Federalism In India 1 Federalism in India Prachi

Federalism In India 1
Federalism in India
Prachita Uprety
Minnesota State University, Mankato
Federalism in India 2

Introduction
India is a diverse country with a population of 1.3 billion, with
people of different religions,
hundreds of ethnicities, thousands of sub-castes many of whom
only reside in one state.
Democracy gets unpleasant in a homogenous region, let alone
such a diverse nation. To function
properly, India has been divided into 29 states (currently), and
the states have their own
government. This paper will discuss the importance and
evolution of federalism in a multi-
ethnic, multi-cultural country called India.
Evolution of Federalism in India
Federalism is a specific form of fragmentation of political
power. Federations show an
architecture of government with dual structures, driven by a
combination of self-rule and shared
rule. In a federal system, both constituent units and the central
government have constitutionally
recognized autonomous powers to interact directly with
citizens. Both the center and the regions

have their own fiscal bases and are directly accountable through
elections. Central governments
enjoy a much stronger institutional position than sub-national
governments (Beramendi, 2009).
Regionalization is important in a country as diverse as India as
it would be strenuous for the
central government to govern such diverse people. “The first
phase of regionalization in India
(1952-1967) started when one-party system was popular,
Congress dominated state-based parties
in some states but at an all-India level they played a marginal
role. India’s first electoral system
was not taken seriously and had little participation. The initial
changes to the Congress Party pre-
eminence came in 1967 when the party was defeated by the
Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam
(DMK) in Madras, Tamil Nadu for the first time, where the
DMK party opposed the imposition
of Hindi being the sole national language of the country. During
this period, Congress Party

remained unchallenged as the party of government in New
Delhi, the capital, but the
competitiveness of politics increased in other regions.
In the second phase (1967-1989) the Congress party was
represented by Indira Gandhi. During
this period, Congress with Indira Gandhi were the central pole
and opposition parties coalesced.
In the 1980s, newer generation of regional parties opposed
Indira Gandhi’s centralized
leadership and intervened in regional conflicts in Assam and
Punjab. In 1983, the Telugu Desam
Party defeated Congress in state elections over Andhra Pradesh,
in 1977 All India Anna DMK
had defeated Congress in Tamil Nadu. The country’s first non-
Congress government formed by
the Janata Party in 1977 also gave space to new regional voices.
By the end of this phase, the
issues of central-state relations and demand for more regional
autonomy divided political
competition at national level, that led to greater opposition
against the Congress Party.
With the third phase (1989-1999) began the post-Congress
polity in which regionalization began

to have a clearer impact on the national party system. A more
fluid phase of government
formation followed in the 1990s with short-lived coalition
governments indicating fragmented
electoral landscape where state parties played more important
roles at the center. The lower
castes, esp. Other Backward Classes (OBCs) mobilized to
implement the Mandal Commision
recommendations for affirmative action for OBCs. Several
parties capitalized on the new social
agendas by integrating with lower castes and OBGs (for
instance, the Samajwadi Party in Uttar
Pradesh, Rastriya Janata Dal in Bihar, etc.). Meanwhile, other
parties started emerging out of
national parties (for instance, Trinamool Congress in West
Bengal, Tamil Maanila Congress in
Tamil Nadu, Janata Dal in Odisha, etc.) This was also the
decade in which the BJP won its first
state elections having laid regional roots before becoming a
serious contender for power in New
Delhi.

The fourth stage of (1999-2009) the post Congress polity settled
into a more stable system of
national coalition government in New Delhi with the BJP-led
NDA and Congress led UPA
alternating in power. The balance of seats and votes shares
between national and regional parties
had a recognizable pattern. Though the party system
regionalization was increasing the social
participation in India’s democracy, from 1970s to 1990s, social
participation decreased in this
period. Though the overall position of national and regional
parties remain stable, new political
parties keep forming, so the role of regional parties on national
level began to change.
The fifth phase (2009-now) the balance between the position of
regional and national parties is
stable in terms of total seats and votes., there has been shift in
types of regional party represented
in Lok Sabha and there have been changes in the pattern of
national alliance. The importance of
regional parties is that they know what their region needs,
caters to that, and has a longer-term

shift.” (Tillin, 2015).
A significant reflection of regionalization was redrawing the
internal borders to provide regional
linguistic communities like Andhra Pradesh (1953), Karnataka
and Kerala (1956), Gujarat and
Maharasthra (1960) and Haryana and Punjab (1966). The
constitution in India does not require
for any state level referendum or approval of state legislative
assembly to change any state's
borders that allows Delhi to respond flexibly to demands for
recognition and self-governance
made by regionally concentrated linguistic or cultural-
nationalist groups. Linguistic
reorganization also took place in the far northeast in the 1970s
and 1980s to protect the cultural
autonomy of tribal groups. In 2000, Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand
and Uttarakhand were created in the
north-central by BJP-led central government which was possible
because of the decline in upper-
caste dominance that long held back the separation. Since
1950’s state division has been peaceful
and with the consent of the ‘parent’ state. The linguistic
reorganization of state boundaries has

allowed democracy within individual states to be more
pluralistic. When engaging in politics,
people can think of their other identities like caste or religion or
their interests. (Tillin 2017, pp.
67-68).
Importance of Regional Government
Some state governments have because of their political leader
knowing the state, its resources, its
people have benefitted economically.
Patnaik, the chief minister of Odisha, who won the seat in the
parliament in 1997, and became
the CM in 2000, impressed the state’s elite by assembling a
team of accomplished technocrats to
push forward a reformist economic policy, that controlled
runaway spending and encouraged
economic growth. Today, Odisha state’s growth averaged close
to double digit rates throughout
his term. The small state of twenty million people has become
one of the top state destinations

for foreign companies investing in India. Patnaik is focused on
exploiting the state’s local
resources for economic growth, mines to produce iron ore and
bauxite and steel plants to refine
metals.
Modi was the CM of Gujarat (now PM of India) and is known
for aggressively pushing to
develop and industrialize Gujarat. Today, Gujarat generates
about 40% of its income from
industry and 15% nationwide. He is widely admired by
businesspeople for his efforts to attract
investors and disliked by human rights activists who consider
him a Hindu chauvinist complicit
in the riots against the Muslim minority in 2002. (Sharma 2013,
pp. 80-82).
“Modi combines the pragmatic and efficient spirit of Gujarat’s
entrepreneurs with charismatic
and potentially destructive, divisive and bellicose Hindu
nationalism”. (Antholis 2013, pp. 97).
In 2003, Modi launched a trade-oriented confab to market the
state to Indian and foreign
investors and 76 investors that amounted to a sum of $14 billion
in 2003, amounting to 8000

investors in 2011 for $450 billion. The foreign investors are
Ford, Colgate-Palmolive, Procter,
and Gamble, Nestle, Hitachi, Hyundai, etc. Modi uses his
aggressively promotional strategies
making Gujarat’s economy the fourth largest in the country.
Discussion
Federalism has worked out for India. Due to the division of
states, the needs and wants of the
people in the states are being listened by the regional leader and
fulfilled to some extent. Central
government is unable to fulfill the needs all around India, so
having state-based government has
helped develop India’s democracy, because state leaders reside
in the state, know the language,
know its people. The public also feels comfortable when
someone who identifies as them is a
leader. It has helped the public to choose one less identity
(linguistic regionalization) when being
political.

Microeconomics 2302 questions for exam 3
You must send me your answers to all of the questions and I
will grade 6 of your answers.
1.Technology, R & D, and Efficiency.
a. Invention:
i. Thoroughly and completely explain Invention.
Ii .Distinguish between invention as a process and invention as
a result and give2 examples of each.
iii. The case of a slow growth / no growth economy.
1.We live on a planet with finite resources which makes
continued economic growth difficult to maintain. Please
explain how invention as a process and invention as a result
might be impacted by a slow growth /no growth economy.
iv. What can we do to cause Invention to happen in a slow
growth / no growth economy? Be specific.
b.Innovation.
i.What is it?
ii.For eachof thetypes of innovationcovered in the slides and
audio:

1.Provide 2 examples of each (that were not included in the
slides or audio) and explain why these are good examples
ofthose types of innovation.
2.For each of your examples explain how these two types of
innovation were used to drive up profits.
a. Discuss the 2 key factors required to drive up profits (drive
down costs and drive up revenues). Include explanation of how
new products gain customer acceptance, including the
importance of the relationship between price and utility.
iii. The case of a slow growth / no growth economy.
1.Explain how our ability to do process and product innovation
might be impacted by a slow growth / no growth economy, and
what we can do about the problem.
c. Diffusion.
i. Define it,
ii. Explain how it works,
iii. Give 3 examples involving firms that have lead diffusion of
some innovation and why these represent good examples of
diffusion,
iv.The case of a slow growth / no growth economy.1.Discuss
how diffusion might be affected by a slow growth / no growth
economy.
d. You work for Mr.Elon Musk and he has asked you to explain
how his company can determine its optimal level of R&D
spending.

