Strasbourg

Jackson,Page 1 of 17
Andrew Jackson
Prof. Michael Harkins
HST 202
05/11/2015
Strasbourg and Adrianople:
A Case Study on the Effectiveness of the Late Roman Army
Introduction
The fall of the Roman Empire can be attributed to a great number of factors. One of the
most popular explanations is a decline of the effectiveness of the Roman army. Assessing the
effectiveness of an army across vast stretches of time against different opponents is a very
difficult task. This assessment is further complicated since our only data are from inevitably
biased written sources that survive from the time period.
What this paper will do is compare two well recorded battles of the 4th century that took
place about 21 years apart. The Battle of Strasbourg and the Battle of Adrianople were both
fought against Germanic barbarians but stand in stark contrast because the former was a great
victory while the latter was a devastating defeat. It is worth noting that both of these battles are
well recorded mostly by the Roman historian Ammianus Marcellinus who had his own pagan
and Roman conservative biases but was also present at some of the events the led up to these
battles.
Before discussing these battles we must first present some background for the Roman
Army during this time period.

Anatomy of the Late Roman Army
The Army of the Late Roman Empire was a very different organization than the one
which Julius Caesar used to conquer Gaul in the days of the Late Republic. Probably the most
important change was that the Army was now organized into units called limitanei and
comitatenses. Limitanei were garrison troops stationed on the frontiers of the empire and were
under the command of the dux the region in which they are stationed. The comitatenses were the
mobile field armies of the Empire and were under the direct control of the Emperor himself or
his direct subordinates. While details are scarce it appears that the limitanei would patrol the
border and confront smaller incursions into Roman territory but would disengage when
confronted with larger forces and allow the comitatenses to handle the situation.
The comitatenses were generally dispersed into towns and cities where they lived in
civilian homes until called into action. This is a huge difference from the Roman Army up to AD
200 when legions would generally be stationed in large castra (legionary forts) designed to
house a full 5000 man legion. Housing the comitatenses in civilian homes made them much
cheaper to maintain but also could not have been good for maintaining military discipline or their
physical condition. Housing comitatenses in cities also provided a garrison force in the case of a
siege.
There is currently intense debate about the total size of the Roman Army during this time
period. By around AD 10 Roman army consisted of around 250,000 men (legionnaires and
auxiliaries). By around AD 100 this had swelled to 380,000 men. According to Goldsworthy the
consensus on the size of the fourth century army was “between 50 to 100 percent bigger” than it
was although he admits that there is very little direct evidence one way or the other to support
these estimates. Needless to say the Roman Army still possessed considerable manpower.

The recruitment of the army shifted from purely voluntary basis during and before the
second century AD to a mix of volunteers and conscripts. A number of military thinkers ( ex.
Maurice de Saxe) state that conscripted soldiers are better than volunteers so this may not by
itself imply a decrease in the quality of the army. What this shift in recruitment does tell us is
that being a soldier was a much less attractive profession than it had been earlier in the Empire;
probably due to increasingly common civil wars.
Another major change in the Roman Army was an increased reliance on cavalry. While
the proportion of foot to horse was fairly constant through the life of the Roman Army their
armament, recruitment, and training changed dramatically over time. Until the mid-Empire
cavalry was exclusively recruited amongst the equestrian (petty noble) classes, Roman allies, or
hired as mercenaries. The units that they did use were almost exclusively light armored melee
horsemen. Over time the Roman’s started to recruit their cavalry more directly. They also started
to change the nature of their cavalry tactics by adopting horse archery from middle-eastern
armies like the Parthians and eventually heavy armored cataphract type cavalry from the
Sarmatians. These changes attempted improve a longstanding Roman weakness by copying the
strengths of their neighbors. While they still did not couch their lances under-arm and they did
not possess stirrups this evolution can be seen as a transition to the medieval model of knight
melee horse.
During the late Empire the majority of conflicts fought were not large set-piece battles
but instead small skirmishes and ambushes against raiding parties. This change was firstly due to
the fact that Rome’s enemies predominantly used these tactics and secondly as a way to diversify
the fighting. Relying on one large set-piece battle to decide the outcome of an entire campaign is
extremely risky versus fighting dozens of smaller skirmishes. Large set-piece battles were also

