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Braden Lohr
Political Analysis
5/1/16
Conflict in Chechnya and its Relevance on Anti-Terrorism and Combat Today
In the 1990’s Russia and Chechnya engaged in two massive bloody conflicts. These wars
launched just two years apart had radically different outcomes. In the span of less than a
decade Chechnya would gain its independence and lose it again. Today Chechnya is not an
oppressed backwater territory of the Russian Federation but instead is thriving and completely
reintegrated into Russia proper. Through changing of tactics, and use of framing, Russia was
able to win the second Chechen war, and through the process of Chechenization Russia has
been able to reintegrate Chechnya and effectively eliminate the terrorist threat within.
To understand how changes in tactics and framing affected the outcome of the second
war, one must first examine the first war to understand how and why Russia failed against the
rouge state of Chechnya. The first war began in 1994, the USSR had broken up only three years
earlier and the ramifications of the breakup had not yet fully been realized. The former USSR
was still in a state of flux as various republics continued to break away. One of these republics
was the Russia state of Chechnya. Dudayev, a native Chechen and former USSR air force
general, became the leader of a Chechen Nationalist movement which declared its
independence from the Russian Federation (Evangelista). Yeltsin, the Russian president was
unwilling to allow Chechnya to split away from the Federation because of its strategic

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importance in the Caucuses. Also Yeltsin feared that allowing one Caucus state to breakaway
would trigger a domino effect, fracturing the entire Caucus region into a series of small
independent republics (Lieven). Yeltsin declared war on Chechnya but because of confusion in
the Russian government, it was several weeks before he was able to actually send troops to
Chechnya. Dudayev would use this time wisely to prepare for the inevitable Russian attack
(Evangelista).
Russia’s failure in the first war from a tactical perspective can be boiled down to
three tactical mistakes, the use of three separate forces, and poor training and lack of radio
operators, and perhaps most egregious of all, Russia’s complete ineptitude in urban combat.
When Russia invaded Chechnya it did so in three separate armies. The Ministry of
Defense (MOD), Federal Security Service (FSB), and the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) all
answered Yeltsin’s call to war by sending forces to Chechnya. However these three agencies did
not share a command structure. In fact they rarely communicated operational information at
all. Thus instead of attacking the Chechen separatists in one large unified force Russia attacked
in three smaller separate armies. Each had its own strategy for winning the war (Oliker). The
MOD for example forced it efforts on territorial conquest believing that if Russia could exert its
control over most of Chechnya and force the rebels into controlled pockets, the rebels would
eventually run out of supplies and be forced to surrender. Meanwhile the FSB held that
territory seizing was of little consequence outside of Grozny and few other strategic points. The
FSB believed that to win the war, Russia should focus on coopting the Chechen elite and
assassinating those who could not be coopted (Oiliker). These strategies had vastly different

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goals and although in theory, either could bring about an end to the conflict because of division
of resources between the three armies neither had the resources needed to win. Without the
combined forces of the FSB and the MVD the MOD did not have enough soldiers to affect
control over Chechnya. Likewise with funding for the Chechen war being divided between the
three agencies, the FSB never had enough funds to effectively coopt a large enough percentage
of the Chechen elite to cripple the Chechen separatists.
In the field, the division of forces into three armies had a more direct disastrous effect.
Friendly fire became a leading cause of death in the first Chechen War among the Russians
because multiple Russian forces would be operating in the same area and be completely
unaware of each other. Not expecting to meet friendly forces the Russians would be mistaken
for rebels (Oliker).
Russia’s inability to train and maintain a force of experienced radio operators also
proved to be disastrous for Russia in the first war. Going into Chechnya the Russian military
already had a shortage of interpreters and radio operators. Chechen snipers were instructed to
single out these units thus making the shortage even more acute. Russia tried to expedite the
training of radio operators in order to fill the need. The result was an influx of poorly trained
radio men who did not understand the complex Russian coding system. Thus the majority of
Russian communications were sent over the radio without being coded. The Chechen rebels
were able to listen in on these communications and know where and when the Russian forces
when moving and attacking. This allowed the Chechens to setup extremely effective ambushes
which devastated the Russian forces (Evangelista).