i. Please explain the general concept of optimal level of R & D
spending
ii. List and explain the marginal cost and marginal benefit
components.
1.You have a good list of items in the slide set –just need to
provide explanations of the items.
iii. Explain how the optimal level of R & D spending is
computed.
1.Feel free to use graphs to support your explanation.2.Don’t
forget to let him know that returns are expected, not guaranteed.
2.Technology, R & D, and Efficiency. You are a business
manager for Coca Cola and some new competitive soft drinks
are being introduced with great customer acceptance.
a. Fast second strategy.
i. Explain the fast second strategy.
i. Explain why and how Coke could use the fast second strategy
to increase its economic profit using 2 examples.
b. Explain to your boss how Coke can use the protection
provided by patents, copyrights, and trademarks to increase
their economic profits of the company.
c. i. Discuss what each of the 3 protections apply to, and
d. ii. Discuss how each will help a firm achieve economic
profits.

e. c. Explain to your boss how Coke can use their Brand to
increase their economic profits.
f. i. Discuss the following and how each can be used to increase
a firms’economic profit:
1.Brand-name recognition
2.Brand equity
3.Brand promise
4.Brand personality
d. Explain to your boss how technological advance increases
productive efficiency and allocative efficiency.
1.Discuss the impact of technological advancements on
productive and allocative efficiency.
3.The demand for resources
a. You are an Economics teacher. Please explain to your class
the significance of resource pricing on resource allocation
among firms and industries,
b. Please explain to your class the significance of resource
pricing on the determination of income,
c. Resource pricing impact on firms
i. Explain how resource prices affect the ability of firms to
acquire resources and the subsequent impact on output,
ii. Explain the impact of resources prices on the ability of firms
to minimize costs.

d. Explain to the class the marginal productivity theory of
resource demand and why businesses care about it.
i. State the assumptions.
ii. Explain MRP and MRC, and the firms’ rule for employing
resources. Be sure to explain the terms and what they mean to a
business.
e. Explain the determinants of resource demand.
1.Discuss the 3 determinants of resource demand.1.Changes in
product demand
2.Changes in productivity
a.Quantities of other resources
b.Technological advance
c.Quality of the variable resources
3.Changes in the prices of other resources including:
a.The case of substitute resources–the substitution effect and
the output effect
b.The case of compliments
4.The demand for resources.
a.Please thoroughly explain the following determinants of the
elasticity of resource demand.
i.Ease of resource substitutability

ii.Elasticity of product demand
iii.Ratio of resource cost to total cost
b.Please explain how a firm would determine the optimal
combination of resources required to produce a given level of
output.
5.Government Regulation of business:
a.Regulation
i.List and explain 4 reasons in favor of federal government
regulation of business. Include the economic consequences of
each for the economy and you individually.
ii.List and explain 4 reasons against federal government
regulation of business. Include the economic consequences of
each for the economy and you individually.
b.Explain why the effectiveness of antitrust laws changes
through time. Include the role of politics and elections.
c.Explain Industrial Regulation(purpose,problems, and
economic impacts)
d.Explain Social Regulation(purpose, problems, and economic
impacts)
6.Incomeinequalitya.Please explain 5 factors that have
contributed to increased income inequality since 1969.
b.What are 5 results of the growing income inequality in
America.

c.For each of the items listed above in part b, explain what
might be done to eliminate the problems that cause growing
income inequality.
d.Explain how discrimination reduces domestic output and
income,
i.Look at the items under Discrimination in the notes and
explain how each contributes to the reduction of domestic
output and income.
e.Social Insurance Programs and Public Assistance Programs.
i.Social Insurance
1.What is it?
2.List and explain3 examples of social insurance programs and
what they do for the beneficiaries of each program.
ii.Public Assistance
1.What is it?
2.List and explain 3 examples of public assistance programs and
what they do for the beneficiariesof each program.
iii.Explain the difference between the two types of programs.
f.Discuss the pros and cons of reducing spending on these two
types of programs relative to stimulating economic growth.
i.Some Google research should help with this.
7.On the subject of Poverty

a.Define poverty–check definition in notes, check google as
well
b.What is the most recent Federal Poverty Guideline for a
family of 4?
c.Assume a household of 2 adults working at full time jobs
paying minimum wage, with 2 elementary school age children.
Please create a monthly budget for this family and explain each
budget line item. Remember to take 15% off their gross earning
for taxes. Explain some of the challenges this family will face.
d.When the national unemployment rate was around 4% or less,
please explain why there were so many people living in poverty
in America? Where were they located geographically? Were
race was more likely to be living in poverty? Which gender was
more likely to be living in poverty?
1.A bit of Google research should provide additional
information.
e.Explain 5 things that need to be done to significantly reduce
the number of people in poverty going forward.
8.TheAmerican economy has beenshut down because of the
COVID-19 virus. The unemployment rate was approximately
15%. Assuming that the leadership of the Federal Government
had scientific evidence that the worst is behind us, please
explain in detail how you would restart the national economy.
Focus on what industries you would open, in what order, and
why.I suggest you go to the BEA.GOV website and review the
input output tables to gain some perspective on how industries
interact.
9.Please select a bill currently in congress and provide an
economic impact analysis.

a.Provide a summary of the Bill, including the objective of the
Bill.
b.In your analysis of the Bill
i.Explain who will be helped and how.
ii.Explain who will be hurt and how.
iii.Explain where the money will come from to fund the Bill.
iv.Explain how the money will be spent.
v.Explain the Economic impact of the Bill on the U.S.
Economy.Congress.gov is a good place to start. Please be
thorough in your analysis. Try to think about how the impacts
of this legislation will work its way through our economy and
how it will impact people, businesses, the environment, etc.
What groups of people will be impacted and how? What
industries will be impacted and how? Etc. Be as thorough as
possible. We need to be able to complete this type of analysis
for the crazy stuff congress does, before the bills get passed so
that we can either support them or get them stopped.
A Step Towards Inclusive Federalism in Pakistan? The Politics
of the 18th Amendment
Author(s): Katharine Adeney
Source: Publius, Vol. 42, No. 4 (Fall 2012), pp. 539-565
Published by: Oxford University Press
Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/41682902
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A Step Towards Inclusive Federalism
in Pakistan? The Politics of the 18th
Amendment
Katharine Adeney*
* University of Sheffield; [email protected]
Pakistan's federal structures have been the subject of
controversy since independence. Long-

standing demands for change have been made, particularly
changes to the vertical and horizontal
division of resources and demands for a reorganization of
provinces along ethno-linguistic lines.
The 18th Constitutional Amendment of 2010 introduced major
changes to the federal system,
agreed by consensus. But have these changes gone far enough?
This article analyses the changes
that were made, engaging with debates concerning the wisdom
of creating ethnofederal units,
dividing core groups, as well as the optimal number of units. It
concludes that while major changes
have been made, they have not yet gone far enough. The
diversity of Pakistan should be seen as
a source of federal strength rather than as a weakness.
Pakistani federation suffers from multiple tensions. The
vertical distribution of
powers, the number of provinces, their representation in central
institutions, and
the inequitable distribution of resources have exacerbated
tensions between the
provinces and the center, some of which have taken a violent
turn. Many of these
tensions have assumed an ethnolinguistic nature. Since 1973,
the constitution has
been amended several times, often by military rulers. In 2009,

President Asif Ali
Zardari commissioned a Special Parliamentary Commission on
Constitutional
Reforms (SPCCR) to roll back these amendments. The SPCCR's
report was released
a few months after consensus had been reached on the 7th
National Finance
Commission's (NFC) award. Both reports surprised even
seasoned Pakistani
observers. This was partially because the level of agreement
between rival political
parties and provinces was unprecedented. Observers were also
taken aback because
the changes agreed by the NFC and recommended by the
SPCCR fundamentally
altered many of the privileges of the center and also those of
the Punjab, the
dominant province.
Pakistan's federal system has been subject to little comparative
scrutiny, partly
because of Pakistan's weak democratic credentials. Exceptions
include Ursula Hicks
(1978), Katharine Adeney (2007) and Harihar Bhattacharya
(2010). Hicks was
Publius: The Journal of Federalism volume 42 number 4, pp.
539-565
doi:10.1093/publius/pjr055
Advance Access publication February 23, 2012

