The Unlucky Country-Afghanistan’s Strategic Significance and Insecure Future
1. The Unlucky Country 1
Afghanistan’s Strategic Significance and Insecure Future
Senior Research Seminar
Austin Shopbell
Dr. Leonardo Figueroa-Helland
13 DEC 2013
Abstract:
In approximately one year, the United States and the greater International Community will
remove all combat forces from the South Asian nation of Afghanistan; numerous guesses
surround the potential results of the withdrawal, but none have definitively painted a complete
picture. This report attempts to fill that gap. The author combines both the historical and
contemporary context with several political and international relations theories that collectively
provide the reader with a comprehensive understanding of the past, present, and future of
Afghanistan. Considered theories include: Neorealism, English School, Indigenous, Islamic, and
the regional geopolitical struggle. Collectively, the theories can be generally understood to
accept that peace and a sense of stability is possible in the long term, but will be very difficult to
achieve.
Keywords:
Afghanistan, Taliban, ISAF, Future, International Relations, Security Studies
1
Title
refers
to
Hamid
Karzai’s
remarks
in
2001
after
learning
of
Massoud’s
assassination;
found
in
Coll,
chapter
“What
an
unlucky
country…”
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“The Security Forces had to learn or suffer.”
-John A. Nagl, referring to the British experience during the Malayan Emergency
“The nation that will insist upon drawing a broad line of demarcation between the fighting man
and the thinking man is liable to find its fighting done by fools and its thinking by cowards.”
-Sir William F. Butler, Charles George Gordon (1889)
“…Another type of war, new in its intensity, ancient in its origin-war by guerrillas, subversives,
insurgents, assassins, war by ambush instead of by combat, by infiltration instead of aggression,
seeking victory by evading and exhausting the enemy instead of engaging him. Where there is a
visible enemy to fight in open combat, the answer is not so difficult. Many serve, all applaud,
and the tide of patriotism runs high. But when there is a long, slow struggle, with no
immediately visible foe, your choice will seem hard indeed.”
-President John F. Kennedy, address to Westpoint graduates, 1961
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Table of Contents
Epigraphs…01
Maps
Geographic…03
Ethnic Dispersion…04
ISAF Dispersion…05
Research Question…06
The Literature…08
The Answer…10
Literature Review…12
Part I: Afghanistan’s History
Introduction and Early History…19
Durrani Empire…20
Anglo-Afghan Wars…21
Monarchy…25
PDPA and Conditions Leading to Invasion…26
Soviet War in Afghanistan…28
Chaos and Civil War in Afghanistan…32
The First Afghan War Was Over, the Second Had Begun…34
Taliban Control and Downfall…36
Usama bin Laden, al Qaeda, and Prelude to Invasion…38
Post September 11th
and US Invasion…41
Part II: Battlespace Afghanistan Today
Afghanistan Tribal Disposition and Social Composition…43
Status and Organization of Conflict…48
Bilateral Security Agreement…48
Afghanistan National Government…52
Afghan National Security Forces…54
The Enemy…56
Part III: The Future of Afghanistan
Neorealist Theory…62
English School Theory…67
Indigenous Theory…70
Pashtun Economic…71
Central Asian…72
Islamic…76
Geopolitics…81
Appendixes
A: Abbreviations…87
B: Definitions…88
C: Principal Characters…89
D: Civilian Casualties by Cause…90
E: ANSF /ISAF Operations…90
Bibliography…91
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Introduction, Research Question, Literature Review:
Introduction:
It isn’t yet light when the young girl, 12 years old and already in her seventh year of
classes, snatches her three pieces of paper and one pencil and disappears into the rural night air.
Her family is determined that she earn an education, so she will walk the three miles to spend
eight hours in the classroom-without eating-before walking the three miles home to chores and
homework. Waiting for her amongst the shadows are two men, both of whom wear black
turbans. Each cradles his Kalashnikov and feels the familiar wood warm under the rough skin;
the village mullah has announced that the girl will not attend school, and they are here to do his
work. This scenario-which occurs daily in Afghanistan-is the perfect example of the bifurcation
of the conflict occurring in Afghanistan today. The South Asian country is at a crossroads
between modernist and traditionalist forces, and the future perpetually suffers as a result. After
discussing the strategic, operational, and social context affecting contemporary Afghanistan, this
research identifies several theories that will likely inform the future of the country, its people, the
region, and the international community as a whole. Sadly, none of these philosophies promise a
beneficial future for the conflict-ridden nation. But by equipping the girl with the flashlight of
the potential future, she may be able to sense the dangerous men in her path and take a different-
albeit longer-path to school.
Research Question:
Following the devastating attacks of September 11th
2001 against US infrastructure and
civilians, American and NATO combat troops invaded Afghanistan, capturing Kabul exactly one
month and six days after the start of conventional US military operations in the country. In the 12
years since, the War in Afghanistan has been put on the backburner and the Taliban, who were
once thought to be all but eradicated, have been able to mount a complex and deadly resurrection.
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International Security Assistance Force combat troops are scheduled to leave the nation by late
2014, leaving a small garrison of trainers to assist the Afghan National Security Forces.
Generally, no one can say with confidence what will happen after the 2014 withdrawal date, and
speculations are extremely varying. Given this scenario, this research attempts to paint a useful
portrait of various possibilities for the future of Afghanistan.
Research into the future of Afghanistan is timely and has direct connotations for the
surrounding region. Neither the United States nor any other Allied force has committed to a
certain number of trainers remaining in the country following the withdrawal of combat troops.
As such, this report will supply policy makers with a basic framework of different potential
outcomes, as well as the most likely outcome. Afghanistan has historically been extremely
important for regional strategy; it is a key player in the India-Pakistan rivalry, shares a large land
border with Iran, and a smaller border with China. Separately and collectively, India, Iran, China,
Pakistan, the Central Asian states, and the Western powers each have interests in a “favorable”
Afghanistan and will seek to achieve these interests. Thus, there is a distinct possibility that
Afghanistan’s future will be informative of the future of the region. This research, then, adds to
the discourse on politics, geopolitics, and international relations in South Asia. Additionally, the
history of Western involvement in Afghanistan’s history of conflict-which is substantial but
mainly forgotten or ignored-has, to a large degree, informed and created conditions that exist to
this day, and was partially responsible for the 9/11 attacks. Under threat of repeating these past
mistakes with the same dire consequences, this research is a critical component for political,
social, military, and international relations study and analysis.
This research couples civilian-led scholarship with a military background; it is thus
intended to address several audiences concurrently. Principally, this report will propose a myriad
of potential outcomes to American policy makers in the intelligence, diplomatic, defense,
executive and legislative communities. These outcomes will allow the respective policy maker to
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adjust and tailor the operations of his/her organization to meet or avoid the listed potential
outcomes. Secondly, this report is being written as a document that will lend itself to casual
observation for non-policy makers; interested students and other individuals with little knowledge
of the situation in Afghanistan will hopefully enjoy reading the research while gaining an in-
depth, theoretical knowledge of the situation. The results of the study can be used to determine
future actions and end states in the prosecution of the War in Afghanistan. This report will help
to predict which direction Afghanistan will turn, allowing US policy makers to strategically
respond proactively rather than reactively.
The Literature:
The future of any country is obviously an incredibly important question with an infinite
number of aspects; as such it draws a wide range of speculation. As a warzone in which the
world’s most powerful country is engaged, Afghanistan draws even more speculation than other,
equally destitute nations. A global audience of governments, non-governmental agencies,
businesses, security analysts, religious scholars, human health and welfare specialists,
environmentalists, sociologists, and other experts have a significant stake in the future of the
country. Accordingly, each organization and interested party is actively attempting to assess the
country’s future. While the United States and Afghanistan recently made significant progress in
diplomatic discussions, there are still critical elements of a legal agreement allowing US troops to
stay in the country after 2014 that remain contentious. The agreement-and subsequent US
response- will specify the exact amount of remaining troops. Because this metric is so indicative
of the future, no professional organization has publicly released its opinion of Afghanistan’s
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future. Many suppositions exist, but each “guess” is dependent on the amount of ISAF forces that
will remain in the country. 5
While no official agreement regarding the future of Afghanistan has yet been released,
there are copious amounts of literature available that detail the country’s history and society, as
well as current security, political, economic, and religious indicators. Combining a historical-
cultural examination of Afghanistan’s past with current indicators of nation strength-a
comprehensive, accurate analysis of Afghanistan today-will allow researchers to better
understand future potential outcomes.
To accomplish this goal, the research seeks to understand each factor shaping
tomorrow’s Afghanistan by dividing the project into three sections. Section one will detail
Afghanistan’s history, culture and social context. Section two will focus on Afghanistan today,
conceptualizing the region as a commander would a battlespace. 6
This section will describe
relevant belligerents in the conflict, the status of the conflict as well as current operations, and an
in-depth look at the government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan. Section three will
discuss several of the theoretical prospective scenarios that exist today. These scenarios include
neorealism, the English School, Indigenous perspective, an Islamic worldview, and finally a
discussion of the regional geopolitics.
5
This
research
will
use
the
term
“guess”
as
opposed
to
“theory”
in
order
to
portray
the
myriad
of
guesses
as
relatively
un-‐founded,
which
they
are.
