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© 2004 – 2010 
FMEA: The Good, The Bad, and The Ugly April ASQ Spokane Section Meeting 
Cheryl Tulkoff 
Senior Member of the Technical Staff 
ctulkoff@dfrsolutions.com 
www.dfrsolutions.com 
April 28, 2011
© 2004 - 2007 
2010 
Instructor Biography 
oCheryl Tulkoff has over 15 years of experience in electronics manufacturing with an emphasis on failure analysis and reliability. She has worked throughout the electronics manufacturing life cycle beginning with semiconductor fabrication processes, into printed circuit board fabrication and assembly, through functional and reliability testing, and culminating in the analysis and evaluation of field returns. She has also managed no clean and RoHS-compliant conversion programs and has developed and managed comprehensive reliability programs. 
oCheryl earned her Bachelor of Mechanical Engineering degree from Georgia Tech. She is a published author, experienced public speaker and trainer and a Senior member of both ASQ and IEEE. She holds leadership positions in the IEEE Central Texas Chapter, IEEE WIE (Women In Engineering), and IEEE ASTR (Accelerated Stress Testing and Reliability) sections. She chaired the annual IEEE ASTR workshop for four years and is also an ASQ Certified Reliability Engineer. 
oShe has a strong passion for pre-college STEM (Science, Technology, Engineering, and Math) outreach and volunteers with several organizations that specialize in encouraging pre-college students to pursue careers in these fields.
© 2004 - 2007 
2010 
FMEA: Failure Modes and Effects Analysis 
1) Introductions & Webinar Instructions 
2) “Common Sense” Reliability Engineering 
3) Introduction to FMEAs 
4) FMEA Process 
Roles & Responsibilities 
5) Common Mistakes & Traps 
6) Examples
© 2004 - 2007 
2010 
Introduction
© 2004 - 2007 
2010 
Common Sense Reliability Engineering 
o"Unfortunately, reliability engineering has been afflicted with more nonsense than any other branch of engineering." - Pat O'Connor (Author Practical Reliability Engineering). 
oReliability engineering as a discipline often fails because: 
oIncorrect activities, incorrect people and incorrect timing. 
oPerforming tasks just to do them but not really fulfill them. 
oReliability activities focused excessively on maintenance or logistics issues instead of product optimization, problem/defect prevention & risk reduction. 
oPrediction based on fundamentally flawed methods & assumptions 
oObscure or Excessive Statistical / Probabilistic Methods. 
oPlaying “Number Games” to “Look Good” of “Justify Good Enough” 
oTo avoid extra effort, to meet schedule, to meet budget.
© 2004 - 2007 
2010 
Common Sense Reliability Engineering 
oCommon sense dictates that: 
oReliability should be defined as the absence of failures during the intended usage life of product & services. 
oReliability Efforts Should Focus On Ensuring The Absence Of Failure. 
oFocus Product Development on FINDING & PREVENTING ALL FAILURES THAT MIGHT AFFECT THE END CUSTOMER 
oFollow by Prevention of defects in production, assembly and fabrication 
oUp front efforts for problem prevention / doing it right the first time 
oReduces the need / cost of correcting problems found in test or problems reported by customers in the field. 
oFailure prevention can achieved by 
oUnderstand why failures happen 
oAnalysis to identify risks followed by risk elimination/mitigation 
oOptimizing activities designed to identify and eliminate both design and process deficiencies.
© 2004 - 2007 
2010 
Introduction to FMEA: 
Failure Modes & Effects Analysis
© 2004 - 2007 
2010 
oFMEA is just one of many tools in your tool box. 
oIt is not the only tool or best tool for every problem or every situation. 
oIt can be used across a wide range of fields and disciplines 
oNot limited to “hardware” 
oManufacturing 
oSoftware 
oBusiness Processes 
oHealthcare 
oService Industries 
oRegulated industries – automotive, medical devices, NASA.. 
oAny place where you need to reduce risk and prevent failure! 
What FMEA IS NOT

© 2004 - 2007 
2010 
What FMEA is
. 
oFMEA 
oA systematic group of activities designed to: 
oRecognize and evaluate potential failures of systems, products, or processes 
oIdentify the effects and outcomes of the failures 
oIdentify actions that could eliminate or mitigate the failures 
oProvide a historical written record of the work performed
© 2004 - 2007 
2010 
FMEA in the News 
Japan’s Fukushima Daiichi nuclear plant 
Industry watchers contend a manufacturing error was likely the culprit. "It means the assembly was wrong, it means the wrong tools were used, it means they were careless in drilling the holes, and maybe the drill was dull," 
Tear in Boeing Jet 
A study has found that fatal medication errors spiked by 10 percent in July, the month that graduates fresh out of medical school report to residencies, in counties with a high number of teaching hospitals, but stayed the same in areas without teaching hospitals 
Medication Errors
© 2004 - 2007 
2010 
oJapan Quake & Tsunami points out both strengths and limitations of FMEA 
oKey issues were detailed and identified 
oThe plants were built to withstand an earthquake of 7.0. 
oThere was a seawall around the facility in case of a tsunami. 
oIn an earthquake, the plants had a SCRAM procedure, which executed an emergency shutdown of the nuclear reactors. 
oElectrical pumps were designed to pump cool water to the container to keep the rods submerged (the rods are hotter AFTER the shut down than during regular operation of the plant). 
oThere were back-up batteries for running the pumps in an emergency that were designed to last about an hour or so. 
oThere were diesel fuel pumps that were available to take over the pumping when the batteries ran out of juice. 
oThere are vents built into the system to release steam from the reactors if the pressure inside got too high 
oBut many were considered low probability and/or excessively expensive to consider or the risk was underestimated 
FMEA in the News


© 2004 - 2007 
2010 
oBoeing engineers underestimated the risk of cracks in the aluminum, they assumed it would be fine for 60,000 flights (pressure cycles) but have now reduced the expected life to 30,000 with inspections recommended every 500 flights after reaching 30,000
. 
ohttp://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703806304576244782850491122.html 
oFMEA: The Cure for Medical Errors 
ohttp://www.medicalhealthcarefmea.com/guides/qp0803reiling.pdf 
ohttp://asq.org/sixsigma/green/pdf/preventing_medication_ errors.pdf 
FMEA in the News
© 2004 - 2007 
2010 
Why perform an FMEA? 
oPurpose of an FMEA Study is to analyze: 
oWhat might go wrong? 
oHow bad might the effect be? 
oHow might it be prevented, mitigated or detected at the earliest possible moment? 
oWith lowest cost, impact, safety risk
. 
oDevelop a Design FMEA process for use in future programs.
© 2004 - 2007 
2010 
Typical FMEA Uses 
oFMEA are often stored and kept to prove due engineering diligence in case of a product liability law suit or government safety investigation. 
oWorst use is when a “FMEA Specialist” generates the analysis alone or to simply fulfill a contract requirement, and the report is not even read by the product team. 
oFMEA are extremely powerful QRD (Quality, Reliability, Durability) analysis techniques 
oBest for total new products, new technologies and challenging design Issues. 
oBut the high degree of detail and repetition in a FMEA can be grueling, costly and time intensive to create especially for complex designs. 
oFMEA’ing everything can lead to 
oOverwork 
oNon Value Added work 
oFMEA fatigue! 
oTry to re-use FMEA “building blocks” or use as a check list on new versions of similar products.
© 2004 - 2007 
2010 
oFMEA is a widely used and powerful analysis/design review technique. 
oAn extremely comprehensive element by element review of: 
oWhat can go wrong 
oWhat that will happen 
oHow the situation can be improved 
oFor improving a design or process 
oFor each component, element or process step: 
oList how failures can occur (Failure Mode, what can go wrong, how the failure manifests itself) 
oList what could happen (Failure Effect, consequences of the mode). 
oList how processes or the system itself can detect & prevent the problem 
oGenerate Recommendations for Improvements. 
FMEA Basics - Failure Mode And Effect Analysis
© 2004 - 2007 
2010 
oCalculate a Risk Priority Number (RPN) for Each Line Item using 3 Criteria, 
oSeverity of the Failure Effect “S” (Scale of 1 (Low) - 10 (High)). 
oFrequency of Failure Occurrence “O” (Scale of 1(Infrequent) - 10 (Frequent)). 
oDetectability/Preventability/Warning “D” (Scale or 1(Very Detectable) - 10 (Not Detectable)). 
oRPN = S x O x D, range (1 (good) to 1000 High Risk). 
oAn unacceptable range is defined. 
oExample: RPN‟s > 150 are unacceptable and require a corrective action redesign. 
oOften a Pareto Ranking of the RPN is performed and used to prioritize corrective action efforts. 
