EM Pulse Weapon Effects on Electronics

ELECTRO MAGNETIC PULSE AS A WEAPON
H.V.P.M. College Of Engineering And Technology , Amravati 1
ABSTRACT
High Power Electromagnetic Pulse generation techniques and High Power Microwave
technology have matured to the point where practical EMP Weapon (Electromagnetic
pulse) are becoming technically feasible, with new applications in both Strategic and
Tactical Information Warfare. The development of conventional EMP devices allows
their use in non-nuclear confrontations. This paper discusses aspects of the technology
base, weapon delivery techniques and proposes a doctrinal foundation for the use of
such devices in warhead and bomb applications.

CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
The future of the battlefield will be closely tied in with the advance of electronics
computers, robots and sensors will become more common on the future battlefield.
Infantrymen are being equipped with digital radios and computers. Night vision
devices have been around for some time. Tanks have highly sophisticated targeting
computers, radar and imaging devices. All these devices are electronic in nature.
As these devices become more and more common they will be integrated into helmets,
weapons, and battle suits. Vehicles will become highly automated and detection of the
enemy will become easier. As weapons become more lethal it will become more
important to have an advantage over the enemy and avoid being found by him.
It is unlikely that this trend will reverse itself. However, electronics are not
invulnerable. There are presently two devices, which are similar, that can destroy the
electronic advantage. These devices are not yet in widespread use but they are as
dangerous to electronics as a non-nuclear electromagnetic pulse weapons.
Countermeasures can protect electronics from these devices to some degree but no
countermeasure is perfect.

CHAPTER 2
HISTORY
2.1. NUCLEAR HIGH ALTITUDE ELECTROMAGNETIC
PULSE (HEMP)
Nuclear devices that generate HEMP are the most sophisticated, expensive, and
effective electromagnetic weapons. The U.S. military first witnessed their effects after
a series of high-altitude nuclear tests on Johnston Atoll in 1962. These tests
unexpectedly generated disruptions in electronic systems in Hawaii, over 1000 miles
away, due to EMP effects. Electronic systems failed across the island, radio broadcasts
were interrupted, streetlights burned out, and burglar alarms sounded. The Soviets had
similar experiences, damaging overhead and underground cables at distances of 400
miles from low yield (300 kiloton) high altitude nuclear tests. HEMP is generated as a
side effect of high-altitude nuclear detonation interaction with the atmosphere. Gamma
rays released by the explosion interact with air molecules, producing high-energy free
electrons through Compton scattering. These electrons are then trapped in the earth’s
magnetic field, generating an oscillating electric current, which gives rise to a rapidly
radiating coherent electromagnetic pulse. The pulse can span continent-sized areas,
due to the vast line of sight provide by its altitude, and affect systems on land, sea, and
air.

CHAPTER 3
3.1. NUCLEAR WEAPON EMP EFFECTS
A high-altitude nuclear detonation produces an immediate flux of gamma rays from
the nuclear reactions within the device. These photons in turn produce high energy
free electrons by Compton scattering at altitudes between (roughly) 20 and 40 km.
These electrons are then trapped in the Earth’s magnetic field, giving rise to an
oscillating electric current. This current is asymmetric in general and gives rise to a
rapidly rising radiated electromagnetic field called an electromagnetic pulse (EMP).
Because the electrons are trapped essentially simultaneously, a very large
electromagnetic source radiates coherently.
The pulse can easily span continent-sized areas, and this radiation can affect systems
on land, sea, and air. The first recorded EMP incident accompanied a high-altitude
nuclear test over the South Pacific and resulted in power system failures as far away as
Hawaii. A large device detonated at 400 to 500 km over Kansas would affect all of
CONUS. The signal from such an event extends to the visual horizon as seen from the
burst point.
The EMP produced by the Compton electrons typically lasts for about 1 microsecond,
and this signal is called HEMP. In addition to the prompt EMP, scattered gammas and
inelastic gammas produced by weapon neutrons produce an intermediate time signal
from about 1 microsecond to 1 second. The energetic debris entering the ionosphere
produces ionization and heating of the E-region. In turn, this causes the geomagnetic
field to heave, producing a late-time magneto hydro dynamic (MHD) EMP generally
called a heave signal.

