More Related Content Similar to Race-Qualified Juries (16) Race-Qualified Juries1. Monahan 1
“Race-Qualified” Juries? Addressing Racial Bias in the Jury System
by Caroline Monahan
I. Introduction
America is in the midst of an intense moment in the fight for minority rights in the
justice system. The recent spate of failures by juries to indict police officers who have killed
black individuals have renewed calls that many have been making for years—that the
American jury system is inherently biased against black individuals and other minorities.
After the jury decisions were handed down for the racially charged cases of Michael Brown,
Trayvon Martin, and Eric Garner, thousands of protesters filled the streets in cities across
America to echo the common cry spreading across the United States—“No justice, no peace.”
As the grand jury proceedings for many of the black men and women killed at the hands of
police came to a close and new similar cases emerged, calls of racism and unfair jury
processes have continued to resound throughout the US.
While American political scientists and politicians extol our white “Founding Fathers”
and principles of democracy, equality, liberty, mutual obligation, and respect as set forth by
white Enlightenment thinkers, many argue an entire section of the population is being treated
with the exact opposite of these ideals by biased, largely white juries. The immense
consequences of failing to craft a more inclusive, representative justice system should be
noted. The United States needs a jury system that reflects the diverse views and experiences
of its citizens and ensures all its citizens feel adequately represented and protected. A failure
to address the issues inherent in the current system will result in a lack of trust in or feeling of
legitimacy of the justice system, which is the bedrock of a functioning state. The current jury
system needs to be reformed in such as way that will instil trust in the structures of justice,
2. Monahan 2
allow the state to continue legitimately exist, and begin to create an environment in which all
members of the community receive just and equal sentencing. In this paper, I will explore the
extent of bias in the American jury system and examine possible responses to curb prejudice
in the system, considering issues of representation and democratic ideals. I will find that the
system should strive for a “race-qualified” jury determined in the voir dire process, similar to
that of a death-qualified jury, in order to instil a sense of validity and fairness in the system.
This will achieve a jury system in which all members of society feel represented and valued. A
valid, impartial judicial system is key to the functioning of a legitimate democratic state. By
decreasing the effect of bias and its existence in the jury in crafting a “race-qualified” jury, the
United States will cement the legitimacy that had been brought into question by many in
minority communities.
II. Implicit Bias and the Jury
Implicit biases permeate every level of public and private level. Much research has
been conducted that details the extent to which individuals have implicit biases, which jurors
are not impervious to. A Harvard-run study of general implicit biases through an online
Implicit Association Test (IAT) found that:
“- Implicit biases are pervasive. They appear as statistically “large” effects that
are often shown by majorities of samples of Americans.
- People are often unaware of their implicit biases. Ordinary people, including
the researchers who direct this project, are found to harbor… implicit biases…
even while honestly… reporting that they regard themselves as lacking these
biases.
3. Monahan 3
- Implicit biases predict behavior... [T]hose who are higher in implicit bias have
been shown to display greater discrimination...