FMEA Basics - Failure Mode And Effect Analysis
© 2004 - 2007 
2010 
FMEA - Failure Mode And Effect Analysis 
oMany FMEA Versions. 
oDesign and Process Version - DFMEA & PFMEA. 
oCan be Performed at that Component, Subsystem, System and Software level 
oFMECA - Failure Mode, Effect and Criticality Analysis a version that further emphasizes & highlights “Safety Critical” issues 
oInitially, the FMECA was called FMEA (Failure modes and effects analysis). The C in FMECA indicates that the criticality (or severity) of the various failure effects are considered and ranked. 
oToday, FMEA is often used as a synonym for FMECA. The distinction between the two terms has become blurred.
© 2004 - 2007 
2010 
oFailure: The loss of expected or intended function under stated conditions 
oFailure mode: The way in which a failure is observed; generally describes the way the failure occurs. 
oFailure effect: The immediate consequences of a failure on operation, function or functionality 
oFailure cause: Defects in design, system, process, quality, or part application, the underlying cause of the failure or things which initiate a process which leads to failure. 
oSeverity: The consequences of a failure mode. Severity considers the worst case outcome of a failure as determined by the degree of injury, property damage, or harm that could ultimately occur." 
Some Key FMEA Terms
© 2004 - 200107 
FMEA – Use a Team Approach! 
Core-team 
Support-team
© 2004 - 2007 
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Product FMEA – Typical Team Example 
Core- team 
Representatives from: 
‱Development 
‱Production 
‱Supplier Quality 
‱Purchasing 
‱Validation. 
‱... 
Support team 
Quality or Reliability Facilitator 
Systems Enrg HW Design SW Design 
Production/ process-engineer
© 2004 - 2007 
2010 
The FMEA Process in Detail
. 
4) Divide the system for analysis & Create Teams - 
7) Performing the FMEA to Identify potential failure modes, & Their Severity, Probability of Occurrence, Detectability & Calculate RPNs for the sub-system 
3) Choose the type of FMEA approach for the study 
8) Complete the Initial Evaluation Phase Identify Excessive Risks, Develop Corrective Action Proposals & Assign Resolution Lead 
2) Define the problems of interest for the analysis. 
10) Mitigation Phase Example Follow Up Evaluate C.A. Effectiveness & Implementation Plans Update FMEA with Finding & Revise RPN‟s 
1) Define the system of interest 
11) If new RPN are Satisfactory, Implement C.A.s IF Unsatisfactory Dev & Evaluate New C.A.s or Escalate to Mgnt 
5) Create block diagrams that illustrate all subsystem elements, interfaces and interactions - Select Ranking System 
6) Create FMEA Outlines based on the block diagrams. Subsystem elements, interfaces and interactions become the FMEA subsections 
9) Team Reports To Example Management
© 2004 - 2007 
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Product Definition: 
Key Product Characteristics, DFMEA 
Process Definition: 
Process Flow Diagram (PFD), 
Failure Mode Analysis: 
PFMEA 
Control Strategy: 
Control Plan, 
Error proofing 
Customer Requirements: 
Manufacturing: 
Work Instructions & Process Monitoring 
Information Flow 
Functions with Req’s/Tech Specs 
System Technical Specs 
Product and Process Characteristics
© 2004 - 2007 
2010 
Design FMEA 
Process Flow Diagram 
Process FMEA 
Process Control Plan 
Operator Instructions 
Design Specifications 
Validation Plan 
Process Specifications 
FMEAs are “continuous steps” in the development process (mind set) 
DFMEA & PFMEA are related, but separate tasks 
Whenever changes are made for: FTQ or other issues, ALL the process documentation should be reviewed & updated as required. 
Key Quality Tools – General Workflow
© 2004 - 2007 
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FMEA – Teamleaders & Facilitators 
oTeam Leaders are often from a Product/Systems Group and facilitators are from a Quality/Reliability Organization but no hard and fast rules! 
oTeam Leader Preparation for the FMEA session: 
oFocuses on the project/product and accessing, distributing, & displaying important product information: 
oDefines and assign tasks of the team-members: 
oAccesses support personnel when needed 
oGathers technical solutions, subject matter expertise
© 2004 - 2007 
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FMEA – Facilitator Tasks 
oFacilitator Preparation of the FMEA session 
oWorks/prepares together with the team-leader 
oHelps define agenda for each meeting 
oProduct-FMEA : creates block diagram 
oProcess-FMEA: creates flows diagram 
oCreates the FMEA starter outline from the diagram 
oHelps select participants with team leader (4-6 persons ideal). 
oEnsures the FMEA-worksheet is completely & accurately filled-in (actions, responsible person, date) 
oFunctions are correctly written down (verb/noun) 
oAll known failure modes are listed 
oFailure modes effects are correct (no confusion between causes and effects). 
oKeeps the process moving don‟t loose time with long discussions about severity and probability. 
oIn case of doubt, take the „worst case‟ and move on.
© 2004 - 2007 
2010
© 2004 - 2007 
2010 
FMEA Worksheet Sections 
1.FMEA #: - Enter the FMEA document number, used for tracking. 
2.FMEA Type & Name: - System, Subsystem or Component, - Item Name and Number. 
3.Design Responsibility Department or Group 
4.Prepared By: - The name, phone, e-mail & company of the person who led or prepared the FMEA. 
5.Program/Model - List the program/project of system the item is used in and the introductory model year of the item. 
6.Key (Due) Date - Target FMEA completion date. 
7.FMEA (Revision) Date - Revision Date of this version of the FMEA worksheet
© 2004 - 2007 
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FMEA Worksheet Sections 
8.Core Team: - List the names, contact info & departments of the FMEA team members 
9.Item/Function - Concisely list the name and pertinent info of the line item/section being analyzed. Correlate the FMEA item/function number to the number on FMEA block diagram/ engineering drawing. 
10.Potential Failure Mode - Sequentially and concisely list the manner in which the item (component, subsystem or system) could potentially fail to perform the intended function described in the item/function column. The potential failure mode could cause a potential failure in a higher level item, or be the effect of lower level item. List each potential failure mode associated with the particular item or function. 
11.Potential Effect(s) of Failure - Sequentially and concisely list the potential effects of the each failure mode on the function, as perceived by the customer. Document if the failure could impact safety or result in noncompliance to regulation.
© 2004 - 200107 
FMEA Worksheet Sections 
12. Severity Ranking: 
- List the teams assessment of the Severity rank associated with the most serious 
potential effect of each identified failure mode. Severity is a relative ranking 
based on the predefined severity evaluation criteria and ranking system 
Sample 
Process 
Severity 
Ranking 
Table 
To be 
adapted 
for Design 
FMEA
© 2004 - 2007 
2010 
FMEA Worksheet Sections 
13.Classification - An non standardized adhoc column that can be used to classify special product characteristics (i.e. critical, key, major, significant). May also be used to highlight high-priority failure modes or specific company policy issues. 
14.Potential Cause(s) / Mechanism(s) of Failure - Sequentially and concisely list all potential causes and/or failure mechanisms that might trigger or result in each failure mode. So that preventative or mitigation efforts can be identified.
© 2004 - 2007 
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FMEA Worksheet Sections 
15.Probability or Potential Frequency of Occurrence. - Rank the likelihood that a specific failure cause/mechanism will occur during the intent design life or usage situation. The likelihood of occurrence ranking number is a relative meaning rather than an absolute value. Preventing or controlling the causes/mechanisms of the failure mode through a design or process change (i.e. design checklist, design review, design guide) is the only way a reduction in the occurrence ranking can be effected. Estimate the likelihood of occurrence of potential failure cause/mechanisms on a 1 to 10 scale. Sample Process Occurrence Ranking Scale 
To be adapted for Design FMEA
© 2004 - 2007 
2010 
FMEA Worksheet Sections 
16.Current Design Controls - List the prevention, design validation/verification, quality controls, self diagnostics, fail safe features or other activities that have incorporated into the product or process to assure the design adequacy for the failure mode and/or cause/ mechanism being considered. The team should always be focused on improving or optimizing design controls; for example, creating better tests or creating new system algorithms. There are two types of design controls to consider: - Prevention: Prevent the cause/mechanism of failure or the failure mode from occurring, or reduce their rate of occurrence. - Detection: Detect the cause/mechanism of failure or the failure mode, either by analytical or physical methods, before the item is released to production of by self diagnostics with fail safe features in the field. The FMEA form has separate columns for Prevention Controls and Detection Controls) to assist in distinguishing between the two types of design controls. This allows for a quick visual determination that both types of design controls are being used.
