The african union high level implementation panel and the conflict over oil between sudan and south sudan in the aftermth of the cpa

Thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for a Masters Degree in
International Relations
Specialty: Diplomacy
By:
AMOUGOU Aristide AGBOR
Supervisor:
Pr. Laurent ZANG
Head of the Department of Diplomacy at the International Relations Institute of Cameroon
THE AFRICAN UNION HIGH-LEVEL IMPLEMENTATION
PANEL AND THE CONFLICT OVER OIL BETWEEN SUDAN
AND SOUTH SUDAN IN THE AFTERMATH OF THE
COMPREHENSIVE PEACE AGREEMENT [2005-2014]
Institut des Relations
Internationales du Cameroun
Web: www.iricuy2.net
Mail: contact@iricuy2.net
International Relations
Institute of Cameroon
P.O. Box: 1637 Yaoundé
Tel: 222 318 999
Academic Year 2014-2015

DECLARATION
I declare that this thesis-“The African Union High-Level Implementation Panel and the
Conflict over Oil between Sudan and South Sudan in the Aftermath of the Comprehensive
Peace Agreement [2005-2014]” is a product of my own independent research and has not
been submitted for publication or any other degree program or examination at any University.
I further maintain that information derived, cited and referenced from the works of others
have been given appropriate acknowledgement.
Amougou Aristide Agbor
June 2015

i
SUMMARY
SUMMARY .............................................................................................................................. i
DEDICATION ........................................................................................................................ ii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT .................................................................................................... iii
LIST OF ACRONYMS ......................................................................................................... iv
LIST OF FIGURES, MAPS, TABLES AND ANNEXES................................................... vi
ABSTRACT ........................................................................................................................... vii
RESUME .............................................................................................................................. viii
GENERAL INTRODUCTION .............................................................................................. 1
PART ONE: OIL AND CONFLICT BETWEEN SUDAN AND SOUTH SUDAN IN
THE POST-CPA ................................................................................................................... 21
CHAPTER 1: SETTING THE CONTEXT: ACTORS, NORMATIVE AND
INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORKS OF OIL OWNERSHIP IN THE POST-CPA ............. 23
Section 1: Oil governance, the second Sudan civil war and the CPA ........................ 23
Section 2: The impact of South Sudan‟s independence on oil ownership .................. 34
CHAPTER 2: OIL AND CONFLICT BETWEEN SUDAN AND SOUTH SUDAN IN THE
AFTERMATH OF THE CPA ................................................................................................. 49
Section 1: Petro-competition between the GOS and the GOSS ................................. 49
Section 2: Conflict over oil After South Sudan‟s independence ................................ 60
PART TWO: RESOLVING THE SUDAN-SOUTH SUDAN CONFLICT OVER OIL
THROUGH THE AUHIP FRAMEWORK AND THE CHALLENGES OF PEACE ....71
CHAPTER 3: RESOLVING THE SUDAN-SOUTH SUDAN CONFLICT OVER OIL
THROUGH THE AUHIP FRAMEWORK ............................................................................ 73
Section 1: Achieving demilitarization on the Sudan-South Sudan border zones within
the framework of the AUHIP‟s facilitation ............................................................................. 73
Section 2: The AUHIP and the facilitation for resolution of territorial and pipeline
disputes .................................................................................................................................... 82
CHAPTER 4: THE CHALLENGES AND THE PROSPECTS OF PEACE IN SUDAN-
SOUTH SUDAN RELATIONS ............................................................................................. 94
Section 1: Challenges linked to the violation of demilitarization agreements and
territorial disputes ................................................................................................................... 94
Section 2: Challenges of mutual interference in civil wars and pipeline politics ..... 107
GENERAL CONCLUSION ............................................................................................... 118
BIBLIOGRAPHY ............................................................................................................... 122
ANNEXES ............................................................................................................................ 138
TABLE OF CONTENT ...................................................................................................... 154

ii
DEDICATION
To all my friends from The Sudan whose worlds have been framed by war, that you may
know peace!
To my mom who left me when I was just a boy at six, that she may be proud of the man I‟m
being.

iii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
I will begin by thanking God for his love, goodness and abundant blessings.
Special thanks to my Supervisor and Head of Department, Pr. Laurent ZANG whose
guidance and insights bring out the best in me. My gratitude goes also to the authorities,
administrative and academic staff of IRIC whose tireless efforts provide a comfortable setting
for studies and research.
Some experts took the time to answer our queries and deserve to be thanked; Dr.
Douglas Johnson (member of the Abyei Boundaries Commission), Pr. Ann HIRONAKA
(University of California Irvin) and Dr. Luke Anthony PATEY (Danish Institute of
International Studies).
My gratitude is also expressed to two student associations at IRIC. First to the African
Union Club of which I was President throughout 2014, our discussions and debates inspired
this research. Secondly, I thank the „Questionnaire‟ group of friends for their moral and
psychological support which remind me that there is life outside thesis.
My heartfelt thanks go to my mates of the class of Diplomacy 2013 and mates in other
classes for the support and encouragement. I‟d like especially to acknowledge OYIE BINDZI
Therese D. (class of Diplomacy 2012) for proofreading this thesis.
I can‟t thank my family enough for the love, care, encouragement and motivation.
To all others who contributed directly or indirectly, thank you. May this be the
materialization of your effort which has not been in vain!

iv
LIST OF ACRONYMS
ABC: Abyei Boundaries Commission
AU: African Union
AUBP-TT: African Union Border Program Technical Team
AUHIP: African Union High Level Implementation Panel for Sudan and South Sudan
AUPSC: African Union Peace and Security Council
AUTE: African Union Team of Experts
Bbl/d: Barrels per day
CNPC: China National Petroleum Corporation
CoH: Cessation of Hostilities
CPA: Comprehensive Peace Agreement
GNPOC: Greater Nile Petroleum Operating Company
GNU: Government of National Unity
GOS: Government of Sudan
GOSS: Government of Southern Sudan
GRSS: Government of the Republic of South Sudan
ICSID: International Center for the Settlement of Investment Disputes
JBVMM: Joint Border Verification and Monitoring Mechanism
JIU: Joint Integrated Units
JPSM: Joint Political and Security Mechanism
LAPSSET: Lamu Port South Sudan Ethiopia Corridor
MID: Militarized Interstate Dispute
NCP: National Congress Party
NOR: Net Oil Revenue
NPC: National Petroleum Commission of Sudan
NPGC: National Petroleum and Gas Commission of South Sudan
ONGC: Oil and Natural Gas Corporation Limited

v
PCA: Permanent Court of Arbitration at The Hague
PDOC: Petrodar Operating Company
SAF: Sudan Armed Forces
SDBZ: Safe Demilitarized Border Zone
SPLM/A: Sudan Peoples‟ Liberation Movement/Army
SPLM/A-IO: Sudan Peoples‟ Liberation Movement/Army in opposition
SPLM/A-N: Sudan People‟s Liberation Movement/Army-North
SPOC: Sudd Petroleum Operating Company
SRF: Sudan Revolutionary Front
SSDF: South Sudan Defense Forces
UN: United Nations
UNGA: United Nations General Assembly
UNISFA: United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei
UNSC: United Nations Security Council
WNPOC: White Nile Petroleum Operating Company
%: Percent

vi
LIST OF FIGURES, MAPS, TABLES AND ANNEXES
Figure 1: Oil Production in Sudan and South Sudan (2005-2014)..........................................39
Figure 2: Petro-aggression framework.....................................................................................66
Figure 3: Correlation between Chinese sale of arms and Sudanese oil sales to China............69
Map 1: Key oil infrastructure in Sudan and South Sudan........................................................38
Map 2: Relative position of oil fields with respect to border agreements in Abyei.................58
Map 3: The Safe Demilitarized Border Zone Sudan-South Sudan..........................................78
Map 4: SPLA and SAF Positions in the SDBZ in violation of demilitarization agreement....97
Map 5: Violation of Abyei‟s demilitarization........................................................................100
Map 6: Projected alternative oil pipelines from South Sudan‟s oil fields......................……115
Table 1: Sudan and South Sudan main oil fields......................................................................39
Table 2: Economic data on Sudan and South Sudan at independence.....................................41
Table 3: Crude oil pipelines in Sudan and South Sudan .........................................................43
Table 4: Major oil producers in Sudan and South Sudan.........................................................45
Table 5: Area of the Ngok Dinka (Abyei) as defined by the PCA...........................................58
Table 6: GOSS budget outruns 2007-2012..............................................................................68
Annex 1: GOS and GRSS, Agreement on Oil and Related Economic Matters, September 27th
,
2012, Articles 1 - 4.4.2............................................................................................................139
Annex 2: Concession Areas in Sudan and South Sudan (2014).............................................146
Annex 3: Communiqué PSC/AHG/COMM.1 (CCVII) creating AUHIP, p.3..........................147
Annex 4: UNSC Resolution 2046 incorporating key provisions of AUPSC Communiqué
PSC/MIN/COMM/3(CCCXIX)......................................................................................................149

vii
ABSTRACT
In the post – 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), Sudan and South Sudan
have been embroiled in a struggle for the ownership and the control of oil resources and rents.
This has been exacerbated by South Sudan‟s secession on July 9th
, 2011 which induced the
GOS a loss of about 75% of proven oil resources. Petro-Competition over the disputed oil rich
territories of Abyei and Heglig-Panthou, disagreement over oil pipeline charges, and disputes
over South Sudan‟s nationalization of the Sudanese national oil corporation (Sudapet) have
triggered interruptions in oil production and violence between Sudan and South Sudan.
Within the framework of the African Union High-Level Implementation Panel for
Sudan and South Sudan (AUHIP), oil pipeline charges have been agreed upon, the crisis has
been deescalated, the implementation of a buffer zone has been agreed upon, and
communication between the belligerents have been strengthened. However, this progress is
curtailed by the hardline position of the belligerents which leaves the issue of territorial
disputes unresolved to date, the buffer zone is violated, the dispute over Sudapet‟s
nationalization remains unresolved, and the volatility of oil prices threatens long term
commitment to the pipeline agreements.
In order to consolidate these achievements and make more progress for sustainable
peace, the AUHIP should sustain its diplomacy of enjoining both countries for their
commitment to pacifically settling their disputes. It also should mobilize the stakeholders in
the Sudan - South Sudan oil industries for more effort in addressing these outstanding
challenges to peace. In the long run, Sudan and South Sudan would have to improve their
energy mix and diversify their economies in order to make them more sustainable and less
dependent on oil.

viii
RESUME
Dans L‟après Accord de Paix Global (APG) de 2005, le Soudan et le Soudan du Sud
se sont livrés à une lutte pour la possession et le contrôle des ressources et de la rente
pétrolières. Ceci a été exacerbé par la sécession du Sud Soudan le 9 Juillet 2011, entrainant
une perte de 75% des ressources pétrolières au Soudan. La petro-compétition pour les
territoires d‟Abyei et d‟Heglig-Panthou, le désaccord autour des frais de transport de pétrole
par oléoducs, le différend concernant la nationalisation de la société nationale de pétrole
Soudanais (Sudapet) par le Soudan du Sud sont autant des facteurs qui ont été à l‟origine des
interruptions de la production du pétrole et des affrontements violents.
Dans le cadre de la facilitation du Group de Mise en Œuvre de Haut Niveau de
l‟Union Africaine pour le Soudan et le Soudan du Sud (AUHIP), un accord a été trouvé sur
les frais de transport par oléoducs, l‟établissement d‟une zone tampon est effectif, et le
dialogue entre les belligérants est renforcé. Toutefois ces réalisations sont limitées par la non-
prédisposition des belligérants à faire des compromis, ce qui laisse irrésolus les différends
territoriaux, la zone tampon est parfois violée, le différend autour de la nationalisation de
Sudapet demeure et la volatilité du prix du baril de pétrole menace l‟engagement à terme aux
accords sur les oléoducs.
Afin de consolider ces réalisations et de faire plus de progrès vers une paix durable,
l‟AUHIP devrait renforcer sa diplomatie en enjoignant davantage le Soudan et le Soudan du
Sud à un engagement inébranlable de résoudre pacifiquement leurs différends. Il faudrait
également mobiliser les parties prenantes des industries pétrolières du Soudan et du Soudan
du Sud vers une plus grande implication dans l‟endiguement de ces défis à la paix. A long
terme, le Soudan et le Soudan du Sud devraient améliorer leurs bouquets énergétiques et
diversifier leurs économies afin de les rendre plus viables et moins dépendantes du pétrole.

