1. Why did the Arab Spring create large pockets of chaos
and ungoverned spaces in the Middle East and North
Africa?
Michel Abi-Akl
B.A. (Hons)
Submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of
Arts in Diplomacy, Law and Global Change
Coventry University
August 2015

2. Table of Contents
List of Abbreviations....................................................................................... i
Introduction.................................................................................................. 1
Chapter one – Transition from ‘Old’ to ‘New’ Order....................................... 4
Authoritarianism and the Arab World....................................................................................4
The Causes, Nature and Effects of the Arab Spring ...............................................................6
Tunisia ............................................................................................................................7
Egypt...............................................................................................................................8
Bahrain...........................................................................................................................9
Yemen.............................................................................................................................9
Libya.............................................................................................................................10
Syria..............................................................................................................................11
Conclusion............................................................................................................................11
Chapter two – Syria: An ongoing Civil War................................................... 13
Repressive Political Leadership within Civil Society.............................................................13
Sectarian Divisions................................................................................................................14
Divided Army ........................................................................................................................15
Fragmentations within Secular and Islamist Parties ............................................................16
Russia and Saudi Arabia’s Indirect Intervention...................................................................17
Conclusion............................................................................................................................18
Chapter three – Libya: Constant Political and Tribal Rival............................. 20
Illegitimate Political Leadership............................................................................................20
Tribal and Regional Divisions................................................................................................21
Military Disunity ...................................................................................................................22
Secular and Islamist Party Tensions......................................................................................24
NATO’s problematic effect....................................................................................................25
Conclusion............................................................................................................................26
Chapter four – Yemen: A Divided Nation...................................................... 27
Political Leadership’s Arduous Transition.............................................................................27
Regional Divisions.................................................................................................................29
Divided Army and Security Apparatus..................................................................................29
Lack of a Collective Agenda between Secular and Islamist Parties......................................31
US and Saudi Intervention....................................................................................................32
Conclusion............................................................................................................................33

3. Chapter five – Ungoverned Spaces after the ArabSpring:A Comparative
Analysis....................................................................................................... 34
Comparing political leadership and central government in civil society .............................34
Comparing sectarian, tribal and regional divisions ..............................................................35
Differences in Army Unification............................................................................................37
Comparing the agendas between Secular and Islamist Parties...........................................38
Different Effects with and without External Intervention ....................................................39
Conclusion............................................................................................................................41
Conclusion................................................................................................... 42
Bibliography................................................................................................ 45
Certificate of Ethics Approval....................................................................... 51

4. i
List of Abbreviations
AQAP – al-Qaeda in the Arab Peninsula
CCYRC – Coordinating Council of Yemeni Revolution for Change
FSA – Free Syrian Army
GPC – General People’s Congress
GCC – Gulf Cooperation Council
ISIS – Islamic State of Iraq and Syria
JMP – Joint Meeting Parties
MENA – Middle East and North Africa
NATO – North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NDC – Conferencefor National Dialogue
NGC – National General Congress
NTC – National TransitionalCouncil
SCAF – Supreme Council of the Armed Forces
SNC – Syrian National Coalition

5. 1
Introduction
The Arab Spring of 2011 had given rise to a wave of political protest, which was
unmatched in its scope and ambition and had swept the regions of Tunisia, Egypt, Yemen,
Libya, Syria, and Bahrain (Bellin, 2012: 127). The toppling of four authoritarian leaders in
Tunisia and Egypt in 2011, and Libya and Yemen in 2012, showed clear signs that there was
deep unpopularity towards the Arab authoritarian regimes, and that they also faced serious
demographic, economic and political problems (Gause III, 2011: 81). The self-immolation of
Tunisian Mohammad Bouazizi in December 2010 symbolised a wider phenomenon and was
merely a catalyst to the true factors behind the cause of the Arab Spring; poorness, high
unemployment rate, economic corruption, raised prices of food and gas, and the
disappearance of the middle class. This is in addition to political factors such as the umbrage
of dictatorial rulers, long-standing “emergency laws”, outdated or non-existent justice
systems, the denial of democratic benefits such as free speech, and a limited prospect for
participation in civil and political life (Al-Suwailemet al, 2014: 34).
This dissertation will argue that the main reason for the creation of chaos and the
gradual widening of ungoverned spaces in Syria, Libya and Yemen is due to the lack of a
coherent alliance between two of the three key actors; the sectarian civil society, the secular
government and the military. Moreover, the reason for this absence of a solid cohesion is
also because of the sheer amount of divisions on sectarian, tribal, regional, political and
military levels. In order to grasp the severity of these fragmentations within the three case
study countries, this study will focus on five main factors that defined the structure and
stability of political life within the three countries during the events after the Arab Spring.
These are the role of political leadership, the sectarian, tribal and regional divisions, military
unification, relationship between secular and Islamist parties, and the effects of external
interventions. In addition, this study will state that all five of the affected Arab regimes,
excluding Bahrain, suffered various degrees of power vacuums, from the Arab Spring.
Therefore a comparative analysis will also be conducted between Tunisia and Egypt, and
Syria, Libya, and Yemen in order to clearly set the reason for why these power vacuums
lasted dangerously longer in the latter three Arab countries, whereas they were easily filled
by new central authority in the former two. Finally, this study will also mention that due to

6. 2
the severity and gradual increase of these ungoverned spaces in Syria, Libya and Yemen, the
chaos created had attracted various unwanted terrorist organisations such as al-Qaeda and
the Islamic State of Syria and Iraq (ISIS).
The surprising outcomes of the Arab Spring of 2011, as well as internal variation
within the region, puts forward various theoretical insights and even new experiential
realities that govern the dynamics of authoritarianism in the twenty-first century (Bellin,
2012: 127). Many scholars have given different interpretations on the outcome of the Arab
Spring, whether it has successfully ushered in a democratic transition to the affected regions
in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), or whether authoritarianism still stands as the
decades-long, political cultured type of government. Arguments from academics such as
Stigall (2014) and Salamey and Pearson (2012), state that the Arab Spring has brought a
transition in order to the Middle East and North Africa, with Salamey and Pearson (2012:
932) arguing that advancements in global communications technology and economic
globalisation had deeply undermined national authoritarian control and brought forward
politically engaged youths. Other scholars such as Khashan (2012: 919) argued that despite
the Arab uprisings being a series of monumental events, the contours and dynamics of
regional politics in the Middle East and North Africa would unlikely be significantly altered.
These scholars provide many interpretations of the outcome of the Arab Spring on
authoritarianism in the MENA regions, and whether there is a clear transition to a
democratic type of government or not. However, this essay will focus on the gap of why the
Arab Spring caused large pockets of chaos and, what Stigall (2014) refers to as, “ungoverned
spaces”, from the transition in all of the affected authoritarian Arab countries, except
Bahrain. Nepstad (2013), Gause III (2011), Dalacoura (2012) and Kazamias (2011), touch on
some of these factors; all three argue on different dynamics of the defection of the army
from their Arab rulers to their citizens. Nepstad (2013: 337) argues that military troops that
do not receive economic or political benefits from the regimes or troops that perceive the
regimes as fragile are more likely to defect whereas Kazamias argues that culture corruption,
cronyism and incompetence from high levels of government played a somewhat vital role in
the conflict between the government and the middle and lower ranking military officers
(Kazamias, 2011: 153). Furthermore, Gause III argues that a regime will only gain complete
support of the army if the regime represents an ethnic, sectarian or regional minority that

7. 3
dominates the military (Gause III, 2011: 84). As for divided societies Dalacoura (2012: 71)
argues that there were important social and political entities that continued to support the
regime, such as Saleh’s use of an extensive patronage network to co-opt the opposition in
Yemen and major metropolitan centres that remained ambivalent to Assad’s regime in Syria.
Some scholars, such as Bellin (2012), Salamey (2015) and Khashan (2012), have
overlooked this gap in academic research, and this study may prove valuable as it intends to
answer many questions about the stability of governments in the MENA regions. By focusing
on the factors stated previously, this study will enlighten readers regarding the effectiveness
of the Arab countries’ attempted or even full transition from an authoritarian type of
government to a democratic one. In addition, by looking at the current conflicts and ISIS
activities in the MENA regions, this study will also look into the stability of conversion within
the countries and evaluate whether these countries were ready for a transition of this
magnitude.

8. 4
Chapter one – Transition from ‘Old’ to ‘New’ Order
Authoritarianism and the Arab world
The Middle East and North Africa’s transition from ‘Old’ to ‘New’ order constitutes
the change, or attempt of change, in the type of government, in this case from authoritarian
to democratic rule. Authoritarianism describes a systemof government with anti-democratic
and dictatorial political regimes characterised by absolute obedience to authority (Smolkin,
2014: 28). The Middle East is most probably one of the most typical examples of current
authoritarian rule, and after the events of the Arab Spring in 2011- it is evident that
authoritarianism is failing in some areas of the region. So, why is authoritarianism a difficult
form of government to maintain? By looking at authoritarianism in general, an argument by
O’Donnell and Schmitter (1986: 15) states that there is the big “Legitimation Problem” when
it comes to authoritarian regimes. For one they state that during interwar periods,
authoritarian rulers aspire to legitimise their government through a sort of combination of
assembling an imagery of fascismand allusions of traditional forms of corporatism. Thus
they promote themselves as the main and long-term solutions to disorder in politics, as well
as the most appropriate mode of governance for the civil societies. They continue to state
that after 1945 this specific ideology is outdated and that authoritarian rulers cannot count
on that way of thinking anymore. The methods most authoritarian rulers use consist of the
practice of repression and dictatorship in the present while promoting democratic freedom
in the future (O’Donnell & Schmitter, 1986: 15). Another problem is that the attempts of
these regimes in institutionalising themselves, conflicts with the restrictions enforced by
their own discourse. Although the bursts of decree-making and generation of law as well as
expansion of the bureaucracy of authoritarian regimes may increase their capacity of control
or even repression, it does not however consider any permanent arrangements for them.
Authoritarianism is therefore seen as a schizophrenic ideology in which the ultimate demand
ends with the abolishment of the authoritarian regime and its replacement with a
democratic one (O’Donnell & Schmitter, 1986: 15).
The Middle East has been portrayed as a region under turmoil, and it has had its
share of regional wars, coups and external interference. Despite all this, until 2011, Peterson