- People differ in levels of implicit bias. Implicit biases vary from person to
person—for example as a function of a person’s group memberships, the
dominance of a person’s membership group in society, consciously held
attitudes, and the level of bias existing in the immediate environment. This last
observation makes clear that implicit attitudes are modified by experience.”1
Implicit biases thus influence many aspects of day-to-day interactions. The IAT has shown
that “seventy-five percent of those who have taken the [test] have demonstrated implicit
racial bias in favor of Whites.”2 Racial biases thus surface in many spheres of public life—and
the jury is no exception. Justin D. Levinson notes the presence of racial bias in capital cases,
saying, “death qualification may activate jurors’ implicit racial stereotypes by indirectly
priming racial constructs.”3 Similarly, Anna Roberts highlights that the Supreme Court has
acknowledged the existence of racial bias in pointing to Justice Brennan’s dissenting opinion
in Turner v. Murray: “[I]t is certainly true, as the Court maintains, that racial bias inclines one
to disbelieve and disfavor the object of the prejudice, and it is similarly incontestable that
subconscious, as well as express, racial fears and hatreds operate to deny fairness to the
person despised…”4 Justice O’Connor also notes in a dissent in Georgia v. McCollum that “It is
by now clear that conscious and unconscious racism can affect the way white jurors perceive
1 Judge Mark W. Bennett, “Unraveling the Gordian Knot of Implicit Bias in Jury Selection: The Problems of Judge-
2 Cynthia Lee, “Making Race Salient: Trayvon Martin and Implicit Bias in a Not Yet Post-Racial Society,” North
Carolina Law Review 91 (2013): 1555, 1572
3 Justin D. Levinson, “Race, Death and the Complicitous Mind,” DePaul Law Review 58 (2009): 599, 623
4 Turner v. Murray, 476 U.S. 28, 42 (1986). Also note Crawford v. United States, 212 U.S. 183, 196 (1909) (Anna
Roberts, “(Re) Forming the Jury) Connecticut Law Review Vol. 44 (2012): 827, 837)
4. Monahan 4
minority defendants and the facts presented at their trials, perhaps determining the verdict of
guilt or innocence.”5
Kang et. al provide an in-depth summary of the many studies conducted to affirm juror
bias in trials—they emphasize findings by researchers Justin Levinson and Danielle Young
that concluded that skin color influenced how jurors analyzed the evidence for mock cases
and affected their responses to the question, “How guilty is the defendant?.” Participants
graded guilt levels on a scale of 100, and there was a 10.6 point difference in mean ratings of
guilt for the defendants of color.6 Kang et. al note that while this may seem in theory like a
relatively small difference, in practice, this results in huge differences in conviction rates of
white defendants as opposed to black defendants. They highlight another study by Tara
Mitchell, who found that a defendant’s race affected both verdicts and sentencing, although
the magnitude of effect sizes was small. Kang conducts an analysis of the seemingly small
effect size, however, and finds that if white juries issued guilty verdicts in eighty percent of
their convictions, then the rate of conviction for black defendants would be 83.8%, as opposed
to 76.2% for white defendants. While this may not seem like a large difference, Kang indicates
that in a group of one hundred otherwise identical trials, eight more black than white
defendants would be ruled guilty.7 Implicit bias, then, is clearly extremely prevalent in juries.
It results in higher rates of conviction for defendants of color in identical cases and
permanently alters the lives of defendants of color simply because of their skin color. This
presents an immense issue for a system of justice that is intended to be blind and thus
legitimate.
5 Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 68 (1992)
6 Kang et. al, “Implicit Bias in the Courtroom,” UCLA Law Review 59 (2012)
7 Kang 1143
5. Monahan 5
III. A “Jury of One’s Peers”—Representation and Juries
The role of the jury is typically seen as providing defendants with a group of
individuals from their society that is able to be an impartial entity to judge the severity of
one’s actions. Amendment VI of the Constitution guarantees citizens a trial by jury, stating “In
all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an
impartial jury of the state and district wherein the crime shall have been committed, which
district shall have been previously ascertained by law…”8 The Amendment ensures that all
citizens have a right to enjoy an impartial jury—but as the above scholarship illustrates, bias
