2. !
I!
Table of Contents
List of figures II
List of abbreviations III
Acknowledgements IV
Executive Summary V
Introduction 1
1 - Identity, language and nationality 3
- 1.1 Identity 3
- 1.2 Language and languaged identities 5
- 1.3 Nations, nationality and national identity 6
- 1.4 Natio and Ethnos 7
2 - Language policy 11
- 2.1 Dissecting language policy 11
- 2.2 Diglossia 16
3 - A tale of two communities 17
- 3.1 Shared beginnings 17
- 3.2 Language policy in Belgium and Denmark 20
- 3.3 Autonomy in Belgium and Denmark 22
- 3.4 'Official' identities in Belgium and Denmark 25
4 - Methodology 27
- 4.1 Questionnaire design 27
- 4.2 Questionnaire distribution 28
5 - Findings 29
- 5.1 Sample 29
- 5.2 Language use 30
- 5.3 Identity 36
- 5.4 Language Policy 41
- 5.5 Summary of results 45
6 - Conclusion 46
Bibliography 48
Appendix 1 - Questionnaire 53
3. !
! II!
List of figures
Figure 1 List of mechanisms between ideology and practice 12
Figure 2 Theoretical framework of language policy 14
Figure 3 Map showing the location of Liège and Verviers 18
Figure 4 Maps showing Belgium’s language areas and the DG 18
Figure 5 Map showing the shifting German-Danish border 19
Figure 6 Data on the make up of the data samples 29
Figure 7 Graph showing the age distribution of the data samples 29
Figure 8 Map showing the geographical distribution of respondents 30
Figure 9 Chart showing the mother tongue of respondents 31
Figure 10 Chart showing the showing the language used in respondents’ homes 31
Figure 11 Chart showing the frequency of foreign language use 32
Figure 12 Graph showing the use of languages across different domains (BE) 33
Figure 13 Graph showing the use of languages across different domains (DK) 35
Figure 14 Graph showing identity label preferences (BE) 36
Figure 15 Chart showing level of acceptance of Belgian identity 37
Figure 16 Chart showing level identification with membership of the DG 37
Figure 17 Chart showing pride in membership of the DG 37
Figure 18 Graph showing identity label preferences (DK) 38
Figure 19 Chart showing level of acceptance of Danish identity 40
Figure 20 Chart showing pride in membership of the German Minority (DK) 41
Figure 21 Chart showing level of satisfaction with Belgian language policy 41
Figure 22 Chart showing demand for more support for the DG 41
Figure 23 Chart showing satisfaction with policy across domains (BE) 42
4. !
! III!
Figure 24 Chart showing level of satisfaction with Danish language policy 43
Figure 25 Chart showing demand for more support for minority (DK) 43
Figure 26 Chart showing satisfaction with policy across domains (DK) 44
List of abbreviations
BE Belgium
CEFR Common European Framework of Reference for Languages
DG Deutschsprachige Gemeinschaft Belgiens (German-speaking community of Belgium)
DK Denmark
L2 Second language
5. !
! IV!
Acknowledgements
I owe a great debt of gratitude to many people who have helped me in completing this thesis,
most of whom will forever remain unknown to me. So first all, let me thank them, the
anonymous participants from the German-speaking minority communities in Belgium and in
Denmark, whose kind cooperation made this endeavour possible.
For their interest and willingness to help, I thank the teachers of the Robert-Schuman-Institut,
Eupen and the Königliches Athenäum Sankt Vith; Stephan Boemer, Director of the Autonome
Hochschule in der Deutschsprachigen Gemeinschaft and Walburga Kohnen-Weinbrenner at
the Königliches Athenäum Eupen. Special thanks to Ruth De Sy and Melanie Wirtz at the
Ministerium der Deutschsprachigen Gemeinschaft, and to Lydia Klinkenberg, Member of the
Parliament of the DG who helped me reach many more members of the DG than I had
anticipated.
In Nordschleswig, special thanks go to Heiner Clausen of the Ludwig-Andresen-Schule,
Tondern, Claus Diedrichsen, of the Deutscher Schul- und Sprachverein für Nordschleswig,
Jan Diedrichsen of the Bund Deutscher Nordschleswiger and especially to Janny Boiesen of
the Deutscher Jugendverband für Nordschleswig. Your tolerance of my incessant requests
and demands was admirable. Without your eagerness to support me, I doubt this research
would be worthy of the descriptor “comparative” at all.