© 2004 - 200107 
FMEA Worksheet Sections 
17. Detection is a relative ranking of the intended design controls. 
Sample Process Detection Scale 
To be adapted 
for the Design 
FMEA
© 2004 - 2007 
2010 
FMEA Worksheet Sections 
18.RPN - Risk Priority Number - The RPN is the product of the severity (S), occurrence (O), and detection (D) rankings: (S) x (O) x (D) =RPN. The RPN is used to prioritize the risk related to each failure mode and mechanism. 
19.Recommended Corrective Action. - Engineering efforts for preventive/corrective action should be first directed at high severity, high RPN, items identified by the team. The objective is to recommended action that reduce severity, occurrence and detection risks rankings. 9 or 10 severity issues require special attention to ensure that the risk is addressed through design controls or preventive/corrective action(s) regardless of the RPN value. After special attention has been given to severity rankings of 9 or 10, other failure modes can then be addressed The primary objective of recommended actions is to reduce risks AND increase customer satisfaction by improving the design. 
20.Responsibility & Target Completion Date - Enter the name of the organization and the individual responsible for evaluating and implementing each recommended corrective action and the target completion date.
© 2004 - 2007 
2010 
FMEA Worksheet Sections 
21.Action Taken - After the recommended corrective action has been evaluated and implemented briefly description the final outcome and effective date. 
22.Corrective Action Results. - After the preventive/corrective action has been identified, estimate and record the revised resulting severity, occurrence, and detection rankings. Calculate and record the resulting RPN. If no actions are taken, leave these columns blank. All revised ratings should be reviewed. lf further action is considered necessary, repeat the analysis. The focus should always be on continuous improvement. 
The design-responsible engineer is responsible for ensuring that all recommended actions have been adequately addressed and implemented. The FMEA is a living document throughout the product development process and should always reflect the latest design level and latest relevant .
© 2004 - 2007 
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o“Fill in the blanks” only. 
oDon’t understand the scope and objective of FMEA 
oDay dreaming 
oDidn’t go through the self-challenge process of design control 
oCouldn’t separate Failure Mode, Cause, Effect 
oMixed everything together. Argument for the sake of argument. 
Common Mistakes and Traps
© 2004 - 2007 
2010 
oRepeated itself 
oDog chases its own tail. 
oMitigation is not truly challenged 
oRanking criteria too loose 
oOnly identifying the problems but not the solutions. Or, couldn’t control it, even if there is a solution. Control plan not in place. 
oDo once, then keep in file 
oLeaving Document rather than Living Document 
oLack of consistency 
Common Mistakes and Traps
© 2004 - 200107 
AUTOMOTIVE EXAMPLE SEVERITY EVALUATION CRITERIA 
Hazardous-with 
warning 
Very High 
High 
Very high severity ranking when a potential failure mode affects safe vehicle 
operation and/or involves noncompliance with government regulation without 
warning 
Low 
Very Low 
Minor 
Very Minor 
None 
Very high severity ranking when a potential failure mode affects safe vehicle 
operation and/or involves noncompliance with government regulation with warning 
Vehicle/item inoperable (loss of primary function). 
Vehicle/item operable but at a reduced level of performance. Customer very 
dissatisfied. 
Vehicle/item operable but Comfort/Convenience item(s) inoperable. Customer 
dissatisfied. 
Vehicle/item operable but Comfort/Convenience item(s) operable at a reduced 
level of performance. Customer somewhat dissatisfied. 
Fit & Finish/Squeak & Rattle item does not conform. Defect noticed by most 
customers (greater than 75%). 
Fit & Finish/Squeak & Rattle item does not conform. Defect noticed by 50% of 
customers. 
Fit & Finish/Squeak & Rattle item does not conform. Defect noticed by 
discriminating customers (less than 25%). 
No discernable effect. 
10 
8 
7 
6 
3 
2 
1 
Hazardous-without 
warning 
Moderate 
4 
5 
EFFECT CRITERIA: Severity of Effect RNK. 
SEVERITY EVALUATION CRITERIA 
9
© 2004 - 2007 
2010 
Occurrence Evaluation Criteria 
*Note: Zero (0) rankings for Severity, Occurrence or Detection are not allowed 
Probability of Likely Failure Rates Over Design Life Ranking 
Failure 
SUGGESTED OCCURRENCE EVALUATION CRITERIA 
Very High: Persistent failures 
High: Frequent failures 
Moderate: Occasional failures 
Low: Relatively few failures 
Remote: Failure is unlikely 
ï‚ł 100 per thousand vehicles/items 
50 per thousand vehicles/items 
20 per thousand vehicles/items 
10 per thousand vehicles/items 
5 per thousand vehicles/items 
2 per thousand vehicles/items 
1 per thousand vehicles/items 
0.5 per thousand vehicles/items 
0.1 per thousand vehicles/items 
ï‚Ł 0.01 per thousand vehicles/items 
10 
9 
8 
7 
6 
5 
4 
3 
2 
1
© 2004 - 2007 
2010 
Detection Rating 
Absolute Uncertainty 
Very Remote 
Remote 
Very Low 
Low 
Moderate 
Moderately 
High 
High 
Very High 
Almost 
Certain 
10 
9 
8 
7 
6 
5 
4 
3 
2 
1 
Design Control will not and/or cannot detect a potential cause/ mechanism and subsequent failure mode; or there is no 
Design Control. 
Very Remote chance the Design Control will detect a potential cause/mechanism and subsequent failure mode. 
Remote chance the Design Control will detect a potential cause/ mechanism and subsequent failure mode. 
Very Low chance the Design Control will detect a potential cause/mechanism and subsequent failure mode. 
Low chance the Design Control will detect a potential cause/mechanism and subsequent failure mode. 
Moderate chance the Design Control will detect a potential cause/ mechanism and subsequent failure mode. 
Moderately High chance the Design Control will detect a potential cause/mechanism and subsequent failure mode. 
Very High chance the Design Control will detect a potential cause/ mechanism and subsequent failure mode. 
High chance the Design Control will detect a potential cause/ mechanism and subsequent failure mode. 
Design Controls will almost certainly detect a potential cause/ mechanism and subsequent failure mode. 
DETECTION 
SUGGESTED DETECTION EVALATION CRITERIA 
CRITERIA 
RNK.
© 2004 - 2007 
2010 
Questions & Discussion Please feel free to contact me anytime for questions! ctulkoff@dfrsolutions.com www.dfrsolutions.com
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2010 
DfR – Software Solutions 
oDfR has developed a revolutionary tool that allows for an early-stage assessment of hardware design 
oEasy-to-use + Comprehensive 
oIdentification of high risk design elements 
oTradeoff analysis 
oFaster time-to-market through guarantee of test success 
oPhysics-based reliability prediction 
oWarranty reduction
© 2004 - 2007 
2010 
DfX – A Software Solution
© 2004 - 2007 
2010 
Tech Insertion: Integrated Circuit Wearout 
oWorking with companies across the electronic supply chain to develop an online solution 
”The notion that a transistor ages is a new concept for circuit designers,” 
 aging has traditionally been the bailiwick of engineers who guarantee the transistor will operate for 10 years or so
But as transistors are scaled down further and operated with thinner voltage margins, it’s becoming harder to make those guarantees
 transistor aging is emerging as a circuit designer’s problem. 
IEEE Spectrum, June 2009 
1995 
2005 
2015 
0.1 
1.0 
10 
100 
1000 
Service life, yrs. 
