CCP's Mishu System Tsai and Dean

The China Journal, no. 73. 1324-9347/2015/7301-0007. Copyright 2015 by The Australian National University. All rights reserved.
Lifting the Veil of the CCP’s Mishu System:
Unrestricted Informal Politics within an
Authoritarian Regime
This article analyzes the Chinese Communist Party’s opaque mishu (secretary) system. It
consists of two branches: institutional mishu and personal mishu. The former are mainly
employed in Party Committee general offices, to assist the Committee leadership and liaise
between departments to push Committee policies and to administer and compile relevant
documents to support the policy-making process. Personal mishu work instead in the indi-
vidual leaders’ executive offices. Those working for members of the Politburo Standing
Committee can be divided into four main categories: political, confidential, security and
life mishu. Both institutional and personal mishu work essentially on behalf of CCP lead-
ers at various levels. In addition to clarifying the formal arrangements of the mishu system,
this article will also consider the system through the lens of unrestricted informal politics,
discussing particularly how mishu are able to accumulate power through leverage of the
client–patron relationship between themselves and their leading cadre.
Within the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), a dynamic élite group has
emerged, dubbed the “Mishu Clique” (mishu bang 秘书帮).1
The members
of this group have worked as high-level institutional or personal mishu2
of impor-
tant top leaders, and have subsequently been promoted to advanced positions in
their own right. For example, Wen Jiabao (温家宝) and Zeng Qinghong (曾庆红)
both worked as institutional mishu in the Central General Office (Zhongyang
bangongting 中央办公厅) before making their way into the Politburo Standing
Committee, while Ye Kedong (叶克冬), a personal mishu employed by Hu Jintao
during his stint in the Communist Youth League, later became Vice Head of
the Taiwan Affairs Office of the State Council. It is generally accepted amongst
1. See table 1 at the end of the article for an illustration of former mishu now working in high-ranking
roles.
2. This article uses a pinyin transcription of the term mishu. Although this word can generally
be translated as “secretary”, within Chinese politics the term can refer to various roles and positions.
Furthermore, as the responsibilities of the CCP mishu are far broader than mere secretarial work, it is more
logical and appropriate to employ the transcribed Chinese term.
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Lifting the Veil of the CCP’s Mishu
observers that the prevalence of former mishu holding élite positions can be at-
tributed to the client–patron relationship between the mishu and his leading
cadre (shouzhang 首长), as well as the extensive informal political opportunities
and personal networking (guanxi 关系) offered by the role, allowing mishu to
secure ever greater promotion and advancement.3
Unfortunately, the mishu system is little understood, although this lack of
understanding does not reflect its significance within the politics of the CCP.4
Academic discussion of this topic has been limited by a dearth of informative
materials. Up to now, the most significant examination has been that by Wei
Li and Lucian W. Pye in a 1992 article in The China Quarterly,5
which drew
mostly on the memoirs of mishu working for important members of the political
élite during the era of Mao Zedong. The article revealed the intensity of work-
ing relationships between leaders and their mishu, often resulting in close and
long-lasting ties. In two further papers of note, Cheng Li discusses the “mishu
phenomenon” which, he argues, has already become a distinctive pattern within
modern Chinese politics, and James C. Mulvenon and Michael S. Chase consider
the working role of mishu.6
However, due to the lack of information available
when these articles were written, they were not able to delve deeply enough into
the world of the mishu. As Kenneth Lieberthal lamented, a clearer and more up-
to-date understanding of the role of today’s mishu within Chinese politics is still
notably lacking.7
This article sets out to address this deficiency, employing a range of newly pub-
lished memoirs and other literature, as well as interviews, to depict and analyze
the role of the mishu system within the CCP. The existing literature does make
the important point that mishu and their senior leaders form client–patron rela-
3. See Andrew Nathan, “A Factionalism Model for CCP Politics”, The China Quarterly, No. 53 (January–
March 1973), pp. 34–66; Tang Tsou, “Prolegomenon to the Study of Informal Groups in CCP Politics”, The
China Quarterly, No. 65 (March 1976), pp. 98–114; Frederick C. Teiwes, Leadership, Legitimacy, and Conflict
in China: From a Charismatic Mao to the Politics of Succession (Armonk: M. E. Sharpe, 1984), pp. 94–99;
Lowell Dittmer, “Chinese Informal Politics”, The China Journal, No. 34 (July 1995), pp. 1–34; Lowell Dittmer,
“East Asian Informational Politics in Comparative Perspective”, in Lowell Dittmer, Haruhiro Fukui and Peter
N. S. Lee (eds), Informal Politics in East Asia (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), pp. 290–308;
Joseph Fewsmith, Elite Politics in Contemporary China (Armonk: M. E. Sharpe, 2001), pp. 35–38.
4. Cheng Li, China’s Leaders: The New Generation (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2001), pp. 147–64;
Meng Jun, Zhonggong mishu bang (The CCP’s Mishu Clique) (Hong Kong: Ha Fai Yi Publications, 2009).
5. Wei Li and Lucian W. Pye, “The Ubiquitous Role of the Mishu in Chinese Politics”, The China Quarterly,
No. 132 (December 1992), pp. 913–36.
6. Cheng Li, “The Mishu Phenomenon: Patron–Client Ties and Coalition-Building Tactics”, China
Leadership Monitor, No. 4 (Fall 2002), http://www.hoover.org/publications/china-leadership-monitor
/article/6191, accessed 25 June 2013; James C. Mulvenon and Michael S. Chase, “The Role of Mishus in the
Chinese Political System: Change and Continuity”, in David M. Finkelstein and Maryanne Kivlehan (eds),
Chinese Leadership in the Twenty-First Century: The Rise of the Fourth Generation (Armonk: M. E. Sharpe,
2003), pp. 140–51.
7. Kenneth Lieberthal, Governing China: From Revolution Through Reform (New York: W. W. Norton,
1995), p. 191.
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tionships, allowing the mishu to share in the power of the leader for whom they
work. This falls into the realm of informal politics. This article refines this insight
by considering the concept of “unrestricted informal politics” to describe the
particular characteristics of the mishu’s power. There is no doubt that informal
politics exists in both China and the West, but the disparity between the two is
one of scale. That is to say, in the West informal politics is limited by the existence
of checks and balances on leaders’ power, meaning that the power available to
share with clients is also restricted. However, under China’s authoritarian regime,
the relative lack of boundaries on senior leaders’ power provides the ideal foun-
dation for mishu to siphon off enormous power of their own. The client–patron
relationship between mishu and their senior leaders can be termed “unrestricted
informal politics”.
Lowell Dittmer argues that the relationship between informal and formal poli-
tics is one of functional interdependence.8
In other words, the informal element
of mishu political power is derived from the formal functioning of the mishu
system. This article will first discuss the source of mishu’s unrestricted informal
power—the formal system structure as a whole—then clarify the various differ-
ent roles of mishu individually. After establishing this background, the article will
move on to elaborate upon the concept of “unrestricted informal politics” within
the CCP’s mishu system.
The unrestricted informal political power enjoyed by mishu is rooted in the cen-
tering of the entire formal mishu management system around senior leading cad-
res with close ties to these intimate members of staff. The mishu system is divided
into institutional (jigou 机构) and personal (siren 私人) mishu.9
Institutional mi-
shu work in Party Committee general offices (dangwei bangongting 党委办公厅),10
whereas personal mishu are based within the individual executive offices of
senior leading cadres (shouzhang bangongshi 首长办公室). Despite this division,
both the institutional and personal mishu sectors place senior cadres at the heart
of their structure. Mishu departments in both the general offices and individual
leaders’ executive offices are directly managed by leading cadres, although they
must also coordinate with other departments at the same level. In CCP parlance,
this is a compartmental, horizontal (kuaikuai 块块) administrative structure. The
8. Lowell Dittmer, “East Asian Informational Politics in Comparative Perspective”.
9. Wei Li and Lucian W. Pye, “The Ubiquitous Role of the Mishu in Chinese Politics”, p. 916.
10. The general office system is extensive, including both Party and government sectors. This article will
only discuss the Party sector; hereafter, “general office” refers only to those in the Party sector.
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informal political power of the mishu is sourced precisely from this structure of
direct management by senior leading cadres.
Institutional mishu make up the vast majority of the staff in Party Committee
general offices at various levels of the Party hierarchy.11
Every level of general
office is subject to a dual leadership (shuangchong lingdao 双重领导) system,12
which involves professional guidance from the superior-level general office, as
well as direct leadership by the Party Committee at that level.13
In other words,
general offices are managed directly by the leading cadre members of their as-
sociated Party Committee. The Central General Office is led directly by the
senior leading cadres of the CCP Politburo Standing Committee. Provincial
Committees in turn direct provincial general offices, and so on. In 1996, former
Central General Office Director Yang Shangkun (杨尚昆) mentioned that some
local Party Committees have requested that the Central General Office exercise
direct, vertical leadership over provincial or municipal general offices. However,
this arrangement would be unfeasible in practice, as the Central General Office
exists to serve the central leadership, and local general offices to serve local lead-
ers. In other words: “Whatever the Party Committee does, the general office must
do”.14
Thus, the work of the institutional mishu staffing the general offices revolves
around the leading cadres in the supervising Party Committee.