My stoic German language consultants Marlene Weber and Oksana Sapelkin deserve a
special mention for helping me to polish up my rusty German - Danke an Euch beide. Thanks
also to Thomas Volstrup for activating his Danish network on my behalf, and to all the other
poor souls who have had to listen to me pontificate about the ins and outs of identity theory
for months on end.
To my dear, eagle-eyed mother, who was still enthusiastic about accurate comma placement
long after I’d given up: for this and everything else you have my eternal gratitude. Finally
many thanks to my promoter, Kris Van Den Branden, who has reignited my interest in
linguistics after a four-year hiatus. Thank you for having supplied equal measures of
patience, encouragement and constructive criticism throughout the preparation of this thesis,
and for being one of the best teachers I have come across.
6. !
I!
Executive Summary
One of the repercussions of the First World War was a significant shift in Europe’s internal
borders. The Treaty of Versailles redrew the map and eventually led in 1919 to the creation
of German-speaking communities within the borders of Belgium and Denmark. Almost one
hundred years later, the communities have developed along radically different lines,
exhibiting completely different patterns of language use and collective identity. This thesis
uses original quantitative and qualitative data to shed some light on the role national language
policy has played in shaping these differences.
An initial discussion of the scholarly literature explains the interplay between identity,
language and nationality. This foundation then informs the development of a theoretical
framework to analyse language policy, drawing on the work of Bernard Spolsky, Elana
Shohamy and John Petrovic. The principles elaborated in these chapters are then applied to
the case study of German-speaking groups in Belgium and Denmark, and some initial
observations are made on the history, language policy, political autonomy and official
identities of the two communities.
Subsequently, the process of questionnaire design and distribution is set out before the most
salient findings are presented. The data, based on samples in each region, confirms
significant differences in the language use and identity construction of the two communities,
and allows for a conclusion that draws a strong causative link between language policies of
the two states and the identity of their minority communities.
7. INTRODUCTION
!
1!
Introduction
The year 2014 marked the centenary of the outbreak of the First World War. The conflict is
broadly considered a breach in the history of Europe whose consequences extended far
beyond the bloody battlefields of the Western and Eastern fronts. The territorial shifts in
Europe following the Treaty of Versailles had many effects on national borders in Europe,
including the creation of German-speaking communities within the borders of modern-day
Belgium and Denmark. Almost a century since these formerly German lands changed hands,
I am interested to find out how the members of these language communities see themselves
today, to what degree they identify with the nation-state in which they live, and how the
national language policy of their state influences the construction of their identities.
As such, the main research question is defined as follows: “To what extent has national
language policy influenced the national identity of the German-speaking communities of
Belgium and Denmark?”
“A people and their language − what could be more straightforward? In the ideal case,
it really is straightforward. There is a particular place where a certain group of people
live, and in that particular place they speak a certain language. They have a name for
themselves and their language, and no other people goes by that name or claims to speak
that language as a mother tongue.”1
Nancy Dorian’s “ideal” fieldwork situation above is not representative of linguistic reality.
Languages do not map neatly onto state boundaries. Not all Spaniards speak Castilian, nor do
all US Americans speak English. This becomes evident when looking at the European Union,
where the number of member states exceeds the number of official languages (28 to 24).
Some nations share the same languages. Look closer and the situation becomes more
complex. The EU recognises the existence of over 60 regional and minority languages, and
indeed living languages on the continent number up to 2862
.
The organisation’s principle of subsidiarity – the idea that decisions should be taken at a level
as close as possible to the citizen – implies the EU has negligible control over language
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1
Dorian, N.C. (1999) Linguistic and Ethnographic Fieldwork. In The Handbook of Language & Ethnic Identity (p. 25) New
2
Lewis, M. Paul, Gary F. Simons, and Charles D. Fennig (eds.). 2015. Ethnologue: Languages of the World, Eighteenth
edition. Dallas, Texas: SIL International. Online version: http://www.ethnologue.com/region/Europe
8. INTRODUCTION
!
