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Creating a unified Performance Management model for Scottish
Governing Bodies: A case study analysis of influences on
performance management applications and practices
Andrew Steen
Grade: 1st
Class Honours
With many studies stating the benefits of performance management practices within
the sport sector, there has been little research regarding the practical application and
suitability of these practices. As such, this study focuses on creating a new model for
performance management whilst analysing the external influences affecting the performance
management practices of Scottish Governing Bodies. To create the model, a qualitative
analyse of 32 Scottish national sport organisations identified the common performance
dimensions, strategic objectives and key performance indicators of this region. Using the
institutional theory, resource dependence theory, and the stakeholder theory to analyse the
results, the interviews showed that the performance management practices of SGBs were
affected by a myriad of external pressures. This study concludes with a practical method for
the models implementation, and identifies that SGBs co-ordinate their behaviours and
practices for their own personal gain.
Keywords: legitimacy, national sport organisations, governance, resource dependency, isomorphism

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Introduction
Research regarding performance management systems (PMS) is frequent within
business and management literature, with a consensus among academics that PM is a
valuable tool to increase an organisations effectiveness and performance (Winand et al.,
2014; O’Boyle & Hassan, 2015; O’Boyle &Hassan, 2014; Pulakos, 2009). This research field
is now emerging within the sports environment with particular emphasis on non-profit sports
organisations (NPSO’s) and national governing bodies (NGB’s). Recent years have seen the
professionalization of NPSOs and the usage of performance management processes has
increased. However, little is known about to what level these practices are suitable for NPSOs
as well as if they adhere to them.
NPSOs and NGB’s are shown to face a variety of pressures due to the variety of
stakeholder expectations of what the organisation is for. Achieving these expectations is
challenging due to stakeholders such as: government, athlete, sponsors, volunteers and
coaches desiring different outcomes (O’Boyle & Hassan, 2014). In order to measure this
NGB’s have seen a cultural change in adopting management practices (Slack, 1985;
Chappelet & Bayle, 2005).
As such this study will focus on the performance management practices of Scottish
Governing Bodies (SGBs) from a resource dependence theory (RDT), institutional theory,
and stakeholder theory perspective. A distillation of 32 SGB’s strategic objectives was used
to create a new PM model, with interviews used to analyse the current PMS and
environmental pressures they face. SGBs operate as the administrator for their sport,
developing strategic goals, managing finances, creating sporting events and ensuring
adherence to regulations placed upon them. SGBs receive a large percentage of their funds
from governmental regulatory agency Sport Scotland. Recent years have seen the resource
allocation for SGBs cut from £49,336,000 (2012/2013) down to £43,150,000 (2013/2014).

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By receiving funds from state agencies SGB’s inherit an increased level of scrutiny over their
actions, as this allocation has to be evaluated to see the “worth” of the investment.
The general goals associated with NGB’s and SGB’s alike, are concerned with elite
level sport, increasing participation, and spreading the values and growth of the sport
(Winand et al, 2012). However, due to operating within a complex environment of pressures,
the intended outcomes of an organisation may be influenced by external factors.
Due to this unique environment of NGB’s, there are also outcomes that are expected
of them. NGB’s have been identified as a catalyst for socio-economic reform, and with public
money, there is also an expectation that they can achieve these wider socio-economic goals
(Sam, 2009). These pressures require NGB’s to implement performance measurement tools
to show their outcomes in a tangible format. By adopting performance management practices,
NGB’s are able to show their outcomes and justify their funding allocation. As evidenced by
O’Boyle and Hassan (2015), the application of a PM system within an NGB can be
successful however the history of non-profit sporting organisations has resulted in an
avoidance of contemporary business practices necessary within high level positions. Instead
NPSO’s are often run with the presence of a volunteer board with little expertise regarding
PMS and managerial practices. Within this volunteer setting, PMS have been shown to be
under-utilised, unsuitable and only used on an ad-hoc basis (O’Boyle & Hassan, 2014). This
inexperience within the sports sector has resulted in performance management being seen as
a measurement tool, and not a method for planning, monitoring, and reviewing actions
(O’Boyle & Hassan, 2015). As a result, this study will aim to contribute to the literature
regarding PMS in the sport sector.
The aim of this study is to create a unified performance management model for SGB’s
to use. By creating a model it is the aim to correctly address the varying performance
dimensions present in all SGB’s of varying sizes, scales and imperatives. Secondary

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objectives are to identify the “why” and “how” they use, or do not use, a performance
management system as well as how it was developed. Using the institutional theory,
stakeholder theory and the resource dependence theory, this study will look to identify if
SGB’s use a PMS for efficiency purposes or as a legitimacy tool as previously hypothesised.
In order to further inform the objectives this study will also discuss the constraining and
enabling environment of the NPSO-state relationship to explain their behaviours.
The research question was then developed to encapsulate the aims and objectives which is
“Creating a unified Performance Management model for Scottish Governing Bodies: A case
study analysis of influences on performance management applications and practices”
Theoretical Review
Empirical research has identified that NPSOs and NGBS face a myriad of differing
performance dimensions due to varying stakeholder interests and strategic imperatives (Cutt,
1998; Speckbacher, 2003; O’Boyle and Hassan, 2014). Achieving these interests is
challenging due to stakeholders such as: government, athlete, sponsors, volunteers and
coaches desiring different outcomes (O’Boyle and Hassan, 2014). Winand et al. (2012)
identified the general goals associated with NGB’s, and SGB’s alike, to be concerned with
elite level sport, increasing participation, and spreading the values and growth of the sport.
However there is little research regarding the actions of the organisations for achieving these
targets. Consequently, this study will look to address how the SGB’s targets are affected by
the influences of different stakeholders.
As evidenced by O’Boyle and Hassan (2015), the application of a PM system within
an NGB can be successful and there is a cultural change of NGBs in adopting management
practices (Slack, 1985; Chappelet & Bayle, 2005). Furthermore, the adoption of an effective
PM system provides SGBs with the ability to ensure their objectives, resources and efforts