©The Author 2012. Published by Oxford University Press on
behalf of CSF Associates: Publius, Inc.
All rights reserved. For permissions, please email:
[email protected]
2019 22:21:58 UTC
540 K. Adeney
writing shortly after the secession of Bangladesh and was
focused on the reasons
for the failure of the pre- 1971 federation, while Adeney and
Bhattacharya were
concerned with the management of diversity through federal
structures within
Pakistan from a historical and comparative perspective. In
contrast, the current
article deals with contemporary developments in the federal
system which address
many of the structural problems in Pakistan's federation
identified by all three
authors. Many other authors on federalism have refused to
accept democratically
challenged states as true federations (Chryssochoou 1998;
McGarry and O'Leary
1993; Riker 1964). It cannot be denied that federal structures in
Pakistan have been

undermined by military rulers and that political structures in
Pakistan have tended
to be weakly institutionalized (Waseem 1994). But the many
different federal
configurations adopted in Pakistan have affected relations
between the center and
the provinces, inter-provincial relations, and intra-provincial
relations, regardless
of whether or not elected politicians have formally held the
reins of power.
The allegiance of different ethnolinguistic groups to the center
varies markedly.
Although this author contends that predictions of Pakistan's
break up are
overplayed,1 the historical structure of the federation and the
manner by which the
center has distributed political and economic resources to
different provinces and
between different groups has affected the legitimacy of the
federation and increased
conflict between certain groups and the center. The promotion
of more inclusive
structures and attitudes is therefore vital, in order to reduce
these conflicts, many
of which have taken a violent turn, in particular in Balochistan.
This article will first set out the debates surrounding federal
design in divided
societies and discuss the Pakistani experience. Such an account

is essential to
contextualize the significance of the changes introduced by the
7th NFC, agreed in
December 2009, and the 18th Amendment, signed into law by
President Zardari on
the 19th of April 2010. The discussion will pay particular
attention to the increase
in powers and resources of the provinces, as well as the
"ethnicization" of elements
of the federation through the renaming of NWFP to Khyber
Pakhtunkhwa (KP)
and the adoption of provisions to redress the
underrepresentation of certain groups
in state institutions. It will conclude by discussing the
remaining challenges facing
Pakistan's federation and the likelihood of successful
implementation.2
Managing Diversity Through Federal Systems
Contemporary debates in Iraq, Nepal, and Sudan demonstrate
that the concerns
over federalism as an appropriate system of government for
divided societies, ar-
ticulated by Nordlinger (1972, 32), remain. Although the
examples given above are
postconflict societies, the worries expressed by academics and
policymakers about
the effectiveness of federalism as a conflict management
institution for divided
societies are pertinent for Pakistan. In the comparative
federalism literature,

2019 22:21:58 UTC
Inclusive Federalism in Pakistan 541
concern is often expressed that creating self-governing
structures for territorially
concentrated groups, where "at least one constituent territorial
governance unit is
intentionally associated with a specific ethnic category" (Hale
2004, 167), will
increase the desire for separation from the central government,
and provide groups
with the institutional resources to effect this change
(Nordlinger 1972; Vile 1982).
Philip Roeder has recently argued that "(e)thnofederal . . .
institutions tend to create
or to keep alive conflicts in which the issue is not simply about
rights of different
ethnic communities within a common-state, but whether the
communities even
belong in a common-state at all" (2009, 208). Similarly, Henry
Hale has noted that
those ethnofederations with a core ethnic region (those
containing "either an

outright majority of the population or mak[ing] up at least 20
percent more of the
whole country's population than does the second largest
region") are likely to be
less stable (2004, 169). However, Hale's conclusions are more
optimistic than
Roeder's - noting that many ethnofederations have survived if
they have not had a
core ethnic region (author's emphasis) (although many have
experienced serious
tensions) (2004, 181).
Even those sympathetic to the federal model as a means of
managing diversity in
some divided societies, notably John McGarry and Brendan
O'Leary, accept that
"pluri-nationgl federations make it easier for groups to secede
should they want to
do so" (author's emphasis) (2009, 6). The highlighted section of
the quote is the
pertinent part. Not all ethno/pluri-national federal systems have
failed. Federal
structures may be successful in creating dual loyalties (to the
center and to the
unit) through increasing a sense of security.3 India has been
the prime example
where the reorganization of states around ethnonational (in this
case ethno-
linguistic) criteria has, rather than increasing pressure for
secession, furthered
national integration. But India is not the only example where
ethno/pluri-
federalism survives. Others include Spain, Canada, Nigeria,
Belgium, Ethiopia,
Russia, Switzerland, Iraq, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and indeed

Pakistan itself, albeit
many with tensions.4 Federations differ in design and the
argument in this article is
that success or otherwise of a particular federal system in terms
of managing
diversity depends on its design, regardless of whether it is an
ethno/pluri-
federation. Differences in design include the number of units
within a federation,
whether a core group is divided, whether groups are given
formal or informal
access to decision-making institutions of state (noting that
giving groups territorial
autonomy does not automatically give them a stake in the wider
state), the division
of powers and the allocation of resources to manage these
powers.
Pakistan's 1973 Constitution was written after the secession of
Bangladesh.
Many of the demands of the opposition were accommodated
and it was designed
to be inclusive. Unlike its predecessors, the 1973 Constitution
created a bicameral
legislature. The Senate is "demos-constraining" (Stepan 1999),
with the four prov-
inces of the federation represented equally with fourteen seats
apiece. In addition,
2019 22:21:58 UTC

542 K. Adeney
Map 1 Provinces of Pakistan
there are eight seats for the Federally Administered Tribal
Areas (FATA) and four
for the Islamabad Capital Territory (ICT).5 FATA is
administered directly from the
centre. Executive authority is exercised by the President on the
advice of the Prime
Minister and no act of Parliament applies to FATA unless the
President so directs.
Gilgit Baltistan (formerly the Federally Administered Northern
Areas) and Azad
Kashmir do not have representation in the central legislature as
their status is in
flux pending a resolution of the conflict with India over the
status of Kashmir.
They both possess elected assemblies, but are subject to more
central direction and
control than the four provinces.6 In common with most other
federations,
Pakistan's National Assembly (NA) is elected on the basis of
population - giving
one province, the Punjab, a majority of seats within this
chamber. The distribution
of seats institutionalizes the dominance of a core ethnic region
at the heart of the
2019 22:21:58 UTC

federation.7 As of the 1998 census, the most recent census
available, Punjab's
population was 55.6 percent of Pakistan's total, although its
total land area covers
just over a quarter of the territory. Its population is over 20
percent larger than the
next largest province, Sindh, with 23 percent of Pakistan's
population. A 2005
international report estimated Punjab produced 57 percent of
Pakistan's GDP
(Asian Development Bank et al. 2005).
By Hale's criteria Punjab is a core region. Hale argues that
federations with
core regions are less likely to be stable and this has indeed
proved to be the case in
Pakistan. The three smaller provinces begrudge the fact that
Punjab has the
majority of seats in the NA and has benefited from the lion's
share of financial
resources (allocated since 1971 on the basis of population). In
addition, the fact
that Punjab possesses the majority of seats in the NA has meant
that any political
party seeking to come to power in Pakistan has to be mindful of
the Punjab vote
bank. The need to appease this vote bank has historically

prevented political parties
such as the Pakistan People's Party (PPP) from pressing for
changes in the federal
structures that would benefit the other provinces. Although
these tensions have not
resulted in serious threats to the unity of Pakistan since the
secession of Bangladesh
in 1971, they have resulted in numerous conflicts, notably in
Balochistan, but also
in other provinces.
The concern to reduce Punjab's dominance is often linked to
the wider debate
concerning the number of units within federal systems. There is
some evidence to
suggest that a larger number of units is beneficial for federal
stability (Vile 1982;
Watts 1999; Adeney 2007, 171-172, 191-192), although the
relationship is not
causal and there are notable exceptions, e.g., the Soviet Union.
A larger number of
units is more likely to result in the core region being divided
(as in India with
Hindi speakers, the Hausa Fulani in Nigeria, or German
speakers in Switzerland).
As Hale has argued, the "existence of a single core ethnic
region can ... be parti-

cularly threatening to minority republics . . . strengthening the
bargaining position
of the core group." If this core group is divided into multiple
regions, "high
hurdles to collective action" on the parts of this core region are
introduced (Hale
2004, 174-176), potentially increasing the sense of security for
smaller regions.
In addition, a federation with a larger number of units is more
likely to experience
changing coalitions of interests on different issues and reduce
the antagonism
that is likely to arise between a smaller number of units,
especially in bipolar
federations (Adeney 2007, 171-172).8 In 1973, Pakistan
created a federation with
four provincial units. The relatively small number of units in
Pakistan
compounded the tensions caused by the existence of a core
ethnic region and
the underrepresentation of certain groups in the core
institutions of state.
As such, there are long-standing demands for the division of
Punjab along ethnic
lines.
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544 K. Adeney

It must also be noted that although federalism divides
sovereignty between levels
of government, there is nothing about federal systems that
guarantees groups access
to central power. Nondominant groups may not have their
interests protected in a
federal system, even though they may be in a majority in a unit.
The debate
between majoritarian and consociational federations has been a
long-standing one
(Lijphart 1979; McGarry and O'Leary 2007). Although
consociational forms of
government have been subjected to many criticisms (Barry
1975; Horowitz 2002),
the inclusion of major groups at the center in a federation is a
mechanism that can
enhance their security and therefore promote harmonious
relations between
groups. Their inclusion may be facilitated by formal power
sharing mechanisms as
in Switzerland, or informal power sharing as in Canada and
India. The importance
of central representation depends to some extent on the
division of powers. In a
decentralized federation, where a high degree of financial and
cultural powers
reside with the units of the federation, control of, and
representation in, the center
is less important than in a centralized federation such as

