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Conflict in collective land and forest formalization: a preliminary analysis


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Conflict in collective land and forest formalization: a preliminary analysis.

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Conflict in collective land and forest formalization: a preliminary analysis

  1. 1. Conflict in collective land and forest formalization: A preliminary analysis Anne M Larson, Esther Mwangi, Iliana Monterroso, Nining Liswanti, Tuti Herawati Land and Poverty Conference 2018: Land Governance in an Interconnected World March 19-23 Washington, DC 2018
  2. 2. Comparative Study on Collective Forest Tenure Reforms  Establish how forest tenure reforms emerge: opportunities, and options for formal approaches to securing customary rights.  Identify factors that constrain reform implementation.  Identify impacts of tenure reform on rights, access and security of women, poor men and ethnic minorities to forests and trees.
  3. 3. Where?
  4. 4. How does formalization affect conflict? Methods… Survey of implementers (119 people, 4 countries) • Frequency, type of conflict; role in conflict resolution Peru (32), Uganda (30), Indonesia (28), Nepal (29) Key informants (133) and focus groups with men and women separately (162) in 55 villages Intra-hh survey (2734 total, 54 villages) • Frequency and nature of conflict before and after reform
  5. 5. Tenure regimes studied by country (2015-2017) Sample: 2707 observations (Intra-household surveys), Indonesia (1024), Peru (988) and Uganda (696) Tenure regimes Villages Uganda Peru Indonesia # of villages State land designated to use by communities 4 7 11 State land used by companies 4 4 Land owned by communities 4 18 (1) 23 Owned by individuals 4 4 Customary lands (different levels of formalization) 4 4 5 13 Total 16 22 17 55
  6. 6. How does formalization affect conflict: two models Variables Frequency (before) Relevance to/ action by government Frequency (after) Tenure security (after) High conflict resolved by reforms (ideal) High High Low High Ineffective resolution High ?? High Low
  7. 7. Some preliminary results
  8. 8. How frequent are conflicts? (implementers) Source: implementers survey 0% 50% 100% 150% Nepal Peru Uganda Indonesia conflict is frequent or very frequent Peru > Indonesia > Uganda
  9. 9. Role of government in conflicts (implementers) Source: implementers survey 0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100% Nepal Peru Uganda Indonesia Responsible for conflict management? Among services provided? Uganda> Indonesia > Peru
  10. 10. Are conflicts better or worse after reforms? (no. of villages reporting ‘worse’ relative to total responses) 0 5 10 15 20 25 Peru Uganda Indonesia Internal conflict 'worse' External conflicts 'worse' Total responses (by village) Source: key informant interviews Peru > Uganda > Indonesia
  11. 11. Conflict in the past year (% of individuals) 0% 2% 4% 6% 8% 10% 12% 14% 16% 18% 20% Peru Uganda Indonesia Were you involved in a land/ forest conflict in the past year? percent "yes" Source: Intra-household survey Peru & Uganda > Indonesia
  12. 12. How frequent are conflicts? (villagers) 0% 20% 40% 60% Peru Uganda Indonesia Villagers report conflict every year or every other year Source: intra-hh survey Peru > Uganda > Indonesia
  13. 13. “Models” of response/ resolution Indonesia High Medium* Low ? High ? Variables Ideal: conflict resolved by reforms Frequency (before) High Relevance to/ action by government High Frequency (after) Low Tenure security (after) High Ineffective resolution High ? High Low Uganda High High Medium ? Low ? Peru High Low High ? Low ? * Implementers report key role by NGOs and private sector on conflict mgmt
  14. 14. Conflict and tenure security 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% Peru Uganda Indonesia "If I have a dispute... my rights will be protected" Percent agree Source: Intra-hh survey
  15. 15. “Models” of response/ resolution Ideal: conflict resolved by reforms Indonesia Ineffective resolution Uganda Peru Frequency (before) High High High High High Relevance to/ action by government High Medium ?? High Low Frequency (after) Low Low High Medium High Tenure security (after) High High Low Low HIGH
  16. 16. Conclusions - 1 • Key reforms in Indonesia are in fact a conflict resolution mechanism. They constitute ways to formalize uses by communities that the state considers illegal. Hence there is a clear conflict reduction associated with certain reforms. • Even if the state is not playing the central role in conflict resolution, it works with NGOs and the private sector to facilitate this.
  17. 17. Conclusions - 2 • In spite of having the highest level of conflict, Peru also has the highest level of tenure security. • The evidence suggests that the regime of full community property rights (land owned by communities) may be one key reason for this. • Conflict does not have a simple relationship with tenure security / insecurity because it is mediated by institutions. In this case, the main institution appears to be the collective title.
  18. 18. Conclusions - 3 • At the same time, if Peru has the strongest legal basis for rights, why is there so much conflict? • The role of the state: o The state doesn’t see this as its mandate o Once titling is over, their work is done