Alger Spring 2022.pdf

Spring 2022 Edition
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Table of
Table of
Contents
Contents
A Sibling Rivalry: Saudi Arabia and Iran
Failed Engagement: A History of Syrian-
Iraqi Unification Attempts
A Case Study on the United Nations
Mission in Ethipoia and Eritrea
Girls’ Education in Kenya: Lessons From
COVID-19
Northern Ireland: Past, Present, Future
Reasoning Inflation and Supply Disruptions
The Logic of Going Green
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Letter from
the Editor
I am pleased to bring you the Spring 2022 edition
of Alger Magazine. This year our writers have focused
on bringing a global approch to writing and have cov-
ered current events out of numerous different nations.
I want to extend a special appreciation to my Man-
aging Editor Josh Goetz for all of his hard work and
support. Additionally, thank you to everyone who con-
tributed their talented writing to Alger. I have thou-
roughly enjoyed getting to know them all and reading
their work. I hope you all enjoy reading Alger as much
as I have!
Sincerely,
Caroline Mallory
Editor-in-Chief

Shiite protesters in Najaf, Iraq on January 4, 2016 holding posters of Sheikh
Nimr al-Nim to protest against the Saudi government and his execution in Saudi
Arabia the week prior, (Sly).
4
A Sibling Rivalry:
Saudi Arabia and
Iran
Rachel Simroth (she/her)

The current relationship between
Saudi Arabia and Iran illustrates an intense
competition for regional hegemony. This
rivalry — a Middle Eastern Cold War — ex-
ploits religious, political, and sectarian dif-
ferences through proxy conflicts to bolster
their influence (Khan, 2020). Both countries
view themselves as the natural leader of the
Middle East, offering different visions for
the Muslim world. Over the past few months
relations appeared to be improving, as Iran
and Saudi Arabia held several rounds of
talks and Iranian diplomats went to Saudi
Arabia for the first time since the Saudis sev-
ered diplomatic ties with Iran in 2016 (Ians,
2022). Yet, in March 2022, Iran unilaterally
suspended talks with its regional rival, offer-
ing no reason or date for new talks (Reuters,
2022). These failed negotiations to resolve
tensions produced by their systemic differ-
ences and regional proxy conflicts leaves the
bilateral relationship between Saudi Arabia
and Iran in a belligerent state.
This current hostile bilateral rela-
tionship between Saudi Arabia and Iran is
shaped by four main factors: religion, oil,
government structure, and their relationship
with the United States. The two countries
hold opposite stances on all of these issues.
This multi-front opposition formed by con-
flicting perspectives and interests increases
hostilities between Saudi Arabia and Iran on
domestic and international levels of analysis.
The religious difference between Sun-
ni-majority Saudi Arabia and Shi’a-majority
Iran fuels tensions as both seek to assert re-
gional dominance by legitimizing their sect
of Islam as the proper guiding force for the
Muslim world. Originally divided in the sev-
enth century over the succession of Prophet
Muhammad, Shiism and Wahhabism —
Saudi Arabia’s strict interpretation of Sunni
Islam — stand at the two extremes of the
Islamic spectrum (Litvak, 2017). A history
of religious conflicts has fueled their current
distrust of one another, as the Wahhabis
massacred thousands of Shiites in Karbala in
1801. The 1979 Iranian Revolution was a key
shift that influenced the current estranged
relationship as the Revolution called for the
overturning of the Sunni monarchical order
(Wehrey, 2009). Both states actively antag-
onize the opposing Islamic sect to promote
their own beliefs, demonstrated in the

Iranian demonstrators hold anti-Saudi signs at a rally to protest the execution by
Saudi Arabia of Sheikh Nimr al-Nimr, (Stephens).
5
multitude of anti-Shi’a publications distrib-
uted by the Saudi clergy to suppress any
support for the Islamic Revolution in the
1980s.
In Iran, the Muslim Brotherhood
- a Sunni Islamist group - would distance
itself in Iran in early 1980s as Sunni groups
became marginalized in their country. The
Republic’s ideology was shifting to revolve
less around pan-Islam, and rather towards
Ayatollah Khomeini’s distinct ‘rule of juris-
prudent’ that originates from Shi’a tradition
and is less compatible with Sunnism (Ataie,
2021). Diplomatic ties were severed in 1987
and 2016 as this religious rivalry turned
violent, with Saudi security forces killing
450 Iranians on their pilgrimage to the
Hajj (Litvak, 2017) and the Saudi execution
of prominent Shi’a leader Sheik Nimr al
Nimer (Ighani, 2016). These repeated reli-
gious clashes, including a series of mosque
bombings throughout the 2000s, augment-
ed distrust and animosity towards one
another, inflaming the bipolar landscape of
the Middle East (Heiden, 2018).
This religious division between Sunni
and Shi’a operates at the state level of analy-
sis as it influences Saudi Arabia’s and Iran's
domestic government systems. Although
the Koran does not promote political struc-
tures, it can advocate for specific political
options in the Muslim World (MacQueen,
2018). As the center of the Muslim world —
due to Mecca and Medina — Saudi Arabia
rigidly adheres to Sharia law in politics,
both to embody its central religious role
but also to avoid further Iranian influences
that criticize their practices and question
their religious legitimacy. Religion and
state regional power are interconnected in
the Middle East, as the fall of Sunni leader
Saadam Hussein in 2003 radically shifted
the regional balance of power in favor of
Iran, weakening the Sunni sect and sub-
sequently bolstering Shi’a Islam (Wehrey,
2009). During the Arab Spring, Iran aided
Shi’a minorities in multiple Gulf Arab states
to threaten the political influence of Sau-
di Arabia by targeting the power of Sunni
rulers across the region (Heiden, 2018). This
religious contention arguably operates also
at the international level, as the growth of
contemporary political Islamic influence
aggregates these proxy conflicts. Shias are
viewed as an Iranian fighting force loyal to
Iran rather than their home country
(Mabon, 2018). Although this classification
embodies the current power influences in
the Levant, it is not universally applicable,
as the Iran-Iraq War saw the Shi’a of Iraq
remain loyal to their state and not their
religious kin (Mabon, 2018). Both coun-
tries use their religious sect as a political
legitimation tool to increase their own state
power and influence across the Middle East.
Furthermore, the relationship be-
tween these two oil-rich states over oil pro-
duction has fluctuated throughout history
but has recently become more contentious.

Saudi Arabia leads the world in oil produc-
tion and exports, a title that carries signifi-
cant economic and political capital (Bahgat,
2000). Iran holds the world’s second-largest
natural gas and fifth-largest oil reserves,
but holds the more geostrategic location
between the Persian Gulf and the Caspian
Sea (Bahgat, 2000). They also hold the top
two spots as the largest oil producers in the
Organization of the Petroleum Exporting
Countries (OPEC) (Bahgat, 2000). Under-
standing that oil is a strategic international
commodity, both countries have historically
had clashes over their oil production and
economy. Saudi Arabia and Iran engaged
in economic warfare from 1985-1986 as the
Saudis flooded the international market with
its cheap abundant oil, consequently anger-
ing Iran as it created a major oversupply that
drastically reduced Tehran’s revenues (Bah-
gat, 2000). In September 2019, 18 drones
hit the Saudi Abqaiq oil processing facility
— the world’s largest — and cruise missiles
struck the Khurais oil field, temporarily
knocking out half of Saudi Arabia’s crude oil
production (BBC, 2019). Even though the
Houthis claimed responsibility, the Saudi
defense minister blamed Iran, stating this
attack “was launched from the north and
was unquestionably sponsored by Iran."
Iran denied these allegations and blamed
foreign forces, but the UN’s estimated range
of Houthi drones cannot reach those Sau-
di eastern oil fields, supporting the theory
of Iranian involvement (BBC, 2019). These
violent escalations over their competing oil
production feed their belligerent relation-
ship.
Oil operates primarily at the state level
as the centrality of oil to Middle East econ-
omies significantly impacts state political
decisions. The contrasting oil policies of
Workers repairing ther Aramco oil-processing facility in Abqaiq, Saudi Arabia,
that was damaged on September 14 in a missile and drone attack, (US troops).
6

Saudi Arabia and Iran represented a broad-
er symbiotic relationship between the state
system and the oil economy (MacQueen,
2018). OPEC is an intergovernmental orga-
nization that unifies petroleum production,
but Saudi Arabia and Iran belong to differ-
ent factions due to their varying economic
needs. Since Saudi Arabia has the world's
largest oil reserves and is a major supplier
for the U.S. and the Far East, they have the
economic ability to pursue cautious policies
to protect these finite resources. The Saudis
— alongside other members such as Kuwait,
Qatar, and the UAE — are the economic
doves of OPEC, while Iran belongs to the
hawk division of the organization. Iran
instead focuses on short-term monetary
and political gains as their lower oil reserves
and larger population forces them to meet
immediate economic needs rather than take
Saudi Arabia’s long-term view of the mar-
ket (Litvak, 2017). With the bilateral rela-
tionship between the two becoming more
antagonistic, any major changes in these
countries' state relations would have serious
implications for the oil energy market and
regional security system (Bahgat, 2000). Oil
has a significant impact at the state level as it
impacts multiple Middle Eastern countries'
economic and political decisions.
Moreover, Iran and Saudi Arabia both
claim to be the model state for Islam, even
though they have contrasting government
structures — a Shi’a theocracy and a Sun-
ni monarchy. Iran’s government combines
democratic and religious institutions: the
government has executive, legislative, and
judicial branches with parallel Islamic insti-
tutions, all laws are compatible with Sharia,
and elections are held but candidates have
to be vetted by the twelve-person Guardian
Council and overseen by the Supreme Lead-
er. Saudi Arabia’s absolute monarchy struc-
ture gives its king sole authority on political
decisions and clerics only have advisory
roles, while Shias believe the clergy is em-
powered to interpret God’s word. Animosity
over these different government structures
most strongly emerged after the 1979 Rev-
olution, as Iran’s theocracy strongly rejects
monarchies, with Ayatollah Khomeini call-
ing for pro-American monarchies in the
Gulf — specifically the House of Saud in
Saudi Arabia — to be overthrown (Iran v.
Saudi Arabia, 2016). This Iranian rhetoric
increases hostilities as it threatens the polit-
ical legitimacy of the Saudi government by
challenging their traditional stewardship of
Islam.
These tensions stem from the different
government structures operating at the state
political level. Iran believes the domestic
political system of Saudi Arabia — monar-
chical rule — is inherently un-Islamic, as
they view the Saudi monarchy’s promotion
of a lavish and exorbitant lifestyle financed
by petrodollars to be an immoral society
(Heiden, 2018). The shift in Iran post-1979
Revolution towards a fundamentalist the-
ocracy inflamed sectarian differences across
the Middle East over the proper structure
of government. (Husari, 2021). Ten months
after the Revolution in Iran, a Sunni Islamist
insurgent uprising seized the Grand Mosque
Saudi Arabia versus Iran, (Cortazzi).
7

