Arab Spring, but also the cause of the post-Arab spring events.
First, it is important to show that the lack of leadership is on three different levels: national,
regional and global. Second, as part of the increase of multipolarity, analyzing the
reconfiguration of the region can lead to understand in a third part the new issues and
controversies. And finally, the fourth part will present the potential leaders and the guidelines
to follow in order to become a leader.
I- A lack of leadership
After the end of the Cold War, the US leadership replaced the world bipolarity. However, in
the last few years, the US hegemony has been threatened by both US-China bipolarity and
multipolarity, especially in a region like the Middle East, and Russia filled the gap. It seems
like the US is not anymore the (only) leader of the post-cold war system, which makes us
wonder: Is there a leader today? As Marwan Bishara said, ‘The old world order is no more,
but there’s no new world order either’ (2015b). In fact, Bishara is right to question the world’s
leadership today and to admit that there is no hegemonic power to put this world in order. The
Middle East is a perfect example to illustrate not only the lack of a leadership but also the
world disorder.
The Arab Spring that started in February 2011 came as a surprise to the world powers. If the
Arab Spring was seen as a fight for freedom and social prosperity as well as a liberation from
dictatorships, it led however to the reorganisation of the region and international powers
(especially the EU and the US) thought they could seize this opportunity to strengthen their
influence and impose their respective ideology by supporting the Arab Spring and controlling
the new regimes that were to emerge. Today, more than four years after the beginning of the
Arab Spring, things are clear. ‘ The so-called Arab Spring has not been about the birth of
freedom but about the collapse of central authority’ (Kaplan, 2015). The loss of leaders in
Arab countries emerged with the collapse of some central authorities, and with the fight for
power of other authorities. Nevertheless, the Arab Spring and the fight for ‘freedom’ came at
a cost: authoritarian figures were overthrown without being replaced by new leaders. On a
national level, new regimes are struggling to rule and old ones are shaking; On a regional
level, some states are loosing influence in the region, others are gaining power; On a global
level, the US lost its hegemony in the region, and isn’t credible anymore.
It is interesting to see how the lack of leadership is felt on three different levels, in a fragile
region that faces uncontrolled changes.
1- National Level
The Arab Spring led to a series of questions concerning the Arab society and the Arab
regimes. A universal principle agrees with the idea of Kaplan (2014) that ‘It is the regime’s
philosophical values that are crucial – more so than of how it came to power’. This is
debatable but to follow Kaplan idea, society is controlled through a balance between freedom
and power. The absence of a balance between these two elements led to the Arab Spring, and
since, a fear that any leader might abuse of its power(s) again is born in Arab societies. Egypt

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is the perfect example with the counter-revolution and the destitution of Mohamed Morsi.
This fear is one of the reasons why no true leaders can emerge in the post Arab Spring states,
because leaders will be accused of grabbing power too quickly and too firmly. The other
reason why no leaders have been seen today is the fact that freedom is now a right in these
countries, and freedom to oppose any political candidate or any political idea exists.
In the Middle East today, some regimes did not fall and are still fighting to keep their
position as leader in their country, but are faced with many obstacles, which let us question
the true power of these leaders. ‘Existing regimes face, on the one hand, an erosion of
traditional means of control, and on the other, increasingly assertive opposition’ (Lesser,
Nardulli and Arghavan in Khalizad and Lesser, 1998), and they also see their legitimacy
being questioned.
The regime of Bashar Al-Assad is the best-suited example; while maintaining power, he is
struggling to stay the leader. He is facing many threats in his own country because of the civil
war; he is losing parts of his territory; and finally he lost his legitimacy as a leader long time
ago. Even the regimes that did not surrender are more fragile today, and the leaders that are
still holding to power see their legitimacy being questioned.
Meanwhile, in some countries where the regime changed, leaders are not threatened, because
they are inexistent (for now). Libya is one of the best examples to show that, after the death of
Gaddafi, no leader has emerged. Today, there are two governments (Tripoli and Tobruk) that
oppose each other as to which one is the legitimate one. The revolutions in the region did not
replace the leaders but rather erased the idea of a leader and replaced it by chaos today. ‘The
success of those revolutions in toppling several of the rotten autocracies, coupled with their
failure to build anything more durable instead, produced the state failures and civil wars in
Libya, Yemen, and Syria’ (Pollack in Brookings Institution, 2015). This goes back to the idea
that the Arab Spring was about the destruction of the central authority who was unable to
provide for its people (social needs, basic needs, economic prosperity…). The aftermath of
these destructions was not planned, and the Middle East lost its leaders, as some countries
(Yemen, Libya, Syria) entered Chaos. Kaplan (2014) says that ‘order is preferable to
disorder’, but would you agree when he says that ‘dictatorship is preferable than chaos’?
Whether it is regimes that are still standing or regimes that fell, the lack of leadership is felt
in some countries. Most of the regimes that fell were not replaced by strong regimes, but
rather by instability. The fear of autocratic regimes will not help resolve the political issues at
a national level. ‘The problem of unresolved political future is already a key driver in the
evolution of the strategic environment in the greater Middle East’ (Lesser, Nardulli and
Arghavan in Khalizad and Lesser, 1998).
2- Regional level
‘Middle Eastern chaos demonstrates that the region has still not found a solution to the
collapse of the Ottoman Empire’ (Kaplan, 2015). By this idea, Kaplan’s point of view is that
the Ottoman Empire used to rule the region as a leading power. Today, there is no power
ruling and controlling the region. One of the reasons is that ‘the states which are part of the
region are mostly middle powers’ (Gaub, 2015). And the three countries that potentially
present themselves as more than middle powers are actually non-Arab states: ‘Turkey, Iran
and Israel are seen as part of the Middle East but they are neither Arab nor part of a regional
organisation including them’ (Gaub, 2015). These three countries have the characteristics to
be leaders in the region, but the simple fact that they are non-Arab makes it difficult for them
to impose their power.
Israel is a military power feared by some countries in the Middle East. The military capacity
of Israel is strong enough for the country to be seen as a leader. Geopolitically, Israel
regroups some of the most important assets to become a major power in the region. Its

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geographic position enables it to be between the open world and the Middle East. Israel
recently discovered Off-shore Gaz. And finally Israel is supported by the United States, a very
strong ally. However, Israel will not rule on the Middle East, not only because it is not an
Arab country, but because of two other reasons: the policy of isolation towards Middle
Eastern countries that creates more enemies, and the relation between Israel and Palestine,
noting that Palestinians are very supported by Arab countries, especially in their fight against
Israeli domination. Besides, ‘whatever the outcome of the peace process, Israel is destined to
be a Jewish ethnic fortress amid a vast and volatile realm of Islam’ (Kaplan, 1994). So it is
difficult to imagine Israel as the leader of the Middle East.
Turkey on the other side has much more to offer. Seen for many years as the ‘mediator’ of
the region, Turkey has developed a policy of ‘zero problems’ to get closer to the countries of
the region. Recently Turkey has been shaken by the conflict in Syria, and this policy didn’t
last for long. Meanwhile, Turkey is a natural leader in the region. Maybe not politically, but
its proximity with Europe is an advantage. Its economy and its demography have their
importance. And finally, vital resources for the region –such as water– can be found in
Turkey. Nevertheless, Turkey, other than being non-Arab, is accused of putting its interests
before the interests of the region. For example, Turkey supports the Islamic State (IS) as long
as the IS will fight the Kurds.
Therefore, Turkey has lost its chance of being a major power ruling over the region.
In his book, Arnaud Pautet (2015) mentions the numerous advantages of Iran: oil, gas,
demography, geography, influence in the region and so on. On another hand, Graham Fueller
(2015) is convinced that ‘The role of Iran as an actor in the region will grow’. If you consider
the recent events in the Middle East, you can witness the growing influence of Iran. First of
all, Iran signed a Nuclear Deal with the P5+1 group, which allows it to go out of its isolation
and gain more legitimacy in regional and global foreign policy. Second, Iran, by taking
advantage of the situation in Syria and Iraq, increased its control over the regime of Bashar
Al-Assad, over the Iraqi government and over the Lebanese militia Hezbollah, reinforcing the
importance of the Shi’a arc. The implication of Iran in Syria is however a reason why it will
not be the future leader. This potential future leader also faces a strong opposition from Saudi
Arabia, which grows bigger every time Iran makes a move in the region. Despite the nuclear
deal, the West will always be suspicious of Iran, as its influence grows. Finally, the military
capacity of Iran is only defensive, thus it cannot be a military leader in the region. And let us
not forget that Iran is not an Arab country.
If Israel, Turkey and Iran can be seen as potential leaders, they have to face many obstacles,
but the fact that they are non-Arab countries in an Arab region won’t change, so is their
inability to rule over an Arab region, dominated by Arabs to whom the idea of nationalism
and Arabism is stonger than the idea of power. Their actions may however lead to a balance
of power, or rather balances of power, considering their respective relationship with each
other and with the world powers (EU, US, Russia, China).
Sure, the lack of leadership led to a chaotic situation in the Middle East. But on another
hand, this chaotic situation does not encourage any leader to come to power. Today, there is
no Arab unity and the different countries are more opposed, because of the situation. The
coalitions change every once in a while, the cooperation between the countries is very limited,
and the stability of the region depends on the stability of the relationship between the
countries. Since the Arab Spring, states of the Middle East are divided, and the region seems
to be lacking an ‘Arab voice’, which increases instability. ‘Arab military forces have largely
been missing in action in the battle against ISIS’ (Sokolsky, 2015). IS is a good example to
show that Arab countries are divided, and all they could use is, if not a leader, unity.
Meanwhile, unity is idealistic in a region where division has always prevailed and where unity
today is not even a façade anymore. Considering Arab countries that could become leaders in