9. 5
argues that ‘old’ order in the Middle East under authoritarian rule had been stable
(Petersen, 2013: 661). Hudson (in Haddad et al, 2012: 19), states that political scientists
formed many explanations as to why authoritarianism has been very persistent in the
Middle East. One of which is the mukhabarat state which means that Arab regimes were
able to spy on their citizens thus suppress them by inflicting fear and concern. The
institutions used to impose such fear are seen with formidable bureaucracies of control such
as multiple police forces, intelligence agencies, paramilitary organisations and especially the
establishment of the military. Another reason is the “deferential” Arab political culture,
which means that authoritarian rule is seen as suitable because the culture benefits the
elites over the masses and teaches people, since their childhood, to comply with patriarchal
authority (Hudson in Haddad et al, 2012: 19). The final reason is due to Western domination.
The colonial era had established the structures and principles of authoritarianism, which
would ultimately endure much further into the future than the colonial era itself.
Furthermore, the post-colonial period was made clear through major manipulations of Arab
politics by new hegemons, that of the United States and the Soviet Union. According to
Hudson (in Haddad et al, 2012: 19-20), the United States supported the authoritarian
regimes for reasons of Realpolitik and also because they feared any rise of anti-American
implications in the Arab masses’ opinion. This was achieved through economic and military
assistance, intelligence cooperation and diplomatic support.
Decades ago, Arab regimes usually resorted to brutal repression and violence in
order to crush domestic dissent and any opposing societies. The Charter of the League of
Arab States, which had been formed and agreed in 1945, allowed states to protect their
sovereignty and national independence by using any means possible. No exceptions were
made if there was any possibility a regime might lose their legitimacy through domestic
behaviour (Lynch, 2013: 25). The Arab authoritarian ‘old’ order denied the dignity of
individuals as well as the disdain showed to the people by their rulers. The state actors
viewed their people as immature, dangerous and not ready for democracy. Muammar Al-
Qaddafi openly stated what other Arab rulers believed; that their peoples are misled and
simply deluded and that they have no dignity (Khalidi in Haddad et al, 2012: 13). Although
there have been many different interpretations of exceptionalismin the Middle East, there is
however a shared common evaluation; that the strong Middle Eastern authoritarian states

10. 6
were always ready to use harsh coercive action against a weak collection of civil society that
were unable to achieve their own collective demands or a transition to democracy. Similar to
Hudson’s point, Salamey and Pearson (2012: 934) also argue that the dominance of the Arab
rulers had been achieved through the manifestation of military and secret services’ control
over all aspects of life in Middle Eastern civil society and organisations as well as most areas
of the media. In addition the authoritarian regimes were able to terrorise and destroy any
sort of insurgency or protest movements, by prosecuting, jailing and even killing the
nonconformists. This was seen in Iraq by former dictator Saddam Hussein against the Shi’ites
and Kurds as well as in Syria by previous president Hafez Al-Assad against the Sunni Muslim
Brotherhood in the cities of Hamah and Homs, currently reoccurring by his son Bashar Al-
Assad, and finally against the Lebanese citizens who opposed the Syrian overseers based in
their country (Salamey & Pearson, 2012: 934). In many regimes, such as Egypt, Tunisia, Libya
and Saudi Arabia, the leaders had maintained historic repression against their domestic
oppositions. On the domestic level, authoritarian regimes were able to make full use of
popular national pride and social discontent with the Arab country’s colonial past in order to
blame opposition elements of treason (Salamey & Pearson, 2012: 935). Peterson’s (2013)
argument that the ‘old’ was stable, is clearly problematic with various arguments that state
otherwise from other scholars, such as Durac (2013), and the obvious Arab uprisings of
2011-. Although the autocratic rulers were brutal to their own people and thought they
were maintaining a stable government, there were many hidden factors that increased
popular discontent in the MENA regions, such as the socio-economic problems and
corruption and nepotism (Durac, 2013: 180-181).
The Causes, Nature and Effects of the Arab Spring
The nature and character of the Arab Spring, consisted of protests that have taken
the form of sustained campaigns involving thousands of Arab citizens using the same
nonviolent means of resistance against their regimes; strikes, demonstrations, marches and
rallies (Salih, 2013: 184). Looking at the nature of the 2011 uprisings epistemologically, they
differ from previous Arab uprisings in terms of form, content and people’s demands. The
change in political behaviour from the Arab youth and new political elites has changed their
political outlook and their relationship with their domestic regimes and foreign powers

11. 7
(Farazmand, 2011: 7). Whereas before, when Arab uprisings focused more on Arab
nationalismand Salafist Islamin order to promote transnational ideas, the 2011 uprisings
show a new Arab political identity; with the expanding approach to an anti-despotic,
pluralist and democratic regime (Farazmand, 2011: 7). In addition, there is also the counter-
revolution aspect of the nature of the Arab Spring. Despite the nonviolent means of the
demonstrators, the regimes met them with violence from the authorities, with the help of
pro-government militias and counter-revolutions (Salih, 2013: 184). The regimes’ response
to the uprisings was vital in the shaping their outcomes. In this case, political, ethnic and
sectarian divisions were deepened further. In contrast to Tunisia and Egypt, the uprisings in
Libya, Syria, Bahrain and Yemen, clearly demonstrated the “abysmal fragmentation of
societies along sectarian, ethnic and tribal lines” (Ozekin & Akkas, 2014: 83).
Today, by focusing on the post-Arab Spring era, it could be argued that a ‘New’ order
has taken place in some Arab countries in the Middle East and North Africa. Tremors of the
Arab Spring sent shockwaves throughout the regions and these uprisings toppled long-
established authoritarian regimes in quick succession. Many of the autocratic state actors
that had the same structure, such as those in Tunisia, Libya, Egypt and Yemen, were ejected
from power whilst other major protests threatened other state actors as empowered
polities organised themselves and demanded change, with the aid of new technologies as
well as social media (Stigall, 2014: 284-285). Although the shockwave of the Arab Spring
caused similar effects to the regions of the Middle East and North Africa, the aftermath of
the uprisings was different for each country in those regions.
Tunisia
Tunisia, unlike other Arab regimes, had successfully converted from an authoritarian
to a democratic type of government. Mohammed Bamyeh (in Haddad, 2012: 50) argued that
Tunisia had seemed to be an unlikely candidate for revolution because of its stability, a
relatively healthy economy and strength of state apparatus. However, by looking at the
statistics of Tunisia’s socio-economic issue presented by Durac (2013: 180), under Ben Ali’s
rule unemployment raised from 8.6 per cent in 1999 to 44.4 per cent in 2009. There were
also elements or corruption, when Ben Ali granted apparatus of the state to his and his
wife’s family, as well as stripping the Democratic Constitutional Rally (RCD) party of its

12. 8
political power to benefit the two families (Durac, 2013: 181). Furthermore, the citizens did
not enjoy political freedom whilst President Ali was imposing restrictions on the freedoms of
speech and association (Coleman, 2015a: 1). Unlike the military in other Arab countries such
as Egypt, the Tunisian army had never experienced combat. Under the rule of Ben Ali, the
army was but a shadow of the country’s domestic security services which Ben Ali
emphasised with (Anderson, 2011: 3). It was until Tunisia’s transition in 2014 where ‘new’
democratic order became less stable due to Islamist jihadist attacks on two anti-Islam
political figures as well as a terror attack by ISIS on Tunisia’s Bardo national museum in 2015.
The only present reminder of Tunisia’s potential instability is the upcoming confrontation of
extremism within its borders (Coleman, 2015a: 44).
Egypt
A similar outcome to the uprising in Tunisia was the unrest in Egypt in 2011 against
the authoritarian rule of Hosni Mubarak’s regime and in 2013 against Mohammed Morsi’s
regime. Socio-economic conditions were the main reason for the outbreak of revolt in Egypt.
The adoption of neo-liberal economic policies in 1991, led to an increase in hardship by the
mid-2000s (Durac, 2013: 180). Corruption and nepotism in Egypt was centred on Mubarak’s
son Gamal, who was the key figure in Egypt’s economy and politics. Gamal’s business elite
benefited significantly from Mubarak’s neo-liberal reforms and he had close ties with the
largest investment bank in Egypt (Durac, 2013: 181). After Mubarak’s removal from office,
the division among revolutionary forces, emergence of political forces, and interconnecting
national and international interests, clouded the transition to a democratic order, thus
making the process ever more difficult (Salamey, 2015: 119). Even when Morsi was in power,
his authoritarian rule threatened to set up a division between the executive and the judicial
government as well as reverse the democratic and progressive achievements made in the
2011 uprising (Coleman, 2015b: 100). Egypt followed a similar path to Libya and Tunisia,
with two regime changes that were opening doors to possible further transformational
actions. However, with the entrenched dynamics of power actual change was hard to
achieve, thus resulting in the anger and frustration of the people (Coleman, 2015b: 99).
Despite this, in 2014 with Sisi in power, a transition of ‘new’ order seems to be taking place
with the ratification of a new constitution (Coleman, 2015b: 100). Yet, Salamey (2015),
brings up very valid points that could prove challenging to Egypt’s transition to ‘new’ order.