2!
policy. The responsibility instead lies with its 28 member state governments and thus it will
be necessary to consider the interplay between identity and language in the context of the
modern European nation-state. In this context, different language ideologies have had
different results, from all but monolingual France to trilingual Luxembourg.
Before tackling the issue of language policy, however, I will first try to disentangle the three
closely connected concepts of language, identity and the nation-state. An initial review of the
sociolinguistic definitions of language and identity will be followed by an overview of
theories of nationalism and its role in the formation of nations.
With the theoretical framework set out, the focus will turn to the methodology of the study
itself, data analysis and the presentation of the most relevant findings, followed by some
conclusions drawn from the evidence gathered.
The endeavour is ambitious, perhaps too ambitious, for the scope of a Master’s thesis. It will
attempt to draw together aspects of sociolinguistics, political and identity theory as well
cultural anthropology in order to address the research question.
9. 1 IDENTITY, LANGUAGE AND NATIONALITY
!
3!
Identity, language and nationality
Defining the term identity, as it will be used in this project, is a crucial first step. A clear
epistemological basis will be essential in order to draw a useful link between identity and
language – the understanding of which will also be addressed. Since the relationship between
language and identity forms the backbone of my enquiry, I will begin by outlining this
framework, before examining how the two concepts have come to be intrinsically connected
with nationhood in the contemporary European context.
1.1 Identity
The concept of identity is a notoriously difficult one to pin down. Attempts to find consensus
on how to use the term have featured in scholarly literature across the social sciences, leading
some to label the endeavour the “identity crisis”3
.
Seen broadly, understandings of identity oscillate between the two poles of “hard”
essentialism and “soft” constructivism. Essentialist thought sees identity as something
inherent and eternal within a person, which cannot change.4
Such views have been strongly
criticized for overstating patterns of communality and continuity, and making “simplistic or
universalizing assumptions […] based on a particular form of collective identity”5
.
Conversely, the constructivist school sees identity as a socially constructed “strategic
fiction”6
. For Cameron, identity “is not something fixed, stable, and unitary that [people]
acquire early in life and possess forever afterwards. Rather, identity is shifting and multiple,
something people are continually constructing and reconstructing in their encounters with
each other in the world.7
Constructivist approaches to identity therefore lead to a proliferation
of identities, which critics often see as vague, superfluous and problematic for the purposes
of analysis.
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3
Brubaker, R., & Cooper, F. (2000). Beyond "identity" Theory and Society,29(1), 1-47. Retrieved from
http://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1023%2FA%3A1007068714468.pdf
4
Robins, K. (2005). Identity. In T. Bennett, L. Grossberg, M. Morris, & R. Williams (Eds.), New keywords: A revised
vocabulary of culture and society (pp. 172-175). Malden, MA: Blackwell Pub.
5
Knauft, B. M. (1996). Genealogies for the present in cultural anthropology. New York: Routledge, cited in Fischer, E. F.
(1999). Cultural Logic and Maya Identity: Rethinking Constructivism and Essentialism. Current Anthropology, 40(4), p.
473. doi:10.1086/200046
6
Robins (2005)
7
Cameron, D. (2001). Identity, difference and power: Locating social relations in spoken discourse. In Working with spoken
discourse (pp. 161-180). London: SAGE.
10. 1 IDENTITY, LANGUAGE AND NATIONALITY
!
4!
It is perfectly plausible that identity, in its broadest sense, is at once personal and collective.
It is, by nature, multifarious and an amalgam both of the external influences of societal
structures imposed from the top down and the “internal” agency exercised by individuals. It
can be familial, territorial, based on class, gender or sexual orientation, religion or ethnicity.
Indeed, for the hard-line constructivist, there are as many identities as there are people on
Earth. Whilst this view has some merit, trying to reflect such an approach in research
methods makes empirical analysis of identity impracticable. If identity can “refer to an
individual’s own subjective sense of self, to personal classification ‘markers’ that appear as
important, both to oneself and to others, and also to those markers that delineate group
membership(s)”, then the researcher is doomed to fail. Brubaker and Cooper put it succinctly:
“Identity […] tends to mean too much (when understood in a strong sense), too little (when
understood in a weak sense), or nothing at all (because of its sheer ambiguity).”8
Jan Blommaert simplifies the debate somewhat in explaining why an individual’s “official
administrative belonging – being a citizen of a state – is a poor indicator of sociolinguistic
belonging”9
. Blommaert essentially splits the identity spectrum set out above into two poles.