permeates the jury system at every step. Many point to the non-representative nature of
juries in the US to condemn their credibility, and assert that the legitimacy of the justice
system lies in the ability to remedy the homogeneity in juries. Justice Powell affirms this need
for representation in order for the system to hold any public esteem—he notes in Batson v
Kentucky that intentional discrimination against a group in the jury selection process
“undermine[s] public confidence in the fairness of our system of justice.”9
This assertion of a need for a representative jury has played a prominent role in
arguments that highlight the failures of the current system—many argue that the lack of
decisions seen as fair or just by juries lies in the system’s inherent inability to take jurors from
a pool of like-minded individuals from defendants’ communities who can adequately pass
judgment on the defendant. The Magna Carta enshrines the importance of a representative
jury in article 39, stating that “no freeman shall be taken or/and imprisoned, or disseised or
outlawed or exiled or in any way destroyed, nor will we go upon him nor will we send upon
8 US Constitution, Amendment VI
9 Batson v. Kentucky, 476 US 79 (1986)
6. Monahan 6
him, except by the lawful judgment of his peers or/and by the law of the land.”10 Although the
Constitution guarantees no such right, this concept of a “jury of one’s peers” derived from the
Magna Carta has been often referenced as inherent in and key to the idea of a jury. Though
this iteration of a representative jury is not explicitly laid out in the Constitution, there is some
precedent in the US that affirms the importance of juries representing an equal portion of
society. 28 USC 1861 affirms that juries must be from a pool of a “fair cross-section of the
community in the district or division wherein the court convenes,” and the Supreme Court in
Strauder v West Virginia held that the jury must be drawn from a group “composed of the
peers or equals [of the defendant]; that is, of his neighbors, fellows, associates, persons having
the same legal status in society as he holds.”11 Peters v. Kiff affirms this the importance of
including diverse viewpoints on the jury, as it states that the exclusion of certain groups
“deprives the jury of a perspective on human events.”12
Representation of a diverse multitude of views on a jury thus serves to reduce bias on
juries and offer alternative ways of thinking to the deliberative body. Jane Mansbridge sees
the power in including a collection of views in her incisive article on theory of representation
entitled, “Should Blacks Represent Blacks and Women Represent Women? A Contingent ‘Yes.’”
She states, “A representative body should ideally include at least one representative for every
group that might provide new information, perspectives, or ongoing insights relevant to the
understanding that leads to a decision.”13 The court and many scholars have thus established
the need for the jury pool to represent a multitude of views and experiences in society, then.
How one conceives of a “peer group” is thus key to arguments for affirmative selection on
10 Magna Carta, paragraph 39 in W. Holdsworth, A History of English Law Vol. 2 (London: Meuthen, 1956), 59.
11 28 USC 1861, Strauder v West Virginia 100 U.S. 303 (1880)
12 Peters v Kiff 407 U.S. 493 (1972)
13 Jane Mansbridge, “Should Blacks Represent Blacks and Women Represent Women? A Contingent ‘Yes,’” The
Journal of Politics, 61, no. 3 (1999): 634
7. Monahan 7
juries, and the divides between how a “jury of one’s peers” should be determined are
reflective of a larger debate about the benefits and drawbacks of certain kinds of
representation.
It is crucial here to examine theories of democratic representation, in order to better
comprehend the arguments for different forms of representation on juries. Representation
theory often splits into two different preferred methods of representation—descriptive
representation, which ensures representatives will be present who share the same
background as constituents (or in this case, the defendant), and substantive representation, in
which representatives reflect the interests of, and not necessarily the racial background of, the
[defendant]. These two forms of representation can be seen as two options for representation
in juries. Many argue for descriptive representatives in the form of quotas or other methods,
as they see jurors of color as being the only individuals who can truly understand the
background of defendants of color. For those who argue this, a jury of one’s peers as a jury of
individuals who share the same descriptive characteristics as the defendant is preferable.