The
future
of
Afghanistan
is
anybody’s
guess:
a
truly
analytic
and
balanced
report
that
would
expound
a
“theory”
has
yet
to
be
released,
as
discussed
in
the
“Literature
Review”
section
of
this
document
6
“Battlespace,”
according
to
Wikipedia’s
synthesized
definition
from
various
DoD
sources,
comprises:
“a
unified
military
strategy
to
integrate
and
combine
the
armed
forces
for
the
military
theater
of
operations…it
includes
the
environment,
factors
and
conditions
that
must
be
understood
to
successfully
apply
combat
pressure,
protect
the
force,
or
complete
the
mission.
This
includes
enemy
and
friendly
armed
forces,
infrastructure,
weather,
terrain,”
and
other
non-‐combatant
populations/forces.
Because
Afghanistan
has
been
a
battlefield
for
so
long,
and
because
of
the
integrated
civil-‐military
objectives
inherent
to
a
counterinsurgency,
this
term
is
appropriate
to
describe
the
situation
in
Afghanistan
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The Answer:
This study assumes several constants in order to retain relevancy. Principal amongst
these assumptions is that the US/ISAF combat mission will not be extended past the 2014
deadline. This is a relatively safe assumption to make due to several indicators; both heads of
state (Obama and Karzai) have expressed personal and political desire for an agreement to a
unilateral disengagement of combat forces. General political will internationally is also calling
for a return of US troops, and there seems to be little American Congressional or public pressure
to remain in combat. A second assumption made is the presence of some number of US/ISAF
advisory and/or counter-terror teams remaining in the country post-2014, coupled with substantial
amounts of foreign aid. This assumption, while still reasonable, is made with moderately more
risk. While the US and Afghanistan have recently experienced a significant diplomatic
breakthrough in the legal agreement allowing the presence of international advisory forces, the
most critical part of the framework (a Bilateral Security Agreement) was not part of the
breakthrough. The US has set an unofficial deadline for finalization of 31 OCT 2013, with
stipulations of pushing it as far back as APR 2014. 7
Should this agreement NOT be finalized, all
US/ISAF options (including all foreign aid) will be cut off from Afghanistan totally (with fairly
obvious connotations). While the risk of this occurrence is certainly not negligible (it did occur in
Iraq), it is unlikely. 8
Thirdly, the project assumes that the situation in Afghanistan will remain on
the general trajectory upon which it is currently tracking; international terrorist groups, such as al
Qaeda, will not make a sudden and unexplainable resurgence, Karzai will not totally cede power
to the Taliban, no foreign/regional power will physically intervene (beyond an escalation of
7
The
Bilateral
Security
Agreement
(BSA)
is
the
legal
framework
that
would
allow
the
presence
of
troops
and
foreign
aid
to
be
used
in
Afghanistan;
the
most
important
element
of
the
framework
is
the
stipulation
that
guarantees
American
trial
for
servicemen/women
accused
of
a
criminal
charge
while
deployed,
for
more,
see
“Bilateral
Security
Agreement”
in
Part
II
of
this
report
8
For
a
brief
review
of
the
consequences
from
pulling
our
troops
from
Iraq-‐which
occurred
in
2010:
http://thecable.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2013/10/22/us_could_ve_prevented_bloodletting_in_iraq_retired_gen_joh
n_allen
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current covert activities) in Afghanistan following the withdrawal of the US, amongst other
general remainders of the status quo.
An understanding of historical and current events, combined with a foundational-level
reading about the conflict and general situation in Afghanistan reveal several possible scenarios
regarding the most likely environment in the country post-2014. This report will analyze several
of these scenarios in different theoretical frameworks, including: neorealism, the English School,
Indigenous, Islamic worldview, and regional geopolitics. Neorealism cites tribal differences,
historical conflict, status of the conflict and regional dynamics to explain a likely descent into low
intensity civil war before a return to relatively rigid sectionalism and Pashtun dominance. The
indigenous theory uses both the Pashtun economic and the Central Asian theory, of which four
scenarios are considered possible, as an example to explain the Afghan future. Concurrently, the
theory applies possible outcomes that may result in a more peaceful and productive future. This
Islamic theory, while not considered indigenous to the case of Afghanistan, will likely play a role
due to the geographical location of the “Islamic world.” It describes three sects of Islamic
international thought, and describes a theory for Afghanistan by using the most modern
Islamization of Knowledge theory. Regional geopolitics concludes by citing the strategic
location of Afghanistan-in relation to Iran, Pakistan, India, China, and Russia-for natural
resources, international trade, and international terrorism.
This analysis of future affairs obviously begins in late 2014, with the diminished US
troop presence in the country. While elements from the occupation and prior history will be
considered and discussed in the research, they are not considered part of the research question;
this report does not analyze the factors from the 9/11 attacks to the current situation that put
Afghanistan into it’s current position as those factors are outside the scope of this research. This
report is geared to address roughly the next 10 years of Afghanistan’s future with an approximate
termination of analysis in 2024. The report has implications for post-2024, but does not attempt
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to seriously consider the environment after that time. It is also mainly limited to Afghanistan; the
report discusses the relationships between regional states and players in the conflict, but does not
attempt to address threats to the region outside of Afghanistan.
Literature Review
The available literature pertinent to my research question is, essentially, endless.
Scholars, politicians, governments, warfighters, economists, journalists; all manner of individuals
have a stake in Afghanistan's future. Accordingly, each individual organization releases its own
form of analysis regarding its stake in the country, bringing with it the organization’s inherent
biases, strengths, and weaknesses. Due to the wide variety of available sources, this report will
focus on scholarly documents, research articles and journals, defense analysis, intelligence
reporting, and regional experts; this literature review generally discusses some of the most
valuable resources in order that they’ll appear in the research.
For a detailed understanding of the indigenous perspective of history during the times of
the first modern Western incursions into Afghanistan during the 19th
Century, this research
utilizes Bijan Omrani’s Afghanistan and the Search for Unity. Omrani, an English-trained
researcher of Central Asian decent, describes an in-depth analysis of both successful and failed
methods used by Afghan leadership during the first interactions with the West. The essay begins
with the goal of analyzing three different leaders of Afghanistan and their governance, while
attempting to allow the reader to draw his/her own connections from the past to the present.
Rather than explicitly describing the authors take on how the past informs the future, that job is
left to the reader, after being given Omrani’s detailed examples. Specifically relevant for this
research, Omrani’s analysis of both Abdur Rahman and King Amanullah were used almost
singularly for the comparison of leadership styles (both of which were considered ultimate
failures).
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Unquestionably one of the most important time periods in Afghanistan’s modern history
is the Soviet invasion and subsequent US/Saudi/Pakistani support for mujahedin elements. For
the purpose of understanding this time period, the report utilizes Ghost Wars: The Secret History
of the CIA, Afghanistan, and Bin Laden, from the Soviet Invasion until September 10th, 2001 by
Steve Coll. The book does an excellent job illustrating the American proxy war-fought against the
Soviets and through the Pakistani Inter Services Intelligence-during the 1980’s. Additionally, the
book describes the rise of the Taliban, life under their rule, and the civil war that continued
amongst the mujahedin factions following the Soviet demise. The research extensively utilizes
Coll’s analysis of this time period in its description of this segment of Afghanistan’s history.
Additionally, the conditions found in 1991-1994, before the Taliban gained any type of influence,
can serve as an analysis of a potential outcome following the American withdrawal. Coll’s work
has served as a major inspiration and source of knowledge throughout my interest in the area.
Because of this, central tenets and passages of this work are prominently utilized throughout the
research.
Understanding the civilian analysis on current civil and military operations in
Afghanistan is crucial for a balanced understanding of the battlespace assessment. The research
relies on a myriad of reports to accomplish this objective, but Congressional Research Service
reports are utilized most heavily due to their reliability, ease-of-access, and objectivity of
analysis. Specifically, two CRS reports are prominently featured: “Afghanistan: Politics,
Elections, and Government Performance” and “Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security,
and U.S. Policy,” both written by Kenneth Katzman in early August 2013. Collectively, these
two reports provide an accurate and (seemingly) unbiased examination of the current state of
affairs in Afghanistan, finding major problems ranging from social, to governmental, to
economic, and to overall security. The Afghan government is hopelessly corrupt, with efforts at
limiting the corruption considered either nonexistent or a complete failure (perhaps an indication
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of the status of the government itself). A mining industry is being set up to bolster the
independent states economy, but is significantly hindered by bureaucratic backlog and the
pervasive corruption. Official figures detailing the Afghan National Security Forces (National
Army and Police) are promising and appear on track for transfer from US support (they officially
lead all offensive operations in the country and are responsible for security in Kabul), but these
figures may be deceiving. ANSF suffer from serious recruitment/retention issues, and are
illiterate-literally and figuratively. CRS reports are made for Congressional scrutiny, in order to
give law/policymakers better understanding of the subject area; as such, the reports are lean on
recommendation or inference and heavy on factual and statistical data. Both reports are crucial to
understanding contemporary Afghanistan, and are utilized extensively to describe the on-the-
ground situation.