13. 9
Similar to many other countries, Egypt is under the influence of extremist violence as well as
regional volatility in neighbouring states. Hence, security priorities were being driven at the
expense of democratic and institutional reform.
Bahrain
In Bahrain, the Al-Khalifa ruling elite bombarded those involved in the demonstration
with repression, backed by Saudi intervention, and pursued all forms of rebellion; ranging
from detaining doctors to suspending opposing political societies and arresting their leaders
(Dodge, 2012: 67). Despite the Al-Khalifa regime succeeding in crushing the demonstration
through brutal repressive actions, the aftermath of the protests left the government
desperately trying to re-establish its international legitimacy. In addition, although the
regime faces no serious threat of ejection from power, their decade-long mission to portray
themselves as an open and liberal base for multinational companies operating there has
now become shattered. The regime had resorted to sectarian division in order to continue
its reign in Bahrain whilst the population has become even more divided (Dodge, 2012: 67).
Although it could be argued that order in Bahrain has not been seriously subjected to
transition, the political systemhas undergone a slight change with the establishment of the
Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry, which is surprisingly both independent from
government control and an inquiry (Dodge, 2012: 67).
Yemen
Similar to Bahrain, Yemen also highlighted “how specific state-building legacies,
regime-opposition dynamics, and a state’s location within regional and international
alliances combine to structure the constraints on anti-regime collective action” (Haddad et
al, 2012: 175). Yemen’s deteriorating living standards played a crucial part in the protests of
2011, with its rapidly growing youth population, high levels of poverty, rising unemployment
and a poor economy. This is in addition to being the poorest country in the MENA region
with its GDP decelerated from 4.6 per cent in 2011 to two per cent in 2004 (Durac, 2013:
180-181). As for nepotism, the president’s family had a central role in key aspects of public
life. Saleh’s son was commander of the Republican Guards and other family members held
high ranking positions in the military and intelligence services, such as the National Security

14. 10
Bureau and the Air Force (Durac, 2013: 182).When power was handed over to Vice President
Abd-Rabbu Mansour Hadi, there was a political and social transition of order. President
Hadi’s transition entailed an arrangement of an all-inclusive national dialogue, a draft of a
new constitution as well as organising parliamentary and presidential elections which would
follow in accordance to the new constitution. Unfortunately, the full transition from
authoritarianism had not come to fruition as order in Yemen is now undergoing a civil war,
with the Houthi movement under control of central government in Sana’a and Hadi resigned
from office in 2014 (Behony, 2015: 242). Yemen is also faced with great danger by Islamist
extremism, in this case Al-Qaeda and ISIS, and tribal divisions, such as the Southerners and
the Houthi rebels. With the Shi’ite Zaidi Houthis currently controlling the majority of Yemen,
as well as the country’s continuous fracturing, ISIS have taken the initiative in exploiting the
chasm of power and has made Yemen a target for terror (Coleman, 2015c: 63). Since 1993,
Yemen had continuously been a state at risk of failure.
Libya
In Libya, Qaddafi correlated with Italian fascismthat ruled the country in the colonial
era, where order consisted of extravagance, dogmatism and brutality. Qaddafi had also
banned retail trade, private ownership, free press, and he destabilised the civil service as
well as military leadership (Anderson, 2011: 6). Unlike ‘old’ order in the other Arab
countries, Qaddafi’s regime demobilised state institutions in order to shield itself from any
potential threat, especially that of a military coup. Meaning that, as an institution, military
order lacked the capacity for collective action once the regime was threatened, let alone
maintain its existence (Haddad et al, 2012: 137). Therefore it was clear that ‘old’ order in
Libya was not particularly stable. Especially with the countless amounts of Libyans that
continued to take to the streets despite the direct threats of murder, massacre and mayhem
imposed on them by Qaddafi (Haddad et al, 2012: 137-138). Libyan ‘new’ order led to the
breakdown of central authority, due to the weakness of state institutions as well as the
parallel strength of regional and tribal loyalties. In addition, each region in Libya is controlled
by their respected armed militias that were formed during the uprising and, so far, they have
resisted any attempt of demobilisation. By, August 2014, the Libyan government had
admitted that they had no control over any state institutions in Tripoli (Coleman, 2015d: 88).
In 2015, similar to Tunisia and Yemen, Libya faces the great threat of terrorism by ISIS who

15. 11
are based in the cities of Sirte and Derna (Coleman, 2015d: 93). ISIS seems to have
commenced terrorist activities in Libya due to the lack of order after the uprising against the
Qaddafi regime. The lack of a unified military and removal of state institutions had formed a
power gap in Libya which is currently slowly being filled by a terrorist organisation.
Syria
Syria remains under the regime of President Bashar Al-Assad and the Arab uprising of
2011 has elevated to an ongoing civil war against the regime (Stigall, 2014: 289). Therefore,
it is clear that a transition in order has yet to be decided, whether Assad successfully
suppresses the rebellion or vice versa. Despite this, Khashan (2012) once argued that the
excessive and continuous use of coercive measures by Assad’s regime against the, once
peaceful, protestors had only eroded its ability to quell demonstrators and had destroyed
the barrier of fear that had kept the people quiet and in-line during the whole of the
authoritarian rule (Khashan, 2012: 924). By looking at current events with the ongoing crisis
and the gradually increasing terrorist activity within the country it seems Khashan’s
arguments seem to be true. Assad’s attempts now to form a consensus with the opposition
to agree on a single agenda in 2014 had repeatedly failed and the conflict has now escalated
into a regional proxy war (Shehata, 2014: 93). Similar to Libya as well as Yemen, Syria has
also experienced the breakdown of its government’s key institutions, due to its own political
upheaval and the weight of the struggle. As a result of this, Syria currently comprises of
ungoverned spaces and power voids which is attracting and raising different undermining
transnational actors, such as the terrorist organisation Al-Nusra Front (Stigall, 2014: 288).
The Al-Nusra Front, who has ties to the terrorist group Al-Qaeda, has emerged as the main
terrorist threat in Syria, proving to be a great challenge to Syrian order for both the Assad
Regime and the Syrian rebels (Coleman, 2015e: 161-162). It is therefore clear that Syria has
not undergone a transition in order. However scholars, such as Khashan and Shehata, argue
that the regime is in need of a change and any more attempts to prevent the crisis by the
Assad regime will continue to be futile.
Conclusion
All in all, from what is gathered in this chapter there has been a, somewhat,

16. 12
transition from an ‘old’ order to a new one in the Middle East and North Africa after the
Arab uprisings of 2011 and stability has not improved dramatically. MENA ‘old’ order
symbolised widespread socio-economic and socio-political problems. The transition from
‘old’ to ‘new’ order from the Arab Spring occurred in the hopes of eradicating these
problems, in addition to switching from an authoritarian rule to a democratic type of
government. However in countries such as Syria, Yemen and Libya, ‘new’ order from the
uprisings has caused more problems than it aimed to solve such as civil war and internal
divisions. Tunisia is probably the most hopeful case of a genuine democratic transition,
whereas for the others, there is a hint of a return to an ‘old’, autocratic order.

17. 13
Chapter two – Syria: An ongoing Civil War
Much like Egypt and Tunisia, the uprising in Syria began as a nonviolent protest
movement which was led by various civil society groups with the demand of a democratic
transition and social reforms (Shehata, 2014: 88). However, instead of becoming a bloody
but short Libyan-style revolution to end the Assad regime, it drastically grew to become a
horrific sectarian war between the Sunni majority and the Alawite minority (Totten, 2013:
28). The balance of military forces in Syria is not as fractured as it was in Libya, as military
defections in the Syrian regime has not reached a critical point in order to doubt the state’s
coherence, thus creating a stalemate between the regime and opposition forces (Dodge,
2015: 68).
Repressive Political Leadership within Civil Society
Historically, the Assad regime focused on a combination of repression and co-
optation to consolidate its power, as well as keeping a tight grip on all institutions of
government and on the coercive apparatus on Syria. This was done by awarding his
minorities, such as the Alawites, Druze and Ismailis, with disproportionate access to power
and privileges (Berti & Paris, 2014: 23). Since 1971, during Hafez Al-Assad’s regime (1971-
2000), the Alawite minority had extended its influence through state institutions, allowing it
to have a considerable amount of power in Syrian political life. In many decisive moments,
for example; the succession of Syria’s presidency in 2000, the unity of the Alawite
community played a significant role in the survival of the regime (Iglesias in Spanish Ministry
of Defence, 2014: 62).
Bashar Al-Assad has been enjoying regional, economic and political shifts that had
been ushered in by his father Hafez. This allowed the consolidation of the Assad regime’s
rule and prevented any military coups and factionalismwithin the regime (Darwisheh, 2014:
12). Hinnebusch (in Darwisheh, 2014: 13) states that the Assad political leadership
penetrates all state institutions and civil society organisations as well as exercising political
control over its military members. Therefore, unlike in the other Arab regimes, the political
systemin Syria is far more institutionally interlocked. That and the preservation of the

18. 14
coalition in the Assad government plays a vital role in the survival of the regime, as well as
the chaos ensued between Assad and the opposition. (Darwisheh, 2014: 13).
Sectarian divisions
The opposition to Assad’s regime, mostly the Sunnis has been ill prepared and highly
fragmented, in terms of both their aims and organisation. One of the reasons for this is that
there are diverse tendencies that coexist within the opposition, such as moderate Islamists,
human rights activists, nationalists and even Islamist militants groups with links to Al-Qaeda
(Phillips, 2012: 39). An argument by Berti and Paris (2014) regarding extremist opposition,
states that fragmentation within the opposition is worsened by transnational, pro-al-Qaeda
militant Islamist fighters inside Syria. These groups subsidise to even stronger fault lines
within the rebel ranks, thus worsening the fragmentation within the opposition (Berti &
Paris, 2014: 28). The dissent among the different ideologies, as well as the serious
differences between leaders, has made it impossible to create a united opposition.
Therefore, the fragmentation of the opposition has made it challenging to form a consensus
on crucial matters such as coordination of the military or government of the “liberated
areas” (Iglesias in Spanish Ministry of Defence, 2014: 65). Zisser (2012) argues similarly to
this, stating that there was no solid domestic opposition confronting Assad’s regime.
Whatever opposition the protestors constituted, it was not organised enough in order to
establish an effective leadership. This was another reason for the division and fragmentation
within the ranks of the regime’s opponents (Zisser, 2012: 108). Diehl (2012) argues that
although the Syrian opposition has tried hard to avoid sectarianism, the problem was that as
the crisis continued the democratic liberal opposition gradually became overshadowed by
the Sunni Islamists who are more willing to die for their cause, in this case by the Free Syrian
Army (FSA) (Diehl, 2012: 13).
In addition, the sectarian war between the Sunnis and Alawites is being stirred
further by the Assad regime. Totten (2013) argues that transforming the revolution into a
sectarian war is Assad’s internal strategy, and by doing so he is keeping his family, clan and
loyalists on his side (Totten, 2013: 30). It could be argued that without an agenda agreed by
the diverse opposition of the regime, in addition to Assad continuously influencing the