Computer, cell phone requirements 
Hi-Rel requirements 
500 
250 
130 
65 
35 
Semiconductor lifetimes 
Semiconductor Feature Size, nm
© 2004 - 2007 
2010 
IC Wearout – Value Proposition 
oTradeoff studies 
oReliability predictions 
oSystem prognostics and self-healing 
oSupplier engagement
© 2004 - 2007 
2010 
DfR Design Assessment Tool 
oMeets current market needs, including 
oAccelerates time-to-market through earlier and more robust analysis 
oMitigates risk in move to environmentally friendly materials 
oEffectively manages the original design manufacturer (ODM) supply chain 
oMeets new requirements from end-users and regulators for knowledge based assessment
© 2004 - 2007 
2010 
Tech Insertion: 2nd Gen Solder Testing 
oMajor solder manufacturer needed to demonstrate reliability of 2nd generation Pb-free alloy 
oDfR provided a turn-key solution 
oTest plan development 
oTest coupon design 
oTest execution 
oFailure analysis 
oSolder reliability model 
oResults 
oDeveloped new test technology to meet schedule and cost constraints 
oOnline calculators now available for customers world-wide
© 2004 - 2007 
2010 
Design: Component Packaging 
oDfR has assisted numerous component manufacturers and OEMs in ensuring robustness of existing and future packaging solutions 
oExpertise 
o1st Level Interconnects (Solder Bumps / Wire Bonds) 
oUnderfill Selection and Validation 
oSubstrate / RDL 
oDesign for Manufacturability (Package Level) 
oPhysics of Failure (PoF) Reliability Prediction 
oFinite Element Analysis (FEA) 
oFocus 
oFlip Chip / Ball Grid Array 
oBottom Terminated Components 
oStacked Die / System in Package (SiP)
© 2004 - 200107 
Design: 
Circuit Board 
Level 
o DfR uses industry-leading design for excellence (DfX) 
practices to optimize design and ensure success early in new 
product development (NPD) 
o Expertise 
o Circuit Analysis 
o Power Supply Design 
o Design for Reliability 
o Design for Manufacturability 
o Design for Testability 
o Design for Environment 
o Physics of Failure (PoF) Reliability Prediction 
o Finite Element Analysis (FEA) 
o Focus 
o Semiconductor Packaging 
o Printed Circuit Board 
o Circuit Card Assemblies 
o Product and System-Level
© 2004 - 2007 
2010 
Supplier Assessment (Approach) 
oDfR offers multiple solution paths for ensuring a quality supply chain. 
oEach solution is specifically tailored to each company’s production volume, design complexity, and cost requirements 
oApproaches include 
oComponent-Level Testing 
oDevelopment of Supplier Qualification Documents 
oSupplier Evaluations (Component, Board, Assembly) 
oConstruction Analysis 
oStatistical Process Control Evaluations
© 2004 - 2007 
2010 
Supply Chain: Component Qualification 
oWorking with major electronic OEMs on benchmarking suppliers of critical components 
oActions include 
oDeveloping test plans 
oCharacterizing time to failure behavior 
oDeveloping qualification criteria based on test results
© 2004 - 200107 
Testing: Test 
Plan 
Development 
o Product test plans are critical to the success of a new product or technology 
o Stressful enough to identify defects 
o Show correlation to a realistic environment 
o DfR Solutions approach 
o Industry Standards + Physics of Failure 
o Results in an optimized test plan that is acceptable 
to management and customers 
o Experience in product test plans include 
o Industrial controls 
o Process monitoring 
o Consumer appliances 
o Telecom (Class I, II, and III environments) 
o Personal computers 
o Mobile phones and other mobile products 
o Avionics (engine controls, fuselage) 
o Automotive (under-hood, passenger 
compartment, chassis, and trunk) 
o Down-hole oil-drilling 
Month Cycles/Year Ramp Dwell 
Max 
Temp 
(ÂșC) 
Min 
Temp 
(ÂșC) 
T 
Cycles 
per Day 
AF 
Jan+Feb+Dec 90 6 hrs 6 hrs 30 5 25 1 12.654 
Mar+Nov 60 6 hrs 6 hrs 35 10 25 1 11.799 
Apr+Oct 60 6 hrs 6 hrs 40 15 25 1 10.944 
May+Sep 60 6 hrs 6 hrs 45 20 25 1 10.26 
Jun+Jul+Aug 90 6 hrs 6 hrs 50 25 25 1 9.576 
Operational 16.6 5 min 3 hrs 25 -40 65 1 2.223 
ALT Plan Approval 
Start 
Manufacture 
Qualification and 
RGT Units 
Pass Qual? 
N 
Y 
Finish 
Perform Qual 
Failure Analysis / 
Repairs 
Perform SRT Perform RGT Order SRT Units 
Perform Updates 
on SRT Units 
Submit Final 
Report 
Update SRT 
Units? 
N 
Y 
Update RGT 
units? 
Perform Updates 
on RGT Units 
Y 
N 
Limited Re-qualification? 
N 
Order Limited Re-qual 
units and 
Perform Limited 
Re-qualification 
Pass Limited 
Re-qual? 
Failure Analysis / 
Repairs 
ALT Objective 
Met? 
Y 
N 
Y Y 
Request Guidance 
from GD 
N
© 2004 - 2007 
2010 
Root Cause Analysis (RCA) -- Personnel 
oThe number one requirement in failure analysis 
oDfR has all the necessary elements 
oElectrical engineers, mechanical engineers, materials scientists, inorganic chemists, etc. 
oExtensive in-house expertise 
oPhD, MS, BS + industry experience 
oThe right background 
oOver 800 failure analyses combined
© 2004 - 2007 
2010 
Failure Analysis: Desktop Computer 
oFailures during HALT 
oExposure to vibration 
oElectrical testing indicated electrical open 
oUnder BGA socket 
oValidity of failure mechanism? 
oShearing of electrolytic capacitor leads 
oDependent upon orientation of capacitors 
oOnly those along the board length 
oVibration test may not have applied random loads 
oPotential issues with vibration table or fixturing
© 2004 - 2007 
2010 
On-Die RCA 
oWireless and telecom component manufacturer 
oIssues with new silicon nitride technology in MIMCAP structure 
oHalted multi-million dollar product launch 
oIdentified potential root causes based on 
oKnowledge of semiconductor process technology 
oFundamental behavior of the material 
oRecommended experimental design and analytical techniques to confirm failure mechanism 
oGuided modification in process parameters for fundamentally more robust technology 
Metal 2 Bridge 
Nitride 2 
Nitride 1 
Standard dual nitride layer MIMCAP
© 2004 - 2007 
2010 
Knowledge and Education (Website) 
oLet your staff learn all day / every day 
E-LEARNING 
oScholarly articles 
oTechnical white papers 
oCase studies 
oReliability calculators 
oOnline presentations
© 2004 - 2007 
2010 
Interested? 
oCould your next product benefit from DfR’s extensive expertise and PoF knowledge base? 
oBring us in as an independent party during critical design reviews 
oAre your concerned with new technologies? 
oDfR’s scientists and engineers can provide comprehensive analysis to ensure risk-minimization during these difficult transitions 
oTake advantage of our unique Open-Door policy! 
oSee how much we already know about your current issues 
oChances are we have already solved your problem at least once before 
oWe work around the clock and around the world 
oContact us by phone (301-474-0607) or email (askdfr@dfrsolutions.com)

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FMEA Guide Provides Insights on Process and Common Mistakes

  • 1. © 2004 – 2010 FMEA: The Good, The Bad, and The Ugly April ASQ Spokane Section Meeting Cheryl Tulkoff Senior Member of the Technical Staff ctulkoff@dfrsolutions.com www.dfrsolutions.com April 28, 2011
  • 2. © 2004 - 2007 2010 Instructor Biography oCheryl Tulkoff has over 15 years of experience in electronics manufacturing with an emphasis on failure analysis and reliability. She has worked throughout the electronics manufacturing life cycle beginning with semiconductor fabrication processes, into printed circuit board fabrication and assembly, through functional and reliability testing, and culminating in the analysis and evaluation of field returns. She has also managed no clean and RoHS-compliant conversion programs and has developed and managed comprehensive reliability programs. oCheryl earned her Bachelor of Mechanical Engineering degree from Georgia Tech. She is a published author, experienced public speaker and trainer and a Senior member of both ASQ and IEEE. She holds leadership positions in the IEEE Central Texas Chapter, IEEE WIE (Women In Engineering), and IEEE ASTR (Accelerated Stress Testing and Reliability) sections. She chaired the annual IEEE ASTR workshop for four years and is also an ASQ Certified Reliability Engineer. oShe has a strong passion for pre-college STEM (Science, Technology, Engineering, and Math) outreach and volunteers with several organizations that specialize in encouraging pre-college students to pursue careers in these fields.
  • 3. © 2004 - 2007 2010 FMEA: Failure Modes and Effects Analysis 1) Introductions & Webinar Instructions 2) “Common Sense” Reliability Engineering 3) Introduction to FMEAs 4) FMEA Process Roles & Responsibilities 5) Common Mistakes & Traps 6) Examples
  • 4. © 2004 - 2007 2010 Introduction
  • 5. © 2004 - 2007 2010 Common Sense Reliability Engineering o"Unfortunately, reliability engineering has been afflicted with more nonsense than any other branch of engineering." - Pat O'Connor (Author Practical Reliability Engineering). oReliability engineering as a discipline often fails because: oIncorrect activities, incorrect people and incorrect timing. oPerforming tasks just to do them but not really fulfill them. oReliability activities focused excessively on maintenance or logistics issues instead of product optimization, problem/defect prevention & risk reduction. oPrediction based on fundamentally flawed methods & assumptions oObscure or Excessive Statistical / Probabilistic Methods. oPlaying “Number Games” to “Look Good” of “Justify Good Enough” oTo avoid extra effort, to meet schedule, to meet budget.