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are aligned with their own strategic imperatives (Winand et al, 2010) and with the regulatory
agencies to ensure resource certainty. However, the study identified several key points and
limitations for implementing a PM system. It identified that an individual bespoke PMS is
best fitted to NGBs, rather than a broad generic one (O’Boyle & Hassan, 2014; Pulakos,
2009). Reflection upon this will inform the creation of a unified model of PM. O’Boyle and
Hassans (2014) study also highlighted the weakness of communication with regards to vital
information between the NGBs and regulatory body. By creating a bespoke model for the
localised region of Scotland, it is the aim to overcome these limitations by allowing the SGBs
to target their own objectives against the funding criteria, with the relevant dimensions and
key performance indicators attached for each action. In order to do this, the interview
methodology will create a continued dialogue with SGBs in order to improve its validity,
which should allow for greater uptake and application of the model.
Similarly, Papadimitrious (1998) study of NGBs identified institutional impacts on
organisational behaviours and as a result the institutional theory will be used to analyse the
results within this study. Using 20 Helenic NGBs, their study identified that there is a highly
institutionalised environment due to the governmental regulations and practices needed to
acquire funding. This institutionalised environment was then evidenced to constrain the
dependent organisation in their decision-making and overall performance. The Institutional
theory has predominantly been used within organisational management literature.
Progressively it has become a method for identifying institutions present within the sports
organisational field. Hughes (1936) described an institution to be a process, practice or idea
that has become the dominant logic (Slack and Hinings, 1994: Gammelsater, 2010) and the
theory states that all organisations are embedded within environments which have
institutional pressures of change. This is evidenced by Papadimitriou’s (1998) study as these
pressures cause organisations to become isomorphic in nature, meaning they adopt policies

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and practices that conform to the dominant logic. The Institutional Theory is underpinned by
three different kinds of isomorphic pressure: Coercive, Mimetic, and Normative.
Isomorphism can be defined as a constraining process that forces one organisation to
resemble other organisations within the same set of environmental conditions (DiMaggio and
Powell, 1983). Coercive pressure derives from the power relationships and constraints of
organisations that have the ability to punish the dependent if there is non-compliance with
their demands (Slack and Hinings, 1994: Gammelsaeter, 2010: Washington and Patterson,
2011). SGBs can be seen to be under coercive pressure due to the funding allocation provided
by SportScotland, with failure to adhere resulting in financial sanctions. Mimetic pressures
occur from the copying of successful organisations within their environment to hopefully
gain legitimacy and mirror success (Haunschild & Miner, 1997). By identifying performance
dimensions of other organisations, the SGBs are predicted to hold similar strategic objectives
to one another for this purpose. Normative pressures occur from organisations which share a
similar resource pool. These resource pools can be university graduates, consultants and
conferences. The theory states that by sharing these resources between organisations, they are
gradually likening their processes/practices (Slack and Hinings, 1994). Normative pressures
were identified within Slack and Hinings (1994) study as this showed the transfer of
knowledge and practices through the exchanging of employees between organisations which
contributed to isomorphism. Slack and Hinings (1994) study examined 36 sporting
organisations who were under environmental pressure from the Canadian national Olympic
organisation to incorporate a bureaucratic process. Identified within this study was that the
failure to adopt a new bureaucratic design created sanctions upon the NGB. This
institutionally coercive pressure resulted in the 36 NGB’s variations of structure and design
being significantly reduced, exhibiting signs of isomorphism.

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However, this study fails to explain the relationship of why the pressures are present.
As such, the resource dependence theory will be used to further inform the interpretations
from the interviews. Using the RDT theory to further explain Slack and Hinings (1994)
findings, Canadian governing bodies are forced to comply with governmental regulations in
order to ensure the certainty of funding for future organisational survival. It is suggested that
by complying with these actions, the NGB’s are able to increase their certainty of resource
acquisition. Similarly, the results in this study are expected to show the same behaviours as a
result of SGB’s dependency on SportScotland. This will be shown through signs of altered
behavioural actions which match the values of the governmental constraints. Due to the
specificity of the RDT, in that it focuses on two organisations and not the collective whole,
academic reviews state that the RDT should be used in conjunction with other theoretical
frameworks to analyse power relations (Hillman, Withers & Collins, 2009). The RDT and IT
share similarities in that they both acknowledge power relations influence on organisational
behaviour. For this reason the case study will use both theories to understand the
relationships consequences between SGBs and their regulatory agency.
The RDT was originally developed by Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) and its
fundamental premise is that the key to organisational survival/success is in the acquirement
of resources (Hillman, Withers and Collins, 2009). The RDT also proposes that an
organisations actions and processes are directly influenced by the external environment
(Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978; Papadimitriou, 1998; Slack and Hinings, 1994). This will be
seen through SGBs altering their actions to suit the requirements of the regulatory agencies
protocols.
The theory proposes that the stronger the dependency between two organisations
results in the supplier having more control over the dependent. (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978:
Parsons, 1956). Thibault and Kelly (1959) identified that once these dependent behaviours