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Finally by far the largest tactical flaw by the Russians in the first Chechen war was their
failure to prepare for protracted urban combat. The Russian soldiers had by and large been
trained by the USSR. The USSR believed that if war with the west was to break out, the Western
powers would abandon cities rather than subject them to the sheer devastation of urban
combat or the threat of nuclear strikes (Oliker). With this belief, the importance of urban
combat training was minimized. The soldiers who marched into Chechnya had virtually no
urban combat experience at all. In fact the Russian government recognizing this problem,
distributed pamphlets with instructions on urban warfare, this was the extent of Russian
training. Urban warfare was important for the taking of Grozny the Chechen capital and the
largest city. Grozny was the spiritual heart of the Chechen people as well as the seat of
government and base of Chechen resistance. The Russians were able to quickly surround the
city but where not able to take the city. The Russian forces launched several assaults into
Grozny but failed to make headway against the determined defenders. The Russians used
armored columns to provide support within the city. However, Chechen fighters were able to
hide amongst the rubble and destroy the armor columns easily with mines, RGP’s and small
anti-tank weapons. Eventually, The Chechen forces would pull out of Grozny and escape into
the mountains, however they were able to escape with supplies. More importantly the Chechen
commander structure was able to escape as well (Eldin). If the Russian forces had had training
in urban combat they could have begun to assault the city of Grozny as soon as they laid siege
to it. The Chechen leadership would have been trapped within the city would have been forced
to surrender and the conflict could have been brought to a close quickly.

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Besides the tactical failing of the Russian forces the Russian government failed to frame
the war favorably domestically and internationally. Domestically the Russian government failed
to explain the reasons for the war. Stating simply that Chechnya was part of Russia. After the
breakup of the USSR, multiple republics had split away from Russia peacefully. It was not lost on
the public that Chechnya had tried to be one of those republics, it was Russia which had
instigated hostilities and no clear answer as to why could be found (Lieven). The Russian
military was unhappy with the conflict as well. At the lowest level the Russian soldiers where
engaged in a type of combat they were not trained for, often poorly supplied, and receiving
conflicting orders from their officers. These factors combined to form a certain animosity
towards the government officials dictating the war. “Our leaders just sit there in Moscow. They
don’t have any idea what it’s like here. They’re not the ones fighting the war” (Hochstader) This
quote is from a Russian captain and shows the bitter disconnect between the Russian soldiers
and the Russian high command.
For their part, the Russian generals where distrustful of the Russian president Boris
Yeltsin. This distrust steamed from the Budennovsk hostage crisis. Chechen terrorist leader
Shamil Basaev led a small band of Chechen terrorists to the Russian town of Budennovsk and
took 150 people hostage. He demanded Chechen independence in exchange for the hostages.
Yeltsin began negotiations with Basaev and ordered Russian special forces Spetnaz troops to
take the hospital. The Spetnaz attack failed and Yeltsin tried to save the negotiations by
publically claiming that the Spetnaz troops had acted independently (Hughes). This was seen as
an act of betrayal by the Russian military which would remain wary of Yeltsin until the end of
his presidency believing that he would once again try to blame the military for his failings.

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Yeltsin framed the conflict as one to maintain the Russian state which made no sense
considering he had oversaw the breakup of the USSR. Furthermore if Chechnya was part of
Russia then the Chechen people were in fact Russian and thus the war would involve the
murder of thousands of Russian citizens simply because they desired self-governance,
something that Yeltsin had been more than willing to give to the Polish, the Estonians, and a
multitude of other groups. Many officers were troubled by this logic General Vororbyov
resigned his commission as protest over a war attacking fellow Russians in all 450 officers
would resign in protest to the war (Evangelista).
Internationally Russia’s failure to frame the war would also undermine the Russian war
effort. Internationally just as domestically Yeltsin failed to frame the war in a positive way for
Russia. The war was viewed by nations like the United States as a war of Russian aggression.
President Clinton who maintained a friendly relationship with Yeltsin was one of many world
leaders to condemn the Russian military’s actions in Chechnya (Campana). Yeltsin failed to limit
the press’s access to Chechen battlefields allowing the press to capture images of the Russian
military bombarding schools. (The fact that Chechen rebels routinely used schools as command
centers was conveniently left out.) Dudayev unlike Yeltsin understood the power of framing. He
routinely spoke to the press and encouraged his soldiers to do the same (Eldin). Members of
the press where allowed to follow Chechen units on missions. Dudayev was very strategic with
his use of the press continually reinforcing the narrative of the war of Russian aggression
(Campana).