likely to cause significant casualties on both sides and the Roman’s came to prefer to save any
manpower possible for future campaigns. The old 5000 man legion was scrapped and replaced
with legions of a maximum size of 1000 that was better able to cope with the new realities of
warfare in the late antiquity. Besides these smaller legions we have already seen that there were
much smaller units, especially amongst the limitanei.
Prelude to Strasbourg
After the death of Emperor Constantine I on May 22, AD 337, the Empire swiftly fell
into chaos. Before his death there were 4 Caesars (junior Emperors): Constantine II, Constantius
II, Constans, and Dalmatius. The first 3 were sons of Constantine while the last was his nephew.
These Caesars ruled the Roman Empire together with Dalmatius’ brother Hannibalianus, who
held the title ‘King of Kings of Bithynia and Pontus.’ In the months after Constantine I death, his
sons purged all of the extended male family members they could find including Dalmatius and
Hannibalianus. By the end of the ordeal the 3 brothers were the sole rulers of the empire and
proclaimed themselves Augusti (senior emperors). They then divided the empire into 3 giving
each Augusti de facto sole dominion over one part of the Empire.
Despite their agreement and fraternal bond, Constantine II and Constans soon engaged
each other in open civil war in 340. This civil war quickly ended when Constantine II was killed
in an initial battle outside of Aquileia and as a result his youngest brother Constans now had
control of two thirds of the Empire. This brief civil war was followed by a decade of peace until
in AD 350 a usurper named Magnentius was declared in Gaul. Constans was quickly killed by
one of Magnentius’ patrols who found him.
The remaining son of Constantine, Constantius II soon declared war on this usurper and a
bloody 3 year conflict ensued. In 351 one of Magnentius’ senior officers Silvanus betrayed him

and moved over to Constantius’ side with many soldiers. This defection enabled Constantius II
to win a major, though bloody for both sides, battle outside of Mursa. Within 3 years Magnentius
had committed suicide. The entire empire was now controlled by Constantius though he had
declared Gallus a Caesar in 351 to manage the eastern provinces while Constantius was off
fighting Magnentius. Gallus was one of two of Constantine I extended relatives to survive the
purge, the other was Gallus’ brother Julian who would later lead the battle at Strasbourg. Despite
the fact that Gallus was spared he still held much ill will against Constantius II for the deaths of
most of his family. In 354 Constantius had Gallus killed because he had grown suspicious of
Gallus.
Following the deaths of Gallus and Magnentius Constantius II engaged in yet another
purge. The Roman historian Ammianus provides us with horrifyingly vivid accounts of false
accusations and suspicion leading to the indiscriminate torture, death, and exile of many innocent
people. One falsely accused person was Silvanus, the defector who ensured Constantius’ victory
at Mursa. Silvanus was so sure that his death was imminent that he considered fleeing into his
ancestral homeland in Germania but instead had his troops declare him emperor in a desperate
bid for survival. Ammianus was a part of a team sent to overthrow Silvanus. While they
succeeded in killing Silvanus by bribing his soldiers in AD 355, it was apparent that Constantius
II had a tenuous grip on the Gallic provinces at best.
In the wake of Silvanus’ revolt Constantius II decided to proclaim Julian as Caesar in AD
355. Constantius figured that the best way to keep Gaul under his control was to have an
Emperor with a familial tie to him on site. Julian had a difficult situation to contend with in Gaul:
because of the recent upflair in civil wars the Franks and Alamanni had overrun the Rhine
border. Goldsworthy says that Constantius II encouraged the barbarians to overrun parts of the

province during Magnentius’ revolt. But now the revolts were settled and the priorities had
changed.
In 356 Julian supported a major campaign headed by Constantius against the Alamanni.
Goldsworthy tells us that the campaign was mainly a show of force to the Alamanni that they
were facing a united Roman Empire and to the towns which had been neglected during the civil
wars. Julian fell into his military role very quickly and engaged in many skirmishes and freed a
number of towns. He spent the winter in Senon being ineffectively besieged by a band of
Alamanni.
In 357 campaigning against the Alamanni started anew. Julian was given command of
13,000 men while the newly appointed Master of the Soldiers Barbatio was given 25,000. Julian
moved to assault the newly established Alamanni settlements west of the Rhine. As his troops
moved in on the towns the Alamanni ran and hid on islands on the Rhine. Julian requested barges
from Barbatio so that his soldiers could take these islands. Barbatio responded to this request by
burning said barges and a large part of the grain supply that Julian had collected to support his
troops. Such destructive petty rivalries were not uncommon during this period of the Roman
Empire. Julian’s troops eventually took the islands anyway by wading and eventually using
captured Alamanni boats forcing the barbarians to retreat to the east bank of the Rhine. Julian
then started to fortify the Rhine by repairing old abandoned forts on the west side.
After regrouping on the east bank of the Rhine the Alamanni crossed the river and
defeated Barbatio’s army. Then an Alamanni force, supposedly numbering 35,000, under the
Command of Chnodomarius and his nephew Serapio then moved to challenge Julian at
Strasbourg.
Battle of Strasbourg (AD 357)