He highlights a distinction between “inhabited” identity, i.e. “the identity people themselves
articulate or claim” versus the “ascribed” identity, i.e. “the identity given to someone by
someone else”10
. Inhabited and ascribed identities do not necessarily overlap, and this is the
springboard for this thesis. It is possible that a German-speaker, ascribed the identity of
Belgian or Danish by the state, does not, either voluntarily or involuntarily, inhabit this
identity in their everyday life.
In order to circumvent the epistemological quagmire that surrounds the term identity, I will
focus here on the role of language use in identity-construction. Specifically, I will attempt to
discover whether the everyday use of a minority language, with its symbolic significance, can
engender a cleft between the inhabited and ascribed identities of the populations. As such, I
will now turn my attention to theories around the functions of language and specifically its
role in identity formation.
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8
Brubaker & Cooper (2000) (p.1).
9
Blommaert, J. (2006). Language Policy and National Identity. In T. Ricento (Ed.), An introduction to language policy:
Theory and method, (p. 238), Malden, MA: Blackwell Pub.
10
ibid.
11. 1 IDENTITY, LANGUAGE AND NATIONALITY
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5!
1.2 Language and languaged identities
The primary function of language is communicative. Humans, unlike other animals, have
developed the ability to communicate complex ideas through a system that links sound with
meaning. So much is clear.
Yet, while the communicative system of language is a universal trait for all humans, scholars’
use of the term is not homogeneous. Semiotician and philosopher Charles Morris (1946) sees
language as “arrangement[s] of arbitrary symbols possessing agreed-upon significance within
a community”11
. Similarly, according to Edward Sapir (1921), “language is a purely human
and non-instinctive method of communicating ideas, emotions and desires by means of a
system of voluntarily produced symbols.”12
He goes on to compare the process of language
learning with the process of walking, to underline his point. While all children, regardless of
location, eventually learn to walk in the same way, different modes of speech, or languages,
are used to communicate depending on the group the child is born into. Language, for Sapir,
“varies as all creative effort varies […], as truly as do the religions, the beliefs, the customs,
and the arts of different peoples.”
Language’s group-specificity means it takes on a secondary, symbolic function, carrying
what Sapir calls “the socially inherited assemblage of practices and beliefs that determines
the texture of our lives”. As well as fulfilling the primary function of communication, a
language variously carries with it aspects of culture (Sapir, 1921), politics (Shohamy, 2006),
tradition (Steiner, 1992) and, important here, identity (Paltridge, 2015 & Byram, 2006). What
is less clear, as John Petrovic points out, is the nature of that link between language and
identity.13
While one camp posits a ‘thin’ link where language is a “surface feature” or
banner of identity, opponents contest that this link is thicker. For them, language represents a
“primordial feature of identity”. 14
The abundance of languages in today’s globalised world – estimated at around 6,90015
-
strongly suggests that the language-identity link is alive and well. Communication between
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
11
Morris, C. (1946) Signs, Language, and Behavior. New York: Prentice-Hall [emphasis added], cited in Edwards, J.
(2009). Language and identity: An introduction. (p.53) Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
12
Sapir, E. (1921). Language: An introduction to the study of speech. (p.7) New York: Harcourt, Brace.
13
Petrovic, J. E. (2014). Language Policy, Identity, and Liberalism: Some Foundational Connections. In A post-liberal
approach to language policy in education (pp. 1-23). Bristol, UK: Multilingual Matters.
14
ibid.
15
Anderson, S. R. (2009). How many languages are there in the world? Linguistic Society of America. Retrieved April 21,
2015, from http://www.linguisticsociety.org/content/how-many-languages-are-there-world
12. 1 IDENTITY, LANGUAGE AND NATIONALITY
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6!
groups of humans would be easier if one common “mode” was used, but these groups
preserve their distinct languages in order to protect what Steiner calls the “inherited, singular
springs of their identity”16
. Indeed, this is why maintaining use of a minority language across
generations is so frequently the focus of activists within language communities. By
campaigning for policies that support minority-language learning and education in the given
language, such groups are in effect fighting for the survival of their identity. Such
mechanisms of language policy will be the topic of discussion in the following chapter.