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The war continued to decrease in popularity inside and outside of Russia, in Chechnya
disastrous tactics stalemated the war. Faced to clear alternatives Yeltsin was forced to sue for
peace and allow an independent Chechnya to form.
Only two years would pass between the end of the first war and the beginning of the
second war, a blink of an eye on the international timescale. Yet in that tiny period, Russia
completely reinvented their military.
Tactically Russia would field a motivated well trained fighting force with a clear
command structure. The confusion in the command structure which had plagued the Russians
in the first war was simplified. Three agencies once again sent troops into Chechnya but a clear
command structure between the three forces was present and a clear strategy which combined
the strategies of the FSB and MOD from the first war (Oliker).
The training had improved as well since the first war radio operators were deployed in
force and properly trained. This allowed the Russians to more effectively coordinate attacks and
call in fire support. This allowed the Russian soldiers to remain in hostile territory throughout
the night with the protection of artillery, which allowed for the more effective control of
territory. Additionally the Russians understood the confusion which could be caused by the
destruction of communication equipment. To this end, the Russians deployed special units who
were tasked with finding and destroying Chechen communications (Oliker).
The Russians improved in urban warfare as well. In the two year interwar period Russia had
begun to train soldiers in urban warfare (Oliker). This training would prove vital for the taking of

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Chechen cities and drastically cut down on the amount of armored units destroyed within these
cities.
The greatest change that would affect the outcome of the second war would prove to
be however the ability of the Russian government to control the framing of the war. Unlike the
first conflict which was viewed as a savage act of Russian aggression against a helpless state,
the second conflict would be framed through the lens of terrorism.
Throughout the interwar period Maskhadov the new Chechen president (Dudaev had
been killed) had attempted to bring order and stability to his war ravaged state. Chechnya
which is surrounded by Russian territory was not only economically crippled by the protracted
war with Russia, but was also embargoed by the Russians which further crippled the already
devastated economy. During the first war Al Qaida had declared the war in Chechnya a Jihad
against the west and had begun to fund troops and supplies to the cause. In the first war the
nationalist forces of Dudaev had vastly outnumbered the Muslim extremists. This was changing.
Basaev a famous Chechen terrorist and Muslim extremist had asked Al Qaida leader Al-Khattab
to travel to Chechnya to oversee the training of new militants. Maskhadov was forced to rely on
the funding Al-Khattab had to offer through Al Qaida to keep the Chechen government
operational (Hughes). This link to terrorism would prove devastating for the Chechens.
In February of 1999 Chechnya was engaged in economic talks with Russia to relieve the
Russian embargo which was preventing any economic recovery inside Chechnya. Maskhadov
had come to the conclusion that because of the size of Chechnya, its position physically being
inside of Russia, and its lack of seaport, Chechnya would need to remain economically linked to