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are established, the patterns of interaction between both organisations are likely to repeat
themselves if it reduces uncertainty. This is why the RDT and IT will be used as Thibault and
Kelly’s (1959) findings show the altered behaviours occurring from the RDT becoming
institutions for future organisations. However, little is known regarding the benefits and
negatives of this relationship and its continuing practices. However negative state
involvement seems, organisations have been shown to position themselves using political
mechanisms to better their external environment (Bae and Gargiulo, 2004). This could help to
explain willingness to conform with external procedures due to the increased certainty of
gaining resources. Consequently, by placing themselves in this position, SGBs increase their
dependency which leads to the adoption of politically motivated behaviours (Pfeffer and
Salancik, 1978; Meznar & Nigh, 1995; Birnbaum, 1985). Contrary to this Blumentritt (2003)
finds that organisations who are dependent on regulatory governmental agencies do not
conform with political activities. However the general consensus within academic literature is
that upon becoming a dependent of the governmental organisation, behavioural actions alter
which match the values of governmental constraints. These actions allow for assurance over
the certainty to acquire and maintain resource levels.
Previous literature has identified that the relationships of NPSO’s cannot be analysed
with solely the institutional theory and RDT as they are not capable of explaining all
organisational behaviours. For this reason the stakeholder theory will also be incorporated to
explain behaviours which cannot be categorised by either of the two previous theories. The
Stakeholder theory is a managerial concept, identified by Freeman (1994) which is highly
studied within managerial literature. It states that businesses and organisations actions are
influenced by those people with a “stake” in the organisation, thus the term stakeholder
(Freeman, 1994). Studies have shown that the influence a stakeholder has on an organisation
is determined by their power and legitimacy (Eesley & Lenox, 2006; Welcomer, 2000). By

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identifying that influence is determined by power, the stakeholder theory will prove useful as
it shares similarities with the RDT and will help to explain behaviours outwith the
SportScotland relationship. As identified previously, the myriad of differing stakeholder
needs forces the SGB to have varying goals, identities and imperatives. Organisations
identified as having multiple identities, consequently results in some stakeholders not being
fully satisfied due to the dilution of resources (Kraatz & Block, 2008). As a result, this study
will provide insight into whether SSGB’s are willingly neglecting the needs of certain
stakeholders in order to conform with SportScotland expectations to maintain their funding
allocation.
The three theories being used in this study are regularly included in sports
management literature, however there is very little research regarding the three theories
contributions to analysing the performance management systems of governing bodies which
this study will aim to contribute to.
Methodology
This investigation consists of a two part qualitative research process due to the nature
of the research question. The first section includes the methodological considerations
surrounding the creation of the model and the second is in relation to answering how and why
SGBs use a PM system. A quantitative approach was disregarded due to the non-measureable
interpretive results that will be obtained from the interviews and the data collection methods
(Uhl & Gollenia, 2012). The participants of this study were 32 non-profit sport organisations
holding national governing body status within Scotland. These participants were found via
the Sport Scotland Website “Sport A-Z” tab (http://www.sportscotland.org.uk/sport-a-
z.aspx), allowing for contact details to be acquired for interviewing purposes. The

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combination of document gathering and interviews will strengthen the findings as they are
expected to validate each others findings.
Creation of the model
A desk based research approach was adopted to create the model. By using the
RDT theory, the original model was developed around the investment principles of
SportScotland. These five investment principles were: People (PE); Places (PL);
Opportunities (OP); Participation (PA); Profile (PR). The five principles were used as
outcomes for performance dimensions to attain in order to secure their funding. The elements
of the model, such as the performance dimensions and strategic objectives, were gathered
from a distillation of 32 SGB’s business plans, who receive funding from SportScotland. The
32 equates to 70% (46 total) of funded SGB’s and these were found from the investment
reporting documents of SportScotland. To find the key elements for the model, the identified
performance dimensions, strategic objectives, and their key performance indicators of the 32
SGB’s were cross-analysed to correctly include the relevant points for the model. All
performance dimensions, strategic objectives and key performance indicators were put into a
categorised matrix for analysis. The matrix allowed for determining the common wording of
each of the three elements to be input into the model. The matrix also allowed for a cross
analysis of the SGB’s elements as represented by the frequency numbers present on the
model.
At each interview, the model was presented with the implemented recommendations
from the previous interview in order to validate and refine the contents for varying SGB’s.
The model was constructed similarly to Winand et als (2010) organisational effectiveness
model as it separates the dimensions into “Input, Throughput and Output” which provided a
hierarchy of analysis.