19. 15
sectarian war in Syria, it has ultimately led to a non-existent alliance between any two of the
three actors. From what is gathered by each of the scholars, each actor is fighting on their
own terms without a coherent plan for the outcome of the civil war. Tensions also grew
between the exiled and internal branches of the opposition, as it consists of elements of
extremism which has created strains within it, as well as challenges for some of its external
supporters, such as the United States (Dalacoura, 2013: 77).
Divided Army
Many Syrian soldiers, mostly Sunni recruits, were disturbed by the orders to attack
unarmed civilians, resulting in the defection of 60,000 of the 300,000 soldiers by the spring
of 2012. Many fled abroad to seek asylum, others publicly executed and the rest united to
form the FSA (Nepstad, 2013: 344). Nepstad presents one valid reason for why some of them
defected whereas others stayed loyal; that sectarian identities play a vital role in the
explanation, as seen in Bahrain. An estimate of 11 per cent of the Syrian population is
Alawite, small offshoots are Shi’ite Muslim and around 75 per cent are Sunni Muslim
(Nepstad, 2013: 344). Assad intentionally appointed his family members and religious sect to
fill in high-ranking military and political positions, in order to prevent any coup in the future.
This ultimately led to around 90 per cent of Syrian military officers being Alawite which in-
turn gave Assad assurance that his military officers would not oppose his regime (Nepstad,
2013: 344). Despite this, the lower ranking military conscripts were largely Sunni, which
forced them to face a moral dilemma of being loyal to the regime or stand by the side of
their own people. Nepstad states the reason for the military divide, is that the Alawite
officers are defending the regime in order to secure their sectarian privileges, whereas the
Sunni conscripts have no political benefits at stake (Nepstad, 2013: 345). This seems to be a
popular argument among many scholars. Bellin (2012: 133) states that this type of
organisation in the military, expressed in this case of Syria by Nepstad, is along patrimonial
lines. The fact that the military leaders are linked to regime elites through blood bonds or
religious sect or ethnicity, gives them the incentive to be inherently linked to the
permanency of the regime (Bellin, 2012: 133). This is the part of the thread that’s fragile in
the unification between high and low ranking officials in the Syrian military. The fact that
Assad placed every emphasis on securing loyalty among his officers and not in his conscripts,

20. 16
is what brought chaos and defections in his military.
By comparing Syria’s military unification to Egypt’s, there is a significant difference in
the methods, motives and magnitude of the army’s shift of alliance that ultimately led to the
contrary degrees of chaos and severe power voids in each of their regimes. Unlike Syria,
Lutterbeck (2013) describes the Egyptian military as a professional and largely meritocratic
force, which is considered a crucial element of institutionalisation (Lutterbeck, 2013: 39).
Another important factor to point out is that, Nepstad and Lutterbeck both agree that the
Egyptian military have become a very important economic actor. With its important
industries and business expanded, the Egyptian military commands up to an estimate of 40%
of the Egyptian economy (Lutterbeck, 2013: 36-37, Nepstad, 2013: 342). In addition, the USA
played an indirect role. Nepstad argues that if Egypt sided with Mubarak, they would lose
the $1.3billion aid from Obama. Thus, with that as well as the increase in civilian
demonstrations and global media coverage, the Egyptian military believed it was impossible
to continue supporting the Mubarak regime (Nepstad, 2013: 343). Therefore, by comparing
what the Egyptian military had at stake and their perception of the events in their own
country, to that of the Syrian military, it is clear then as to why the Egyptian army shifted its
support as a whole to the demonstrators instead of some defecting and others staying loyal
to the regime. The whole Egyptian army was its own institutionalised actor and with its
economic power, made it very independent to Mubarak’s regime. Unlike the Syrian military,
the Egyptian army played a much stronger key actor than the secular government. Therefore
when the unified military took power, the ungoverned spaces were quickly filled as they
were able to take it amongst themselves to retain many elements of the “deep state” and
did not drastically change many of its key state institutions (Stigall, 2014: 288).
Fragmentations within Secular and Islamist Parties
In line with militarisation, political and civil activists created forums and entities to
represent Syrians opposing the regime (Fares in Sadiki, 2015: 157). The National Coalition for
Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces, most commonly known as the Syrian National
Coalition (SNC), is the only recognised group as a legitimate opposition of the Assad regime,
by many Arab countries and international organisations (Phillips, 2012: 39-40). Despite this,

21. 17
clear divisions had risen within the SNC. Former judge Haitham al-Maleh walked out of the
SNC, due to the party’s poor leadership. Even the issue to seek western military intervention
has been especially divisive (Phillips, 2012: 40). In addition to sectarian and secular divisions;
there have also been divisions between Islamist factions. Radical Islamists in Syria have been
clearly separated from the Salafi groups, as the former is prepared to use violent methods,
whereas the latter have decided to use non-violent means (Dalacoura, 2013: 83).
Furthermore, there is no consensus or any element of combined effort to effectively
oppose the Assad regime between the secular and Islamist parties. Rafizadeh (2012) argued
that any opposing party that attempted to take a strong leadership is attacked by other
groups, due to suspicions of its differing ideology and prospects for Syria (Rafizadeh, 2012:
113). Rafizadeh gives an example of a prominent secular dissident, Bourhan Ghailoun, who
was greatly criticised by other opposition groups due to his anti-Assad speech in Istanbul.
Since the start of the Syrian crisis, the Syrian civil society and secular and Islamist parties
have been incapable of uniting under a consensual agenda, when such unity has proven to
be vital with the ousting of Mubarak in Egypt and Ben Ali in Tunisia (Rafizadeh, 2012: 114).
Russia and Saudi Arabia’s Indirect Intervention
As for external interference, uncertain calls for Western intervention only came forth
once Assad reached the peak of brutality, even though most Syrian opposition leaders
rejected any military action (Lynch, 2013: 163). Russia seems to be central to Syria
diplomacy for the reason that the US wants UN legitimisation and support for its own
interventions (Charap, 2013: 39). Kozhanov (2014) argued that in 2014, Russia aimed to
bring a ceasefire and start negotiations between the regime and the opposition as it had
equally strong contacts between the two. He continues to state that Russia probably tried to
demonstrate that it was ready to deal with new Syrian order after Assad’s ousting or
resignation, as it had done previously with post-Mubarak Egypt and post-Qaddafi Libya
(Kozhanov, 2014: 11). However, Kozhanov’s argument was problematic and vague as Russia
was very dismissive with many opposition groups; for example, they branded the SNC as
pro-western and refused to see them as a legitimate representative for Syrian civil society. In
addition, they also condemned the FSA as a body of extremists and Islamists (Allison, 2013:

22. 18
800). Instead, Russia backs the Syrian regime as it has many key interests in their bilateral
relations, for example a solid arms trade as well as a strategic interest. Another main interest
which is worth mentioning is Russia’s reliance on to the naval base in Tartus on the Syrian
coast, due to its access to the Mediterranean sea (Allison, 2013: 805 & 807). Russia’s
intervention in Syria has further deepened the chaos in the Syrian civil war, to the extent
that the FSA aimed to target Russian ships in Tartus due to Russia’s continuous supply of
weapons and experts to the Assad regime (Allison, 2013: 807).
Saudi Arabia has even participated in intervening in Syria. Although the Saudi’s never
approached Syria solely on the basis of sectarianism, their allegiance shifted between
oppositions. They first allied themselves with the least sectarian rebel groups that distanced
themselves from the Muslim Brotherhood, such as the FSA. However, once they realised the
FSA were not producing any results, the Saudis then shifted some of their allegiance to the
more sectarian Salafi fighting groups such as the Islamic Front, while at the same time
refusing to support any extremist Islamic groups such as the Al-Nusra Front, ISIS or any Sunni
organisation linked with al-Qaeda (Gause III, 2014: 6-7). Therefore, the allegiance between
external actors and the opposition was also not clear, thus maintaining the chaos in Syria at
a stalemate. The reasons for Saudi Arabia intervening in Syria and siding with the opposition,
is because they saw it as an opportunity to put pressure on Iranian influence, also because
they see Al-Qaeda and its regional affiliates as a moral threat to Saudi domestic rule (Gause
III, 2014: 15 & 18). In addition to Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Qatar have intensely supported
the FSA by financing them directly, supplying them with covert arms, and granting them
access to safe havens along key border areas (Henry & Hyang Jang, 2012: 263).
Conclusion
The fragmentation aspect in Syria, which has affected the military, the opposition,
and secular and Islamist parties, is arguably the most significant hindrance to the prospects
of ending the crisis as well as making it gradually difficult to undergo a successful political
transition. The fragmentation within the opposing organisations of the Assad regime seems
to be the biggest complication the opposition faces, in both altering the military balance of
power and establishing a cohesive and united front with political status and legitimacy (Berti

23. 19
& Paris, 2014: 29). Furthermore, the divided opposition of both civil society and the secular
parties further lacks the ability to negotiate a political agenda and guarantee its
implementation in Syrian political life. This is made even more complex with the rise of
Islamist militant groups such as Al-Qaeda; the opposition has become alienated by the much
needed support of international actors, while at the same time strengthening the regime’s
support base (Berti & Paris, 2014: 29). Although the youth-led movements and civil society
groups avoided any sectarian demands, the full scale response of the Assad regime and its
efforts on deepening sectarian divisions to suppress the uprising transformed the conflict
into a sectarian war. Furthermore, due to the sheer violence and extended nature of the
conflict, state institutions have been destroyed overtime and primary loyalties to the regime
were hardened, thus gradually widening Syria’s ungoverned spaces (Shehata, 2014: 89).
Out of all the five affected Arab regimes, Syria’s is arguably the nightmare scenario of
the Arab Spring. Although the nature of the uprising began with the model of Tunisia and
Egypt, the aftermath took an unexpected and violent turn imaginable. Bloodshed started
almost immediately, and by 2013 the full scale civil war resulted in 35,000 casualties, as well
as nearly two million refugees and displaced people (Kalpakian, 2013: 13). To make matters
worse, the chaos in Syria has attracted ISIS into the rebellion, whilst al-Qaeda linked groups
continue to fight amongst themselves as well as with the secular opposition. ISIS’s main
objective is to establish a de facto caliphate in Syria and in order to do so, they have
partnered with the FSA and al-Nusra Front (Laub & Masters, 2014). With the presence of ISIS
and al-Qaeda, any hope for a cease-fire between the opposition and the regime appears to
be non-existent.

