Lessons learned from Boston Bombing, and best course of action to avoid possible secondary attacks.

1. The Initial Police Response
THE BOSTON MARATHON BOMBING:

2. OUTLINE OF EVENTS
• April 15th, 2013 - Boston Marathon finish line suffers two explosions of
unknown origins
• Hundreds of people are injured, 3 people are killed
• The evidence quickly points to pressure cooker devices, and a terrorist
attack
• April 18th, 2013 – After days of unsuccessfully being able to identify the
suspected bombers, the FBI releases the images to the public
• April 19th, 2013 - The bombers, Tamerlan and Dzhokar Tsarnev come out
of hiding, and murder an MIT police officer. The brothers then carjack a
civilian
• Police locate the stolen vehicle, and after a shootout, Tamerlan is killed
• A manhunt for Dzhokar begins on April 19, 2013, and he is found later that
evening by a homeowner who discovers Dzhokar hiding in a boat
• Authorities respond, and take Dzhokar into custody

3. THE INITIAL POLICE RESPONSE
• The devices explode; police, civilians, and medical personnel rush to the
blast area
• Police work to move pedestrian barricades, and render first aid to some of
the victims
• Police congregate in the blast areas, and form a hasty perimeter, which
lacked integrity
• Police allow civilians and medical to rush to and from the blast areas, at
will, for several minutes
• Police begin to call for the transport vehicles to come to the blast areas to
transport victims
• Police begin to clear the area several minutes after medical starts to
arrive
• The scene is finally secured, and all injured victims are transported to
area hospitals

5. AREAS OF CONCERN
• Police did not restrict the movement within, in, or out of the blast area
• Police did not form a perimeter around the blast areas to deny access or
permit access to first responders
• The pedestrian barricades were difficult to manipulate and tear down
• Police did not have an organized and cohesive response
• Police did not move unnecessary personnel or civilians away from the
blast area
• Police called for emergency vehicles to come directly to the blast area
• Police did not give consideration to: Ambush, “kill box”, or secondary
devices

6. Threats:
Secondary Explosions:
Small Arms Fire:
Ambush:

7. BEST COURSE OF ACTION
• Utilize barricades that can easily be torn down and manipulated so police
and first responders have access to the crowd for a variety of reason
• Establish an Immediate Action Plan (IAP) prior to a major event, to
include: contingencies for attack, explosions, suicide bombers, active
shooter, medical emergencies, staging, rally points, communication, and
chain of command
• In the event of an explosion from an obvious terrorist attack:
 Respond to the scene to gauge the damage
 clear the area of any civilians not injured or rendering aid
 call for medical personnel
 establish a perimeter, do not allow anyone other than police or
medical to enter the area after an attack

9. BEST COURSE OF ACTION (CONT)
• The threat of a secondary explosion or another form of attack should be
considered high
• Clear as many people out of the blast area as possible, immediately
 Injured personnel may be ambulatory, move them
 Restrict the number of first responders to the lowest possible amount
to render aid, and evacuate injured civilians
 Create a casualty evacuation point away from, and out of the line of
sight of the initial blast area
 All emergency vehicles, to include transport should respond to the
casualty evacuation point, not the blast area
 Those who are critical victims that cannot be moved by a carry, should
be evacuated by gurneys

10. Casualty
Evacuation Points:
Primary –
Secondary –

11. UNDERSTANDING THE THREAT
• The blast area must be cleared as soon as possible to lower the number
of potential victims should a secondary attack or explosion occur
• The traditional response by first responders is to flood a scene, with an
abundance of resources and personnel, only enriching a target for an
attacker.
• In many cases, the attacker will have a line of sight on the first explosion,
and will wait until the area is saturated to detonate another device, or
begin another form of attack
• Moving victims to a casualty evacuation point, out of the line of sight of
the initial blast area, will lower the chances of being exposed to further
harm
• The response of medical personnel and emergency vehicles to the
casualty evacuation point, lowers the first responder foot print at the
scene, making the secondary attack, less catastrophic
• The large perimeter and area denial by Police will preserve a scene, and
prevent others from exposure to potential future attacks

12. CONCLUSIONS