2
I. AN OVERVIEW AND BACKGROUND OF THE STUDY
Before South Sudan gained independence from Sudan on July 9th
, 2011, Historic
Sudan’s history was understood as comprising 5 distinct phases; the Turco-Egyptian rule
(1821-1881); the Madhiya era (1882-1898); the Anglo-Egyptian condominium (1809-1956);
Independent Sudan (1956-2005); and the Post-CPA era (2005-present).1
During the
condominium, the British largely dominated the administration of Southern Sudan marked by
a preponderance of Africanist-Animist-Christian culture while they left the Islamic authorities
in place in the North, strengthening the Egyptian Islamic presence. Sudan gained
independence from the Anglo-Egyptian condominium on January 1st
, 1956.
After gaining independence, Sudan crumbled into a civil war known as the Anyanya
civil war that will later be considered as the first Sudan civil war opposing the Anyaya
movement in Southern Sudan to the authority of the Central government in Khartoum. This
civil war officially ended with the signing of the Addis Ababa Agreement in 1972. However,
after 11 years, a second civil war erupted opposing the Sudan Peoples‟ Liberation
Movement/Army to the Government of Sudan (GOS) in Khartoum. While this war was
motivated by a host of factors, the onset of oil production in Sudan after the signing of the
Addis Ababa agreement proved to be one of the main reasons for its demise.2
The GOS‟s
discriminate policies used oil revenue primarily for the development of the North to the
detriment of the South. It was also used to finance the war, leading to its perpetuation.3
The second Sudan civil war which started in 1983 was officially ended in 2005 with
the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement by the GOS on the one hand, and the
SPLM/A on the other hand after painstaking negotiations led by Ali Osman Taha, Vice
President of Sudan and John Garang, Commander in Chief of the SPLM/A. The CPA made
provisions for the creation of the autonomous Government of Southern Sudan (GOSS) that
together with the National Congress Party (NCP)-Led GOS formed the Government of
1
Andrew Natsios, Sudan, South Sudan and Darfur What Everyone Needs to Know, Oxford, Oxford University
Press, 2012. [Andrew Natios like many other authors on Sudan have used the terminologies Historic Sudan or
Greater Sudan to qualify pre-referendum Sudan and the term New Sudan to qualify Sudan after the referendum
in which the South Seceded]
2
Lukong Stella Shullika, Managing The Challenges Of Conflict Transformation And Peace-Building In South
Sudan, Msc Thesis in Conflict Transformation and Peace Studies, University of KwaZulu-Natal,
Pietermaritzburg, 2013, p.34.
3
Douglas H. Johnson, The Root Cause of Sudan’s Civil Wars, Indiana, Indiana University Press, 2003, pp. 45-
47. Also Cf. Eric Reeves, “Oil Development in Sudan”, Review of African Political Economy, Vol. 29, No. 91,
2002, pp. 167-169.

3
National Unity (GNU), that ruled Sudan during the interim period (2005-2011) after which a
referendum was organized for the future of the South and in which 98% of Southerners voted
for independence.4
In addition, the parties to the CPA agreed for an equal sharing of oil
revenue from Southern oil fields between the GOSS and the GOS during the transition.5
The CPA provisions regarding oil faced a number of key challenges which led to
renewed hostilities between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the SPLA in the aftermath
of the CPA. These challenges were particularly linked to territorial disputes over the oil rich
territories of Abyei and Heglig-Panthou amongst other disputed territories.6
Determining
whether these territories were part of Southern Sudan or Northern Sudan, and as a result
whether their oil wealth could be shared or not, kept the GOS and the GOSS at odds during
the transition. These disputes stemmed from the legacy of the condominium era in Sudan and
the imprecision of the January 1st
, 1956 boundary line at independence.7
As South Sudan seceded in July 2011, and became a sovereign State headed by the
Government of the Republic of South Sudan (GRSS), the unresolved issue of territorial
disputes would be heightened.8
South Sudan also seceded along with approximately 75% of
oil in pre-secession Sudan. In addition, other contentious issues linked to the legacy of the oil
infrastructure in Sudan, particularly the use of pipelines which are found in Sudan and
indispensable for South Sudan‟s exportation of its oil to foreign markets further fuel conflict
between both countries leading to militarized interstate disputes (MID) with massive human
and material loses particularly in Heglig in 2012.9
In fact some analysts had predicted a
recrudescence of conflict in the post-CPA articulated around the struggle over oil.10
4
For the CPA provisions on power sharing Cf. GOS and SPLM/A, Power Sharing Agreement-Comprehensive
Peace Agreement, Chapter II, 26 May 2004. For the CPA provision on the referendum Cf. GOS and SPLM/A,
The Machacos Protocol-Comprehensive Peace Agreement, Chapter I, Part A, Article 1.3, 20 July 2002.
5
GOS and SPLM/A, Wealth Sharing-Comprehensive Peace Agreement, Chapter III, 7 December 2004.
6
Joshua Craze “Contested Borders: Continuing Tensions over Sudan-South Sudan border”, Small Arms Survey,
November 2014. pp. 40-50 Also Cf. Douglas Johnson, “The Heglig Oil Dispute between Sudan and South
Sudan”, Journal of Eastern African Studies, 2012, pp. 1-9.
7
International Crisis Group, “Sudan: defining the North South Border”, ICG Africa Briefing, No. 75, 2
September 2010.
8
The Government of Southern Sudan (GOSS) shouldn‟t be confused with the Government of the Republic of
South Sudan (GRSS); the latter terminology identifies the government of the Independent Republic of South
Sudan born after the July 2011 referendum and the latter corresponding to the government of the autonomous
Southern Sudan region during the transition (2005-2011).
9
Douglas Johnson, Op. Cit.
10
Marina Arbetman-Rabinowitz and Kristin Johnson, “Power Distribution and Oil in Sudan: Will the
Comprehensive Peace Agreement turn the oil curse into a blessing?”, International Interactions: Empirical and
Theoretical Research in International Relations, Vol. 34, No. 4, December 2008. pp. 382-401.

4
In order to establish an atmosphere of cooperation between the GOS and the GOSS
and ensure the resolution of the disputes that oppose them, the African Union Peace and
Security Council (AUPSC) mandated the African Union High Level Implementation Panel
(AUHIP) for Sudan to facilitate negotiations between Sudan and South Sudan regarding
disputes over oil, security, citizenship, assets, and their common border.11
While the AUHIP
focused on facilitating for the implementation of the CPA provisions in the run up to the 2011
referendum as well as negotiations for post-referendum arrangements, since independence, it
has addressed an array of challenges with the struggle over oil being amongst the greatest
threats to peace and security between Sudan and South Sudan.
The AUHIP has indeed been the locus of the regional and international effort to
resolve outstanding issues of conflict between the GOS and the GOSS [GRSS] by facilitating
for an implementation of CPA provisions and the negotiations for post-referendum issues that
oppose Sudan and South Sudan. The AUPSC and the United Nations Security Council
(UNSC) have respectively mandated and endorsed the AUHIP‟s peace effort in the conflict
opposing the Sudan and South Sudan.12
II. DEFINITION AND CONTEXTUALIZATION OF KEY TERMS
African Union High Level Implementation Panel For Sudan and South Sudan (AUHIP)
The AUHIP is a framework created at the 207th
meeting of the AUPSC on October
29th
, 2009 and mandated to facilitate between “the two parties to the CPA negotiations on
post-referendum issues.”13
The two (initially the GOS and the SPLM/A and after
independence as Sudan and South Sudan) have been holding negotiations on a range of issues.
The contentious issues which strain their relationship are oil, border disputes, security, assets
etc.14
Facilitation entails “providing good offices in an attempt to assist the settlement of an
international or interstate dispute.”15
It is a diplomatico-political means for the pacific
settlement of disputes.16
The AUHIP framework is composed of three former Heads of State;
11
Sudan Tribune, “African Union High-Level Implementation Panel”. Available at
http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?mot505&debut_articles=80#pagination_articles. Accessed May 04 2015.
Also Cf. AUPSC, “Rapport Intérimaire du Groupe de Mise en Œuvre de Haut Niveau de l‟Union Africaine Pour
le Soudan et le Soudan du Sud”, PSC/ PR/2. (CDLVI), 456 Meeting of the AUPSC, 12 September 2014.
12
Solomon Dersso (Ed.), Annual Review of the Peace and Security Council, 2012/2013, Pretoria, Institute of
Security Studies, 2013, p. 61.
13
Ibid., p. 59.
14
Sudan Tribune, Op. Cit.
15
G.R Berridge and Allan James, A Dictionary of Diplomacy, New York, Palgrave Macmillan, 2003, p. 102.
16
Yves Paul Mandjem, Les Sorties de Crise en Afrique Tome 1Le déterminisme relatif des institutions de sortie
de crise en Afrique, Louvain-la-Neuve, Academia, 2015, p. 52.