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Case Study
Out of the total 32 SGBs, 20 interviewees were contacted through selective sampling
to participate in a semi-structured face to face interview (Appendix 1.2). The selective
sampling criteria was: accessibility of persons and interview venue; strength of current
strategic objectives; size of the organisation; Olympic status; and team & individual sports.
Semi-structured interviews were chosen as it allowed each of the interviewees to voice their
opinions and allow for unexpected questions and results. However, due to the nature of semi-
structured interviewing, the possibility of bias from the interviewer and the interviewee to
answer each question correctly and not honestly is present (Randall and Fernandes, 1991).
For this reason, there will be a degree of researcher perspective when interpreting the results.
It was the aim to interview four persons who hold high level positions within SGBs. By using
these varying organisations, in terms of their criteria, the PM model would be tested in its
ability to cater for a wider variety of SGB’s. Furthermore by interviewing persons from
varying organisational criteria, it would provide a greater picture as to how the current
performance management system was formed and also as to how it was being used
throughout the sector. The four interviews which were conducted are represented in table 1.
The interviewee’s consisted of one Chief Executive Officer, one Chief Operating Officer, one
SGB ex-Board member and one SGB Board member. A variety of positions within this study
was preferred due to the different duties and tasks each position focuses on. This was
intended to target certain elements of the model, however with future research it should be
considered to increase the sample size of interviews at each position.

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Table 1 showing variety in size, status, and nature of the 5 interviewees
Organisation Number Individual / Team Size of Organisation Olympic Status
1 Individual Small Olympic
2 Team Small Non-Olympic
3 Individual & team Large Olympic
4 Team Large Olympic
The case study interviews were conducted between the months of January and early
March 2015, which allowed the interviews to be transcribed for the project deadline. The
interviews were designed to last for 30 minutes, with no restriction on time in order to
effectively gather any additional information. The layout of the interview schedule was
identical for each of the interviews with variations in specific details regarding their business
plans (Appendix 1.2). The interviews started with the presentation of a basic step by step
performance management framework, which highlighted where the new model fitted into it
to gain a better understanding of where this applies (figure 2). The interview then progressed
into questions relating to the current procedures and strategic objectives of the organisations
business plan and where these were developed, and how they were monitored. The data was
then analysed periodically, with the results being segmented into the varying theories and
their attributed elements (Coercive, normative, mimetic, resource dependence, stakeholder).
To ensure the results are valid the interviewees were provided the transcripts from the
interviews prior to publication to ensure the results are truly representative of their views.
Throughout the course of the study, a workshop consisting of members of three
SGB’s and five members of local authority Sports Development teams were present. The

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model was presented to the group with questions fielded in order to find the models
suitability.
Results
Unified Performance Management model
The distillation of the SGB’s business plans revealed 10 performance dimensions
which were used within the created model. These were then categorised into the ‘input,
throughput, output’ categories. The performance dimensions were all found to be elements of
the funding criteria of SportScotland with the exception of ‘Partnerships’ which could not be
categorised. The remaining performance dimensions were labelled with their corresponding
funding criteria tag as shown below. Each performance dimension was then attributed with
the relevant strategic objectives of SGB’s and their associated KPI’s.
The 10 performance dimensions identified were:
 Staff Development (People)
 Funding (People)
 Governance (People)
 Increased Club Support (Places)
 Accessibility of Sport (Places)
 Political Agenda (Profile)
 Partnerships
 Elite Sport (Opportunities)
 Increased Profile (Profile)
 Increased Participation (Participation)
The development of the model was aided by the interviewee’s recommendations as the
results from the interviews were used to improve and validate the contents. The models
structure changed only once, as the effective governance performance dimension was moved
to the “throughput” category, after consultation with the author of the organisational

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performance model. This process was not seen to invalidate the previous results as the
content was the same.
Several elements of the model changed throughout the interview process. For instance,
Interviewee 1 specifically stated the use of a governance reporting mechanism as a key
performance indicator. This was implemented into the effective governance performance
dimension as the “KPMG report findings”. All other interviewees confirmed the validity and
use of the KPMG report as a KPI.
Interviewee 4 recommended the implementation of further segmentation with regards to
the age, sex and location of participation data. This would overcome some of the barriers to
base line information identified within the interviews. By adapting this segmentation into the
KPI’s it was the intention to further the effectiveness of the model.
Interviewee 3 identified that their objective “funding opportunities” was absent, and
would be relevant. This addition was implemented with the KPI of “Funding % increase or
decrease”. Interviewees 3 and 4 confirmed the relevance and need to include this objective as
it is an integral part of the commercial operations of an SGB.
The interviews revealed the performance dimension of “political influence” was not
relevant and instead “political agenda” was more suited. The strategic objective of this was
also altered to “achievement of wider socio-economic objectives” as the interviewees seen
this as more suited to the outcomes of SGB’s. The KPI for this changed to “No. of contacts
with government” in reference to interviewee 2’s needs. However other Interviewees said
that this KPI was on a case by case basis and fluctuated dependent on the intended outcome
of the actions. Therefore the addition of “fluctuating KPI” addressed the changing
circumstances of the political agenda.