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the region, Saudi Arabia and Qatar seem to be the most legitimate ones. However, Qatar has
lost influence after its support to the IS, and Saudi Arabia is struggling with many issues –
such as the new king, its relationship with Iran, the war in Yemen. Another important issue to
consider is that it is not clear whether the next Arab leader will be a political leader and
therefore an Arab leader, or a religious leader. The distinction between religion and politics is
very delicate in the Middle East, and any power that will rise to lead the region will have to
distinguish between leading the Arab states (politically) and the Arab people (religiously).
Finding a leader capable of resolving the issues of the Middle East and end the chaos is
complex, especially without a world leader.
3- Global level
Many would agree with the idea that the world is lacking true leadership today. In fact, as
Marwan Bishara (2015b) says, ‘there are many world leaders, but […] no leadership’. The
lack of leadership in the world had repercussions on the stability of the Middle East. As the
US and the EU lost their dominant place in the world, they also lost their control over the
region. In fact, the failure of the American foreign policy in the Middle East is obvious. And
to quote Hisham Melhem: ‘Obama in the Middle East: What We’ve Got Here is failure … of
leadership’ (in Hagopian, 2015). The US is no more the hegemonic power of the world, and
certainly not of the Middle East. ‘Even Europe, which is presumably more capable than the
rest to act globally, has been either terribly divided or playing catch-up with the US and
Russia’ (Bishara, 2015b). The world multipolarity reflects the idea that no power is good
enough to be the world leader today. At least, no power is good enough to act as a leader in
the Middle East. The US and Europe failed in controlling the region or predicting the changes,
and thus contributed to the increase of instability. Russia seems to take profit from the
situation and to act freely in the region (Russian actions in Syria), but it doesn’t mean that
Russia is the new leading power of the region, or even the new leader in the world. Because
America stepped out of the Middle East, Russia stepped in. The problem is that, only the US
and ‘No other outside power has the capacity to really make a decisive difference in the
region’ (Carafano, 2015). Since ‘the end of America’s great power role in organizing and
stabilizing the region’ (Kaplan, 2015), Russia wants to replace it, but can it really influence
change in the region?
The lack of control from outside powers in the Middle East is a reflection of the lack of
leadership in the world, which is an issue that will not be resolved easily. And as long as a
world order is not found, the Middle Eastern region will still be uncontrolled, unstable, and
unpredictable.
Since 2011, the regimes of the Middle East are changing, the leaders are missing in the
region, and the world powers are not strong enough to influence it. The lack of leadership in
the Middle East caused by insecurity in the region embedded it into instability, but, As
Florence Gaub (2015) says, ‘Stability can be created in multipolar systems when a balance of
power is created; the process might entail shifting alliances as well as conflict’. In fact, since
the Arab Spring, the Middle East witnessed more than once a reconfiguration of the alliances.
Till today, countries from the region as well as outside powers often shift from one alliance to
another, depending on the situation, the conflict, and the outcome. The most difficult part to
understand is that the Middle East does not seem to be a bipolar region disputed by two
alliances, but rather a multipolar system with shifting alliances.

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II- A reconfiguration of the Region
Having no hegemonic power in the Middle East or even in the world is not the only reason
why the region is subject to a reconfiguration. The US interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan
coupled with the events since 2011 have also been important catalysts of the Middle East
reconfiguration. The actors are not the same, or at least their role has changed, new actors are
born, new conflicts emerged, the US lost its credibility and the EU most of its influence, and
nobody controls the region anymore.
The reconfiguration of the region is an expression of the multipolarity of the Middle East.
This same multipolarity makes it difficult to categorise the actors of the region, understand the
issues and controversies, and find a power willing to lead this complex region and restore
stability. The many changes that occurred and still occur concern four dominant aspects: the
internal powers, Iran, the Shi’a-Sunni opposition, and the external powers.
1- Internal powers
The Arab Spring has forced the Middle East countries to reconsider their interests,
reevaluate their true power, and identify their enemies. The complex situation of the region
has led some actors to become more active, and others to become more discreet. It is difficult
to define the relationship between theses actors, as they depend on the situation and not on the
alliances. For example, Saudi Arabia and Qatar oppose the regime of Bashar Al-Assad,
however, Saudi Arabia condemns the actions of the IS, supported by Qatar. As Haizam
Amirah-Fernández (2015) explains, united allies against a threat are not the same against
another threat. This is one of the reasons why the reconfiguration of the Middle East powers is
neither clear, nor permanent and continues to destabilize the region.
We can witness new actors, new conflicts and new regimes since 2011, which complicates
the question. Old allies become rivals and old rivals become allies. Middle East States do not
like to compromise, and do not act in consideration of other actors, but rather in consideration
of their own immediate interest. And with all the new issues in the region, the cards are
reshuffled very often, and they are very difficult to read. As an example, ‘The Saudis seem
uncertain as to who is their greater threat, Iran or the Islamic State’ (Gause, 2015). The
Islamic State is also a threat to Iran. Does this mean that the Saudis and Iran are “allies”
against the Islamic State? Until now, they haven’t been cooperating, but would both benefit
by focusing on the imminent threat of DAESH rather than on their rivalry. It is complicated to
expose the alliances, as they are many and constantly changing. However, it is interesting to
see the position of the most powerful countries of the region.
Turkey is a powerful state in a tormented region. Seen as the old ‘mediator’ of the region,
Turkey doesn’t know exactly where to stand today. The Syrian conflict pushed Erdogan to
intensify his actions against the Kurds, shifting the focus from any other major issue, such as
the destitution of its Egyptian ally Morsi, or the fact that ‘Turkey fell into the trap of
sectarianism, and became identified with the Sunni camp’ (Ozel and Ozkan in Kausch,
2015:95).
Egypt is still a geostrategic power, and the new president Sisi has taken only a discreet
position concerning issues such as Yemen where he supports Saudi Arabia, or issues such as
Syria where he tacitly supports Assad but still benefits from the friendship of Saudi Arabia,
despite a Russian arms trade partnership. Egypt is also struggling internally against the threat
of Islamists, especially in the Sinai region.
The GCC (Gulf Cooperation Council) has lost its unity. Saudi Arabia is too weak and too
preoccupied to lead the Council, and Qatar is embedded in the scandal of its support to IS.
Saudi Arabia has a big role to play in the region, especially in the Yemen war and the Syrian
conflict, mainly because of its rivalry with Iran.