It is unclear if the force under Chnodomarius was the same force that had just defeated
Barbatio. It is possible some elements may have been similar. Whatever the case they were
definitely confident seeing the recent victory over Barbatio’s superior army. Goldsworthy tells us
that 35,000 was probably an exaggeration but indeed they may have outnumbered the Romans.
Another complication is that Julian’s forces attacked while the Alemannic forces were still
crossing the river but they did not want to engage until a significant number were already across
so as to make it a complete victory. It is not clear what proportion was on what side of the Rhine
when Julian’s force engaged.
Goldsworthy tells us that Julian’s force of 13,000 most likely consisted of 10,000 infantry
and 3000 cavalry. The cavalry would have consisted of horse archers, cataphracts, as well as less
heavily armored mêlée cavalry. The Alamanni may have had less cavalry but either way they
were definitely less well armed and armored compared to their Roman counterparts.
The ground on the Roman left was broken, marshy, and uneven that was further broken
by what was left of an aqueduct or canal that had fallen into disuse. Since cavalry would have
been of limited use on this broken ground, the Romans put all of their cavalry on their right
flank. The Alamanni moved their cavalry on their left to match the Romans. Ammianus tells us
that the Alamanni knew that their cavalry was inferior to the Roman cavalry, especially the
cataphrats, and decided to have foot soldiers interspersed among the cavalry who could take the
Roman cavalry by surprise in the case of a charge. While this stratagem would strengthen the
Alamanni cavalry it would also mean that they could not move quickly without leaving their foot
support behind thus hindering their offensive capability.
The Roman infantry in the center were organized into at least 2 lines: a front line and a
reserve force(s). The use of infantry reserves were a traditional feature of Roman deployments

and Strasbourg was no different in this regard. The Alamanni placed their infantry in the center
to face the Roman line but also interspersed soldiers into the broken swampy ground on the
Roman left flank in an attempt to flank the Roman line. Thankfully Severus, Julian’s new Master
of the Horse (Magister Equitum), grew suspicious of an ambush on the broken ground on the
Roman left and held back some contingents of infantry just in case.
During the battle the Alamanni leaders all dismounted to fight with their men, a brave
gesture but one which probably decreased their tactical control of the battle. Julian remained
mounted with his bodyguard which will have allowed him to travel between trouble spots more
easily. This certainly gave Julian greater tactical control than Chnodomarius had of his force,
though controlling an army was still a very difficult task.
The battle began with an exchange of javelins from both sides. The Alamanni charged the
Roman position and caused the Roman cavalry to rout. Julian was able to rally enough of the
Roman cavalry that their left flank never became an issue later in the battle. This was an
extremely dangerous moment in the battle since it is very easy for a visible rout of part of the
army to infect the rest of the force and cause a devastating general retreat.
After this the battle was going according to plan until some determined Alamanni troops
in the center led by their chieftains and princes charged and broke through the Roman center.
The reserves in the second line were able to stop them and eventually force them back. The
Alamanni fought with great determination but they eventually broke and fell into a general route
towards the Rhine.
Aftermath of Stasbourg
Ammianus tells us that 243 Roman soldiers died during the battle in addition to 4
officers. The low casualty rate on the Roman side may be a hint that their cavalry was not as