The reality, as ever, is less black and white. People experience different levels of attachment
to a variety of different groups, in different contexts. In combination, this confers multiple
layers of identity. It is perfectly possible for an individual to be, at once, ‘a university
professor’, ‘an Anderlecht supporter’, ‘a Brusselaar’ and ‘a Belgian’. Members of these
groups, or communities of practice17
, have their own modes of speech (be it a ‘language’,
‘regional dialect’ or jargon), which gives a sense of belonging to the group, or what Charlotte
Burck calls a ‘languaged identity’18
. As Blommaert elaborates, the choice of which variety to
use in any given context – the communicative behaviour - is determined by judgements on
language use. “Language users have conceptions of language and language use: conceptions
of “quality,” value status, norms, functions, ownership, and so forth.”19
Depending on the
specific interlocutor-context, the speaker has recourse to a variety of different modes of
language, each selected to signal, maintain or strengthen a given identity.
In the hierarchy of identities, European scholars have consistently observed that identification
with a nationality, or national identity, takes primacy. “Of all the collective identities in
which human beings share today, national identity is perhaps the most fundamental and
inclusive.”20
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16
Steiner, G. (1992). After Babel: Aspects of language and translation. (p.243) Oxford: Oxford University Press.
17
Paltridge, B. (2015). Language, identity and communities of practice. In D. N. Djenar, A. Mahboob, & K. Cruickshank
(Eds.), Language and identity across modes of communication (Vol. 6, Language and Social Processes, pp. 15-26). Berlin:
De Gruyter Mouton.
18
Burck, C. (2005). Multilingual living: Explorations of language and subjectivity. Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire:
Palgrave Macmillan.
19
Blommaert, J. (2006). Language Policy and National Identity. In T. Ricento (Ed.), An introduction to language policy:
Theory and method (p. 241). Malden, MA: Blackwell Pub.
20
Smith, A. D. (1991). Beyond National Identity. In National identity (p. 143). Reno: University of Nevada Press.
13. 1 IDENTITY, LANGUAGE AND NATIONALITY
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7!
1.3 Nations, nationality and national identity
Joshua A. Fishman, reflecting on collective identity, uses the terms “unity”, “groupness” or
“peopleness association”21
. In the states of modern Europe, it is through national identity that
this feeling of belonging to a group usually manifests itself. This is borne out in the
persistence of nationalist movements across Europe and the failure, up to now, to forge a
sense of European identity.
Historically, the formational years of nation-building were in the late eighteenth and
nineteenth centuries with the rise of nationalism - a specific ideological and political process,
particular to the socio-economic developments of the time. The reasons for the rise of
nationalist feeling have long been debated, but are variously cited as industrialisation and
societal homogenisation22
(Gellner), the Reformation of the Church and print capitalism23
(Anderson), mass communication systems and the shift from small local communities to
modern societies24
(Breuilly).
Language is the one element that unites all of these scholars in their theories of the actuation
of nationalist sentiment. The combination of the above-mentioned developments brought
with them increased production, dissemination and understanding of elite, standard written
languages. The rationalization of regional variants into national standard languages gave rise
to “a set of decontextualised rules and norms […] confined to national spaces within which
they could become the emblems of national identity”25
.
The phenomenon of the monoglot nationalist ideology that we see in the majority of today’s
European countries “rests on associations between “pure,” standard language, membership
of an ethnolinguistically defined “people,” and a particular region occupied by these
(ethnolinguistically homogenous) people” – the language-people-country link 26
.
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21
Fishman, J. A., & García, O. (2010). Handbook of language & ethnic identity. (p. xxvi) New York, NY: Oxford
University Press.
22
Gellner, E. (1983). The Transition to an Age of Nationalism. In Nations and nationalism (pp. 38-51). Ithaca: Cornell
University Press.
23
Anderson, B. R. (1991). The Origins of National Consciousness. In Imagined communities: Reflections on the origin and
spread of nationalism (pp. 37-46). London: Verso.
24
Breuilly, J. (1982). Appendix: Approaches to nationalism. In Nationalism and the state (pp. 404-424). Chicago: University
of Chicago Press.
25
Blommaert (2006) (p.242)
26
ibid.