The United States is both the most powerful entity and most important determinant in the
Afghanistan equation. Accordingly, battlespace assessment reports from the Department of
Defense-the organization charged with prosecution of the security assistance mission-are
invaluable for understanding the current state of military and security affairs in Afghanistan. To
this end, the report utilizes “Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan” reports to
gain an in-depth US and ISAF military perspective on the conflict. The most current report at the
writing of this proposal, released in July 2013, paints a hopeful yet sobering picture of the
progress toward stability, ultimately contending that without significant international support the
Western-engineered government apparatus will quickly fall and that the Afghan government
remains dependent on outside support. Due to the nature of the time-intensive conflict, the
insurgency will NOT be defeated under the US timeframe for withdrawal of combat troops, and
the government will not be strong enough to support itself without substantial outside assistance.
A significant indicator of the validity and true representation of the Afghan government will be
the April 2014 elections and whether Karzai will allow the democratic process to continue
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uncontested. The report does not discuss potential outcomes were this to occur as it is considered
outside the scope of the report. The article also acknowledges significant gains in social
development, counterinsurgency metrics, and counterinsurgent narrative; these gains are tenuous
at best and depend on the post-2014 ISAF troop presence.
Understanding the historical and ethnic background that comprises modern-day
Afghanistan is critically important for understanding the current operational and hospitable
environment found in Afghanistan today, which is so obviously instrumental in the nation’s
future. Central to this element of the research is Amin Tarzi’s “Political Struggles over the
Afghanistan-Pakistan Borderlands.” The essay’s analysis of the current importance of the Durand
Line, remnants of British colonial control, and of the dominant ethnic group in Afghanistan
(Pashtun) are invaluable in understanding an indigenous philosophy that will outlast both radical-
Islamist and Western influence. While touching on the modern history of Afghanistan, the article
significantly paints a picture of the influence the Afghan-Pakistan diplomatic situation will have
on any future Afghanistan, and provides both an impetus and recommendation for change.
For a broader, more operational sense of the conflict in Afghanistan (and elsewhere), this
report will utilize David Killcullen’s Counterinsurgency. Killcullen is an Australian infantry
company commander with actual combat experience in counterinsurgency, who is also a
revolutionary world-class thinker about insurgency/counterinsurgency philosophy. Killcullen
earned his doctorate from the University of New South Whales, is a US State Department
advisor, and was a principal architect of FM 3-24. 9
His argument for the recognition of a global
insurgency facing the West is important for policy makers (with strong influences from the
English School), but this study focuses on one comparatively small passage in the text. Killcullen
claims that a major stumbling block the US has created in Afghanistan is the American tendency
to build the government from the top down. Citing historical accounts from the time of
9
Field
Manual
3-‐24/Marine
Corps
Warfighting
Publication
3-‐33.5:
Counterinsurgency
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Alexander the Great, Killcullen maintains that Afghanistan has always been a tribal society, from
which power started at the tribal level before being elevated to local, regional, and finally
“national” prominence. This analysis plainly describes a root cause of current governmental
instability in Afghanistan and supports the supposition that, without dominating the other tribes
through force, Afghanistan will remain leaderless.
Former militant, resident of Pakistan, and journalist/scholar Ahmad Rashid’s analysis of
the region is an indispensable resource for this project; any Western-based analysis of the Central
Asian region, especially including Pakistan and Afghanistan, would be totally incomplete without
his input. Following the September 11th
attacks against the United States, his first text in his
trilogy on the region was required reading at the White House, Pentagon, and Central Intelligence
Agency (the text is Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil, and Fundamentalism in Central Asia). In order
to keep this work as up-to-date as possible, the report utilizes other sources for learning about the
Taliban and conditions before 9/11. However, his trilogy’s final text: Pakistan on the Brink: The
Future of America, Pakistan, and Afghanistan is an incredibly important resource used throughout
the research; it is the predominant source of the author’s understanding of the current and future
prospects for Afghanistan. Able to provide balanced, critical, and insightful perceptions of the
indigenous forces at play in the international system, Rashid also has an equally balanced and in-
depth understanding of the Western perspectives on those forces.
For a non-Western overview of international relations theories-and how they apply to
Afghanistan today-this report principally utilizes two separate sources that elucidate the Central
Asian and Islamic theory. Distant Futures and Alternative Presents for South Asia, written by
Indian scholar Sohail Inayatullah, admirably applies indigenous Indian theory to Pakistan, which
can relatively easily be conferred onto the case of Afghanistan for the purposes of this research.
Inayatullah’s task is not an easy one; the constant state of conflict between Pakistan and India
forces the reader to objectively determine the value of Inayatullah’s research and the amount of
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bias it contains. Distant Futures doesn’t attempt to justify any element of that conflict; rather, it
prescribes several non-Indian methods for stabilizing the region. Because of his objective take on
Pakistan, this paper is incredibly important to this research’s understanding of non-Western but
applicable theories for the future. In the same pursuit for the non-Western perspective, this
research relies upon International relations theory and the Islamic worldview written by
Afghanistan expert Shahrbanou Tadjbaksh. 10
The essay is an excellent resource for non-Muslims
to better understand the international concepts preached by the Islamic tradition, and her
discussion on the Islamization of Knowledge movement occurring in Islam today serves as an
extremely helpful metric for measuring the future of Afghanistan in a progressive yet traditional
manner.
A foundational survey of the literature reveals that Afghanistan faces many problems.
Much of the country’s history is of foreign domination and subsequent resistance, the nation is
deeply divided upon tribal lines, the Afghan government and it’s security apparatus is too corrupt
for functional control and the US military recognizes significant gains in the nation but admits the
tenuousness of each gain. From the start of the US invasion and subsequent reconstruction, the
international community-led by the US-followed a distinctly Western top-down approach rather
than distinctly Afghan bottom-up; indeed, the whole paradigm may have been flawed. The
United States, along with members of the International Security Assistance Force, have been in
the region for (almost exactly) 12 years with significant cost, but have seen few permanent
changes and are now poised to end combat operations in the country. One year from now, the
combat mission in Afghanistan will have ended and the Western-supported government will be in
charge of all security with severely limited US force application. Research articles and journals,
scholarly novels, defense analysis, and regional experts, combined with an
10
Tadjbaksh
lives
and
researches
in
France,
is
of
Iranian
origin,
and
is
a
citizen
of
the
United
States,
where
she
completed
all
of
her
higher
education
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operational/battlespace awareness, lends itself to the analysis and conclusions for the resultant
theories.
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PART I: Afghanistan’s History: In the Shadows-
Introduction and Early History:
Afghanistan has had a long and storied past, unknown to most Westerners. The region
known today as “Afghanistan” and her people “Afghan’s,” has been of international strategic
importance since the dawn of time. Afghanistan is located barely over 1000 kilometers from
Mesopotamia, the “Cradle of Civilization,” and was thus the home of some of the world’s earliest
humans. Archaeologists have found evidence of early humans in Northern Afghanistan from as
long as 50,000 years ago, and many experts believe that these agricultural communities may have
been home to some of the earliest human attempts at farming. After 2,000 BCE, Indo-Europeans
began migrating into Central Asia, setting up some urban civilizations but relying mostly on
tribal, agrarian social structures. 11
Mesopotamia, the world’s first empire, met its downfall in
2005 BCE. It is possible that the Mesopotamian downfall was the work of “barbarians” coming
from Central Asia and specifically Afghanistan. 12
Afghanistan and Central Asia underwent several, successive empire and regime changes
before writing was introduced to the region at approximately 500 BCE. Undoubtedly influenced
by whichever ruler claimed sovereignty over these people, Afghans likely resisted complete
domination by further identifying with a tribal, local/community based power structure. In the 5th
Century BCE, the Greek scholar Herodotus found in Afghanistan a traditional tribe-based society,
similar to the one found today. Men came to power from the ground up; driven men accumulated
influence and power amongst his family and tribe before being elevated by his peers to a position
of local, and finally regional, importance. 13
Indeed, In 330 BCE, by the time Alexander the
Great marched into Central Asia in pursuit of the Persian king Darius, he found a tribal society
11
Schroder,
Afghanistan
12
Boot,
Invisible
Armies,
Book
I
Chapter
IV.
Author
attributes
downfall
to
tribes
from
Southwestern
Iran,
but
surmises
that
due
to
close
proximity,
Afghan
tribes
may
have
participated
as
well
13
Killcullen,
Counterinsurgency,
describes
Herodotus’
account
of
Deiokes,
the
first
King
of
the
Medes
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governed only remotely by regionalist rule. He found this area, a region and culture comprised of
modern-day Afghanistan, to be the most difficult and costly to subdue. 14
Following Alexander’s costly conquest of Central Asia, Afghanistan withstood different
waves of foreign rule, spawning mostly from the division of the Macedonian Empire following
Alexander’s death. Between the 3rd
and 8th
centuries AD, Afghanistan was a Buddhist state, ruled
by the Maurya Empire from modern-day India. Various rulers came and went, but Buddhism
remained in Afghanistan until the end of the 7th
Century when the Umayyad Dynasty defeated the
Persian Sassanian empire. “The complete conversion of Afghanistan to Islam occurred during the
rule of the Gaznavids in the 11th
Century.” 15
While under Islamic rule, Afghanistan was home to
significant conflicts over control of territory between the Shi’a Mughal Empire and the Sunni
Safavid Dynasty of Persia. Most native Afghanis, including an overwhelming number of the
dominant Pashtuns, fought against the Safavid army. Following the assassination of the Persian
Emperor, Safavid rule was weakened and a senior officer in the Persian army-Ahmad Shah
Durrani-formed a monarchy in Afghanistan.