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Interviewee 4 identified their KPI of “resource packs present” as relevant to the
“increased club support” performance dimension. This was added and refers to information
being provided to clubs by the SGB with relevance to effective running, education,
legislation and other resources.
Throughout the interviews there was a common theme of not including certain outcomes
within the strategic plans, as they are not an emphasis for the SGB. As interviewee 4 stated
when asked about disability sport as a strategic objective:
“I think since we are still small and we are building at the moment that emphasis will be
a few years off.” (Interviewee 4).
This shows that SGB’s prioritise their actions which effect the contents of their strategic
plans and PMS.
When speaking about the relevance of the model, organisation 2 said:
“This does cover a lot and we will do all of those in one way or another” (Organisation
2)
This was also seen through the rest of the interviews and workshops as they all saw the model
as relevant to their organisations and due to the refinement throughout the interviews would
employ a similar, if not the same model for their organisation. However, after speaking with
them, the results were interpreted to show that the SGB’s would use this model for funding
applications and perhaps use a second model for their general operations.

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Figure1–Completedmodelwithrecommendationsimplemented

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Rationale of a Performance Management System
The interviews identified that SGB’s know the merit and benefits of a PMS and actively use
this for continuous improvement. Interviewee 2 said:
“in my mind you are always looking to continuously improve and in practical terms your
looking to learn from your mistakes”.
This evidence was seen throughout the rest of the interviewee’s and even with interviewee 4
who had no formal PMS in place. Interviewee 4’s organisation, instead measure their
outcomes as and when they occurred, with no evidence of a feedback loop for improvement.
Each of the SGB’s also identified the necessity to be critical of themselves, and be
accountable and transparent due to public funding. Interviewee 1 was stated as saying:
“I do think we need to have specific targets if not you can’t be accountable for public
investment.” (Interviewee 1)
This statement, as well as the responses from the other SGB’s, infers that there is an
acceptance that with publicly funded money, there are expectations to operate within certain
procedures and have criteria to meet in order to analyse their worth.
Within the interviews there was reference to SGB’s using the PMS as legitimacy tools
and not for their intended purpose. Interviewee 1 stated:
“a lot of governing bodies just do it since they are told to do it and I’m not sure if they
believe in it.” (Interviewee 1)
This inference was also explicit with Interviewee 2’s results and reinforced the hypothesis
that SGB’s undertake actions that are expected of them by SportScotland. Although there was
no conclusive evidence to suggest a PMS is one of these actions that are undertaken, it is

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suspected there was pressure to implement this. However, there was evidence to suggest that
Interviewees 1 and 3 used a PMS to maintain their adherence and improve their relationship
with SportScotland as they wish to remain in a dependent position with them. The
interviewees saw this as beneficial for their SGB, as interviewee 4 stated that remaining
dependent on SportScotland increased the security of resources to their organisation, as
opposed to being self-reliant.
“What most governing bodies will try and do is to try and maintain their reliance of
sportscotland…….. So it offers a little bit of security” (Interviewee 4)
Furthermore, this reliant position was found to be an opportunistic environment. So by
adhering to the regulations of SportScotland, SGB’s are able to be reactive to funding criteria
as interviewee 3 stated that a pool of money opened up for a specific staff position, so they
focussed their actions to get this pot of money.
The development of the current Performance Management Systems
The interviews showed us that three of the four SGB’s developed their own KPI’s and
objectives and monitored these with internal mechanisms. When asked how these KPI’s and
Strategic Objectives were identified, the predominant answer was that these were self-evident
as sport governing bodies have been using these for many years. Interviewee 4 was isolated
in that it was set strategic objectives from SportScotland. These were described as
“negotiated objectives” as they were consulted with and are relevant to interviewee 4’s needs
and capabilities.
The interviewees all showed that when it came to creating their strategic objectives they all
underwent a consultation phase with stakeholders to understand what they wanted.

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“the objectives came about from a consultation exercise which included our
members and our partner organisations, that’s how the words came about
(Interviewee 1)
The consultation exercises were seen to be used as an input method for creating strategic
objectives, and they used the PMS to satisfy their stakeholders by showing their progress and
achievements. This will also be the case for interviewee 4, whose organisation is currently
within a consultation phase designed specifically for this purpose.
How the current Performance Management System is used
The premise of the created model was to link all actions towards the funding criteria
of SportScotland. This was seen to increase the security of resources however the interviews
revealed that SGB’s will perform actions which are related to their own objectives and when
it comes to the funding application, will reword their targets to parallel the SportScotland
criteria. Although it was expected that SGB’s align their objectives and actions with the
funding criteria, they revealed that they instead specifically target the funding criteria within
their annual funding applications and not on a day to day basis.
“What I will say is that we will have developed our strategy based on the needs of
[organisation name]. And then when [the other members of staff at organisation name] were
putting together the proposal for getting investment from sport Scotland they might then have
transferred some of the stuff into the actual application for Sport Scotland using some of
those terminologies” (Interviewee 3)
Interviewees 1,2 and 3 showed that they have PMS in place with annual and six
month reviews of progress. Interviewee 3 saw this as a method for giving information to
SportScotland regarding their performance and to ensure they are being compliant.