24. 20
Chapter three – Libya: Constant Political and Tribal Rivalry
40-50 years preceding the civil war in 2011, Libya began to achieve some notable
political unity, ever since the dissolving of internal regional boundaries and the efforts to
tackle regional political divisions began (Siebens & Case, 2012: 5). The regionalismand
tribalism of previous states, such as Tripolitania, Cyrenaica, and Fezzan, survived many
historical attempts, by previous state actors, in establishing a vivid national unity, from King
Idris to Colonel Qaddafi. To a great extent, the 2011 Libyan uprising was the result of these
preluding cleavages than any ambition for a democracy (Siebens & Case, 2012: 5). Libya is
currently undergoing a new front of instability, which has created regional ramifications,
reintroduced several bases of conflict in transitional areas, and shattered geo strategic
equilibrium. Ultimately, this has forced communities to challenge the ideological agendas
within which they have been imprisoned (Ammour, 2012: 2). With the lack of any political
or economic opportunities, especially for the youth population, Libya now consists of
impoverished areas and ungoverned zones (Ammour, 2012: 3). As for a transition to
democracy, the Libyans had little wisdom in national identity and no experience with
democracy in the past (Vandewalle, 2012).
Illegitimate Political Leadership
An argument by Vandewalle (2012), states that Libya is undergoing a gradual
transition to democracy and it “stands out as one of the most successful countries to emerge
from the uprising” (Vandewalle, 2012). Vandewalle continues to observe that Libya is surely
on the process of a democratic transition after its first national elections in July 2012, as well
as the emergence of the National Transitional Council (NTC) as the opposition’s political
leadership (Vandewalle, 2012). However, Vandewalle’s argument is rather optimistic and
overlooks Libya’s history of weak institutions and fragmentation, which has had severe
effects in the long run.
What Vandewalle fails to understand was that without an alternative government
that is ready and capable to take power after the collapse of the Qaddafi’s regime, the NTC
had to step in as an unelected directorate, before the elected National General Congress

25. 21
(NGC) in July 2012. Unlike the establishment of government in Tunisia and Egypt, the NTC
imposed laws and participated in international diplomacy on behalf of a disjointed nation,
over which they had established limited and feeble control. With the consistent lack of
central authority, as well as the NTC having limited parliament’s ability to draft a
constitution, it remains debatable whether democracy plays a central theme to Libya’s
transition of government (Siebens & Case, 2012: 22). This is made even more problematic
with Libya’s traditionally weak state institutions, challenging central government in their
ability to exercise legitimate jurisdiction over the country’s regions (Dalacoura, 2013: 79).
The government’s failure to control continuous violence has forced armed militias to provide
security for their own local communities, thus undermining the authority of central
government (Dalacoura, 2013: 79).
Since developed political movements and civil society institutions were non-existent
in Libya during Qaddafi’s regime, coupled with the persistence of regional and tribal
loyalties, the nature of the uprising was decisively tribal and regional, with the north-eastern
and eastern tribes leading the rebellion. Hence, the weakness of the Libyan government, as
well as the lack of a coherent alliance with the military, prevented political leadership from
playing a decisive role in managing the outcome of the uprising and the crisis that had
occurred afterwards (Shehata, 2014: 89).
Tribal and Regional divisions
Libya’s ethnic society consists of ninety-seven per cent Sunni Muslim and three per
cent other religions. Most of the sectarian divisions in Libya occurred from a historical and
extensive clan system, based on religion, tribes and kinship (Kruger, 2013: 50). Ultimately,
when all expressions of political pluralismand civil society were significantly suppressed by
the Qaddafi regime, the Islamists were not institutionally rooted in society and state.
Moreover, Islamismis not that influential in Libya’s heavily emphasised tribal based society,
where tribal identity replaces ideology, and voting has more of a chance in following tribal
instead of ideological lines (Darwisheh, 2014: 16). Therefore, unlike Syria, the division in
Libya’s society is more between tribes and Islamists rather than between Islamists and non-
Islamists. In addition to this, there are further divisions within the militias; between Islamists

26. 22
and those who oppose religious extremism. The tribal loyalties, as mentioned previously, are
a crucial factor to the fractious nature of the heavily-armed militias, with many extremist
militias forming links with Al-Qaeda (Frykberg, 2013: 18).
By looking at Tunisia’s civil society, a clear difference can be seen with how society
can have an impact on decision making within government, which clearly seems to be
absent in Libya due to the sheer amount of tribal divisions. The balance of power between
the Tunisian Islamist and secularist coalition was greatly reinforced by the presence of strong
civil society institutions who forced the Islamist party, Ennahda, to revise its position on
heavily controversial issues such as Sharia law and women’s rights (Shehata, 2014: 91). On
many occasions, civil society managed to maintain a balanced coalition when Islamists
attempted to force their own agendas against the wishes of the secularists, by organising
large protests in order to force the Islamist to back track (Shehata, 2014: 91). Salamey argues
that the reason for this is that Tunisian, and even Egyptian, civil society consisted of an
educated middle class and youths, and many intellectuals who were resentful towards an
authoritarian regime, particularly after the 1990s (Salamey, 2015: 118 & 122). On the other
hand, an observation by Boose (2012) states that Libya’s civil society was practically non-
existent after Qaddafi’s rule. The fact that society in Libya consists of loose militia groups, as
well as relying on traditional tribal and regional divisions for security and support, showed
vivid signs of dramatic fragmentation, which resulted in a lack of civil society in order to
carry Libya through a democratic transition, or any sort of transition at that (Boose, 2012:
314).
Despite Libya’s fragmented society being more on a tribal level rather than a
sectarian level as it is in Syria, civil society is still non-existent as it was during Qaddafi’s rule.
The lack of civil society means the incapability to impose order by the authorities, especially
with loose local militias imposing their own style of security.
Military Disunity
The Libyan armed forces had previously failed to protect the Qaddafi regime when
the 14 February revolution broke out. They showed very little unity, lacked morale and
leadership, and they were unable to side with the uprising either. Its internal disorder and

27. 23
broken loyalty has been weakened by the regime, and by not creating a cohesive alliance
with the uprising, chaos has ensued between the secular government and Islamist groups
(Gaub, 2014: 40). First of all, the 2011 civil war against the Qaddafi regime was fought by a
loose group of militias instead of a cohesive, national, army, with post-war security gradually
coming under the control of these local forces. Therefore since the post-war government
lacked legitimacy, it was unable to take full control in uniting the power of the militias or
even integrate them into a unified, singular army under the government’s control in Tripoli
(Chivvis et al, 2012: 2).
Secondly, attempts to secure military power by the transitional government had
faded. This is evident with the emergence of three security groups; the Libyan National
army, the main fighting force of the Libyan state, the Libyan Shield Forces, an auxiliary armed
force which are separate from the national army, and the Supreme Security Council created
by the NTC. These groups were formed as an ad hoc response in order to bring about some
degree of security; however any attempts by these three military groups to strengthen the
power of the Libyan government have been slimand ineffective. In fact, internal divisions
began to occur when militia commanders retook de facto control of their foot soldiers.
Eventually, by October 2012, military powers became unreliable and ceased to be in control
of the NTC (Chivvis et al, 2012: 4). This argument is also supported by Dalacoura (2012), who
states that the fragmentation within the Libyan national army, and also within the
paramilitary and security organisations is partly the reason as why there is internal division
within the Libyan government (Dalacoura, 2012: 70).
In contrast to Libya, after the removal of Ben Ali in Tunisia, the military and the
demonstrators showed a strong alliance regarding power and the formation of a new
regime. Since the Tunisian military had presented no interest in political affairs, they willingly
handed power over to the civilian body, which already comprised of representatives from
various ideological forces that was charged with overseeing affairs until elections were held
(Shehata, 2014: 91). Unlike Tunisia, whose army was highly institutionalised and apolitical,
Libya’s military lacked institutionalisation, consisted of very high levels of patrimonialism,
and its security apparatus was greatly politicised, which resulted in a certain number of
defections (Lutterbeck, 2013: 39). What’s worse was that due to the NTC being a weak and
under-legitimised party in government, their aim to impose control over the militias fighting

28. 24
to take back their military power and geographic autonomy was little but unachievable
(Dodge, 2015: 67-68).
Secular and Islamic Party Tensions
Similar to the other Arab regimes that experienced the processes of the Arab
revolutions; political Islamhad become vivid and influential in Libya after the Qaddafi
regime. However the Islamismtendency, gradually increasing in both the NGC and
institutions levels, is fragmented, with many developing rivalries between personalities,
ideologies, tutelages and external influences (Cepoi and Lazar in Naumescu, 2014: 411).
Furthermore, the chaotic situation in Libya has been worsened by the deepened rivalry
between secular and Islamist groups, with which Islamist politics and the Salafi jihad group
began to dominate the political scene immediately after Qaddafi’s removal from office
(Gause III, 2014: 18). In April 2014, Prime Minister Thinni labelled Ansar Al-Sharia, a Salafist
Islamist militia group, and other extremist Islamist groups as terrorist organisations (St John,
2015). Furthermore, according to Mikail (2013) Islamists have some influence within the
NTC, as they insisted on the importance of Sharia for the country. This has caused many
secularists and liberals to doubt the Islamists’ commitment to a democratic transition,
despite the Islamist parties continuously reassuring their domestic opponents, as well as
international actors, of their democratic prospects (Mikail, 2013: 91).
As for the NGC, although it was formed democratically in the 2012 elections, Cepoi
and Lazar (2014) argue that the alliance between the leader of the NGC, Ali Zeidan, the
Alliance of National Forces and a large number of independents showed more interest in
limiting the influence of the Islamists. The alignment of the secular party revealed a
significantly fragmented nature of the Libyan political class, as well as the whole of society
(Cepoi & Lazar in Naumescu, 2014: 410). On the other hand, Cepoi and Lazar state that the
Islamist parties, mostly the Muslim Brotherhood and the Salafi movements, were the only
political force with a national program and reach, whereas the rest of the political class were
robustly conditioned by local, regional, tribal, clan or economic interests. Cepoi and Lazar
label Libya as a heterogenic political environment, where alliances are roughly made out of
interests without much concern on political or ideological identities (Cepoi and Lazar in