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Israel is happy to see that the region is now fighting against a common threat that is ISIS.
Thus, Israel is no more the common enemy of every Arab State, and it gives the Israeli a
legitimate reason to fear Muslims. Meanwhile, the instability of the region leads to more
‘geopolitical vulnerability and regional isolation’ (Berti in Kausch, 2015:50) and therefore
Israel’s violence seems more defensive.
Turkey, Egypt, Gulf States and Israel are all powers that have been influenced by the events
of the region, which complicates multipolarity, not only because of their implications in these
events but also because of the inconsistency of their foreign policy towards the region.
Iran on another side has been trying to keep the same principles in foreign policy, or at least
the same allies, and is today considered as an important actor of the Middle East that tries to
form a Shi’a bloc focused around its supremacy.
2- Iran
Iran must be approached independently of other states, because of its new and dominant role
in the region. But none of that could have happened without the Arab Spring. In fact, the Arab
uprisings gave Iran the opportunity to stand as the new power that ‘has been effective at
filling regional power vacuums’ (Sadjapour and Ben Talablu in Kausch, 2015:36). The
conflict in Syria coupled with the Nuclear Deal gave Iran the opportunity it needed to increase
its influence over the region. In 2009, Iran began to develop a plan in order to spread its
power over the region. The regime ‘mercilessly crushed the Green Revolution in 2009, and
have invested heavily in authoritarian partners in Iraq and Syria, paramilitary group such as
Hezbollah, and non-democratic movements in Bahrain and Yemen’ (Cambanis, 2015), while
getting implicated in the Syrian war, and today ‘Iran shows no sign of ending its support for
the regime’ (Farhi et al. 2015). As opposed to other powers, Iran’s foreign policy towards the
Middle East is still the following; no matter the events, Iran has the same allies, and this is
one of the reasons why it is one of the most influential actors of the region.
The Nuclear Deal also contributed to the emergence of Iran as a dominant actor. On one
side, ‘The Gulf States are hoping that [the] agreement will […] eventually make Iran a more
responsible regional actor’ (Farhi et al. 2015), and on the other side, the deal ‘has Israelis
frightened’ (Goldberg, 2015). One thing for sure is that the deal ‘will have direct influence
over the balance of power in the region’ (Herzog in Goldberg, 2015), and also in the world, as
the world powers reconsidered their relationship with Iran, and suddenly, ‘even “the old
enemy” Iran turned out to be a more sensible interlocutor’ (Mert, 2015). Iran took advantage
of this Deal to reconfigure its foreign policy and reaffirm its (now legitimate) domination in
the region. The deal changed the relations between Iran and the West from distrust to trust;
the deal gave Iran enough power to act freely in the region (implication in Syria); and the deal
was enough for Iran to frighten its neighbours. Was all this part of Iran’s plan? At least Iran
succeeded in increasing its influence over the region. However, the concept of an influential
Iran is not new. Some Arab rulers have the impression to assist to the comeback of the Persian
Hegemony. For example, Walid Jumblatt (Lebanese Druze Leader) compared the role of Iran
in the region to the ‘revenge of Cyrus the Great’ (Perrin, 2015). The Iranians have been one of
the most active actors in the region, being implicated in the conflict in Syria, supporting the
Houthis in Yemen, influencing the Iraqi government and so on… Thus it is difficult to see
Iran lead the region, as it cannot widen its influence anymore, being stuck with many issues,
and because in truth, Iran is more reactive than active. In fact, without the Arab Spring, Iran
could not have acted as it did.
Finally, contrary to other countries of the region, Iran’s interests and position do not depend
on the events but rather on its allies, giving it the power to maintain its strong position, to
influence the region as the Persian successor and to be (re) active. Meanwhile, if the Nuclear
Deal seems like part of Iran’s plan to get closer to Western countries and to impose its foreign

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policy goals, it ‘might actually contribute to a more unstable and violent Middle East’ (Farhi
et al. 2015), not only because of a frightened Israel, but also because of the unbalanced power
between Iran and Saudi Arabia, two countries using the Shi’a-Sunni opposition to fight their
battles.
3- Shi’a-Sunni opposition
If the Shi’a-Sunni opposition is seen as one of the causes of the instability in the Middle
East, the growing tension between Iran (Shi’a bloc) and Saudi Arabia (Sunni bloc) is also a
consequence of the events since 2011. The main problem in the Iran-Saudi relation (hence
Shi’a-Sunni relation) is that ‘both Tehran and Riyadh see themselves as the natural leaders of
not only the Middle East, but also the broader Muslim world’ (Sadjapour and Ben Talablu in
Kausch, 2015:42). Therefore, ‘We are witnessing a struggle for regional dominance between
two loose and shifting coalitions — one roughly grouped around Saudi Arabia and one around
Iran’ (Cambanis, 2015). Since 2011, the tension between the two blocs increased, as well as
the proxy battles (for example Yemen), thus participating in the region’s reconfiguration.
It is told that the Iranian Shi’a bloc controls four major cities today: Tehran, Baghdad,
Damascus and Beirut (with Hezbollah). Iran’s objective is to spread its ideology throughout
the region, by supporting and financially boosting regimes, militias and even non-militarized
groups. Again, the Nuclear Deal gave Iran a strong backup in order to strengthen the
legitimacy of the Shi’a bloc in the region. On the other side, ‘the Saudi leadership’s overall
strategy is to shape and defend a regional order friendly to Saudi Arabia’ (Cook, Stokes and
Brock, 2014). And this is why tensions have increased between Tehran and Riyadh, especially
since ‘Riyadh has undertaken a major initiative to unite Sunni states in an anti-Iran alliance’
(Farhi et al. 2015).
The events that occurred in the region and the differences between Shi’as and Sunnis have
increased the tension of the already fragile relation between Iran and Saudi Arabia. In fact,
when the Shi’a government of Nouri al-Maleki came to power in Iraq, it conducted
‘counterinsurgency policies […] aimed at reducing the influence of Sunnis in the state and the
military’ (Mather, 2014). These policies pushed the Sunni Iraqis to be strongly opposed to the
Shi’a, and some of them even joined the IS, to fight the great Shi’a enemy. Moreover, the
opposition between Tehran and Riyadh constantly nourishes the hatred between these two
opposed Muslim groups. Opposed because ‘The Saudi bloc wants to turn back the clock to the
status quo ante that existed before the uprisings. The Iranian bloc wants to permanently alter
the region’s balance of power’ (Cambanis 2015). The Sunnis are scared about what Iran wants
to achieve, especially since the Shi’a’s objectives seem feasible. Indeed, Sunni powers such as
Turkey seem threatened by Iran; ‘President Erdogan warned that Iran is trying to dominate the
region’ (Sadjapour and Ben Talablu in Kausch, 2015:43).
The Arab Spring also showed that ‘the Saudi-Iran rivalry is sectarian (Sunni vs. Shiite),
ethnic (Arab vs. Persian), ideological (US-allied vs. US-opposed), and geopolitical’
(Sadjapour and Ben Talablu in Kausch, 2015:42). Iran and Saudi Arabia use proxies to fight
their battles and to reaffirm their rivalries. Take for example DAESH. Sadjapour and Ben
Talablu (in Kausch, 2015:42) believe that ‘Though DAESH is a threat to both Tehran and
Riyadh, it is unlikely that the two sides will manage to directly collaborate’, only because
their rivalry is so strong. The situation in Bahrain was also an act of the Shi’a-Sunni
opposition. Iran tried to influence large protests in this majority Shi’a island ruled by Sunni
minority. However, Saudi forces made sure to defend their Sunni ally, the Al-Khalifa
monarchy. Finally, Yemen is the strongest example to illustrate the Tehran-Riyadh rivalry.
Sadjapour and Ben Talablu (in Kausch, 2015:38) explain that Iran supported the Houthis (also
called Ansar-Allah) when they took control of the Yemeni capital and tried to destitute the

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president Mansur Hadi. Saudi Arabia then decided to lead a coalition and to restore president
Hadi in Yemen.
The ongoing conflict gives a clear idea of the importance of the opposition between Saudi
Arabia and Iran, especially after 2011, when Iran’s influence increased. Iran took advantage
of the protests in the region to try and control some countries like Bahrain and Yemen.
Meanwhile, it is necessary to know that the Shi’a bloc going from Tehran to Beirut, passing
by Baghdad and Damascus, will continue to spread across the region, increasing fear in the
Saudi-led camp, and therefore intensifying the proxy wars. The rivalry between Saudi-Arabia
and Iran illustrates the multipolarity of the region and is synonym of a fight for the (empty)
power of the region.
External powers such as the US and the EU are also scared of Iran’s influence in the region,
especially when Iran is strongly supported by Russia. The game of external powers in the
Middle East changed since 2011, contributing to the reconfiguration of the region and its
instability.
4- External powers
The influence of external powers on the Middle East has always been of importance for the
stability of the region. Since the Arab Spring, with their direct or indirect implications in the
events of the region, external powers such as the US, the EU, China and Russia have all
played a defining role in the reconfiguration of the Middle East not only because of their
foreign policy and their relation with countries in the region, but also because we can assist
today at a reconfiguration of power between these 4 external actors. If we take the example of
the civil war in Syria, ‘the history of civil wars suggests that external intervention can have a
dramatic influence’ (Pollack and Walter, 2015). One of the influences is to reconfigure the
actors of the civil war, and in the case of the Middle East, to mainly reconfigure the actors in
Syria, as ‘external powers can […] tilt the military balance’ (Pollack and Walter, 2015). The
changing balance of power between these four external actors contributed to the
reconfiguration of the region.
The US: The US seems to have lost its supremacy, and it has failed its foreign policy
concerning the Middle East. Not only because of the disastrous invasion of Iraq, but also
because of its passivity regarding the conflict in Syria, IS, the situation in Libya and so on.
The Arab Spring took the US by surprise, and it had to act on many fronts with new actors in
order to conserve its interests; IS in Syria and Iraq, Morsi in Egypt and now Sisi, rebels in
Libya, Iran… Pollack and Walter (2015) agree that ‘when it comes to the Middle East, the
United States’ first and foremost interest is in oil exports and oil market stability’. However,
Pierre Razoux (2013) argues that the US have many more interests in the region, such as
Israel’s safety; insuring free trade in the region especially with the Suez Canal and the Strait
of Hormuz; being closer to China to be able to influence (if needed) China’s energy provision.
One thing for sure is that the Nuclear Deal signed with Iran is strategic, as it guarantees a
good relation between the US and the soon-to-be power, Iran, but seems more profitable to
Iran’s legitimacy.
Since the rise of IS, the US objective has been mainly to dismantle terrorist networks and
fight terrorist groups. This is why the US led a coalition to fight ISIS in Syria and Iraq, even if
this coalition has been accused of not destroying ISIS, but rather of containing it. ‘Several of
the Arab countries (mainly Turkey and Saudi-Arabia) included in the coalition have expressed
misgivings about the US policy targeting DAESH but not the Assad regime’ (Echague in
Kausch, 2015:187). Indeed, the US strongly opposed Assad’s action in the beginning of the
Syrian conflict, and even condemned the use of chemical weapons by the regime, threatening
to intervene. But Obama did not act, and this is when the US foreign policy looked like a
failure. ‘Nevertheless, pre-2011 policies remain in place and the US continues to support