The Black Panther Party is one such group that saw the benefits in and advocated for
descriptive representation on juries. In their original ten-point plan, the BPP demanded that
juries include their peers as a requisite to be able to place trust in the justice system and
resolve the many injustices black folks were repeatedly being met with.14 The ninth point of
the plan published by the Black Panther Party in 1966 defined peer group in stating the
following: “We want all Black people when brought to trial to be tried in court by a jury of
their peer group or people from their Black communities as defined by the Constitution of the
14 Michael Martin and Marilyn Yaquinto, ed. Redress for Historical Injustices in the United States (Duke University
Press: 2007)
8. Monahan 8
United States.”15 Here, the BPP is equating “peer group” with those racially similar to the
defendant. The Party goes on to expand on this idea, asserting, “We believe that the courts
should follow the United States Constitution so that Black people will receive fair trials. The
Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution gives a man a right to be tried by his
peer group. A peer is a person from a similar economic, social, religious, geographical,
environmental, historical, and racial background. To do this the court will be forced to select a
jury from the Black community from which the Black defendant came. We have been, and are
being tried by all White juries that have no understanding of the ‘average reasoning man’ of
the Black community.”16
The Black Panthers emphasize a crucial benefit of descriptive representation
highlighted above by Mansbridge and certain court cases surrounding the idea of difference of
experience that has an effect on individuals’ ability to judge others. In asserting that the
average reasoning black person has a different worldview and experience with the state and
others that cannot be understood by white people, the Party highlights what is seen as one
major benefit of descriptive representation. Although some individuals can reflect the
interests of a group without necessarily being a member of that group, there are instances in
which only members of a certain group can understand an experience. Mansbridge affirms
this, in noting that the benefits of descriptive representatives can be most clearly seen in
deliberation processes. “Although a representative need not have shared personally the
experiences of the represented to facilitate communication and bring subtlety to
deliberation,” she writes, “the open-ended quality of deliberation gives communicative and
15 Joshua Bloom and Waldo E. Martin, Black Against Empire: The History and Politics of the Black Panther Party
(University of California Press: 2012)
16 ibid
9. Monahan 9
informal advantages to representatives who are existentially close to the issues”— descriptive
representatives.17
Descriptive representatives are also seen as beneficial due to their ability to serve as
role models to inspire others in their minority group who may feel disenfranchised to engage
in the system. Their inclusion on juries in making important decisions indicates the value that
the state places on these minority groups’ inputs and views, and will result in a state that is
viewed as more legitimate. Mansbridge agrees, noting that “seeing proportional numbers of
members of their group exercising the responsibility of ruling with full status [or here, serving
on a jury] can enhance de facto legitimacy by making citizens, and particularly members of
historically underrepresented groups, feel as if they themselves were present in the
deliberations.”18
While descriptive representation is important for its enhancement of legitimacy of the
state and its ability to ensure group experiences can be represented in the deliberation
process, many criticize descriptive representation for its essentialization.19 They assert that
simply including a representative of color on a jury or in the legislature does not ensure that
they will protect or represent the interests of their descriptive group, nor will it ensure that
they will not reflect any bias— indeed, research on the IAT indicates that forty percent of
African-Americans have a pro-white bias.20 Representation on juries is thus widely
acknowledged to be important—how to go about this in a manner that remains constitutional
and allows for representation in the best interest of a group is difficult to achieve. We will
17 Mansbridge 636
18 Mansbridge 650
19 See Mansbridge, Suzanne Dovi, “Preferable Descriptive Representatives: Will Just Any Woman, Black or Latino
Do?” The American Political Science Review 96, no. 4 (2002): 733, Edward S. Adams and Christian J. Lane,
“Constructing a Jury that is Both Impartial and Representative: Utilizing Cumulative Voting in Jury Selection,”
New York University Law Review 73 (1998):703
20 Lee 1572
11. Monahan 11
that in Virginia v Rives, additionally, the Supreme Court ruled that the right to an impartial
jury does not constitute the right to a member of any distinct race on the jury.23
Similarly, there have been arguments that assert that one half of the jury should be of
the same minority background as the defendant.24 This approach finds its roots in the twelfth
century, when English charters promised half Jewish, half English juries to Jewish defendants.