29. 25
Naumescu, 2014: 410).
NATO’s problematic effect
The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation’s (NATO) intervention, led by the United
States (US), in Libya played a decisive role in the country’s stability and security after the
upheaval of the Qaddafi regime. One argument by Daalder and Stavridis (2012), stated that
NATO greatly succeeded in Libya, and saved tens of thousands of lives, minimalized collateral
damage and did not suffer a single allied casualty (Daalder and Stavridis, 2012: 3). However,
what Daalder and Stavridis overlooked was how Libyan society perceived NATO’s
intervention, as well as the long-term problems caused by NATO regarding the legitimacy of
the new government as well as Islamist extremism. First of all a counter-argument by
Campbell (2012) stated that instead of saving lives, NATO’s interference caused thousands of
civilian deaths and destroyed Libya when choosing sides (Campbell, 2012: 140). Although
Resolution 1973 authorised the use of force to protect civilians, the thousands of deaths
instigated by NATO’s air-strikes made it clear that NATO was hell-bent on destroying
Qaddafi’s government. Therefore, external intervention in Libya was more concerned with
the toppling of the Qaddafi regime than stopping a humanitarian crisis (Siebens & Case,
2012: 21). Kuperman (2013) supports Campbell’s view, by stating that NATO’s intervention
extended the war’s duration about six fold, increased civilian casualties seven to ten times,
brought about Islamic radicalismand exacerbated human rights abuses (Kuperman, 2013:
105). As a result, NATO’s intervention has given rival militias the incentive to not show any
concern to a democratic transition, as well as no commitment towards formal processes of
elections, nor the establishment of a 200-seat National Assembly (Campbell, 2012: 142).
Another argument by Dodge (2015), suggests that the nature of NATO’s actions has left the
post-Qaddafi Libyan government with false legitimacy and little control in influencing events
on the ground (Dodge, 2015: 67).
Additionally, the US-led military intervention was a determining factor in imposing US
influence and discouraging the revolutionary movements, which eventually directed the
popular uprising towards the US-planned regime change (Selim, 2013: 265). According to
Selim (2013), analysts, such as Salami (2011) and Howaidy (2011), have observed that the

30. 26
US’s influence in post-Qaddafi Libya bares a similar resemblance to post-Saddam Iraq. The
US’s military intervention in Libya, under the perception of securing peace and stability
within the country hence justifying the US’s existence in the oil-filled country, risks the
emergence of the same chaos as was in Iraq, as well as the extraction of Libya’s natural
resources (Selim, 2013: 265).
Conclusion
Old power structures, political and military institutions in Libya have been replaced
by new political, military, social, economic actors that have been in fierce rivalry over power
and resources. The wide fragmentation and complexity of the new landscape had increased
the difficulty for any pragmatic and coherent effort of implementing programmes for
national reconstruction (Cepoi & Lazar in Naumescu, 2014: 408). The ungoverned spaces in
Libya have been the principal among problems that has been gradually increasing after
Qaddafi’s removal. In terms of the army, military power has become inefficient, as military
command is very localised making it less effective than the hundreds of militias spread out
among Libya’s regions (Siebens & Case, 2012: 22). The reconstruction of political, social and
security order in post-Qaddafi Libya has had a limited efficiency due to the lack of unity, and
profound tensions that circulates in Libya’s current society. The divisions are numerous and
have faced great difficulty in coming to a compromise (Cepoi & Lazar in Naumescu, 2014:
409). Moreover, the lack of political unity between the military and militias, and between
Islamist and secular groups has challenged even basic security and rule of law. Without a
reliable, coherent central order, and the dissolution of the central government, civil war
grows more chaotic and Libya is gradually becoming a tribalism-fuelled failed state (Siebens
& Case, 2012: 22).

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Chapter four – Yemen: A Divided Nation
What started off as a peaceful youth movement, the uprising in Yemen transformed
into an elite power struggle due to violence between heavily armed factions (Thiel, 2012:
45). The country faced its own transition. Inspired by the movement in Tunisia, the uprising
in Yemen began a day after the removal of Tunisian President Ben Ali, as tens of thousands
of Yemenis began protesting in January 2011, for the removal of President Saleh, who had
been in rule since 1994. The uprising was successful and Saleh’s Vice President Hadi came to
power in 2012 (Brownlee et al, 2015: 76). The result of the Arab Spring has left it facing
various political challenges as well as it unity and stability continuously being endangered.
The geopolitical landscape has been deeply fragmented through tribal lines, Islamist
movements and military interest groups (Berger et al, 2012: 2).
Political leadership’s Arduous Transition
The political leadership in Yemen failed to stick by the terms of the protestors after
the removal of President Saleh. The deal for a power sharing political systembetween the
General People’s Congress (GPC) and the Joint Meeting Parties (JMP), orchestrated by the
Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), was rejected by the vast majority of the protestors as they
believed it to be a continuation of Yemeni old politics (Durac, 2013: 190). The immunities
granted to Saleh through the GCC deal in exchange for his negotiation, had adverse effects
on the democratic transition in Yemen. Saleh’s refined tribal systemof allegiances and
considerable neo-patrimonial networks had made him a primary spoiler of the agreement
for transition, as well as any future visions for national reconciliation (Salloukh in Fisher &
Stewart, 2014: 25). In addition, the protestors believed the deal was flawed, since neither
the youth nor the disenfranchised group, such as the Houthi rebels or the southern
movement, were involved in the negotiation or the plan for transition (Durac, 2013: 190).
President Hadi exacerbated southern complaints by appointing a member of the northern
Islamist Islah party as governor of Aden (Salloukh in Fisher & Stewart, 2014: 21). Juneau
(2013) also noted that President Hadi remained too weak to marginalise Saleh or the formal
opposition, the Hashed tribal confederation (Juneau, 2013: 413). In addition, the Yemeni
government has leveraged American interests to focus on AQAP, instead of addressing the

32. 28
challenges of domestic security and associated drivers of conflict (Lewis, 2013).
One key factor that is worth mentioning as part of the GCC transition plan was the
establishment of the Comprehensive Conference for National Dialogue (NDC), with the
intention to include youths, the Southern movement, the Houthis, all forces and political
actors, all political parties, and women (Brownlee et al, 2015: 151). Although the NDC
brought 565 representatives from various areas of Yemeni society and social landscapes on
March 2013, it caused much controversy. For example, its extension on January 2014, when
it was supposed to end in September 2013, as well as a report stating that the NDC failed to
reach consensus on major issues, such as the solving the unrest in the South and Sa’ada
government as well as Yemen’s future form of government (Brownlee et al, 2015: 151-152).
The NDC also aimed to re-organise the military and security forces in order to remove the
power and influence of the traditional patronage networks as well as make them
accountable through leadership (Brehony, 2015: 238). In addition, the proposition to
transform Yemen into a six region federal state, Hadi gave the task of defining these regions
to a special committee, which excluded the Southerners and the Houthis. The Houthis
viewed it as the latest attempt in their marginalisation (Brehony, 2015: 239). It could be
argued that the failure of the NDC was one of the factors that lead to the civil war, as the
NDC failed to form any alliances between all aspects of society and political life.
The struggle between Yemeni elites has been another key element in the chaos
ensued for Yemen’s transition and political stability. This struggle has become more extreme
and violent even after the removal of Saleh’s regime. A wide range of political actors and
power groups had been competing for control over Yemen’s political, economic and security
power centres. Even after his ousting, Saleh remains a dominant figure due to his
preservation of loyalists in key government and army positions, as well as a multi-branched
network of contacts in the bureaucratic frameworks, tribal leaderships and religious
institutions (Kronenfeld & Guzansky, 2014: 83). Therefore, Kronenfeld & Guzansky’s (2014)
argue that from what is seen with the transition in Yemen, a change in government was not
sufficient to bring about stability, because the influence of the old elites is linked to the
informal connections and loyalties that had no intention for real reform.

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Regional Divisions
Similar to Libya, the Yemeni revolution had damaged national unity and the very
fabric of society, with regional divisions being the most prominent (Salloukh in Fisher &
Stewart, 2015: 21). The nature of the uprising comprised of a divided protest movements,
with the most significant regional divisions being between the north and south region
(Aryani in Haddad et al, 2012: 180). The Arab Spring opened opportunities for various
regional actors, who had been in conflict with the government, to carry out their own
individual agendas instead of a collective national agenda. One case was the Houthi
insurgency movement from the northern region of Yemen, who used the insecurity caused
by the protests to reorganise and establish a separate governance systemin Sa’ada, in order
to consolidate a stronghold of operations (Lewis, 2013). In addition, the restructure of the
Yemeni government as well as the call for a change of leadership reinvigorated the Southern
Separatist Movement, which used the protest to vocalise grievances (Lewis, 2013).
Kronenfeld & Guzansky (2014) argue similar to this stating that throughout the
uprising and the establishment of the new regime, there has been instability and tension in
the north of Yemen. Aspects among the Houthis had articulated fierce opposition to the
division in regions outlined by the regime, such as the inclusion of the Sa’ada province. This
was viewed by the Houthis as an attempt to undermine their power and the ability to
develop economically by the central government (Kronenfeld & Guzansky, 2014: 87). In
addition to the ethnic conflict in the north, there were degrees of threat on the southern
region. There had been friction and instability between the north and south even after their
unification, since the early 1990s. A sense of marginalisation had been created among the
southerners due to the dominance of the north (Kronenfeld & Guzansky, 2014: 87). The
failure to unite and administer a collective agenda has left Yemen’s regions in conflict, with
each tribe and region focusing on their own interests.
Divided Army and Security Apparatus
Unlike Syria, where a single communal group dominates the armed forces, during
Saleh’s regime Yemen’s security apparatus was based on communal divisions that defined
society (Makara, 2013: 351). An argument by Fattah (2011, in Makara, 2013: 351) states that