  • 6. © 2004 - 2007 2010 Common Sense Reliability Engineering oCommon sense dictates that: oReliability should be defined as the absence of failures during the intended usage life of product & services. oReliability Efforts Should Focus On Ensuring The Absence Of Failure. oFocus Product Development on FINDING & PREVENTING ALL FAILURES THAT MIGHT AFFECT THE END CUSTOMER oFollow by Prevention of defects in production, assembly and fabrication oUp front efforts for problem prevention / doing it right the first time oReduces the need / cost of correcting problems found in test or problems reported by customers in the field. oFailure prevention can achieved by oUnderstand why failures happen oAnalysis to identify risks followed by risk elimination/mitigation oOptimizing activities designed to identify and eliminate both design and process deficiencies.
  • 7. © 2004 - 2007 2010 Introduction to FMEA: Failure Modes & Effects Analysis
  • 8. © 2004 - 2007 2010 oFMEA is just one of many tools in your tool box. oIt is not the only tool or best tool for every problem or every situation. oIt can be used across a wide range of fields and disciplines oNot limited to “hardware” oManufacturing oSoftware oBusiness Processes oHealthcare oService Industries oRegulated industries – automotive, medical devices, NASA.. oAny place where you need to reduce risk and prevent failure! What FMEA IS NOT

  • 9. © 2004 - 2007 2010 What FMEA is
. oFMEA oA systematic group of activities designed to: oRecognize and evaluate potential failures of systems, products, or processes oIdentify the effects and outcomes of the failures oIdentify actions that could eliminate or mitigate the failures oProvide a historical written record of the work performed
  • 10. © 2004 - 2007 2010 FMEA in the News Japan’s Fukushima Daiichi nuclear plant Industry watchers contend a manufacturing error was likely the culprit. "It means the assembly was wrong, it means the wrong tools were used, it means they were careless in drilling the holes, and maybe the drill was dull," Tear in Boeing Jet A study has found that fatal medication errors spiked by 10 percent in July, the month that graduates fresh out of medical school report to residencies, in counties with a high number of teaching hospitals, but stayed the same in areas without teaching hospitals Medication Errors
  • 11. © 2004 - 2007 2010 oJapan Quake & Tsunami points out both strengths and limitations of FMEA oKey issues were detailed and identified oThe plants were built to withstand an earthquake of 7.0. oThere was a seawall around the facility in case of a tsunami. oIn an earthquake, the plants had a SCRAM procedure, which executed an emergency shutdown of the nuclear reactors. oElectrical pumps were designed to pump cool water to the container to keep the rods submerged (the rods are hotter AFTER the shut down than during regular operation of the plant). oThere were back-up batteries for running the pumps in an emergency that were designed to last about an hour or so. oThere were diesel fuel pumps that were available to take over the pumping when the batteries ran out of juice. oThere are vents built into the system to release steam from the reactors if the pressure inside got too high oBut many were considered low probability and/or excessively expensive to consider or the risk was underestimated FMEA in the News


  • 12. © 2004 - 2007 2010 oBoeing engineers underestimated the risk of cracks in the aluminum, they assumed it would be fine for 60,000 flights (pressure cycles) but have now reduced the expected life to 30,000 with inspections recommended every 500 flights after reaching 30,000
. ohttp://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703806304576244782850491122.html oFMEA: The Cure for Medical Errors ohttp://www.medicalhealthcarefmea.com/guides/qp0803reiling.pdf ohttp://asq.org/sixsigma/green/pdf/preventing_medication_ errors.pdf FMEA in the News
  • 13. © 2004 - 2007 2010 Why perform an FMEA? oPurpose of an FMEA Study is to analyze: oWhat might go wrong? oHow bad might the effect be? oHow might it be prevented, mitigated or detected at the earliest possible moment? oWith lowest cost, impact, safety risk
. oDevelop a Design FMEA process for use in future programs.
  • 14. © 2004 - 2007 2010 Typical FMEA Uses oFMEA are often stored and kept to prove due engineering diligence in case of a product liability law suit or government safety investigation. oWorst use is when a “FMEA Specialist” generates the analysis alone or to simply fulfill a contract requirement, and the report is not even read by the product team. oFMEA are extremely powerful QRD (Quality, Reliability, Durability) analysis techniques oBest for total new products, new technologies and challenging design Issues. oBut the high degree of detail and repetition in a FMEA can be grueling, costly and time intensive to create especially for complex designs. oFMEA’ing everything can lead to oOverwork oNon Value Added work oFMEA fatigue! oTry to re-use FMEA “building blocks” or use as a check list on new versions of similar products.
  • 15. © 2004 - 2007 2010 oFMEA is a widely used and powerful analysis/design review technique. oAn extremely comprehensive element by element review of: oWhat can go wrong oWhat that will happen oHow the situation can be improved oFor improving a design or process oFor each component, element or process step: oList how failures can occur (Failure Mode, what can go wrong, how the failure manifests itself) oList what could happen (Failure Effect, consequences of the mode). oList how processes or the system itself can detect & prevent the problem oGenerate Recommendations for Improvements. FMEA Basics - Failure Mode And Effect Analysis
  • 16. © 2004 - 2007 2010 oCalculate a Risk Priority Number (RPN) for Each Line Item using 3 Criteria, oSeverity of the Failure Effect “S” (Scale of 1 (Low) - 10 (High)). oFrequency of Failure Occurrence “O” (Scale of 1(Infrequent) - 10 (Frequent)). oDetectability/Preventability/Warning “D” (Scale or 1(Very Detectable) - 10 (Not Detectable)). oRPN = S x O x D, range (1 (good) to 1000 High Risk). oAn unacceptable range is defined. oExample: RPN‟s > 150 are unacceptable and require a corrective action redesign. oOften a Pareto Ranking of the RPN is performed and used to prioritize corrective action efforts. FMEA Basics - Failure Mode And Effect Analysis
  • 17. © 2004 - 2007 2010 FMEA - Failure Mode And Effect Analysis oMany FMEA Versions. oDesign and Process Version - DFMEA & PFMEA. oCan be Performed at that Component, Subsystem, System and Software level oFMECA - Failure Mode, Effect and Criticality Analysis a version that further emphasizes & highlights “Safety Critical” issues oInitially, the FMECA was called FMEA (Failure modes and effects analysis). The C in FMECA indicates that the criticality (or severity) of the various failure effects are considered and ranked. oToday, FMEA is often used as a synonym for FMECA. The distinction between the two terms has become blurred.