Iranian students demonstrating against the United States and ‘world
imperialism’ in Tehran, November 4, 2010, (Parsi).
8
in Mecca to dispose of Saudi monarchs and
restore Islamic rule (Husari, 2021). This was
a direct challenge to the House of Saud’s
leadership as a method to export a particu-
lar domestic political influence throughout
the Middle East. These contrasting internal
political systems of Saudi Arabia and Iran
created a bipolar landscape between monar-
chies versus non-monarchies in the Middle
East.
In addition, Saudi Arabia and Iran’s
differing relationships with the United States
have placed additional pressure on their
relationship. The 1979 Revolution caused a
radical shift in the U.S.-Iranian relationship,
as Khomeini embraced fierce anti-American
sentiment and the Iran Hostage Crisis led
to severed diplomatic relations in 1980 (U.S.
Department, 2022). American multination-
al firms were expelled, the U.S. intelligence
base used to spy on the Soviets was closed,
and US arms exports to Iran abruptly ceased
after 52 American hostages were taken from
the US embassy in Tehran. Iran’s withdrawal
from its role as the policeman of the Persian
Gulf after 1979 left the U.S. with one less ally
in the Middle East to support Western in-
fluences, subsequently leading to a stronger
alliance between the U.S. and Saudi Arabia
(Rubinstein, 1981).
The U.S.-Saudi alliance is built on
decades of securing regional stability and
strong business ties as the Saudis are the top
destination for U.S. arms and have engaged
in multiple military operations, including
the first Gulf War (Council, 2017). Yet their
main shared goal is containing Iran. Saudi
Arabia’s close relationship with the U.S. is a
point of contention with Iran as the Iranian
government promotes a foreign policy that
is anti-imperialism, and is especially an-
ti-American influence (Rubinstein, 1981). A
warmer relationship between Saudi Arabia
and Iran is probably unlikely if the Saudis
continue to receive significant political, eco-
nomic, and military support from the Unit-
ed States, which Iran heavily criticizes. Yet,
this is not an unequivocal alliance, as Saudi

rooted in decades of distrust. Contradictory
religious beliefs, oil policies, government
structures, and relationships with the U.S.
have exacerbated tensions as both want re-
gional hegemony in the Middle East. Oper-
ating either at the state level or international
level, these four factors demonstrate how
religion, politics, proxies, and international
organizations are interconnected in influenc-
ing broader Middle East politics. Although
this bilateral relationship is quite estranged,
I believe warming relations can be possible,
if the two countries focus on economic and
trade interests as a starting point for their
mutual interests, and go from there.
9
Arabia’s connection to Jamal Khashoggi’s
death, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of
Action (JCPOA, also known as the Iran
Nuclear Deal) that restricts Iranians nuclear
capabilities, and the killing of Qasem Solei-
mani have driven Iran, Saudi Arabia, and
the United States to reevaluate their allianc-
es.
Saudi Arabia and Iran’s alternative
relationship with the United States operates
at the international level as we see the im-
mense power of global political structures
on the politics of the Middle East. Two
overlapping bi-polar systems impact Mid-
dle East politics here: Saudi Arabia-Iran
and U.S.-Soviet Union/Russia. Given that
the region holds the majority of the world’s
oil supply, these superpowers exert their
influence to achieve their own strategic
goals. The Islamic Revolution in 1979 sunk
American credibility while boosting Soviet
diplomacy, and the Soviets sought to de-
velop early friendly relations by being the
first state to recognize the Islamic Republic
(Rubinstein, 1981). Additionally, the JCPOA
demonstrated how the global political struc-
ture of the P5+1 (China, France, Germany,
Russia, the U.K., the U.S.) influenced the re-
gional politics of both Iran — regulations on
their domestic enrichment activities in ex-
change for the removal of sanctions — but
also Saudi Arabia. Today the Saudis support
U.S. efforts for revitalized talks, but back in
2015, the Saudis opposed the JCPOA as they
believed removing sanctions would expand
Iran’s economy and subsequently shift the
regional balance of power in Iran’s favor,
threatening their own economy (Al Jazeera,
2015). This deal embodies both realism and
neoliberalism as it stresses the critical influ-
ence of the international system on shaping
nation-states, like Iran and Saudi Arabia.
The current antagonistic bilateral re-
lationship between Saudi Arabia and Iran is

The relationship between Syria
and Iraq dates back to World War I, before
these two states existed. In 1914, the British
Empire was at war with the declining Otto-
man Empire and sought to undermine it in
any way possible (Bickerton and Klausner
42). During this time, a correspondence
between Sir Henry McMahon, the British
High Commissioner in Egypt, with Shar-
if Hussein bin Ali, the Hashemite King of
the Hejaz, which was located in the west-
ern part of modern-day Saudi Arabia, was
initiated. Through these correspondences,
the British promised to support the estab-
lishment of an independent Arab state in
the Levant and the western Arabian Penin-
sula (McQueen 38). However, following the
end of World War I, this promise would be
broken with the revelation of the Sykes-Pi-
cot Agreement and the Balfour Declaration.
The Sykes-Picot Agreement divided all Arab
territories east of Egypt between British and
French spheres of influence, and the Balfour
Declaration was a statement by the British
government in support of establishing a
Jewish national home in Palestine, which
was originally offered to Sharif Hussein (38-
40). In 1920, the French marched into Da-
mascus to depose Hussein’s son Faisal who
had been crowned King of the Arab King-
dom of Syria by the Pan-Syrian Congress
(42). Despite their broken promises,
the British tried to appease the Hashemite
family by making Faisal the King of Iraq and
making his brother, Abdullah, the Emir of
Transjordan (later Jordan) (Barnett 64-65).
The Hashemite family would later attempt to
unify the Levant and bring it under their in-
fluence, with Emir Abdullah floating a “Fer-
tile Crescent” plan in the 1940s. He wanted
the immediate unification of Syria, Lebanon,
Palestine, and Jordan, but he would settle for
a step by step process to achieve unification
that would have united Syria and Transjor-
dan, forming a union with Lebanon and
Palestine based on the model of the United
States or the Swiss Confederation (Seale 12).
In Iraq, the Hashemite family would be left
with a sense of resentment at being deprived
of Syria and believed that if Syria could be
brought under their control, it would ad-
vance Iraq’s security and economic interests
(Barnett 72). As these material factors were
developing, the idea of Pan-Arabism was
emerging and entering the mainstream dis-
course. Pan-Arabism called for political and
cultural unity between all
1 0
Failed Engagement: A History of
Syrian-Iraqi Unification Attempts
Michael Sarkis (he/him)
The crowing of Faisal I (in the center) as King of Syria, (Syrianhistory.com).

Arab states; this ideology would go on to
influence important political actors and
decision makers in the relationship between
Syria and Iraq (“Pan-Arabism”).
Attempts to unify Iraq and Syria
would not begin until after 1950, but the
groundwork for it was laid in the previ-
ous years. This was especially true in Syria.
During the French occupation of Syria, the
National Bloc led the struggle for Syrian
independence (Seale 24). However by 1947
fractures began to emerge and the bloc
would split into two parties: the National
Party and the People’s Party. The dominant
faction within the National Bloc was the
National Party, which represented the inter-
ests of Damascus (28). The weaker faction in
the bloc was the People’s Party, representing
the business interests of Aleppo. The Peo-
ple’s Party received considerable support
from the land-owning families of Syria and
would advocate most fiercely for unity with
Iraq as the economy of Aleppo had close ties
with the economies of Mosul and Baghdad
under the Ottoman Empire. They suffered
tremendously when the new borders cut off
the cities in the 1920s. However, it should
be noted that despite its support for unifica-
tion with Iraq, the People’s Party was not a
pro-Hashemite or pro-monarchy party and
this played a role in future negotiations (29-
30).
Following the Palestine War of 1948,
the Syrian government of President Shukri
Al-Quwatli and Prime Minister Khalid
Al-Azm was ousted in a coup led by Husni
Za’im on March 30, 1949 (44). Shortly, after
the coup, Za’im would approach Iraq with a
proposal for a defense treaty with the in-
tention of strengthening his hand vis-à-vis
Israel in the upcoming armistice talks (47).
However, the Iraqis were hesitant. Citing the
lack of constitutional government and Syria’s
previous rejection of cooperation with
Iraq, Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri Al-Said
expressed his reservations. However, Said
assured the Syrians that Iraq would come
to Syria’s aid if Syria was attacked by Israel
(51). While talks continued, Za’im gradual-
ly became less interested in his own propos-
al due to the influence of the Saudis, Egyp-
tians, and French (54). Za’im later joined
the anti-Iraq camp and opposed furthering
ties between Syria and Iraq (56). Za’im
would be overthrown in a coup by Sami
Hinnawi on August 14, 1949 (Barnett 99).
Following Hinnawi’s coup and the
return of parliamentary democracy to Syr-
ia, the People's Party came to dominate the
interim and post-November 15 parliamen-
tary elections (Seale 77-79). On the tail of
their victory, they would enter into unifi-
cation talks with Iraq. Despite the desire of
the People’s Party to see Syria and Iraq grow
closer and the desire of Hashemite Iraq to
exert influence over Syria, several key fac-
tors caused the talks to fail. One key issue
was the system of government between the
two countries. Syria was a parliamentary
republic, and many, including the People’s
1 1
Colonel Sami al-Hinnawi (fourth from the left) with the cabinet of Hashim Al-Atasi
(third from the right) in August 1949, (Syrianhistory.com).