11. 11
authoritarian regimes in the name of stability and cooperation on security issues’ (Echague in
Kausch, 2015:189).
Finally, the US contributed to the reconfiguration of the region in three ways: first the US
had new allies and new rivals, and reshuffled the alliances; second the US gave Iran the power
to rise in the region; third the US left a vacuum in the Middle East.
The EU: it is difficult to talk about the foreign policy of the EU, as it seems inexistent towards
the Middle East since 2011, with the exception of the intervention in Libya and its implication
in the Middle East Peace Process. The EU and even the three European powers (France,
Germany and the UK) have been seen as followers, who try to catch up with Russia and the
US. The EU foreign policy depends on member states; it is therefore complicated for the EU
to act geopolitically or even to take decisions. However, the ‘overall EU geopolitical interest
in the MENA region is well known, not least since the proximity of the region exposes the EU
to Middle Eastern instability’ (Youngs in Kausch, 2015:116). The EU have expressed the
wish to not be directly implicated in the Syrian war, but has suffered the consequences
(Migrants, Terorism). Because the EU foreign policy relies mainly on three states (France,
Germany, UK) it is more interesting to look at these three European powers separately.
France: the interests of France in the region are ‘regional stability, energy security and arms
export’ (Mikail in Kausch, 2015:129). France has always tried to act outside the EU
concerning its foreign policy in the Middle East, even while being a major decision-maker of
the EU. For example, since 2009, France has a military base in the UAE (Peace camp) and
France has been part of the negotiators in the Nuclear Deal with Iran. When it comes to arms
deals, France has been very close to Qatar, Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states. While
condemning the support of Qatar to ISIS, France maintained arms deal with Qatar. It seems
like France follows its interests first. In fact, France is accused of conducting a ‘Business first
policy’, even with the instability of the region. While part of the coalition to fight ISIS, the
actions of France have been very limited but are increasing. France failed to defend the ideas
of democracy, human rights and development in the Middle East by failing Syria and failing
Libya.
Germany: Germany has always been in favour of diplomacy rather than military action. While
Germany does not appear to have strong interest in the region’s energy (because it has
renewable energy), it has a strong interest for arms export. Germany’s strong political and
economic ties with Turkey have surprisingly not been affected by the support of Germany to
the Kurds. Germany developed strong relations with Israel and with Iran, and supports the
PLO, all of which illustrates that Germany has a very independent and non-influenced foreign
policy. Not only independent vis-à-vis the EU, but also vis-à-vis its allies in the Middle East.
If Germany has not been seen as a major power in the reconfiguration of the region, it knows
how to take advantage of it and how to adapt to it.
The United Kingdom: the historical ties between the UK and the region are very strong, should
it concern the Suez Canal, Israel or even the Sykes-Picot division. Today, the UK’s interests
in the region seem to be first security then second economy. The nineteenth century was a
period of glory for the UK in the Middle East, where it controlled most of the region’s affairs.
But in the last decade or so, UK’s foreign policy towards the Middle East seems to have
failed. This was reaffirmed by the withdrawal of British troops in 2009 from Iraq, and the
sudden drop of any aid to the country. Since the Arab Spring, Britain wants to play a new role
in the region, for instance its implication in Syria, and wants to rebuild strong ties with the
Iraqi government, because of the threat of IS. ‘The UK initially saw the 2011 Arab popular
uprisings as a major geopolitical opportunity – a unique moment to remake its relations with
the Arab world’ (Burke in Kausch, 2015:172). The UK did not really contribute to the
reconfiguration of the Middle East, however it wants to take advantage of it today, and to play
a role in the future of the region.

12. 12
Russia: Russia has many interests in the MENA region. Arms trade and oil are the economic
ones. The arms trade concern mainly Syria and Iraq, and the key Russian industries producing
the weapons are supporters of Putin. Russia’s interest in oil is to keep the price of the oil in
the Middle East relatively high, so that Russia will provide Europe with cheaper oil. Another
interest relies in the fear that radical Islam might have repercussion in Russia and in the
Caucasus. The last interest is that Russia wants to compete with the West, especially the US.
After the west intervention in Libya, it is now for Russia to intervene in Syria.
This interest is in reality what leads Russia’s foreign policy today. First, Moscow needs to
make up for its mistakes in Ukraine. Julia Ioffe argues that one of Russia’s goals consists of
‘restoring Russia as a leader of world opinion after the reputational damage it suffered in
Ukraine’ (2015). The second objective of Russia in the region is to support the Regime of
Bashar Al-Assad. There are many reasons why Syria is important for Russia today: Russia
needs access to the Mediterranean; other allies of Moscow have already fallen (Gaddafi in
Libya and Morsi in Egypt); Russia wants to show the West that it can succeed in Syria when
they failed in Libya; and finally, ‘If you don’t help Assad, he’ll lose and then the whole world
will say Putin lost’ (Mirsky in Ioffe, 2015). If some like Ioffe argue that keeping Bashar Al-
Assad in power is about the image of Russia, others like Frédéric Pichon (2013) believe that
Russia stands out from the rest because of the constancy of its Foreign Policy. In both cases,
Russia has been conducting an independent foreign policy opposed to the west and free from
any limitation.
China: China’s first interest is security. The second one is economy. And as the interest of
security prevails over the economic one, China has been reluctant to be implicated in the
Middle East. In fact, China prefers to not intervene in the region and not defend its interests
rather than be embedded in the Middle East’s instability. However, there are three main
interests around which China’s foreign policy in the Middle East is organised. The first
interest is the economic aspect. Arms trade and China’s export to the Middle East have
increased in the last decade. Arms trade mainly concern Egypt, Turkey and recently Iraq, and
overall exports to the region reached $121bn in 2012. The second interest is related to the
Islamists. ‘Beijing is particularly unsettled […] by the spread of Islamic radicalism’ (Neill,
2014) that goes from Syria to Pakistan, and might increase the existing radicalism in China’s
Western region. The One Belt One Road (OBOR) project is the third interest of China.
Indeed, the OBOR goes from China to Europe, passing by countries like Iraq and Syria. The
safety of these countries and the stability of the region are essential for China to realise this
project. If Beijing has many interests in the Middle East, it does not however have a clear
strategy. In fact, China’s foreign policy in the region is unclear, unknown, and unspecified.
Kerry Brown (in Kausch, 2015) explains that ‘China does not have a specific Middle East
policy’. When you analyze the position of China regarding the events of the region you realise
that ‘its default position is to aim for neutrality’ (Brown in Kausch, 2015). Nevertheless,
China has taken two major stands concerning the Middle East: China implicitly supports
Russia and thus the Syrian regime; China insists on favouring a non-intervention policy.
In the end, if China’s foreign policy is imprecise, it is because Beijing does not link directly
its interest in the Middle East with its position on the region: China’s pragmatic foreign policy
is more about securing Chinese interests and be ready to give up these interests in exchange
for security, rather than blindly follow economic needs. Meanwhile, China would like to
contribute more to the reconfiguration of the region if it favours the OBOR project.
The powers implicated in the Middle East (internal or external) and the complexity of the
religious debate have all contributed to the reconfiguration of the region, that is also subject to
the changes brought by the events since 2011. Today, the Middle East is witnessing a
reorganisation of powers and actors, encouraged by the lack of leadership in the region. This