  • 18. © 2004 - 2007 2010 oFailure: The loss of expected or intended function under stated conditions oFailure mode: The way in which a failure is observed; generally describes the way the failure occurs. oFailure effect: The immediate consequences of a failure on operation, function or functionality oFailure cause: Defects in design, system, process, quality, or part application, the underlying cause of the failure or things which initiate a process which leads to failure. oSeverity: The consequences of a failure mode. Severity considers the worst case outcome of a failure as determined by the degree of injury, property damage, or harm that could ultimately occur." Some Key FMEA Terms
  • 19. © 2004 - 200107 FMEA – Use a Team Approach! Core-team Support-team
  • 20. © 2004 - 2007 2010 Product FMEA – Typical Team Example Core- team Representatives from: ‱Development ‱Production ‱Supplier Quality ‱Purchasing ‱Validation. ‱... Support team Quality or Reliability Facilitator Systems Enrg HW Design SW Design Production/ process-engineer
  • 21. © 2004 - 2007 2010 The FMEA Process in Detail
. 4) Divide the system for analysis & Create Teams - 7) Performing the FMEA to Identify potential failure modes, & Their Severity, Probability of Occurrence, Detectability & Calculate RPNs for the sub-system 3) Choose the type of FMEA approach for the study 8) Complete the Initial Evaluation Phase Identify Excessive Risks, Develop Corrective Action Proposals & Assign Resolution Lead 2) Define the problems of interest for the analysis. 10) Mitigation Phase Example Follow Up Evaluate C.A. Effectiveness & Implementation Plans Update FMEA with Finding & Revise RPN‟s 1) Define the system of interest 11) If new RPN are Satisfactory, Implement C.A.s IF Unsatisfactory Dev & Evaluate New C.A.s or Escalate to Mgnt 5) Create block diagrams that illustrate all subsystem elements, interfaces and interactions - Select Ranking System 6) Create FMEA Outlines based on the block diagrams. Subsystem elements, interfaces and interactions become the FMEA subsections 9) Team Reports To Example Management
  • 22. © 2004 - 2007 2010 Product Definition: Key Product Characteristics, DFMEA Process Definition: Process Flow Diagram (PFD), Failure Mode Analysis: PFMEA Control Strategy: Control Plan, Error proofing Customer Requirements: Manufacturing: Work Instructions & Process Monitoring Information Flow Functions with Req’s/Tech Specs System Technical Specs Product and Process Characteristics
  • 23. © 2004 - 2007 2010 Design FMEA Process Flow Diagram Process FMEA Process Control Plan Operator Instructions Design Specifications Validation Plan Process Specifications FMEAs are “continuous steps” in the development process (mind set) DFMEA & PFMEA are related, but separate tasks Whenever changes are made for: FTQ or other issues, ALL the process documentation should be reviewed & updated as required. Key Quality Tools – General Workflow
  • 24. © 2004 - 2007 2010 FMEA – Teamleaders & Facilitators oTeam Leaders are often from a Product/Systems Group and facilitators are from a Quality/Reliability Organization but no hard and fast rules! oTeam Leader Preparation for the FMEA session: oFocuses on the project/product and accessing, distributing, & displaying important product information: oDefines and assign tasks of the team-members: oAccesses support personnel when needed oGathers technical solutions, subject matter expertise
  • 25. © 2004 - 2007 2010 FMEA – Facilitator Tasks oFacilitator Preparation of the FMEA session oWorks/prepares together with the team-leader oHelps define agenda for each meeting oProduct-FMEA : creates block diagram oProcess-FMEA: creates flows diagram oCreates the FMEA starter outline from the diagram oHelps select participants with team leader (4-6 persons ideal). oEnsures the FMEA-worksheet is completely & accurately filled-in (actions, responsible person, date) oFunctions are correctly written down (verb/noun) oAll known failure modes are listed oFailure modes effects are correct (no confusion between causes and effects). oKeeps the process moving don‟t loose time with long discussions about severity and probability. oIn case of doubt, take the „worst case‟ and move on.
  • 26. © 2004 - 2007 2010
  • 27. © 2004 - 2007 2010 FMEA Worksheet Sections 1.FMEA #: - Enter the FMEA document number, used for tracking. 2.FMEA Type & Name: - System, Subsystem or Component, - Item Name and Number. 3.Design Responsibility Department or Group 4.Prepared By: - The name, phone, e-mail & company of the person who led or prepared the FMEA. 5.Program/Model - List the program/project of system the item is used in and the introductory model year of the item. 6.Key (Due) Date - Target FMEA completion date. 7.FMEA (Revision) Date - Revision Date of this version of the FMEA worksheet
  • 28. © 2004 - 2007 2010 FMEA Worksheet Sections 8.Core Team: - List the names, contact info & departments of the FMEA team members 9.Item/Function - Concisely list the name and pertinent info of the line item/section being analyzed. Correlate the FMEA item/function number to the number on FMEA block diagram/ engineering drawing. 10.Potential Failure Mode - Sequentially and concisely list the manner in which the item (component, subsystem or system) could potentially fail to perform the intended function described in the item/function column. The potential failure mode could cause a potential failure in a higher level item, or be the effect of lower level item. List each potential failure mode associated with the particular item or function. 11.Potential Effect(s) of Failure - Sequentially and concisely list the potential effects of the each failure mode on the function, as perceived by the customer. Document if the failure could impact safety or result in noncompliance to regulation.
  • 29. © 2004 - 200107 FMEA Worksheet Sections 12. Severity Ranking: - List the teams assessment of the Severity rank associated with the most serious potential effect of each identified failure mode. Severity is a relative ranking based on the predefined severity evaluation criteria and ranking system Sample Process Severity Ranking Table To be adapted for Design FMEA
  • 30. © 2004 - 2007 2010 FMEA Worksheet Sections 13.Classification - An non standardized adhoc column that can be used to classify special product characteristics (i.e. critical, key, major, significant). May also be used to highlight high-priority failure modes or specific company policy issues. 14.Potential Cause(s) / Mechanism(s) of Failure - Sequentially and concisely list all potential causes and/or failure mechanisms that might trigger or result in each failure mode. So that preventative or mitigation efforts can be identified.
  • 31. © 2004 - 2007 2010 FMEA Worksheet Sections 15.Probability or Potential Frequency of Occurrence. - Rank the likelihood that a specific failure cause/mechanism will occur during the intent design life or usage situation. The likelihood of occurrence ranking number is a relative meaning rather than an absolute value. Preventing or controlling the causes/mechanisms of the failure mode through a design or process change (i.e. design checklist, design review, design guide) is the only way a reduction in the occurrence ranking can be effected. Estimate the likelihood of occurrence of potential failure cause/mechanisms on a 1 to 10 scale. Sample Process Occurrence Ranking Scale To be adapted for Design FMEA
  • 32. © 2004 - 2007 2010 FMEA Worksheet Sections 16.Current Design Controls - List the prevention, design validation/verification, quality controls, self diagnostics, fail safe features or other activities that have incorporated into the product or process to assure the design adequacy for the failure mode and/or cause/ mechanism being considered. The team should always be focused on improving or optimizing design controls; for example, creating better tests or creating new system algorithms. There are two types of design controls to consider: - Prevention: Prevent the cause/mechanism of failure or the failure mode from occurring, or reduce their rate of occurrence. - Detection: Detect the cause/mechanism of failure or the failure mode, either by analytical or physical methods, before the item is released to production of by self diagnostics with fail safe features in the field. The FMEA form has separate columns for Prevention Controls and Detection Controls) to assist in distinguishing between the two types of design controls. This allows for a quick visual determination that both types of design controls are being used.
  • 33. © 2004 - 200107 FMEA Worksheet Sections 17. Detection is a relative ranking of the intended design controls. Sample Process Detection Scale To be adapted for the Design FMEA
  • 34. © 2004 - 2007 2010 FMEA Worksheet Sections 18.RPN - Risk Priority Number - The RPN is the product of the severity (S), occurrence (O), and detection (D) rankings: (S) x (O) x (D) =RPN. The RPN is used to prioritize the risk related to each failure mode and mechanism. 19.Recommended Corrective Action. - Engineering efforts for preventive/corrective action should be first directed at high severity, high RPN, items identified by the team. The objective is to recommended action that reduce severity, occurrence and detection risks rankings. 9 or 10 severity issues require special attention to ensure that the risk is addressed through design controls or preventive/corrective action(s) regardless of the RPN value. After special attention has been given to severity rankings of 9 or 10, other failure modes can then be addressed The primary objective of recommended actions is to reduce risks AND increase customer satisfaction by improving the design. 20.Responsibility & Target Completion Date - Enter the name of the organization and the individual responsible for evaluating and implementing each recommended corrective action and the target completion date.
  • 35. © 2004 - 2007 2010 FMEA Worksheet Sections 21.Action Taken - After the recommended corrective action has been evaluated and implemented briefly description the final outcome and effective date. 22.Corrective Action Results. - After the preventive/corrective action has been identified, estimate and record the revised resulting severity, occurrence, and detection rankings. Calculate and record the resulting RPN. If no actions are taken, leave these columns blank. All revised ratings should be reviewed. lf further action is considered necessary, repeat the analysis. The focus should always be on continuous improvement. The design-responsible engineer is responsible for ensuring that all recommended actions have been adequately addressed and implemented. The FMEA is a living document throughout the product development process and should always reflect the latest design level and latest relevant .