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Russia while being political separate. Basaev believed this to be akin to capitulation to the
Russian and seeking to end the economic talks invaded Dagestan, the neighboring territory.
Dagestan had access to a seaport and was a majority Muslim territory within Russia. Basaev
demanded the liberation of Dagestan from Russia and conducted two terrorist bombing on
apartment complexes within Moscow and Volgodonsk (Hughes).
Putin, the new leader of Russia, seized the opportunity that Basaev had given him,
declared the Chechen government terrorists, and reinvaded Chechnya to end the terrorist
threat (Hughes). Putin may have always planned to reinvade Chechnya eventually. He
continually refused to sign the status of forces agreement which would have formally ended
hostilities and form a separate Chechen state legally. He also referred to Chechnya as a Russian
territory (Eldin). Basaev merely expedited the process by providing a perfect issue to frame the
war differently.
Domestically none of the internal political unrest seen during the first war would be
present. The public had a very clear understanding of the reasons for this war, anti-terrorism.
This understanding had profound effect on the willingness of the public to sacrifice for the war
effort. In the first war the Russians had experienced roughly 5,000 casualties and the resistance
to the war had been deafening among the civilians. During the second war, Russia would suffer
roughly 20,000 casualties yet there would be virtually no public protest against the conflict. This
speaks to the power of framing providing with a clear tangible reason for the necessity for war
(Campana). The public was willing to endure four times the cost in terms of lives. Basaev
continued to reinforce the Russian government’s position about the need to reign in Chechen

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terrorism. He continually launched terrorist attacks against Russia including the Dubrovka
Theater attack and the infamous Beslan School Hostage Crisis where 385 would die (Hughes).
These attacks ironically continued to weaken the Chechens position as any call for the end of
the war within Russia would be tantamount to giving into terrorism something the Russian
were not willing to do.
Internationally Putin was also able to use the frame of terrorism to effectively control
the international communities view on the Russian invasion of Chechnya. Putin restricted the
medias access to Chechnya which allowed the Russian government to control what the outside
world saw, further Putin refused to allow reporters to speak to Chechen fighter effectively
robbing them of their voice which had been so effective at humanizing the conflict in the first
war. At the beginning of the conflict, the West remained largely silent neither condoning Russia
actions nor condemning them. The word “terrorism” had made the western powers unwilling
to come to the aid of Maskhadov (Hughes). This proved to be damning for the Chechens, the
political pressure put on Russia by the general public and the pressure brought externally from
nations like the US was the key reason for Chechen victory in the first Chechen war. The
Chechens ability to hold Grozny and mountains from the Russian invaders only served to apply
more pressure to the Russian government on its own; in absence of the external and internal
pressure exerted upon the Russian Federation would not have been enough to gain Chechnya
their independence.
A different act of terrorism committed in New York City would seal the fate of the
Chechen rebels in the eyes of the world. The 9/11 terrorist acts prompted the invasion of

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Afghanistan. Although the US did not get UN approval for the invasion of Afghanistan, Russia’s
status as a P5 nation and its proximity to and influence in the Middle East made their
cooperation or lack of interference extremely desirable for the Bush administration. Chechnya
had ties to the Al Qaida through the funding Maskhadov had received. Putin had been pushing
for Maskhadov’s government to be recognized as an international terrorist organization. Bush
in an attempt to win Russia support for the invasion of Afghanistan, declared the Chechen
government an international terrorist organization (Hughes). This declaration sealed the fate of
the Chechen independent state. Being labeled and international terrorist organization by both
the US and Russia assured that no nation would come to their aid. Through the skillful use of
framing Putin had effectively been able to isolate Chechnya.
With the second Chechen war winding down Putin began the lengthy task of
reintegrating Chechnya into the Russia Federation. This was no small task the two nations had
in less than a decade waged two extremely destructive wars against each other. The Chechens
blamed their economy collapse and destruction of Chechen cities on the Russian. The Russians,
likewise remembered vividly the painful Chechen terrorist attacks which had caused the second
war. Putin’s plan for Chechnya would be known as “Chechenization.” The plan realized the
importance the Chechen people placed on self-rule. Putin planned to put into power a pro-
Russian Chechen, then fund the largely autonomous Chechen government with vast sums of
money to rebuild the nation, making it clear to the public where the funding for the new
infrastructure is coming from (Russell).