5
H.E President Thabo Mbeki (South Africa), H.E Abdul Salami Alhaji Abubakar (Nigeria) and
H.E Pierre Buyoya (Burundi) and their team. Thabo Mbeki chairs this panel.17
The UNSC has also endorsed the AUHIP‟s efforts in its Resolutions on the conflict
between Sudan and South Sudan demonstrating the value of working within the framework of
„Global federalism‟.18
The AUHIP is as a result the focal point of regional and international
peace efforts in the conflict that opposes South Sudan to Sudan. From the African Union‟s
(AU) perspective, it is the microcosm of the AUPSC‟s peace efforts between Sudan and South
Sudan and has been ultimately qualified as an African solution an African problem.19
Conflict
The term conflict refers to “a condition in which one identifiable group of human
beings whether tribal, ethnic, linguistic, cultural, religious, socioeconomic, political or other is
engaged in a conscious opposition to one or more identifiable human groups because these
groups are pursuing what are or appear to be incompatible goals.”20
In our case study on
Sudan and South Sudan, the primary groups in opposition are the NCP-Led GOS and the
SPLM/A-led GOSS (GRSS). The struggle for oil poses as the incompatible goal which this
research seeks to analyze. However, the opposition between these two actors on a State level
is also reflected by communal rivalries between some local communities which reside in
disputed areas, particularly in Abyei which has witnessed violence between the Misseriya and
the Ngok Dinka people.
This study embraces the position that “conflict is a universally ubiquitous and
permanently reoccurring phenomenon within and between societies (…) a certain amount of
low level, muted almost invisible conflict goes on constantly in all societies, even those
apparently peaceful.”21
Therefore the “total elimination of conflict is not only impossible but
is undesirable.”22
Based on this, conflict between Sudan and South Sudan is perceived as an
ongoing and pathological social process.
17
Sudan Tribune, Op. Cit. [It is however important to note that H.E Thabo Mbeki had chaired a previous panel;
the African Union Panel on Darfur (AUPD) and also that before the referendum, the AUHIP was simply for
Sudan and only covered South Sudan after the birth of the independent Nation].
18
Solomon Dersso, Op. Cit., p. 61. [Global federalism as used by Solomon Dersso makes reference to the
cooperation between the UNSC and the AUPSC in the achievement of Peace and Security].
19
Luka Biong Deng, “Abyei: A test of African Solutions for African Problems”, 1 July 2013. Available at
http://sudantribune.com/spip.php?article47125. Accessed 27 May 2015.
20
James E. Dougherty and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr., Contending Theories of International Relations, New York,
Haper and Row, 1981, p.182.
21
Ibid., p.183.
22
Ibid., p.184.

6
Only, conflict must not necessarily issue in violent behavior. The SPLA and the Sudan
Armed Forces (SAF) engaged in violent skirmishes and high scale combats taking place
especially around the oil fields of Abyei and Heglig in 2008 and 2012 respectively leading to
large combat and non-combat (civilian) related deaths and the displacement of people. The
threat of inflicting pain by resorting to violence will always be a useful means of political
bargaining within domestic and international society.”23
This argument explains the
permanence and remanence of violent conflict between the GOS and the GRSS despite the
ongoing peace talks held by the AUHIP. Non-violent means of conflict resolution abound;
“politics itself is a way of resolving conflicts”24
.
Oil
From a strictly scientific perspective, oil is defined as “petroleum liquids as they come
from the ground.”25
It is also known as petroleum or crude oil.26
It is a source of energy used
in the world‟s economies today and arguably amongst the most covetous. However, in this
study, oil should be understood as surpassing the mere hydrocarbon resource present in the
subsoil and embracing the entire oil industry comprising of the infrastructure and actors
involved in its extraction, its processing and its transport for commercialization.
The struggle for oil ownership and oil rents can be source of conflict. A. Coser offers a
definition which could better situate the role of resources like oil in conflict. According to him
a conflict is defined as “a struggle over scarce values, power, and resources in which the aims
of the opponents are to neutralize and injure or eliminate their rivals.”27
Defining conflict this
way enables us to contextualize the role that oil as a resource has come to play in raising the
stakes of conflict between Sudan and South Sudan after the CPA was signed in 2005.
Comprehensive Peace Agreement
The CPA is an agreement which officially put an end to the second Sudan civil war
which opposed the GOS in Khartoum to the SPLM/A led by Dr. John Garang de Maribor.
Dimah Mahmoud defines it as “an attempt by regional and later international actors to end
23
H.L Nieburg, Political Violence, New York, St. Martin‟s, 1969, In James E. Dougherty and Robert L.
Pfaltzgraff, Jr., Op. Cit., p.183.
24
Ibid., p.182.
25
Alireza Bahadori, Chikezie Nwaoha and Malcolm William Clark, Dictionary of Oil, Gas and Petrochemical
Engineering, Boca Raton, CRC Press, 2014, p. 111.
26
André Combaz, Les Termes Pétroliers dictionnaire anglais français, Paris, Total édition-Presse, 1981, p. 152.
27
Lewis A. Coser, The Functions of Social Conflict, New York, The Free Press, 1956, p.3, In James E.
Dougherty and Robert L. Pflatzgraff, Jr., Op. Cit., p.182.

7
Africa‟s longest civil war and in turn bring peace.”28
The second Sudan civil war lasted 22
years, i.e. from 1983 till 2005. At the signing of the CPA, two and a half million people had
died and 5 million were uprooted.29
Three fundamental pillars underscored the CPA; fairer
distribution of power and wealth; democratic transformation and the right of Southern
Sudanese to determine their own future.30
The aftermath of the CPA as implied in this
research covers the period of 2005-2014 and is distinctly marked by the „transition‟ period
(2005-2011) and the post-referendum period (2011-2014).
III. DELINEATING THE RESEARCH PROBLEM
The delineation of this research is carried out from temporal, spatial and organic
perspectives. From a temporal perspective this studies focuses on the period following the
signing of the CPA i.e. from 2005-2014. This time frame is punctuated by an important date,
July 9th
, 2011 when Southern Sudan became an independent sovereign State. However,
reference shall occasionally be made to antecedents to this time frame which are vital for
understanding the oil industries in Sudan and South Sudan as well as their conflict over oil.
From a spatial perspective, this research is focused on the conflict over oil between
Sudan and South Sudan. Historically, these two geographical zones correspond to the regions
of Northern Sudan and Southern Sudan in the Historic Republic of Sudan that preceded the
2011 referendum which led to the independence of South Sudan. The conflict between the
GOS and the GRSS has resulted in MID taking place along their ill defined boundary and the
border zones between the two countries where most of the oil production takes place.
From an organic perspective, this research focuses on the Sudan-South Sudan conflict
over oil and the role played by the AUHIP to resolve it. This precision is vital as the AUHIP
is also engaged in resolving other issues of contention between Sudan and South Sudan which
shall not be considered in this research. Equally, both Sudan and South Sudan are engaged in
their respective civil wars; (For Sudan: Civil war in Darfur, Blue Nile and South Kordofan
States. For South Sudan: The SPLM/A and the SPLM/A in opposition [SPLM/A-IO] are
fighting particularly in Unity and Northern Bahr El Ghazal States). These shall not be the
28
Dimah Mahmoud, “Sudan‟s Comprehensive Peace Agreement Amidst the Clash of Agendas: Attempts,
Failures and Lessons Unlearned”, Civil Wars, 2013, p. 157.
29
Christopher Zambakari, “In Search of Durable Peace: The Comprehensive Peace Agreement and Power
Sharing in Sudan”, The Journal of North African Studies, 2013, p. 17.
30
Ibid.

8
focus of this research amidst some connections therein to the conflict between Sudan and
South Sudan, raising the need to analyze their ramifications on our object of study.31
It should be specified that this research is not an analysis of the resource curse
abounding in political sciences and political economy paradigms and which builds the nexus
between political underdevelopment as a result of oil revenue clientelism and ensuing civil
upheaval in poorly governed oil rich societies. The choice not to recourse to the resource
curse doesn‟t stem from an alleged irrelevance but simply because it has been largely
explored within the context of Sudan and also because in situations of „inter-governmental‟32
or interstate conflict over oil, it might not be well suited since its use is more coherent with
respect to singular domestic politics.33
It should also be emphasized that this research does not assume that oil is the only
factor of conflict that opposes the GOS and the GOSS (GRSS). Embracing all the factors of
conflict would be too broad an approach and scientifically irrational. The focus on the
struggle for the control of oil rich territories and oil revenue narrows down our scope and
addresses a key point of contention between these actors which merits to be analyzed.
However, this study needs to be carried out lucidly to avoid the trap of unproven inference or
fallacy. As attested by Marc-Antoine Perouse, “the simplistic affirmation of oil as the motive
for conflict can be overemphasized, thus leading to a geopolitical misinterpretation and a
misleading analysis.”34
All the same, the connectedness between oil and other factors of
conflict in oil rich countries are usually strong and almost impossible to disentangle as
affirmed by Michael Klare.35
One of such liaisons is the nexus between oil and security which
is central to this research.
IV. JUSTIFICATION AND INTEREST OF THE STUDY
First, this Study is justified by its novelty. While research abound on Sudan‟s history
before the CPA, the post-CPA era still offers avenues of research for understanding the
31
International Crisis Group, “South Sudan: A Civil War by Any Other Name”, ICG Africa Report, No. 217,
April 2014. Also Cf. International Crisis Group, “Sudan and South Sudan‟s Merging Conflict”, ICG Africa
Report, No.223.
32
„Inter-governmental‟ as opposing two autonomous regional governments; the GOS in Northern Sudan and the
GOSS in Southern Sudan.
33
Cleophas Lado, “Political Economy of the Oil Industry in the Sudan: Problem or Resource in Development”,
Erdkunde Archive for Scientific Geography, vol. 56, No. 2, Apr-Jun 2002, pp.157-169.
34
Marc-Antoine Pérouse de Montclos, “Les fantasmes géopolitique dans les pays en guerre ou … pas” In
Béatrice Giblin (Ed.), Géopolitique de L’Energie. Hérodote, No. 115, 2014, pp. 3-8.
35
Michael Klare, Resource Wars: The New Landscape of Global Conflict, New York, Henry Holt and Company,
2002.

9
challenges of peace in the region and ultimately contributing towards the development and
adoption of adequate policies which are vital for consolidating the peace process which has
been challenged by decades of conflict. Ideally, Sudan and South Sudan offer an interesting
scenario in which an intrastate conflict transforms into an interstate conflict.
In the same light, this research is justified by the novelty which is reflected in the
AUHIP as a framework of conflict resolution between Sudan and South Sudan. While
research has been largely carried out on the AUPSC, and the overall AU peace and security
architecture in general, relatively little research has focused on the AUHIP‟s facilitation
between Sudan and South Sudan for reasons linked possibly to its relatively short history
(mandated in 2009). In this regard, this research is a contribution towards investigating the
progress made and challenges faced within the framework of the AUHIP in the quest to
facilitate the pacific resolution of the Sudan-South Sudan conflict with focus on oil.
From the aforementioned justifications, this research is of fundamental scientific
interest in that it seeks to confront the vast paradigmatic knowledge amassed on the nexus
between oil and conflict to the praxis of regional and international efforts for the resolution of
conflict opposing Sudan and South Sudan through the AUHIP. According to Christophe
Dupont, “theory and practice are to a large extent, two domains that suffer from mutual lack
of appreciation and ignorance,”36
and therefore need to be bridged. In this regard, an analysis
shall be made of the struggle for both countries to control oil resources as well as the
underlying constructions that they make of oil rents in their mutual relations. The manner in
which oil revenue is used affects the identities that belligerent actors make of each other and
their intentions. This research also underscores the researcher‟s personal interest in the
domain of conflict resolution. As affirmed by G.R Berridge and Allan James, diplomacy is an
“attempt to promote international negotiations, particularly in circumstances of acute crisis,
whether concerning inter- or intra-state conflicts.”37
V. REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE
About Sudanese and the South Sudanese
It is important to understand the individuals embroiled in this conflict. Most
publications on Sudan and South Sudan give background information on the Sudanese and
36
Christophe Dupont, Négociation et transformations internationales du monde Deuxième Biennale de la
Négociation, Paris, Publibook, 2007, p. 52.
37
G.R Berridge and Allan James, A Dictionary of Diplomacy, Op. Cit., p. 70.