  • 36. © 2004 - 2007 2010 o“Fill in the blanks” only. oDon’t understand the scope and objective of FMEA oDay dreaming oDidn’t go through the self-challenge process of design control oCouldn’t separate Failure Mode, Cause, Effect oMixed everything together. Argument for the sake of argument. Common Mistakes and Traps
  • 37. © 2004 - 2007 2010 oRepeated itself oDog chases its own tail. oMitigation is not truly challenged oRanking criteria too loose oOnly identifying the problems but not the solutions. Or, couldn’t control it, even if there is a solution. Control plan not in place. oDo once, then keep in file oLeaving Document rather than Living Document oLack of consistency Common Mistakes and Traps
  • 38. © 2004 - 200107 AUTOMOTIVE EXAMPLE SEVERITY EVALUATION CRITERIA Hazardous-with warning Very High High Very high severity ranking when a potential failure mode affects safe vehicle operation and/or involves noncompliance with government regulation without warning Low Very Low Minor Very Minor None Very high severity ranking when a potential failure mode affects safe vehicle operation and/or involves noncompliance with government regulation with warning Vehicle/item inoperable (loss of primary function). Vehicle/item operable but at a reduced level of performance. Customer very dissatisfied. Vehicle/item operable but Comfort/Convenience item(s) inoperable. Customer dissatisfied. Vehicle/item operable but Comfort/Convenience item(s) operable at a reduced level of performance. Customer somewhat dissatisfied. Fit & Finish/Squeak & Rattle item does not conform. Defect noticed by most customers (greater than 75%). Fit & Finish/Squeak & Rattle item does not conform. Defect noticed by 50% of customers. Fit & Finish/Squeak & Rattle item does not conform. Defect noticed by discriminating customers (less than 25%). No discernable effect. 10 8 7 6 3 2 1 Hazardous-without warning Moderate 4 5 EFFECT CRITERIA: Severity of Effect RNK. SEVERITY EVALUATION CRITERIA 9
  • 39. © 2004 - 2007 2010 Occurrence Evaluation Criteria *Note: Zero (0) rankings for Severity, Occurrence or Detection are not allowed Probability of Likely Failure Rates Over Design Life Ranking Failure SUGGESTED OCCURRENCE EVALUATION CRITERIA Very High: Persistent failures High: Frequent failures Moderate: Occasional failures Low: Relatively few failures Remote: Failure is unlikely ï‚ł 100 per thousand vehicles/items 50 per thousand vehicles/items 20 per thousand vehicles/items 10 per thousand vehicles/items 5 per thousand vehicles/items 2 per thousand vehicles/items 1 per thousand vehicles/items 0.5 per thousand vehicles/items 0.1 per thousand vehicles/items ï‚Ł 0.01 per thousand vehicles/items 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
  • 40. © 2004 - 2007 2010 Detection Rating Absolute Uncertainty Very Remote Remote Very Low Low Moderate Moderately High High Very High Almost Certain 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 Design Control will not and/or cannot detect a potential cause/ mechanism and subsequent failure mode; or there is no Design Control. Very Remote chance the Design Control will detect a potential cause/mechanism and subsequent failure mode. Remote chance the Design Control will detect a potential cause/ mechanism and subsequent failure mode. Very Low chance the Design Control will detect a potential cause/mechanism and subsequent failure mode. Low chance the Design Control will detect a potential cause/mechanism and subsequent failure mode. Moderate chance the Design Control will detect a potential cause/ mechanism and subsequent failure mode. Moderately High chance the Design Control will detect a potential cause/mechanism and subsequent failure mode. Very High chance the Design Control will detect a potential cause/ mechanism and subsequent failure mode. High chance the Design Control will detect a potential cause/ mechanism and subsequent failure mode. Design Controls will almost certainly detect a potential cause/ mechanism and subsequent failure mode. DETECTION SUGGESTED DETECTION EVALATION CRITERIA CRITERIA RNK.
  • 41. © 2004 - 2007 2010 Questions & Discussion Please feel free to contact me anytime for questions! ctulkoff@dfrsolutions.com www.dfrsolutions.com
  • 42. © 2004 – 2010 Your Partner Throughout the Product Life Cycle DfR lends a guiding hand on quality, reliability and durability (QRD) issues through our expertise in the emerging science of Reliability Physics, providing crucial insights and solutions early in product design, development and test throughout manufacturing, and even into the field.
  • 43. © 2004 - 2007 2010 Your Needs
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faster time to market o
find, incorporate new technologies o
extend warranty period o
reduce warranty costs o
technically manage suppliers o
improve employee skills o
out perform your competition
  • 44. © 2004 - 2007 2010 
Our Capabilities oDfR uses Physics-of-Failure (PoF) and Best Practices expertise to provide knowledge- based strategic quality and reliability solutions to the electronics industry oTechnology Insertion oDesign oManufacturing and Supplier Selection oProduct Validation and Accelerated Testing oRoot-Cause Failure Analysis & Forensics Engineering oUnique combination of expert consultants and state-of-the-art laboratory facilities oCapabilities at package, board, product, and system- level
  • 45. © 2004 - 2007 2010 How Do Companies Use DfR? oWork overflow oMaximize the efficiency of your current staff oIndependent party on critical design reviews oSupplier benchmarking (commodity / custom) oTest plan development and execution oReliability predictions oRoot-Cause Analysis oContinuing education
  • 46. © 2004 - 2007 2010 Who Uses DfR? Military / Avionics / Space Enterprise / Telecom / ATE Consumer / Appliance Industrial / Power Lockheed Martin Cisco Systems Dell Computers General Electric Northrop Grumman Huawei Hewlett Packard Siemens Boeing Sun Microsystems Apple Emerson Electric General Dynamics Motorola Fujitsu Schlumberger BAE Systems Alcatel-Lucent Samsung Ingersoll Rand Honeywell Juniper Networks LG Electronics Danaher Motion Hamilton Sundstrand KLA-Tencor Microsoft Olympus Rockwell Collins Xerox Tyco Electronics Auto / Transportation Government General Motors Portables Medical NAVAIR Caterpillar LG Electronics Philips Medical NASA Panasonic Automotive Kyocera Medtronic Air Force TRW Boston Scientific Magna Components Cardinal Health Contract Manufacturers Takata Samsung Beckman Coulter Flextronics Fairchild Semiconductor Biotronik Benchmark Electronics Materials International Rectifier Cameron Health Jabil Graftech Nvidia Cardiac Science Gold Circuit Electronics Nihon Superior Amphenol Zoll Medical Viasystems NIC
  • 47. © 2004 - 2007 2010 DfR Solutions – Senior Experts oDr. Craig Hillman, CEO and Managing Partner oExpertise: Design for Reliability (DfR), Pb-free Transition, Supplier Benchmarking, Passive Components, Printed Circuit Board oPhD, Material Science (UCSB) oDr. Nathan Blattau, Vice President oExpertise: Power Devices, DfR, Nonlinear Finite Element Analysis (FEA), Solder Joint Reliability, Fracture, Fatigue Mechanics. oPhD, Mechanical Eng. (University of Maryland) oCheryl Tulkoff, CRE oExpertise: Pb-Free Transition, PCB and PCBA Fabrication, IC Fabrication, RCA (8D and Red X) oB.S., Mechanical Engineering (Georgia Tech) oDr. Ron Wunderlich oExpertise: Design for EMI/EMC, Power Supply Design, Analog Circuit Design, Spice Model Development, Monte Carlo Circuit Simulation oPhD, Electrical Engineering (SUNY – Binghamton) oGreg Caswell oExpertise: Nanotechnology CMOS, CMOS/SOS, Input Protection Networks / ESD, SMT, Pb-free oB.S., Electrical Engineering (Rutgers) oDr. Randy Schueller oExpertise: IC Fabrication, IC Packaging, Pb-Free Transition Activities, Supplier Benchmarking, Corrosion Mechanisms oPhD, Material Science (University of Virginia) oDr. Gregg Kittlesen oExpertise: Semiconductor Lasers, Microprocessors, Memory Components, Photonic and RF Technologies, Supply Chain Management oPhD, Inorganic Chemistry (MIT) oJames McLeish, CRE oExpertise: FMEA, Root-Cause Analysis, Warranty Analysis, Automotive Electronics, Physics of Failure, Battery Technology oM.S., Electrical Eng. (Wayne State University) oNorm Anderson oExpertise: Avionics, Product Qualification, Safety Criticality Assessment, FTA, FMEA, Component Uprating, Obsolescence oB.S., Electrical Engineering (Iowa State University) oAnne Marie Neufelder oExpertise: Software Reliability Prediction, Best Practices in Software Risk Management oB.S., Systems Engineering (Georgia Tech) oWalt Tomczykowski, Vice President, CRE oExpertise: Systems Eng., Life Cycle Management (including obsolescence), Spares Analysis, Counterfeit Mitigation, Failure Analysis oM.S., Reliability Eng. (University of Maryland)