devastating as it appeared at the time. This also tells us that the Roman cavalry was undisciplined
to rout so easily. On the Alamanni side 6000 men were supposed to have been killed on the
battlefield with many more drowning when trying to cross the Rhine to safety. Goldsworthy
notes that this figure is likely an exaggeration but the Alamanni losses were certainly higher and
the loss was complete enough that they never challenged the Romans again as will be shown
later. Just as importantly, the Alamannic chieftain Chnodomarius was captured and sent to
Constantius who almost certainly used the captured chieftain as a propaganda tool. Immediately
after the battle Julians troops tried to proclaim him Augustus but Julian immediately denied that
he had any ambitions beyond his current role as Caesar. Secretly Julian resented the treatment of
his brother Gaulus and the rest of his family during the purges.
He proceeded across the Rhine and spent the rest of the fighting season attacking the
Alamani on their side of the river. After Julian made a move at repairing and garrisoning a fort
on the east side of the Rhine the Alamanni vied for peace; seeing this move as an attempt at
permanent occupation. That winter he moved out to the west side of the Rhine and assaulted a
group of Franks held up in a fort on that side of the river. During the 358-359 fighting seasons he
continued to attack and expel other Germanic peoples such as the Franks who had settled on the
east side of the Rhine. He also crossed the Rhine against the Alamanni and encountered very
little resistance, with the barbarians preferring to flee than to defend their villages and crops from
being destroyed by the Romans, which shows that Julian had reestablished Rome’s image of
power to the Alamanni using his conclusive victory.
In 359 Constantius II went to war with the Sassanid Persians. He demanded that Julian
send him 4 of his auxiliary regiments to fight in Perisa. Many believed that the ever paranoid
Constantius II was simply trying to disarm the very successful Julian who was increasingly

becoming popular with the soldiers and therefor a threat to himself. The soldiers refused to go to
Persia and leave their families and lands at the hands of the barbarians east of the Rhine, instead
declaring Julian Augustus and this time he accepted. Constantius II died in 361 before he could
confront Julian. This left Julian as the sole emperor on the Roman Empire.
Prelude to Adrianople
The Battle of Adrianople was in many ways a turning point in the narrative of the Roman
Empire. The battle took place on August 9, AD 378 between a force of Gothic refugees from
beyond the Danube border and an organized Roman force. By the end of the day some two thirds
of the Eastern Roman field army was completely annihilated. The shock of such a decisive defeat
rippled through the empire and shattered any remaining perceptions of the invulnerability of
Roman power. This defeat would eventually lead, though indirectly, to the sack of Rome by
another Gothic force in 410AD for the first time in about 800 years.
The story starts with the appearance of “at least tens of thousands” of Goths led by the
Tervingi-Goth chieftains Alavivus and Fritigern. Ammianus tells us that these Goths were
refugees fleeing the onslaught of the mysterious Huns that seemingly appeared out of nowhere
on the Eastern fringes of the known world. Ammianus’s account tells us that the Huns rampaged
from east to west; subsequently smashing through the Alans, Greuthungian Goths, and finally the
Tervingian Goths who were the closest tribe to the Eastern Roman border.
The Tervingi chieftains sent ambassadors to the Eastern Roman Emperor Valens who
was in Antioch preparing for his war against the Sassanid Persian Empire. The Goths wanted
peaceful entry into the Empire; they would give provide manpower for the Roman Army in
exchange for grain to subsist until they received land to cultivate. Valens saw this as an
opportunity to acquire more soldiers for his planned war. Barbarian settlements within the

Empire were not uncommon at this point in the empire and usually went down without any
complications. This would not prove to be the case with this particular settlement.
The men in charge of overseeing this population transfer were Lupicinus, a comes rei
militaris(in charge of the comitatenses), and Maximus, the dux (in charge of limitanei) of Scythia
or Moesia. Inadequate food supply quickly became a major problem during the transfer. It is
possible that the Roman supply chain was unprepared for this massive population shift but it is
equally likely that the grain was sold by the Romans elsewhere for personal profit. Whatever the
case Marcellinus tells us that Lupicinus had his men gather all stray dogs from the area and sold
the carcasses to the Goths in exchange for their children as slaves. Despite the disgusting nature
of this exploitation Kulikowski tells us that this corruption may not have been excessive during
the period but merely a good scapegoat for the disaster.
Standard procedure during settlements of this nature was always to disarm the migrants
before entry. For whatever reason, probably corruption or incompetence, many weapons slipped
through as they crossed the border. The lack of food would probably not have been an issue if it
weren’t for this oversight.
By 377 Lupicinus began to fear unrest and decided to move the Tervingi into
Marcianople for settlement. Soldiers posted at the border had to leave their post to supervise the
Tervingi march south. This gave the Greuthungi, whom Valens denied entry, the opportunity to
cross without permission. When the Tervingi arrived at Marcianople the bulk of the Goths were
camped outside the city walls while Lupicinus invited Alavivus and Fritigern to a banquet inside
the city. During the banquet the starving, frustrated Goths outside of the city began to riot and
ended up killing the Roman soldiers outside of the city. Lupicinus panicked and hastily killed the