This approach was later used in the US for the inclusion of Native Americans in the US court
system, and it is still used in Canada for language purposes—one half of the Canadian jury
must speak the same language as the defendant. Scholars have criticized this approach for
similar reasons to racial matching, however-- minority representation is not assured for
minority individuals who have been the victims of crimes carried out by a white defendant,
and scholars argue it is not more constitutionally defendable than similar efforts like racial
matching.25
Some might assert that these affirmative selection approaches raise issues of
prescriptive identity. Ensuring racial representation would require individuals to self-identify
as a particular race and it might be difficult to ensure the same exact race be represented in
the jury pool, especially given those who identify as multiple mixed races. This argument is
related to the assertion that affirmative selection and other forms of descriptive
representation are essentializing.26
There would also be significant difficulty in employing race in jural districting, as some
have advocated for. The Supreme Court has previously struck down using race in the
formation of districts, which many highlight as the downfall of any argument that attempts to
23 Virginia v Rives, 100 U.S. 313 (1880)
24 Adams and Lane 729
25 ibid
26 Mansbridge 637
12. Monahan 12
use race to re-district and enforce affirmative selection in juries.27 In his article “Jural
Districting: Selecting Impartial Juries Through Community Representation,” however, Kim
Forde-Mazrui asserts that although the court has limited racial districting, it has endorsed
designing districts around “communities of interest” and that race can be considered in these
communities of interest so long as other factors have been considered as well.28 Forde-Mazrui
recommends dividing the jury district into twelve sub-districts based on these “communities
of interest,” and requiring that juries include jurors from each of the sub-districts.29 Although
this effort might result in greater inclusion of minority jurors, the courts have not dealt with
the issue of racial inclusion in communities of interest, and as Forde-Mazrui acknowledges,
this will not address minority venirepersons’ reluctance to attend jury duty due to distrust in
the system.30 This argument seems unlikely to be allowed by the courts, and it does not
address many of the aforementioned issues inherent in descriptive representation.
Many point to peremptory challenges as a large indicator of racial bias in the jury
system, and a means through which prosecutors and defense attorneys alike seek to remove
opportunities for representation for minority groups when it might help or detract from their
case to have such representatives present. In Batson v. Kentucky, the court famously ruled that
peremptory challenges could not be utilized to exclude certain races from the jury, though
many argue they are still used in an exclusionary manner.31
Adams and Lane propose one such solution for an alternative to peremptory
challenges that they assert will increase representation on juries. They posit that a cumulative
voting system can resolve all issues with constitutionality in racial matching methods or jury
27 Adams and Lane 731
28 Kim Forde-Mazrui, “Jural Districting: Selecting Impartial Juries Through Community Representation,”
Vanderbilt Law Review Vol 52:353 (1999)
29 Forde-Mazrui 382
30 ibid
31 Batson v Kentucky 476 US 79 1986
13. Monahan 13
re-districting. In their approach, each litigant would receive a number of votes corresponding
to the size of the jury, which they can exercise either positively or negatively. Each side would
be allowed strikes for cause, but no peremptory challenges. After strikes, each side would
submit a voting list to the judge. The venirepersons with the highest total number of votes
would serve on the jury. Any ties would be broken by a legitimate method of random
selection. Adams and Lane acknowledge here that the prosecution and defense have to
consider their votes very carefully, as they could easily end up with a jury that completely
favors the other side.
This seems to be the main issue with Adams and Lane’s proposition—a new system
such as this allows for unexpected results and is very strategic. If a lawyer does not play her
cards right, the results could be even more detrimental to representation than the current
system. Additionally, peremptory challenges can allow the defense to remove venirepersons
they think will be actively biased in their approach of the case if it is difficult to prove—while
this can result in counsel using peremptory challenges to remove individuals based on biased
or racist presumptions, the defense can similarly use peremptory challenges to remove those
they believe will reflect implicit racial bias. While it is important to address when these
challenges are being used to actively exclude a minority group from participating in the jury,
and many alternatives to peremptory challenges have been introduced, other opportunities to
ensure descriptive or substantive representation that are not detrimental to the system
should be simultaneously explored. While it is important to consider alternative systems such
as Adams and Lane’s and re-imagine the manner in which we conceive of the current jury
system, then, this approach allows for too harmful results if lawyers do not use the system
correctly. Instead, perhaps it is valuable to examine how the current system can be employed
to reduce bias in the jury through various tactics in the selection process in a manner that
14. Monahan 14
avoids the issues with descriptive representation, but still ensures members of minority
groups are present on the jury.