13. 13
unfinished reconfiguration is stressed by the emergence of new actors and new issues, making
it difficult to find a power willing to end multipolarity.
III- New Actors and Controversies
The lack of leadership on three different levels inevitably led to the emergence of new
actors. And the reconfiguration of the region certainly brought new controversies. These new
actors and new issues are a result of the multipolarity in the region, but they are also a cause
of the increase of multipolarity. Seeking to replace old leaders or just to be seen as
independent, actors such as ISIS or minorities have taken advantage of the turmoil in the
region to gain power. On another side, the Arab Spring paved the way to new issues such as
the conflict in Libya, and to new ideologies.
1- ISIS, IS or DAESH.
If we must explain the ISIS phenomenon, the first thing that comes to mind is Samuel
Huntington’s idea of ‘The Clash of Civilizations’ (1996). For Huntington, the ‘most
prominent and dangerous cleavage will be between Islam and the West’ (Lesser, Nardulli and
Arghavan in Khalizad and Lesser, 1998). This pertinent prediction is however not sufficient
enough to explain the Islamic State.
Jama’at Al-Tawhid wal Jihad (organization of monotheism and jihad) is the pillar of the IS.
Abu Musab Al Zarqawi, founder of this movement, recruited jihadists in 2003 when the US
invaded Iraq. The group linked with Al-Qaeda will later be accused by Al-Qaeda to use
extreme violence and barbaric acts. However, this movement continued its actions,
independently. Between 2006 and 2007, the movement seemed to fade away, when the US
destroyed most of it. It turns out that in the last years, this movement regained power because
of the instability of the Middle East. Even before the Arab Spring or the conflict in Syria, the
group (renamed Islamic State in Iraq) took advantage of the situation in Iraq to recruit Sunnis,
discriminated by the new Shi’a government of Al Maliki. The Arab Spring and more
specifically the civil war in Syria created the perfect conditions for the Islamist group to
evolve, widen its activities, recruit jihadists from all over the region and all over the world,
and have a territory on which it can restore its ‘Caliphate’.
The implementation of the Islamic State was facilitated by the lack of leadership in the
region and the reconfiguration of the Middle Eastern regimes. Lesser, Nardulli and Arghavan
(1998) confirm that ‘Islamist movements are acquiring a monopoly by default as the only
serious opposition to failing regimes’. In Syria, the IS is the strongest actor facing the regime
of Bashar Al-Assad. In truth, DAESH is not opposed to the regime of Bashar Al-Assad,
because the Syrian regime helped in a way the development of the Islamist movement.
Freeing Islamist prisoner, creating the prefect conditions to their development and giving the
IS a territory on which jihadists can fight for their ideology made of Bashar Al-Assad a friend
more than an enemy. ‘Is it so hard to fathom that ISIL and the Syrian regime have a symbiotic
relationship where the parasite would not freely kill the host?’ (Hagopian, 2015). External
powers also facilitated the implementation of ISIS. The weapons given by the US to help the
‘opposition’ ended up in the hand of IS, giving them the means to fight their battles; IS was
financially supported by Qatar and other Gulf countries; and as Arnaud Pautet (2015)
explains, the activities of the jihadists are made easy by Turkey because Turkey prefers
jihadists to Kurds, especially when jihadists fight Kurds. ISIS is also taking advantage of the
world discomfort (economic crisis, unfavourable social conditions) to recruit jihadists from
Europe, Russia, the US and so on.

14. 14
The Islamic State has a three-step strategy that explains how it is so powerful today and so
threatening for the West. In an article written in French, Gillon and Marbot (2015) explain
this strategy. The first step consists of exhausting the West with chronic terrorism. The second
step is barbarous acts, and the final step constitutes the establishment of a State (Caliphate in
this case). This strategy led to create chaos in the region, with the intervention of Russia, the
implication of a coalition led by the US etc… and the populations living in Syria, specifically
in regions not controlled by the regime, are in search of someone or something that can
control this chaos and put an end to it. ISIS seems to be this someone or something.
There are not many solutions exposed before us as to what to do of ISIS and how to defeat it.
This actor is not new, but has certainly new means and has taken a dimension never seen
before. Pollack and Walter (2015) simply suggest that if we ‘resolve the civil war, […] the
source of ISIS’s strength and appeal disappears’. It is true in a way, however the ideology
they follow will still be. Another solution proposed by Graham Fuller (2015) is that ‘Ideally
ISIS should fail and fall on its own’ as did the Roman Empire. But the Roman Empire ruled
for over 400 years before it collapsed. An imminent solution doesn’t seem to be found. The
threat of ISIS is surely scaring the actors of the region, but also neighbours like Russia and
Europe. Maybe the solution is to take a step back and to understand the meaning of ISIS
actions and not only their barbarous acts. Kaplan (1994) said it very well: ‘to see the future,
the first step is to look back to the past immediately prior to the birth of modernism’.
The situation in the Middle East and the lack of leadership, more specifically the lack of
control of regions like Iraq and the Levant have contributed to the rise of the Islamic State,
which contributes in turn to the complexity and the multipolarity of the region.
2- Libya
Libya is considered a new issue not only because actors that didn’t have power during
Gaddafi’s rule are now involved in the transition, but also because Libya is a new type of
‘conflict’, where traditional conflict resolving solutions cannot be applied, and conflict
management seems to have failed.
The reconfiguration of the region, (and in the case of Libya the destitution of Gaddafi),
coupled with the lack of global leadership led to a disastrous situation that Hillary Clinton
characterizes by ‘innocents executed, a terrorist haven, a nation in chaos’ (in Rubin, 2015).
The 2011 military intervention in Libya did not plan the aftermath of the intervention and
declared ‘mission accomplished’ as soon as Gaddafi was killed, which explains the disastrous
post-Gaddafi situation.
Libya is a rich country, mainly because of the oil and the resources (gas and gypsum), but
also because of its culture. Libyans see their tribal division as a strength rather than a
weakness, and experts on Libya (such as Evy Deman who is working at the Belgian Foreign
Affairs Ministry and is specialized on Libya) can assure that the origin of the conflict is not
confessional. The problem of Libya today is the transition from the Gaddafi era to a post-
Gaddafi democracy. And the international community did not assure this transition. In a
speech at the UN, Obama confirmed that ‘Even as we helped the Libyan people bring an end
to the reign of a tyrant, our coalition could have and should have done more to fill a vacuum
left behind’ (in Tafuri, 2015). Indeed, ‘the U.S. did little to ensure postwar Libya’s survival
and stability’ (Rubin, 2015), and what we can witness in Libya after the death of Gaddafi is an
absence of political transition and a rivalry for leadership, fought on the Libyan soil rather
than on the diplomatic and political field. However, in the last two years or so, we have seen
major efforts from the UN to try and form a government of national unity, supposedly
replacing the two actual governments: the one in Tobruk recognized by the International
Community, and the one in Tripoli accused of being held by Islamists. Talking about
Islamists, the Islamic State is a constant threat to Libya and there is a constant fear that it will

15. 15
take control of the country (or at least a part of it). Rubin (2015) affirms that after the death of
Gaddafi, ‘Jihadists poured in, as the country became another safe haven for terrorists’. Many
IS members have been trained in Libya, and many Libyans who fought in Syria are returning
to Libya. ‘On a per capita basis, Libya’s 6 million people have provided more fighters for
conflicts in Iraq and Syria than any other countries. But now, the home front is turning into a
battlefront’ (Brannen and Johnson, 2015). The deteriorated political, economic and social
situation in Libya has effectively provided ISIS with another environment favourable for its
actions and recruitments. Nevertheless, Libya is neither Syria nor Iraq, and the IS faces many
obstacles. First, Libya lacks the sectarian and religious division between Sunni and Shi’a.
Second, Libyans who believe in Political Islam (Government of Tripoli) are opposed to the
Islamic State, and will prevent it from leading the country. And third, even if the IS is
dominating some zones, ‘These zones are more aspirational than they are real’ (Joscelyn in
Brannen and Johnson, 2015). The Islamic state, even seen as a threat, cannot easily control
regions in Libya as it does in Syria, because there is a will in Libya to not let Islamists take
over. There is also outside implications that will prevent ISIS to extend its actions to Libya.
Egypt stands against Islamists (therefore supporting the Tobruk government) and has already
bombed strategic position. Tunisia, Algeria and Morocco are scared of the threat of terrorism
in the region, so they are active in finding a solution. For example, Morocco has played an
important role in the negotiations between the two governments. There is a political will
inside Libya and also outside Libya to resolve the crisis. And if partition is not a solution, the
only viable one seems to be Government of National Unity. Influencing both sides and
bringing them to cooperate is the only way to avoid a longer conflict, to prevent terrorists
from controlling the region, and to assure a democratic transition worthy of its name.
3- Minorities
Minorities are not new actors in the Middle East. However, since the Arab Spring, some
minorities have been considered as new issues, because since 2011 they have been playing a
crucial role in the reorganisation of power in the region, particularly in Iraq and Syria. The
minorities in the region are from important relevance. Indeed, belonging to a minority is part
of the identity. As General Lloyd Austin said, ‘It is more important to be a Shi’a or a Sunni or
a Kurd than it is to be an Iraqi. And until this changes, it is going to be increasingly difficult
to unify the country’ (Brookings Institute, 2015). It is possible to categorize these minorities.
There are ethnic minorities, linguistic minorities and religious minorities. If the Arabs are
considered the majority, they are divided into minorities, not only religiously (Sunni, Shi’a,
Christians…) but also ethnically. In fact, they do not all share the same dialect, the same
traditions, the same way of life. And this is dangerous when you consider that Arabs have to
face three important non-Arab minorities: Turks, Persians and Israelis.
Even if the issue of minorities is complex, it is a crucial one for the region, especially since
2011, when the Arab Spring continued to divide the region and to empower minorities such as
the Kurds. ‘Samuel Huntington […] views clashes of civilizations as the basic conflict of the
present and argues that such clashes are inevitable’ (Primakov, 2009). In the Middle East, it is
rather clashes of minorities than clashes of civilizations. The reconfiguration of the region
gave hope to some minorities that took advantage of the situation to fight for their cause; to
fight for their independence: the Kurds. The Kurds are not new actors but more of an issue
that reemerged in 2011 with the conflict in Syria. It is important to focus on Kurds because of
their strong implication in the changes of the Middle East. The 25 millions of Kurds are
divided in a region that extend from Turkey to Iran, passing by North West Iraq and North
East Syria. The Kurds do not have their own independent territory, but have however an
illusion of independence with the Autonomous Region of Kurdistan in Iraq. If this minority is
supported by Israel (for strategic interests such as controlling the minority close to Iran or