chieftains bodyguard and possibly Alavivus before Fritigern convinced Lupicinus that allowing
him outside the city was the best way to regain control of the Goths.
Once outside Fritigern decided that the situation had deteriorated beyond reconciliation
and that their best hope of getting what they wanted lay in open rebellion. Lupicinus and his
troops met the Goths in battle some 14km outside of the city and were slaughtered. Lupicinus
escaped behind the city walls but the Goths were now confident and armed with Roman weapons
taken from the dead soldiers. Many Goth’s born in the Empire and some disenfranchised
Romans joined the rebellion after this victory.
Valens soon realized the gravity of the situation and hastily made peace with the Persians
in order to deal with the situation with the Goths. Even the Western Roman Emperor Gratian
sent two of his talented generals with troops to help deal with the situation. Gratians interference
is an unusual instance in Western-Eastern Roman relations and shows the severity of the
situation. After a series of draws and reverses by 378 the Romans were able to confine the Goths
to Thrace by fortifying the mountain passes the connected Thrace with the Western Balkans. By
378 peace was firmly established with the Sassanid Persians and violence had quelled on the
Western Empire’s Rhine border so that Valens and Gratian could move their main armies to deal
with the Gothic threat in a decisive manner.
After several Gothic raiding parties were comprehensively defeated Fritigern
consolidated his Goths into a single army and moved south towards Adrianople. Hearing of this
news, Valens moved with his main army to Adrianople to prepare for the decisive encounter.
The Battle of Adrianople (AD 378)
We do not have an exact number for either side of the battle. Valens scouts reported that
Fritigern’s army numbered 10,000 men. Valens seemed confident that he could handle this,

though not confident enough to deploy without intense discussion. Goldsworthy tells us that
modern estimates for both armies number around 15,000 each give or take. It is possible that the
Goths outnumbered the Romans but we really do not know with certainty.
One thing that we do know is that both were similarly armed. The Goths had won
previous battles as described earlier and had plenty of opportunity to loot the bodies of the dead
Roman soldiers for armor and armaments. The Roman force however, will have been the better
trained and experienced of the two armies since many would have just come back from fighting
against the Sassanid’s. The Roman Army would also have had a better structured officer
hierarchy while the Gothic force essentially consisted of desperate war refugees.
While the Goths, being refugees, ensured that they were not an organized military force
in the way that the Romans were, it also gave them a degree of desperation that may have
provided some edge over the Romans. Along with the Gothic military force present at
Adrianople, there were also tens of thousands of women, children, and non-military age males
behind the front lines inside of the Gothic wagon circle. The presence of the warrior’s wives,
children, parents, etc. would probably have been a strong motivator to win since their loved ones
would probably have been killed if they lost.
The Roman force would certainly have consisted of comitatenses since it was
commanded directly by emperor Valens. There may also have been limitanei in the form of
pseudocomitatenses attached.
On August 9th, AD 378, after the war counsel, Valens marched his Army from
Adrianople to confront the defended Gothic position. The Romans arrived in a hot early
afternoon that was exacerbated with brush fires lit upwind from the Goths. They marched to the
field in a single column and the plan was for the front of the column to deploy on the right flank

of the field and for the rear to deploy on the left flank. Fritigern sent two separate embassies to
hold talks with Valens, the first of which was rejected. It seems that both may have wanted a
bloodless victory since the second embassy was accepted and a Roman hostage was exchanged
for a meeting with Fritigern himself. Alternatively it was possible that both sides were delaying
the battle since Fritigern was awaiting the arrival of the allied Greuthungi, Alans, and Huns who
were grazing their horses while Valens was still waiting for the rear of his column to properly
deploy on the left wing of his battle line.
The battle started on accident when the Roman cavalry on the right flank attacked
without orders. They were quickly driven back by the Tervingi and routed from the battle but
this caused the entire Roman line to engage. At some time the Gruethungi returned and attacked
and routed the ill-formed left flank of the Roman line. For whatever reason reserves were not in
place and the left flank could not be relieved, most likely the reserves routed or were not yet
formed. The cavalry on the left flank was also not in place to help against the flanking
Greuthungi. The center of the Roman line held for a while but was inevitably flanked and
systematically cut down.
Aftermath of Adrianople
At the end of the day Ammianus tells us that two-thirds of the roman army was
slaughtered together with 35 tribunes, two senior officers, and most significantly Emperor
Valens himself. The Empire was psychologically stunned by such a decisive defeat. Despite the
fact that the Roman Army probably numbered a half a million soldiers during this time period
the Empire was powerless to bring the Goths under control.
Immediately after the battle the Goths attempted to lay siege to Adrianople but were
unsuccessful. They then tried to lay siege to Constantinople but were again repulsed partly