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“Every so often there is a need to supply something to demonstrate that we actually are
compliant.” (Interviewee 3)
Furthermore, interviewee 3 identified that some SGB’s may use this political agenda as a
method to extract more resources and influence legislation for the benefit of their sport.
“that they need politicians to exert pressure on local authority education departments to
make sure that [their sport] is an expressed objective or outcome that all children should
learn how to [participate in]. ……. They would be trying to influence legislation.”
(Interviewee 3)
Discussion
Within the model, performance dimensions and strategic objectives were tracked for
frequency as shown by the ‘n’ number. This provided some interesting results regarding the
uniformity and isomorphism of SGB’s key actions. For instance the models main
performance dimensions were ‘Increased Participation’ (n=28); ‘Elite Sport’ (n=27);
Governance (n=27); and Staff Development (n=23). This shows that there are trends and
uniformity in some areas. However, this conversely shows that some organisations do not
place an emphasis on the general goals associated with sporting organisations as identified by
Winand et al, (2010). This could be explained by the transparency levels of SGB’s as the
interviewees attributed the missing objectives to being located within internal documents.
Although all the interviewees stated they were as transparent as they can be, and there is an
onus to be accountable for public money, there was evidence that they were not showing all
of their actions. Perhaps the levels of transparency should extend to showing all performance
dimensions which are being worked towards in order to effectively evaluate the worth of the
investment. By increasing the sample size and gaining a larger degree of access, this
statement of “missing objectives are present and internal” can be confirmed or refuted.

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Furthermore, the failure to include certain aspects into a PMS could be explained by
the size and focus of the organisation. Interviewee 4 identified the absence of disability sport
as a result of a focus on ‘increased membership as a whole’ and not targeting certain groups.
Although they have clear intentions to increase disability sport participation, in order for
them to reach their targets they focused on increasing general membership. This is perhaps
another explanation when considering the NGB’s strategic priorities and their PMS.
By underpinning the model on the funding criteria of SportScotland, the interviews
responded that there may be other activities which are not funded and still a priority within
SGB’s. However, as this model encompasses Winand et als. (2010) general goals for sporting
organisations, and has the ability to specifically target funding by aligning strategic
objectives, the usefulness was apparent. Future alternations to the model could include a dual
underpinned approach with ‘SportScotland funding criteria’, and ‘unfunded criteria’ as the
outcome. This would alleviate the concerns of the interviewee’s as there is room to have
external actions not designed to attain funding.
When speaking to the interviewee’s and those in attendance at the workshop, the
model was challenged and adapted in order to greater represent the needs of SGB’s. By
creating a new model, and explaining its practical implications, all interviewee’s responded
that this was relevant to their needs. This study will also contribute to the real world
applications currently in use as the creation of a new model for performance management
would reinvigorate the current methods of SGB’s. Studies have shown that performance
systems degrade in their effectiveness and legitimacy over time and by introducing a new
model, the current systems can be renewed and improved (De Bruijn, 2006; Meyer & Gupta,
1994; van Dooren et al., 2010; Van Thiel & Leeuw, 2002; Macris & Same, 2014).

22. 22
Throughout the interviews the predominant reason for SGB’s to use a PMS was to
“strive for continuous improvement”. Many of the interviewees referred to the
implementation of PM systems as self-evident for any organisation and perhaps this is now
the common ideology within NGBs and the sports sector should no longer be considered as
an exception of common managerial practices. The interviewees attributed this understanding
of managerial practices to staff competency as several of them had experience in other
business practices such as the law and financial sectors. This coincides with O’Boyle and
Hassan’s (2015) report regarding staff competencies affecting practices as well as
contributing to Slack (1985) and Chappelet & Bayles (2005) findings of NGB’s adopting
management practices. This is further evidenced as interviewee 4 stated that their
organisation does not have a PMS due to a previous board made up of volunteers with no
expertise in PMS. The results also exhibited the normative pressures of the institutional
theory due to staff expertise being transferred through organisational fields contributing to the
isomorphism of objectives and practices.
The interviews produced a conclusive view that due to SGB’s receiving public money
there is an onus on them to be accountable, as well as a self-evident need to satisfy external
aims which corresponds with the academic literature (Parsons, 1956: Papadimitriou, 1998).
Interestingly, Kerwin, Maclean and Bell-Laroche (2014) found that due to personal values,
such as the belief they should be scrutinised and be worth their money will affect the
managerial decisions through the “theory of practising values” (Gehman, Trevino, & Garud,
2013). This theory could potentially inform the discussion as to why SGB’s use a PMS to
evaluate their worth, and would be worth researching further. To help explain their actions,
the SGB’s were seen to actively target wider goals out-with their strategic plans. This was
evidenced by interviewee 1 & 3 undertaking actions which was said to maintain their
adherence and relationship with SportScotland. These results were also seen in Macris and