10
South Sudanese people as well as their geography and history. Andrew Natsios‟ Sudan, South
Sudan and Darfur: What Everyone Needs to Know presents the main components of Historic
Sudan as comprised of 70% Sunni Muslims, 20% Christians and 10% traditional religionists
and diverse ethnic groups; Dinka, Kakwa, Bari, Azande, Shilluk, Kuku, Morle, Marandi,
Didunga, Ndongo, etc. in South Sudan and Sudanese Arab, Fur, Beja, Nuba and Fallata etc. in
Sudan. 38
Geographically, he puts to the lamplight South Sudan‟s rich subsoil, endowed with
oil and minerals of all kind from diamond to coltan. Joseph R. Oppong‟s Sudan, follows the
same trend, informing on Sudan‟s history, geography and ethnicity.39
Although, he adds vital
information concerning the economic setup of the former Republic of Sudan which was
glaringly marked by the marginalization of Southern Sudan (today‟s South Sudan), albeit
being the major source of growth as a result of oil production on its oil rich fields.
A history of oil exploration in Sudan and South Sudan and the nexus to the second
Sudan War
The stakes of oil in the post-CPA can be traced back to the second Sudan civil war. In
The Root Causes of Sudan’s civil wars, Douglas H. Johnson gives an account of how the GOS
unilaterally made decisions on oil exploitation in the southern oil fields without giving an ear
to the southerners‟ plight for the construction of a refinery in the south.40
President Nimeiri
even went as far as modifying the map of the country just to make sure that the oil rich fields
of Unity state would be in the North. Verney‟s account Raising the Stakes: Oil and Conflict in
Sudan validates the above mentioned ills of oil on how it fuelled the conflict. He pinpoints the
GOS‟s expenditure on its military capabilities amounting to 1 million dollars a day. 41
Anthony Patey gives a succinct presentation of the history of the actors of oil
exploration in Sudan in his piece entitled “State rules: Oil Companies and Armed conflict in
Sudan.”42
He accounts of how North American firms were forced to leave under pressure
from Washington due to deteriorating human rights in Sudan‟s oil industry. The European
firms were supported by the European Union as they decided to stay on grounds of a
„constructive engagement‟ argument with Khartoum as a prerequisite for conflict resolution
38
Andrew Natsios, Op. Cit.
39
Joseph R. Oppong, Sudan, Modern World Nations Series, New York, Chelsea Publication House, 2010.
40
Douglas H. Johnson, Op. Cit.
41
Peter Veney, Raising the Stakes: Oil and Conflict in Sudan – A Sudan Update Report, Sudan, Sudan Update,
1999.
42
Luke Anthony Patey, “Oil Companies and Armed Conflict in Sudan”, Third World Quarterly, Vol. 28, No. 5,
May 2007, pp. 997-1016.

11
and nation building in Sudan.43
The giant Asian parastatals motivated by profit decided to
implant and continue exploration amidst the ongoing war and human rights violations.
Jemera Rone‟s “Sudan: Oil & war” is a history account of oil exploitation in Sudan,
especially in the southern fields and how the multinationals were involved indirectly by the
revenue they bought to the government and fuelling the second civil war.44
In the same light,
Oil development in Sudan by Eric Reeves, is an account of the correlation between oil
revenues and the GOS‟s increase militarization which intensified battles and led to massive
human rights violation around oil fields.45
“Political Economy of the Oil Industry in the
Sudan: Problem or Resource in Development” is an analytical approach by Cleophas Lado to
the question of oil being an impediment to development and an obstacle to peace in Sudan
albeit having the potential to have contrary ramifications.46
“God, Oil and war” by
International Crisis Group is a comprehensive historic account of oil exploration and violence
in Sudan‟s intractable civil war.47
Oil and Conflict between Sudan and South Sudan in Post-CPA developments
These literatures on post-CPA developments are the most important in this research.
Literatures on the Stakes of oil in the conflict between Sudan and South Sudan in the
aftermath of the CPA are quite limited, amidst the availability of enriching articles. Those
available focus on the struggle over the oil rich territories of Abyei and Heglig. As analyzed
by Luka Biong Deng in his scientific article “Will the Award of the International Arbitration
Tribunal be honored?” the GOS violated key elements of the CPA related to the resolution of
the Abyei dispute for reasons associated to oil and ethnicity leading to renewed hostilities.48
Brooks Daly analyzes the legal battle between the GOS and the GOSS in “The Abyei
Arbitration: Procedural Aspects of an Intra-State Border Arbitration.”49
Douglas Johnson‟s
article “The Heglig Oil Dispute between Sudan and South Sudan” analyzes the conflict
43
The constructive engagement argument used by the European Union and European firms; OMV and Lundin in
Sudan was based on the premise that in order to improve human rights, the respect for rule and law and
democracy in Sudan, oil firms were supposed to operate and provide jobs and development in oil producing
areas in the South Cf. Luke Anthony Patey, Op. Cit.
44
Jamera Rone, “Sudan: Oil & war”, Review of African Political Economy, The Horn of Conflict, Vol.30, No.
97, September 2003, pp. 504-510.
45
Eric Reeves, Op. Cit.
46
Cleophas Lado, Op. Cit.
47
International Crisis Group, “God, Oil and Country Changing the Logic of War in Sudan”, ICG Africa Report,
No. 39, Brussels, 2002.
48
Luka Biong Deng, “Justice in Sudan: Will the award of the international Abyei Arbitration Tribunal be
honored?”, Journal of Eastern African Studies, Vol. 4, No. 2, June 2010, pp. 298-313.
49
Brooks Daly, “The Abyei Arbitration: Procedural Aspects of an Intra-State Border Arbitration, Leiden Journal
of International Law, Vol. 23, No. 4, Nov. 2010, pp. 801-823.

12
between the GOS and the GRSS for the disputed oil rich territory of Heglig and its oil fields
and explains how this continues to fuel conflict between the two governments.50
In The New Kings of Crude, China India and the Global Struggle for Oil in Sudan and
South Sudan, Luke Anthony Patey explains how Sudan and South Sudan became embroiled in
violent confrontations in the disputed oil fields and as a result of disagreement over pipeline
charges.51
The disagreement between Sudan and South Sudan on oil pipeline charges and the
resulting violence that ensued is also reported by Elke Grawert and Christine Andrä in “Oil
and Investment in Upper Nile State, South Sudan.”52
Solomon Dersso‟s “Sudan and South
Sudan: from turbulent cohabitation to messy divorce” accounts of how disagreement over the
territory of Abyei, border demarcations and oil pipeline issues pushed both countries into
armed confrontation in March and April 2012.53
Luke Anthony Patey‟s “Crude Days Ahead?
Oil and Resource Curse in Sudan” gives an account of the difficulty in implementing the CPA
provisions for the sharing of oil revenue between the GOS and the GOSS as they both sought
to maximize rents and still remained at odds on the exact location of some oil fields.54
Joshua Craze‟s contribution, “Unclear Lines: State and Non-State Actors in Abyei” in
the collection The Border Lands of South Sudan explains how conflicting goals at the State
level (GOS and GRSS) and the local community levels (Ngok Dinka and Misseriya have
continued to fuel conflict in the border area of Abyei, particularly as the GOS sought to
control oil fields in Abyei.55
This analysis is equally explained in his article “Contested
Borders: Continuing Tensions over the Sudan South Sudan Borders.”56
In “A return to
hostilities?: The Comprehensive Peace Agreement and the future of a two-State Sudan”,
Wilfried Ileykolo recounts of the difficult transition period marked by the disapproval of the
GOSS over the running of the oil industry and how the Southern Sudan pushed forward the
50
Douglas Johnson, Op. Cit.
51
Luke Anthony Patey, The New Kings of Crude China India and The Global Struggle for Oil in Sudan and
South Sudan, London, C. Hurst & Co., 2014.
52
Elke Grawert and Christine Andrä, “Oil Investment and Conflict Upper in Nile State South Sudan”, Bonn
International Center for Conversation Brief, No. 48, November 2012.
53
Solomon Dersso, “Sudan and South Sudan: from turbulent cohabitation to messy divorce”, Journal of African
Union Studies, Vol. 1, No. 1, 2012.
54
Luke Anthony Patey, “Crude days ahead? Oil and the Resource Curse in Sudan”, African Affairs, Vol. 109,
No. 437, 2010, pp. 617-636.
55
Joshua Craze, “Unclear Lines: State and Non-State Actors in Abyei”, In Christopher Vaughan, Mareike
Schomerus and Lotje De Vries (Eds.), The Border Lands of South Sudan Authority and Identity in Contemporary
Historical Perspectives, New York, Palgrave Macmillan, 2013, pp. 45-66.
56
Joshua Craze “Contested Borders: Continuing Tensions over Sudan-South Sudan border”, Small Arms Survey,
November 2014.

13
agenda for secession during the referendum in order to have complete ownership of its oil
revenue.57
Paradigmatic Literature on Oil Pipeline Politics and Conflict
Understanding how power relations are framed between pipeline connected countries
would help decrypt the conflict over their use between Sudan and South Sudan. In Cross-
Border Oil and Gas Pipelines and the Role of the transit Country Economics, Challenges and
Solutions, Ekpen James Omonbude analyzes the complexity of pipeline relations between the
oil producing country and the transiting country and explains that the fixing of pipeline
charges depends on the bargaining power of each party which is usually in favor of the
transiting country and the inability to find an agreement could lead to conflict.58
Paul Stevens, in his piece “Cross Border Oil and Gas Pipelines: Problems and
Prospects” explains the legitimacy of transit fees in the use of pipelines as based on the
„sacrifice‟ of sovereignty made by the transiting State. He observes though that no
overarching legal jurisdiction exists to police and regulate activities and contracts in this
domain, coupled with the States‟ quest to maximize rents and profits and ultimately leading to
conflicts of an economic and political nature.59
Oil as a fuel in Interstate Conflict
Literature on the role of oil as a fuel in interstate conflict helps understand how and
why Sudan and South Sudan have been embroiled in conflict over its possession and shall
frame this thesis‟ arguments and analysis. In “Territory: Geography, Contentious Issues, and
World Politics”, Paul Hansel argues that the struggle for control of territory particularly rich
in resources is a driving cause for conflict.60
Clifford Singer in his book Energy and
International War From Babylon to Baghdad and Beyond builds an interesting nexus between
internal conflict for the control of energy resources and their ramifications on interstate
dispute, this is of valuable importance in this study.61
57
Wilfried Ileykolo, “A return to hostilities: The Comprehensive Peace Agreement and the future of a two State
Sudan”, in Mammo Muchie, Phindile Lukhele-Olorunju and Oghenerobor Akpor (Eds.), The African Union ten
years after: Solving African Problems with Pan-Africanism and African Renaissance, Pretoria, Africa Institute of
South Africa, 2013, pp. 156-174.
58
Ekpen James Omonbude, Cross-Border Oil and Gas Pipelines and the Role of the transit Country. Economics,
Challenges and Solutions, Hampshire, Palgrave Macmillan, 2013.
59
Paul Stevens, “Cross Border Oil and Gas Pipelines: Problems and Prospects”, Joint UNDP/World Bank
Energy Sector Management Programme, June 2003.
60
Paul Hansel, “Geography: Territory, Contentious Issues and World Politics”, In John Vasquez, What do we
Know About War, Plymouth, Rowman & Little field publishers, 2012, pp. 3-26.
61
Clifford Singer, Energy and International War From Babylon to Baghdad and Beyond, New Jersey, World