All mishu working in the Party’s general offices—including the director
(zhuren 主任)—can be categorized as institutional mishu, and they cover a range
of functions. The important units within the Central General Office, for example,
include the Secretarial Bureau (mishu ju 秘书局), Security Bureau (jingwei ju
警卫局), Complaint Letters and Visits Bureau (xinfang ju 信访局), Confidential
Bureau (jiyao ju 机要局) and Confidential Communication Bureau (jiyao jiaotong
ju 机要交通局).15
The Secretarial Bureau oversees the smooth day-to-day run-
ning of affairs and is on standby duty 24 hours a day, charged with compiling and
organizing communication and information, and notifying individual directors’
offices immediately, should an urgent situation arise.16
The Security Bureau is
11. The central, provincial and municipal levels have larger general offices (bangongting), whereas county
and townships levels have smaller offices (bangongshi). Despite the nominal difference, this article will treat
both the same, for the sake of simplicity.
12. Li Xin, Li Xin wenji (di yi juan) (Collected Works of Li Xin [Vol. 1]) (Beijing: Higher Education Press,
2008), p. 354.
13. For more on the difference between direct leadership and professional guidance, see Kenneth
Lieberthal, Managing the China Challenge: How to Achieve Corporate Success in the People’s Republic
(Washington: Brookings Institution Press, 2011), pp. 52–53.
14. Su Weimin, “Yang Shangkun tan zai zhongyang bangongting ershi nian” (Yang Shangkun Discusses
His 20 Years in the Central General Office), Bainian chao (100-Year Trend), No. 7 (2008), p. 22.
15. Tian Yi, “Pingmin zongli Wen Jiabao” (Wen Jiabao: The Common People’s Premier), Shidai chao
(Trends of Our Time), No. 7 (2003), p. 16; James C. Mulvenon and Michael S. Chase, “The Role of Mishus in
the Chinese Political System”, p. 142.
16. Wu Jiansheng, “Qian chui bai lian cheng meiyu” (Tempering Stone Into Fine Jade), Mishu gongzuo
(Mishu Work), No. 2 (February 2005), p. 14.
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responsible for the safeguarding and protection of all cadres in the Politburo and
above. Whenever Politburo members leave the confines of the secure govern-
ment complex at Zhongnanhai (中南海), the Security Bureau Director is tasked
with coordinating security arrangements.17
The Complaint Letters and Visits
Bureau receives and responds to complaint letters, petitions and personally de-
livered complaints,18
and the Confidential Bureau is responsible for handling the
confidentiality of Central General Office documents.19
Finally, the duty of the
Confidential Communication Bureau is to transmit safely and deliver confiden-
tial documents and communiqués, particularly missives sent from the central
authorities to provinces and municipalities.20
Each of these bureaus is staffed by
institutional mishu.
In addition to the institutional mishu in the general offices, higher-level lead-
ers also retain their own personal mishu. According to regulations, only leaders at
vice-provincial leadership rank and above are entitled to the services of personal
mishu, who handle both professional and life-oriented tasks; however, many
lower-ranking leaders flout the rules by employing private secretaries.21
The per-
sonal mishu working on behalf of the Politburo Standing Committee members
are divided into even more specific categories. Four types are of particular impor-
tance: political (zhengzhi 政治), confidential (jiyao 机要), security (jingwei 警卫)
and life (shenghuo 生活) mishu.22
Personal mishu are employed in the executive offices of individual leaders,
and are directly led by their respective senior cadre.23
On paper, each category
of mishu also receives the professional guidance of related bureaus in the Central
General Office, which has a wide and comprehensive professional scope.24
For ex-
ample, security mishu are handled by the Security Bureau of the Central General
Office, confidential mishu by the Confidential Bureau, and political and life
17. Wu Jicheng and Wang Fan, Wu Jicheng huiyi lu (Memoirs of Wu Jicheng) (Beijing: Contemporary
China Press, 2003), p. 385.
18. Zhang Tongqin, Mishu xue gailun (Introduction to Mishu Studies) (Beijing: People’s University Press,
2011), p. 45.
19. Li Gengqi, “Wo zai zhong ban jiyao shi gongzuo de rizi li” (My Time Working in the Central General
Office Confidential Bureau), Mishu gongzuo, No. 11 (November 2006), p. 53.
20. Li Xin, Li Xin wenji (di yi juan), p. 31.
21. Li Song, “Mishu fubai, beihou shi ‘yi ba shou’ quanli wubian” (Behind Mishu Corruption is the
Unlimited Power of the Élite Leadership), Mishu (The Mishu), No. 4 (2009), p. 6.
22. The functions of these four types of mishu are relatively comprehensive and important in nature. These
mishu are thus likely to form close relationships with their senior leader. Leaders will, according to necessity,
also employ mishu with more specialized functions. For instance, State Council member Yang Jiechi was
once employed as Deng Xiaoping’s personal interpreter mishu. However, these specialized mishu carry out
functional, non-political jobs and are therefore less likely to develop client–patron relationships with senior
leaders.
23. Executive officers are traditionally named informally after leaders; the office of Jiang Zemin was
known as “Jiang’s Office” (Jiang ban), Hu Jintao’s was “Hu’s Office” (Hu ban), and so on.
24. Lu Congmin, Waijiao rensheng: wo de huiyi he ganwu (Diplomatic Life: My Recollections and
Sentiments) (Beijing: Zhongxin Press, 2009), p. 174.
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mishu by the Central General Office Secretarial Bureau.25
The Central General
Office maintains constant contact with individual executive offices in order to
provide support when needed. In practice, however, as executive office mishu
are backed behind the scenes by a powerful Standing Committee member, their
demands tend to take precedence over the guidance of the Central General Office
bureaus.26
A pertinent example is the hiring of personal mishu. Technically, mishu should
be assigned by the Central General Office, but in reality the decision is often
made according to a leading cadre’s wishes.27
Senior leaders may take several
considerations into account when deciding upon mishu appointments, includ-
ing recommendations from other trusted cadres. Jiang Qing (江青), for instance,
selected her personal mishu, Yan Zhanggui (阎长贵), on the recommendation of
Cultural Revolution Small Group member Qi Benyu (戚本禹).28
Cadres also rec-
ommend their own children to one another, a practice particularly prevalent in
the 1980s.29
Senior leaders may select former colleagues, or mishu hailing from
their home region. For example, Zhong Shaojun (钟绍军) worked with Xi Jinping
(习近平) in Zhejiang before becoming his mishu;30
Li Keqiang (李克强) and his
mishu, Shi Gang (石刚), both come from Anhui Province.31
From 2003 onwards,
the CCP ruled that those hoping to become mishu must first pass a professional
examination before being qualified to take on the role.32
The direct relationship between personal mishu and their senior leading cadre
is vividly reflected in a number of examples, not least that of Zhou Enlai (周恩来).
Arranged in a drawer of his office desk, laid out like a row of piano keys, were
buzzers to summon whichever mishu he needed.33
Mishu were expected to be
constantly at his beck and call, to the extent that a running joke amongst the
mishu at the time played on a classic adage: “All roads lead to the director”.34
In fact, even Zhou’s toilet had a bell to call his mishu; in the course of using
the bathroom, Zhou would call in the mishu on duty to hear important notices
25. Xue Litai, “Hu Jintao zhangwo le dang zheng jun da quan” (Hu Jintao’s Powerful Hold on the Party,
Government and Military), Lianhe zaobao (United Morning News) (24 September 2007), p. 12.
26. Li Xin, Li Xin wenji (di yi juan), p. 354.
27. Interview, Chinese scholar, 18 November 2012.
28. An Xiaoyi, “Yan Zhanggui gei Jiang Qing dang mishu” (Yan Zhanggui Working as Jiang Qing’s Mishu),
Yanhuang chunqiu (Chinese People’s History), No. 1 (2003), p. 54.
30. “Dami Zhong Shaojun” (Mishu Zhong Shaojun), Xingdao ribao (Sing Tao Daily) (13 June 2013),
p. A24.
31. “Li Keqiang dami ren guo yan shi fu zhuren” (Li Keqiang’s Mishu Takes on State Council Research
Office Deputy Director Role), Xingdao ribao (21 June 2013), p. A32.
32. Zhang Tongqin, Mishu xue gailun, p. 26.
33. Tong Xiaopeng, Feng yu sishi nian (di er bu) (Forty Years of Hard Work [Vol. 2]) (Beijing: Central
Literature Press, 1996), p. 343.
34. Cheng Hua, Zhou Enlai he ta de mishumen (Zhou Enlai and His Mishu) (Beijing: China Radio and
Television Press, 1992), p. 263.