Durrani Empire:
After seizing power in 1747 through a regional Loya Jirga, Ahmad Shah was able to
unite disparate Pashtun tribes with other ethnic minorities and formed a regional empire
encompassing much of modern-day Afghansitan, Pakistan, Iran and parts of India, thus forming
the first regional affiliation of tribes that would become known as “Afghanistan.” 16
A strong
ruler, Ahmad Shah’s empire lasted wholly until his death in 1772. Rule passed peacefully to his
14
Romey,
The
Forgotten
Realm
of
Alexander
15
Katzman,
Afghanistan:
Post-Taliban…,
Background
pg
1
16
Tarzi
and
Lamb,
Measuring
Perceptions,
page
3.
Loya
Jirga
means
“grand
assembly”
and
is
a
traditional
method
for
political
activity
and
association;
the
Loya
Jirga
is
a
traditionally
Pashtun
undertaking
but
has
been
recently
extended
to
include
the
other
tribes,
involving
a
large
congregation
of
important
individuals
meeting
to
resolve
major
events,
conflicts,
and
other
important
happenings,
Jirga’s
can
last
for
very
long
periods
of
time
as
decisions
can
only
be
reached
by
the
group
and
arguments
can
go
on
for
days
22. Shopbell
21
sons, who received “but nominal homage from the tribal chieftains.” 17
The sons spent much of
their rule quelling tribal uprisings, and moved the capital from Kandahar to Kabul within the first
generation for increased security. Taking advantage of significant contention amongst the
Durrani clan for control over territory as well as the empire, Dost Muhammad Khan advanced on
Kabul from Kashmir in 1826. After capturing the capital, he declared himself emir of the empire
and sought to retake lost terrain.
Anglo-Afghan Wars:
While in control, Dost Muhammad Khan faced a myriad of internal and external security
threats, presiding over the first Anglo-Afghan war. Seeking to retake lost territory, Persia
attacked several provinces-including Herat-in Afghanistan with Russian support. Fearing a
Russian takeover in the event of an Afghan defeat, Britain attempted to initiate diplomatic
discussions with the Afghan leader. Britain viewed Herat as a strategically imperative buffer
zone, keeping Russian hegemony from threatening English colonies in India. 18
The British
diplomat was accepted into the Afghan capital, but negotiations ultimately failed. Upon their
withdrawal, the British delegation saw evidence of Russian presence in Kabul itself. 19
Their
subsequent report sparked the First Anglo-Afghan War and the first Western war in Afghanistan
since the time of Alexander the Great. Eerily similar to both the Soviet Union and the American
invasions centuries later, the British invaded Afghanistan quickly and easily in April 1839,
installing a British-backed ruler in the capital within three months of invasion. The Afghans
rebelled against the foreign power and dictator, coalescing around Pashtun leader Dost
Mohammad Khan and gradually decreasing the territory effectively held by the British. After a
decisive British route of his troops in spring 1839, Dost Mohammad was forced to flee the region,
17
Encyclopedia
Britannica
18
Ibid
19
The
British
reported
the
presence
of
a
“Russian
agent”
in
Kabul
as
their
reason
for
termination
of
discussions
and
diplomatic
withdrawal.
It
is
likely
that
their
subsequent
reports
and
testimony
to
the
Russian
presence
was
exaggerated
23. Shopbell
22
leaving several sons to unify the tribes as leaders of the low-intensity warfare. Ignorant of the
politico-security situation on the ground, the British decided to evacuate their Kabul garrison in
early January 1842; 4,500 soldiers (mostly Indian colonial troops) and 12,000 civilian followers
left the British lines. Smelling blood, the Afghan tribesmen fell upon the retreating British and
Indian colonial soldiers. 30 miles and one week later, only ONE Englishman made it back to
British-held India, along with roughly 40 Indian soldiers. 20
In response to the utter destruction of the army, Britain doubled down on its claims for
Afghanistan and sent in many more colonial troops from India. At the same time and under more
competent leadership, troops stationed in Kandahar and Peshawar reached Kabul by late summer
1842, killing and destroying as they moved through the countryside. 21
Unable to subdue the
restive populace, the commander of British troops in the region ordered all troops to be evacuated
before winter 1842. British troops briefly re-occupied Kabul, destroying the Grand Bazaar and
freeing several captives from the earlier British defeat. 22
Following this bloody conclusion to the
First Anglo-Afghan War-a resounding defeat for the British-Dost Mohammad returned to power.
The British occupation and brutal pillage of the country terrified the population and planted a
deep social hatred of foreign invasion and influence. 23
Dost Mohammad seized upon the comparably “unified” tribal Afghanistan following the
expulsion of the British. After re-establishing control of Kabul, he eventually took Kandahar (in
Southern Afghanistan) before extending his influence north. In 1855, Dost Mohammad ended his
feud with Britain and moved against the Persian army in the West. He captured Herat less than
20
Boot,
Invisible
Armies,
scene
immortalized
by
Thompson:
“Remnants
of
an
Army.”
Cold,
dehydration,
and
Afghan
guerrillas
had
essentially
annihilated
the
entire
British
column
21
Baxter,
The
First
Anglo-‐Afghan
War,
1997
22
The
Bazaar,
one
of
the
most
vibrant
marketplaces
of
the
region,
was
destroyed
as
retaliation
for
the
destruction
of
the
British
column
in
the
January
1842;
as
an
interesting
side
note,
the
author
read
a
2011
report
from
a
British
military
unit
in
Kabul
which
was
shocked
to
find
that
some
Afghans
still
hold
today’s
soldiers
accountable
for
the
destruction
of
the
Bazaar
171
years
ago
23
Ibid;
the
British
invasion
of
Afghanistan
may
be
responsible
for
a
significant
amount
of
distrust
of
foreigners-‐
particularly
amongst
tribal
Afghans-‐found
in
Afghanistan
today
24. Shopbell
23
one month before his death in June 1863. 24
Reign passed to his sons, with Afghanistan’s
territorial and governmental control remaining essentially static. However, in early summer
1878, tensions with Britain again boiled over, resulting in the Second Anglo-Afghan War.
Sher Ali Khan, Dost Mohammad’s son and ruler of Afghanistan, once again refused to
allow the British to set up a diplomatic mission in Kabul. Seeing that Russia was officially
communicating with the Afghan ruler, Britain again feared increasing Russian hegemony over
their “buffer” area for the Indian colonies; this time, they sent over 40,000 troops with superior
weaponry to forcefully assert British foreign policy. 25
Given their numerical and technological
superiority, the British quickly captured a significant amount of Afghan territory. During the
British invasion, Sher Ali Khan died peacefully in Mazar-i-Sharif and control of the Afghan
crown passed to his son. Sher Ali’s son, eager to prevent a total British takeover, signed an
agreement that ostensibly resulted in a pseudo-neutrality between the two powers, total British
control over all Afghan foreign policy, and the removal of all British forces from Afghan
territory. Although a formal English diplomatic delegation remained in Kabul, the Afghans
promptly killed the diplomat and his family; following their death the English Crown abandoned
its objective of maintaining a mission in the nation. 26
Of immense contemporary consequence, this time period saw the creation of
Afghanistan’s borders as they are recognized today. Most controversially-and most importantly-
was the Durand Line created in 1893 that separated British India (areas of which are now modern
day Pakistan) from Afghanistan. At the time, the Afghan emir thought of the line as a “temporary
concession of a nature similar to that which he had been obliged to make in order to secure
British recognition [for his right to rule domestic policy] in 1880.” 27
This seemingly arbitrary
24
Encyclopedia
Britannica
25
The
First
Anglo-‐Afghan
War
consisted
of
an
initial
invasion
force
of
only
21,000
troops,
these
numbers
come
from
various
British
military
documents
26
Boot,
Invisible
Armies,
page
170
27
Tarzi,
Political
Struggles…,
page
19,
Tarzi
argues
that
the
emir
believed
his
concession
for
British
control
of
foreign
policy
AND
his
acceptance
of
the
Durand
Line
as
purely
temporary
stop-‐gap
measures
designed
in
order
to
alleviate
British
pressure
25. Shopbell
24
border is a critical element of understanding the modern politics and social context of
Afghanistan. Consequently, it will be detailed and referred to in greater depth later in this
research.