Party, wished to preserve that system, un-
willing to abolish it or make it subservient to
the Hashemite monarchy (79-80). Another
issue was Iraq’s treaty with Britain, as many
Syrians, especially members of the military,
were against associating with Britain and/
or potentially being subject to British influ-
ence. As a result, the Syrians demanded that
Iraq abrogate its treaty with Britain, but Iraq
refused. In the midst of these negotiations,
Iraq proposed the issue of unification with
Syria to the Arab League in October of 1949
(Barnett 99). Egypt immediately moved to
undermine the union, by proposing the cre-
ation of a regional security pact, and making
it the focal point of the meetings with the
Arab League (100). Egypt’s endeavor even-
tually succeeded, culminating in the Arab
Collective Security Pact, which was passed
on April 13, 1950. However, the provisions
of the pact would never be implemented, as
Egypt had succeeded in obstructing unifica-
tion (102). Syrian premier Hashim Al-Atasi
announced that Syria would accept the pro-
posed security pact and cease negotiations
with Iraq (101). Despite this hindrance, the
People’s Party continued to lobby for unifi-
cation with Iraq. Iraq’s Regent Abdu’llah re-
placed Nuri Al-Said, who was seen as being
too pro-British, with Ali Jawdat, a politician
who was thought to be more acceptable to
the Syrians, to help smooth negotiations
(Seale 83). However, their hopes for unifica-
tion would be squashed with a coup led by
Adib Al-Shishakli, a colonel in the Syrian
army and an opponent of unification with
Iraq, in December 1949.
In the aftermath of the coup, Shishakli
was seeking to protect Syria from unification
with Iraq and as a result, allowed Syria’s par-
liament to continue (84, 91). This allowed
for renewed, but ill-fated attempts, to fur-
ther pursue Syrian-Iraqi unity, with Nazim
Al-Qudsi at the forefront. Nazim Al-Qudsi
was a predominant figure within the People’s
Party and became Prime Minister on June
4, 1950 after the collapse of the post-coup
government (95). In January 1951, Qud-
si asked the Arab League what measures
needed to be taken for an Arab Federation
to come about, but in effect, this federation
would have been between Syria and Iraq
(105). Back in Syria, many were against
Qudsi’s move and hounded him in the Syr-
ian Chamber, eventually forcing him to re-
sign (106). No further attempt at unification
would be pursued under Shishakli’s rule and
over the following years,he would further
solidify his hold on power. This temporarily
suspended the parliamentary system, which
was only restored when he was overthrown
in February 1954.
From February 1954 to February
1958, no serious attempt at unification was
made, even though pro-Hashemite sympa-
thies continued to exist in Syria,
Colonel Adib Al-Shishakli in 1952, (Syrianhistory.com).
1 2

traditional enemies of Syrian-Iraqi unity
were distracted, and the pro-unionist Fadil
al-Jamali was Prime Minister of Iraq. On top
of the traditional reasons that had hindered
Syrian-Iraqi unity, the Syrians realized that
they would be able to gain more from multi-
ple governments—Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Iraq,
etc.—competing over them, than if they
were to side with Iraq. Along with this, the
Iraqis became weary of Syria’s political scene
and Syrian politicians' unreliability (166-
167). However, in the final days of the post-
coup government, Syrian Prime Minister
Sabri Al-Asali and Mikhail Ilyan, a pro-Iraqi
member of the National Party, met with
Prime Minister Jamali and other Iraqi lead-
ers to discuss the possibility of Iraq attacking
Syria, in order to bring about their unifica-
tion (169-170). However, in the following
years Syria would grow closer to Egypt, and
created two ministerial committees in
in 1956 and 1957 to explore the possibility
of a federal union with Egypt (Jankowski
101-102). Alongside these committees, a
Syrian delegation was sent to visit Egypt to
discuss union in December 1957, but they
were rebuffed (103). In contrast to these
civilian pursuits of union, nationalist and
“progressive” factions of the Syrian military
formed a Military Command Council in Au-
gust 1957 to safeguard Syrian independence
(104). Ironically, this council served as the
catalyst to the Syrian-Egyptian union. On
January 11, 1958, after being prodded by the
Syrian Foreign Minister Salah al-Din Bitar
of the Baath Party and adopting a resolution
endorsing a unification between Syria and
Egypt, sent a delegation to Egypt to nego-
tiate (105-106). Upon receiving the delega-
tion, Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nass-
er told them he would only discuss union
with an official delegation from the Syrian
President Gamal Abdul Nasser (on the left) of Egypt and President Shukri Al-Quwatli (on the right) of Syria uniting Syria and Egypt
in 1958, (Syrianhistory.com).
1 3

government. The Syrian government did
just that, sending an official delegation to
negotiate union between the two countries
(107). Eventually, they reached an agree-
ment, culminating in the formation of the
United Arab Republic on February 1, 1958
(114). On July 14, 1958, the Hashemite
monarchy in Iraq would be overthrown in a
coup. The United Arab Republic would not
last long, with a successful Syrian separat-
ist coup launched on September 28, 1961
which was spurred by the exclusion of Syri-
ans from the decision-making of the United
Arab Republic (Kienle 13).
In the years following the 1961 coup,
the Ba’ath party played an increasingly out-
sized role in Syria and Iraq. The Ba’ath party
was founded in Syria in 1947, by Michel
Aflaq and Salah al-Din Bitar, who had been
college students together in Paris (Seale 148,
151). Their ideology was influenced by a
mixture of German romantic and idealistic
nationalism and Marxism (153). Their mot-
to was “Arab unity, freedom, and socialism”
and they promoted pan-Arabism though
they had been opposed to earlier attempts
at unification with Iraq, because of Britain’s
perceived control over Iraq.
In the immediate aftermath of the
coup, Syria’s relations with Egypt damp-
ened and led to rapprochement with Iraq.
However, this rapprochement ended when
the Iraqi branch of the Ba’ath Party staged
a coup on February 8, 1963. In Syria, this
was followed with a coup led by a coalition
of Baathists, Nationalists, and Nasirists on
March 8, 1963. These two Ba’ath regimes
would not have long to cooperate as anoth-
er coup in Iraq occurred on November 18,
1963 (Kienle 13-14). From this second coup
in Iraq to July 1968, no unity attempt was
made between Syria and Iraq. Instead,
the two countries competed for Egyptian
support (15). In fact, after the Ba’ath Party
regained power in Iraq in July 1968, the two
Ba’ath regimes’ pursuit of unification would
be limited, each only pursuing it when uni-
fication benefited their own interests. Why
did these two regimes with supposedly the
same ideology and commitment to pan-Ara-
bism fail to advance and achieve unity be-
tween their respective countries? The main
reason is that, since the end of the United
Arab Republic where some elements of the
Ba’ath praised the republic’s dissolution,
regional interests had come to supersede
transnational pan-Arabism in both Syria
and Iraq (16).
The last attempt at unity came in the
aftermath of the 1973 Arab-Israeli War. As
an Egyptian-Israeli rapprochement appeared
on the horizon, Syria sought to create an
alternative to the Syrian-Egyptian axis that
had traditionally opposed Israel (Ma’oz 152).
As a result, the Syrians tried to settle their
differences with Iraq, but Baghdad rejected
their overtures. However, the Syrians would
continue to push for a new alliance, espe-
Hafez Al-Assad (on the right), President of Syria from 1971 to 2000, with
then Vice-President Saddam Hussein (on the left) of Iraq in Damascus 1979,
(Syrianhistory.com).
1 4

cially after Egyptian President Anwar Sa-
dat visited Jerusalem in 1977. The Syrians
attempted a “Tripoli Bloc,” composed of
radical Arab regimes, but the Iraqis refused
to join when the Syrians refused to de-
nounce UN Resolutions 242, which called
on Israel to withdraw from the territories
it captured in the Six-Day War in exchange
for Arab recognition, and Resolution 338,
which called for an end to the October War
and the implementation of Resolution 242
along with the initiation of negotiations
(Ma’oz 153, “United Nations Resolution 242,”
“United Nations Resolution 338”). After
the Camp David Accords, a series of agree-
ments between Egypt and Israel that would
culminate into a peace treaty, were signed
in 1978, Iraq sought rapprochement with
Syria (Carter, Ma’oz 153). This culminated
in Syria and Iraq signing the Charter for
Joint National Action in October 1978 which
called for political, economic, military, and
cultural unity. In spite of this step towards
unification, Syria hesitated on a full merger
with Iraq, preferring a step-by-step approach
to avoid Iraqi domination and a war with
Israel. In the midst of these unity talks, Sadd-
am Hussein seized power in Iraq in 1979,
and though unity talks continued, they were
eventually suspended when Saddam claimed
to have discovered a plot by Syria to depose
him. In 1980, the two countries would expel
each other's ambassadors, after Iraq claimed
to have found another plot by Syria (Ma’oz
153-154).
Tensions between the two countries
remained high. In the Iraq-Iran War, Syria
sided with Iran, and in the first Gulf War,
it sided with the United States against Iraq
(206). During the Iraq War, Syria funneled
foreign volunteers from across the Arab
World into Iraq and provided
military assistance to them, in order to
counter the Americans who they saw as
a threat (Dagher 113). However, the two
countries re-established diplomatic ties in
2006. Tensions remained even with the new
government in Iraq, as both Iraq and Syria
both recalled their envoys in 2009 after Iraq
found evidence linking two Iraqi Ba’athists
in Syria to bombings across the country
(“Iraq and Syria recall ambassadors”). This
accusation was not without cause, as Syr-
ia had allowed several Saddam loyalists to
set up base in the country and support the
Iraqi insurgency (Dagher 127). However,
following the beginning of the Syrian Civil
War, in a deal brokered by Iran, Iraqi mi-
litias went to Syria to defend the regime of
Bashar Al-Assad and to defend Holy Shrines
(Khan). Along with this, following the rise
of ISIL, the Iraqi military would share intel-
ligence and security information with Syria,
along with Russia and Iran. In 2019, Syria
and Iraq reopened a border crossing on a
highway linking Baghdad and Damascus af-
ter Iraqi security forces retook the area from
ISIS in 2017 (“Iraq reopens Al Qaim border
crossing with Syria”).
1 5

A Case Study on the United Nations
Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea
Background
Ethiopia is an ancient civilization.
Indeed, it is mentioned in the Bible that
a eunuch of Ethiopian origin is said to be
among the first converts to Christianity
(Acts 8:26-40). Christian tradition further
records that Ethiopia would later become
the second Christian state in the world;
being preceded only by Armenia. It is one of
only two countries in Africa to have never
been colonized by a European power—
though unlike Liberia, Ethiopia was formed
solely in Africa by Africans.
Eritrea is much younger and smaller
than its neighbor to the south. Unlike Ethi-
opia, it was colonized by the Kingdom of
Italy. Notably, Italy also attempted to colo-
nize Ethiopia, but was famously—and for
the time, embarrassingly—militarily defeat-
ed by Ethiopia. Italy tried again in 1935 and
was able to mostly defeat Ethiopia, a fellow
member of the League of Nations, and
forced Emperor Haile Selassie into exile.
Following the end of the Second
World War—into which Italy’s invasion of
and conflict with Ethiopia was largely fold-
ed —and the defeat of Italy and the other
Axis powers, Ethiopia became a founding
member of the new United Nations. And
in that new international organization, “the
General Assembly in its fifth regular session,
recommended that Eritrea should constitute
an autonomous unit federated with Ethiopia
under the sovereignty of the Ethiopian
Crown” via Resolution 390 (Final Report
1). This federation lasted for about a decade
before “Emperor Haile Selassie dissolved the
federation and annexed Eritrea, triggering a
thirty year armed struggle” for Eritrean in-
dependence (“Ethiopia and Eritrea” [Global
Policy Forum]). During those three decades,
there were a number of important occur-
rences in Ethiopia proper. The most notable
concurrences include: the 1974 overthrow of
Haile Selassie and the Ethiopian monarchy,
an invasion by and war with Somalia, and a
seventeen year long civil war. 1991 saw the
end of both the civil war and the Eritrean
War of Independence, with Eritrea gaining
independence. The new country would be
admitted to the United Nations two years
later on May 28th, 1993 (“A/RES/47/230”).
After independence, Isaias Afwerki
became President of Eritrea—a position he
Horn of Africa Map, (Wikimedia commons/Z fre).
1 6
James Welch (he/him)