Initially, the plasma from the weapon is slightly conducting; the geomagnetic field
cannot penetrate this volume and is displaced as a result. This impulsive distortion of
the geomagnetic field was observed worldwide in the case of the STARFISH test. To
be sure, the size of the signal from this process is not large, but systems connected to
long lines (e.g., power lines, telephone wires, and tracking wire antennas) are at risk
because of the large size of the induced current. The additive effects of the MHD-EMP
can cause damage to unprotected civilian and military systems that depend on or use
long-line cables. Small, isolated, systems tend to be unaffected.
Military systems must survive all aspects of the EMP, from the rapid spike of the early
time events to the longer duration heave signal. One of the principal problems in
assuring such survival is the lack of test data from actual high-altitude nuclear
explosions. Only a few such experiments were carried out before the LTBT took
effect, and at that time the theoretical understanding of the phenomenon of HEMP was
relatively poor. No high-altitude tests have been conducted by the United States since
1963. In addition to the more familiar high-yield tests mentioned above, three small
devices were exploded in the Van Allen belts as part of Project Argus. That
experiment was intended to explore the methods by which electrons were trapped and
traveled along magnetic field lines.
The acid test of the response of modern military systems to EMP is their performance
in simulators, particularly where a large number of components are involved. So many
cables, pins, connectors, and devices are to be found in real hardware that computation
of the progress of the EMP signal cannot be predicted, even conceptually, after the
field enters a real system. System failures or upsets will depend upon the most
intricate details of current paths and interior electrical connections, and one cannot
analyze these beforehand. Threat-level field illumination from simulators combined

with pulsed-current injection are used to evaluate the survivability of a real system
against an HEMP threat.
The technology to build simulators with rise times on the order of 10 ns is well
known. This rise time is, however, longer than that of a real HEMP signal. Since 1986
the United States has used a new EMP standard which requires waveforms at threat
levels Having rise times under a few nanoseconds. Threat-level simulators provide the
best technique for establishing the hardness of systems against early-time HEMP.
They are, however, limited to finite volumes (aircraft, tanks, communications nodes)
and cannot encompass an extended system. For these systems current injection must
be used.
HEMP can pose a serious threat to military systems when even a single high-altitude
nuclear explosion occurs. In principle, even a new nuclear proliferator could execute
such a strike. In practice, however, it seems unlikely that such a state would use one of
its scarce warheads to inflict damage which must be considered secondary to the
primary effects of blast, shock, and thermal pulse. Furthermore, a HEMP attack must
use a relatively large warhead to be effective (perhaps on the order of one mega-ton),
and new proliferators are unlikely to be able to construct such a device, much less
make it small enough to be lofted to high altitude by a ballistic missile or space
launcher. Finally, in a tactical situation such as was encountered in the Gulf War, an
attack by Iraq against Coalition forces would have also been an attack by Iraq against
its own communications, radar, missile, and power systems. EMP cannot be confined
to only one side of the burst.
Source Region Electro-magnetic Pulse [SREMP] is produced by low-altitude nuclear
bursts. An effective net vertical electron current is formed by the asymmetric
deposition of electrons in the atmosphere and the ground, and the formation and decay
of this current emits a pulse of electromagnetic radiation in directions perpendicular to
the current. The asymmetry from a low-altitude explosion occurs because some

electrons emitted downward are trapped in the upper millimeter of the Earths surface
while others, moving upward and outward, can travel long distances in the
atmosphere, producing ionization and charge separation. A weaker asymmetry can
exist for higher altitude explosions due to the density gradient of the atmosphere.
Within the source region, peak electric fields greater than 10 5 V/m and peak magnetic
fields greater than 4,000 A/m can exist. These are much larger than those from HEMP
and pose a considerable threat to military or civilian systems in the affected region.
The ground is also a conductor of electricity and provides a return path for electrons at
the outer part of the deposition region toward the burst point. Positive ions, which
travel shorter distances than electrons and at lower velocities, remain behind and
recombine with the electrons returning through the ground. Thus, strong magnetic
fields are produced in the region of ground zero. When the nuclear detonation occurs
near to the ground, the SREMP target may not be located in the electromagnetic far
field but may instead lie within the electro-magnetic induction region. In this regime
the electric and magnetic fields of the radiation are no longer perpendicular to one
another, and many of the analytic tools with which we understand EM coupling in the
simple plane-wave case no longer apply. The radiated EM field falls off rapidly with
increasing distance from the deposition region (near to the currents the EMP does not
appear to come from a point source).
As a result, the region where the greatest damage can be produced is from about 3 to 8
km from ground zero. In this same region structures housing electrical equipment are
also likely to be severely damaged by blast and shock. According to the third edition
of The Effects of Nuclear Weapons, by S. Glasstone and P. Dolan, the threat to
electrical and electronic systems from a surface-burst EMP may extend as far as the
distance at which the peak overpressure from a 1-megaton burst is 2 pounds per square
inch.