Afghanistan became a virtual protectorate of British control for 40 years, until war-weary
England formally relinquished total control of Afghan foreign policy in August 1919. In 1880,
following the Second Anglo-Afghan War, control of the Afghan crown was taken by Abdur
Rahman Khan; known as the “Iron Amir,” Abdur Rahman was able to unify the tribes and bring a
sense of nationality previously unknown in Afghanistan. 28
Abdur Rahman modernized many
parts of the country through intense centralization and his “iron” punishments, installing for the
first time a chiefly religious right to rule. 29
…Within 20 years, at the end of his reign, the country was a unity, possessing a
standing army, institutions of central and local government, a civil service, a tax
collection system; the roads were safe, the tribes generally obedient, and the writ
of government ran far more deeply into the lands of the tribes than had ever been
the case before…He was the first to change the idea of kingship in
Afghanistan…He saw that for centralized government, there had to be a single,
strong leader. His means of changing the conception of kingship was by religion.
Kingship came not from jirgas, he said, but from God. 30
Abdur Rahman’s example of total control over religion as a unifying and commanding
force over the disparate tribes remained following his death in 1901 for several decades. King
Amanullah, taking the throne in 1919 and immediately launching the Third Anglo-Afghan War,
which would finally rid Afghanistan of all British control, was the first to challenge this
traditionalist view of governance. 31
Amanullah possessed familial ties to Kabul’s “elite,” a
burgeoning group of intellectuals who favored Westernization and modernization for the country,
and was an ardent supporter of women’s rights. The King initiated serious attempts to distance
the hegemony of state over religion and in fact even attempted to completely isolate the two
28
Abdur
Rahman
was
a
grandson
of
Dost
Mohammad,
keeping
control
of
the
Afghan
Crown
in
the
Khan
dynasty
29
Punishments
described
by
Omrani
as
“tyranny”
30
Omrani,
Afghanistan
and
the
Search
for
Unity
31
Ibid
26. Shopbell
25
institutions from each other; the national conscription army was severely cut in favor of social
and educational advancements; diplomatic missions from the world over were established in
Kabul, with varying foreign policies gaining prominence in Afghan politics; education was made
compulsory, with drastic improvements in women’s education, health, and social freedoms. 32
Facing a total reversal over their centuries-old way of life, the tribes rebelled. Lacking the strong
national army that had benefitted Abdur Rahman, King Amanullah was unable to put the
rebellion down and was forced to flee, abdicating his throne and moving in exile to Sweden in
early 1929. In his wake, the tribes descended into civil war, while the leader of the tribe that had
displaced Amanullah took nominal control in Kabul for several months.
Monarchy:
After the overthrow of central leadership, various tribal leaders took control and were
eventually displaced or assassinated. This period of turnover came to an abrupt end when 19 year
old Mohammad Zahir Shah assumed power and established a strong monarchy following the
assassination of his father. The ascendancy of the young King issued in a 40-year reign of
perpetual monarchy-one of the longest in Afghanistan’s history. The time period was marked by
an initial re-consolidation of centralization, with the National Government again gaining
influence over the tribes. Zahir Shah utilized tribal militias and grievances to pit the secular
tribes against each other, while the government improved general tribal life by accepting aid
projects from both the Soviet Union and the United States. 33
The Afghan government eased
traditionalist restrictions on women, promulgated a constitution and bicameral legislature, and
became increasingly internationally-focused. Interestingly, some older Afghans cite this time
period as one of Afghanistan’s best. Potentially hoping to limit the influence of the USSR on the
32
Ibid
33
Katzman,
Post-‐Taliban
…,
pg
2,
both
Cold
War
powers
attempted
to
mitigate
the
influence
of
the
other
through
public
works
and
infrastructure
projects:
the
USSR
built
transportation
infrastructure
and
Bagram
Airfield
(both
of
which
it
utilized
extensively
in
the
coming
invasion),
while
USAID
provided
chiefly
energy
and
agricultural
reforms
27. Shopbell
26
small but growing communist factions in his country at the time, Zahir Shah built significant
political and military-industrialist ties with the Soviet Union. 34
By the 1970’s, the Afghan government faced increasing internal and external threats in
addition to a very unstable, weak economy. One third of the legislature was chosen by the people
of Afghanistan; while this democratic “experiment” was hailed by the West, it also allowed the
political creation and nourishment of both right and left wing extremist groups. Students
attending chiefly Marxist institutions in Kabul created the communist People’s Democratic Party
of Afghanistan (PDPA) with Soviet guidance and support. Concurrently, religious scholars and
leaders from both Kabul and the tribes coalesced around a new, fanatical brand of Islam
emanating from the Middle East. In 1979, the deeply conservative Muslim cleric Ayatollah
Khomeini rose to power in Iran; his election and subsequent religious edicts spread into
Afghanistan across the porous Western land border, energizing Afghan populations with the
religious-political revival. 35
PDPA and Conditions Leading to Invasion:
Signaling the end of his rule, King Zahir Shah and his entire family traveled to Italy in
July 1973 for medical treatment. The King’s cousin and Prime Minister, Mohammad Daoud,
seized power in a nonviolent coup, receiving significant help and guidance from leftist military
officers, elements of the PDPA, and the KGB. 36
Daoud proclaimed himself the First President of
Afghanistan and promoted progressive politics and strong state-centric economic reforms while
engaging in nepotism and heavy-handed repression of dissent. At the time, the military was
highly influenced by the PDPA because “the military was the portion of the state apparatus where
the Soviet model of modernization was most influential.” 37
Indeed, the Soviet Union and its
34
Ibid,
pg
2
35
Coll,
Ghost
Wars,
pg
40
36
Ibid,
pg
2
37
Rubin,
The
Fragmentation
of
Afghanistan,
pg
104
28. Shopbell
27
intelligence service, the KGB, had even established overt and covert political advisory units
within the Afghan army and throughout Kabul. 38
Daoud, who came to power with the help of the
PDPA and who considered himself a military ruler, was thus highly influenced by the Soviet
Union and communist ideology. During his tenure, the PDPA attempted large scale, rapid
modernization programs and split into two semi-rival factions: Khalq (“masses” faction) and
Parcham (“banner” faction). 39
The Khalq faction, which was composed of mostly the middle and
lower level Pashtun-dominated officer corps, drew significantly more recruitment amongst the
bulk of the Afghan army. Parcham consisted mostly of the urban, more-modernist middle and
upper classes amongst the Afghan population.
Despite a late start, Khalq seems to have overtaken Parcham by 1978. During
1975 and 1976, as Soviet interest in the PDPA increased, Parcham and Khalq
competed for recognition by the international communist movement as the
genuine Marxist-Leninist Party of Afghanistan. Instead they encountered
pressure-presumably unwelcome-to unite. 40
While subscribing to his communist over-seers, Daoud followed the example of his disposed
predecessor; he continued to play the two powers off the other, gaining financial, agricultural, and
infrastructure aid and using it to strengthen his rule in a “precarious balancing act.” 41
By 1978,
however, Daoud “fell off his beam. He arrested communist leaders in Kabul after they staged a
noisy protest.” 42
With formal Soviet authorization, and active participation by members of the
KGB, the PDPA and Afghan military staged a coup on 27 APR 1978. Soviet KGB and Afghan
Army forces attacked the Presidential Palace; after a 12 hour firefight, the entire Daoud family
38
Coll,
Ghost
Wars,
pg
39
39
Katzman,
Post-‐Taliban
Governance,
Security,
and
US
Polisy,
pg
2,
and
Rubin,
pg
104:
according
to
Katzman,
modernization
included
redistribution
of
land
and
inclusion
of
more
women
in
government
40
Rubin,
The
Fragmentation
of
Afghanistan,
pg
105
41
Coll,
Ghost
Wars,
pg
39;
Coll
discusses
Daoud
only
minimally,
dedicating
only
six
lines
in
his
700
page
book
to
Daoud’s
tenure,
thus
seemingly
dismissing
the
impact
Daoud
had
on
the
rise
of
communist
rule
in
Afghanistan,
while
other
sources-‐including
Rubin-‐maintain
that
his
rule
was
instrumental
in
the
PDPA’s
success.
42
Ibid;
the
PDPA
was
protesting
the
assassination
of
a
senior
liaison
officer
for
Parcham,
potentially
at
the
hands
of
the
Khalq
29. Shopbell
28
(including women and children) were exterminated and by 30 APR 1978, Khalq leaders were in
nominal control of the country. 43
Seizing the initiative presented by the unrest, and objecting to the communist reforms that
were already taking place in the nation, the right-wing Islamist movement, calling themselves the
“mujahedin” and inspired by the Iranian example, launched a violent revolt in Herat in March
1979, hacking to death several dozen Russian political agents and their families. The Soviet Air
Force, flying out of Kabul, flew vengeance sorties against Herat and, by April 1979 had killed
20,000 civilians in Herat alone. 44
The Islamic rebellion and it’s mujahedin fighters gained steam,
revolting against the Leninist-style heavy-handed crackdown on dissent. Khalq and PDPA
leaders believed that Iran and Pakistan were covertly sending fighters and clerics into
Afghanistan and were helping foment the dissent, which was spreading throughout the
countryside. 45
Infighting within the Khalq led to the political assassination of the movement’s
leader, replaced by an unstable and even more aggressively-Leninist Hafizullah Amin. The
Soviet leadership became increasingly concerned about the PDPA longevity in the face of the
Islamic movement and found Amin intolerably hostile to USSR political and operational
objectives. Their desperation for a stable ally in Afghanistan would inspire a drastic move with
global ramifications: ramifications that still have a profound affect on the global political
dynamic.