14
Robert Mandel in his book entitled Conflict Over the World’s Resources, Background,
Trends, Case Studies and Considerations for the Future projects into the non-renewable fossil
fuels as energy resources and how they would continue to fuel interstate conflict if
appropriate policy measures are not adopted.62
Michael Klare operates a succinct analysis of
the impact of resource scarcity on the military policies of Nations in his piece Resource Wars
The New Landscape of Global Conflict.63
As States seek to guarantee energy security so do
their military options become more proactive and possibly leading to conflict and wars.
In their book, The Politics of the Global Oil Industry, Toyin Falola and Ann Genova
operate an analysis of onshore disputes over oil and their place in international disputes. Case
studies of conflict between Venezuela and Guyana on the one hand, and Saudi Arabia‟s
territorial disputes with Yemen and the United Arab Emirates on the other hand, whose stakes
have been raised by the presence of oil in ill defined border zones.64
However, they observe
that even in situations of well defined borders, the quest for oil can lead to aggression even
from an oil rich country like Iraq whose annexation of Kuwait was blatant.
Thomas Homer-Dixon‟s book, Environment, Scarcity and Violence builds the nexus
between resource scarcity which leads interethnic violence and the impact of resource scarcity
in fuelling interstate war.65
Despite his emphasis on the latter than the later, this literature is
enriching in decrypting the stakes in local and State perceptions of conflict and ultimately
security between Sudan and South Sudan. This is particularly the case in Abyei where this
literature is helpful in understanding the quadruple relation „GOS-Misseriya-GRSS-Ngok
Dinka. In addition David G. Victor‟s “What Resource Wars?” demonstrates how high energy
consuming countries can trigger conflict in supplying countries by their outgoing postures and
how the flow of oil revenue into badly governed countries can fuel hostilities.66
The AUHIP Facilitation for the Resolution of Conflict between Sudan and South Sudan
Literature on the AUHIP‟s facilitation for the resolution of the conflict between Sudan
and South Sudan is quite limited but very important to situate this panel in context and
evaluate the progress achieved within its framework. In The 2012/2013 Annual review of the
Scientific, 2008.
62
Robert Mandel, Conflict Over the World’s Natural Resources: Background, Trends, Case Studies and
considerations for the Future, Connecticut, Greenwood Publishing Group, 1988.
63
Michael Klare, Op. Cit.
64
Toyin Falola and Ann Genova, The Politics of the Global Oil Industry: An introduction, Portsmouth,
Greenwood Publishing group, 2005.
65
Thomas Homer-Dixon, Environment, Scarcity and Violence, New Jersey, Princeton University Press, 1999.
66
David Victor, “What Resource Wars”, The National Interest, No. 92, Nov-Dec 2007, pp. 48-55.

15
AUPSC, Solomon Dersso reports on the AUHIP‟s facilitation as an efficient mechanism for
the prospect of peace between Sudan and South Sudan.67
In Chapter 8 of his book entitled
War and Governance International Security in a Changing World Order, Richard Weitz hails
the AUHIP as the lead platform for a coherent international approach to building peace
between the NCP led GOS and the SPLM led GRSS.68
In “Oil and Politics in Sudan”, Alsir Sidaahmed analyzes the negotiations done
between Sudan and South Sudan within the AUHIP‟s facilitation pointing out the hard line of
the parties as they both aimed at maximizing their respective gains in the use of the pipelines
and how the issue of oil transit became entangled and conditioned by that of security in the
border zone.69
Elke Grawert Explores the mandate of the AUHIP in facilitating negotiations
between Sudan and South Sudan and justifies the incorporation of oil issues as been
predetermined by the quest to agree on pipeline charges and compensation to Sudan for losing
75 % of its oil revenue.70
VI. PROBLEM STATEMENT AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS
This thesis shall seek to answer the following question:
“To what extent is the resolution of the Sudan-South Sudan oil conflict within the
AUHIP framework efficient?”
In other words “Is the AUHIP‟s facilitation framework efficient in the resolution
of the conflict over oil between Sudan and South Sudan in the post-CPA?”
As encompassing as this problem statement may be, it raises two subsidiary research
questions;
Q1. How has oil been a factor of conflict between Sudan and South Sudan in the post-
CPA?
Q2. What progress has been achieved by the AUHIP facilitation for the resolution of oil
related disputes between Sudan and South Sudan and what are the challenges and the
prospects of peace in relation to these efforts?
67
Solomon Dersso (Ed.), Annual Review of the Peace and Security Council, 2012/2013, Pretoria, Institute of
Security Studies, 2013.
68
Richard Weitz, War and Governance International Security in a Changing World Order, California, ABC-
CLIO, 2011.
69
Alsir Sidaahmed, “Oil and Politics in Sudan”, in Abdel Ghaffar M. Ahmed and Gunner M. SØrbØ (Eds.),
Continuing Conflict in a Contested State, New York, Palgrave Macmillan, 2013. pp. 103-120.
70
Elke Grawert, Forging Two Nations Insights on Sudan and South Sudan, Addis Ababa, OSSREA, 2013.

16
VII. RESEARCH HYPOTHESES
1. Oil as a predominant factor of conflict between Sudan and South Sudan in the
aftermath of the CPA can be explained from three perspectives. First, by the quest of
both the GOS and the GRSS to maximize oil rents by engaging into violent clashes
over disputed oil rich territories; secondly, by disagreement over pipeline charges
between the GOS and the GRSS; finally by the use of oil revenue to finance
militarization in their respective countries.
2. The AUHIP‟s effort to resolve the conflict over oil has been effective to an extent as
reflected by two major achievements. First, by the facilitation of agreement on the
contentious issue of pipeline charges which has opposed the GOS and the GRSS; and
secondly by facilitating an agreement for the institution of the Safe Demilitarized
Border Zone (SDBZ) in order to curb violence and offer a platform for pacifically
settling disputes.
3. The AUHIP‟s facilitation is challenged by three categories of factors. First, the issue
of disputed territories including the oil rich ones hasn‟t yet been resolved given that
Sudan and South Sudan are rentier economies seeking to maximize oil gains; secondly
the AUHIP SDBZ is usually violated by the GOS and the GRSS as well as rebels and
contesting movements that operate in their countries; finally, the consistent lack of
confidence and the persistent correlation between oil revenue and arms purchase by
Sudan and South Sudan threaten the agreements on pipeline charges especially in the
context of oil price volatility.
VIII. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
This research is carried out within the framework of two theories; Holistic
Constructivism and Petro-Aggression. First, constructivism as the third debate in
contemporary international relations theory owes much of its intellectual development to
sociological institutionalism studied in the field of sociology.71
It adopts an empirical
approach which views actors as socially embedded, communicatively constituted and
culturally empowered within the framework of an interpretive, discursive and historical mode
of analysis.72
For constructivists, the process of identity and interest shaping takes place via
71
Joseph Lapid, “The Third Debate: On The Prospects of International Theory in a Post-Positivist Era”
International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 32, No. 4, 1988 pp. 379-396 in Jean-Jacques Roche, Théories des Relations
Internationales, Paris, Montchrestien, 2004, p.196.
72
Scott Burchill et al., Theories of International Relations, Hampshire, Palgrave Macmillan, 2005, p. 195.

17
three mechanisms; imagination (which is what actors see as their realm of possibility, how
they think they should act), communication (which is the tendency for actors to appeal to
established norms of legitimate action to justify their actions), and constraint (which is the
result of imagination and communication trends by which actors put limits to their own
action).73
The justification for this theoretical choice stems from the comparative advantages
which Holistic Constructivism has over rationalist theories (neo-realism and neo-liberalism),
international critical theory (modernists and post-modernists) and other varieties of
constructivism (systemic and unit level) from ontological and epistemological perspectives.
Concretely, constructivism in general has the ontological advantage of refuting lakatosian-
based microeconomic and positivist premises characteristic of rationalist theories which
perceive actors as pre-social, atomistic and egoistic with autogenous identities and interests
which are exogenous to social interaction. Rather, Constructivism views identity and interest
formation as a product of social interaction.
This ontological advantage is primordial in explaining the evolution of interests,
identities and relationships. Thus, it brings out the heuristic power of a non-rationalist
perspective.74
In addition, “constructivism offers insight for conflict analysis and conflict
resolution at the international level because it draws attention to a range of factors and
processes that are frequently missing from the rationalist and structuralist based approaches of
neo-realism and neo-liberalism.”75
It shall help explain how Sudan and South Sudan frame
their conflict over oil as this is important for an appropriate analysis of the AUHIP‟s
effort.
With regards to international critical theory from which constructivism emerged, the
latter ontologically challenges the former on its meta-theoretical foundations. Although they
both share strong interpretive foundations, Constructivism emphasizes on aspects such as the
debate between the relative importance of normative versus material forces, between
continuity versus transformation in world politics, on the role of social agency and a range of
other theoretical-empirical questions which critical theory ignores. 76
As a result, it diminishes
the epistemological, methodological and normative premises of critical theories. This
73
Ibid., p.198.
74
Ibid., pp. 189 -193.
75
Richard Jackson, “Constructivism and Conflict Resolution”, In Jacob Bercovitch, Victor Kremenyuk and I.
William Zartman (Eds.), The Sage Handbook of Conflict Resolution, London, Sage Publications, 2009, p. 172.
76
Scott Burchill et al., Op. Cit., pp.193-194.