One of the unique features of SREMP is the high late-time voltage which can be
produced on long lines in the first 0.1 second. This stress can produce large late-time
currents on the exterior shields of systems, and shielding against the stress is very
difficult. Components sensitive to magnetic fields may have to be specially hardened.
SREMP effects are uniquely nuclear weapons effects.
During the Cold War, SREMP was conceived primarily as a threat to the electronic
and electrical systems within hardened targets such as missile launch facilities.
Clearly, SREMP effects are only important if the targeted systems are expected to
survive the primary damage-causing mechanisms of blast, shock, and thermal pulse.
Because SREMP is uniquely associated with nuclear strikes, technology associated
with SREMP generation has no commercial applications. However, technologies
associated with SREMP measurement and mitigation are commercially interesting for
lightning protection and electromagnetic compatibility applications. Basic physics
models of SREMP generation and coupling to generic systems, as well as numerical
calculation, use unclassified and generic weapon and target parameters. However,
codes and coupling models which reveal the response and vulnerability of current or
future military systems are militarily critical.
Starts to form in less than a millionth of a second after explosion several tens of
million of degrees: transformation of all matter into gas/plasma thermal radiation as x-
rays, absorbed by the surrounding atmosphere During expansion of the fireball,
vaporized matter condenses to a cloud containing solid particles of weapon debris fire
ball becomes doughnut-shaped, violent internal circulatory motion Air is entrained
from the bottom “mushroom” cloud if dirt and debris sucked up from earth’s surface .

Fig.4.1 Nuclear Attack

CHAPTER 4
4.1. ELECTROMAGNETIC PULSE
Electromagnetic pulse (EMP) is an electromagnetic wave similar to radio waves,
which results from secondary reactions occurring when the nuclear gamma radiation is
absorbed in the air or ground. It differs from the usual radio waves in two important
ways. First, it creates much higher electric field strengths. Whereas a radio signal
might produce a thousandth of a volt or less in a receiving antenna, an EMP pulse
might produce thousands of volts. Secondly, it is a single pulse of energy that
disappears completely in a small fraction of a second. In this sense, it is rather similar
to the electrical signal from lightning, but the rise in voltage is typically a hundred
times faster. This means that most equipment designed to protect electrical facilities
from lightning works too slowly to be effective against EMP.
There is no evidence that EMP is a physical threat to humans. However, electrical or
electronic systems, particularly those connected to long wires such as power lines or
antennas, can undergo damage. There could be actual physical damage to an electrical
component or a temporary disruption of operation.
An attacker might detonate a few weapons at high altitudes in an effort to destroy or
damage the communications and electric power systems. It can be expected that EMP
would cause massive disruption for an indeterminable period, and would cause huge
economic damages.
On July 8, 1962, the EMP from the high altitude (250 miles above Johnston Island)
"Starfish Prime" test (1.4 Mt) turned off 300 streetlights in Oahu, Hawaii (740 miles
away).