Soviet War in Afghanistan:
“From the very first hours after cables from the US embassy in Kabul confirmed that a
Soviet invasion had begun, Zbigniew Brzezinski, Jimmy Carter’s most determined cold warrior,
43
In
June
2008,
US
forces
found
a
mass
grave
outside
Kabul
containing
the
remains
of
the
Daoud
family
and
security
forces
44
Ibid,
pg
42
45
Ibid,
pg
42;
over
the
summer,
the
United
States
also
made
the
first
of
many
payments
to
the
Islamic
insurgents
with
the
goal
of
challenging
communist
control
over
the
country.
30. Shopbell
29
wondered if this time the Soviets had overreached.” 46
The Soviet invasion began in textbook air-
assault fashion in the early morning hours of 25 DEC 1979 and ended as the bodies of Soviet
troops, strapped onto tanks and covered with snow, rumbled out of the Salang Highway on 15
FEB 1989. The literature regarding the Soviet War in Afghanistan is immense; any interested
party need only perform a rudimentary “Google” search for the time period in order to quickly
gain an enormous amount of information regarding the conflict. Because of the length, depth,
and scope of the invasion, and because the minute details of the occupation are not entirely
relevant to contemporary or future Afghanistan, This research will only briefly discuss the
overview of the conduct and after action review from the war. It will instead focus on the
belligerents of contemporary relevance and any lasting consequences of the war. 47
Following the Politburo’s decision to conventionally invade Afghanistan, covert Soviet
advance teams entered the country in early December 1979. A late night Christmas Eve airborne
operation dropped shock troops into Kabul, who quickly seized strategic objectives including the
airfield, various military installations, and the Presidential Palace; early Christmas morning, the
40th
Army invaded with mechanized infantry, armor, and artillery units penetrating the nation
from two different approaches. Hafizullah Amin was promptly killed in a costly assault on his
residence and was replaced by the Soviet-installed Babrak Karmal, a Parcham leader who had
been exiled following Amin’s rise to power. Intended to quickly pacify the nation through a
“blitzkrieg,” the invasion and subsequent occupation of all major metropolitan areas not
surprisingly had the reverse effect; it spawned an increased sense of nationalism directed against
the foreign invader, and the mujahedin’s Islamic insurgency grew exponentially. 48
46
Ibid,
pg
50;
Brzezinksi
was
the
United
States
National
Security
Advisor
to
President
Jimmy
Carter
47
For
interested
readers,
Steve
Coll’s
previously
cited
Ghost
Wars
provides
an
excellent,
in-‐depth
analysis
of
the
regional
consequences
and
actions
on
during
the
Soviet
War
in
Afghanistan;
additionally,
Ahmed
Rashid’s
trilogy:
Taliban,
Descent
into
Chaos,
and
Pakistan
on
the
Brink,
provides
consistent
reporting
on
the
continued,
regional
impacts
of
the
Soviet
invasion
48
Ibid,
pg
51;
Coll
describes
the
textbook
invasion
and
subsequent
insurgency/counterinsurgency
throughout
his
text
31. Shopbell
30
Throughout the conflict, both the United States and Saudi Arabia funded elements of the
mujahedin, with the United States funneling billions of dollars of aid, including advanced
weaponry, through the proxy services of Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI). 49
Importantly, and with significant future ramifications, the United States allowed the ISI total
control over fund dispersion and allotment. Answering a call for Jihad, or Holy War against the
foreign invader, Arabic fighters flocked to the South-Asian nation. The United States, ISI, and
various Afghan groups established sanctuaries in Pakistan, amongst the fiercely independent
Pashtun tribes, and in the mountainous North and North East regions of the nation. The status
and various resistance abilities of the mujahedin closely followed tribal lines; militaristic
Pashtuns mounted the most capable defense, while Tajiks and Uzbeks often had to re-learn
warfare lessons through trial-and-error. 50
Throughout the conflict, the vast majority of forces
battled the Soviets as guerrillas, only rarely-and usually with disastrous consequences-engaging
the Soviets with conventional tactics. 51
As the occupation wore on, mujahedin benefactors and
tactics advanced as well. “The elite [mujahedin groups] evolved from a nationalistic group based
on Afghan exclusivity to a non-statist Islamist group that felt as comfortable in Pakistan as they
did in Afghanistan.” 52
Many of these fighters would go on to form the backbone of the Pakistan-
controlled Taliban. Initially uncoordinated, the Afghans operated out of an estimated 4,000
kinetic origins of attack throughout the country: in response to the adaptive demands of an
insurgency, they eventually coalesced around a core group of major mujahedin commanders who
received support from the US, Saudi Arabia, and ISI, many of whom will be discussed later in the
report. 53
49
Barlett,
The
Oily
Americans,
Saudi
Arabian
intelligence
matched
many
US
funds
dollar
for
dollar,
combined
with
Saudi
private
citizens
and
Islamic
charities
also
donating
additional
millions
to
the
rebels
50
Roy,
The
Path
to
Victory
and
Chaos,
the
tribes
and
ethnicities
will
be
discussed
in
great
detail
in
following
sections
of
this
report
51
Guerrilla
warfare
is
characterized
by
small,
highly
mobile
and
lightly
armed
fighters
engaging
the
enemy
in
limited,
low
intensity
warfare,
typically
utilizing
“hit-‐and-‐run”
tactics
designed
to
maximize
enemy
casualties
over
a
short
period
of
time
while
minimizing
unit
casualties
52
Tarzi,
Political
Struggles
Over…,
pg
24
53
Roy,
The
Path
to
Victory
and
Chaos
32. Shopbell
31
Throughout the occupation, Soviet forces concentrated their counterinsurgency (COIN)
operations amongst the centers of population, rarely venturing into the 80% of Afghanistan that
was considered rural and outside the Red Army’s reach. 54
When they did, they utilized mass-
force, scorched earth campaign tactics; these tactics resulted in the slaughter of more civilians
than fighters and destroyed local agrarian economies. Combined, the two factors resulted in the
quickly increasing radicalization of the rural Muslim population. Contrary to basic population-
centric COIN, Soviet forces remained highly separated from the Afghan urban population and
were seen as the invading and occupying force. 55
Realizing that they were losing the conflict, the
USSR installed the former head of the dreaded Afghan secret police, Mohammad Najibullah, as
the new President of Afghanistan. Najibullah’s command increased its control over the National
Army and spread its international presence, shooting down several Iranian aircraft and covertly
attacking targets inside Pakistan. Over the course of the conflict, the Soviets were unable to deny
sanctuary and supply routes from Pakistan into Afghanistan-vast quantities of financial aid,
communications equipment, and increasingly sophisticated weapons reached rebel groups. In
later years, the CIA even gave some mujahedin fighters Stinger surface-to-air/surface-to-surface
missiles; these shoulder-fired and highly portable weapon systems were able to negate the Soviet
heli-borne operations-the USSR’s greatest advantage-and seriously threatened air resupply
around major airfields. 56
Towards the later years of the conflict, the USSR was facing increasing financial and
political ruin; the costs of the Afghan War were unbearable in the face of a deteriorating
communist agenda across the Soviet bloc and even in Moscow itself. By the time of their
withdrawal, the USSR had lost approximately 14,453 personnel, 451 aircraft, numerous other
54
Amstutz,
Afghanistan:
The
First
Five…,
page
127
55
Killcullen,
Counterinsurgency,
provides
definitions
and
examples
of
doctrinally-‐sound
COIN
OPS
56
Coll,
Ghost
Wars,
the
utilization
of
the
FIM-‐92
Stinger
weapon
system
has
been
hailed
as
the
most
important
escalation
of
the
conflict
and
almost
singularly
responsible
for
the
defeat
of
the
Red
Army,
Coll
acknowledges
the
important
role
these
missiles
played
but
disputes
the
contention
that
they
essentially
won
the
war
33. Shopbell
32
vehicles, and had spent billions of dollars. 57
After attempting to consolidate the Afghan National
Government and reinforce Najibullah’s position, the Red Army completely left Afghanistan on
15 FEB 1989, spending a total of nine years, two months and three weeks in country.
Chaos and Civil War in Afghanistan:
As previously stated, the mujahedin coalesced around a core group of principal leaders
who were mostly favored by the Pakistani ISI to receive the military aid. Following the retreat of
the Red Army in early 1989, these forces turned against each other for control of Afghanistan
and, broadly, control of the regional Islamist movement. Afghanistan descended into a virtual
civil war with many combatants and a constantly changing number of fronts. Najibullah’s
government lasted much longer than the mujahedin, CIA, or KGB predicted; his army (receiving
continued financial and material aid from the USSR) held Kabul and other strategic population
centers. For three years, Najibullah successfully played the mujahedin against each other,
allowing the rebel infighting to weaken and further divide the movement, often directly along
tribal and even familial lines. 58
There were several principal commanders involved in the Afghan Civil War; the
following are some of the commanders who played the largest part in the future of Afghanistan,
and some are still active to this day. Directly north of Kabul, Ahmad Shah Massoud’s Tajik-
dominated Jamiat-e-Islami had developed a guerrilla army and functional society, successfully
defending the Panjshir Valley against Soviet occupation for the entire conflict with considerably
little outside support. Several ethnic minorities-including Uzbek commander Abdul Rashid
Dostum-eventually joined Massoud’s forces in the Panjshir and coalesced into the Northern
Alliance, which will be discussed in depth. Gulbuddin Hekmatyar’s Hizb-e-Islami was favored
57
These
numbers
were
found
on
Wikipedia,
with
a
citation
from
the
American
VFW
that
had
expired:
through
separate
sources
I
have
confirmed
that
these
numbers
are
relatively
accurate
but
are
not
meant
to
be
exact
58
Coll,
Ghost
Wars,
the
entire
section
regarding
Najibullah’s
government
as
well
as
strategic
postures
of
mujahedin
units
comes
from
this
work
34. Shopbell
33
by ISI and was mostly composed of Pashtun Khalq forces. The group absconded into the
mountains, targeting threatening leadership networks while gaining territory against Najibullah’s
regime.