16. 16
opposing the Turks), the question of independence remains uncertain, while the political
Kurdish parties such as the PYD, the YPG and the PKK are gaining power. ‘The Turkish-
Kurdish dispute will be more critical to the future of the Middle East than the eventual
outcome of the Israeli-Palestinian agreement’ (Kaplan, 1994). The importance of Kurds has
increased with their implication in the Syrian conflict. Strictly opposed to Turkey, the
powerful Peshmerga (Kurdish fighters) is an essential actor in the Syrian conflict that can
influence the balance of power. By fighting both Turkish forces and ISIS, the Kurds have
shown to be very strategic. ‘One reason for the PYD/YPG’s success is that it has maintained a
non-aggression pact with the Syrian regime that has allowed to concentrate on fighting IS’
(Salih, 2015). They are also willing to cooperate with anyone giving them hope. For example,
‘The fighters said the Kurds would accept Assad if he grants them full autonomy’ (Johnson,
2015). However, Kurds have many obstacles to overcome. First they have to fight against
Turkish forces and DAESH, which is not an easy task. Second, ‘the biggest obstacle […] will
be economic considerations’ (Mather, 2014). In fact, the economy of the Kurdistan will have
to rely mainly on Turkey, which will not be willing to cooperate with a new autonomous or
independent region. Finally, ‘there is also the question of Sunni Arabs living in Iraqi
Kurdistan’ (Mather, 2014). The multipolarity of the region and the reconfiguration since 2011
have encouraged minorities to become more implicated in the events in order to influence the
outcome, which led to the destabilization of the region. If no solution seems viable, ‘Vice
President Biden […] suggested carving countries like Iraq into little “tribal fiefdoms” ‘
(Carafano, 2015). Even if ‘the idea of separatism/partition has become far more acceptable in
Iraq in last two years’ (General Lloyd Austin in Brookings Institute), this simplistic solution
will only reinforce multipolarity in the region and does not seem like a long-term solution.
4- Ideologies
The Arab Spring shook the Middle East and confirmed that strong countries of the region are
guided by strong ideologies. The fight for freedom is similar to nationalism; the Middle
Eastern societies needed to gain freedom from the oppressing central authority(ies). It was
predicted. In fact, Lesser, Nardulli and Arghavan (1998) said that ‘Islam and nationalism will
be key drivers in the evolution of societies and policies across the greater Middle East’. And
here we are today, where the fight for nationalism paved the way to Islamism. The Arab
Spring was not only about these two ideologies, ‘the central slogan of the uprisings, has been
interpreted as anything from a return to pan-Arab sentiments to a new Arab liberalism’
(Haugbolle, 2012). Even if the uprisings brought changes, they didn’t however change the
fact that believing in an ideology is stronger than the national identity. And this is one of the
reasons why there is ‘ideological multipolarity’ (Gause, 2015) not only in the region, but even
inside the countries of the region. To better understand the ideologies since the Arab Spring, it
is important to sum up the dominant ideologies of the history of the Middle East. The
Nasserism, brought by Egypt’s formal president Nasser, was directed against the west and had
as an objective to create Arab Unity around Egypt, led by the idea of ‘Arabism’. This Arab
unity is just an illusion, contradicted by the many divisions. The Ba’athism is an ideology
focused on building the Arab, socialist and laic nation. The Ba’athism is the dominant
ideology of Bashar Al-Assad’s regime. The ideology of Islamism existed since the creation of
the Muslim Brotherhoods in 1928.
If the ideologies are not a new issue or a new principle in the region, there are however
newly dominant ideologies since 2011. For example, Iran and Saudi Arabia have opposing
ideologies (it is not new) but they make use of the situation to influence change, and they both
fight to impose their own beliefs. Iran’s Islamist ideology targets Shi’a all over the region,
whereas the Saudi Wahhabism is the guardian of the Sunni Islam. Most of the ideologies,
while characterizing a specific group or religion, praise the idea of Arabism and Arab unity.

17. 17
All these ideologies defend the idea of Arabism, but each one has a different definition of
Arab, except for Western scholars who believed for many years ‘that there was an Arab mind
bent on rejectionism, fundamentalism and terrorism’ (Amirahmadi, 2015). There is no ‘one’
Arab mind; there are many Arab doctrines.
If the most dominant ideology nowadays is Islamism, it is not to be confused with the
ideology defended by the IS. Praising the Jihad and the return of the Caliphate, DAESH is an
ideology of its own with doctrines that are misinterpreted (such as the Jihad). More than an
actor, ISIS is an ideological movement followed and approved not only by some Arabs but
also by people from all around the world. This strong movement is based essentially on the
failure of the Western systems, and ‘as long as the root causes remain (failure), movements
like ISIS will feed on them’ (Amirahmadi, 2015). IS opposition to the Western system and its
negation of the western ideology(ies) will continue until the West can find a way to counter
ISIS’s ideology and contradict its doctrines
These new issues and emerging actors are fighting in an uncontrolled region dominated by
chaos and unpredictable changes, because since 2011, the lack of leadership led to a
reconfiguration of the Middle East as well as to the emergence of new controversies. Both
consequences have increased multipolarity, and the region is dominated by so many actors
that it makes their head spin.
In order to resolve the issues, to control the reconfiguration and to put an end to
multipolarity or at least to contain it, a new hegemonic power is needed. Who will it be? This
is uncertain. However, some actors have potential, all they have to do is follow the guidelines.
IV- In search of a regional order
‘In this world, stability can be achieved by a balance of power or by regional hegemony’
(Lesser, Nardulli and Arghavan in Khalizad and Lesser, 1998). It is essential for the Middle
East to find a leader in the next few years, (maybe months), in order to try and bring stability
to the region. The Arab Spring was synonym of instability, but also of multipolarity. And as
seen earlier, the region, defined by the lack of leadership, the reconfiguration and new issues,
needs a new hegemonic power to (re)instate regional order. However fighting multipolarity is
not easy, and some countries do not have the capacity or even the will to stand as the leader of
the region. The US lost its hegemony and credibility in the region and cannot be seen as the
power to look-up to. China as always has been very discreet, and does not show any wish to
try to lead the region (at least not politically) towards stability. Israel is so badly embedded in
the conflict with Palestine that it will never be able to rule over the region. Finally Turkey
seems more interested in joining the European Union or fighting the Kurds than leading the
Middle East, even if its geostrategic position is favourable for its supremacy. On another
hand, powerful countries are willing to face the problems of the region and take credit for
their actions that could lead to peace. Russia by intervening in Syria showed that it will be
more implicated in the region’s future and replaces the US by gaining credibility. Iran has a
growing influence, and the conditions (Syria war, Nuclear Deal) are perfect in order to make
it a regional champion. Saudi Arabia on the opposite side tries to lead the region by
countering the actions of Iran. Saudi Arabia is not willing to become the leader, but prefers to
fight for it than let Iran dominate. If the European Union seems far away from any strong
imposition in the Middle East, it has everything to gain by being more active and by leading
the change in the region, not only because of its proximity, but also because the EU is the
most experienced actor when it comes to stability and peace.