18
advantage enables intertwining the material factor of oil within the framework of an
ideational and normative context surrounding its struggle between Sudan and South Sudan.
Finally, while Systemic Constructivism as developed by Alexander Wendt focuses
only on State actors and how their identities and interests are shaped by their interaction,
disregarding any processes from within the State and Unit-level constructivism focuses only
on the internal dynamics of States in order to explain interests and identities in international
relations, Holistic constructivism has the advantage of merging their strengths. Holistic
Constructivism amalgamates the two identities of a state; social and corporate distinguished
by the other constructivist approaches into a “unified analytical perspective that treats the
domestic and the international as two faces of a single domestic and political order.” 77
This is
of crucial importance in the current study as it helps understand the identities and interests of
the GOS and the GRSS as well as the perception which they make over the issue of oil in
their mutual relations.
Petro-aggression is a theory develops by Jeff Colgan which posits that under certain
circumstances petro-States are systematically more likely to act aggressively and instigate
international conflict.78
A petro-State as a State in which oil revenue constitutes at least 10 %
of Gross Domestic Product (GDP), a characteristic shared by the GOS and GRSS.79
The
international monetary fund estimates that oil income is responsible for half of government
revenue and 90 % of oil exports for Sudan while in South Sudan oil income accounts for a
staggering 98 % of the government‟s total oil revenue.80
Rather than just being a magnet for
international competition, oil has multiple effects on a petro-State‟s foreign policy which
could either increase or decrease its preference for aggressiveness.
Although the effect of oil is not monolithic on societies, Petro-States are statistically
proven to be amongst the most violent in the world. This however depends on the manner in
which oil interacts with domestic politics. Oil income has its most negative consequence for
international peace when it flows into a State that is led by a government with aggressive
preferences. This theory validates that “large-scale oil income generates multiple political
77
Ibid., pp. 199-201. [Corporate identity refers to the manner in which a State perceives itself whereas Social
identity is the perception that other actors have of a State.]
78
Jeff Colgan, Petro-aggression When Oil Causes War, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2013, pp. 3-4.
Also Cf. Jeff Colgan, “Fuelling the Fire Pathways from Oil to war”, Conference Paper at the International
Studies Association, George Washington University, 2012, p. 161.
79
Jeff Colgan, “Oil and resource-backed aggression”, Energy Policy, Vol. 39, 2011, p. 1669.
80
John Daly, “South Sudan Considers Alternative Kenyan Pipeline to Outflank Sudan”, 15 August 2012.
Available at http://oilprice.com/Energy/Crude-Oil/South-Sudan-Considers-Alternative-Kenyan-Pipeline-to-
Outflank-Sudan.html. Accessed 28th May 2015.

19
incentives which affect a petro-State‟s foreign policy.”81
In addition petro-aggression as a
theory affirms that “a leader with huge financial resources to redistribute or to buy political
support can afford to take risks, including those in aggressive policy adventurism.”82
IX. RESEARCH METHOD, METHODOLOGY AND DESIGN
This study employs a case study method centered on international security.83
As
attested by Arie M. Kacowicz, case study methods have an advantage in that they
operationalize qualitative variables which allow the attainment of high levels of conceptual
validity, they have the potential to examine causal mechanisms within individual cases, and
they offer a construction of historical processes and deep explanations of particular cases
through in-depth examination and they analyze complex causal relations through contingent
generalizations and typological theories.84
In addition, the method of geopolitical analysis is used. This method is appropriate
within this research in the sense that as developed by Yves Lacoste, he defines geopolitics as
“the analysis of rivalry for the appropriation of territory or in a more extensive manner as the
relationship between power and territory.”85
This method consists thus of situating actors of
the international society and their power relations within a space-time setting. The
geopolitical method used this way enables the elimination of ambiguities and creates room for
nexus to other disciplines; history (geo-history), economics (geo-economics) and geography
which are central to this research.86
Finally, qualitative methods are used in this research. The information obtained is
gotten from secondary sources and a few primary sources (interviews conducted with experts
on Sudan and South Sudan). Secondary sources include published books, theses, journal
articles, policy documents, reports and other forms of information and statistics from
governments and International Organizations (GOS, GOSS [GRSS], SPLM/A, AU, AUPSC,
AUHIP, UNISFA, UNSC). The research methodology entailed data analysis, consultation
81
Jeff Colgan, Op. Cit., p. 1670.
82
Jeff Colgan, Petro-Aggression When Oil Causes War, Op. Cit., p.4.
83
Arie M. Kacowicz, “Case Study Methods in International Security Studies”, In Detlef F. Sprinz and Yael
Welinsky-Nahmias (Eds.), Models, Numbers and Cases Methods For Studying International Relations, Ann
Arbor, University of Michigan Press, 2004, pp. 107-125.
84
Ibid., p. 108.
85
Cédric de Lestrange, Christophe Alexandre Paillard, and Pierre Zelenko, Géopolitique du Pétrole Un nouveau
marché De nouveaux risques Des nouveaux Mondes, Technip, Paris, 2005, p. 12.
86
Ibid.

20
and review, and program planning in order to decrypt the causes of conflict over oil
between the GOS and the GRSS and the appropriateness of the AUHIP‟s response.
X. LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY
Insufficient financial and time resources are the major obstacles which prevented the
researcher from going to the field. As a result, this study has essentially relied on available
documented and verified information as well as interviews. Also, there is a relative deficiency
of literature on the AUHIP‟s facilitation for Sudan and South Sudan, interview with experts
and the analysis of official documents from the AUHIP and the AUPSC were thus helpful.
XI. OUTLINE OF THE STUDY
“Any negotiation aimed at resolving a conflict could do well by first clarifying the
nature of the disagreement: the true disagreement and the perceived disagreement.”87
In that
light, Part I of this study is entitled “OIL AND CONFLICT BETWEEN SUDAN AND
SOUTH SUDAN IN THE POST-CPA” and is dedicated to an analysis of the oil factor in
the conflict opposing Sudan and South Sudan after the CPA. It shall comprise of two
Chapters, Chapter 1: Setting The Context: Actors, Normative And Institutional Frameworks
Of Oil Ownership In Sudan-South Sudan, shall present oil governance in Sudan and South
Sudan with particular emphasis on how it was influenced by the CPA and subsequently by
South Sudan‟s independence. Chapter 2: Oil and Conflict between Sudan and South Sudan in
the Aftermath of the CPA, shall operate a historic analysis of the conflict over oil between
Sudan and South Sudan.
Part II entitled “THE ROLE OF THE AUHIP IN RESOLVING THE
CONFLICT OVER OIL BETWEEN SUDAN AND SOUTH SUDAN AND THE
CHALLENGES OF PEACE” is dedicated to analysis of the role played by the AUHIP in
facilitating negotiations between Sudan and South Sudan for the pacific resolution of their
conflict (Chapter 3) and the challenges that affect the progress made (Chapter 4).
87
Mauro Galluccio, Handbook of International Negotiation: Interpersonal, Intercultural, and Diplomatic
Perspectives, New York, Springer, 2015, p. 193.

21
PART ONE:
OIL AND CONFLICT BETWEEN SUDAN
AND SOUTH SUDAN IN THE POST-CPA

22
The 2005 CPA officially put an end to the longest civil war in Africa, the second
Sudan civil war which lasted 22 years (1983-2005). One of the key tenets of this agreement
was the oil wealth sharing deal by which the GOS agreed to share 50 % of net oil revenue
from the Southern oil fields with the SPLM/A. Chapter 1 would operate quite of a brief
retrospective within the framework of context setting in order to present the gliding ownership
of oil revenue from the sole control of the GOS (before the CPA) to an equal sharing
arrangement (the transition period) and the reaffirmation of permanent Sovereignty by the
people of South Sudan (After independence). This would help understand the social
construction, motivations, stakes and the evolution of identity articulated over the oil resource
by the belligerents.
Chapter 2 would delve into the core of the research, understanding how oil has been a
factor of conflict between Sudan and South Sudan after the signing of the much heralded
CPA. The post-CPA era, marked by MIDs between Sudan and South Sudan has risked a full
blown recrudescence of war particularly in 2008 (The Abyei clashes) and in 2012 (The Heglig
crisis which some called the Heglig war). The intentions and crave which underlie the
struggle for oil (that is in oil rich territories) and oil rents (from the commercialization of oil,
pipeline transactions) and the use of oil revenue (usually for militarization) in these two post-
referendum petro-States shall be analyzed as these are fundamental to understanding as shall
be seen in part II whether the conflict resolution mechanism provided by the AUHIP
framework is adequate.

23
The second Sudan civil war was caused by a variety of factors amongst which the
discriminate policies in the oil sector which were principally geared towards serving the
interest of the GOS in the North, leading to the marginalization of Southern Sudan. In this
regard, review shall be made of the nexus between oil and the second Sudan civil war and
how the CPA restructured relations between the North and the South in an effort to build
peace (Section 1). One very important component of the CPA was the 2011 referendum in
which the Southerners fulfilled their right for self determination and opted for independence.
Two countries ensued; Sudan and South Sudan, the latter born out of Southern Sudan. This
new configuration has given rise to new stakes for both countries themselves and the oil
producers. These stakes are primordially linked to South Sudan‟s preconfigured dependence
on Sudan for energy security (Section 2).
Section 1: Oil governance, the second Sudan civil war and the CPA
Oil governance refers to the norms and institutions by which oil ownership and
production are framed and the utilization of oil rents is conducted. The 2005 CPA put an
official end to the second Sudan civil war by laying down the framework for the realignment
of power sharing between the GOS and the SPLM (I). In addition to this, the CPA had a
transformative impact on oil governance within Sudan (II).
I. The CPA‟s effort to resolving conflict through power and oil wealth sharing in
Sudan
The nexus of the second Sudan Civil war to oil governance in Sudan shall primordially
be decrypted (A) in content order to better understand the provisions of the CPA (B).
A. The nexus between oil and conflict in the second Sudan civil War
Sudan‟s oil industry was preeminent in the Second Sudan war for two main reasons.
First, because of the marginalization of the Southerners‟ opinion in oil policy-making despite
CHAPTER 1: SETTING THE CONTEXT: ACTORS, NORMATIVE
AND INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORKS OF OIL
OWNERSHIP IN THE POST-CPA

24
the majority of oil being produced in the South (1). Secondly, because of the GOS‟s
repressive policy on the Southerners in order to clear the way88
for oil production (2).
1. The GOS‟s unilateralism and marginalization of Southern Sudan on oil policies
President Nimeiri‟s government in Sudan established a system of marginalization
towards the regional government of Southern Sudan89
on issues of oil policy. The decision
making on oil development excluded the opinion of the Southerners despite their region being
the most endowed in oil resources. For example the regional government was not consulted
on the grant of exploration and drilling licenses to Chevron and Total oil companies.90
In addition, the regional government of Southern Sudan‟s request for the construction
of an oil refinery by Chevron inside the Upper Nile province in the South was rejected by the
central government which rather decided that it should be constructed in Khartoum and linked
through pipeline to the Southern oil fields.91
Southern students had protested in reaction to
this decision92
. The Southerners plea for the construction of a shorter pipeline through Kenya
to the port in Mombasa was equally rejected to the benefit of a longer pipeline from the oil
fields through Northern Sudan to Port Sudan. President Nimeiri‟s government argued that it
was wiser to concentrate development in the industrial regions of Sudan such as in Khartoum,
while the southern government argued that such a development philosophy will drive
inequality between the different regions of the country.93
Abel Alier, former President of the High Executive Council of the autonomous region
of Southern Sudan had subsequently claimed that the issue of oil had turned president Nimeiri
against the Addis Ababa agreement and the provisions which enabled the Southern regional
government to levy tax on corporations and products exported from the region, including oil.
The presence of the refinery in Southern Sudan would have given the regional government an
enormous financial capacity which the central government in Khartoum wished to prevent.94
88
This term has been used in existing literature to describe the military actions taken by the GOS during the
second Sudan civil war in order to defeat rebellious movements especially the SPLM/A and Anyanya II who
opposed oil production in the Southern oil fields. Such measures were taken to reassure foreign oil companies of
their security. Cf. Douglas Johnson, The Root Causes of Sudan’s Civil Wars, Op. Cit., p.163.
89
Just like the CPA, the 1972 Addis-Ababa agreement which officially ended the first Sudan civil war made
provisions for the establishment of a regional government of Southern Sudan.
90
Douglas H. Johnson, Op. Cit, p. 45.
91
Ibid.
92
Andrew Natios, Op. Cit. p. 59.
93
Ibid.
94
Douglas H. Johnson, Op. Cit, p. 45.