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and arrange the day’s schedule. His mishu jokingly christened the bathroom
“The Second Office”.35
In short, both the personal and institutional mishu systems are at the service
of individual leading cadres. The structure of the system at the central level, in-
cluding the dual leadership mechanism, is portrayed in figure 1 below. General
offices, the workplace of the institutional mishu, come under the direct leader-
ship of the senior cadres in their associated Party Committee, but are also guided
professionally by their superior-level general office. The personal mishu working
in the individual executive offices of leading cadres are directly led by the cadre
himself, but also receive professional guidance (zhidao 指导) from the related
bureaus in the Party Committee general office at their level. The formal work
of mishu centered on a senior cadre allows them to develop informal but close
client–patron ties with the leader for whom they work. This relationship, in ad-
dition to the leaders’ own relatively unlimited power, creates the conditions for
unrestricted informal politics.
According to Li Xin (李欣), who previously worked in the Central General Office,
the general offices are crucial core units (hexin yaohai bumen 核心要害部门) in
the CCP system due to their close working relationship with Party Committees.36
An understanding of the work of the general offices thus reveals the importance
of the institutional mishu to the CCP as a whole.
Each level of general office, staffed by institutional mishu, serves the needs of
its associated Party Committee. General offices handle the details of the various
day-to-day affairs handled by the Committee leadership, allowing institutional
mishu to grasp clearly the Committee’s agenda and operations.37
General offices
also coordinate the operations of each Party department and unit at their level,
and are responsible for ensuring that all units adhere closely to the Committee’s
directives. Coordination of the various Party departments allows the general of-
fice staff to accumulate the most comprehensive information on every possible
subject. Thus, before laying out policy, Party Committees often call on the general
office to coordinate with relevant units or directly to chair meetings to discuss the
35. Zhang Zuoliang, Zhou Enlai de zuihou shinian (Zhou Enlai’s Last Ten Years) (Shanghai: Shanghai
People’s Press, 1997), p. 82.
36. Li Xin, Li Xin wenji (di er juan) (Collected Works of Li Xin [Vol. 2]) (Beijing: Higher Education Press,
2008), p. 86.
37. Li Xin, Li Xin wenji (di san juan) (Collected Works of Li Xin [Vol. 3]) (Beijing: Higher Education
Press, 2008), p. 2.
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Structure of the CCP’s mishu system
Note:
1. Solid lines represent a direct leadership relationship, and dotted lines represent a relationship
of professional guidance.
2. A detailed breakdown of the operations in individual executive offices of provincial leading
cadres is as yet unclear and thus cannot be laid out in this diagram.
3. According to CCP regulations, cadres of municipal leadership level and below are not entitled
to employ personal mishu, and so the Party Committee offices at their level provide related services
instead.
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issues at hand.38
Yang Shangkun, former director of the Central General Office,
explained that his role was primarily to understand the inclinations of the central
leadership, and then to synchronize the central and local levels in order to imple-
ment central directives most effectively.39
General offices’ coordination work involves balancing the interests of the lead-
ership and various departments, and is therefore far from easy. For example, the
Party Committee plus the mayor and vice mayor of a directly controlled mu-
nicipality number seven or eight people; the municipal level general office must
coordinate between them to lay the foundations for the development and promo-
tion of every single political regulation. If at any point leaders display differences
of opinion, it is the role of the general office to iron out the problems. Some
departmental leaders are unwilling to accept the guidance and negotiation of the
office staff, and attempt instead to approach senior leading cadres directly. In this
situation, the general office director must step in to thwart the unsatisfied cadre’s
efforts, to avoid troubling the senior cadre. Li Xin recalls that, in the course of his
work, he received many complaint letters from disgruntled cadres containing the
acerbic words “please do not rebuff me, noble secretary” (qing mishu laoye buyao
dangjia 请秘书老爷不要挡驾).40
Another important role of the general offices is the accumulation and proces-
sing of information. Since the Opening Up and Reform, the CCP has aimed to
strengthen the function of data collection and reporting functions within the
general office system, in order to supply Party Committee members with up-
to-date information on the political, economic and social conditions needed to
make appropriate policy choices.41
At that time, the CCP introduced a slogan
stating that the general offices would no longer be mere “recorders” (liusheng ji
留声机)—simply replaying messages—but would instead be upgraded to “pro-
cessors” (chuli ji 处理机)—handling policy-making information.42
General of-
fices at every level would be responsible for compiling appropriate materials and
information, and acting as the eyes and ears of its Party Committee. Every gen-
eral office produces a regular publication for internal reference which discusses
important societal situations, such as the recovery from the 2008 Wenchuan
Earthquake.43
The Central General Office compiles a publication entitled “Daily
38. Mei Weiwei and Mei Yulin, Jiyao mishu gongzuo guifan daquan (Specifications of Confidential Mishu
Work) (Nanning: Guangxi People’s Press, 2010), p. 266.
39. Li Ying, “Xin Zhongguo zhongyang bangongting zhuren gangwei shang de Yang Shangkun” (The New
Director of the Central General Office Yang Shangkun), Zhonggong dangshi ziliao (Party History Materials),
No. 3 (2007), p. 158.
40. Li Xin, Li Xin wenji (di san juan), p. 3.
42. Li Xin, Li Xin wenji (di er juan), p. 10.
43. Yang Dianzhong, “Tantan women ban ‘meiri qingkuang huibao’ de zuofa he tihui” (Discussing the
Method and Experience of Organizing the “Daily Briefing”), Mishu gongzuo, No. 8 (August 2008), pp. 22–23.
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Briefing” (Meiri huibao 每日汇报) which circulates important information to the
central leadership on a daily basis.44
In order to gather information most effectively, each general office acts as a
data processing center. If necessary, general offices dispatch staff to the grass roots
to conduct investigations and clarify specifics. After 1986, every level of general
office established a system of “direct reporting” (xinxi zhibao dian 信息直报点)
which involved dispatching information officers to important companies, auton-
omous bodies, community groups and schools, primed to pass on information
at any point in time.45
In the case of a significant occurrence such as a large-scale
popular protest, criminal case, serious disaster or traffic accident, information of-
ficers must send a report to their general office within two hours. After receiving
the news, general offices must prudently distinguish between which information
is suitable for public scrutiny and which should be limited to internal reference.
Public information can be passed on to the media, whereas internal information
must be delivered to the superior general office in strict compliance with the
Party’s confidential document transfer system.46
For example, when the SARS epidemic hit in 2003, the CCP set up a dedicated
internal telephone system and intranet site in order to disseminate information
about the crisis. Each general office was required to file a report to the superior-
level general office at least once a day. When faced with significant and large-
scale disasters, each level of general office must send reports to the superior office
within 30 minutes of receiving new information.47
Within this strict reporting
system, it is vital that every information officer can be contacted at any time. A
general office staff member revealed that, on one occasion, information officers
were unable to contact him as a large-scale incident was unfolding. Ever since
making this mistake, he has made sure to keep his mobile telephone switched on
24 hours a day, and checks every evening that it has enough battery charge to last
through the night.48
The information gathered by the general offices must be reported clearly
and concisely to their associated Party Committee. As reports are generally re-
ceived early in the morning, CCP cadres have come to call these briefs “spiritual
breakfast” (jingshen zaocan 精神早餐).49
It is important for the reports to be as
comprehensive as possible. A document detailing the instructions of the central
45. Jiangsu Taizhou Municipal Party Committee General Office, “Women shi zenyang gao hao shangbao
xinxi gongzuo de” (How We Deal With Reporting Information), Mishu gongzuo, No. 8 (August 2012), p. 29.
46. Mei Weiwei and Mei Yulin, Jiyao mishu gongzuo guifan daquan, pp. 251–52.
47. Zhang Chunlin, “Bianjiang diqu dangwei bangongshi zenyang tigao gongzuo xiaolü” (Improving Effi-
ciency in Border Region Party Committee Offices), Mishu gongzuo, No. 8 (August 2008), p. 18.
48. Xi’an Municipal Party Committee General Office, “Bangongting gongzuo shiwu ershi li (xia)” (20 Cases
of Mistakes in General Office Work [Part 2]), Mishu gongzuo, No. 4 (April 2010), p. 29.
49. Li Xin, Li Xin wenji (di er juan), p. 151.
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leadership states that “the Central General Office urges all offices to truthfully
convey all information, and consider how to resolve the tendency of reporting
only the good news”.50
The CCP’s reinforcement of the information-processing
function of the general offices is beneficial to its aim of improving governing
ability, as it allows for rapid reactions to the needs of society. This was the initial
goal behind the restructuring of the general offices’ operations from “recorders”
to “processors”.