Gulbuddin Hekmatyar…was moving systematically to wipe out his rivals in the
Afghan resistance…as the Soviet Union soldiers pulled out, Hekmatyar and ISI
had embarked on a concerted, clandestine plan to eliminate his rivals and
establish his Muslim Brotherhood-dominated Islamic Party as the most powerful
national force in Afghanistan. 59
Hekmatyar is still active in the Afghan battlespace to this day, maintaining closer ties to
Iran than to Pakistan. His group was widely condemned for significant brutality against civilians
during and after the Soviet invasion, although significant numbers of civilians were killed by all
sides. 60
The fall of the Berlin Wall signaled the fall of Afghanistan’s most important trade partner
and source of support. Without the economic lifeblood of the USSR, Najibullah’s communist
government was unable to maintain the high operational-tempo required for control of Kabul.
From the North, Massoud’s Northern Alliance-now in complete and conventional warfare against
Hekmatyar- descended upon the final remnants of the communist regime in Kabul. Hekmatyar’s
forces, numerically exceeding his Northern opponent’s, advanced from the south. While the rival
mujahedin factions encircled Kabul, internationally-renown Islamic leaders (including Usama bin
Laden) attempted to bring the two factions to an agreement that could prevent a continuance of
the civil war, already responsible for the deaths of so many civilians. The negotiations failed. In
a testament to the commander’s unconventional warfare aptitude and audacity, Massoud utilized
traditional Afghan fighting customs as a weakness: knowing that Hekmatyar and many other
mujahedin commanders would disengage all communications over night, the Tajik commander
utilized the communications blackout to exploit his opponent and moved many of his forces into
59
Ibid,
pg
181
60
Five
other
commanders
and
parties
were
operational
in
the
civil
war;
with
the
exception
of
Massoud,
all
were
comprised
of
predominantly
Sunni-‐Islamist
Pashtun
fighters,
they
are
not
principally
involved
in
events
that
have
created
contemporary
Afghanistan
and
will
be
discussed
in
section
two
of
this
report
35. Shopbell
34
Kabul while Hekmatyars forces were either asleep or unable to communicate about the invasion.
Massoud entered Kabul, quickly overwhelmed Najibullah’s final defenses, and established
extremely advantageous fighting positions for his forces before Hekmatyar could even be woken
up. Within a week, Hekmatyar’s forces had been entirely routed from Kabul and were relegated
to haphazardly “lobbing” indirect fire onto the city, killing as many civilians as enemy forces, and
Najibullah had been placed under house arrest. 61
“The first Afghan war was over. The second had begun.” 62
Massive amounts of conventional and guerrilla fighting continued in Kabul and the
surrounding countryside for years. Hekmatyar’s Islamist forces, backed by Pakistan’s ISI,
controlled different parts of Kabul and different parts of the country on a daily basis. 63
The
Northern Alliance, which claimed sovereignty and established a government for Afghanistan
under Prime Minister Rabbani, controlled most of Kabul and the entire Northern parts of the
country. Tribal warlords again sprang up out of the chaos; the corrupt belligerents allowed
lawlessness, extortion, the drug trade, and violent crime to seize the rural parts of the country.
Abroad, “Islamist violence connected to Arab veterans of the Afghan jihad surged worldwide.” 64
Brutal violence in Afghanistan had reached levels that surpassed even the anti-Soviet resistance,
with everyday Afghan citizens forced to choose between two evils.
In 1994, therefore, people were generally highly supportive and enthusiastic when a
group of devout Muslims sporting black turbans rode into Kandahar on shiny new Toyota Hilux’s
in the spring and summer. These young men, who called themselves “Taliban” and followed a
devout form of Islam known as Deobandism, started out with small intentions, initially acting as a
61
Ibid,
pgs
235-‐237
62
Ibid,
pg
237
63
Pakistan
was-‐and
still
is-‐intent
on
seeing
a
friendly
government
installed
in
its
Western
neighbor;
regional
interference
in
Afghan
affairs
has
been
a
recurring
theme
throughout
the
country’s
history
and
will
be
discussed
later
in
the
report
64
Ibid,
pg
275,
Coll
cites
different
terrorist
plots
and
attacks
aimed
at
many
different
targets,
including
the
United
States
36. Shopbell
35
type of business-security force that meted out vigilante justice against the corrupt and terrorizing
warlords in Kandahar. 65
The Taliban assembled their story so that Pashtuns could recognize it as a revival
of old glory. The Taliban connected popular, rural Islamic values with a
grassroots Durrani Pashtun tribal rising. They emerged at a moment when
important wealthy Pashtun tribal leaders around Kandahar hungered for a
unifying cause. The Taliban hinted that their militia would become a vehicle for
the return to Afghanistan of King Zahir Shah from his exile in Rome. They
preached for a reborn alliance of Islamic piety and Pashtun might. 66
As their movement gained influence, their moderate Islamist stance began to deteriorate. “But as
the months passed and their legend grew, they began to meet and appeal for backing from
powerful Durrani Pashtun traders and chieftains.” 67
The Taliban’s one-eyed Pashtun leader and
former mujahedin fighter, Mullah Omar, quickly gained a mystical reputation for merciless
justice and devout piety; his exploits ranged in extent from the capture and public torture of a
child rapist before hanging the offender from a tank barrel, to donning a cloak housed in the
Kandahar Madrassa that had purportedly belonged to the Prophet Mohammad himself. 68
Although relatively little is known about Mohammad Omar the man, it is believed that the first
Taliban were Afghan refugee’s living in Pakistan attending Madrassa (Taliban can be translated
to “student of Islam”) studying under Omar’s tutelage in the Frontier Provinces of Pakistan.
Many were orphans of the Afghan violence, while many others were “Afghan Islamic clerics and
students, mostly of rural, Pashtun origin…former mujahedin who had become disillusioned with
conflict among mujahedin parties and had moved into Pakistan to study in Islamic seminaries
(“madrassas”)…” 69
By November 1994 they had secured control of Kandahar and were quickly
expanding their territory. Sometime between the fall of Kandahar and early 1995, Pakistan’s ISI
became significantly involved in the Taliban movement. “Pakistan had all but invented the
65
According
to
Katzman:
Post-‐Taliban…,
pg
4
note
4,
“The
Deobandi
school
began
in
1867
in
a
seminary
in
Uttar
Pradesh,
in
British-‐controlled
India,
that
was
set
up
to
train
Islamic
clerics
and
to
counter
the
British
educational
model”
66
Ibid,
pg
283,
Coll
apparently
grasped
much
of
his
understanding
of
the
Taliban
from
Ahmad
Rashid’s
Taliban:
Militant
Islam,
Oil,
and
Fundamentalism
in
Central
Asia
67
Ibid,
pg
285
68
Ibid,
pg
283,
and
Katzman:
Post-‐Taliban…
pg
4
69
Katzman,
Post-‐Taliban…,
pg
4
37. Shopbell
36
Taliban, the so-called Koranic Students.” 70
Attempting to use the Taliban as a vehicle to both
quell the turbulence and install a friendly regime in its neighboring country, the ISI and Pakistani
military supported the Taliban with “arms, ammunition, fuel, and military advisors…” 71
As the year progressed, fighting between Massoud and Hekmatyar continued in Kabul
while the Taliban continued their constant march north and west. By September 1995, the
Taliban ousted Massoud ally Ismail Khan from power in Herat Province and had captured
significant amounts of Hizb territory as well. Seeing that Hekmatyar could not overcome Jamiat
to take Kabul, and that the leader was despised by his own tribe-the Pashtuns-in addition to all
other ethnicities for his wanton use of artillery on civilian locations, Pakistan abandoned
Hekmatyar and shifted funds entirely to the Taliban. Caught between Massoud’s Kabul to the
North and the advancing Taliban from the South, Hekmatyar was forced to abandon his command
and ally with the Rabbani/Massoud government. Realizing the Taliban’s unstoppable momentum
and seeming popular appeal, Massoud, Rabbani, and several allies abandoned their Kabul
positions favorably in September 1996. 72
These forces went back to Massoud’s homeland and
familiar territory: the Panjshir Valley, where they formed the Northern Alliance and continued to
contest Kabul from the Taliban. The region, commanded militarily by Massoud and politically
by Rabbani, was the only part of Afghanistan that the Taliban failed to capture.