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Putin chose Akhmed Kadyrov a Chechen leader who had switched over the Russian side
once it became clear that Russia was going to win the war. He was promptly assassinated. Putin
personally mentored his son Ramzon Kadyrov until he was old enough to occupy the Chechen
presidency. Putin began pumping money into Chechnya to revitalize the economy. Chechnya is
no longer a war ravaged nation. Just over a decade after the end of the second war, Grozny has
been revitalized through the process of Chechenization. It is now a modern Middle Eastern city
sporting a large center Mosque which Ramzon Kadyrov himself largely funded. Kadyrov has also
held up his commitment to Putin to continue to fight the remaining rebels. Kadyrov has used
the funds provided by the Russian government to coopt the vast majority of former Chechen
freedom fighters and now pays these Chechens handsomely to hunt down their former allies
(Russell).
Chechenization is not without its flaws however. Kadyrov loyalty lies with Putin and not
the Russian state. He continually voiced his desire to have Putin become president for life. He
also through coopting the rebels has built himself a fairly large fighting force personally loyal to
himself. Kadyrov has also been accused of being corrupt. He owns massive estates throughout
Russia and Chechnya, a fleet of expensive cars and paid Mike Tyson two million dollars to visit
Chechnya. Kadyrov also controls a large memorial fund setup in his name. Public employees
have to pay into this fund. It was with money from this fund that Kadyrov build the large
Mosque in Grozny. He has thrown lavish parties is his own honor and is suspected of grave
human rights abusing. (Fortin) Kadyrov’s death would prove a difficult test for the effectiveness
of Chechenization. Putin does not currently have another Chechen leader who could effectively
replace Kadyrov which is a pressing concern because Kadyrov has already survived five

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assassination attempts (Russell). Overall despite the alleged corruption Kadyrov and Putin have
brought stability to Chechnya and have reintegrated Chechnya back into Russia.
Relevance
Understanding the conflict in Chechnya as well as the process of reintegrating
Chechnya back into the Russian Federation is paramount to understanding modern conflict. The
adage that “war never changes” is simply a fallacy. War changes as much as the human
environment changes. In 2008 for the first time in human history 50% of the global population
was living in urban environments (PRB). As these cities expand so will the likelihood for urban
combat. Russia’s two wars almost read like a gigantic experiment on the effects of adequate
urban combat training. In the first war Russia’s was unprepared for the urban environment and
subsequently was not able to take Grozny in an organized manner, the no clear tactics are used
areas are won and lost constantly and Russian armor is suffers horrible loses. The second war
Russia again faced a determined dug in enemy. However, they are able to take blocks in an
organized manner, make extremely effective use of artillery, reduce armor losses and enact a
successful blockade which forced the surviving Chechens short on ammo and food to abandon
the city (Oliker). Chechnya presents the best example of urban warfare in a modern city with
the use of modern weapons. Chechnya’s two wars also are useful at demonstrating effective
tactics for holding a city against a superiorly armed and larger force. The Chechen rebels held
Grozny for roughly a year in both wars. Their use of snipers to eliminate specialized troops and
officer greatly reduced the capabilities of the Russian troops. Their ability to knock out armored
columns proved the limited role tanks can play inside the urban environment (Oliker). Finally it

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is important to remember that the Chechens were using weapons easily obtained by non-state
actors such as terrorists, and rebel groups. With these weapons they were able to hold a large
military power off for almost a year. Wars in the modern era are categorized by the prevalence
of these forces. The US launched two wars in the Middle East against terrorist forces. Syria is
currently ripped apart by civil war with a multitude of small militant groups fighting within its
borders. Ukraine is engaging pro-Russian forces in the east, and ISIS controls area in both Iraq
and Syria. The wars of the future are likely to be against militant forces in urban environments.
The hard fought lessons of Russia’s wars in Chechnya provide tactics and strategy applicable to
this type of warfare, which may help to reduce the amount of casualties in these conflicts.
The importance of framing is another take away from the Chechen conflicts. Wars
today waged against these militant group are decided not by the ability to control territory or
the removal of a leader more often than not these war are decided by the public’s willingness
to continue the war. Since the Korean War America has engaged in a series of campaigns where
the borders between friendly and hostile territory are blurred and victory rests more on public
approval then continued military action. The Vietnam conflict is a prime example, the US pulled
out of Vietnam not because of a crushing military defeat, but because of the wars extreme
unpopularity in the US. Iraq and Afghanistan are a more modern example. Bush’s popularity
skyrocketed after 9/11 and the invasion of Afghanistan, likewise his inability to end either
conflict, their rising cost and the questionable reasons governing the invasion of Iraq caused his
popularity to plummet towards the end of his presidency. The Russian’s use of framing
demonstrates the effectiveness of framing as well. In the first war Yeltsin fails to frame the
conflict in terms the common Russian can relate to and thus the war becomes incredibly