MISHU
Of the four types of personal mishu, political mishu are undoubtedly the most
important, often referred to as “great secretaries” (dami 大秘). They take on a
huge range of responsibilities: Liu Congwen (刘崇文), former political mishu to
Hu Yaobang (胡耀邦), recalls that his work included investigation and research,
drafting documents and responding to petitions and letters. Hu also requested
Liu to gather the information needed to help him write a memoir, but Hu passed
away before the work could be completed.51
Zheng Bijian (郑必坚), the former
vice-principal of the Central Party School, also worked as Hu Yaobang’s politi-
cal mishu in the 1980s, and helped him to compose the political report of the
13th
National Party Congress.52
During the 1980s, Party elders such as Deng
Xiaoping (邓小平) and Chen Yun (陈云) would even send their political mishu
to chair Politburo meetings on their behalf.53
Precisely what constitutes “politi-
cal affairs” is by no means clear-cut; the power of the political mishu is limited
only by the attitude of their leading cadre. Former Premier Zhu Rongji (朱熔基)
preferred to see to his own duties himself, and the power of his political mishu
was therefore limited. However, his predecessor, Li Peng (李鹏), would delegate a
great many tasks to his mishu, thereby allowing them far greater power.54
Political mishu often work as the directors of the leading cadre’s individual
executive offices.55
Executive offices are the first point of contact when approach-
ing a senior cadre, and thus the office directors act as a representative of the
leader, ready to communicate with other departments and units in his name
50. Zhang Bangkui, “Zhongyang bangongting lingdao tongzhi tan jiejue xinxi gongzuo zhong de bao you
nan wenti” (Central General Office Leading Comrades Discuss Resolving the Difficulties of Reporting Bad
News), Bangongshi yewu (General Office Business), No. 6 (1998), p. 12.
51. Liu Chongwen, “Hu Yaobang shishi qian bannian de xintai” (Hu Yaobang’s Way of Thinking in the
Six Months before his Death), Yanhuang chunqiu, No. 9 (2009), pp. 3–4.
52. Xi Yin, Zhongguo gaoceng wendan (The Knowledge Bank of Chinese Top Leaders) (Hangzhou:
Zhejiang People’s Press, 2008), pp. 151–53.
53. Ezra F. Vogel, Deng Xiaoping and the Transformation of China (Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard
University Press, 2011), pp. 379–80.
55. The director of President Hu Jintao’s executive office was ranked at deputy ministerial level ( fu bu ji).
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whenever necessary. For example, when Jiang Zemin ordered Hu Jintao to han-
dle the US spy plane collision incident in 2001, this in practice involved “Hu’s
Office” working closely with the Foreign Minister Tang Jiaxuan (唐家璇) on Hu’s
behalf.56
During the Sino–US negotiations over Chinese accession to the World
Trade Organization, when the Chinese delegate, Minister of Foreign Trade and
Cooperation Long Yongtu (龙永图), placed a telephone call to “Zhu’s Office” (Zhu
ban 朱办) at 6 a.m. on 15 November 1999 to inform Premier Zhu Rongji of the
status of the discussions, it was Zhu’s political mishu, Li Wei (李伟) who answered
the call.57
In other words, political mishu are the chief supervisors of the executive
offices, and must be prepared to take care of any political issue on behalf of their
senior leading cadre.
In general, as leading cadres have many pressures on their time, it is the re-
sponsibility of political mishu to help read and process documents on their be-
half. The political mishu acts as a “filter”, sifting through information and writing
summaries and abstracts to lighten the reading load of the senior cadre.58
When
submitting documents to the senior leader, it is imperative that political mishu
possess acute discretion and avoid submitting any problematic content. During
the Cultural Revolution, Jiang Qing’s mishu, Yan Zhanggui, forwarded her a letter
written by a young Beijing actress, requesting help on the basis of their shared oc-
cupational background. Jiang had worked as an actress in Shanghai in the 1930s,
but was adamant that her past be covered up. When presented with the letter,
she not only immediately relieved Yan of his duties, but even had him sent to
prison.59
For many Politburo Standing Committee members and senior cadres, the first
item on the day’s agenda is to read the Internal Reference documents (neibu can-
kao 内部参考, or neican 内参) with the political mishu’s help. Neican documents
are highly confidential edited news reports prepared by Xinhua News Agency
(Xinhua she 新华社), circulated only to the highest leadership. There are different
levels of clearance within the CCP; only the highest level of clearance, limited to
the Politburo Standing Committee members, can access the “Domestic Status
Proofs” (guonei dongtai qingyang 国内动态清样), which outlines the details of
the most significant and urgent incidents, such as the 1989 riots in Lhasa or the
flooding of the Yangtze in 1998.60
Political mishu first skim through the contents
56. Tang Jiaxuan, Jing yu xu feng (Strong Rains and Warm Winds) (Beijing: World Affairs Press, 2009),
p. 271.
57. Zhao Yining, “Zhu Rongji zongli jueduan ZhongMei tanpan de gushi” (The Story of Premier Zhu
Rongji’s Decisive Sino–US Negotiations), Ershiyi shiji jingji baodao (21st
Century Business Herald) (21 Nov-
ember 2011), p. 13.
58. Tong Xiaopeng, Feng yu sishi nian (di er bu), p. 342.
59. An Xiaoyi, “Yan Zhanggui gei Jiang Qing dang mishu”, pp. 54–55.
60. Chen Yanhui, “Neican jiemi” (Revealing the Secrets of Internal Reference), Xinhua Ao bao (Xinhua
Macao Daily News) (30 May 2005), p. 3.
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of the neican and highlight the most important points, before passing it onto the
leading cadre. Zhou Enlai had his political mishu read him the neican aloud at
breakfast.61
Leading cadres may write remarks and instructions on the document
and direct their mishu to send a copy to the Central General Office and to any
other relevant departments, to take action as instructed.62
The Central General
Office will subsequently charge appropriate general offices with the task of moni-
toring the application of the leading cadre’s directives. This process is known as
“supervision and inspection” (ducu jiancha 督促检查),63
and is a special part of
the overall information transmission system within the CCP, reflecting the con-
ditions of pervasive external supervision. Under the conditions of a persistent
lack of media freedom, it is vital for the top leadership to have access to compre-
hensive information sources in order to maintain and strengthen their capacity
to govern effectively.
In addition to the neican documents, since political mishu work so closely with
senior leaders they have a great deal of sensitive information at their fingertips.
For example, in the early 1980s, many smuggling cases implicating CCP cadres
occurred in the coastal provinces of Guangdong and Fujian. Chen Yun’s mishu,
Zhu Jiamu (朱佳木), revealed that he was allowed to enter Chen’s office and read
the briefings of proceedings regarding charges of corruption.64
Under normal cir-
cumstances, such sensitive documents would be seen by nobody but the most
senior leadership.
Another responsibility falling within the scope of a political mishu’s work is
arranging important survey and investigation (diaoyan 调研) trips for the lead-
ing cadre. When members of the Politburo Standing Committee take these trips,
the schedule and location are decided upon by the Standing Committee and then
carefully organized by the senior cadre’s political mishu, the Central General
Office and the top leader in the diaoyan location. The information is categorized
“top secret”. To promote recognition of CCP policy in rural areas, at Chinese New
Year in 2006 Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao paid visits to rural regions in Shaanxi and
Shandong respectively.65
Both itineraries were arranged by the Politburo Standing
Committee and brought to fruition by the planning and coordination of Hu’s mi-
shu, Chen Shiju (陈世炬), and Wen’s mishu, Qiu Xiaoxiong (丘小雄). The senior
cadres’ speeches and discussions on such trips, and even the questions asked by
the general public, are all drawn up in advance by the political mishu. Often, they
organize local Party representatives to act as members of the general public, in
61. Cheng Hua, Zhou Enlai he ta de mishumen, p. 251.
62. Chen Yanhui, “Neican jiemi”.
63. Li Xin, Li Xin wenji (di er juan), pp. 52–55.
64. Zhu Jiamu, Lun Chen Yun (Discussing Chen Yun) (Beijing: Central Literature Press, 2010), p. 12.
65. Li Guangmin and Zhong Jian, “Jiemi Zhongnanhai de diaoyan zhengzhi” (Decrypting the Politics of
Zhongnanhai’s Investigation and Research), Fenghuang zhoukan (Phoenix Weekly), No. 435 (15 May 2012),
pp. 24–25.