Pakistan, which has a core
ethnic region and a small number of units. In addition,
representation in the core
institutions of a federal state is crucial for a group to have its
interests protected.
Again, this representation can be formal, as in Belgium (Brans
and Hondeghem
1999, 136), or informal, as in India (Potter 1996, 215).
Since 1971, Pakistan has survived as a federation and is in no
danger of
splitting up. But there exist many serious tensions. First of
these are the major
resentments concerning the allocation of revenues from the
exploitation of
natural resources. Challenges to the construction of hydro-
electric dams and the
receipt of revenues generated from their operation are a key
demand of KP in
whose territory many of these dams are located. As in many
other areas of
central and southern Asia water issues are controversial. Sindh
is aggrieved that
Punjab gets the lion's share of the water from the Indus for
irrigation. Provinces
such as Balochistan have also resented the fact that the natural
resources such as
oil and gas located within their borders have not financially
benefitted the
province (as the revenue from their extraction has been
allocated to the center

and the gas heats homes and businesses in provinces other than
Balochistan)
(Tahir 2009). 9
Second, these issues are connected with the lack of
representation at the center,
particularly of Balochis and Sindhis. These issues have an
impact on how groups
view the federation and the Punjab. At the time of
independence the Pakistani elite
pursued an integrationist strategy of national integration. Islam
was prioritized as
the unifying identity and regional and linguistic differences
were de-legitimized
(Adeney 2007, 99-104). However, in practice, some groups
were privileged in terms
of their access to, and representation in, the core institutions of
state (Adeney
2009). Representation in the army and the bureaucracy, which
are two core
institutions of the state in Pakistan, are ethnically skewed in
favor of Punjabis (and
2019 22:21:58 UTC
Map 2 Ethnolinguistic Composition of Pakistan

Notes: This map has been compiled from the 1998 district-level
census reports. Districts have been
coded according to the largest group within the district. In the
overwhelming majority of cases,
this group was also a majority of the population in that district.
Publicly available census data on
language does not exist for Azad Kashmir and Gilgit Baltistan -
hence the decision to leave them
blank. The "others" in KP are two separate groups: Hindko
speakers (in the northeast of the
province) and Khowar speakers (in the north of the province)
less so in favor of Pakhtuns in the army, and Mohajirs in the
bureaucracy)
(Kennedy 1987; Siddiqa 2007). Anti-Punjab feelings are high,
amid talk of the
"Punjabi empire."10
Third, and equally importantl y, the south of Punjab is much
less developed
than the rest of the province. This inequity in development has
contributed to
the demand for the creation of a Seraiki province. Seraiki is a
distinct language
(and is now categorized as such in the census, despite claims
that it is "only a
2019 22:21:58 UTC

546 K. Adeney
dialect" of Punjabi).11 Other provinces are also not particularly
homogeneous as
Map Two demonstrates. There are tensions within and between
the urban areas of
Sindh, particularly Karachi and the rest of the province. These
tensions were most
violent in the 1980s and 1990s but continue to flare up
(Harrison 1991; Kennedy
1984; Wright 1991). Other tensions concern the division in
Balochistan between
Balochi and Brahvi speakers and Pashto speakers.12 Many of
the latter support a
political party demanding either the merger of the Pashto
speaking areas with KP,
or the creation of a separate Pashto speaking province from the
Pashto speaking
areas of Balochistan.
These tensions have undermined the legitimacy of the Pakistani
state in parts of
its territory. The State of Democracy in South Asia Survey
reported very different
levels of allegiance to Pakistan among different ethnolinguistic
groups (SDSA 2008,
255-261). It is no coincidence that many of the areas of
Pakistan which are
seriously underdeveloped (and often have lower levels of
allegiance to the Pakistani
state) are those in which Islamic extremist organizations have
secured support.

The situation in FATA is well known, but the same applies to
areas of Balochistan,
and (less well known) to southern Punjab. Southern Punjab is
the area from which
demands for a Seraiki speaking province have been made
(Rumi 2010). Although
the issue of Islamic extremism in Pakistan is beyond the scope
of the article,
it underlines the importance of creating a more inclusive state,
of which a more
balanced federal set up is an important part. The
recommendations of the SPCCR
must be seen in this context.
The 7th NFC and the 18th Amendment
The twenty-seven member SPCCR was set up after consultation
with leaders of all
political parties with representation in the federal parliament.
The larger parties had
fewer representatives than their party strength allowed,
ensuring that the smaller
parties received representation. The terms of the reference of
the SPCCR were
to "propose amendments to the Constitution keeping in view
the 17th Amendment,
Charter of Democracy (CoD) and provincial autonomy, in order
to meet the
democratic and Islamic aspirations of the people of Pakistan"
(SPCCR 2010). Two of

the nine criteria which informed the SPCCR's deliberations
were "strengthening
Parliament and Provincial Assemblies" and "Provincial
Autonomy." The 133-page
report was submitted in April 2010. The SPCCR recommended
changes to
ninety-seven articles, many increasing provincial autonomy,
although the concern to
rewrite the constitution to reverse the changes made by
Musharraf s Legal Framework
Order was paramount. The efficiency of the process has been
remarked upon not only
by academics (e.g., Gazdar 2010) but also politicians. There
was awareness by the
leaders of political parties of the dangers of returning to the
politics of the 1990s,
where politicians co-opted the army to undermine their
political opponents.
2019 22:21:58 UTC
Politicians appreciated that the short-term political gains of
army intervention
against their political opponents was outweighed by the
weakening of the
democratic process. To maintain consensus, parties agreed not
to "oppose the

Committee's decision . . . (but would) reiterate their stated
position without
prejudice to the Committee decision, through a note to be
called, 'a Note of
Réitération"' - eleven were submitted. Although there were
constraints on the
SPCCR imposed by the army, notably with regard to
recommendations concerning
FATA, the army assumed that the politicians would not be able
to reach consensus,
thus explaining the relative freedom of the Commission.13 The
18th Amendment
Bill was passed unanimously by both houses of parliament and
was signed into law
by President Zardari later that month.
This article concentrates on the changes introduced by the 18th
Amendment
that were important for the management of diversity within the
Pakistan
federation. These include the increase in provincial powers, the
change in formula
for the vertical and horizontal distribution of resources, and the
increased
ethnicization of the federation. Interestingly, many of these
changes escaped public
notice - journalists were more concerned with the reduction in
the power of the
president vis-à-vis the parliament and the conflicts between

parliament and the
judiciary.14
The Increase in Provincial Powers and Resources
One of the changes that has excited interest in Pakistan has
been the abolition of the
Concurrent List. Long-standing demands for the abolition of
the Concurrent List have
existed (because the center could override provincial
legislation on all subjects listed
on it). Federations divide sovereignty, but different federations
do so in different ways.
Under the 1973 constitution, the Federal Legislative List (FLL)
had sixty-seven
subjects; the Concurrent List (over which both center and
provinces could enact
legislation) had forty-seven. All other powers resided with the
provinces. Ian Talbot
rightly comments that this constitution "granted more
autonomy to the provinces
than any previous" (2009, 229). However, the provision that
any legislation enacted by
the Center on a subject on which it was competent to legislate
would prevail over an
Act of a Provincial Assembly (Article 143) reveals the true
locus of power, as the

Centre also prevailed on items on the Concurrent List.
Although no documentary
record exists, many have alleged that Zulfikar Ali Bhutto
promised the Balochi leader
Bizenjo that within ten years of the promulgation of the 1973
constitution, all powers
on the Concurrent List would reside in the provinces. Demands
for the abolition of
the Concurrent List were therefore long-standing among many
of the smaller
provinces in Pakistan before the recent changes.
After the adoption of the 18th Amendment, the Pakistan
Constitution contains
only one list - the FLL, divided into two parts. Part I contains
subjects that the
2019 22:21:58 UTC
548 K. Adeney
Federal Government solely controls. Part II contains subjects
that also come under
the purview of the Council of Common Interests (CCI), whose
duty is to "promote

joint supervision of Federal resources and collective dispute
management," as well
as to take decisions on any controversial issues referred to
them (SPCCR 2010).
The vast majority of powers on the Concurrent List have now
been allocated to
the provinces, requiring the devolution of seventeen ministries
from the center.15
Residual powers remain with the provinces. These changes will
require a large
increase in provincial resources. As will be discussed below,
there are real concerns
about provincial capacity to manage these powers, in terms of
both human and
financial capital.
In December 2009, a few months before the SPCCR made its
recommendation
on the abolition of the Concurrent List, the 7th NFC increased
the amount of
resources available to the provinces. In 2006, Mohammad
Zubair Khan calculated
that the federal government generated about 93 percent of the
resources of the
federation, while its expenditure accounted for 72 percent
(cited in Ahmed,
Mustafa, and Khalid 2007, 12). In the previous NFC Award
(imposed by Musharraf
because of a lack of consensus in 2006), 45 percent of the
divisible pool (which
includes all taxes) was allocated to the provincial governments
(Ahmed, Mustafa,