has continued to occupy to the time of this
writing, December of 2021. In Ethiopia,
Meles Zenawi ascended to become first the
President of Ethiopia and then the Prime
Minister. He would hold the latter position
until his death in 2012. Following the con-
clusion of the Ethiopian Civil War and the
Eritrean Civil War, there appears to have
been tension and competition between
the two men. It seems President Afwerki
“viewed himself as mentor of Zanawi [sic]
[and] suddenly realized that the latter had
become more important when he took over
the reigns [sic] of the bigger country.” There
were other, more concrete reasons for ten-
sions as well; particularly “over issues such
as, valuation of currency; un-demarcated
borders and use of Assab port of Eritrea that
had traditionally served the trade interests
of Ethiopia”(Chauhan) Of these, the lack of
clear demarcation along the border shared
by the two countries would become the
source of much tension between Ethiopia
and Eritrea.
Fighting Begins & the Build-up to the
Mission
In the region occupied by the border of
Ethiopia and Eritrea, there is a small village
known as Badme. It is home to around 1500
people. By all accounts it should be an in-
significant settlement. However, Badme has
also played an outsized role in the histories
of Ethiopia, Eritrea, and indeed the United
Nations. As previously mentioned, the Ethi-
opian-Eritrean border was poorly demar-
cated, leading to ambiguities. The village of
Badme was the site of one such ambiguity,
which in May 1998 created a small dispute
(Chauhan). Unfortunately, this small, lo-
calized border dispute got out of hand and
turned into war (Healy and Plaut 2).
This war quickly attracted an array of inter-
national attention. The Secretary-General of
the United Nations, Kofi Annan, “immedi-
ately contacted the leaders of both countries,
urging restraint and offering assistance in
resolving the conflict peacefully” (“Ethio-
pia and Eritrea - UNMEE - Background”).
Important international actors, namely the
United States of America, also offered sup-
port in finding a peaceful solution (Healy
and Plaut 2). It was, however, the Organiza-
tion of African Unity (OAU)—the predeces-
sor to the African Union—that led the push
to halt the fighting and reestablish peace. As
an African intergovernmental organization,
the OAU was particularly concerned by the
start of a violent, inter-state conflict in the
continent. This concern is compounded
when one considers the influence and signif-
icance that Ethiopia held and holds among
(pan-)African organizations and among Af-
rican states themselves. As mentioned before,
Ethiopia was the only African country to
not only escape, but successfully resist col-
onization, while maintaining a government
created and led by indigenous Africans. It is
no surprise therefore that the man chosen
to serve as the first Chairman of the Orga-
nization of African Unity was Haile Selassie,
Emperor of Ethiopia. In fact the OAU had its
headquarters in the capital of Ethiopia, Addis
Ababa. The African Union maintains one of
its headquarters there to this day. With such
an intertwined history, there was never real
doubt as to whether the OAU would seek to
end the Ethiopian-Eritrean conflict.
In pursuing that goal, they found suc-
cess. In November 1998, the organization got
the two countries to agree to the Framework
Agreement for a Peaceful Settlement of the Dis-
pute Between Eritrea and Ethiopia. This was ex-
panded and elaborated upon by the Modalities
for the Implementation of the OAU Framework
Agreement of the Dispute Between Ethiopia
1 7

and Eritrea in July of 1999 and the Technical
Arrangements for the Implementation of the
OAU Framework Agreement and Its Modali-
ties in August of the same year. A notable,
immediate product of the Framework Agree-
ment and its Modalities and Technical Arrange-
ments was that “Eritrea committed itself to
‘redeploy its forces outside the territories
they occupied after 6 May 1998’” and “Ethi-
opia committed itself to ‘redeploy, thereafter,
its forces from positions taken after 6 Febru-
ary and which were not under Ethiopian ad-
ministration before 6 May 1998’” (“Ethiopia
and Eritrea - UNMEE - Background”). The
exact locations of the redeployments was to
be determined by a Neutral Commission
(“Technical Arrangements”). Unfortunately,
the implementation of the documents was
hindered by Ethiopia, who “requested clari-
fications, while reaffirming its commitment
to a peaceful resolution of the conflict”
(“Ethiopia and Eritrea - UNMEE - Back-
ground”). This did not however stop
attempts at mediation. From May 8th to
May 10th of 2000, a special mission visit-
ed the two capital cities, Addis Ababa and
Asmara, in hopes of helping to find a solu-
tion (“Security Council special mission visit
to Eritrea and Ethiopia” 1-2; “Ethiopia and
Eritrea - UNMEE - Background”). A report
regarding the special mission was delivered
to the United Nations Security Council on
May the 11th. The next day, on the 12th of
May, “fighting between Eritrea and Ethio-
pia erupted again” (“Ethiopia and Eritrea
- UNMEE - Background”). With this devel-
opment—which was rather disappointing
to some—the actors working for peace had
to redouble their efforts. Fortunately, their
labors were not in vain.
Fighting Ends & the Establishment of
the United Nations Mission in
Ethiopia and Eritrea
Ethiopia Eritrea Temporary Security Zone, (Martin Plaut)
1 8

UN Soldiers in Eritrea, (Wikimedia commons/
Dawit Rezene)
1 9
The Agreement on Cessation of Hostili-
ties between Ethiopia and Eritrea was signed
by the two countries foreign ministers on
June 18th of the same year, after negotia-
tions under the auspices of the Organization
of African Unity (“Ethiopia and Eritrea -
UNMEE - Background”). Assistance was
further provided by the then-President of
Algeria—who was also serving as the Chair-
man of the Organization of African Unity
at the time—the Personal Envoy of the
Presidency of the European Union, and a
representative of the President of the Unit-
ed States (“Ethiopia and Eritrea - UNMEE
- Background”). In the treaty, the Federal
Democratic Republic of Ethiopia and the
State of Eritrea
committed themselves to resolve the crisis
‘through peaceful and legal means’, in ac-
cordance with the principles of both the
OAU and the UN; to reject the use of force
as a solution to disputes; to respect the
borders existing at independence, deter-
mining them ‘on the basis of the pertinent
colonial treaties and applicable internation-
al law’; to make use of technical means to
demarcate the borders; and to resort to
arbitration, in case of controversy
(Greppi).
Additionally, the OAU Framework Agree-
ment was to be accepted by the two coun-
tries (Greppi). Most importantly, it “called
upon the United Nations… to establish
a peacekeeping operation to assist in
the implementation of the Agreement”
(“Ethiopia and Eritrea - UNMEE - Back-
ground”). December 12th saw the signing
of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in
Algiers (Special report 7 Apr. 2008 1). The
two treaties are often collectively referred
to as the Algiers Agreements. An import-
ant aspect of the latter agreement was the
establishment of “a neutral boundary
commission, mandated to delimit and de-
marcate the border between the two coun-
tries, based on pertinent colonial treaties
and applicable international law” comprised
of “eminent legal experts chosen by both
countries” (Special report 7 Apr. 2008 2;
Healy and Plaut 2). It was then, in the latter
half of the year 2000, the work of the United
Nations Missions in Ethiopia and Eritrea
began.
Mandate
As previously mentioned, the Algiers
Agreements asked the United Nations to
create a peacekeeping mission to help actu-
alize the agreements. To fulfill this request,
the Security Council passed Resolution
1312 on July 31st of 2000, which created
the United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and
Eritrea—also known as UNMEE—“consist-
ing of up to 100 military observers and the
necessary civilian support staff” and lasting

until January 31st, 2001. Roughly a month
and a half later, the Security Council
changed the nature of the mission via Res-
olution 1320. This transformed what had
been a simple observer mission of up to 100
into a proper peacekeeping mission “of up
to 4,200 troops, including up to 220 military
observers” with a mandate to:
(a) Monitor the cessation of hostilities; (b)
Assist, as appropriate, in ensuring the ob-
servance of the security commitments agre-
ed by the parties; (c) Monitor and verify the
redeployment of Ethiopian troops from po-
sitions taken after 6 February 1999 which
were not under Ethiopian administration
before 6 May 1998; (d) Monitor the po-
sitions of Ethiopian forces once redeployed;
(e) Simultaneously, monitor the positions
of Eritrean forces that are to redeploy in
order to remain at a distance of 25 kilome-
tres [sic]from positions to which Ethiopian
forces shall redeploy; (f) Monitor the
temporary security zone (TSZ) to assist in
ensuring compliance with the Agreement
on Cessation of Hostilities; (g) Chair the
Military Coordination Commission (MCC)
to be established by the United Nations and
the Organization of African Unity in accor-
dance with the Agreement on Cessation of
Hostilities; (h) Coordinate and provide
technical assistance for humanitarian mine
action activities in the TSZ and areas adja-
cent to it; (i) Coordinate the Mission’s activi-
ties in the TSZ and areas adjacent to it with
humanitarian and human rights activities of
the United Nations and other organizations
in those areas (“Resolution 1320”).
The date of the expiration of the mandate
was also changed to March 15th, 2001
(“Resolution 1320”). During the course of
the mission, its mandate would be modified
a further twenty times. As a peacekeeping
mission, changes to the mandate of UN-
MEE—like its creation—were done via
resolutions passed by the Security Council.
Most of these resolutions only extended the
mandate, i.e. pushed back the date of the
mission’s conclusion, in most cases by
increments of six months. However, there
were some that affected the substantive
nature of the mandate. Resolution 1430,
passed on August 14th of 2002, adjusted
UNMEE’s mandate “in order to assist the
Boundary Commission in the expeditious
and orderly implementation of its Delimi-
tation Decision, to include with immediate
effect: (a) demining in key areas to support
demarcation, and (b) administrative and
logistical support for the Field Offices of the
Boundary Commission”.
On September 14th, 2004, the Securi-
ty Council passed Resolution 1560, which—
in addition to extending the mandate until
March 15th of the next year—approved
“the adjustments to UNMEE, including its
presence and operations, as recommended
by the Secretary-General.” The recommen-
dations in question involved two phases.
The first called for the “replacing the Slovak
military demining contingent, which left
the Mission in June, with a modest com-
mercial capacity.” The second called for the
consolidation of some military and civilian
elements of the mission (Progress report
4). Roughly a year later, Resolution 1622
added ten additional military observers,
approved more demining assistance, and
decided “to extend the mandate of UNMEE
until 15 March 2006”. On May 31st, 2006,
Resolution 1681 reconfigured the mission’s
military component “of up to 2,300 troops,
including up to 230 military observers.” It
also extended the mandate “for a period
of four months, until 30 September 2006”
(“Resolution 1681”). Resolution 1741 would
reduce that number to 1700, “including 230
military observers” and extend the mandate
to July 31st, 2007. The next Security Council
resolution to substantively affect the man-
date of the United Nations Mission in Ethi-
opia and Eritrea would be its last. On July
30th, 2008, Resolution 1827 was passed
2 0