25
In a nutshell, although the breakdown of the Addis Ababa agreement which sparked
off the second Sudan civil war can‟t be entirely attributed to issues of oil policies, the impact
of the latter cannot be undermined. The exclusion of the southerners on decisions pertaining
to the most important resource in the country and largest bearer of its foreign exchange, of
which their region was the greatest contributor contributed to the grievance of the southerners
against the GOS in Khartoum and compromised the fragile peace which the Addis Ababa had
preserved for a few years.
2. The GOS‟s repressive policies in the Southern oil fields
As the second Sudan civil war unraveled the oil fields in South Sudan became serious
battle-grounds in the faceoff opposing the SPLA to the GOS. The latter implemented very
repressive policies against the local populations in order to clear them off and pave the way
for oil companies to carry out their exploratory and drilling activities. The clearing off of the
civilian population around the oil fields was achieved via an alliance of SAF forces, Baqqara
militias and Nuer break away factions of the SPLA.95
Once installed, the SAF used the oil
companies‟ created roads and airfields to launch attacks on the population.
The GOS‟s repressive policies resulted in massive human right abuses which tarnished
the image of the GOS, the oil companies operating in the country and their respective
governments. The oil companies were particularly interested in receiving protection from the
Sudanese army, given that they faced repeated attacks on their workers and installations by
the Southern rebel forces who opposed oil activities in the South. For example, in 1984 a year
after the second Sudan civil war began, rebel forces attacked the Chevron oil field killing
three expatriate workers. This resulted to Chevron‟s suspension of its activities in Sudan for
two years.96
The SAF resorted to massive repression in order to assure the oil companies‟
security.
The GOS also resorted to fuelling internal violence amongst the Southern rebels in
order to weaken their capacity to launch attacks against the SAF. As a result, Khartoum
forged alliances with Anyanya, the Southern Separatist Movement which both opposed the
SPLM and made arrangements for them to protect southern oil fields in exchange of favors.
More so, the GOS fuelled divisions between the Nuer and Dinka factions of the SPLM under
95
Douglas H. Johnson, Op. Cit., p.163.
96
Andrew Natios, Op Cit., p.58.

26
a divide and rule strategy. The South Sudan Defense Forces (SSDF) was thus born out of the
break-off of some Nuer commanders from the SPLM and they decided to side with Khartoum,
providing oil field protection for the GOS. “By placing loyal forces around the oil fields, the
GOS made it increasingly difficult for the SPLA to launch successful attacks which require an
open offensive.”97
This resulted to massive condemnation from human rights groups such as Amnesty
International, Human rights Watch and Christian Aid. The public opinion on Sudan was very
negative and this put pressure on governments to rethink doing business in Sudan and to
pressure oil companies to do likewise. Some oil companies decided to quit doing business
with Sudan as a result of its bad human rights record in this regard for instance Chevron
which eventually left in 1992, other oil companies were very eager to continue business with
Sudan while new oil companies came in such as the China National Petroleum Corporation
(CNPC). This only fuelled human rights violations in many oil fields around Unity and
Heglig as the GOS had to provide more security for oil activity on the midst of its war against
the SPLA.
Also the impact of oil revenue on the financing of war was non-negligible. As Luke
Anthony Patey coins it, “Khartoum terrorized civilian populations with improvised Antonov
bombers and helicopter gunships that became more easily available as oil revenue grew.”98
This enabled Khartoum to make important military advances and continue the displacement
of civilians in order to open up strategic oil-bearing areas.99
B. The 2005 CPA officially puts an end to the second Sudan civil war
After 22 years of fighting, the GOS and the SPLM/A finally came to an agreement to
put an official end to their long war. The war was causing the GOS more than half of its oil
revenues and it was beginning to lose grounds on the battle-field. In this regard, it is vital to
first present a general overview of the CPA (1) and to subsequently decrypt its ramifications
on power redistribution in Sudan (2).
1. A general overview of the 2005 Sudan CPA
The CPA was principally negotiated by Sudan‟s foreign affairs minister Ali Osman
Taha and the SPLM/A leader at the time John Garang. Negotiations began to really intensify
97
Cleophas Lado, Op. Cit., p.164.
98
Luke Anthony Patey, “Oil Companies and Armed Conflict in Sudan”, Op. Cit., p. 1001.
99
Ibid., p.1002.

27
in 2002 as Sudan sought to bring an end to the war which had long tarnished its image and
which could make it a potential target of international action in the post 9/11 era which saw
the US step up its war against terror and Sudan fearing to have been the next target in this
respect after Iraq and Afghanistan, adopted a posture of concession making.
Concretely, the CPA is a set of six different agreement packages aimed at mitigating
conflict and building peace between Northern and Southern Sudan. These included:
The Machacos Protocol: Signed in Machacos, Kenya on July 20th
2002 and based on
laying the framework of peace agreements including the transition period, religious
freedom and the right to self determination for the people of the South;
Agreement on security arrangements signed in Naivasha, Kenya on September 25th
,
2003;
The Wealth sharing agreement signed at Naivasha, Kenya on January 7th
, 2004 and
which was focused on the modalities of oil and non-oil revenue sharing;
The Agreement on Power Sharing: Signed at Naivasha, Kenya on May 26th
, 2004
which focused on the respect of human rights, the functioning of the GNU, the GOSS,
the Central Government and issues of national security;
The agreement for the resolution of the Abyei conflict signed at Naivasha on May
26th
, 2004;
The agreement on the resolution of conflict in the Kordofan and Blue Nile States
signed at Naivasha on May 26th
, 2004.
In a nutshell, the GOS recognized and granted the South‟s right to self
determination by agreeing within the framework of the CPA, the organization of the 2011
referendum by which Southern Sudan decided on its independence. However the transition
period which ran from 2005 till 2011 was very vital period for the resolution of contentious
issues between both regions. The GOSS was established in the autonomous region of
Southern Sudan to represent the people of the South and co-function with the GOS within the
framework of the GNU.100
However, the extent to which these agreements could be respected depended on how
much the GOSS was empowered within the framework of the CPA provisions, thus, the need
to review of the impact of the CPA on power realignments in Sudan.
100
Government of Sudan and The Sudanese Peoples‟ Liberation Movement/Army, Power Sharing-The
Comprehensive Peace Agreement, Naivasha, 26 May 2004, Article 2.5.

28
2. How the CPA restructured power relations in Sudan
The CPA was the SPLM/A‟s most important step towards legitimization as a political
actor in Sudan. The SPLA was now more than just a militia force but rather a conventional
one. Since the CPA was signed only between the GOS and the SPLM, this rendered other
militia forces in Sudan illegal, particularly the Nuer dominated (SSDF) which had fragmented
from the earlier SPLA struggles against the North as a result of John Garang‟s unilateral
decision making approach. However when John Garang died, his successor President Salva
Kiir took a new approach in co-opting other armed groups through an amnesty policy. In his
2006 Juba declaration, he integrated the SSDF onto the SPLA in what was termed the “big
tent”. This only gave more legitimacy to the SPLM.101
The SPLM and the NCP both contributed to the formation of the GNU. The CPA also
recognized the establishment of the autonomous region of South Sudan, headed by a President
who was First Vice President in the GNU. The structure of the GNU also provided for the
position of Second Vice President. To an extent this arrangement provided for the GOS‟s
containment of the GOSS in the sense that President Omar El Bashir still possessed most
powers on the important matters of the State, particularly on issues of national security. This
configuration still suited John Garang, whose vision as opposed to that of some other
Southerners was geared towards national unity, hoping that at the end of the transition period
Southerners will vote to remain united with Northern Sudan.
In any case, the SPLA retained the right to exist as an independent military force with
the provision of international assistance, although it remained part of the joint integrated units
(JIUs) formed with the SAF. As such, the SPLA remained shielded from Sudan‟s influence
and the President of the GOSS was in effect the commander in chief of the SPLA, a clause
which John Garang posed as unconditional for the CPA. However beyond the direct impact of
the CPA on power relations in Sudan, it had an important impact on the oil sector which is
worth elucidating.
II. How the CPA provisions reshaped Sudan‟s oil sector
Oil as a contentious issue between Northern and Southern Sudan was addressed by the
CPA, particularly the wealth sharing agreement signed at Naivasha, Kenya on January 7th
,
101
International Crisis Group, “South Sudan: A Civil War by Any Other Name”, ICG Africa Report, Number
217, April 2014, p. 6.

29
2004. However the normative impact of the CPA on the oil sector cannot be limited to this as
consideration needs to be given to the disputed strategic oil territory of Abyei and how the
CPA addressed the issue (A). Subsequently, the institutional framework under which oil
production took place in Sudan during the transition shall be examined (B).
A. Normative ramifications of the CPA on oil governance during the transition
The normative ramifications of the CPA on oil governance in South Sudan directly
impacted the sharing of oil revenue (1) and the issue of the oil rich Abyei territory (2).
1. Equal sharing of oil revenue from Southern oil fields between the GOSS and the
GOS
The most striking provision of the CPA regarding the question of oil was that related
to the equal sharing of the net oil revenue derived from oil producing wells in Southern Sudan
between the GOSS and the GOS. The two parties were each entitled according to this
provision to 50 % of the net oil revenue after a deduction of 2 % to be attributed to the Oil
Producing State. The formula developed below enlightens the procedure.102
Achieving this agreement was a milestone for Southern Sudan which had for long
been marginalized by the GOS and this provision set an important base with the aim to ensure
that conflict between both parties would eventually and finally be mitigated. The provision on
equal sharing of wealth was equally a blow for the GOS whose sovereignty was progressively
eroded as it was compelled to compromise since international pressure was seriously
mounted. Before the CPA, Khartoum had full ownership and control of oil resources and oil
wealth in Sudan but that changed with the CPA, giving legitimacy to the SPLM on the
question of oil wealth.
Given that these oil provisions of the CPA were signed at Naivasha, Kenya on January
7th
, 2004 and seemed incompatible with the existing executive configurations, on May 26th
,
2004 still in Naivasha, Kenya the CPA was enriched with important provisions on power
102
The formula for determining the net oil revenue is set in article 3.5.3 of the Wealth sharing Agreement of the
CPA as the sum of net revenue from exports of government oil at Free On Board (FOB) prices and from
deliveries of government oil at refineries less any charges incurred to deliver oil at export destinations including
pipeline and management charges.
Net Oil Revenue (NOR) = Net Oil Revenue from Exports of Government Oil (FOB) + Net Oil Revenue from
deliveries of Government Revenue at Refineries – Transport Charges – Pipeline Charges – Management Charges
2% of the NOR is attributed to the Oil Producing State while the remainder shared equally between the GOS and
the GOSS during the entire transition period of the CPA that ran from 2005 to 2011.