and Khalid 2007, 9). In contrast, the 7th NFC provided that
from 2011, 57.5
percent should be allocated to the provinces and 42.5 percent to
the center. This
was a sizeable increase. The 18th Amendment went one step
further and provided
that the provinces shall be given a greater share in the
distribution of resources
between the center and the provinces and also that "the share of
the Provinces in
each Award of National Finance Commission shall not be less
than the share given
to the Provinces in the previous Award" (author's emphasis)
(Article 160 3A). The
changes to the distribution of resources are important, for
symbolic as well as
financial reasons. In 2010, Hafiz Pasha calculated that almost
Rs 300 billion would
be added to the four provincial budgets as a result of larger
federal transfers; Rs 178
billion more than if the formula under Musharraf had been
continued (2010).
However, although "the share of provincial governments in
public expenditures
will rise from 30 percent to almost 36 percent," this is still
comparatively low in
relation to other federal systems. In Switzerland, Canada,
Belgium, and Germany,

the provincial governments spend 60-70 percent. In most
federations, provincial
spending is between 45 and 55 percent (including India, the
United States, Spain,
and Mexico). Pakistan is therefore still comparatively
centralized along fiscal lines
among federations (Anderson 2010, 17; Pasha 2010). In
addition, since the NFC
was signed there has been a decrease in tax revenues received
by the center - thus
reducing the absolute amount that can be distributed to the
provincial
governments (Government of Pakistan 2011, Ch. 1). The
implications of the
latter are discussed below.
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The 18th Amendment also sought to redress the concerns of
Balochistan,
allowing the Balochi representatives on the SPCCR to sign the
report.16 Before the
passing of the 18th Amendment, all "lands, minerals and other
things of value
within the continental shelf. . .were [vested] in the Federal

Government." Revised
Article 172 now provides that "mineral oil and natural gas
within the Province or
the territorial waters adjacent thereto shall vest jointly and
equally in that Province
and the Federal Government." The revised Article substantially
increases the
resource base of provinces with natural resources - most areas
of which reside
outside the Punjab. Revised Article 157 also provides that the
Federal Government
must now consult a provincial government before constructing
hydro-electric
power stations within its territory. This goes some way to
appeasing the demands
of provinces such as KP, but fails to satisfy those downstream
of such constructions.17
The significance of these changes should not be
underestimated. As Asma Jahangir,
now chair of the Supreme Court Bar Association of Pakistan
and the Human
Rights Commission of Pakistan has noted, these changes strike
"at the heart of
institutions that feed on the largess of the federal government"
- a not so subtle
reference to the army (2010).
The Horizontal Distribution of Resources

One of the major tensions within Pakistan that has had
implications for the affinity
of groups with the Pakistani state concerns the way that
resources are distributed
between the provinces. Since 1973, and unusually for a federal
system, resources
have been distributed solely according to population,
benefitting the province of
Punjab (Jalal 1999, 220). 18 Much of Punjab is already very
developed and urbanized
compared to other provinces. The other provinces have long
argued that allocating
resources according to population is grossly unfair. Sindh has
argued that
allocations should be made on the basis of the provinces'
contribution to national
revenues - Sindh benefits from Karachi's status as Pakistan's
major port (Ahmad
2010b, 18). Both KP and Balochistan have argued that
"backwardness" (and
inverse population density in Balochistan) should form part of
the criteria. These
calls for change were previously resisted by the NFC.
The 7th NFC went a long way to addressing these concerns.
The revised formula
provided that 82 percent of resources allocated to the provinces

was distributed
according to population, 10.3 percent for
poverty/backwardness, 5 percent for
revenue generation and collection, and 2.7 percent for inverse
population density.
The revised formula resulted in a 5.6 percent reduction of the
share of Punjab
from the last consensus award of 1996. Punjab received 51.7
percent, there was a
1.3 percent increase in Sindh's allocation to 24.6 percent, a 1.1
percent increase in
KP's share to 14.6 percent,19 and a 3.8 percent increase in
Balochistan's share to 9.1
percent (The Nation 2010).
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550 K. Adeney
I.A. Rehman, an astute observer of Pakistan's politics, gives
credit for agreement
over the revised formula to Punjab politicians, even going as
far to name Chief
Minister Shahbaz Sharif of the PML-N who
informed the finance ministers of the three other provinces that
Punjab was

prepared to examine alternatives to the traditionally followed
formula. It is to
the credit of the Punjab government that it successfully resisted
the opposition
to any alteration in the old formula, especially from some
ostriches among
economic experts and bureaucrats (2009).
However, Punjab was enabled to compromise through a change
in sequencing
within the NFC. Unlike in previous awards, agreement was
reached on the formula
for the horizontal division of resources before that on the
vertical division. Thus,
"Punjab was brought around by the Federal Finance Minister's
assurance that the
Center would compensate Punjab for its absolute loss."20 The
changes to the
allocation of natural resource revenue also, in the eyes of many
Punjabi politicians,
stood to hit the center rather than the Punjab.
Ethnicization
The Pakistani state after independence sought to unify the
country around Islam
(although Pakistan has never been a theocratic state) (Adeney
2007, 99-104). The

Pakistani power elite, traditionally termed the "Establishment,"
eschewed any
recognition of ethnolinguistic identity, the recognition that
provinces could adopt
provincial languages in 1973 being the sole exception.
Therefore the renaming of
NWFP to KP is a major development. Formerly part of the
Punjab, NWFP was
carved out as a security buffer against potential Russian
expansion in 1901 by the
British. They created a predominantly Pushto-speaking state,
with significant
Hazara minorities in the northeast of the province, as can be
seen in Map Two.
Ever since independence, demands have been made by
Pakhtuns for the renaming
of the province to Pushtoonistan or Pakhtunistan. The demand
was fiercely resisted
by the center, ever fearful of legitimizing ethnic claims for
recognition. The demand
for the name change did not feature in the Charter of
Democracy, signed between
Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif in 2006, but it was a
manifesto commitment of
the Awami National Party (ANP). The change of name reflects
the importance of
coalition politics and the real importance attached to consensus
and bargaining by

the SPCCR (Asghar 2010; Hindustan Times 2010).21 It was
said at the time that the
ANP only secured a partial victory because the word "Khyber"
was inserted before
Pakhtunkhwa to reinforce the territorial nature of the name. In
fact, given the
ANP's demands for FATA to be joined to KP, the inclusion of
"Khyber" may
bolster their claims to FATA.22
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The renaming of the province prompted immediate conflict,
with the Hazara
community of KP demanding their own province23 [supported
by the Pakistan
Muslim League (Nawaz) (PML-N) and the Pakistan Muslim
League (Quaid)
(PML-Q)] (2009). Several people died in the violence that
followed. The name
change has been popular in much of Pakistan. As one
respondent opined: "[a]t
last, after 63 years, a province, which was nameless and was
called by its directions,
now got its proper name."24 Another commented "[w]hy don't

we call Alaska,
NWFP?"25 However, the change has also been controversial,
some charging that "it
will only create further disunity in Pakistan," pointing to the
conflict with the
Hazara linguistic group in the province and asking why the
province was not
renamed as "Hazara-Pakhtunkhwa."26
The second change introduced by the 18th Amendment
concerns the attempt
to redress the well-documented under-representation of certain
groups in the core
institutions of state such as the army and bureaucracy, one of
the major causes of
ethnic tensions in Pakistan since independence (Kennedy 1984;
Siddiqa 2011b).
Steven Wilkinson has correctly argued that Pakistan's quota
politics have been
a major cause for conflict between different ethnolinguistic
groups (2000, 221).
But much of the tension relating to inequitable representation
in the bureaucracy
revolves around the fact that these quotas are provincial rather
than ethnic, contrary
to Wilkinson's contention. One of the grievances of Balochis
and Sindhis has
been that more educated Punjabis have moved into "their"
provinces and are
able to avail themselves of the provincial quota, at the expense
of Balochis and

Sindhis. The 18th Amendment recognized these tensions, and
Article 27 of the
constitution now provides "that under-representation of any
class or area in the
service of Pakistan may be redressed in such manner as may be
determined
by . . . Parliament." It remains to be seen how this redress will
work in practice -
especially as it concerns intervention in the internal
recruitment practices of the
army. In interviews with the author in 2007 several retired
officers argued that the
recruitment strategies were becoming more inclusive (this
strategy has recently been
confirmed by Ayesha Siddiqa [2011b]). In addition, formal
recognition that
under-representation of certain groups is a political issue is an
important
milestone. As noted above, lessons from other federal systems
demonstrate the
importance of inclusion in the core institutions of state -
territorial autonomy is
not sufficient for stability.
Explanations for the Compromise
The fact that politicians, especially those hailing from the
Punjab, were willing to
compromise and were able to do so despite the opposition from
the military and

civil bureaucracy is encouraging. They were willing to include
the smaller political
parties on the SPCCR, and just as importantly, take their
demands into account.27
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552 K. Adeney
There are several explanations for the compromises made,
especially from the
politicians representing the Punjab. The primary explanation is
that, as noted,
although the horizontal distribution of resources was amended,
Punjab was assured
it would be compensated by increased revenue transfers from
the center. The
changes to the allocation of natural resource revenue also, in
the eyes of many
Punjabi politicians, stood to hit the center rather than the
Punjab. Several recent
commissions of the Center have recommended that Balochistan
receive increased
resources and the political space provided by the departure of
Musharraf in 2008
has provided an opportunity to put these recommendations into
effect.
A less charitable explanation, but one that unfortunately carries
weight, is that