Taliban Control and Downfall:
The Taliban victoriously rode into Afghanistan’s capital on 27 SEP 1996. “Taliban
gunmen subsequently entered a U.N. facility in Kabul to seize Najibullah, his brother, and aides,
and then hanged them.” 73
They were castrated and tortured before being displayed from a traffic
light, signaling a new regime in Afghanistan’s history. After they captured Kabul, and while
70
Randall,
Osama:
The
Makings…,
pg
26
71
Giraldo,
Terrorism
Financing…,
pg
96
72
Katzman,
Post-‐Taliban…,
pg
5,
the
fighters
abandoning
Kabul
left
essentially
unopposed
with
most
heavy
weaponry,
supplies,
and
personnel
intact
73
Ibid,
pg
5
38. Shopbell
37
continuing to fight Massoud, the Taliban quickly became much more radical. They moved away
from their moderate, vigilante status, and lost both international and domestic support for their
increasingly strict adherence to Islamic customs. 74
Education for boys was slashed and, when it
occurred, tightly controlled by religious teachers. Television, dancing, music, and other
“immoral” elements of modern civilization (mostly components of Western culture) were banned
at the risk of severe physical punishment. Two gigantic Buddha statues, carved above Bamiyan
city during Afghanistan’s Maurya period, were destroyed on Mullah Omar’s orders as
representations of a false idol. 75
Particularly harsh and criticized for its stance on girls and
women, the Taliban forbade them from attending school or working outside the home, and it was
a crime to show any skin except hands, ankles, and (occasionally) eyes in public. Executions,
especially for women accused of adultery, were common and public, often occurring in the old
Afghan soccer stadium. While the Taliban controlled just about the only export-opium-it also
preached against the use of any type of alcohol or drug, and citizens caught using were severely
punished or killed. International Islamic terror organizations, including al Qaeda and others, were
granted protected access and given free reign throughout Afghanistan; this would be the Taliban’s
near-fatal mistake. 76
In early September 2001, two Arab journalists entered Northern Alliance lines. They had
been granted an interview with Massoud himself; a rare honor, and the two journalists had
excellent recommendations and credentials. They waited for the interview for several days before
finally being granted an audience with the Tajik commander on 09 SEP 2001. That morning, the
journalists set up their recording equipment, read their target a list of prepared questions, and
detonated a bomb that had been hidden in their camera. Massoud was unable to survive this
74
Ibid,
pg
5
75
The
demolition
of
these
statues
brought
significant
global
condemnation;
both
Japan
and
Switzerland
have
since
committed
to
rebuilding
the
statues,
although
the
status
of
the
repairs
remains
uncertain
as
the
statues
were
completely
destroyed
76
This
section,
detailing
life
under
the
Taliban,
is
formally
derived
from
Katzman:
Post-‐Taliban…
page
5,
and
supplemented
by
the
authors
own
understanding
of
Taliban
rule
from
popular
sources
39. Shopbell
38
assassination attempt, the last of many. The Lion of the Panjshir was the most recent victim of
Usama bin Laden’s battle-proven international terrorist organization, al Qaeda. 77
Initially
unorganized and leaderless against the expected Taliban and al Qaeda offensive, Northern
Alliance units rallied around Uzbek General Dostum and were critical in the overthrow of the
Taliban in the following months.
Usama bin Laden, al Qaeda, and Prelude to Invasion 78
The goal of this research is not to highlight al Qaeda, Usama bin Laden (UBL) or other
international terrorist organizations as it is not intended to be counterterrorism or COIN research;
that being said, the Saudi radical-Islamist leader’s role in the status and context that Afghanistan
currently finds itself is impossible to ignore. Therefore, this section briefly addresses bin Laden’s
mid to late history and the justifications for his various attacks throughout the region and against
the West. Usama first entered the country that would host his planning for the 9/11 attacks in
May 1996, where he quickly formed a personal and professional bond with Mullah Omar and the
Taliban. Bin Laden had spent much of the Soviet invasion living in Pakistan, setting up supply
and training infrastructure for the mujahedin while gaining global renown as an international
Islamist figurehead and financier of jihad, more than an actual participant in the act itself. 79
No
evidence has yet surfaced to suggest that bin Laden or al Qaeda directly received any American
funds for the prosecution of the Soviet War. By the time that the Soviets had withdrawn from
Afghanistan, in early 1989, bin Laden and several other Arabic figures had formally created al
Qaeda.
77
Connections
to
al
Qaeda
and
bin
Laden,
and
a
similar
description
of
the
assassination,
is
found
in
Coll,
Ghost
Wars,
pgs
574-‐583
78
This
section
utilizes
chiefly
sources
from
the
9/11
Commission
Report
and
Coll,
Ghost
Wars
79
He
did
directly
fight
Russian
forces
in
one
firefight
in
Paktia
Province
during
the
Battle
of
Jaji,
which
garnered
significant
credibility
and
admiration
amongst
other
Arab
fighters;
his
role
in
actual
combat
throughout
the
occupation
and
even
in
the
battle
itself
was
actually
extremely
limited
40. Shopbell
39
Al Qaeda’s stated goals included “opposing non-Islamic governments with force and
violence;” although this and other operational goals certainly predisposed the group to anti-
Western activity, it was not until approximately 1992 that bin Laden became seriously and
aggressively anti-West. 80
Both al Qaeda and bin Laden are (were) devoutly Sunni entities,
targeting all non-Sunni’s for extermination. Bin Laden advocated, and al Qaeda utilized, a
violent form of Islamist international relations known as Qutbism. 81
After failing in his bid to
win a Saudi contract to wage war on the Kingdom’s behalf in the first Gulf War, and possibly
becoming embarrassed when the Royal Family turned instead to the “infidel” Americans, bin
Laden began to preach against his home nation, for which he was deported and sent into exile in
the Sudan in 1992. There are various accounts that may explain bin Laden’s relatively sudden
shift to aggressive anti-Western targeting.
According to an account later provided to the CIA by a source in Saudi intelligence, the
Saudi officer assigned to carry out the expulsion assured bin Laden that this was being
done for his own good. The officer blamed the Americans. The US government was
planning to kill him, he told bin Laden, by this account, so the Royal Family would do
him a favor and get him out of the kingdom for his own protection. 82
This misinformation (UBL had yet to be identified even as a threat), combined with the fact that
the West had been permitted into the Holy Lands of Saudi Arabia, and because of bin Laden’s
already anti-Western views, resulted in the issuance of a fatwa, or religious decree meant as law,
declaring war against the United States for its support of the Israeli occupation of Lebanon and
Palestine, as well as it’s garrison in Saudi Arabia, in August of 1996. Before the fatwa had been
issued, however, CIA assets in Sudan had identified al Qaeda-and in particular the organization’s
leader- as a threat in 1994; by March 1996 the US had applied sufficient diplomatic pressure
80
PBS:
Frontline,
Background
al
Qaeda
81
For
more
information
on
Qutbism,
consider
Paul
Berman
2003:
Terror
and
Liberalism
82
Coll,
Ghost
Wars,
pg
231
41. Shopbell
40
(later targeting al Qaeda infrastructure with Tomahawk cruise missiles) to convince Sudan to
expel him. 83
He traveled to Jalalabad, outside of Taliban control, and set up radical Islamist operations
in his new home. There, he executed the August 1998 deadly attacks against the American
embassies in Tanzania and Kenya, moved under Taliban protection outside Kandahar, and
escalated his involvement in foreign terrorist organizations while continuing to plan against
Western interests in the region. By early 1999, bin Laden had authorized Khalid Sheik
Mohammad to begin the preparations for the 9/11 attacks; additionally, bin Laden appointed
leadership for the undertaking, supplied the financial backing, and lent his training infrastructure
to the cause. In the following years, the hijackers entered the United States in waves and
continued refresher training for their mission. 84
Given the personal and professional closeness of
bin Laden and Mullah Omar, contrasted with the inherent need for secrecy, upper levels of the
Taliban leadership may or may not have known about the impending attack against American
civilians and infrastructure before the attack occurred. However, there is no denying that the
Taliban were aware of previous al Qaeda attacks on civilians and supported the same goals; the
two organizations shared training camps, supply infrastructure, and a common ideology. In any
case, Mullah Omar refused to hand bin Laden over to the American authorities after September
11th
.
Following the US invasion, bin Laden initially retreated to the mountainous Afghanistan-
Pakistan border where he continued to command al Qaeda. In March 2002, American SOF units
wounded and almost captured bin Laden during Operation Anaconda; in a major set back and
embarrassment for US leadership, he and several other top al Qaeda leaders were able to slip
through the Northern Alliance/Afghan encirclement and, presumably, find refuge in Pakistan.
After this, he released a limited amount of guidance and operational support for al Qaeda and the
83
The
9/11
Commission
Report,
2004
84
Ibid,
2004,
there
is
almost
zero
evidence
to
suggest
that
bin
Laden
did
not
have
a
direct,
active
role
in
the
planning
for
the
attacks