34. 30
the political and economic competition among the elites is seen exactly the same within the
military, which reflects the elite struggle and tribal coalitions instead of state power. The
security apparatus failed to be unified after defections occurred once popular protests
began, due to these communal rivalries. Similar to Libya, the defections of the Yemeni
armed forces were motivated by the divisions and competitions within the security
apparatus. Despite this, unlike Egypt, there was no guarantee for survival of the whole
security apparatus after the change of regime (Makara, 2013: 352).
Gaub (2014) argues that the Yemeni army was weak in the sense that it never
managed to consolidate itself as the drive for a national agenda. It was more of a tribal
militia than a national armed force. The army was highly politicised with multiple command
structures, divisions between officers, and disagreements over promotions, since
appointments to posts was based on personal or tribal affiliations instead of qualifications
(Gaub, 2014: 42). Furthermore, a strong central authority that is capable of controlling the
means of coercion over the loose militias and military splinter groups was non-existent in
the Yemeni national army (Dalacoura, 2012: 70). This is evident with the north and south
armies, as they have never been integrated into a single army. Historically, this led to many
rebellions by the southern region against the north and Saleh’s regime since the early 1990s
(Kronenfeld & Guzansky, 2014: 87). Seitz (in Lackner, 2014) argues that the Saleh regime’s
systemof tribal control and modifications caused various internal and external pressures
over the past decade, which eventually led to the shifts in civil-military relations. Seitz
continues to argue that the response of the Yemeni armed forces to the uprising, as well as
their following attempts of restructuring and reforming the Yemeni security apparatus,
stresses “the influence of patronage politics, tribal identity and personal loyalty in decision-
making within the military as well as the shaping of Yemeni civil-military relations” (Seitz in
Lackner, 2014). Hence when it came to President Hadi’s NDC decrees to restructure the
military, mentioned previously, the process proved difficult due to the military’s long-
standing systemof patronage and loyalty. In fact, Hadi’s early moves in replacing certain
leaders led to violent conflict between military factions, followed by mutinies within the
army (Seitz in Lackner, 2014). Similar to Syria and Libya, Yemen’s army had a unique brand of
praetorianism, where the military played a dominant role in political structures and
institutions. The fact that the military consisted of a decades-long patronage system, proved

35. 31
difficult and costly for Hadi’s restructuring scheme. The army was traditionally chaotic with
continuous divisions, and failed to play as a vital key actor in the attempt to reshape Yemen’s
stability.
Lack of a Collective Agenda between Secular and Islamist Parties
According to Durac (2012), the GPC’s main role is to serve as a tool for patronage and
the survival of the regime. A unification ideology between various aspects of society in
Yemen had been totally ignored by the party, which is seen with its diverse membership,
which comprises of ‘independents’, leftists, tribal sheikhs, Arab nationalists and Islamists
(Durac, 2012: 169). The JMP is another fascinating party to look into, as its coalition of a
number of opposition parties was mainly orchestrated in fear of the increased dominance of
the GPC party, despite their differing ideological values. This has caused slight fragmentation
within the party due to an inefficient ideological unity (Durac, 2012: 169-170).
As the most significant member of the JMP, the Islamist Islah party had grown to be
one of the most prominent parties during President Hadi’s rule, with influential powers
granted to them over the ministries of finance, electricity, interior and education (Salloukh in
Fisher & Stewart, 2014: 21). In addition to being an important member of the JMP, Islah
were also active in the protests, however they did maintain a supportive attitude towards
the Saleh regime and were disliked by the young Yemeni activists (Dalacoura, 2012: 74-75).
After the youth demonstrators struck a bargain with the Islah party, as well as with the
military and the al-Ahmar tribe, for the removal of Saleh, the key powerbroker began to use
the protest movement to fulfil their own political agenda. Islah and other political parties
gradually gained control over the change of squares and used their well-funded and
organised party to outdo the youth protestors (Thiel, 2012: 45). The power granted to the
Islah party had caused much grievance by the southern movements as, according to
Salloukh, they had mainly focused on dominating post-Saleh order, as well as excluded all
other groups that had helped engineer the uprising (Salloukh in Fisher & Stewart, 2014: 22).
The secular parties in Yemen, particularly the Yemeni Socialist Party (YSP), operate in a harsh
environment, as the sectarian and tribal nature of the fabric of Yemeni society has limited
the influence of their messages (Ottaway & Hamzawy, 2009: 56). The Islah party and JMP’s

36. 32
involvement in the protest was greeted with profound distrust by the youths. This was due
to the youths’ long-stated distrust of the political actors (Durac, 2012: 173). Durac (2012)
believes that instead of an elite transfer of power, the old parties must be transformed in
order for there to be a drastic shift in Yemeni political dynamics (Durac, 2012: 173).
Therefore, as evidently similar to the regional divisions between the north and the south,
the Yemeni political parties also aimed to seek their own interests instead of the interests for
the good of society.
US and Saudi intervention
Before the uprising in Yemen, Saleh and the US had close ties due to the US’s interest
in its war on terror, as Yemen was a strategic location and a main danger zone due to
terrorist activity, primarily by al-Qaeda (Gilboa in Inbar, 2013: 64). However, this was
received negatively in Yemen, as Saleh’s relationship with the US had brought anti-American
sentiment on the regime. The more internal opposition began to grow on Saleh, the more he
became dependent on the support afforded by his position on the US-led war on terror
(Seitz in Lackner, 2014). Saleh took the unwise decision of relying on US patronage at the
cost of marginalising his support groups as well as large segments of Yemeni society (Seitz in
Lackner, 2014). Therefore, US intervention had become an unpopular factor among many
aspects of Yemeni society. An alliance with the USA forced many Yemeni support groups to
bring out the weakness of government, as well as decrease the legitimacy of central
authority as was witnessed in Libya.
Consequently, when the Yemeni revolution occurred, the USA and Saudi Arabia
worked closely together to aid in the ousting of President Saleh, despite being a key ally to
the USA in the fight against terrorism (Selim, 2013: 265-266). The Saudi and American-
backed GCC initiative, as mentioned previously, although ousted Saleh from government, it
still maintained his military and security apparatuses. The initiative also granted immunity to
Saleh and his family for their acts of corruption and abusing human rights (Selim, 2013: 266).
In addition to Durac’s (2013: 190) observation previously, the initiative was received
negatively by the Yemen’s Coordinating Council of Yemeni Revolution for Change (CCYRC), as
they viewed it as ignoring the demands of the protestors and failing to restructure the

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military. Also it failed to serve justice to Saleh, and addressed formal political parties whilst
disregarding the youth movements (Selim, 2013: 266). South Yemen’s separatist groups felt
they had been negatively affected the most, as they viewed the Saudi-US backed transition
agreement as an attempt to preserve northern Yemen’s consolidation over a marginalised
south (Salloukh in Fisher & Stewart, 2014: 21). In addition, the geo-struggle between Saudi
Arabia and Iran had turned Yemen into a key battleground, hence making it more difficult for
the country to exist as a nation-state in the long term (Geopolitical Diary, 2015).
Conclusion
Yemen has reverted to its natural state, where sectarian divisions and various
ideological forces are locked in a stalemate of weakness preventing the country from existing
as a coherent polity (Geopolitical Diary, 2015). The removal of President Saleh further
weakened the central government in Sanaa, thus creating the gap in power (Dalacoura,
2013: 82). Although President Hadi succeeded in weakening Saleh’s loyalists, he had been
accused by his rivals of following in his footsteps as he had tried to gain control of the army
by positioning his own loyalists into key commanding areas as well as recruiting soldiers
from the ranks of the Islamist Islah party (Kronenfeld & Guzansky, 2014: 85). Yet the
continuous weakening of central authority has increased the scale of chaos, with the
Houthis, the Hirak, AQAP, and various tribal militias having consolidated their own regional
influence. The longer these tribes and groups stay outside the hands of a weakening central
government, the more difficult it will be to regain control over the country by any future
regime (Juneau, 2013: 414). The nature of the NDC worsened the already existing exclusion
of the Southerners and the Houthis tribe. Although the NDC aimed to include all aspects of
Yemen into it, Hadi clearly marginalised the social aspect of Yemen, particularly the
Southerners and the Houthis, which could be argued to have led to the civil war.

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Chapter five – Ungoverned Spaces after the Arab Spring: A
Comparative Analysis
As stated previously in the introduction, although the nature of the Arab Spring was a
common phenomenon between all the affected Arab regimes, the outcome manifested
differently between them. This chapter will fully focus on the comparison between the three
countries that resulted in chaos from the Arab Spring; Syria, Libya and Yemen, and the two
that have become somewhat stable after the uprising; Egypt and Tunisia. Furthermore, this
chapter will compare the same five factors that constitute to the stability of order in the five
Arab states. Finally, there will also be a comparison of the analytical findings, of the scholars
mentioned in this study, to the scholars who give their own analysis, whom are yet to be
mentioned, such as Bormann et al (2012), Green & Ferguson (2015) and Kazamias (2011).
Comparing political leadership and central government in civil society
Political leadership in Syria, Libya and Yemen failed to fill in the ungoverned spaces
that were shaped after or during the uprising, due to their incapability of following a
collective national agenda and the weak legitimacy and central authority of the new regime.
Libya’s new regime lacked the legitimacy to rule as Siebens & Case (2012) states that the
NTC attempted to impose laws on behalf of a fragmented nation. Similar to Yemen, the
fragmentation in Libya was mostly by different militia groups in various regions across the
country. Dalacoura (2013) and Shehata (2014) present a supportive analysis, stating that
Libya’s traditionally weak central government proved challenging for them to exercise
legitimate jurisdiction. In comparison to Libya and Yemen, since the conflict caused by the
Arab Spring is still ongoing in Syria, political leadership under the Assad regime is more
repressive towards civil society.
By comparing Libya, Syria and Yemen’s political leadership to Tunisia and Egypt, there
are many different aspects that show why political leadership in the latter two flourished in
civil society. With regards to Egypt, Stigall (2014) refers to the success of military political
leadership in maintaining key institutions without any drastic changes, despite two regime
changes and turbulent political uncertainties. According to Darwisheh (2014: 4), a heavily