Punjabi politicians expected little to change from the 18th
Amendment; "[t]hey
know that agreeing to something does not always mean actually
doing it."28 There
are major problems with implementation that have yet to be
addressed and given
that Punjabis dominate the bureaucracy, "manipulai [ing] the
implementation" was
an option.29 In addition, even if we take a more optimistic
view, to think that
Punjab's position will decline vis-à-vis the other provinces is
dubious. It is the most
educated and developed province, dominating "political,
intellectual and religious
discourse." As one Pakistani professor of politics argued, "I do
not believe that
Punjab's position will decline. Politicians of Punjab think the
same way."30
Finally, it was becoming increasingly difficult for Punjabi
politicians and those
in the coalition at the center to dismiss the long-standing
grievances of the other
provinces, especially in the new mindset of democratic
compromise. Politicians
"were left with little choice under the overall rubric of
'reconciliation' otherwise
risking being charged as being 'bloody minded'."31 However,
in the absence of the

promised compensation for Punjab, agreement would have been
much less likely. It
is important to note that the compromises made, although
ostensibly undermining
the power of the Punjab, are likely to strengthen the loyalty of
people in the smaller
provinces to Pakistan. Therefore, the reworking of the federal
compact can be seen
as benefitting the Punjab through creating a stronger and more
stable federation:
"they realize that in the long term their destiny is intertwined
with the well being
of the rest of Pakistan."32 Although there has historically been
a concern in
Pakistan that stronger provinces mean a weaker center, this
perception is slowly
changing. Once stronger provinces are not seen to be as much
of a threat, "any
easing of tensions arising from the 18th Amendment will be to
[Punjab's]
advantage as the core province of the Pakistani state."33
Everything Must Change to Stay the Same?
This article concludes with an assessment of the potential of
these changes for the
management of diversity within Pakistan in a comparative
context. Asma Jahangir
observed that the "amendments may face obstructions - not for

their weaknesses
2019 22:21:58 UTC
but for their strength" (2010). Her colleague, I. A. Rehman,
concurred, arguing
that the reforms, despite falling short of some expectations are
a major leap
forward (2010). As noted, the army was not expecting the
politicians to be able to
reach a consensus on these issues and major changes, both
symbolic and practical
were adopted.
The first question is whether the much-heralded transfer of
responsibilities
following the abolition of the concurrent list will bring about
good government and
a sense of inclusion? One of the claims made by advocates of
federalism is that it
brings government closer to the people affected by it.
Devolution of responsibilities
has the potential to increase the efficiency of service delivery
and thus increase
certain group's affinity to the state. Although not a federal

system, Bolivia's
experiences with decentralization were premised on "giving
voice to the
disadvantaged people who saw little benefit during extended
periods of centralized
rule" (Ahmad 2010a, 14). A similar outcome is possible in
Pakistan; the changes
are likely to increase affinity with the center. However, there
are few grounds for
optimism in the short to medium term regarding service
delivery. Although
seventeen ministries have been devolved to the provinces,
adequate resources have
not been devolved to finance these responsibilities, and central
revenues have
declined as a result of a lower revenue trajectory than forecast
at the time the
NFC was signed (Ghaus Pasha 2010). This has resulted in Rs
36 billion less than
predicted being transferred to the provinces (Government of
Pakistan 2011).
To counter this, provinces need to raise substantially greater
amounts of their own
revenue. To date they have lacked the political will and the
capacity to do this,
although the Punjab is better positioned in this regard.
As a recent article in Dawn (2011) noted "[i]n a sense the new
NFC award has
taken away the [provinces'] incentive to generate provincial
taxes given that they
stand to get much higher shares from federal divisible pool

without putting in their
own efforts." The abolition of the concurrent list does pose
serious questions about
the capacity of the provincial governments to deliver services,
as argued by Senator
S. M. Zafar in his note of reiteration to the SPCCR (and also
Sethi 2010; Almedia
2010). Previously, it had been estimated that the Federal
Government was spending
Rs 190 billion on subjects that had fallen under the concurrent
list and that a large
amount of resources would have to be transferred to the
provinces (Haider 2009).
As Ehtisham Ahmad reminds us, the "18th Amendment
reiterated the right of the
provinces to administer the GST [General Sales Tax] on
services" (2010a, 25).
However, as the logistics of collecting this tax are enormous,
Ahmad argues that it
would not be surprising if the amount of revenue collected
from this source
declined (2010b, 18). There are also human resource issues;
will the central
expertise effectively devolve to the provinces? Although
provinces cannot develop
capacity to deliver these services unless they are given an
opportunity to do so,
there is a real challenge posed by the radical extent of the
devolution.
2019 22:21:58 UTC

554 K. Adeney
All the above has potentially negative implications for service
delivery. But to
what extent will it increase (or decrease) conflicts within
Pakistan's federal system?
As discussed, some provinces are less developed than others,
and some areas of
provinces are less developed than others (e.g., southern
Punjab). Despite the
reduction in Punjab's share, it will continue to be dominant as
its "economic base
is much deeper than the other provinces, and its ability to raise
its own resources is
comparatively greater."34 It is a reasonable assumption that
provinces like
Balochistan will struggle to deliver services as a result of weak
infrastructure.
Although Balochistan has a greatly increased income stream,
the condition of its
people, already impoverished and underdeveloped, may not
improve. It is difficult
to be optimistic, especially in the short to medium term. One
respondent opined
that the resource-rich provinces such as Balochistan are likely
to see their newly
found wealth absorbed by companies or state agencies with

Baloch "front men."35
Obviously, these are wider issues that cannot be solely
addressed through federal
reform.
The second question relates to the issue of the small number of
provinces. With
the majority of the population living within one "core"
province, the small number
is likely to continue to be a force for federal instability. Ahsan
Iqbal, Information
Secretary for the PML-N noted that the SPCCR "unanimously
decided that, at
present, it is not feasible to open the scheme of present
provinces. Therefore, no
new province was recommended" (Piracha 2010). IqbaFs
observation was
confirmed by the author's discussions with politicians involved
in the process in
April 2010. The issue is a controversial one and to have tried to
resolve the issues
relating to provincial reorganization, even in the context of the
radical changes
that were adopted in the 18th Amendment, could have derail ed
the process and
possibly even the democratic transition. Many believe that
there are more pressing
issues facing Pakistan.36 A Gallup poll conducted in October
2010 reported
that 67 percent of Pakistanis opposed the creation of more
provinces (Gallup

Pakistan 2011).
However, a member of the SPCCR, Senator Zafar of the PML-
Q, lamented that
this was a lost opportunity, and others have expressed regret
that the opportunity
was not taken to facilitate the future creation of more provinces
through changing
Article 239(4).37 Article 239(4) states that any bill seeking to
alter the limits of a
Province needs to have "been passed by the Provincial
Assembly of that Province
by the votes of not less than two-thirds of its total
membership." This provision
places almost insurmountable obstacles to the creation of new
provinces, which are
not supported by both the majority and the minority
ethnolinguistic group in a
province. One of the reasons for the permissive nature of the
Indian constitution
relating to the creation of new states was precisely to allow the
federation to be
adaptive (it currently has twenty-eight states, plus seven Union
Territories). The
provisions of Article 3 of the Indian constitution have been
seen as a positive
2019 22:21:58 UTC

example by some of the smaller provinces, notably Balochistan
and Sindh, but less
so by the Punjab. The 2011 Gallup poll results when
disaggregated by province
"revealed that Sindh and Balochistan (43% each) showed more
support for the
creation of more provinces followed by Khyber Pakhtoonkhwa
(33%) and Punjab
(28%)" (Gallup Pakistan 2011).
It would be possible to make provinces more linguistically
homogeneous
through reorganization as Map Two demonstrates. Examples
include the creation
of a Seraiki-speaking province from southern Punjab and a
district of KP,
a Hindko speaking province from areas of northeast KP, the
merger of the
Pashto-speaking population in the north of Balochistan to KP,
or for the
creation of a separate Pashto-speaking province [as variously
articulated by the
Pakhtoonkhwa Milli Awami Party (PKMAP)]. Calls for the
creation of a Seraiki
province are re-emerging (although those demands have been
long standing, they
have increased in volume in the last three years) and have
recently received support
from the PPP and the PML-Q (Ahmed 20 10). 38 The ANP, a
coalition partner
in the current governing coalition demands that FATA be

incorporated into
KP. Many in FATA have expressed a desire for independent
provincial status
( Dawn 2010). There have been calls for the normalization of
relations between
FATA and the rest of Pakistan for some time (e.g., Grare
2007), although the army
had pressed for the exclusion of the consideration of FATA in
the SPCCR, for
operational reasons.
How will the refusal to entertain a reorganization of provinces
in Pakistan affect
the management of diversity? A division of provinces,
particularly the creation of a
new province from the Punjab, has been mooted as a solution to
the dominance,
perceived and actual, of that province (Langah 2011). The
province of Punjab has
traditionally been the main recruiting ground for the army and
bureaucracy.
Resources have flowed to these areas, and dividing the
province would in all
likelihood mean a significant reduction in resources, much
more so than the
current reformulation of the NFC has done. It would also
fragment its voting
power in the NA. Opposition to the division of the Punjab from
vested interests is
therefore understandable. But the opposition is wider. The
issue of dividing
provinces is extremely controversial elsewhere in Pakistan.39