14. 1 IDENTITY, LANGUAGE AND NATIONALITY
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8!
1.4 Natio and Ethnos
Ethnicity and nationality are related and often coterminous concepts, but it is where ethnicity
and nationality do not align that is of interest here. In the archetypal framework of the nation-
state (see Renner27
, 1937, Acton28
, 1862 and Herder29
, 1772, for example) the nation is
formed of one “ethnicity” or common origin, often marked by language. Since this does not
hold true for German-speaking minorities in Belgium or Denmark, both terms demand
consideration.
Ethnicity finds its roots in the Ancient Greek ethnos (ἔθνος), meaning members of foreign
groups. In contemporary academia, ethnicity is generally understood as the membership of a
population group regarded as having common descent30
. Natio in Classical Latin, similarly
referred to a class of people or gentiles, but has come to take on rather broader meaning than
ethnicity:
“A large aggregate of communities and individuals united by factors such as common
descent, language, culture, history, or occupation of the same territory, so as to form a
distinct people.” 31
Leigh Oakes, in his work on language and national identity, uses the framework developed
by Hettne, Sörlin and Østergard to elucidate the four ways in which ethnic and national
identity can be linked:
a) ethnic identity is a subcategory of national identity;
b) ethnic identity is a historical predecessor, the raw material used to forge national
identity of modern times;
c) ethnic identity is a competing identity to national (and/or state) identity;
d) ethnic identity is a supercategory of national identity, so that national identity is a
specific type of ethnic identity.32
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27
Renner, C. (1964) [1937]. Die Nation: Mythos und Wirklichkeit. Vienna: Europa Verlag.
28
Acton, J.E.E.D., (1948). Essays on freedom and power. Boston: Beacon Press.
29
Herder, J. G. (2002) [1772]. Treatise on the Origin of Language (M. N. Forster, Trans.). Cambridge, UK: Cambridge
University Press.
30
Ethnicity [Def. 2]. (2015). In OED Online. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Retrieved April 25, 2015.
31
Nation [Def. 1]. (2015). In OED Online. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Retrieved April 25, 2015.
32
Hettne, B., Sörlin, S., & Østergard, U. (1998). Den globala nationalism.Stockholm: SNS Förlag.
cited in Oakes, L. (2001). Basic Concepts. In Language and national identity: Comparing France and Sweden (pp. 9-28).
Amsterdam: J. Benjamins Pub.
15. 1 IDENTITY, LANGUAGE AND NATIONALITY
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9!
As Oakes points out, in the European context, the construction of modern nation-states has
favoured national identity as the paradigm for collective identity, and so scenarios a, b and c
above are most relevant for the populations analysed in this thesis. In other words, ethnicity
or ethnic identity can be a constituent, precursor or subordinate element in the construction of
national identities in Europe.
Dorian highlights that ethnicity “rests fundamentally on social rather than on biological
underpinnings − and socially contrasted categories are subject to change. People will redefine
themselves when circumstances make it desirable or when circumstances force it on them.”33
Here we see a parallel with language, which is also often selected on these criteria and forms
a fundamental part of ethnicity. Language can act as an identity marker - like a traditional
costume or typical cuisine - which is functionally expendable and easily replaceable. But,
language is perhaps also the only identity-marking behaviour that carries with it extensive
cultural content. “The distinctive sounds uttered in speaking a particular language encode
meaning, and the link between ethnic group and ethnic language becomes much more
important at this level.”34
Given the history of the minority German-speaking communities that are the focus of this
study, there is some reason to suppose that the German culture, and, by extension, the idea of
German ethnicity borne by the language may not be aligned with the state-ascribed non-
German (here Belgian or Danish) national identity. In any case, it is clear that language,
especially with the emergence of more monolithic national languages, has developed to
become a marker of national identity. Even in multilingual situations such as Switzerland, for
example, national citizenship for many is unthinkable without having fluency in one of the
four national languages.*
Language then, as Buck declares, is a “conspicuous banner of
nationality to be defended against encroachment, as it is the first object of attack on the part
of a power aiming to crush out a distinction of nationality among its subject peoples…[and]
that, with few exceptions, the European nationalities are essentially language groups.”35
While slightly crass and oversimplified, Buck’s words summarise well the reality of
language-based nationality in today’s Europe. Given this blueprint, it is interesting to
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33
Dorian, N.C. (2001) Linguistic and Ethnographic Fieldwork. In Handbook of Language & Ethnic Identity. (p.25) New
York, NY: Oxford University Press
34
ibid. (p.31)
*
92% of Swiss respondents to the 2000 Eurobarometer in Switzerland said it was either “quite important” or “very
important” to be able to speak one of the national languages to be considered a Swiss citizen.