because of a group of vicious Arab cavalry auxiliaries who reportedly terrorized the Goths by
killing one of their number and proceeding to slit his throat and drink his blood on the battlefield.
Despite these setbacks the Goths raided the Eastern Empire with impunity until in 380 the
recently proclaimed Augustus Theodosius was able to contain the Goths in Thrace. In 382
Theodosius was able to conclude a peace treaty with the Goths. The details of this treaty are
scarce but it seems to have given the Goths the land they were looking for in exchange for
military obligations. Nothing is heard from Fritigern, Alatheus, Saphrax, or Videric again in any
historical record.
Conclusions
One striking similarity between these two battles is the misbehavior of cavalry. While the
arms and armor of the Roman cavalry was definitely a match or superior to that of their
opponents, Jestice tells us that they were often badly officered, poorly trained, and panicky. This
is a serious problem since cavalry by their nature are the fastest troops on the battlefield and can
very easily flee to safety. Seeing the cavalry flee can very easily lead to the loss of the entire
battle since the rest of the soldiers can see this visible rout and cause them to flee or at least
destroy their morale. If Julian was unable to rally his routing cavalry his right flank would have
been exposed to the Alamannic cavalry and he may have lost. Similarly if Valens cavalry had not
attacked without orders they may have been able to prevent the returning Greuthungi from
overtaking the Roman flanks and allow the Roman force to withdrawal and await Gratian’s
reinforcements.
One notable difference in these battles is the battlefield deployment. During Stasbourg it
appears that the troops were fully deployed in their battle lines with front and reserves. This
allowed Julian to commit reserves to trouble spots when needed and make it more difficult for a

cavalry force to overcome the army’s flank. During Adrianople however, Ammianus tells us that
the left flank of the army was not yet formed when the fighting started. Also when the battle
commenced the reserves were nowhere to be found, perhaps because they were immediately
drawn into the melee or because they fled with the cavalry. This lack of reserve support
combined with the missing cavalry made the Roman line very easily susceptible to being flanked
when the Gruethungi returned. It is also worth noting that during Adrianople the Romans were
on the offensive and had to deploy while the barbarians waited while at Strasbourg this was the
other way around. It still seems that Valens could have found a better way to deploy his troops
even if that meant building an encampment and waiting until the next day. This would also have
solved his soldier’s exhaustion/morale issues going into the battle and it would have meant
fighting with Gratian’s forces. This brings us to another point.
Besides these tactical issues there were also institutional issues that prevented the Roman
army from performing optimally in both battles. During both battles the barbarians were facing a
more or less united Rome. More united because at the time of Adrianople and Strasbourg there
was no ongoing drawn civil war that was exhausting the Empires supply of manpower and
furthermore the entire Empire was united in combating threats on the Rhine-Danube frontier at
this time. Despite the Roman’s present unity, they were still facing the battles having recently
dealt with revolts of Procopius’ against Valens and Silvanus’ against Constantius II. Roman vs
Roman battles were usually very bloody. Even if the revolt ended quickly through luck or
subterfuge the revolt still showed how tenuous imperial power had become over the military and
government. As Ammianus shows us even revolts that did not result in open warfare led to mass
purges of real or imagined threats to the rule of the emperor and may have deprived the Empire
of a number of talented high ranking officers.

Works Cited
Cowan,Ross."Cataphractsand Siegecraft."AncientWarfare,2011, 33-37.
Goldsworthy,Adrian."A CaesaronCampaign:JulianinGaul,AD356-60." InIn the Name of Rome:The
Men Who Won the RomanEmpire,379-405. London:Phoenix,2004.
Goldsworthy, Adrian.The Fall of the West:The Deathof a RomanSuperpower.London:Phoenix,2010.
194-263.
Goldsworthy,Adrian."The Armyof Late Antiquity."InThe Complete RomanArmy,198-214. London:
Thames& Hudson,2013.
Jestice,PhyllisG."Adrianople,AD378." In Battlesof the AncientWorld:1285 BC~ AD 451, 198-205.
London:AmberBooks,2012.
Kulikowski,Michael.Rome'sGothicWars.New York,NY: Cambridge UniversityPres,2013. 123-153.

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