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unpopular. The war eventually ends much like Vietnam, not because of Russian military losses,
but because of the incredible unpopularity of the war both internally and internationally. The
second war shows the power of framing. Remember Russia sustained four times the amount of
casualties then in the first war but because of Putin’s ability to frame the conflict as a response
to terrorism, no largescale public outcry is evident. Putin skillfully uses framing internationally
as well. By labeling the Chechens as terrorist, he ensured no nation would actively support
Chechnya, and by using 9/11 to get the US to label the Chechen government terrorists he was
able to delegitimize the Chechen regime on an international scale. Even if Russia had lost the
second war, being formally recognized as terrorists by two world powers would have made it
impossible for the Chechen government to function on the international stage thus ensuring
their continued dependence on Russia. Especially in a post 9/11 world, the wars in Chechnya
can be used to demonstrate the power of framing a conflict as “anti-terrorism.”
Finally the wars in Chechnya have proven to be a lesson in the proper method of state
building. Chechnya is one of the few examples in the world where a serious terrorist threat has
been eliminated. The Russian model for Chechnya is 1) coopt elite, the Russians coopted a
Chechen leader Kadyrov giving him autonomy in exchange for loyalty for to the state. 2)
Assimilate the masses; Russia is not seen as an occupying force. Russia views Chechnya as
Russian and has been very good and making Chechens feel that they are part of Russia. If an
ethnic group has a social contract with the state that gives clear benefits to them they will be
much less likely to flock to terrorist or militant groups. 3) Present clear benefits to being part of
the state. Russia has rebuilt Chechnya, and reinvigorated its economy. By comparison the US
occupation of Iraq was disastrous and directly led to the creation of ISIS. This Russian model

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used in Chechnya is the only clear example of a successful anti-terrorism campaign in modern
history. If the US continues the “War on Terror” an approach similar to that seen in Chechnya
would be needed to ensure the elimination of terrorist sects instead of their proliferation as
seen in Iraq.
In the 1990’s Russia launched two vastly different wars in Chechnya. The outcome of
these conflicts was radically altered because of changes in tactics, and framing. The peace that
ensued has been made possible because of the Russian policy of Chechenization. The study of
both actual conflict and the resulting peace bears importance’s because of the lessons which
can be applied to future conflicts.
Sources
Campana, A., & Legare, K. (2010, January 12). Russia's Counterterrorism Operation in
Chechnya: Institutional Competition and Issue Frames. Department of Political Science
University of Laval, 47-63.
Eldin, Mikail, and Anna Gunin. The Sky Wept Fire: My Life as a Chechen Freedom
Fighter. London: Portobello, 2013.
Evangelista, M. (2002). The Chechan Wars Will Russia Go the Way of the Soviet Union?
Washington DC, DC: Brooking institution Press.

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Fortin, Jacey. "For Russian-Controlled Chechnya, A Sparkling City and A Dancing
Dictator." International Business Times (2012).
Hockstader, L. (1995, January 13). On Night Partol in Chechnya- at Ivan's Invitation. The
Washington Post, p. A25.
Hughes, J. (2008). National and Ethnic Conflict in the 21st Century: Chechnya: From
Nationalism to Jihad. N.p.: University of Pennsylvania Press.
"Human Population: Urbanization." Population Reference Bureau . N.p., Feb. 2016.
Web. 1 May 2016
Lieven, A. (1998). Chechnya Tombstone of Russian Power. New Haven: Yale University
Press.
Russell, John. "Ramzan Kadyrov: The Indigenous Key to Success in Putin's
Chechenization Strategy?" Routledge. September 1, 2008.
Oliker, O. (2001). Russia's Chechen Wars 1994-2000 Lessons from Urban Combat. Santa
Monica, CA: Rand.