23. 23
Sam’s (2014) study and was stated to be beneficial for national sport organisations to
strengthen their relationship due to a correlation with increased funding. For this reason, we
can see that SGBs can benefit by adhering to external targets and monitoring their progress.
The results also found that organisations who are dependent on SportScotland funding
will carry out their own actions, and then reword their targets to align with the funding
criteria. This suggests that SGB’s actions are directly linked to their own values and when
given the opportunity, they can match these to external influences. Organisation 3 referred to
the actions of SGB’s and the targets of SportScotland to be in parallel and this would help to
explain the phenomenon that SGB’s can reword their actions to acquire funding as they are
similar in nature. These results compliment Slack and Hinings (1994) findings that although
the NPSO’s actions were more bureaucratic and isomorphic in nature, there was still
resistance to institutional demands (Papadimitriou, 2000). This could explain why SGB’s
then reword their own actions, rather than starting off with the funding criteria as it is an
intrinsic sign of autonomy or resistance. It is an interesting perspective of the RDT as it can
be seen to only be a dependency when there is a need or opportunity for resources and it can
used within an enabling context for the dependent. This was evidenced as interviewee 2
identified, their organisation has elements which are independent and self-reliant. For these
areas they do whatever actions are better for their organisation, and for their funded activities
they will align their goals and processes towards the funding criteria.
The results identified that three of the four SGB’s created their strategic objectives
and KPI’s. When creating their objectives, the SGB’s were found to conduct consultation
exercises to understand what is wanted of their organisation. This consultation exercise
allowed them to determine the values of their stakeholders, and not just the regulatory agency
(Macis & Sam, 2014). This myriad of differing stakeholder needs was described as an
‘organised anarchy’ (March & Olsen, 1976; Cohen & March, 1986) and results in a greater

24. 24
dilution of resources in order to appease the many targets and expectations set. This
consequently decreases effectiveness of attaining the goals most pertinent to themselves
(Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). For SGB’s to maintain themselves there must be a balance where
they focus on funding goals as well as the core entity goals which are the participants and
members of their organisation. When developing their own strategic objectives, all
interviewees responded that it was not mimetic pressures but instead the objectives were
similar due to the very nature of sporting organisations. This identifies the levels of
institutional isomorphism within SGB’s as they are continuing the common objectives of the
past, however if these are effective strategic objectives then it is beneficial for SGBs to mime
previous successes. Interviewee 4 however was seen to take elements surrounding their
governance policies and legislations from other organisations in a mimetic fashion. This is
relevant to the development of a PMS as one of the performance dimensions present within
the model requires ‘Effective Governance’ and this is made up from the policies and
legislation measured by the KPMG report and is the one example of SGB’s acknowledging
mimetic pressures. The four interviewee’s also referenced their beliefs that other SGB’s have
copied their objectives and don’t currently use a PMS even though it is in place. This would
contribute to the hypothesis that some SGB’s use a PMS as a legitimacy tool and primarily
use it on an ad-hoc basis such as those in the New Zealand case study (O’Boyle & Hassan,
2014). However without conclusive evidence this will need to be researched further.
With regards to creating their own strategic objectives, SGB’s can be seen to exhibit
“earned autonomy” which was also evident in New Zealand NSO’s with Macris and Sam’s
(2014) study. However, Green (2009) identified this to be an “illusionary notion of freedom”
as the performance systems can be used as a steering mechanism for organisations.
Furthering this, Papadimitriou (1998) stated that the collaboration of creating management
practices between the NGB and regulatory agency created little predisposition to oppose the

25. 25
practices. Perhaps by allowing the SGB to have a sense of autonomy whilst also maintaining
some control will reduce the risk of resistance, and by allowing this “earned autonomy”
increases the adherence of SGB’s. However the competencies of specialised staffing
identified by O’Boyle and Hassan (2015) perhaps suggest that these organisations do not
need external influences due to their internal capabilities and did earn a degree of autonomy.
This could show us that there is some element of self-reliance, and a mediating environment
provided by SportScotland. This is further evidenced by the findings that SGB’s are reactive
to funding opportunities. One example stated that an SGB altered their actions in order to
acquire a new funding source from SportScotland. This would exhibit that the external
environment, and their dependent position can be further exploited with many academic
papers focussing on the constraining processes of the external environment on the
organisations actions, the results from this study could show that the external environment is
in fact enabling less capable organisations to greater enhance their internal actions through
steering the strategic objectives.
The results also showed that the organisations had an intrinsic motivation to achieve
the wider socio-economic objectives. However to what extent these goals are philanthropic in
nature was not able to be understood. Similar studies have also shown the adoption of
politically motivated behaviours of dependent organisations (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978;
Meznar & Nigh, 1995; Birnbaum, 1985), however this may be due to the onus of public
spending, and requirement to achieve wider goals in order to continue governmental
investment. Contrary to this Blumentritt (2003) finds that organisations who are dependent on
regulatory governmental agencies do not conform with political activities. However, the
actions of SGB’s can be said to resemble the political agenda as the results showed that the
regulatory agencies and the SGB’s goals were mostly congruent with one another, and as
such it should be taken into consideration that wider socio-economic affect may be a bi-