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order to ensure that the agenda runs smoothly. Another example of such arrange-
ments is Deng Xiaoping’s famous Southern Tour in 1992. The Central General
Office put forward suggestions for the trip, which were ultimately decided upon
by Deng’s political mishu, Wang Ruilin (王瑞林).66
Local cadres hoping to film
Deng’s trip had first to obtain permission from Wang.67
In addition to organizing the trips of senior cadres, some political mishu go
on investigative trips by themselves, collecting information for their leader. In
the Mao era, perhaps the most famous mishu to embark on such tours was Tian
Jiaying (田家英), who investigated the People’s Communes on behalf of Mao
Zedong and offered suggestions for improvements to the system.68
Further to
this, Chen Yun’s political mishu, former Minister of State Security Xu Yongyue
(许永跃), recalled that, after Deng Xiaoping’s Southern Tour, he was dispatched
by Chen to Guangzhou and Fujian to observe the development of township en-
terprises in the south. Chen asked him to investigate several hundred enterprises,
and told him: “When you go, say that it was I that sent you; that you are there
on my behalf”. On his return to Beijing, Xu Yongyue presented Chen Yun with
lengthy reports of his observations.69
These examples illustrate the significant power of the political mishu. However,
it is far from easy to become a successful and competent political mishu. In addi-
tion to excellent planning skills, political mishu must also possess acute political
acumen and the ability to comprehend the intentions and wishes of their leading
cadre even when these are not explicit. For example, when noting instructions
on documents concerning particularly sensitive topics such as demolition, land
acquisition or personnel appointment, some senior cadres are not willing to dis-
close their true opinion or make criticisms. In recent years, the term “provisional
agreement” (ni tongyi 拟同意) has become a common watchword in the CCP
vocabulary, allowing cadres to sidestep this dilemma neatly. When receiving
documents inscribed with this ambiguous phrase, involved units usually com-
municate with the political mishu to clarify whether the senior leader merely has
certain concerns that he is reluctant to voice, or whether he entirely disagrees
with the proposals.70
In other words, above and beyond organizing daily affairs,
political mishu must also express the true sentiments which the leading cadre
66. Tian Bingxin, “Deng Xiaoping ‘Nanxun’ zhong xian wei ren zhi de gushi” (The Little-Known Stories of
Deng Xiaoping’s Southern Tour), Nanfeng chuang (Southern Window), No. 14 (July 2004), p. 23.
67. Chen Kaizhi, “Wo quancheng peitong Xiaoping Nanxun” (Accompanying Deng Xiaoping’s Southern
Tour), Zhongguo jingji zhoukan (China Economics Weekly), No. 38 (27 September 2009), p. 74.
68. Ye Yonglie, Mao Zedong de mishumen (Mao Zedong’s Mishu) (Shanghai: People’s Press, 1994),
pp. 265–67.
69. Qiao Jun, “Fang guojia anquan buzhang, yuan Chen Yun tongzhi mishu Xu Yongyue” (Interviewing
National Security Bureau Director, Chen Yun’s Former Mishu Xu Yongyue), Bainian chao, No. 3 (2006), p. 17.
70. Hu Ben, “Lindao pishi: weimiao jiqiao yu chuanyue luoji” (Leaders’ Instructions: Subtle Techniques
and Circular Logic), Gongchandang yuan (Communist Party Members), No. 8 (2010), p. 54.
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himself does not dare venture. If not hardened by lengthy experience in CCP of-
ficialdom, it would be unlikely that many could successfully rise to the challenge.
MISHU
After political mishu, confidential mishu are the most important group, responsi-
ble for managing all of the leading cadre’s confidential matters. The scope of their
work involves document confidentiality and couriering. The CCP’s more confi-
dential documents, such as those sent from leaders at department level and above
to members of the Politburo Standing Committee, are marked with the words
“top secret” (juemi 绝密) or “for addressee only” (qinqi 亲启).71
Confidential
mishu alone have the right to open such documents on behalf of their leading
cadre. These documents often discuss important inner Party political issues;
for example, during Party elections for members of the Central Committee
(Zhongyang weiyuan 中央委员), the list of potential candidates is conveyed by
such a document.72
In addition, confidential mishu also act as couriers for top secret documents.
Individual leading cadres’ confidential mishu maintain a professional connec-
tion with the Confidential Bureau of the Central General Office, and may be re-
sponsible for transferring important documents between the senior cadre and
the office, as well as between senior cadres themselves. If a top secret document is
marked “extra urgent” (teji 特急), confidential mishu must ensure that it reaches
the hands of their leading cadre immediately.73
Mao Zedong’s confidential mishu,
Luo Guanglu (罗光禄) and Gao Zhi (高智), would enter Mao’s bedroom directly
and wake him on receipt of any particularly urgent or significant message.74
In fact, after the founding of the PRC, as Mao Zedong, Liu Shaoqi (刘少奇)
and Zhou Enlai habitually worked through the night, confidential mishu scurried
back and forth to deliver secret and “extra urgent” documents between leaders
into the small hours.75
After Hua Guofeng (华国锋) took office, leaders began
to work in the daytime instead, and the role of confidential mishu as night-time
couriers faded away, but they still needed to be ready at a moment’s notice. For
example, in 1981, Chen Yun had copies of his missive “Improving the Cultivation
of Young Cadres Is Imperative” (tiba peiyang zhongqing nian ganbu shi dangwu
zhi ji 提拔培养中青年干部是当务之急) delivered immediately to Deng Xiaoping,
71. Shan Lan, Hong qiang nei de mishumen (shang) (The Mishu within the Red Walls [Part 1]) (Jilin:
Yanbian University Press, 1998), pp. 33–34.
73. Ji Dong, Nanwang de ba nian (A Memorable Eight Years) (Beijing: Central Literature Press, 2007),
p. 70.
74. Shan Lan, Hong qiang nei de mishumen (shang), pp. 33–34.
75. Li Gengqi, “Wo zai zhong ban jiyao shi gongzuo de rizi li”, p. 53.
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Hu Yaobang and other senior figures.76
The topic of cadre rejuvenation was par-
ticularly delicate at the time, as it touched upon the thorny issue of senior lead-
ers’ retirement. This example demonstrates that confidential mishu are trusted to
handle even the most sensitive of materials.
However, some senior leaders, such as Premier Zhou Enlai, so respected the
notion of confidentiality that they preferred to handle these files themselves, and
did not make much use of confidential mishu. In fact, a secure private telephone
line connecting only the highest leadership was installed in Zhou Enlai’s bed-
room.77
His mishu recalled that, when the telephone rang, aware that it was an-
other leader calling on highly important business, Zhou would immediately send
all the mishu out of the room.78
In order to ensure total confidentiality, Zhou’s of-
fice had only three keys cut: one for the Premier himself, one for his confidential
mishu, and one for his security mishu. Nobody else was allowed to enter without
authorization.79
In addition to written documents, mishu must handle confidential telegrams
and other communications. The former Chinese ambassador to Japan, Xu
Dunxin (徐敦信), recalled that, during the process of signing the Sino–Japanese
Friendship and Peace Treaty in 1978, he received a request from the Japanese for-
eign minister to pay a visit to China. The ambassador immediately placed a call
to “Deng’s Office” for advice. The call was answered by Deng Xiaoping’s mishu,
who swiftly made an oral report to Deng and conveyed the immediate response,
“Welcome to China”.80
A further responsibility of confidential mishu is to record
the spoken words of their leading cadre. Many of today’s mishu use dictaphones
for this purpose, but Mao’s mishu Gao Zhi recalls that Mao did not allow the use
of recording devices. Gao Zhi had no choice but to rely on the strength of his own
memory.81
Close in importance to the confidential mishu are the security mishu, who
are responsible for safety and security arrangements. In fact, the security mishu
are never more than a few paces away from their leading cadre. Whenever Mao
Zedong traveled by car, his driver would be on the left, with Gao Zhi in the front
right seat; Mao would sit on the back right, and on his left would invariably be
76. “Jinian Chen Yun tongzhi bainian danchen” (Commemorating the 100th
Anniversary of Comrade
Chen Yun’s Birth), Zhejiang News (13 June 2005), http://zjnews.zjol.com.cn/05zjnews/system/2005/06/13
/006133109_02.shtml, accessed 23 December 2012.
77. Ji Dong, Nanwang de ba nian, p. 66.
78. Cheng Hua, Zhou Enlai he ta de mishumen, pp. 183–84.
80. Yang Faxi, “Fang Zhongguo qian zhu Riben dashi Xu Dunxin” (Interview with Former Chinese
Ambassador to Japan Xu Dunxin), Qiushi (Seeking Truth), No. 20 (2008), p. 63.
81. Gao Zhi, Jiyao mishu de simian (Memoires of a Confidential Mishu) (Beijing: Central Party School
Press, 1993), pp. 97–99.
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his security mishu, Li Yinqiao (李银桥).82
Although regulations state that security
mishu should be appointed by the Central General Office Security Bureau, sen-
ior leaders generally prefer to employ their most trusted confidants in the role.
In 1989 when he was transferred from Shanghai to Beijing to take on the posi-
tion of General Secretary, Jiang Zemin, concerned that unknown security mishu
might be plants of other leaders sent to spy on him, insisted that the Central
General Office also transfer his mishu from Shanghai to continue working for
him in Beijing.83
Security mishu must conduct security arrangements in tandem with the
Central General Office Security Bureau. Whenever leading cadres make excur-
sions or tours, the security mishu and the security staff of the General Office
first analyze the security needs for the trip. For example, before Deng Xiaoping
embarked on his Southern Tour in 1992, his security mishu, Zhang Baozhong
(张宝忠), went ahead of him to Guangdong to prepare necessary security deploy-
ments.84
Security mishu must also ensure the safety of their leading cadres when at
home. Each Politburo member’s home is guarded by a squad, and each Standing
Committee member’s by a platoon.85
These guards are nominally arranged by
the Central General Office, but security mishu also give specific directions for
dispatching and planning. As safeguarding a senior cadre is a round-the-clock
responsibility, security mishu live in the leader’s house. For example, when Jiang
Zemin was the acting General Secretary, his security mishu lived with him in the
Zhongnanhai compound.86
The CCP is also well aware of the importance of subduing the security mishu
when attempting the seizure or arrest of a high official. For example, in 1971,
when detaining Lin Biao’s (林彪) close supporters Huang Yongsheng (黄永胜),
Wu Faxian (吴法宪), Li Zuopeng (李作鹏) and Qiu Huizuo (邱会作), and
again in 1976 when apprehending Jiang Qing’s Gang of Four henchmen Wang
Hongwen (王洪文), Zhang Chunqiao (张春桥) and Yao Wenyuan (姚文元), the
CCP lured the security mishu of each official to a different location, and disarmed
and restrained them, before the arrests could be made.87
Had such action not
been taken, the mishu might have called on other forces to come to the leading
cadres’ aid, potentially resulting in violent turmoil.