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coercive apparatus to dictate the rules of transition did not exist in Tunisia, not even any
intervention that would tamper with the balance of power between deadlock oppositional
forces. Therefore, its civil society was able to encourage political negotiation as well as
prevent certain forces from taking advantage of the political process. The total opposite
happened in Yemen under President Hadi’s regime. Juneau (2013: 413), notes that President
Hadi’s incapability of marginalising Saleh or the formal opposition, as well as granting
influential powers to the Islamist Islah party, raised much discontent from the southern
movements.
The Arab Spring had created various degrees of ungoverned spaces, differing for each
Arab country that was affected. From what has been stated regarding political leadership
and the capability of central government to assume control of the ‘new’ order, the coherent
alliance between the secular government and civil society in Tunisia, as well as the
maintenance of key institutions by the unified military in Egypt, allowed them to smoothly
fill in the vacuums of power in their respective aspects of political life. On the other hand,
the Assad regime in Syria and the Qaddafi regime had destroyed key institutions. In Yemen
and Libya, central government in the new regime were too weak and lost their legitimacy to
rule, as perceived by their tribal and regional societies. The longer the ungoverned spaces
remained in the political life in Syria, Libya and Yemen, the more difficult it had become to
take control and fill them in with a stable political leadership. Eventually, unwanted
extremist entities exploited these power voids and established their radicalismamong the
chaos.
Comparing sectarian, tribal and regional divisions
By focusing on the factor of civil society and sectarianism, Shehata (2014) argues the
difference in civil society between Egypt and Tunisia, and Libya, Syria and Yemen, was due to
the former two having a more homogeneous population whereas the latter three consists of
a heterogeneous population (Shehata, 2014: 89). Shehata argues that due to the population
in Egypt and Tunisia being homogeneous, meaning state and civil society institutions are
more developed and the levels of national integration are high, various political and civil
society groups, the institutionalised state institutions and military were able to maintain full

40. 36
control of the transition process as well as managing the crisis. Therefore each of these
aspects of Tunisian and Egyptian political life, were able to coincide to smoothly fill in the
ungoverned spaces created after the ousting of Ben Ali and Mubarak (Shehata, 2014: 89).
On the other hand, the countries of Yemen, Libya and Syria had a more heterogeneous
population, meaning primary loyalties were strong, and state and civil society institutions
were weak (Shehata, 2014: 89). Therefore after the uprisings, or during the uprising in the
case of Syria, a sectarian nature developed and the weakness of state and civil society led to
the destruction of state institutions creating mass power voids that have slowly been filled
by unwanted extremist organisations, such as the current case with ISIS and Al-Qaeda.
So how does the heterogeneity element relate to the creation of chaos and
ungoverned spaces in Syria, Libya and Yemen? Shehata’s argument is supported by
Darwisheh (2013), in regards to Syria. The ethnic heterogeneity prevented the rebels from
unifying and was thus unable to have a serious effect against the Assad regime. Where the
remainder of Assad’s supporters were unified in securing his government and institutions,
the rebel groups were divided among regional, ethnic and sectarian lines, which ultimately
prevented them from gaining any sort of popular support (Darwisheh, 2013: 18). Bormann
et al (2012) argue similarly, stating the Arab revolutions were more successful in ethnically
homogenous states like Tunisia and Egypt, whereas Syria, Libya and Yemen saw large-scale
violence, because their heterogeneous status was more prone to sectarian discrimination,
exclusion and conflict (Bormann et al, 2012: 9). Boose (2012) gives a similar argument with
regards to Libya, noting that the loose militia groups who relied on tribal and regional
divisions for security, brought absence to any sort of civil society. In addition, Kronenfeld &
Guzansky (2014) observe that Yemen’s regional division between north and south was a
product of each seeking their own interest and had little intension for a unified and stable
Yemen.
In contrast, Dalacoura (2012) argues similarly as well with regards to Tunisia and
Egypt. The ethnic homogeneity in Egypt meant that the protestors represented a wide range
of social classes, excluding the wealthy elites affiliated with Mubarak. Also in Tunisia, the
uprising was the result of a widespread consensus against the Ben Ali regime, topped with
Ben Ali’s shrinking support base during the 2000s (Dalacoura, 2012: 71). In contrast, civil
society was divided in Libya, Syria and Yemen, with important social and political entities

41. 37
continued to support the old regimes and creating chaos within sectarian, tribal and regional
lines. (Dalacoura, 2012: 71).
Differences in army unification
The role of the military was very crucial in deciding the outcome of the Arab Spring
as well as the potential crisis after the toppling of the old regimes. Therefore it would be
wise to consider what drove the armies to defect and how the outcome was different to
each of the affected regimes. Firstly, by looking at the arguments of Bellin (2012), and
Lutterbeck (2013), these two scholars focus on the element of “institutionalisation”. Their
arguments state that due to the Tunisian and Egyptian militaries being institutionalised, the
armies’ decision on whether to defect or remain loyal to the regime is not influenced by the
regime itself. The fact that they are institutionalised also means that if they were to defect,
they would shift as a whole, cohesive apparatus and not risk some soldiers defecting whilst
others remain loyal. This is one of the main reasons as to why chaos ensued in Libya, Syria
and Yemen, because there was balance between the defected soldiers and those who
remained loyal which resulted in conflict between the loyalist military and the opposing
military. Another factor worth mentioning is the stakes risked by each of the militaries.
Salamey (2015) argues that although the Tunisian military had no stake in the economic
policies of the Ben Ali regime, they had been largely trained and equipped by the USA and
France, and it was these external actors that were pressuring Tunisia for a change of
government (Salamey, 2015: 123). Lutterbeck and Nepstad (2013) argue similarly to this
regarding Egypt, in the chapter on Syria. The Egyptian military, being its own economic actor
in Egypt, had its own economic motivation, perceived the regime too fragile to rule, and
would lose funding from the USA if they were to side with Mubarak.
This gives a clear insight into how unified each of the regimes’ militaries were. By
looking at the difference between Tunisia and Egypt, and Yemen and Libya, Dalacoura (2012)
argues that the relationship between the military, the security forces and the regime in
Yemen and Libya consisted of internal fracturing and conflict, whereas the armies in Tunisia
and Egypt sought to keep itself as a singular and stable force by protecting the privileges of
its officer corps, while at the same time maintaining stability within their respective

42. 38
countries (Dalacoura, 2012: 70). Durac (2013) argues that the uprising in Yemen continued
far longer than those of Tunisia and Egypt, because the response of the military in Yemen
was far too complex (Durac, 2013: 188). By looking at the alliance between the defected
military and the demonstrators or the secular and Islamist parties, Diehl (2013) and Chivvis
et al (2012), with regards to Syria and Libya respectively, supports the thesis of this study
stating that the fraction of the military opposing those countries’ regimes, had no intention
with siding with the social and political opposition. Instead their violent intentions took over
the non-violent uprising, which resulted in a civil war within the two countries and an
illegitimate ruling of the new regime in Libya with a divided military apparatus.
Comparing the agendas between Secular and Islamist parties
The power shift between secularismand Islamismhas been an intriguing outcome
after the Arab Spring, after the introduction of a democratic transition. It had opened the
opportunity for parties to organise and made elections more free and competitive.
Historically in the Arab world, Islamist parties have always been the best organised and
popular, such as the Muslim Brotherhood and Salafis in Egypt, whereas secular parties
appeared unable to deliver a clear message, poorly organised, and fragmented to the extent
where they are unable to form coalitions, particularly for electoral purposes, for example the
secularist al-Hirak southern movement in Yemen (Ottaway in Ulgen et al, 2012: 6).
By looking at Syria’s parties, not only is there no combined effort between the
Islamist and secular parties to establish themselves as an effective opposition to Assad’s
regime, there are deep fragmentations within each of the parties, due to different ideologies
and effective methods to use against Assad. According to Rafizadeh (2012), secularist
divisions are visible within the SNC regarding solutions to the civil war, as well as divisions
within Islamist parties in which, according to Dalacoura (2013), radical Islamists are using
violence against the regime, whereas the Salafi group wish to take the non-violent route to
overthrow Assad. Despite this, unlike Syria, Libyan and Yemeni secular and Islamist parties
have not, to a great extent, suffered deep divisions. However, rivalries between the two
were worsened due to the emergence of chaos within their borders. In Libya, secular and
liberalist parties were threatened by the Islamist influence over the NTC as well as their

43. 39
dominance over the political scene. This is similar to Yemen, where the secular southern
movements were threatened by the great influential powers granted to the Islamist Islah
party by the Hadi regime. In relation to each other, the parties in Syria, Libya and Yemen
were ultimately unable to reach a consensual collective agenda for the good of civil society.
In addition, to the deep fragmentations within the other two key actors; the lack of unity by
these parties also paved the way for the ungoverned spaces to be filled by extremist
organisations.
On the contrary, in Tunisia the uniting of the secular and Islamist parties had proved
to be significant in the ousting of Ben Ali as well as in the events afterwards. Tunisia’s secular
and Islamist parties managed to pass their post-Arab democratic constitution almost
unanimously even after heated debates for each article. Unlike in Libya, Syria, and Yemen,
Tunisia’s parties of all ideological variances displayed the willingness to put the demands of
civil society before their own political interests (Green & Ferguson, 2015: 29). Additionally,
Islamist parties in Tunisia have put effort in searching for a common policy basis in order to
gain secularist and leftist support in the formation of a ‘new’ order. The Islamist party
Ennahda had put itself as the moderate balance among extremes from both the Salafists and
secularists (Salamey, 2015: 124).
Different Effects with and without External Intervention
The intervention of external actors such as USA, Russia and Saudi Arabia, has
arguably added to the chaos and ungoverned spaces already present in Syria, Libya and
Yemen. Russia and Saudi Arabia’s intervention maintained the stalemate of chaos in Syria,
because the purpose of their intervention was mostly for self-interest. Allison (2013)
observes that Russia’s intervention was mainly for the upkeep of their naval base in Tartus,
and Gause III (2014) states that Saudi Arabia’s intervention was mainly to put pressure on
Iranian influence while at the same time containing the threat of Al-Qaeda. Seitz (in Lackner,
2014), argued that during Saleh’s regime, the weakness of central government and the
divisions within the military was worsened by the influence of external actors who pursued
their own regional and international interest, such as the US’s war against al-Qaeda and
Saudi Arabia’s protection of its domestic borders from the same terrorist organisation. This