Fig.5.1 Emp Measured During Test

4.2. THE EMP EFFECT
The Electro Magnetic Pulse (EMP) effect was first observed during the early testing of
high altitude airburst nuclear weapons [GLASSTONE]. The effect is characterised by
the production of a very short (hundreds of nanoseconds) but intense electromagnetic
pulse, which propagates away from its source with ever diminishing intensity,
governed by the theory of electromagnetism. The Electro Magnetic Pulse is in effect
an electromagnetic shock wave. This pulse of energy produces a powerful
electromagnetic field, particularly within the vicinity of the weapon burst. The field
can be sufficiently strong to produce short lived transient voltages of thousands of
Volts (ie kilo Volts) on exposed electrical conductors, such as wires, or conductive
tracks on printed circuit boards, where exposed. It is this aspect of the EMP effect
which is of military significance, as it can result in irreversible damage to a wide range
of electrical and electronic equipment, particularly computers and radio or radar
receivers. Subject to the electromagnetic hardness of the electronics, a measure of the
equipment’s resilience to this effect, and the intensity of the field produced by the
weapon, the equipment can be irreversibly damaged or in effect electrically destroyed.
The damage inflicted is not unlike that experienced through exposure to close
proximity lightning strikes, and may require complete replacement of the equipment,
or at least substantial portions thereof. Commercial computer equipment is particularly
vulnerable to EMP effects, as it is largely built up of high density Metal Oxide
Semiconductor (MOS) devices, which are very sensitive to exposure to high voltage
transients. What is significant about MOS devices is that very little energy is required
to permanently wound or destroy them, any voltage in typically in excess of tens of
Volts can produce an effect termed gate breakdown which effectively destroys the
device. Even if the pulse is not powerful enough to produce thermal damage, the
power supply in the equipment will readily supply enough energy to complete the
destructive process. Wounded devices may still function, but their reliability will be
seriously impaired. Shielding electronics by equipment chassis provides only limited

protection, as any cables running in and out of the equipment will behave very much
like antennae, in effect guiding the high voltage transients into the equipment.
Computers used in data processing systems, communications systems, displays,
industrial control applications, including road and rail signalling, and those embedded
in military equipment, such as signal processors, electronic flight controls and digital
engine control systems, are all potentially vulnerable to the EMP effect.
Other electronic devices and electrical equipment may also be destroyed by the EMP
effect. Telecommunications equipment can be highly vulnerable, due to the presence
of lengthy copper cables between devices. Receivers of all varieties are particularly
sensitive to EMP, as the highly sensitive miniature high frequency transistors and
diodes in such equipment are easily destroyed by exposure to high voltage electrical
transients. Therefore radar and electronic warfare equipment, satellite, microwave,
UHF, VHF, HF and low band communications equipment and television equipment
are all potentially vulnerable to the EMP effect.
It is significant that modern military platforms are densely packed with electronic
equipment, and unless these platforms are well hardened, an EMP device can
substantially reduce their function or render them unusable .

CHAPTER 5
5.1. THE TECHNOLOGY BASE FOR CONVENTIONAL
ELECTROMAGNETIC PULSE
The technology base which may be applied to the design of electromagnetic bombs is
both diverse, and in many areas quite mature. Key technologies which are extant in the
area are explosively pumped Flux Compression Generators (FCG), explosive or
propellant driven Magneto-Hydrodynamic (MHD) generators and a range of HPM
devices, the foremost of which is the Virtual Cathode Oscillator or Vircator. A wide
range of experimental designs have been tested in these technology areas, and a
considerable volume of work has been published in unclassified literature. This paper
will review the basic principles and attributes of these technologies, in relation to
bomb and warhead applications. It is stressed that this treatment is not exhaustive, and
is only intended to illustrate how the technology base can be adapted to an
operationally deployable capability.
Fig.6.1 Typical Electromagnetic Pulse

5.2. TELECOMMUNICATIONS
Telecommunications are critical to modern society’s function because they enable
other key infrastructures like financial markets, transportation, and energy distribution;
facilitate business and commerce; provide personal convenience; and allow for
coordinated emergency response. Fortunately, efforts have been underway since 1985
to harden critical parts of the U.S. telecommunications infrastructure from
HEMP.64Its four major elements—wireline, wireless, satellite, and radio—have
overlapping capabilities and different vulnerabilities to EMP. After an attack, some
portion of the system would still be intact but would be overloaded by massive call
volume, leading to significantly degraded service. In anticipation, the U.S. government
developed national security and emergency preparedness (NS/EP) telecommunications
services that guarantee government priority on surviving infrastructure. An
unfortunate side effect of NS/EP, in the event of an HEMP attack, is that most civilian
users would be locked out of the communications grid, making disaster response
problematic. In many cases, authorities would have no way to contact citizens and
provide instructions.