V. “Race-Qualified Juries”
The current established jury selection process could work to strike jurors who might
exhibit racial bias if utilized correctly. In developing a method of selection that would enable
lawyers to ensure those who will exhibit more intense racial bias will not be selected, the
current system can be used to curb racial bias on juries. This is a technique currently used for
“death-qualified” juries, in which venirepersons go through the selection process in a manner
that ensures the jury would be willing and able to take the possibility of ruling for the death
penalty into account if the penalty is a possible sentence in the case. The selection process for
death-qualified juries involves requiring jurors to reveal through questioning in voir dire
whether or not they would be able to impose the death penalty as a sanction if the case came
to that. Many would argue the questioning process for achieving a death-qualified jury does
not effectively determine a venireperson’s view of the death penalty, though—one lawyer,
however, has created a method selecting a death-qualified jury that allows counsel to
understand venirepersons’ positions on the death penalty and select accordingly.
David Wymore, a Colorado defense attorney, has proposed a technique for ensuring
that the defense obtains accurate views of a juror’s opinion on the death penalty, and thus
asserts he can craft a “life positive” jury—one that is more likely to rule against the death
penalty—by using this method of selection. The Wymore method works to employ creative
questioning to reveal underlying biases for or against the death penalty. This Wymore
technique, also known as the “Colorado method,” purports to drastically reduce the number of
15. Monahan 15
death sentences handed down if carried out correctly.32 During voir dire, defense attorneys
ask questions of potential jurors in such a way that reveals their underlying opinions without
making them obvious to the prosecution. By determining the weight jurors would give to
mitigating factors, the defense is able to uncover how the juror views the death penalty,
instead of simply asking flat out if the juror would be able to rule for the death penalty.
Wymore achieves this deeper understanding of biases by presenting a scenario in
which a defendant has no legal defense in the eyes of the law, and asking the potential juror to
find a mitigating circumstance.33 Through follow-up questioning after the juror’s response,
predispositions might emerge. The Wymore technique suggests the defense then rank the
venirepersons on a seven-point scale, with one exhibiting the least proclivity to rule for the
death penalty and seven exhibiting the most. Where possible, Wymore recommends removing
the jurors who rank on higher on the scale with challenges for cause, or if this is not possible,
removing them with peremptory challenges. Embedded in the questioning are affirmative
statements meant to empower jurors to voice their opinions about the influence other jurors
might allow race to have on their deliberation process when the time comes.34 This same
approach could be transferred to race—studies have shown that simply instructing juries to
not be prejudiced by race in their decisions, or asking jurors if they will be able to do so, does
not actually affect the implicit bias prevalent in jury decisions.35 By instead asking more
roundabout questions that would lead individuals to reveal how deep their biases lie,
attorneys could address bias in the system through the existing selection process, and thus
avoid the many issues that could come with radically changing the system and adopting a
32 David Wymore, The Life Penalty, Documentary (2008; Wild Berry Productions)
33 Wymore
34 ibid
35 S. Mendoza, P. Gollwitzer, and D. Amodio, “Reducing the Expression of Implicit Stereotypes: Reflexive Control
through Implementation Intentions,” Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 36, (2010). 512-523 and D. Kim,
“Voluntary Controllability of the Implicit Association Test (IAT),” Social Psychology Quarterly, 66, (2003) 83-96.
16. Monahan 16
cumulative voting system, as Adams and Lane propose. This process could be enshrined in the
current selection system, as a required set of questions that jurors must answer, similar to
how jurors must answer questions about their views on the death penalty for a death-
qualified jury. If not included in the official process, attorneys should utilize this method of
questioning where possible to assess bias. It should be noted, however, that judges play a
discretionary role in determining the how much race is focused on in voir dire.36 There should
be increased efforts to disseminate information to judges about implicit bias in juries and the
importance of race-relevant questioning to encourage them to allow race-relevant
questioning, then.