by the Security Council, terminating the
mission on 31 July 2008.
Operating Details
The United Nations Mission to Ethio-
pia and Eritrea, as the name suggests, oper-
ated within the Federal Democratic Repub-
lic of Ethiopia and the State of Eritrea. Most
of their activity was concentrated within
the Temporary Security Zone or TSZ. As
previously mentioned, the TSZ spanned
the border of the two countries in a bid to
separate their militaries. The TSZ was 1000
kilometers in length, twenty-five kilometers
wide, and entirely within Eritrea. It must
also be noted that the Temporary Security
Zone accounted for more than one fifth of
the land territory of Eritrea (Chauhan).
Monitoring the TSZ, the troops of
both states, and the “cessation of hostilities”
were the principal tasks of the mission. It
also had responsibilities regarding “human
rights, mine action, and other humanitarian
activities” (“Ethiopia and Eritrea” [Global
Peace Operations Review]). That being said,
human rights and other humanitarian issues
were a secondary concern for the mission
and not an important priority.
Mission Composition & Cost
As a peacekeeping mission under the
guises of the United Nations, UNMEE was
composed of a diverse group of participants.
The following fifty countries contributed
military personnel:
Algeria, Australia, Austria, Bangladesh,
Benin, Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina,
Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, China, Croatia,
Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland,
France, Gambia, Germany, Ghana, Greece,
Guatemala, India, Iran, Ireland, Italy,
Jordan, Kenya, Kyrgyzstan, Malaysia,
Mongolia, Namibia, Nepal, Netherlands,
Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Paraguay, Peru,
Poland, Romania, Russian Federation,
Singapore, Slovakia, South Africa, Spain,
Sri Lanka, Sweden, Switzerland, Tanzania,
Tunisia, Ukraine, United Kingdom,
United States, Uruguay and Zambia
(“Ethiopia and Eritrea UNMEE - Facts and
Figures”).

One should note that the above list contains
multiple states from every inhabited con-
tinent. One should also note that all of the
Permanent Members of the Security Coun-
cil—the People’s Republic of China, the
French Republic, the Russian Federation,
the United Kingdom of Great Britain and
Northern Ireland, and the United States of
America—contributed military personnel.
This signals that these great powers found
a continuation of violent conflict between
Ethiopia and Eritrea to harm their own
goals or to not be a part of their own goals.
With the two countries being so close to the
crucial shipping areas of the Red Sea and
the Gulf of Aden—not to mention proxim-
ity to the southern Middle East and Soma-
lia—conflict in the Horn of Africa would
seem most unappealing.
Three other countries of note include
Canada, Denmark and the Netherlands;
who notably took part in the deployment
of the Standby High-Readiness Brigade
or SHIRBRIG (“Military”). At the time of
writing, SHIRBRIG is the closest thing to
a standing UN peacekeeping force that
has ever existed. It was sent right at the
start of UNMEE and was assigned to be
there “for a period of no more than six
months” (“ECLIPSE”). While deployed
with SHIRBRIG, the Dutch and Canadian
forces combined, “thus creating the Neth-
erlands-Canadian Battalion (NECBAT)”
(“The Dutch contribution”). By the end of
June 2001, SHIRBRIG deployments had
2 1

been withdrawn (" ECLIPSE”; “The Dutch
contribution”).
At the highest point of deployment
in May 2002, the United Nations Mission
in Ethiopia and Eritrea included “4,154
total uniformed personnel including 3,940
troops and 214 police supported by 229 in-
ternational civilian personnel and 244 lo-
cal civilian staff.” It had four different force
commanders during its existence. From
November 2000 to October 2002, Brigadier
General P.C. Cammaert of the Netherlands
filled the role. He was followed the next
month by Major-General Robert Gordon
of the United Kingdom, who served in that
position until June 2004. Major-General
Rajender Singh of India was force com-
mander from July 2004 – March 2006. The
final force commander was Major-General
Mohammad Taisir Masedeh of Jordan who
began his term in April 2006 and finished
his term with the conclusion of the mission
in July of 2008. The civilian head of the mis-
sion was the Chief of the Mission and Spe-
cial Representative of the Secretary-Gen-
eral, a position filled by Joseph Legwaila
of Botswana until July of 2006. Technically
speaking, he did not have a permanent
successor, but Azouz Ennifar of Tunisia
served as the Acting Special Representative
of the Secretary-General and Acting Chief
of Mission from Legwaila’s departure until
UNMEE’s conclusion. The official headquar-
ters of the mission were l located in both
countries’ capitals: Asmara and Addis Aba-
ba.
United Nations Peacekeeping states
that the total estimated expenditures for
the United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and
Eritrea was $1.32 billion USD. This broke
down into the following:
31July 2000 to 30 June 2001: $164.11 million
1 July 2001 to 30 June 2002: $185.01 million
1 July 2008 to 30 July 2008: $7.34 million
(estimated) (“Ethiopia and Eritrea - UN
MEE - Facts and Figures”).
Including the last month of funding, the
average yearly expenditure on the mission
was about $164.84 million. For the sake
of comparison, more than $2 trillion was
spent in the United States’ twenty-year war
in Afghanistan (Helman and Tucker). The
yearly average spent in that conflict would
be roughly one hundred billion USD, which
is many times more than the total monetary
cost, $1.32 billion, of the UNMEE.
Situations dealing with armed, hostile
groups typically have another cost associated
with them: the human cost. Tragically, this
was true for the United Nations Mission in
Ethiopia and Eritrea. During its eight-year
existence twenty people associated with the
mission lost their lives; thirteen of whom
were military, three were international civil-
ians, and four were local civilians (“Ethiopia
and Eritrea - UNMEE - Facts and Figures”).
Compared to actual warfare, twenty is a low
amount of fatalities. However, for the family,
friends, and to a lesser degree country of the
departed, twenty is a number far too high.
SHIRBRIG logo, (Wikimedia commons/
Poznaniak)
2 2

Experience of the Mission
The official duration of the United
Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea
was exactly eight years; beginning on July
31st in 2000 and ending on July 31st in 2008
“Ethiopia and Eritrea - UNMEE - Facts and
Figures”). Work began almost immediately
after Resolution 1320 was passed “with the
establishment of military liaison offices in
the capitals of the two countries in August
2000” (Special report 7 Apr. 2008 3). De-
ployment soon followed, with the Standby
High-Readiness Brigade, leading through-
out the early stages. This was carried out
at a good pace, for “by mid—March 2001,
98% of the authorized force strength was
in place” (Gowan and Whitfield 9). That
same month, “in accordance with standard
practice, a status-of-forces agreement was
concluded between Ethiopia and the United
Nations.” Eritrea never signed on due to a
number of disagreements over agreement
provisions. In February of the same year,
“the Eritrea-Ethiopia Boundary Commis-
sion was formally constituted… to delimit
and demarcate the common border between
the two countries, based on pertinent co-
lonial treaties and applicable international
law” as called for the Comprehensive Peace
Agreement. Per the Agreement, “‘the delim-
itation and demarcation determinations of
the Commission were to be final and bind-
ing.’’’ It would begin work shortly afterwards.
In the meantime UNMEE went on with its
business overseeing the redeployment of for-
merly belligerent troops and officially estab-
lishing the TSZ (Special report 7 Apr. 2008
3). Things were not perfect. For instance,
Eritrea did not provide UNMEE total free-
dom of movement, among other issues (Lie
12). Still, this may have been the high point
of the mission with the most cooperation
and acceptance of the peace process. Things
changed on the 13th of April, 2002, when the
Boundary Commission announced its deci-
sion at The Hague. Incredibly, the village of
Algerian President Abdelaziz Bouteflika with Ethiopian PM Meles Zenawi and Eritrean President Isaias Afwerki after the signing of a peace agreement on
December 12, 2000, in Algiers, (Associated press).
2 3

Horn of Africa Map, (Pax et Bellum)
2 4
Badme—where the conflict had kicked off
years prior—was not explicitly mentioned by
the Commission nor included on their maps
(Healy and Plaut 3). The representatives of
both Ethiopia and Eritrea left believing that
their respective countries had secured Bad-
me. As an aside, this is almost unbelievable.
One imagines that writers of fiction might
struggle to create a situation as outlandish as
this very real one. Eventually, the confusion
was cleared up and it became apparent that
the Eritrea-Ethiopia Boundary Commission
had awarded Badme to Eritrea (4).
Unsurprisingly, Ethiopia was not
happy. After a failed appeal attempt, Ethio-
pia ceased cooperation with the Boundary
Commission and decried the Commission’s
ruling as being “‘not in the interest of peace’”
and “‘manifestly unjust and illegal’” (Healy
and Plaut 4; “Ethiopia and Eritrea” [Glob-
al Peace Operations Review]; Gowan and
Whitfield 9). Eritrea, having been given the
village of Badme, accepted the Commis-
sion's ruling and refused to negotiate on
the matter, insisting that the “decision was
binding” (“Ethiopia and Eritrea” [Global
Peace Operations Review]). Nonetheless, the
Boundary Commission prepared to under-
take the actual demarcating of the border
and Resolution 1430 and gave UNMEE the
additional task of assisting that work. This
would eventually prove impossible to com-
plete without the cooperation of Ethiopia.
There were attempts to mediate and find
a solution, but both sides—especially Er-
itrea—were unwilling to change their posi-
tions (Special report 7 Apr. 2008 5). Later,
November of 2004 saw Ethiopia announce
“a five-point proposal that accepted the
boundary commission’s decision in princi-
ple”, which was promptly refused by Eritrea
(“Ethiopia and Eritrea” [Global Peace Oper-
ations Review]). This lack of acceptance of
the Commission’s decision and lack of
progress in forcing Ethiopia to accept the
decision—which Eritrea thought should be
done—angered the Eritrean government
and led it to take drastic action. Suddenly,
in early October of 2005, “Eritrea banned
UN helicopter flights in its airspace, forcing
peacekeepers to abandon eighteen out of a
total of forty small posts along the border
and to end demining activities” (Gowan and
Whitfield 9; “Ethiopia and Eritrea” [Global
Peace Operations Review]). Indeed, this
decision by Eritrea “curtailed UNMEE’s
operational efficiency and reconnaissance
along the border region by more than half”
(“Ethiopia and Eritrea” [Global Peace Op-
erations Review]). This also “affected evac-
uations by air of ill and injured UN person-
nel” (Healy and Plaut 5). Later in the same
month, Eritrea further restricted UNMEE
“by limiting night ground operations and
restricting land patrols to main roads.”
UNMEE was rapidly losing the ability to
operate. The next month it was revealed
that Ethiopia had sent thousands of troops
north towards the border, ostensibly “to
prevent an invasion by Eritrea.” This could
have started a war—or rather restarted the
previous war —between the two Horn