5.3. TARGETING ELECTROMAGNETIC BOMBS
The task of identifying targets for attack with electromagnetic bombs can be complex.
Certain categories of target will be very easy to identify and engage. Buildings
housing government offices and thus computer equipment, production facilities,
military bases and known radar sites and communications nodes are all targets which
can be readily identified through conventional photographic, satellite, imaging radar,
electronic reconnaissance and humint operations. These targets are typically
geographically fixed and thus may be attacked providing that the aircraft can penetrate
to weapon release range. With the accuracy inherent in GPS/inertially guided
weapons, the electromagnetic bomb can be programmed to detonate at the optimal
position to inflict a maximum of electrical damage.
Fig.6.1 Targeting

CHAPTER 6
6.1. HOW EMP EFFECTS ARE GENERATED
Electromagnetic pulse (EMP) effects are typically caused by the detonation of a
nuclear weapon at high altitude, typically burst altitudes of 40 to 400 kilometers.
Prompt gamma rays from such an explosion travel outward and are captured in the
uppermost atmosphere in what's known as a “deposition region.”
Within the deposition region, those gamma rays interact with air molecules via
multiple effects, with the largest number of highly energetic free electrons being
produced via the Compton Effect.
Those highly energetic free electrons, generated within an extremely short time and
interacting with the earth's geomagnetic field, can result in voltages in excess of 50kV
capable of upsetting or killing sensitive electrical and electronic gear over a wide area.
Fig.7.1 Generation Of Emp

6.2. A 50KV AND NANOSECOND RISE TIME THREAT
MIL-STD-2169, a classified document, apparently provides detailed information
about the EMP threat wave forms. For all of us (including me!) without access to
classified documents like that one, an unclassified version of the EMP threat wave
form has been released, and it describes a 50kV potential which develops in literally
just nanoseconds.
This is important because:
-- 50 kV is a very high voltage, more than enough to zap sensitive unprotected
electronic devices.
-- a few nanosecond rise time is so fast that most conventional surge suppressing
technologies (aimed at much slower-building pulses, such as lightning), typically
wouldn't have time to react.
It is also worth noting that besides the prompt ("E1") high voltage threat, there's also a
longer duration wide area magneto-hydrodynamic ("E3") component which is also
important.
Fig.7.2 Duration of EMP

CHAPTER 7
THE STARFISH PRIME SHOT, JULY 8TH, 1962
The most important of those nuclear tests was the Fishbowl Event series, part of
Operation DOMINIC I. Those nuclear tests were done to evaluate the potential of high
altitude nuclear explosions as a possible defense against incoming ballistic missiles,
and weren't focused on EMP effects per se. The Starfish Prime shot of that series took
place at 2300 Hawaiian time, July 8th, 1962, and consisted of a 1.45 MT warhead
which was carried aloft to an altitude of 400 km by a Thor missile, 32km south of
Johnston.
“At zero time at Johnston, a white flash occurred, but as soon as one could remove his
goggles, no intense light was present. No sounds were heard at Johnston Island that is
could be definitely attributed to the detonation.”
In Hawaii, over 700 miles from Johnston Island, some resorts were reportedly holding
"rainbow bomb" parties the night of the Starfish Prime shot, anticipating a spectacular
auroral light show . about three hundred streetlight go out of order , burglar alarm is
get off , communication link are fail and telephone system is fail .

Fig.8.1Thor missile image courtesy Boeing Starfish Prime sky glow image.

7.2. DAMAGE RATING OF EQUIPMENT

CHAPTER 8
PROTECTION
8.1. Providing EMP Shielding For Systems
Much of the effort (and cost!) involved in constructing EMP shielded areas is
associated with the careful design, essentially perfect craftsmanship, and extensive
conformance testing that's required to verify required protection.
EMP shielded areas also require extra space, which may be an issue for some space-
constrained facilities. Ideally there should be at least 3 feet of access space around the
shielded area for ongoing EMP testing and for maintenance access to penetrations.
If you're out of space before you even start, now might be a good time to think about a
secondary data center, connected by fiber
8.2. Doors and EMP Enclosures
Doors are one of the most difficult areas when it comes to providing unimpaired EMP
shielding.
Doors for personnel and equipment access will often be specially constructed to use a
double knife edge seal with beryllium copper fingerstock contacts.
Ideally doors will be configured in pairs, arranged at right angles, separated by a
vestibule, and protected from being opened simultaneously by an interlock
mechanism.