82. Ye Yonglie, Mao Zedong de mishumen, p. 332.
83. Sheng Xue, “Yuanhua An” hei mu (The Inside Story of the Yuanhua Smuggling Case) (Hong Kong:
Mingjing Press, 2001), p. 37.
84. Tian Bingxin, “Deng Xiaoping ‘Nanxun’ zhong xian wei ren zhi de gushi”, p. 23.
85. Zhang Hailin, “Yuan fu zongli Ji Dengkui de changzi huiyi wangshi” (Former Vice Premier Ji
Dengkui’s Eldest Son Recalls Past Events), Liaowang dongfang zhoukan (Eastern Outlook Weekly), No. 398
(30 June 2011), p. 65.
86. Sheng Xue, “Yuanhua An” hei mu, p. 39.
87. Gu Baozi, Kua chu Zhongnanhai (Out of Zhongnanhai) (Beijing: China Women’s Press, 2006),
pp. 290–95.
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The final category of personal mishu is the life mishu, who are relatively less
important. Their main responsibility is to organize the logistics of a leading cad-
re’s personal affairs. For example, Xie Guofu (谢国富), Chen Yun’s life mishu dur-
ing the 1990s, recalls that he was responsible for coordinating the use of all of the
official cars of “Chen’s Office”.88
Another important facet of a life mishu’s work
is to handle the “special supply” (te gong 特供) for the leading cadre. The CCP
special supply system enables exclusive logistics units to provide higher-quality
food, tobacco, alcohol and clothing for senior cadres.89
As life mishu are deeply
involved in a senior cadre’s personal affairs, in certain cases they can obtain a
great deal of informal power. During the late stages of Mao Zedong’s life, as ill
health confined him to his bed, his life mishu, Zhang Yufeng (张玉凤), stayed
with him and was one of the very few people allowed into his room. Even the
élite Politburo Standing Committee members were compelled to respect Zhang’s
opinions when deliberating over Mao’s healthcare.90
As Lucian W. Pye has insightfully noted, the line between formal and informal
politics within CCP officialdom is perpetually indistinct.91
Due to the nature of
their work, mishu who gain the favor of their leading cadre are in a position
to mine a rich vein of heightened power. Factions and patron–client relation-
ships also exist in Western countries,92
and the existence of an influential secre-
tarial system is hardly peculiar to China. For example, in the United States, the
Executive Office of the President is staffed with the President’s own secretaries
and wields a considerable amount of power in drafting policy and budgets.
So why is a “Mishu Clique” not emerging in Western countries? Simply put,
the CCP regime lacks systematic checks and limits on the power of its leaders,
and through their close working relationship the CCP’s mishu are in an ideal
position to leverage excessive influence and clout from the leader for themselves.
Furthermore, the Party Committee general offices and individual leaders’ execu-
tive offices are vital cogs in the CCP machine, pivots of the Party’s administra-
tive operations and hubs for gathering and processing information. Through
88. Xie Guofu, “Wo suo liaojie de Chen Yun” (What I Understand of Comrade Chen Yun), Renmin ribao
(11 June 2005), p. 6.
89. Du Qing, “Shenmi shiqi de te gong pin” (Special Supplies in the Period of Mystery), Renwu huabao
(Important Figures Illustrated Paper), No. 11 (June 2011), pp. 96–97.
90. Li Zhisui, Mao Zedong siren yisheng huiyi lu (Memoir of Mao Zedong’s Personal Physician) (Taipei:
China Times Culture, 1994), pp. 588–89.
91. Lucian W. Pye, “Factions and the Politics of Guanxi: Paradoxes in Chinese Administrative and Political
Behaviour”, The China Journal, No. 34 (July 1995), pp. 36–37.
92. See Alex Weingrod, “Patrons, Patronage, and Political Parties”, Comparative Studies in Society and
History, Vol. 10, No. 4 (July 1968), pp. 377–400.
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their close association with these offices, mishu are easily able to reap personal
gains.93
In democratic countries, although clients may be able to share informally
in their patrons’ power, the formal constraints on leaders mean that this sharing
is by no means “unrestricted”. The informal power of mishu is not without con-
straint, however; rather, under the conditions of unrestricted informal politics,
the power of mishu is inextricably linked to the power of senior leaders. For ex-
ample, since the strongman eras of Mao and Deng, greater restrictions have been
placed upon CCP leaders, and in turn the unrestricted power of their mishu has
somewhat waned. Nevertheless, as long as conditions of relatively unconstrained
power continue to exist for senior leaders, so too do conditions of unrestricted
informal politics for mishu.
Mishu understand in great depth how to survive within the CCP system, mak-
ing sure never to clash with their leader or steal his limelight. They also zealously
avoid meeting other leaders’ mishu in private, to avoid raising their leader’s suspi-
cion.94
Some of the more suspicious senior leaders like to “tame” their mishu with
an initial firm strike to establish a sense of hierarchy. For example, Yang Yinlu
(杨银禄), Jiang Qing’s confidential mishu during the Cultural Revolution, re-
called that, the very first time he met her, she set the tone by loudly admonishing
him for some very minor issues.95
In private, mishu address their leading cadre
as “boss” (laoban 老板), demonstrating the nature of their professional relation-
ship.96
The following quotation aptly describes the model CCP mishu:
The first impression outsiders get of mishu is one of diligence and modesty. They
are always dressed appropriately, neither too fat nor too thin, and seem to possess
an innate insight into the ways of the world. They carry out their work methodi-
cally, are never rash or flustered, and are always ready to respond to their leader’s
summons. They generally carry a briefcase, and are the last to draw up a seat qui-
etly in a crowd of people. They neither speak nor laugh much, but instead placidly
shake or nod their head; they walk with an upright posture, and are careful to walk
at a respectful distance behind their leader.97
The humility of mishu in the presence of their leader does not necessarily equate
to a similar attitude behind the scenes. For example, the leaders of many of
93. Li Song, “Mishu tiba ‘lujing yinhuan’” (Mishu’s “Hidden Path” to Promotion), Liaowang xinwen zhoukan
(Outlook Weekly), No. 1393 (8 November 2010), p. 13.
95. Yang Yinlu, “Wo gei Jiang Qing dang mishu” (I Was Jiang Qing’s Mishu), Wenshi cankao (Literary and
Historic Reference), No. 7 (April 2011), p. 49.
97. Yang Min and Huo Ye, “Gaoguan shenbian de mishumen” (The Mishu at the Side of High Officials),
Renmin wenzhai (People’s Digest), No. 2 (2011), p. 8.
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China’s officially recognized “national impoverished counties” (guojia ji pinkun
xian 国家级贫困县) manage to approach and bribe the mishu of central leaders
into negotiating a way to retain their impoverished status and thus continue to
receive the central authorities’ generous grants. Another source of bribes for mi-
shu is the selling of official positions. A Chinese academic told us that, although
the power to put forward candidates for a role lies officially with the Organization
Department, the department accepts recommendations from senior cadres. As
the true origin of a senior cadre’s recommendations is not at all clear, this process
is open to manipulation by unscrupulous mishu.
Due to the close relationship between mishu and leading cadres, the mishu
are often referred to as the “Second Leader” (er lingdao 二领导).98
Mishu have
control over many aspects of a leader’s life, including his activities, visitors and
document-signing, all of which can be used to turn an illicit profit.99
A Chinese
academic told me that, after the Tiananmen incident in 1989, it was extremely
difficult to get authorization to publish more sensitive materials. When attempt-
ing to publish his book, the academic managed to request the help of a leading
cadre’s security mishu, who asked the cadre to write an inscription on the book
cover. The publishing authorities had no choice but to authorize the book’s pub-
lication, out of respect for the senior cadre. A Taiwanese businessman revealed
that he kept a large photograph of himself and a senior cadre on prominent dis-
play in his office. To gain the opportunity to meet the senior cadre, he had gone
through the political mishu. After establishing a relationship with the political
mishu, it was fairly simple to gain a photo opportunity with the cadre. The pho-
tograph could then act as a shield against the potential malice of local officials.
Unsure of the nature of the relations between the businessman and the senior
cadre, they dare not stir up trouble.