26. 26
product of the general goals of the sporting environments. Interviewee 2 highlighted the
opportunistic aspect of organisational dependency as they referred to the ability of SGB’s to
leverage further investment out of the political environment to target wider goals (Houlihan
& Green, 2006). This could help to explain the willingness to conform with external
procedures due to the benefits of remaining a dependent. This is evidenced by interviewee 3’s
statement regarding SGB’s using their position to alter the political agenda in their favour. By
having a relationship, in proxy, with governmental decision makers, SGB’s can leverage
personal gain through influencing legislation and local authority actions.
Coercive pressures in the form of sanctions are present within the SGB environment.
This is seen through interviewee 1’s example of their funding being consequently reduced as
a result of the failure to reach targets. When speaking to the organisation it was evident that
there were external circumstances, such as venue closures which detrimentally affected their
targets. As such, the performance management system that is in place could be described as a
performance measurement system that centres around a reward and punishment scheme. The
SGB’s interviewed believe it is not simply a case of cutting funding straight away but
investigating why this happened and administering change. This would confirm O’Boyle and
Hassan’s (2015) statements that sports management is predominantly seen as a measurement
tool rather than for its managerial functions.
Conclusion
The main aim of the study was to create a performance management model for SGB’s to use.
By adopting a constructivist approach to developing the model, enabled it to change and
reflect the varying dimensions in which SGB’s seek to monitor and succeed in. With each
interviewee confirming the relevance and usefulness of its application, the model was
deemed appropriate to be adopted and used within the SGB setting. The model itself was
created around the performance objectives and dimensions of SGB’s however the results

27. 27
show that the goals of sporting organisations are often congruent to one another, which gives
the model a greater range of regional applications. For instance, the models implications can
be transferred to other environments where there are regulatory agencies allocating funding
such as New Zealand, Canada, and the rest of the United Kingdom.
Practical recommendations for model implementation
As mentioned within the methodology, the model was also presented in a step by step
format, allowing for an example of its practical implementation. The step-by-step format was
developed from a general ‘plan, implement, monitor and evaluate’ performance management
feedback loop, with the addition of the relevant steps identified by the SGB’s. This informed
the creation of a framework for the model to be used within. However, the changing political
landscapes may detrimentally affect resource levels which SGB’s rely on, and without the
drive to become autonomous or to reduce funding levels and the dependency on
SportScotland to something manageable, there may be a challenging future. However within
the current environment, using a model which directly reflects funding criteria, which is also
congruent to the SGBs objectives, would be beneficial for SGB’s to use. As such, figure 2
shows the step-by-step framework presented within the interviews, and can be used for the
practical application of this studies model. By providing this framework, organisations which
have little expertise surrounding PMS should be able to implement and adapt the model
through the changing circumstances.

28. 28
Figure 2 – step-by-step framework shown to interviewee’s and adjusted for practical
application
This study has also shown that the four SGB’s know the merit and benefits of performance
management systems and this is why they use them. However, as evidenced by interviewee 4,
some SGB’s do not have a PMS in place. This would create the assumption that there still are
governing bodies who are absent of a PMS. Mainly attributed to a volunteer board with little
expertise, there may be other reasons to the lack of adoption. For instance although this study
only evaluated the funded SGB’s, future studies can also include self-reliant and unfunded
NGBs to show the difference in behaviours and to how much effect the RDT has on
performance management practices. With academic research stating the negatives of state
involvement on NPSO actions, this study has shown that the relationship between state
agencies and NPSO’s can be an enabling and opportunistic environment for SGB’s.
Throughout the interviews, the SGB’s referred to themselves as important elements of
Identify funding
criteria
Create Congruent
Performance
Dimensions
Attach Strategic
Objectives
associated with
Performance
Dimensions
Attach Relevant
KPI's to Strategic
Objectives
Cost-Benefit
Analysis of
actions and
initiatives
Outcome of
actions and
initiatives
Evaluate actions
against funding
criteria

29. 29
SportScotland. By linking the RDT with Emerson’s reciprocal power-dependence theory, the
results and the relationship of SGB’s with SportScotland can be explained to greater degree.
For this reason, future studies should include the resource dependence theory in three
perspectives; a.) a singular power dependency relationship b.) a transactional two-way
reciprocal relationship c.) an enabling environment for the dependent. This broader, dyadic
and reciprocal relationship between state agencies and SGBs is in fact more accurate than a
singular dependency model. However negative state involvement seems, this study has
confirmed the findings of Bae and Gargiulo (2004) that organisations can position themselves
using political mechanisms to better their external environment. For this reason it is logical
for organisations to remain in a dependent position, as the resource dependence theory can no
longer be seen as a singular constraining theory.
Nevertheless, the financial reliance of SGB’s on SportScotland has potentially
devalued their strategic and administrative autonomy. There was little evidence to suggest
resistance to SportScotlands involvement as the objectives and tasks SGB’s were set were
congruent to their own organisation. However, there was no opportunity to study the effects
of funding criteria which was not congruent to the SGB, and this is an area which may cause
tension and resistance. By examining goals which are not in the SGB’s interests would
further test the fundamental argument of the RDT that the priority for any organisation is to
acquire resources.
There was little evidence of ‘how’ the SGB’s used there PMS in a practical setting as it was
mainly for internal consumption. However, it was clear that they use the PMS for a variety of
purposes such as a relationship builder, organisational improvement tool, adherence tool, and
a method to measure stakeholder expectations. This study also revealed insinuations that
some SGB’s undertake PMS as they are told to. Future research could expand the sample size
to identify these groups and their reasons for not pursuing the improvement.

30. 30
As to ‘how’ the SGBs developed a PMS, the results showed an element of autonomy within
the competent organisations which resulted in internal methods of performance tracking.
With interviewee 4’s organisation on the premise of creating such a model, and with no
previous template, it would be an interesting case study to see this in development.

31. 31
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