  • 48. © 2004 - 2007 2010 DfR Locations (North America) Austin, TX 512-913-8624 Rochester Hills, MI 248-726-7600 Binghamton, NY 607-754-0347 Minneapolis, MN 320-433-4075 Corporate Headquarters College Park, MD 301-474-0607
  • 49. © 2004 - 2007 2010 DfR Resources and Equipment Electrical oOscilloscopes (Digital and Analog) oCurve Tracers (Digital and Analog) oCapacitance Meters oLow/High Resistance Meters oHigh Voltage Power Supplies (Hi-Pot) oNetwork Analyzer (up to 3 GHz) Testing oHALT / HASS oTemperature Cycling oThermal Shock oTemperature/Humidity oVibration oMechanical Shock / Drop Tower oMixed Flowing Gas oSalt Spray oCapacitor Testing (Ripple Current, Step Stress, Partial Discharge) oBend Testing (Cyclic and Overstress) oMechanical Testing Material Analysis oX-ray oAcoustic Microscopy oInfrared Camera oMetallographic Preparation oStereoscope oOptical Microscope oScanning Electron Microscope oEnergy Dispersive Spectroscopy oIon Chromatography oFTIR (Solid / Film / Liquid) oThermomechanical Analyzer oMechanical Testing (Tension, Compression, Shear, etc.) oSQUID Microscopy Other oCircuit Simulation oFinite Element Analysis (FEA) oComputational Fluid Dynamics oReliability Prediction (Physics of Failure)
  • 50. © 2004 - 2007 2010 DfR – Software Solutions oDfR has developed a revolutionary tool that allows for an early-stage assessment of hardware design oEasy-to-use + Comprehensive oIdentification of high risk design elements oTradeoff analysis oFaster time-to-market through guarantee of test success oPhysics-based reliability prediction oWarranty reduction
  • 51. © 2004 - 2007 2010 DfX – A Software Solution
  • 52. © 2004 - 2007 2010 Tech Insertion: Integrated Circuit Wearout oWorking with companies across the electronic supply chain to develop an online solution ”The notion that a transistor ages is a new concept for circuit designers,” 
 aging has traditionally been the bailiwick of engineers who guarantee the transistor will operate for 10 years or so
But as transistors are scaled down further and operated with thinner voltage margins, it’s becoming harder to make those guarantees
 transistor aging is emerging as a circuit designer’s problem. IEEE Spectrum, June 2009 1995 2005 2015 0.1 1.0 10 100 1000 Service life, yrs. Computer, cell phone requirements Hi-Rel requirements 500 250 130 65 35 Semiconductor lifetimes Semiconductor Feature Size, nm
  • 53. © 2004 - 2007 2010 IC Wearout – Value Proposition oTradeoff studies oReliability predictions oSystem prognostics and self-healing oSupplier engagement
  • 54. © 2004 - 2007 2010 DfR Design Assessment Tool oMeets current market needs, including oAccelerates time-to-market through earlier and more robust analysis oMitigates risk in move to environmentally friendly materials oEffectively manages the original design manufacturer (ODM) supply chain oMeets new requirements from end-users and regulators for knowledge based assessment
  • 55. © 2004 - 2007 2010 Tech Insertion: 2nd Gen Solder Testing oMajor solder manufacturer needed to demonstrate reliability of 2nd generation Pb-free alloy oDfR provided a turn-key solution oTest plan development oTest coupon design oTest execution oFailure analysis oSolder reliability model oResults oDeveloped new test technology to meet schedule and cost constraints oOnline calculators now available for customers world-wide
  • 56. © 2004 - 2007 2010 Design: Component Packaging oDfR has assisted numerous component manufacturers and OEMs in ensuring robustness of existing and future packaging solutions oExpertise o1st Level Interconnects (Solder Bumps / Wire Bonds) oUnderfill Selection and Validation oSubstrate / RDL oDesign for Manufacturability (Package Level) oPhysics of Failure (PoF) Reliability Prediction oFinite Element Analysis (FEA) oFocus oFlip Chip / Ball Grid Array oBottom Terminated Components oStacked Die / System in Package (SiP)
  • 57. © 2004 - 200107 Design: Circuit Board Level o DfR uses industry-leading design for excellence (DfX) practices to optimize design and ensure success early in new product development (NPD) o Expertise o Circuit Analysis o Power Supply Design o Design for Reliability o Design for Manufacturability o Design for Testability o Design for Environment o Physics of Failure (PoF) Reliability Prediction o Finite Element Analysis (FEA) o Focus o Semiconductor Packaging o Printed Circuit Board o Circuit Card Assemblies o Product and System-Level
  • 58. © 2004 - 2007 2010 Supplier Assessment (Approach) oDfR offers multiple solution paths for ensuring a quality supply chain. oEach solution is specifically tailored to each company’s production volume, design complexity, and cost requirements oApproaches include oComponent-Level Testing oDevelopment of Supplier Qualification Documents oSupplier Evaluations (Component, Board, Assembly) oConstruction Analysis oStatistical Process Control Evaluations
  • 59. © 2004 - 2007 2010 Supply Chain: Component Qualification oWorking with major electronic OEMs on benchmarking suppliers of critical components oActions include oDeveloping test plans oCharacterizing time to failure behavior oDeveloping qualification criteria based on test results
  • 60. © 2004 - 200107 Testing: Test Plan Development o Product test plans are critical to the success of a new product or technology o Stressful enough to identify defects o Show correlation to a realistic environment o DfR Solutions approach o Industry Standards + Physics of Failure o Results in an optimized test plan that is acceptable to management and customers o Experience in product test plans include o Industrial controls o Process monitoring o Consumer appliances o Telecom (Class I, II, and III environments) o Personal computers o Mobile phones and other mobile products o Avionics (engine controls, fuselage) o Automotive (under-hood, passenger compartment, chassis, and trunk) o Down-hole oil-drilling Month Cycles/Year Ramp Dwell Max Temp (ÂșC) Min Temp (ÂșC) T Cycles per Day AF Jan+Feb+Dec 90 6 hrs 6 hrs 30 5 25 1 12.654 Mar+Nov 60 6 hrs 6 hrs 35 10 25 1 11.799 Apr+Oct 60 6 hrs 6 hrs 40 15 25 1 10.944 May+Sep 60 6 hrs 6 hrs 45 20 25 1 10.26 Jun+Jul+Aug 90 6 hrs 6 hrs 50 25 25 1 9.576 Operational 16.6 5 min 3 hrs 25 -40 65 1 2.223 ALT Plan Approval Start Manufacture Qualification and RGT Units Pass Qual? N Y Finish Perform Qual Failure Analysis / Repairs Perform SRT Perform RGT Order SRT Units Perform Updates on SRT Units Submit Final Report Update SRT Units? N Y Update RGT units? Perform Updates on RGT Units Y N Limited Re-qualification? N Order Limited Re-qual units and Perform Limited Re-qualification Pass Limited Re-qual? Failure Analysis / Repairs ALT Objective Met? Y N Y Y Request Guidance from GD N
  • 61. © 2004 - 2007 2010 Root Cause Analysis (RCA) -- Personnel oThe number one requirement in failure analysis oDfR has all the necessary elements oElectrical engineers, mechanical engineers, materials scientists, inorganic chemists, etc. oExtensive in-house expertise oPhD, MS, BS + industry experience oThe right background oOver 800 failure analyses combined
  • 62. © 2004 - 2007 2010 Failure Analysis: Desktop Computer oFailures during HALT oExposure to vibration oElectrical testing indicated electrical open oUnder BGA socket oValidity of failure mechanism? oShearing of electrolytic capacitor leads oDependent upon orientation of capacitors oOnly those along the board length oVibration test may not have applied random loads oPotential issues with vibration table or fixturing
  • 63. © 2004 - 2007 2010 On-Die RCA oWireless and telecom component manufacturer oIssues with new silicon nitride technology in MIMCAP structure oHalted multi-million dollar product launch oIdentified potential root causes based on oKnowledge of semiconductor process technology oFundamental behavior of the material oRecommended experimental design and analytical techniques to confirm failure mechanism oGuided modification in process parameters for fundamentally more robust technology Metal 2 Bridge Nitride 2 Nitride 1 Standard dual nitride layer MIMCAP
  • 64. © 2004 - 2007 2010 Knowledge and Education (Website) oLet your staff learn all day / every day E-LEARNING oScholarly articles oTechnical white papers oCase studies oReliability calculators oOnline presentations
  • 65. © 2004 - 2007 2010 Interested? oCould your next product benefit from DfR’s extensive expertise and PoF knowledge base? oBring us in as an independent party during critical design reviews oAre your concerned with new technologies? oDfR’s scientists and engineers can provide comprehensive analysis to ensure risk-minimization during these difficult transitions oTake advantage of our unique Open-Door policy! oSee how much we already know about your current issues oChances are we have already solved your problem at least once before oWe work around the clock and around the world oContact us by phone (301-474-0607) or email (askdfr@dfrsolutions.com)