It is not only mishu who are prone to engage in corrupt behavior. Often the
leading cadres are also keen to gain from their positions, and enlist the help of
their most trusted mishu to do so. Illustrative examples include the corruption
cases of the Hebei Provincial Party Secretary Cheng Weigao (程维高) and the
Shanghai Party Secretary Chen Liangyu (陈良宇), who accepted bribes through
their respective mishu, Li Zhen (李真) and Qin Yu (秦裕).100
The mishu also made
a tidy profit in the process. The opportunity to squirrel money away is certainly
attractive—many mishu may actually have no intention whatsoever of being
98. Yang Min and Huo Ye, “Gaoguan shenbian de mishumen”, p. 9.
99. Li Song, “Mishu fubai: shikong de yinxing quanli” (Mishu Corruption: Out-of-Control Concealed
Powers), Liaowang xinwen zhoukan, No. 1298 (12 January 2009), p. 16.
100. Zhu Wenyi, “Zhongguo mishu buluo de quanli chang” (The Power Base of China’s Mishu Tribe), Juece
yu xinxi (Policy-Making and Information), No. 220 (2003), pp. 34–35.
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promoted to a new position, preferring to maintain their role over an extensive
period.101
However, if a mishu does intend to progress in his career, the client–patron re-
lationship enjoyed with his senior cadre will almost invariably smooth his path to
the top. As shown in table 1 at the end of this article, many CCP officials ranked
at Deputy Ministerial level and higher have had experience working as mishu.
Due to its horizontal (kuaikuai) nature, regular vertical promotion through dif-
ferent political rankings is not available within the mishu system; there instead
appear to be two different notable career paths for mishu to take, seemingly un-
related to whether they have worked as institutional or personal mishu. Firstly,
some mishu work for one leader for a long period; once their work is complete,
having gained no other qualifications or experience, these cadres often end up
working in research institutes. Examples include Zhu Rongji’s mishu, Li Wei,
Wen Jiabao’s mishu, Tian Xuebin (田学斌) and Li Keqiang’s mishu, Shi Gang.
The second type of career route involves using the position of mishu as a spring-
board to higher roles, leveraging the patronage of an influential senior cadre.
After completing their stint as mishu, these cadres are transferred to different
units to gain more experience, subsequently rising to important ministerial or
provincial roles. For example, Li Jianguo (李建国) was promoted by his senior
cadre, former Tianjin Municipal Secretary Li Ruihuan (李瑞环), to the post of
Tianjin Deputy Municipal Secretary, and later worked as a provincial leader in
Shaanxi and Shandong. Zhou Qiang (周强) was employed as the mishu of for-
mer Minister of Justice Xiao Yang (肖扬), and later worked as a leader in the
Communist Youth League and in Hunan Province. Both Li Jianguo and Zhou,
who now hold posts in the State leadership, began their ascent with their work
as mishu.
The unrestricted informal political power of mishu derives largely from their
senior leader, and thus the leader’s own power within the Party may influence
the available career positions of their mishu. In 2003, Jiang Zemin installed his
former political mishu, Jia Yan’an (贾廷安), as director of the Central Military
Commission (CMC) General Office; in June 2013, Xi Jinping also selected his
mishu, Zhong Shaojun, for the commission. Although neither Jia nor Zhong had
any formal military experience, both had military rank conferred on them and
entered the CMC General Office through the influence of Jiang and Xi respec-
tively, thus helping their former senior leaders to retain a degree of vicarious
influence over the military.102
However, at the 18th
National Party Congress, Hu
Jintao failed to maneuver his political mishu Chen Shiju into the same role. This
probably reflects Hu’s lack of power within the Party.
101. Interview, Chinese university academic, 8 November 2012.
102. “Dami Zhong Shaojun”.
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Once a senior leader loses power, it is highly likely that both his current and
former mishu will also suffer some loss of political status. For example, when the
Bo Xilai (薄熙来) affair exploded, his long-serving mishu, Wu Wenkang (吴文康),
was also put under investigation.103
Former Sichuan Provincial Committee mem-
ber Guo Yongxiang (郭永祥), employed as the mishu of Politburo Standing Com-
mittee member Zhou Yongkang (周永康), came under investigation on suspicion
of corruption in June 2013. Many outsiders consider this to be Xi Jinping’s open-
ing gambit in eliminating Zhou Yongkang’s power.104
However, in certain circum-
stances, a senior leader’s loss of power need not have consequences for the mishu.
For example, when Hu Yaobang was ousted from the political arena in 1987,
his mishu, Zheng Bijian, remained unaffected and went on to enjoy a success-
ful official career. This may be because, although Hu had been forced to retire,
the overall evaluation of him remained fairly positive, and there was no need
to remove all trace of his former power base.105
In addition, some mishu have
the support of other high officials in addition to their own senior leader. Zheng
Bijian had previously worked for the Party elders Deng Liqun (邓力群) and Hu
Qiaomu (胡乔木), and had been praised by Deng Xiaoping.106
These multiple
connections to influential leaders may also have saved Zheng from suffering any
unwanted consequences.
One final important issue for the Party is how best to clamp down on mishu’s
unrestricted informal political power. A potential method would be to weaken
the links of patronage between leading cadres and mishu. In 2010, the CCP
ruled that the promotion of mishu to new positions must be subject to the agree-
ment of the supervising Organization Department, rather than on the decision
of the senior cadre alone.107
In another interesting example, it was laid down in
2003 in Sichuan that male leaders could not employ female mishu, in order to
avoid complicating political relations by triggering sexual relationships.108
While
such measures could indeed curb the strength of the patron–client relationship,
converting mishu’s informal political power from “unrestricted” to “restricted”
103. “Xuanze xing da hei yiguo” (The Calamity of Selective Anti-Corruption), Jiangnan dushi bao
(Southern Metropolis Daily) (4 February 2013), p. A14.
104. Yu Zeyuan, “Zhonggong qian zhengzhiju changwei Zhou Yongkang jiang shou qianlian?” (Will
Former CCP Politburo Standing Committee Member Zhou Yongkang Be Implicated?), Lianhe zaobao, No. 17
(25 June 2013), p. 17.
105. “Guanbao zan Xi jicheng Hu Yaobang linian” (Official Newspaper Praises Xi Jinping’s Inheriting of
Hu Yaobang’s Ideals), Ming bao (Daily News) (16 April 2013), p. A20.
106. Xi Yin, Zhongguo gaoceng wendan, pp. 151–54.
107. “Dangzheng lingdao ganbu xuanba renyong gongzuo youguan shixiang baogao banfa (shixing)”
(Reporting Practices on Matters Relating to the Selection and Appointment of Party and Government Leading
Cadres [pilot version]), Xinhua.net, http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2010-03/31/c_1210973.htm, accessed
26 June 2013.
108. “Nan lingdao bu pei nü mishu” (Female Mishu Unsuitable for Male Leaders), Dagong bao (Ta kung
pao, Impartial Daily) (28 July 2003), p. A13.
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Table 1. Name list of former mishu holding deputy provincial–ministerial leadership rank and
above (as of June 2013)
Name Position
Year of
Birth Mishu Experience
State Leadership Rank
Xi Jinping (习近平) General Secretary 1953 Mishu to Geng Biao (耿飚)
1979–82
Li Jianguo (李建国) Vice Chairman of the NPC
Standing Committee
1946 Mishu to Li Ruihuan
(李瑞环) 1981–87
Director of the Tianjin
Municipal Committee
General Office 1983–89
Zhao Hongzhu (赵洪祝) Central Secretariat
Secretary
1947 Mishu to Wei Jianxing
(尉健行) 1992–98
Liu Qibao (刘奇葆) Central Secretariat
Secretary
1953 Mishu to Wan Li (万里)
1977–80
Ling Jihua (令计划) Chairman of the CPPCC 1956 Director of the Central
Committee General Office
2007–12
Zhou Qiang (周强) Chief of the Supreme Court 1960 Mishu to Xiao Yang (肖扬)
1993–95
Provincial–Ministerial Leadership Rank
Xu Shaoshi (徐绍史) Chairman of the Reform
and Development
Commission
1951 Mishu to Wen Jiabao
(温家宝) 1983–85
Ji Bingxuan (吉炳轩) Heilongjiang Provincial
Secretary
1951 Mishu to Hou Zongbin
(侯宗宾) 1990–92
Jia Yan’an (贾廷安) Deputy Director of the
General Political
Department
1952 Mishu to Jiang Zemin
(江泽民) 1982–94
Zhou Benshun (周本顺) Hebei Provincial Secretary 1953 Mishu to Zhou Yongkang
(周永康) 2003–13
Li Wei (李伟) Director of State Council
Development Research
Center
1953 Mishu to Zhu Rongji
(朱镕基) 1998–03
Jiang Yikang (姜异康) Shandong Provincial
Secretary
1953 Mishu to Li Peng
(李鹏) 1988–90
continued on next page
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Han Zhangfu (韩长赋) Minister of Agriculture 1954 Mishu to Zhu Rongji
1998–2001
Huang Xingguo (黄兴国) Mayor of Tianjin 1954 Mishu to Chai Songyue
(柴松岳) ?–1998
Cai Yingting (蔡英挺) Nanjing Military Region
Commander
1954 Mishu to Zhang Wannian
(张万年) ? –?