18. 18
It is therefore important to illustrate how these four powers dominate the regional order, and
what are the guidelines they should follow in order to do so.
1- Russia, the stand-in.
Since 2011, Russia has explored many ways to fill the vacuum left by the US in the Middle
East. The strong ties between Russia and countries like Syria or Egypt have been very useful
for Russia to take control of issues in the region, without any strong opposition. And Russia
did not hesitate to show its military power.
The intervention (or implication) of Russia in Syria shows not only the capacity to intervene
in the Middle East, but also the wish to do so. The concrete proof of Russia’s footstep(s) in
the region is a sign that Putin may be the future leader in the region (or at least in Syria). And
Russia has all it takes to become this true leader, especially ‘if US leaders continue to play
innocent (read stupid) and Europeans continue to play catch up’ (Bishara, 2015a). It is true
that ‘The growth of Russian influence is directly proportional to the decline of American
influence in the region’ (Lukyanov in Ioffe, 2015), and Putin is taking advantage of this to
impose Russia as the main actor of the Syrian conflict and the region’s future. How is Russia
building a step-by-step leadership and gaining power?
There are three ways: first, Putin is supporting the Syrian Regime (not particularly Assad,
but a strong regime) in a conflict that has regional implications; second, Russia is becoming
an indispensable actor in regional matters, for example, ‘Russia has been an important partner
in the P5+1 talks with Iran and took the initiative for the multilateral effort to destroy Syrian
chemical weapons’ (Kausch, 2014); and finally, the US and the EU have been obedient to
Russian conditions when, for instance, Russia ‘threatened to withdraw [its] support to the
Iranian nuclear talks if the West imposed sanctions over the annexation of Crimea’ (Kausch,
2014).
So Moscow has the means to impose itself as a leader, but it also has the will. In fact, Putin
wants to defend Russian interests in the region, specifically the military base in Syria and the
access to the Mediterranean. Putin also wants to expand Russia military actions; after
Ukraine, Russian troops are now posted in Syria. It is a way to intimidate Europe and
America, and to show that Russia is a military power. And finally, Russia’s ‘main aim [is] to
position itself as a competitor and alternative partner to the US’ (Kausch, 2014), and be a
better leader than the US was.
One of the possible futures of the Middle East is to have Russia leading the decisions, the
reconfiguration, and the way towards stability, (or at least Russia’s definition of stability). It is
possible that the multipolarity of the region will be replaced by Russia’s unipolarity. It is
unclear whether this unipolarity will resolve the tensions in the region, or increase them. One
thing for sure is that Russia will continue to gain power and influence, by keeping its foreign
policy indifferent to the EU and the US, and leading its own vision of Russian implication in
the Middle East.
2- Iran, the unlooked-for champion.
‘Iran has been the main benefactor of recent geopolitical shifts in the Middle East’ says
Kausch (2014). Iran has emerged as a new powerful actor after the Arab Spring, and it has
been seen as a frightening one for many reasons, one of them being that it is a potential
leader.
Iran has all the characteristics of a leader: strategic location, social development (education
for example), resources, ideology…
And Iran wishes to become the leader and to govern over the region. The situation in the
Middle East since the beginning of the Arab Spring has been in favor of Iran’s strategy: the
conflict in Syria has made Iran more active; the Nuclear Deal has given Iran more legitimacy

19. 19
to act in the region; the arrival of Hassan Rouhani as president in 2013 improved the image or
Iran. And Iran has taken advantage to act (read react): supporting the conflict in Yemen and
the Shi’a in Bahrein to weaken Saudi Arabia; ruling over Iraq and Syria in order to fight the
threat of the Islamic State; increasing its support to groups over the region such as the
Lebanese Hezbollah in order to expand its influence. What Iran has that is important in order
to lead the region is ideology. The Iranian ideology based on Shi’a Islam can be dominant in
the region especially facing the Sunni Islamic State. The notion of ‘export of Islamic
Revolution’ targets the Middle East, and Iran’s foreign policy is directed towards the
objective of imposing its ideology to its neighbors. The Moral value combined with the need
to liberate Muslims countries from the Saudi domination is what pushes Iran to aim for the
leadership of the region.
Iran has the will to dominate the region, has the ideology to spiritually and morally guide the
Muslim world, and takes advantage of the Middle East instability since 2011. However, Iran
military and strategic powers seem to be on a defensive level. And in order to conquer the
region and rule, it needs to be on the offensive side and to move from being reactive to being
active. Only then will Iran’s foreign policy be dominant in the region and Iran a major power.
However, despite being defensive, Teheran will keep trying to mainly control the Syrian
conflict, provoke proxy wars and master its relationship with the west, passing over Israel’s
fear and Saudi Arabia’s intentions.
3- Saudi Arabia, the hopeless struggle.
Saudi Arabia has many reasons to fight for the leadership, but has no willingness to do so.
Saudi Arabia is losing its power in the region, as well as its allies. The US-Saudi relations are
fading away; the Sunni radicalism let us question the legitimacy of Saudi Arabia’s spiritual
leadership in the Muslim world, for example, ‘the Gulf monarchies fear that the religious
establishments that helped to uphold their rule may be overtaken by the more appealing brand
of political Islam that came to power through electoral politics across the region’ (Kausch,
2014); and finally the Arab Spring has shaken the Saudi Kingdom, both domestically and
regionally. Though, the main reason why Saudi Arabia aspires to become the leader is to
counter Iran in doing so. ‘Since the 2003 US invasion of Iraq, Riyadh has continuously lost
ground to Tehran’ (Kausch, 2014). Add to this the Arab Spring, the empowerment of Iran, the
Nuclear Deal, the friendlier relationship between Iran and the US, and you understand why
Saudi Arabia is struggling with the fear of seeing Iran lead the Middle East. However, Saudi
Arabia has taken many actions or measures to counter Iran and impose its position. First, the
military power of Saudi Arabia has increased in the last decade, mainly because the US will
not anymore protect Gulf countries, and ‘Saudi Arabia fears that the US may switch sides and
support Iranian hegemony in a “grand bargain” around the nuclear deal’ (Kausch, 2014).
Second, Saudi Arabia switched its foreign policy strategy. This foreign policy has been
characterized by ‘Riyadh attempts to raise its domestic legitimacy […] by displaying the
empowered foreign policy independent from the West’ (Kausch, 2014). For instance, ‘Saudi
Arabia became the most vocal advocate of arming the Syrian opposition and ousting Assad’
(Echague in Kausch, 2015:83). Finally, the most concrete action undertaken by the Sunni
leader in order to defy Iran is its implications in military actions in the region (namely proxy
wars). Actions in Bahrein, Yemen, Egypt and Syria have as objective to counter Iran’s
influence in the region. If the struggle is hopeless, Saudi Arabia still tries to influence the
region’s reconfiguration, not in order to become the leader, but at least ‘in order to re-
establish a more favourable regional balance of power’ (Echague in Kausch, 2015:83).
However, as long as Saudi-Arabia does not take concrete and aggressive actions in the region
(without only countering Iran), the Wahabist Kingdom will always be one step behind Iran,
thus losing power.

20. 20
4- The EU, the soft ‘power’.
The EU as a multilateral power does not have the same ability to act as a one-state actor, and
is struggling with institutional and internal issues, and has not yet found its voice regarding
issues such as Syria or Egypt. Moreover, the EU has been exerting a soft power policy
towards the MENA region since the Arab Spring while showing the limitations of soft power.
The EU should be the one leading the change and the events in the Middle East by shifting
from a soft power to a hard power policy, especially if it considers its interests first. In fact,
‘the EU should be aware that there is a circular impact of the crises in Europe and the
neighborhood’ (Otte, 2015) and take concrete actions. The regional instability of the Middle
East affects the stability of the EU (migrants, terrorism). Moreover, the EU has the capacity to
lead the region towards stability, and has the instruments needed to put an end to the region’s
turmoil. This means however that the EU needs to skirt the risks and the institutional
problems, and restructure its foreign policy. Besides, the EU needs to adapt to the situation in
order to become a successful and legitimate leader. ‘Europe must let go of a number of
assumptions’ (Kausch, 2014), and the ‘EU must accept regimes as they are rather than [try] to
remake them in its own image’ (Youngs in Kausch, 2015:122). First, the EU needs to adapt its
foreign policy according to the events in the region and in the world. The EU needs today a
collective action, based on ‘a clear single organizing principle’ (Kausch, 2014). Second,
adapting to multilateralism ‘means that cooperation frameworks need to de-emphasise the
strategic alignment narrative inherent to comprehensive approximation and institutional
memberships’ (Kausch, 2014). And finally, ‘by engaging and involving non-state actors on a
much broader basis’ (Kausch, 2014) the EU will adapt to the new emerging actors of the Arab
Spring.
But as Youngs says, ‘care is needed: today’s wall-to-wall advocacy of a more ‘geopolitical
approach’ could easily open the door to policies that harm rather than advance European
interests’ (in Kausch, 2015:122). Not only are there risks to avoid, but there are also problems
to overcome. The limits of soft power are now visible and ‘Awareness has grown in Europe
that a larger re-positioning is due’ (Kausch, 2014); a hard power policy towards the MENA
region coupled with a willingness to gain influence can lead the EU to become this wanted
regional power.
5- The road for leadership
In order to become a successful leader in the Middle East, the next power should face many
issues, propose solutions, and make sure to be strong enough in order to face opposition, or
even to defeat it. The Iran-Saudi opposition, the Israel-Palestinian conflict and the situation in
Syria are three issues in need of a solution. And whoever wants to lead needs first to propose
and impose solutions.
-­‐ Iran-Saudi opposition: the opposition between Saudi Arabia and Iran, hence the Sunni-Shi’a
opposition is part of Middle East’s instability. The war in Yemen, the implications in Syria,
the situation in Bahrein… all theses events are the expression of this opposition. A partial,
neutral and objective power should lead both sides (individually, or together) to a more
peaceful approach and towards acceptance, without each camp overbidding to gain power.
Russia, close to Iran, cannot lead the way to a fair solution in this case. Turkey, the old
mediator of the region, was too opposed to Iran and therefore failed. The US cannot today
pick any side. The EU, if not impartial, seems neutral and could be the future mediator
between the two powers, leading them, if not towards reconciliation, towards acceptance of
each other. Only then will the EU be strong enough to be seen as a potential leader.
-­‐ Israeli-Palestinian conflict: The Israeli concern is a very sensitive one. However, finding a
solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and influencing Israel is the key to become leader of
the region. The EU seems the closest to achieve this goal, as it is the most active in the MEPP