Sindhis, including
Sindhi supporters of the PPP, have also opposed division. Their
lukewarm support
for the Seraiki cause is partially explicable by the desire to
maintain votes in the
Punjab heartland. But PPP parliamentarians are aware that any
call for reorganizing
the province would open up calls for a division of Sindh "under
the pretext of
creating new provinces." A division of Sindh would obviously
be unaccept-
able for the PPP, and they have argued that supporters of
reorganization are
articulating issues "created by visible and invisible forces"
(Abro 20 10). 40 Some
have even argued that plans to divide the Punjab are a means to
increase Punjabi
representation.41
2019 22:21:58 UTC
556 K. Adeney
To some extent there is truth to these claims; many military
leaders such as
Zia-ul Huq considered imposing provincial reorganization. In
2011, the debate over
creating new provinces has increased in salience, but opened up
a rift between
those supporting the creation of new provinces along
ethnolinguistic lines and

those supporting new provinces along administrative lines. The
military support
the creation of a Bahawalpur province, a former princely state
in southern Punjab.
Its borders are not coterminous with the Seraiki speaking
population in the area,
although there is some overlap. The military's support is widely
viewed as a strategy
to undermine the creation of an ethnolinguistically defined
Seraiki-speaking
province (Siddiqa 2011a), in keeping with the integrationist
nation-building
strategy adopted at independence. Punjab Chief Minister
Shahbaz Sharif stated in
April 2011 that if new provinces were "formed in south Punjab
. . . Karachi should
also be made a new province" ( Daily Times 2011b). A few
days later the PML-N
clarified that their position was that "new federating units
should be for adminis-
trative convenience, not based on ethnicity" (PML-N 2011).
Such statements
confirmed the worst fears of Sindhis about where the issue of
reorganization would
lead. However, as the Muttahida Quami Movement (MQM), a
party whose main
base of support is Urdu speakers in Karachi, swiftly rejected
the call for Karachi to
become an independent city-state, the issue was defused

somewhat ( Daily Times
2011a).
The issue of whether to proceed with provincial reorganization
is difficult. On
the one hand, the status quo perpetuates the domination of a
particular province.
However, there exist real demands for the creation of new
provinces, particularly
from Seraikis. As long as the MQM holds to its position of not
separating Karachi
from Sindh then the creation of a Seraiki speaking province is
not likely to be
destabilizing. Reorganization of the Punjab through creating a
Seraiki province
would also bring government closer to the people affected by it
(although there is
also a need for a more effective local government system to
complement rather
than undermine the provinces).42 Conceding the demand for a
Seraiki province
would increase the demands for FATA and the Pashto-speaking
areas of Balochistan
to be created either as separate provinces or joined to KP), but
neither of these
demands are likely to be conceded as long as the security
situation in those
provinces remains tenuous.
The creation of a Seraiki province would be a challenge to
Pakistan's nation
building strategy, premised around integration rather than

multiculturalism.
However, the recognition of a Seraiki province would increase
affinity with the
Pakistani state among Seraikis and other groups. It can also be
argued that official
recognition of the multinational nature of the Pakistani state
will strengthen rather
than weaken the federation, as long-standing demands have
existed for such
recognition. Certainly, the reorganization of provinces along
administrative lines as
advocated publicly by the Establishment in April 2011 would
be likely to increase
2019 22:21:58 UTC
conflict still further and be seen as an antidemocratic move,
particularly among
Sindhis. The creation of new provinces would be no panacea to
all the tensions
within the federation - but could be a step in the right
direction.43 The issue is not
going to go away.
Moving on from the issue of reorganization of provinces - the
other issue

tackled by the SPCCR concerned the under-representation of
certain groups,
notably Sindhis and Balochis from the core institutions of
state. It is unlikely that
the provisions for parliament to redress the imbalances will be
effective. Parliament
is a weak institution and the majority of questionnaire
respondents were skeptical
that it would be able to effect any changes in this regard or
indeed that it would be
even willing to try. As a lecturer from KP bemoaned: "One
cannot touch sacred
cows in Pakistan, even Parliament" and a professor opined that
"the power
structure is such that these lofty ideals will not be realized in
near future."44
However, several authors and informed observers have noted
that changes may
occur despite Parliament's weakness: "All three services are
somewhat likely to
redress the problem of underrepresentation because there is a
realisation that
without correcting this imbalance that is tilted in favour of
Punjab it may not be
possible to keep Pakistan united."45 Ayesha Siddiqa confirms
the general picture
with regard to the army and its recruiting practices, but notes
that the increased
recruitment from the under-represented groups is a means to
neutralize identity

politics (2011b). An integrationist policy (as advocated by
authors such as Donald
Horowitz (1993) is compatible with the successful inclusion of
groups - ethnic
quotas are not the only way of securing such inclusion.
However, Siddiqa questions
whether Sindhi and Balochis will reach the higher echelons of
these institutions
(2011b). Although the inclusion of Sindhis and Balochis is to
be welcomed,
increased recruitment is unlikely to decrease tensions if
opportunities for
progression do not exist.
Conclusion
Pakistan to date has been a centralized majoritarian federation
with a core ethnic
region and a small number of units. Lessons from the
experiences of other
federations remind us of the dangers of core ethnic regions.
The dangers posed by
core regions are compounded by a small number of provinces.
Although Pakistan
faces many challenges, the design of its federation has
increased disaffection with
the center and the core group - Punjabis. This disaffection
exists regardless of the
democratic status of Pakistan (although it is increased during
military regimes).
Given the comparative evidence and tensions that have been
caused by the
dominance of the Punjab since 1971, and the accepted need to

bring government
closer to the people affected by it, the failure of the SPCCR to
at least initiate a
debate on the creation of new provinces, and to facilitate the
ability of parliament
2019 22:21:58 UTC
558 K. Adeney
to create new provinces, was a missed opportunity. The issues
of delivery and
responsive government are important to the inclusion of all
groups within
Pakistan, many of who have been alienated from the state by
the current political
system, of which the federal design is an important part.
As argued, Pakistan is not in danger of splitting up - in
common with
neighboring India, the army is strong and disciplined. The
secessionist movements
that do exist, are factionalized. Many of the changes introduced
by the SPCCR and
the 7th NFC have gone a long way to redressing the concerns
of disaffected groups,
particularly concerning economic grievances. However, there
remain real worries

about whether the inadequate resourcing of the new
responsibilities will jeopardize
the expected political and economic gains from the
constitutional review process.
As Ahmad opines, there is a risk of an "untenable situation in
which there will be
insufficient financing available for the devolved functions, and
could trigger a
significant backlash against the devolution process" (2010a,
25). And there are still
major challenges in Balochistan, where the recommendations of
the SPCCR and the
7th NFC were welcomed as a first step, but Balochi politicians
stress that there is a
long way to go. Although many political parties in Balochistan
have signed up to
the accord and welcome the changes and dialogue with
Islamabad, the province is
incredibly factionalized and violence and extra-judicial killings
continue. Decades
of underdevelopment, exploitation and neglect will not and
cannot be fixed
through pronouncements from Islamabad and it will take at
least a generation for
meaningful changes to occur.
It is difficult to be optimistic about the prospects for
democratic consolidation

in Pakistan, although there does appear to be awareness among
the major
politicians that short-term deals with the army against one's
opponents backfire in
the long term (even if this awareness is borne out from a
commitment to political
survival rather than democratic consolidation). Are the changes
introduced in 2009
and 2010 likely to be of long standing duration? Will they be
reversed if the
military takes over again? The SPCCR is obviously not the end
game - much
depends on implementation and the willingness of politicians to
continue their
cooperation on the big issues affecting the unity of Pakistan.
However, the fact that
these conflicts and inequities have been so entrenched within
Pakistani discourse
and that the politicians have managed to reach an agreement
makes it unlikely that
the redistribution of resources will be unpicked. There also
seems to be recognition
that groups need to be recruited into the core institutions of
state. However, is it
a story of "too little, too late?"46 Has the underdevelopment
and systematic
marginalization of parts of provinces gone too far to rectify any
chance of