A jury that is thus “race-qualified” by the Wymore technique would address the issues
inherent in descriptive representation and affirmative selection processes, and David Wymore
has asserted that a jury selected through this method of selection will actually result in many
minority groups being represented (because although descriptive representation is not taken
into account and the selection method is more focused on substantive representation of
views, many of those who hold certain less-biased viewpoints will come from minority
groups, Wymore posits). In this sense, a race-qualified jury would experience the benefits that
descriptive representation achieves, but avoid the negative aspects, and it would reap the
benefits of substantive representation as well.
Some could argue this approach does not ensure a fully representative jury, however,
as lawyers are actively attempting to restrict some views (those that reflect implicit bias).
While these criticisms might be legitimate when the technique is being applied to the more
controversial subject of the death penalty, when applied to racial bias, the criticisms do not
hold. Mansbridge asserts that “[a] representative body…should not…simply reproduce all
36 Peter A. Joy, “Race Matters in Jury Selection,” Northwestern University Law Review Vol. 109:80 2015.
18. Monahan 18
Works Cited
Adams, Edward S. and Lane, Christian J. “Constructing a Jury that is Both Impartial and
Representative: Utilizing Cumulative Voting in Jury Selection.” New York University Law
Review 73 (1998):703
Batson v. Kentucky, 476 US 79 (1986)
Bennett, Judge Mark W. “Unraveling the Gordian Knot of Implicit Bias in Jury Selection: The
Problems of Judge-Dominated Voir Dire, the Failed Promise of Batson, and Proposed
Solutions.” Harvard Law and Policy Review 4 (2010)
Bloom, Joshua and Martin, Waldo E. Black Against Empire: The History and Politics of the Black
Panther Party (University of California Press: 2012)
Crawford v. United States, 212 U.S. 183, 196 (1909)
Dovi, Suzanne. “Preferable Descriptive Representatives: Will Just Any Woman, Black or Latino
Do?” The American Political Science Review 96, no. 4 (2002): 733
Forde-Mazrui, Kim. “Jural Districting: Selecting Impartial Juries Through Community
Representation.” Vanderbilt Law Review Vol 52:353 (1999)
Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 68 (1992)
Holdsworth, W. A History of English Law Vol. 2 (London: Meuthen, 1956), 59.
Joy, Peter A. “Race Matters in Jury Selection.” Northwestern University Law Review Vol. 109:80
2015.
Kang et. al. “Implicit Bias in the Courtroom.” UCLA Law Review 59 (2012)
Kim, D. “Voluntary Controllability of the Implicit Association Test (IAT).” Social Psychology
Quarterly, 66, (2003) 83-96.
Lee, Cynthia. “Making Race Salient: Trayvon Martin and Implicit Bias in a Not Yet Post-Racial
Society.” North Carolina Law Review 91 (2013): 1555, 1572
Levinson, Justin D. “Race, Death and the Complicitous Mind.” DePaul Law Review 58 (2009):
599, 623
Mansbridge, Jane. “Should Blacks Represent Blacks and Women Represent Women? A
Contingent ‘Yes.’” The Journal of Politics, 61, no. 3 (1999): 634
Martin, Michael and Yaquinto, Marilyn ed. Redress for Historical Injustices in the United States
(Duke University Press: 2007)
19. Monahan 19
Mendoza, S, Gollwitzer, P and Amodio, D. “Reducing the Expression of Implicit Stereotypes:
Reflexive Control through Implementation Intentions.” Personality and Social Psychology
Bulletin, 36, (2010). 512-523
Peters v Kiff 407 U.S. 493 (1972)
Roberts, Anna. “(Re) Forming the Jury) Connecticut Law Review Vol. 44 (2012): 827, 837
Strauder v West Virginia 100 U.S. 303 (1880)
Turner v. Murray, 476 U.S. 28, 42 (1986).
US Constitution, Amendment VI
Virginia v Rives, 100 U.S. 313 (1880)
Wymore, David. The Life Penalty. Documentary (2008; Wild Berry Productions)