Li Hongzhong (李鸿忠) Hubei Provincial Secretary 1956 Mishu to Li Tieying (李铁映)
1982–88
Wang Zhengwei (王正伟) Chairman of Ningxia Hui
Autonomous Region
1957 Mishu to Li Xuezhi (李学智)
1984–86
Zhong Shaojun (钟绍军) Director of CMC General
Office (?)
? Mishu to Xi Jinping 2002–?
Deputy Provincial–Ministerial Leadership Rank
Qiu Xiaoxiong (丘小雄) Deputy Director of the State
Taxation Administration
1999–2003
Hou Yunchun (侯云春) Deputy Director of State
Council Development
Research Center
1952 Mishu to Li Rongrong
(李荣融) 1996–2002
Ye Kedong (叶克冬) Deputy Director of the State
Council Taiwan Affairs
Office
1953 Mishu to Hu Jintao (胡锦涛)
1983–87
Wang Huaichen (王怀臣) Sichuan Provincial
Committee Member
1953 Mishu to Qiao Shi (乔石)
1983–85
Jin Daoming (金道铭) Shanxi Vice Provincial
Secretary
1953 Mishu to Wei Jianxing
1987–2003
Gou Lijun (苟利军) Vice Chairman of the
Tianjin Municipal NPC
Committee
1953 Director of the Tianjin
Municipal Committee
Dong Hong (董宏) Director of the Party
Literature Research
Office
1953 Mishu to Bo Yibo (薄一波)
1983–92
Hu Yadong (胡亚东) Vice Secretary of the China
Railway Corporation
1953 Mishu to Zeng Qinghong
(曾庆红) ?–?
Table 1. (Continued)
Name Position
Year of
Provincial–Ministerial Leadership Rank
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25
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Chen Hao (陈豪) Vice Chairman of the All-
China Federation of
Trade Unions
1954 Director of the Shanghai
Municipal Committee
Hong Feng (洪峰) Deputy Mayor of Beijing 1954 Mishu to Ma Kai (马凯)
?–1991
Sun Qingyun (孙清云) Shaanxi Vice Provincial
Secretary
1954 Mishu to Jiang Chunyun
(姜春云) 1995–98
Yu Weiguo (于卫国) Fujian Vice Provincial
Secretary
1955 Mishu to Ding Guan’gen
(丁关根) 1991–95
Liu Weijia (刘维佳) Yunnan Provincial
Committee Member
1955 Mishu to Wang Qishan
(王岐山) 2002–03
Han Yongwen (韩永文) Hunan Vice Provincial
Governor
1955 Mishu to Ma Kai 2006–08
Li Jinjun (李进军) Deputy Director of the CCP
International Liaison
Department
1956 Mishu to Dai Bingguo
(戴秉国) 1997–99
Liu Xiaobin (刘晓滨) Head of the National
Research and
Development
Commission Discipline
Inspection Group
1956 Mishu to He Guoqiang
(贺国强) 1994–96
Zeng Wei (曾维) Liaoning Provincial
Committee Member
1956 Director of the Liaoning
Provincial Committee
Liu Hongcai (刘洪才) Ambassador to the DPRK 1956 Mishu to Dai Bingguo
2001–03
Shang Yong (尚勇) Jiangxi Vice Provincial
Secretary
1957 Mishu to Song Jian (宋健)
1992–95
Gu Chaoxi (顾朝曦) Vice Minister of Civil
Affairs
1958 Mishu to Zhu Rongji
1985–2000
Fan Zhaobing (范照兵) Chongqing Municipal
Committee Member
1999–2002
Lin Xiong (林雄) Head of the Guangdong
Province United Front
Department
1986–93
Name Position
Year of
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42

Ding Xiangyang (丁向阳) Deputy Secretary General
of the State Council
1959 Mishu to Wang Zhongyu
(王忠禹) ?–?
Wang Xiaodong (王晓东) Hubei Vice Provincial
Governor
1960 Director of the Guizhou
Provincial Committee
Li Yi (李屹) Vice Chairman of the China
Federation of Literary
and Art
1960 Director of the Xinjiang
Party Committee General
Office 2000–04
Guo Kailang (郭开朗) Hunan Provincial
Committee Member
1960 Mishu to Jiang Zemin
1997–2000
Zhao Dacheng (赵大程) Deputy Minister of Justice 1960 Mishu to Xiao Yang 1993–98
Xia Yong (夏勇) Deputy Director of the
State Council Legislative
Affairs Office
1961 Mishu to Hu Jintao 2003–05
Sun Wei (孙伟) Shandong Vice Provincial
Governor
1961 Mishu to Wu Bangguo
(吴邦国) 2000–04
Ling Yueming (凌月明) Chongqing Vice-Municipal
Governor
1992–99
Ding Xuexiang (丁薛祥) Vice Director of the Central
Committee General
Office
1962 Mishu to Xi Jinping 2007
Director of the Shanghai
Municipal Committee
General Office (主任)
2006–07
Yin Li (尹力) Deputy Director of the
State Food and Drugs
Administration
1962 Mishu to Wu Yi (吴仪)
2006–08
Cong Bing (丛兵) Vice Secretary of the State
Administration for
Industry and Commerce
1992–99
Gongbao Zhaxi (公保扎西)
[Tibetan]
Vice Chairman of the Tibet
Autonomous Region
1991–?
Chen Shiju (陈世炬) Deputy Director of the
Central Committee
General Office
1960
or
1963
Mishu to Hu Jintao
1992–2013
Name Position
Year of
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42

would involve targeting the source: the largely unconstrained political power of
senior leaders. Such an approach would require systematic checks and balances
and strict independent oversight. Unfortunately, under the current authoritarian
CCP regime, such oversight does not appear conceivable.
The mishu system is made up of two streams: institutional mishu and personal
mishu. The former make up the staff of the Party Committee general offices at
every level, liaising between departments and pushing policy decisions on be-
half of the Party Committee, gathering data and processing it for senior officials.
Personal mishu work in the individual executive offices of senior leading cadres.
Those working for Politburo Standing Committee members are divided into four
main categories: political, confidential, security and life mishu. Both institutional
and personal mishu are subject to a dual leadership mechanism, but their main
responsibility is to the leading cadres around whom the system revolves.
Tian Xuebin (田学斌) Deputy Director of the State
Council Research Office
2003–08
Lin Nianxiu (林念修) Vice Chairman of the
Guangxi Autonomous
Region
1963 Mishu to Zou Jiahua
(邹家华) 1994–2003
Yu Yuanhui (余远辉) Guangxi Autonomous
Regional Committee
Member
1964 Director of the Guangxi
Autonomous Region Party
Committee General Office
2010–13
Ji Wenlin (冀文林) Hainan Vice Provincial
Governor
1966 Mishu to Zhou Yongkang
1998–2008
Shi Gang (石刚) Deputy Director of the State
Council Research Office
? Mishu to Li Keqiang
(李克强) ?–2013
Source: Wisers Greater China News Portal (Huike Da Zhonghua Xinwen Wang 慧科大中华新闻网); PRC
Political Elite Database (Taiwan National Zhengzhi University Department of Political Science, directed by
Professor Kou Chien-wen), http://ics.nccu.edu.tw/chinaleaders/index_flash.htm, accessed 1–8 July 2013.
Note: This table only includes directors of Party Committee general offices and personal mishu to senior
leaders, but does not include cadres working in the general offices of government bodies.
Name Position
Year of
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42

The importance of the relationship between a senior leader and his mishu can-
not be understated; they are as inseparable as fish and water. Institutional mishu
are invaluable to the senior cadre, as they provide important information and
support for policy-making, and personal mishu assist with political, confidential,
security and life-based tasks. As a result of this management structure centered
on senior cadres, as well as the importance of relationships in Chinese culture,109
the division between the power of the leading cadre and his mishu is extremely
indistinct. This allows the mishu to siphon off a certain amount of the senior
cadre’s power, potentially leveraging this power to great personal advantage.
Furthermore, mishu can continue to draw upon a strong client–patron relation-
ship to benefit yet further, not least from the chance for promotion to high office
and entrance to the ranks of the CCP’s powerful “Mishu Clique”.
The mishu system is perhaps the only structure remaining in the CCP which
has not undergone a process of institutionalization, remaining fairly constant
over time. This is a result of the lack of formal limitations on the power of senior
leading cadres, allowing mishu working for these leaders in vital hubs of admin-
istrative operations, such as Party Committee general offices or individual execu-
tive offices, to accumulate a vast potential for unrestricted informal power. In the
worst of scenarios, mishu are in a position to play a ruthless role, manipulating
policy and decision-making while raking in wealth and influence. Yet mishu re-
main perpetually hidden from the glare of external scrutiny, concealed behind
the protective screen of the leading cadres whom they serve.
109. Lowell Dittmer, “Chinese Informal Politics”, p. 10.
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