2 5
countries. Fortunately, this did not happen
as Ethiopia agreed to remove its troops. That
same November, Eritrea introduced another
restriction: “the security zone (TSZ) along
the border was declared off-limits to all UN
staff except peacekeeping troops” (“Ethiopia
and Eritrea” [Global Peace Operations Re-
view]). The Security Council was not exactly
happy about these and future restrictions
placed upon the United Nations Mission
in Ethiopia and Eritrea. To their credit, the
Council did threaten “to penalize the Eritre-
ans if they continued to obstruct the mis-
sion,” but it never really went further than
that (Gowan and Whitfield 9). Nevertheless,
in its final UNMEE restriction of 2005, Er-
itrea “demanded that all European and North
American staff be withdrawn from UNMEE,
leading to the hasty removal of around 180
members of staff” (Healy and Plaut 5). With
these restrictions in place, it was becoming
clear to the UN and others that the position
of UNMEE—which could be described as
having “been almost immobilized”—was
“becoming increasingly untenable and that
the time may be fast approaching to take
difficult decisions on the Mission 's future”
(Ray).
The year 2006 did not bring improve-
ment. Most of the year saw the same, restrict-
ed situation continue. In October of 2006,
there was a development, though not a posi-
tive one:
The Eritreans inducted a large num-
ber of Eritrean Defence [sic] Forces
(EDF) troops and heavy arms and
equipment inside the TSZ. Conse-
quent to all these developments, the
Eritrean Army, Police, Militia and
Administration adopted a more ho-
stile attitude towards UNMEE per-
sonnel in the field. Eritrea also re-
stricted supply of fuel to UNMEE
partially. A large number of UN patrols
were detained. It also prevented UNMEE
from manning the entry points, meant for
monitoring induction of regular
troops inside the TSZ (Chauhan).
This development, combined with the
previous and continuing restrictions, led
the Security Council to repeatedly cut
down the size of UNMEE, as several of
their resolutions demonstrated (Gowan
and Whitfield 9).
During this era of restrictions, the
Boundary Commission continued trying
to have the Ethiopian-Eritrean border
demarcated, to no avail. Eventually, “on
30 November 2007 the Eritrea-Ethiopia
Boundary Commission affirmed that, as
at that date, the border was demarcated by
coordinates (‘virtual demarcation’)” and
ceased to operate (Special report 7 Apr.
2008 5).
There were several, repeated at-
tempts by the UN, particularly by the
Secretaries-General Kofi Annan and Ban
Ki-Moon, to find a solution to the stale-
mate and crisis, but none were successful
(Special report 7 Apr. 2008 6-7). Later on
December 1st of 2007, Eritrea halted the
delivery of all fuel supplies to UNMEE,
“knowing fully well that the UN kept a
reserve for three months only” (Special
report 3 Mar. 2008 1; Chauhan). Impres-
sively, the mission was able to continue for
another eight months. Eventually however,
the Security Council could read the writing
on the wall and adopted resolution 1827,
thereby terminating UNMEE, effective
from 31 July (Lie 15).
Analysis
Without a doubt, the United Na-
tions Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea is an
example of first-generation peacekeeping;
that being peacekeeping focused primarily
on separating previously fighting factions,
thereby providing the necessary

However, it seems that there was a less ex-
plicit, implied portion of their mandate:
create an environment so the Algiers Agree-
ment and associated covenants could be
carried out. This did not happen. It would
not be illegitimate to argue that UNMEE is,
therefore, a failure. That, however, is not the
position being presented in this case study.
The Algiers Agreements were not fulfilled
because of anything done by the peace-
keepers, whether military personnel or not,
in UNMEE. No, the reason for this lack of
fulfillment was Ethiopia and Eritrea them-
selves. It was Ethiopia who refused to accept
the decision of the Eritrea-Ethiopia Bound-
ary Commission, despite the fact that it had
treaty obligations to do so. It was Eritrea
who refused to negotiate any further about
the matter—although, legally speaking, they
were not wrong to do so. It was then Eritrea
who imposed all manners of restriction on
UNMEE, effectively starving it out. The two
countries transformed UNMEE from be-
ing part of the solution to their quarrels to
an obstacle (Gowan and Whitfield 10). The
two neighboring countries did not fulfill
their obligations. If fault should be placed
or given, let it be laid at the feet of Ethiopia
and Eritrea. For this is ultimately the truth
of peacekeeping: if the parties to the peace
process and the peacekeeping mission do not
cooperate and do not fulfill their obligations
to the peace process and/or peacekeeping
mission, then the outcome of the UNMEE is
inevitable.
There is one aspect that UNMEE de-
serves a failing grade in: the treatment of
women. There a number of instances of sexu-
al exploitation and abuse during the course of
the mission. It got to the point that it warrant-
ed the attention of the Security Council and
was mentioned in at least one resolution the
Council produced (“Resolution 1622”). This is
unacceptable. Sexually harassing, assaulting
environment for a peace process. This is
abundantly clear in its mandate which was
essentially to supervise and oversee the
cessation of hostilities between the two
East African neighbors. They did dabble,
so to speak, in some more humanitarian
aspects that previous first-generation mis-
sions would not have considered, but these
remained far from the main focus of the
mission. The main focus was to facilitate the
peace process between the Federal Demo-
cratic Republic of Ethiopia and the State of
Eritrea.
This does raise the question of wheth-
er or not UNMEE was successful in this.
Under the watch of UNMEE, Ethiopia and
Eritrea did not return to a state of war—
though they, at times, may have gotten closer
than many in the international community
would have liked. This is certainly a positive
and, if judging more conservatively, seems to
indicate that UNMEE was successful.
2 6
Kofi Annan 2012, (Wikimedia commons/US Mission in Geneva)

Tigray in Ethipopia, (Wikimedia Commons/TUBS)
2 7
exploiting, abusing women, or anyone for
that matter, is intolerable in any and every
context. The fact that this was able and/or
allowed to happen is a failure on the part of
the UNMEE.
Epilogue
Following the withdrawal and ter-
mination of the United Nations Mission in
Ethiopia and Eritrea there were fears, held
in particular by Secretary-General Ban Ki-
moon, that full-scale war between the two
neighbors—as seen before the signing of the
Algiers Agreements—would return (“Eritrea
allays”). Thankfully, this did not happen
but, the regions surrounding the border in
both countries have seen outbreaks of vio-
lence (“Eritrean–Ethiopian border”). Still,
inter-state conflict between Ethiopia and
Eritrea was averted.
Early it was mentioned that the lead-
ers in the two countries prior to UNMEE
were President Isaias Afwerki of Eritrea and
Prime Minister Meles Zenawi of Ethiopia.
Afwerki is still the President of Eritrea. Ze-
nawi held the office of Prime Minister until
his death in 2012. After his death, Zenawi’s
party, the Tigray People's Liberation Front,
was able to hold power for six more years.
In 2018, it was voted out of office and Abiy
Ahmed became the new Prime Minister.
That same year, he formally made peace with
Eritrea and settled the border issue; actually
ceding Badme to Eritrea and recognizing
Eritrean control over it (Mersie et al.; Maas-
ho). However, the region is not at peace.
According to the Ethiopian government of
Abiy Ahmed, the Tigray People’s Liberation
Front is waging an insurrection that began
in late 2020, which the government is fight-
ing. This is occurring largely in Tigray, right
on the Eritrean border. Eritrea seems to
have joined in the fight against their old
enemies (Mersie et al.). As of this writing,
the situation involving Ethiopia, Eritrea, and
the Tigray People’s Liberation Front is very
much ongoing and what conclusion will
be reached is unknown. What is known is
that violence continues, people suffer, and
peace—whether negative or positive—con-
tinues to elude the border of the Federal
Democratic Republic of Ethiopia and the
State of Eritrea.

2 8
Appendix
Security Council Resolutions Affecting the Mandate of the United Nations Mission in
Ethiopia and Eritrea
Resolution 1312
Resolution Number Effect on UNMEE Mandate Date Passed
First Creation of UNMEE;
Discussed in case study, 31 July 2000
see Mandate section
Second Creation of UNMEE;
Resolution 1320 Discussed in case study, 15 September 2000
see Mandate section
Extends mandate to 15
Resolution 1344 September 2001 15 March 2001

Resolution 1369 March 2002 14 September 2001

Discussed in case study, see
Resolution 1430 Mandate section 14 August 2002
`



Discussed in case study; see
Resolution 1560 Mandate section 14 September 2004


Discussed in case study, see
Resolution 1622 Mandate section 13 September 2005

Extends mandate to 15 April
Resolution 1661 2006
14 March 2006

2 9
Extends mandate to 15 May
Resolution 1670 2006 13 Apri 2006
Extends mandate to 31 May
Resolution 1678 2006 15 May 2006

Resolution 1681 Mandate section 31 May 2006
Resolution 1741 Mandate section 30 January 2007

Extends madate to 31 January
Resolution 1767 2008 30 July 2007

Extends mandate to 31 July
Resolution 1798 2008 30 January 2008

Terminates the mandate on 31
Resolution 1827 July 2008 30 July 2008

many students did not return when schools
reopened for various reasons, most of whom
were girls. In Kenya, specifically, 16% of girls
withdrew when schools closed in March
2020 (Kwuak).
Kenya closed schools from March
2020 to January 2021 to combat the virus.
The East African nation attempted to de-
liver education in various online formats;
however, connecting all students remained
a challenge, and the government canceled
classes in July of 2020. The government's
decision ultimately disrupted the education
of over 18 million students (Dahir). When
schools moved virtually in March of 2020,
rural areas in Kenya were starting their
planting season. Girls used this opportuni-
ty to support their families by assisting in
agricultural or household work. The pan-
demic drastically increased poverty as many
Kenyans lost their jobs or businesses. Across
the country, there was an increase in child
marriages to ease economic circumstances.
When schools did reopen, enrollment
fees added to the economic hardships, forc-
ing parents to decide which of their children
Girls’ Education
in Kenya: Lessons
From COVID-19
Kenyan classroom with boys and teacher teaching math, (Flickr/Kelly Lynch)
3 0
Angela Heaney (she/her)
In the past two decades, there has
been significant progress in improving girls'
education worldwide. Between 1995 and
2018, more than 180 million girls globally
were enrolled in primary and secondary
school. The increase in girls completing
secondary education led to a decline in child
marriages, maternal mortality rates, and
child malnutrition. Girls' lifetime earnings
and economic opportunities have risen as
a result. Many governments have invested
in advancing girls' education and placing
importance on Science, Technology, Engi-
neering, and Math. However, the Covid-19
pandemic threatens the progress made as 11
million girls may never return to the class-
room ("Girls' Education and COVID-19:
New").
When the pandemic initially closed
schools, 1.3 billion students experienced
disrupted education. Governments and
schools adjusted to distance education in
various modes, from instructing via vid-
eo calls to radio programs to distributing
at-home worksheets. No government or
school's response was identical, and many
forms of instruction revealed wide dispari-
ties across the globe, particularly those with
large rural communities. These communities
often lacked access to the internet or devic-
es. Some governments decided to completely
cancel classes for the year. Subsequently,