30
sharing which emphasize in article 2.3.5 that the incumbent president at the time (Omar EL-
Bashir) would be President and that the SPLM chairman (Dr. John Garang) would be the first
of two Vice-Presidents of a Government of National Unity.
Based on these provisions, the GOSS was able to raise US$ 894.7 million in the first
year of 2005 alone and US$ 437 million between January and June of 2006 according to the
Sudanese ministry of Finance and National Economy. Between 2005 and 2010, a year before
the referendum, US$ 7 billion was transferred into the Southern treasury by the North.103
However the process had been highly criticized for lacking transparency as the Sudanese
ministry of Mining and Energy and that of Finance and National Economy were all controlled
by the NCP and all official revenues were declared by them alone.
2. The Abyei Protocol of the CPA and the Annex to the Abyei Protocol
Abyei was one of the potential undoing of the CPA negotiation process for three main
reasons. First because two tribes, the Misseriya and the Ngok Dinka with respective
allegiances to the GOS and the SPLA claimed that it was their home and secondly, because of
its oil resources and finally, because of its complex colonial history.
The exact geographical delimitation of Abyei was highly disputed by the GOS and the
GOSS. Determined not to let the talks fail, the US drafted the text of an Abyei agreement and
pressured both sides to sign it which the SPLM did, with the GOS following suit later.104
Summarily, the Abyei protocol provided for special administrative status for Abyei, a
mechanism for local governance, a process for determining Abyei‟s boundaries, sharing of oil
revenue to meet the needs of Abyei survivors and returnees and a 2011 referendum to
determine whether Abyei will be part of Northern or Southern Sudan.105
Concretely, according to the Abyei protocol, the oil revenue from Abyei was to be
distributed accordingly; 50% to the GOS, 42% to the GOSS, 2% each to Bahr El Ghazal and
Kordofan States and 2% to the local Ngok Dinka and Misseriya.106
The Abyei protocol also
created an Abyei‟s Boundaries Commission (ABC) with the task of determining Abyei‟s
boundaries. The ABC was to be constituted of representatives from the GOS and the GOSS as
103
Andrew Natios, Op. Cit., p.178.
104
Roger Winter and John Prendergast, “Abyei: Sudan‟s “Kashmir””, 18 February 2008. Available at
http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?page=imprimable&id_article=26024. Accessed 18 April 2015.
105
Ibid.
106
Government of Sudan and The Sudanese Peoples‟ Liberation Movement/Army, Resolution of the Abyei
Conflict-The Comprehensive Peace Agreement, Naivasha, 26 May 2004, Article 3.1.

31
well as five international experts. If these representatives couldn‟t reach an agreement, it was
agreed that the findings of the experts would be considered final and binding. The
commission was then supposed to submit its report to the President of Sudan who will take all
measures to put the special administrative status of Abyei to immediate effect.
In December 2005, the GOS and the SPLM adopted the annex to the original Abyei
protocol outlining the composition of the ABC; the 5 representatives of the GOS and the
GOSS and the neutral experts which were:
Godfrey Muriuki: From the University of Nairobi;
Kassahun Berhanu: From the University of Addis Ababa;
Douglas Johnson: An expert on South Sudan;
Shadrack Gutto: A Lawyer from South Africa;
Donald Patterson: Former United States Ambassador to Sudan.
B. The CPA‟s institutional setting for oil wealth sharing
The CPA laid down provisions for the creation of the National Petroleum Commission
(1) and stipulated its governing principles which were aimed at building peace between the
GOS and the GOSS by promoting the efficient use of oil wealth for the development of both
Northern Sudan and Southern Sudan (2).
1. The National Petroleum Commission
Through the CPA, the GOS and the SPLM agreed to the creation of the National
Petroleum Commission (NPC), spelling out its constitution and functions. According to these
provisions, the NPC was to be established during the pre-interim period and it was to be
constituted as follows107
:
The President of the Republic of Sudan and the President of the GOSS as co-chairs
and permanent members;
Four permanent members representing the National Government and four others
representing the GOSS;
At most 3 non-permanent members representing the State/Region in which petroleum
development is considered.
107
Government of Sudan and The Sudanese Peoples‟ Liberation Movement/Army, Wealth Sharing-The
Comprehensive Peace Agreement, Naivasha, 7 January 2004, Article 3.2.

32
The functions of the NPC as stipulated by the CPA included:
The formulation of national policies and guidelines in relation to the development and
management of the petroleum sector;
Monitoring and assessing the policies to ensure that they are in the best interest of the
people;
Developing strategies and programs for the petroleum sector and;
Negotiating and approving oil contracts.
The NPC was eventually created in October 2005 and played a primordial role in
ensuring the equal repartition of oil revenue from southern oil fields between the GOS and the
GOSS. In addition to these functions, the NPC equally ended up resolving issues of
overlapping contracts which the GOSS had issued over oil blocks previously granted by
Khartoum.108
Throughout, the GOSS expressed lots of dissatisfaction with the NPC as it accused the
latter of not providing sufficient access to documents and information on contracts.109
Southern Geologists were equally not stationed at key production sites which made checks
quite difficult.110
For these reasons the GOSS distrusted the NPC and believed that the latter
was deceiving it.111
For many experts, even in 2010, the NCP was far from being fully
operational.112
2. Promoting inclusive oil governance during the transition
The NPC‟s primary principle was inclusive governance. This was very important
given that the Southern Sudanese felt for so long that Khartoum had marginalized the region
and directed development projects essentially in Northern Sudan. Therefore clauses related to
inclusive governance between the GOSS and the GOS were of prime interest for the SPLM
which represented the Southerners. Such clauses are reflected first and foremost in the
constitution of the NPC elaborated above which included the SPLM in the oil governance
circles and in the overall leadership of Sudan during the transitional period. This principle of
inclusion was also reflected in the consultation and participation of local State representatives
in the elaboration of development programs and the distribution of 2% of the NOR from
108
Global Investment and Business Center, Sudan Oil and Gas Exploration Laws and Regulation Handbook,
Volume 1, Washington, International Business Publications, 2011, p.61.
109
Luke Anthony Patey, “Crude days ahead? Oil and the Resource Curse in Sudan”, Op. Cit., p.626.
110
Elke Grawet and Christine Andrä, “Oil Investment and Conflict Upper in Nile State South Sudan”, Bonn
International Center for Conversation Brief, No. 48, November 2012, p.22.
111
Ibid.
112
Luke Anthony Patey, Op. Cit., p. 627.

33
southern oil fields to the producing States. Also, persons enjoying rights to land where oil
production was envisaged were to be consulted and compensated.113
In addition to the aforementioned principle of inclusion, the CPA emphasized overall
on good governance regarding oil production in the southern oil fields. In article 3.1 of the
wealth sharing agreement, the parties agreed to these norms which were aimed at guiding the
NPC‟s actions.114
First of which is the sustainable utilization of oil for the national interest
and public good and especially for the interest of the affected States and regions and their
local populations. The NPC was also called upon to create a stable macroeconomic
environment for the stability of the petroleum sector. This was especially critical within the
context of the referendum which was scheduled for 2011. With uncertainties surrounding its
outcome, and faced with the quest to attract more investment in the sector, the NPC had to
therefore ensure that the conditions on the contract were attractive enough to incite further
investment in the oil sector. It is in this regard that article 3.2 of the wealth sharing agreement
tied the functioning of the NPC to the strict respect of these principles.115
To sum up, the CPA whilst marking an official end to the civil war opposing Northern
and Southern Sudan brought about glaring transformations regarding the normative and
institutional framework of oil governance marked by a shift from the sole GOS control over
oil revenue and decision making to a co-governance approach of both the GOSS and the GOS
on the oil sector during the transition (2005 - 2011). However the 2011 referendum marked a
distinct turning point for Southern Sudan which became the independent Republic of South
Sudan and this brought profound changes in its oil governance.
Section 2: The impact of South Sudan‟s independence on oil ownership
In July 2011, the region of Southern Sudan in the former Republic of Sudan became
the Independent Republic of South Sudan after voting in favor of secession at the end of the
transition as provided for by the 2005 CPA. This would have profound ramifications on oil
governance, changing it radically from what it had been until then. South Sudan‟s sovereignty
on natural resources will be reaffirmed (I) with implications for the actors of oil production
(II) in the independent Republic of South Sudan.
113
Government of Sudan and The Sudanese Peoples‟ Liberation Movement/Army, Wealth Sharing-The
Comprehensive Peace Agreement, Naivasha, 7 January 2004, Article 3.1.6.
114
Ibid., Article 3.1.
115
Ibid., Article 3.2.

34
I. A reassertion of sovereignty over oil resources in South Sudan
As an independent Republic, South Sudan will reassert its sovereignty over its oil
resource within the framework of the 2012 Petroleum Act which emphasizes the Principle of
Ownership over oil (A). However this Principle will have to cope with a legacy of
dependence on oil infrastructure in Sudan (B).
A. The 2012 South Sudan Petroleum Act
As an independent nation, President Salva Kiir issued out Presidential Order No.
27/2011 by which South Sudan took over the management of its oil sector.116
This was
complemented by the more detailed 2012 Petroleum Act which South Sudan‟s parliament
adopted and which was enacted by President Salva Kiir. This strategic document reveals key
transformations regarding the principle of ownership of oil resources and good oil governance
(1) in the country and also provided for the relevant institutions (2).
1. The 2012 Petroleum Act‟s principle of oil ownership in South Sudan
The transition period was marked by shared governance between the GOSS and the
GOS over oil resources from the southern oil fields. However, after independence, a new
legislation was adopted and enacted, the 2012 Petroleum Act. This instrument emphasized the
changed landscape on sovereignty over South Sudan‟s oil ownership. As it states in article
II.7.1 “petroleum existing in its natural state in the subsoil of the territory of the Republic
shall be owned by the people of South Sudan and managed on their behalf by the
government.”117
This declaration of ownership is an absolute fundamental right of the people
of South Sudan protected by the UNGA Resolution 1803 of December 14th
, 1962 on the
permanent sovereignty of Nations over natural resources. It declares that “The right of
peoples and nations over their permanent wealth must be exercised in the interest of their
national development and of the well-being of the people of the State concerned”118
According to article II.8.1 of the South Sudan 2012 Petroleum Act, “The entire
property right in and control over petroleum existing in its natural state in the subsoil of the
territory of South Sudan is hereby vested in the Government (GRSS) and shall be developed
and managed by the Government (GRSS) in each case on behalf of and for the benefit of the
116
Elke Grawet and Christine Andrä, Op. Cit., p. 25.
117
Government of South Sudan, Laws of South Sudan The Petroleum Act, 2012, Article II.7.1.
118
UNGA, Resolution 1803 on the Permanent sovereignty over natural resources, 1962. Article I.1.

The african union high level implementation panel and the conflict over oil between sudan and south sudan in the aftermth of the cpa

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