Conflict in collective land and forest formalization: a preliminary analysis.

1. Conflict in collective land and forest
formalization:
A preliminary analysis
Anne M Larson, Esther Mwangi, Iliana Monterroso, Nining Liswanti, Tuti Herawati
Land and Poverty Conference 2018: Land Governance in an Interconnected World
March 19-23
Washington, DC 2018

2. Comparative Study on Collective
Forest Tenure Reforms
 Establish how forest tenure reforms
emerge: opportunities, and options
for formal approaches to securing
customary rights.
 Identify factors that constrain reform
implementation.
 Identify impacts of tenure reform on
rights, access and security of women,
poor men and ethnic minorities to
forests and trees.

3. Where?

4. How does formalization affect conflict?
Methods…
Survey of implementers (119 people, 4 countries)
• Frequency, type of conflict; role in conflict
resolution
Peru (32), Uganda (30), Indonesia (28), Nepal (29)
Key informants (133) and focus groups with men
and women separately (162) in 55 villages
Intra-hh survey (2734 total, 54 villages)
• Frequency and nature of conflict before and after
reform

5. Tenure regimes studied by country
(2015-2017)
Sample: 2707 observations (Intra-household surveys), Indonesia (1024), Peru (988) and Uganda (696)
Tenure regimes
Villages
Uganda Peru Indonesia # of villages
State land designated to use
by communities
4 7 11
State land used by
companies
4 4
Land owned by
communities
4 18 (1) 23
Owned by individuals 4 4
Customary lands (different
levels of formalization)
4 4 5 13
Total 16 22 17 55

6. How does formalization affect conflict: two
models
Variables
Frequency
(before)
Relevance to/
action by
government
Frequency (after)
Tenure security
(after)
High conflict
resolved by
reforms (ideal)
High
High
Low
High
Ineffective
resolution
High
??
High
Low

7. Some preliminary results

8. How frequent are conflicts?
(implementers)
Source: implementers survey
0% 50% 100% 150%
Nepal
Peru
Uganda
Indonesia
conflict is frequent or very
frequent
Peru > Indonesia > Uganda

9. Role of government in conflicts
(implementers)
Source: implementers survey
0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%
Nepal
Peru
Uganda
Indonesia
Responsible for conflict
management?
Among services provided?
Uganda> Indonesia > Peru

10. Are conflicts better or worse after reforms?
(no. of villages reporting ‘worse’ relative to total
responses)
0 5 10 15 20 25
Peru
Uganda
Indonesia
Internal conflict
'worse'
External conflicts
'worse'
Total responses (by
village)
Source: key informant interviews
Peru > Uganda > Indonesia

11. Conflict in the past year
(% of individuals)
0% 2% 4% 6% 8% 10% 12% 14% 16% 18% 20%
Peru
Uganda
Indonesia
Were you involved in a land/ forest
conflict in the past year?
percent "yes"
Source: Intra-household survey
Peru & Uganda > Indonesia

12. How frequent are conflicts? (villagers)
0% 20% 40% 60%
Peru
Uganda
Indonesia
Villagers report conflict
every year or every other
year
Source: intra-hh survey
Peru > Uganda > Indonesia

13. “Models” of response/ resolution
Indonesia
High
Medium*
Low
? High ?
Variables Ideal:
conflict
resolved by
reforms
Frequency
(before)
High
Relevance
to/ action by
government
High
Frequency
(after)
Low
Tenure
security
(after)
High
Ineffective
resolution
High
?
High
Low
Uganda
High
High
Medium
? Low ?
Peru
High
Low
High
? Low ?
* Implementers report key role by NGOs and private sector on conflict mgmt

14. Conflict and tenure security
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70%
Peru
Uganda
Indonesia
"If I have a dispute... my rights will be protected"
Percent agree
Source: Intra-hh survey

15. “Models” of response/ resolution
Ideal:
conflict
resolved
by reforms
Indonesia Ineffective
resolution
Uganda Peru
Frequency
(before)
High High High High High
Relevance
to/ action by
government
High Medium ?? High Low
Frequency
(after)
Low Low High Medium High
Tenure
security
(after)
High High Low Low HIGH

16. Conclusions - 1
• Key reforms in Indonesia are in fact a conflict
resolution mechanism. They constitute ways
to formalize uses by communities that the
state considers illegal. Hence there is a clear
conflict reduction associated with certain
reforms.
• Even if the state is not playing the central role
in conflict resolution, it works with NGOs and
the private sector to facilitate this.

17. Conclusions - 2
• In spite of having the highest level of conflict, Peru
also has the highest level of tenure security.
• The evidence suggests that the regime of full
community property rights (land owned by
communities) may be one key reason for this.
• Conflict does not have a simple relationship with
tenure security / insecurity because it is mediated by
institutions. In this case, the main institution appears
to be the collective title.

18. Conclusions - 3
• At the same time, if Peru has the strongest
legal basis for rights, why is there so much
conflict?
• The role of the state:
o The state doesn’t see this as its mandate
o Once titling is over, their work is done

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