21. 21
(Middle East Peace Process). Meanwhile, the EU needs to be more aggressive and follow
another strategy: Isolate the Israeli government and compel it to modify its approach to the
Palestinian file as well as the Iranian one (Razoux, 2013). If Israel Education Minister Naftali
Bennett (in Yerkes, 2015) believes that the Israeli-Palestinian conflict can be resolved through
education, especially by teaching tolerance, respect and appreciation (on the long term),
another possible approach is to stop Israel from legitimizing its actions. Isolating Israel and
condemning its actions should go with imposing contradictions (to both parties) in order to
resolve this issue. Only then will the balance of power be equalized, and the region stabilized.
-­‐ Syria: resolving the crisis in Syria is not an easy task for the leader-to-come. The three
different concerns regarding the situation in Syria (Assad, ISIS and the future of Syria) are all
to be resolved in order to put an end to the conflict in Syria and the instability in the region.
However, it is difficult to ask one power to resolve all three issues at once.
Assad: there are mainly two opposed camps on what to do with Assad. The first camp
composed of the EU and Arab States wants the imminent and unconditional departure of
Assad. The second camp (Russia, Turkey) is willing to cooperate with Assad during a
transition period or would prefer to see Assad remain in power (Iran). Bashar Al-Assad needs
to go in order to satisfy all the actors of the region, but it is dangerous to leave Syria empty,
without transition, and embedded in a civil war, with no leader (and have a second Libya).
Problems concerning Assad are much more complicated: the opposition does not agree that
Assad should stay, even for a transitional period (so the civil war will go on), and if Assad
stays, the remaining opposition will be tempted to join IS. It seems like the leader-to-come
has a tough choice to make: ‘Sacrifice Assad to save Syria, or sacrifice Syria to save Assad’
(Bishara, 2015a).
ISIS: the Islamic State is an ideology that will persist, independently of the Syrian war
outcome. The solution is not to only destroy ISIS, but to erase its ideology. A counter-
ideology seems like a solution, however a counter-ideology gives more power to the ideology
of ISIS; it strengthens it by recognizing its power and the need to counter it. Therefore it is
necessary to find another ideology, not comparable to IS but erasing the IS ideology by
prevailing. What gives ISIS a strong power is the failure of the western system, and as long as
this system will have even small flaws, this ideology will be nourished.
Future of Syria: experts on civil war believe there are four ways a civil war could end:
partition, negotiation, intervention and victory (by on side). Russian intervention may put an
end to the conflict in Syria, and Russia will therefore be the ‘natural’ leader. If the
intervention of Russia looks like one of the four solutions to end the civil war trap, other
powers can present another solution to put an end to the conflict. For example, a federal state
(rather than a partition) based on the different groups living (and fighting) in Syria (Kurds,
Christians, pro-Assad, Shi’a, Sunni…) can be a viable solution. Many implications shall be
considered, for instance, if Assad has to stay or no, does ISIS needs to be included or not.
The EU as a Union of 28 countries with different cultures, backgrounds and opinions is the
most experienced (unified) power to guide Syria towards a federal state.
There are four potential leaders for the MENA region, and only one of them is Arab (Saudi
Arabia). Two other are not even part of the region, but are close neighbors (Russia and the
EU). Russia seems to be the most active one, but is limited to Syria. Iran, part of the region, is
a non-Arab state getting more and more implicated in the entire region. Saudi Arabia, the only
Arab potential leader is the weakest one. And finally, the EU, is still convinced that soft
power can work. It is uncertain as to who will be the leader, but it is clear that the Middle East
is in need for one, to fight multipolarity and restore stability. Saudi Arabia seems already far
behind Iran which has nonetheless limited action. The EU foreign policy is soft and limited by

22. 22
internal problems. Russia is the only actor that seems aggressive enough to become a more
powerful actor and influence the regional order.
Conclusion
The Arab Spring that hit the MENA region was not successful in every country. States like
Tunisia or Egypt are said to have succeeded in overthrowing authoritarian regimes and
engaging the democratic process. But for other states, namely Syria or Libya, ‘the gates to
paradise had a hidden trapdoor down to hell’ (Diab, 2015). In truth, the Arab Spring
contributed in destabilizing the region and creating new issues rather than bringing democracy
and freedom to the Middle East. Simply because the uprisings helped overthrown old leaders
without replacing them, helped reshape the regional balance of power, and contributed to
increasing the world multipolarity. The reconfiguration of the region was inevitable,
especially with new issues and actors shaping their way to power. The lack of a hegemonic
power in the world and in the region let us wonder what will come next and who should be
the leader. One thing for sure, is that this vacuum left by old powers and the fight for
leadership are causes of the Middle East instability today. And this instability could easily
create many more conflicts, destabilize ‘stable’ countries and spread war towards the region.
Successful countries now face many challenges. Tunisia for example is considered as the
success story of the Arab Spring, but needs to face many issues such as security, social
instability and unemployment. For example, because of the economic situation, many
Tunisians joined ISIS, said Habib Essid (2015), Head of Government in Tunisia since 2015.
However, he assures that Tunisia is a strong country capable of overcoming these difficulties,
partly because Bourguiba built a strong nation. Tunisia is an isolated case of success, but is
also a very fragile country, that could easily be destabilized because of the region’s situation.
Lebanon is also a country struggling in order to resist the Middle East dangers of conflict and
chaos. The dangers of the Arab Spring, could easily lead an extremely fragile country like
Lebanon into the civil war trap, or even the Middle East war trap. The threat also hits
apparently strong countries like the Gulf States. As Khaled Diab (2015) says, ‘the Gulf States
[…] are far more vulnerable that they appear at first sight’.
There is no ‘one’ solution to all the issues left by the uprisings, however finding a
hegemonic power to rule over the world or the region could help reorganise the Middle East
and restore stability, or at least control the instability. Other solutions have been proposed. For
example, Carafano (2015) talks about promoting governance, fighting corruption and
protecting the society. Thus, all this should come after resolving the conflict in Syria and
restoring strong regimes in the region. Arab unity is also a solution, it will help resolve the
current issues and prevent the future ones. ‘Arab, Turks, Kurds and other groups in the region
could find relative peace in ever closer union’ (Husain, 2015). How to unite countries that
have many differences and have been fighting for a long time? How to unite Iran and Saudi
Arabia? Unity, even if a viable solution, seems utopian. As Pollack (2015) said (in Brookings
Institution), ‘rather that throw away the limited resources available to the West for the Middle
East on the worst problems and the biggest countries, these same resources might have a
much greater impact on these smaller, more progressive countries. In so doing, it could
transform them into breakwaters against the anarchic tide and even models of what progress
might look like’. Give the power to small countries like Lebanon, Tunisia, Jordan, and they
will be the ones guiding the Middle East towards change, peace and freedom. Give these
countries the means to show successful uprisings and transformation, and others will follow.
Meanwhile, even for this alternative, a country should lead the way towards change and
therefore should be strong enough to impose its model.

23. 23
The ideal leader should plant the seeds of change and overcome the domestic dictatorship,
the foreign hegemony, and the region’s instability. And since the big powers (Iran, Russia, the
EU, Saudi and the US) have not shown the capability to succeed in this mission, maybe the
solution lies in small powers or small countries. Maybe the solution should be to take example
on countries that have already experienced uprisings, wars, changes and resistance. Lebanon
did not overcome its problems or the problems of the region, but have learnt to deal with it, to
adapt, to accept these issues while resisting them and to survive in spite of everything.
Lebanon can be a model of what defying instability and conflict is, with means such as
obstinacy to survive, fortitude to resist and fury to live. Maybe following the path of Lebanon
is the solution.

24. 24
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