8.3. Sample Double Door EMP Vestibule Style Entrance
Fig.9.1Sample Double Door EMP Vestibule Style Entrance

Fig.9.2Sample Welded Steel EMP Enclosure
Fig.9.3Sample TEMPEST (and GSA Class 5 Security Container)

8.4. What Precautions Should We Be Taking?
Harden systems, networks and power sources against EMP-related damage now, while
we still have time and can easily do so. Stockpiled critical spare parts in a shielded
environment.
Plan for how you or your neighbor’s business would continue to operate without the
availability of many electronic devices, electrical power, or the Internet. Are you ready
to employ manual backup processes? Do you have more than just-in-time levels of
inventory on hand? Could you operate on a cash-only basis? What if you can’t scan
items to find out what they’re supposed to cost?
Don’t forget your own family. Do you have multiple months worth of food on hand?
How would you get drinking water? If an attack happened in winter, would you have
fuel to stay warm while the electricity’s out? Do you have reserves of any medicines
you need?
Work to insure that our officials are thinking about these issues, and insist that they
plan and take other appropriate steps.

CHAPTER 9
9.1. CONCLUSIONS
Even if you aren’t a specialist in nuclear weapons effects, credible government experts
have been trying to tell us for years that electromagnetic pulse is a serious issue. We
need to listen to them.
We can protect against EMP through use of shielding and filtering. Most electronic
devices come with relatively little inherent protection, so we need to add supplemental
external shielding to obtain protection. We can add that shielding gradually, beginning
with our highest value/most irreplaceable electronic assets.
Given that little attention is being paid to this issue on the national scale, we need to
pay attention to this issue on the local/regional scale, particularly since if an EMP
attack does occur, emergency support resources will likely be overwhelmed over a
large area. Lane County will likely need to fend for itself.
Simple technologies and once-common skills from a hundred years ago may
unfortunately once again become very useful.

CHAPTER 10
LITERATURE REVIEW
The Literature Review is to understand the problem in the depth and have a proper
look over it. The following paper were obtain form a variety of publication and almost
all the paper present some new and relevant information to help the seminar.
Stephen Younger, Irvin Lindemuth, Robert Reinovsky, C. Maxwell Fowler,
James Goforth, and Carl Ekdahl.
The first international conference On Mega gauss Magnetic Field Generation and
Related Topics was held in 1965 in Frascati, Italy. Bythen, Max Fowler, Wray Garn,
and Bob Caird had already spent the better part of eight years producing Mega gauss
magnetic fields. The small group of Los Alamos scientists had pioneered a technique
called magnetic-flux compression, which takes the energy stored in the chemical
bonds of high explosives and converts it to magnetic field energy. The energy is then
delivered to an experiment as a pulse of either extremely strong magnetic field or
extremely large electrical current.
Colin R. Miller, Major, USAF
Electromagnetic pulses damage electrical and electronic circuits by inducing voltages
and currents that they are not designed to withstand. To understand how this occurs, it
is necessary to understand both the characteristics of electromagnetic pulses and the
circuits they offend. An electromagnetic pulse is defined by its rise time (measured in
volts/second), its electrical field strength (measured in volts/meter (v/m), and its
frequency content (measured in Hertz [Hz]).These factors combine to determine the
threat EMP pose to a given system.

10.1. REFERENCE
1. Stephen Younger, Irvin Lindemuth, Robert Reinovsky, C. Maxwell
Fowler, James Goforth, And Carl Ekdahl, “Scientific Collaborations Between
Los Alamos And Arzamas-16Using Explosive-Driven Flux Compression
Generators”, Los Alamos Science,1996.
2. National Conference On Frontiers In Communication And Signal Processing
Systems ( NCFCSPS ),“Electronic Suit With EMP For Defense Department Of
ECE”,10th-11th March 2016.
3. L. EDEBO AND I. SELIN Institute Of Medical Microbiology,“The Effect Of
The Pressure Shock Wave And Some Electrical Quantities In The Microbicidal
Effect Of Transient Electric Arcs In Aqueous Systems”, University Of
Uppsala, 20 July 1967 .
4. Isaac Jamieso Phd DIC RIBA ARB Dipaas Bsc(Hons) Arch
Minstp,“ELECTROMAGNETIC PULSE (EMP) RISK AWARENESS”.
5. Alexander Glaser, “Effects Of Nuclear Weapons”, Princeton University
,February 12, 2007.
6. Cynthia E. Ayers NSA Visiting Professor US Army War College,
Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP) As “Weapon Of Choice” A National Security
Threat Perspective, August 30,1996 .

EM Pulse Weapon Effects on Electronics

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