would attend school. Parents often choose
their sons because schools had previously
failed to provide safety or sanitation needs
for girls, such as gendered bathrooms or safe
transportation. The pandemic exacerbated
gender gaps in education and threatened to
undo decades of progress. The longer girls
are out of the classroom, the less likely they
will return due to various socio-economic
reasons. The costs of education and income
generation remain barriers alongside con-
tinued health concerns related to Covid-19.
Other girls married, became pregnant, or
had a child during the pandemic, which
prohibits them from attending school due to
Kenyan education policies.
School is more than education for
girls. It is a safe space and reduces the rates of
gender-based violence, infant mortality, and
child marriage. Research at Moi University
in Eldoret, Kenya, found that, "...an addi-
tional year of female schooling reduces the
probability of child mortality by 5 to 10[%]..."
(Syomwene and Kindiki).
The longer a girl is in school, the more they
learn about health and proper health prac-
tices in natal care, child nutrition, malaria
prevention, and other diseases. Additionally,
infection rates of HIV/AIDS decrease. Edu-
cation also breaks the poverty cycle. In rural
areas of Kenya, women are more likely to
lead agricultural activities. Higher education
rates increase agricultural knowledge and
best practices because they have greater ac-
cess to training materials and modern tech-
nology. This leads to higher yields and ulti-
mately increased incomes. Higher yields also
improve food security and child nutrition.
However, due to Covid-19 and educational
losses, the World Bank predicts that there
will be a $17 trillion loss in lifetime earnings
in global GDP ("Learning").
In predicting the long-term trends and
disruptions, many governments and organi-
zations turn to data from the Ebola epidemic
that spread throughout West Africa from
2014 to 2016. Similar to Kenya, Sierra Leone
saw its school enrollment rates fall by 16% for
3 1
Share of Countries Responding to School Closures with Different
Forms of Remote Learning, by Region, (Emiliana Vegas)

girls after the Ebola epidemic (UNESCO).
Sierra Leone had one of the highest infec-
tion rates, totaling to about 14,124 cases
and a 28% fatality rate (Bandiera et al.).
The government closed schools for almost
ten months to prevent the spread of Ebola.
School closures led to more child marriag-
es to ease financial situations and a 65%
increase in adolescent pregnancy (UNES-
CO). Even once it was safe to return to the
classroom, many parents and students were
not properly informed about the school's
safety procedures and struggled with the
trauma of Ebola. Sierra Leone's government
adjusted its education policies to increase
enrollments, including abolishing primary
school tuition fees and providing free school
meals. Although these policies did increase
enrollments, they brought another challenge
to schools: massive classroom sizes. The
average student-to-teacher ratio was 72:1.
("Girls' Education and COVID-19"). Many
teachers refused to return to the classroom
because they were still uncomfortable, and
these class sizes deterred them more.
Longonot Secondary School, Kenya, (teachandlearn)
3 2
Kenyan public schools officially re-
opened in January 2021. The Kenyan Min-
istry of Education ensured they were taking
safety measures, including taking tempera-
tures, using hand sanitizer upon entering
the classroom, and wearing masks. However,
when parents dropped their kids at school,
many reported that social distancing was
nearly impossible. "When students sat down
for class, they were shoulder to shoulder,
three at a desk, as before the pandemic"
(Muyoka). Among the frustration, only final
year students were permitted to continue
from where they ended in March of 2020.
All other students repeated the last academic
year to make up for learning losses. When
testing the students, UNICEF reported a
53% decline in math levels, and the average
learning loss was 13 months (Zaman).
The pandemic has shown the wide
disparities in education, and it opened dis-
cussion for policy initiatives to close these
gaps. These policies vary widely between
governments, organizations, and think
tanks. In 2020, Kenya's government
Parents Worry as Crowded Kenyan Schools Reopen After Coronavirus Shut-
down, (Thomas Muyoka)

committed to connecting every school
to the internet by 2030, but this initiative
failed to address one of the problems that
resulted in learning losses. If another wave
of Covid-19, or another disease, were to
close schools, students would not be able
to access these computers. The United
Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cul-
tural Organization suggested initiatives to
include gender as a core element of crisis
planning and response (UNESCO). Al-
though important, this suggestion is vague
and does not outline how to include gender
or address the capacity failures seen during
Covid-19. Policies need to target the root
causes that prevent girls from receiving an
education exacerbated by the pandemic.
Following the Ebola epidemic, Sierra
Leone's efforts, although not perfect, ad-
dressed the root causes of decreased enroll-
ments. Kenya's public education system is
free; therefore, waiving tuition fees would
not ease economic circumstances in the
same manner. Sierra Leone's government
also suspended policies that prohibited
pregnant girls from attending school and
exams. This initiative could benefit Kenyan
girls if the government waived their similar
policy. Pregnant girls could re-enroll and
would already be advancing their child's
well-being. Pregnant girls who do not wish
to re-enroll and have some high school
education would at least be able to take the
national exam and receive a high school
diploma. Holding a high school diploma
would increase their likelihood of a higher
paying job and would help break the pover-
ty cycle.
Additionally, safety and access to san-
itation at school were barriers to girls before
the Covid-19 pandemic. Although these
challenges would vary from school to school
and region to region, improving school
infrastructure could convince parents to
send their daughters alongside their sons.
Furthermore, increasing school security and
providing access to feminine hygiene prod-
ucts could increase enrollments.
It is important to remember that not
all progress was lost due to Covid-19. The
global female literacy rate (ages 15 and old-
er) in 2000 was 75.34% and is now at 83.29%
("Literacy"). Overall, enrollment rates are
increasing, and girls stay in school longer
than before. There is still a long way to en-
sure education, and the barriers before are
more prevalent than ever. Covid-19 further
outlined where governments could improve
access to education, whether new or existing
challenges.
3 3

Northern Ireland: Past, Present, Future
James Welch (he/him)
Catholicism has been present in
Ireland since the fifth century when St.
Patrick, the Apostle of Ireland, introduced
Christianity to the isle. Protestantism ar-
rived more than 1000 years later, in the wake
of the Reformation. It was the Tudor Period
following Henry VIII’s break with the Papa-
cy that introduced Protestantism and made
religion a divisive factor in Irish politics.
Henry VIII, previously the Lord of Ireland—
who controlled only a fraction of the isle in
that role—declared himself to be the King
of Ireland and linked that position to the
English Crown. He also began the process of
conquering the rest of Ireland and supplant-
ing the local Irish with friendly English
and later Scottish settlers. This was, in effect,
settler colonialism and the advent of what
would become the British Empire. This cre-
ated a situation in Ireland in which,
The Protestants, though only a minority
of the population…enjoyed a virtual mo-
nopoly of power. They were descended
mainly (though by no means exclusively)
from English and Scottish settlers of the
seventeenth century, while the Roman
Catholic majority represented, for the most
part, a mixture of the old Gaelic stock with
English settlers of the medieval period, a
mixture, however, in which Gaelic cultural
influence was very strongly marked
(Beckett 121-122).
That Protestant ruling class, who controlled
the Parliament of the Kingdom of Ireland
Deaths in The Troubles by area, (Wikimedia commons/Twinxer)
3 4

and much of its land, is often referred to as
the Protestant Ascendancy. In those centu-
ries, though no one knew it, the stage was
being set for future conflicts. Interestingly,
the Ascendancy was “Protestant opinion
was disposed to support Ireland's claim to
be regarded as a distinct and self-governing
kingdom, joined to Great Britain only by the
link of a common sovereign." Such feelings
came to an end in the closing years of the
1700s, when “Ireland, like other parts of Eu-
rope, experienced the unsettling influence of
the French Revolution; and in 1800 the Prot-
estants, alarmed for their safety in the face of
growing unrest among the Roman Catholic
majority, accepted a parliamentary union
with Great Britain." This union of Ireland
and the Kingdom of Great Britain—itself
the result of union between the Kingdom
of England, which had ruled Wales since
the Middle Ages, and the Kingdom of Scot-
land—created the United Kingdom of Great
Britain and Ireland, a state with a Protestant
majority.
In 1829, the previously disenfran-
chised Catholics of the United Kingdom
gained full political rights. It was around
this time that calls for Irish Home Rule
or self-government in Ireland began to be
made by mostly Catholic Irish. In such a
situation, “Irish Protestants, instead of form-
ing part of a permanent Protestant major-
ity in the United Kingdom, would form a
permanent minority in Ireland. It is hardly
surprising, then, that the Irish Protestants
as a body (though there were many nota-
ble exceptions) vigorously resisted every
proposal to set up a separate parliament for
Ireland” (122). The Protestants in Ireland,
being the wealthy class, were able to exercise
significant amounts of influence, i.e. soft
power, in regards to Home Rule and other
issues. However, they were not the majority
in Ireland. That being said, the situation
was different in Ulster, located in the north
of the isle. Significant amounts of Protes-
tants resided and continue to reside in that
part of the isle. Indeed, Protestants outnum-
bered and continue to outnumber Catholics
in some parts of the traditional province.
Not only could those Protestants elect Mem-
bers of Parliament that were Unionist—i.e.
those in favor of continued union between
Great Britain and (Northern) Ireland—they
could also, should the need or want arise,
take up arms in pursuit of continued union.
It was from this reality that the idea of parti-
tioning Ireland arose.
Following the First World War and
the 1916 Easter Rising—an armed attempt
to unilaterally create an independent Irish
Republic—the Irish War of Independence
broke out in 1919. To end the fighting and
placate both Irish nationalists and Union-
ists, the 1920 Government of Ireland Act
was passed by the British parliament, which
“created two Irish states: ‘Northern Ireland’,
consisting of the six north-eastern counties
and ‘Southern Ireland’, consisting of the rest
of the country. Each state was to have a par-
liament with limited authority over purely
internal affairs, and each was to continue
to send representatives to Westminster”
(123). This did not happen. While those six
north-eastern counties—which collectively
had a Unionist and Protestant majority—ac-
cepted this, the nationalists did not and the
war continued for another year until 1921.
That year saw the signing of the Anglo-Irish
Treaty, creating the Irish Free State—which
would become the Republic of Ireland in the
future. However, the treaty also contained
the following provisions:
11. Until the expiration of one month from
the passing of the Act of Parliament for the
ratification of this instrument, the powers of
the Parliament and the Government of the
Irish Free State shall not be exercisable
3 5