meaningful inclusion within a generation? In addition, in
Pakistan as a whole,
issues of economic development, the need for local government
reforms, ending
corruption, and promoting good governance cannot be ignored.
2019 22:21:58 UTC
The 18th Amendment has therefore been an important step
forward in center-
province relations in Pakistan and in relations between
provinces. It has been common
in Pakistan to talk of provincial rights as if they detract from
federal stability. But
stronger provinces may also lead to a stronger federation -
recognition of provincial
rights (whether or not they are associated with a particular
group) can strengthen
affinity with the federation. Recognition of diversity can also
be a source of strength
(as the case of neighboring India demonstrates). However, the
recognition of identities

through formally recognizing Pakistan as a multinational or
multi-linguistic state
(as demanded by many of the smaller nationalities in Pakistan)
or creating new
provinces around ethnolinguistic boundaries, are likely to
continue to be opposed by
the Establishment. Although Pakistan's federation has become
more inclusive there
remains a long way to go.
Notes
I am grateful to the Forum of Federations for permission to use
the material
contained in the reports of numerous meetings held during 2010
and 2011 in
Pakistan and Nepal as part of their program in Pakistan. I also
greatly benefitted
from conversations with several politicians, academics, and
civil society activists
during these meetings, too numerous to mention, but all of
whom were incredibly
helpful. In particular I would like to thank the Centre for Civic
Education Pakistan,
especially its Director Zafarullah Khan, for facilitating the
distribution of a survey
to participants in the different provinces. Thanks are also due

to all those who
filled the survey in, as well as Dr. Sean Carey, Dr. James
Chiriyankandath, and
Haris Gazdar who commented on its design. The article also
benefitted from the
feedback received at the BASAS Annual Conference in
Southampton in April 2011,
as well as comments from Haris Gazdar, Zafarullah Khan, and
the four anonymous
referees.
1. There are secessionist pressures in the province of
Balochistan, but the province is
extremely divided: politically, tribally, and ethnolinguistically.
There is no unified
secessionist movement that poses a credible threat to the
integrity of Pakistan. Some
Baloch seek secession, others seek autonomy and control over
resources. The situation is
similar to the politics of India's northeastern states. Pakhtuns
living within Balochistan
do not seek secession, indeed many seek a merger of the Pashto
speaking areas with KP
or the creation of a separate province. Anatol Leiven concurs:
"this less than heroic
insurgency does not as yet pose a serious threat to the control
of the Pakistani military"
(2011, 353).
2. This research is informed by primary research and access to
policymakers involved in the
process, facilitated through the author's involvement as Lead
Consultant with the Forum

of Federations' program in Pakistan. It also draws on an elite
questionnaire, completed
by seventy- three respondents in 2011. This sample does not
purport to be representative,
2019 22:21:58 UTC
560 K. Adeney
but the responses to the questionnaire have informed the
research for this article and
have provided support (or otherwise) for the author's
observations.
3. Federalism is premised on a division of sovereignty between
at least two territorially
defined levels of government, but local government structures
are also important in
bringing government closer to the people affected by it - thus it
may be appropriate to
talk of triple loyalties.
4. As of the most recent census in Pakistan, 1998, all four
provinces possess a majority
of one ethno-linguistic group. However, Pakistan's federal
system has never been

consciously organized along ethnolinguistic lines.
5. Politicians from the smaller provinces argue that the
representatives of the Federal
Capital and FATA protect the interests of the centre against
those of the units.
6. In 2009, Gilgit Baltistan had its status changed to that of a
province, although it does not
have full provincial status, e.g. it has no representation in the
central legislature and the
Prime Minister of Pakistan chairs its Council which has
exclusive legislative powers over
fifty- five items enumerated on the Council Legislative List. Its
elected assembly has exclusive
legislative powers over matters on the Assembly Legislative
List. Residual powers reside
with thé Government of Pakistan. Similar mechanisms operate
in Azad Kashmir, although it
has a President rather than a Governor and a Prime Minister
instead of a Chief Minister.
Residual powers reside with the Assembly in Azad Kashmir;
there is no separate list
enumerating the powers of the Assembly (although certain
items such as the defence and
external affairs of Azad Kashmir are allocated to the
Government of Pakistan).
7. Effective power resides with the NA as the Senate is unable
to initiate finance bills.

8. The secession of Bangladesh from Pakistan in 1971
ostensibly occurred in a five unit
federation but the backdrop to the secession was the two unit
federation in existence
until 1970.
9. Sui Gas was discovered in 1952 but it was only piped to
Quetta in 1980. Much of the
province is still not connected to the gas grid. Author's
interview with Dr. Samina
Ahmed of International Crisis Group, January 2007.
10. Author's interview with Mehmood Achakzai of the PKMAP
in 2007, and more general
conversations with politicians and civil society activi sts in
2010.
11. Interviews in Pakistan, May 2005 and January 2007.
12. Balochi and Brahvi speakers were categorized separately
until the 1998 census. As Map
Two relies on 1998 district level data, it has not been possible
to disaggregate them.
Interested readers may wish to refer to the map of Balochistan
in Gazdar et al. (2010,
11) that shows the divisions before 1998.
13. Conversations with Pakistani politicians and civil society
activists including Bushra
Gohar of the ANP, June 2011.
14. Some have argued that these disputes were engineered by
the army in a belated attempt
to derail the process. Conversations with Pakistani politicians
and civil society activists

including Bushra Gohar of the ANP, June 2011.
15. Although subjects such as national planning and national
economic coordination, the
supervision and management of public debt, the census, the
extension of police powers
to another province, major ports, and interprovincial matters
and coordination among
others have been moved to Part II of the FLL.
2019 22:21:58 UTC
16. Conversations with Balochi politicians, May 2010.
17. Sentiments expressed by a senior PPP politician to the
author in May 2010.
18. Before 1971, when the majority of the population lived in
the Eastern Wing, resources
were allocated according to economic sector - thus ensuring the
majority of resources
were allocated to the Western Wing.
19. Although KP received an additional 1 percent of the
divisible pool to recompense
the provincial government for the "War on Terror" (equivalent
to 1.83 percent of the
provincial poll).

20. Email interview with Dr. Kaiser Bengali on 26 June 2011 -
Sindh's nonstatutory (private)
representative on the NFC. Whether this will now happen as a
result of the center's
declining tax receipts is now doubtful.
21. Although the PML-Q opposed the name change in their note
of reiteration and tried to
amend the bill in the Senate to retain the name of NWFP. The
PML-N threatened to
derail the entire SPCCR report over the renaming issue,
although this was coupled with
the issue of judicial appointments and was widely regarded as a
bargaining tool.
22. Discussion with Bushra Gohar, NA member and Vice Chair
of the ANP, June 2011.
23. Hazara speakers are not categorized separately in the
census, but their location can be
seen as the "others" in northeast KP.
24. Kishwer Khan, lecturer, Karachi University, questionnaire
response.
25. Khurram Hussain, PhD Student, Yale University (originally
from Lahore), questionnaire
response.
26. Anonymous, questionnaire response.
27. Personal discussions with politicians involved in the
process, April-May 2010.

28. Khurram Hussain, questionnaire response.
29. Aslam Khwaja, researcher from Sindh, questionnaire
response.
30. Professor Mohammad Waseem, Lahore University of
Management Sciences, question-
naire response.
31. Karachi-based analyst, questionnaire response.
32. Talat Masood, retired Lt. General and now a commentator
and columnist based in
Islamabad, questionnaire response.
33. Professor Ian Talbot, University of Southampton,
questionnaire response. Similar
comments were made by Professor Yunas Samad, University of
Bradford.
34. Dr. David Taylor, retired academic, previously at SOAS
and AKU, questionnaire
response.
35. Informed observer who wished to remain anonymous,
questionnaire response.
36. Personal conversations with the author with politicians and
civil society activists,
April-May 2010.
37. Personal conversations with the author, April-May 2010.
38. However, the PML-N has changed its stance, and now
supports the creation of provinces
based on administrative convenience rather than ethnicity.

39. As this author can testify from experience of raising the
issue with Pakistani decision
makers, and confirmed by the responses to the questionnaire.
40. Confirmed by discussions with senior PPP politicians,
April-May 2010.
41. Discussions with senior PPP politicians, April-May 2010.
2019 22:21:58 UTC
562 K. Adeney
42. I would like to thank Yunas Samad for reminding me of this
point. The Musharraf
backed local government system was an exercise to undermine
provincial assemblies.
When the provincial assemblies were restored they have
systematically undermined these
structures, to the detriment of the people of Pakistan. Punjabi
politicians and civil
society activists at the Punjab PAG stressed this issue and the
importance of capacity
building at the local level.
43. "None of this will happen without much kicking and
screaming" Khurram Hussain,
questionnaire response. The question is, would such conflict be
worth the long-term
benefits to the federation or should this 'can of worms ... be
left alone?' (Professor
David Taylor, questionnaire response)

44. Professor Mohammad Waseem, questionnaire response.
45. Talat Masood, questionnaire response. He made similar
assertions in an interview with
the author in Islamabad in January 2007.
46. Dr. Huma Baqai, Karachi, questionnaire response.
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