as respects Northern Ireland, and the
provisions of the Government of Ireland Act
1920, shall, so far as they relate to
Northern Ireland remain of full force and
effect, and no election shall be held for the
return of members to serve in the
Parliament of the Irish Free State for
constituencies in Northern Ireland, unless
a resolution is passed by both Houses of
the Parliament of Northern Ireland in favour
of the holding of such elections before the
end of the said month.
12. If before the expiration of the said
month, an address is presented to His
Majesty by both Houses of the Parliament
of Northern Ireland to that effect, the
powers of the Parliament and the
Government of the Irish Free State shall no
longer extend to Northern Ireland, and
the provisions of the Government of Ireland
Act, 1920, (including those relating to the
Council of Ireland) shall so far as they relate
to Northern Ireland, continue to be of
full force and effect, and this instrument
shall have effect subject to the necessary
modifications. Provided that if such an
address is so presented a Commission
consisting of three persons, one to be
appointed by the Government of the Irish
Free State, one to be appointed by the
Government of Northern Ireland, and one
who shall be Chairman to be appointed by
the British Government shall determine in
accordance with the wishes of the
inhabitants, so far as may be compatible
with economic and geographic conditions
the boundaries between Northern Ireland
and the rest of Ireland, and for the purposes
of the Government of Ireland Act, 1920,
and of this instrument, the boundary of
Northern Ireland shall be such as may be
determined by such Commission
(“Documents on Irish”).
The Parliament of Northern Ireland quick-
ly made use of this and Ireland was parti-
tioned. Nearly a century later, this partition
remains.
The Troubles
The partition was not without opposi-
tion. The treaty that allowed for it to happen
thrust the Irish Free State into a civil war,
splitting the Irish Republican Army (the Old
IRA) into pro-treaty and anti-treaty fac-
tions. The pro-treaty side won. Parts of the
anti-treaty side continued on attempting to
establish a united, 32-county Ireland. They
also continued the use of the IRA name.
Their efforts were unsuccessful and rather
insignificant. However, nearly half a century
after partition, a splinter group from that
faction would emerge and have a huge im-
pact on Northern Ireland. That group was
the Provisional Irish Republican Army.
For its first fifty years, Northern Ire-
land was home to much discrimination. The
Ulster Protestants—many of whom were
ethnically English and/or Scottish—were the
ruling class. Irish Catholics faced discrima-
tion in most aspects of life, society, and
Northern Ireland in the UK and Europe, (Wikimedia Com-
mons)
3 6

politics. Ulster Protestants were almost
exclusively Unionists. Irish Catholics were
mostly Nationalists or Republicans; in favor
of leaving the United Kingdom and joining a
united Ireland. In the 1960s, similar to other
oppressed peoples of the era, Irish Catholics
started a civil rights movement in hopes of
addressing the situation. It began peacefully.
However, due to actions from both Repub-
licans, Unionists, and eventually the British
government, it spiraled out of control and
into violence; into the Troubles.
The Troubles claimed the lives of
more than 3,600 people and affected count-
less others (“The Troubles”). It is one of the
most well-known intrastate conflicts of the
twentieth century. As such, there is a pletho-
ra of literature about it and, therefore, a great
deal of attention will not be given to the spe-
cifics of the conflict. Its ending, on the other
hand, must be given attention. After decades
of violence, the Troubles were able to end
peacefully with the signing of the Good
Friday Agreement in 1998. It created, among
other things, “a power-sharing Assembly in
Northern Ireland with an Executive drawn
from the four main political parties”, rep-
resenting both Unionists and Republicans
(Mac Ginty et al. 6). It also led to the rec-
ognition by the governments of both the
United Kingdom and Ireland “that Northern
Ireland’s constitutional status could only
change if a majority of the population want-
ed change” and the right of the population
to “claim Irish, British, or both citizenships”
(7). The aftermath of the Agreement has not
been perfect, but a return to violence on the
scale of the Troubles has been avoided.
Demographics
As previously mentioned, Northern
Ireland traditionally had a Protestant
majority, though there were areas where
Catholics formed a majority. The Protestant
majority may not exist anymore. The 2011
British census recorded that, in Northern
Ireland, “45 per cent of the population were
either Catholic or brought up as Catho-
lic, while 48 per cent belonged to or were
brought up in Protestant, Other Christian or
Christian-related denominations” (Census
2011). As of 2011, there is no longer a Prot-
estant majority in Northern Ireland, but they
still form the plurality. It has been theorized
that Northern Ireland could have a Catholic
majority by 2021 (Gordon). The decenni-
al British census was conducted that year,
however its data has not been released at the
time of this writing (Campbell). If a Cath-
olic majority or a majority with a Catholic
background exists in Northern Ireland, two
things must be noted. First, said majority
may not yet be an electoral majority. Indeed,
in such a situation an electoral majority may
not be possible for up to two decades, when
many of today’s children will be eligible to
vote. Second, a Catholic majority may not
necessarily equal a Republican or National-
ist majority. Returning to the 2011 census,
“almost half (48 per cent) of people usually
Protestants in Northern Ireland 2011, Map of districts in Northern Ireland
color coded with percentage of non-Catholic Christians reported in the 2011
census, (Wikimedia commons/DrKay)
3 7

resident in Northern Ireland in 2011 includ-
ed British as a national identity, while 29
per cent included Northern Irish and 28 per
cent included Irish”(Census 2011). Clearly,
not all Catholics listed their national identi-
ty as Irish. It is also quite possible—though
this is very much conjecture—that not every
Protestant listed their national identity as
British. Nevertheless, the demographics of
Northern Ireland have seen real and signifi-
cant changes since its inception. How much
more change has occurred will be revealed
this summer, when 2021 census data be-
comes available (Campbell).
Brexit
Withdrawing from the European
Union may be the most important piece of
British history from the 2010s. It was not
a universally popular decision. During the
referendum that led to the exit, Northern
Ireland voted to remain with a majority of
55.78 percent (“EU referendum”). Neverthe-
less, the United Kingdom as a whole—En-
gland, Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ire-
land—withdrew from the European Union.
Obviously, the exit has affected all of the
constituent countries of the United King-
dom. Yet, it has impacted Northern Ireland
in a special way, mainly through the North-
ern Ireland Protocol. The Protocol allows
“lorries (trucks) to deliver goods without
having paperwork and goods checked when
they cross the border from Northern Ireland
into the Republic of Ireland” (Edgington and
Morris). However, it requires inspections and
document checks to take place in between
Northern Ireland and Great Britain, effec-
tively creating a custom border within the
United Kingdom. Obviously this is very un-
popular amongst Unionists and it led to the
resignation of Paul Givan, the First Minister
of Northern Ireland and member of the
Democratic Unionist Party (DUP)—histori-
cally one of the more extreme Unionist par-
ties (Edgington and Morris; Landler). The
current situation, with an election in May,
could make Sinn Féin—which was the polit-
ical wing of the Provisional IRA during the
Troubles—the largest party in the Northern
Ireland Assembly. Such a result would make
its Northern Irish leader, Michelle O'Neill,
First Minister (Landler). This situation, both
regarding the election and relating to Brexit
implications, remains on-going.
The Future
Northern Ireland has changed great-
ly since its creation a century ago. It will
certainly change in the next century. This
poses questions about its constitutional and
political status, but predicting the future is
notoriously difficult. Reasonable predictions
can be made, but it is largely impossible to
avoid conjecture. For that reason, a predic-
tion will not be made, rather options for the
future will be presented. At the present mo-
ment, continued union with Great Britain
seems the most likely. This would likely be
in the form of the status quo or something
similar to it. A redefined relationship is not
entirely impossible, but it seems unlikely
as it would probably require moving either
closer or farther from London—undesirable
to outcomes to Republicans and Unionists,
respectively. That being said, if Scotland—or
perhaps Wales—were to leave the United
Kingdom, the resulting change could require
a re-evaluation of Northern Ireland’s status.
A Catholic majority could force a
change in the status quo. One such change
could be to leave the United Kingdom alto-
gether and join the Republic of Ireland. No
doubt, this is the ideal goal of Republicans; a
united Ireland. It must be remembered that,
as previously mentioned, a Catholic majority
3 8

may not necessarily be a Republican ma-
jority. Assuming it is, per the Good Friday
Agreement, a referendum would have to be
held and its results respected by the govern-
ments of the United Kingdom and Ireland.
In a situation where Northern Ireland joins
the rest of the isle, Republicans would most
likely want it to be a regular part of the Re-
public, no different than Galway or Cork. If
a significant Protestant and Unionist seg-
ment remains in the population—which is
almost certain for the foreseeable future—
an Irish unification may require Northern
Ireland to be given a unique status within
the Republic, one with autonomy. One
might imagine a situation in which North-
ern Ireland continues in much the same
manner—with the structures set up by the
Good Friday Agreement largely remaining
in place—only being a part of the Republic
of Ireland rather than the United Kingdom.
The remaining option is the most unlikely:
an independent Northern Ireland. While it
is true that a significant percentage of the
population identify nationally as
Northern Irish, independence would face
huge obstacles (Census 2011). Republicans
and Unionists would be united in opposing
this—for the opposite reasons, of course.
The governments of the United Kingdom or
Ireland seem unlikely to be inclined to have
a third bedfellow, especially one who would
certainly complicate their relations. The
final hurdle is perhaps the most important:
lack of support. At present, there does not
seem to be widespread popular support for
an independent Northern Ireland. There are
no significant groups that work to achieve
it. There may be some people and groups
who do desire such a goal, but they are cer-
tainly in a small minority. It is an interesting
thought experiment or what-if situation, but
it seems incredibly unlikely. Ultimately, the
fate of Northern Ireland remains unknown
to the people of the present. Only those
privileged to live in that future time will
know its destiny. Perhaps they, too, will ask
what the future holds in store for those six
counties of Ulster.
Stormont - Belfast - Northern Ireland, Northern Irish parliment building (Wikimedia commons/ William Murphy)
3 9

Reasoning Inflation and
Supply Disruptions
If you’ve noticed that your grocery bill is
getting higher and higher every month, you
are not alone. Inflated food commodity pric-
es are infecting grocery stores as the infla-
tion rate in the United States rises. Inflation
is the “decline of purchasing power of a giv-
en currency over time” (Investopedia). Some
inflation is indicative of a healthy economy,
however the inflation that we have been
facing in 2022 is largely tied to supply chain
issues associated with the pandemic and the
war in Ukraine. Unfortunately, as the Unit-
ed States reopens and war rages, this infla-
tion will stick around. According to Forbes,
“prices rose 7.9% in February compared to
the year prior, according to the most recent
Consumer Price Index (CPI) report. This is
the biggest annualized growth in CPI
inflation since January 1982” (Tepper). The
above graph shows how CPI has changed
over the past 20 years. After the coronavirus
recession in 2020, it has been climbing con-
sistently as both demand and supply have
changed. For the next few years, expect the
inflation rate to reach above the long run av-
erage and ensure that this is accounted for in
your budget for everyday essentials as supply
chain disruptions can take years to correct.
Pandemic Inflation
When the pandemic caused shut-
downs in March of 2020, the supply of goods
and services was immediately disrupted.
This caused a supply shock which is “an
unexpected event that suddenly changes the
supply of a product or commodity, resulting
Background
Caroline Mallory (she/her)
12-month percentage change, Consumer Price Index, selected categories (Bureau of Labor Statistics)
4 0

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