35
Buck, C. D. (1916). Language and the sentiment of nationality. American Political Science Review, 10(01), (p.49).
Retrieved from http://www.jstor.org/stable/1946302
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investigate how national identity is constructed amongst minority-language populations
whose native tongue deviates either from the state’s single majority language (as in
Denmark) or simply from the vast majority of compatriots, as in Belgium.
Yet, however widespread the idea of national identity might be, it is in essence no more than
an “ascriptive label attached to people”36
by the state. As such, the label of nationality per se
is of meagre interest. If we accept the constructivist approach to identity - a complex,
evolving and layered concept - then the nationality label does not contribute to our
understanding of the unpredictable nature of identity and its relationship to language use.
Rather, the endeavour here will be to assess the extent to which the minority-language groups
in question accept and inhabit their ascribed national identity.
The interplay between the three concepts of identity, language and nationality is both
complex and contested. No Venn diagram or flowchart can provide a definitive picture of
how the concepts interact. In sum, though, it will be tentatively concluded that the symbolic
concept of nationhood in Europe is a fundamental but ascribed component of identity.
Language, in turn, can (and often does) feed into a sense of national identity by providing a
distinction that allows the perceptual boundaries of a community to be maintained. However,
where there is a “mismatch” between a population’s language and nationality, the situation
becomes less fixed. When a language-community in a territory uses a language other than the
hegemonic state–sponsored standard(s), then other factors necessarily come into play with an
effect on the given population’s sense of identity. One such factor is a state’s language
ideology and the resultant policies imposed on its population. The impact of language policy
on a population’s acceptance of a national identity will be the focus in the next chapter.
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
36
Blommaert (2006) (p.245.)
17. 2 LANGUAGE POLICY
11!
2 - Language policy: management, planning, ideology and more
The previous chapter established the relationship between language and (national) identity. It
was noted that the rise of nationalism fused standard languages with their respective national
identities, which implied that other languages used in any given nation-state were often “ignored
and suppressed”37
. As Shohamy puts it, “…it is […] language that falls in the midst of battles
between those interested in continuing to perpetuate a homogenous and nationalist ideology and
those seeking representation, participation and self-expression.”38
Given the role of language in identity construction, one would expect that government policies
influencing the use and status of languages within a nation-state also affect people’s identity. As
Spolsky points out, language policies can influence a whole gamut of different domains
including family, religion, the workplace, the public linguistic space, the law, health, the
military, government and, importantly, the realm of education39
. Language policy in education
will be considered more closely when looking at the cases of Belgium and Denmark. More
generally, however, these areas, and the linguistic circumstances in which they are conducted,
are important arenas in which speakers construct their identity.
2.1 Dissecting language policy
Bernard Spolsky’s conceptualisation of language policy will be used to lay the foundation for a
discussion of the Western language ideologies and the forms of language management at play in
Belgium and Denmark. Finally, using several case studies, I will highlight some ways in which
combinations of such mechanisms resulting from these processes could impact a minority
group’s national identity.
Language policy is a concept that has been used in different ways by different scholars. Spolsky
sees language policy as choices, which are arranged into three levels: i) practice, ii) beliefs and
iii) management.
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
37
Shohamy, E. G. (2006). Manipulating Languages. In Language policy: Hidden agendas and new approaches (p. 23). London:
Routledge.
38
ibid.
39
Spolsky, B. (2009). Towards a theory of language management. In Language Management (pp. 5-9). Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
18. 2 LANGUAGE POLICY
12!
Practice – real-life language use - the observable language behaviours and choices
of speakers (e.g. the choice made by members of a minority-language community
to speak their mother tongue rather than adopting the majority language).
Beliefs – language ideology - the values and statuses assigned to named languages,
varieties and features (e.g. individual or public opinion on the prestige or stigma
attached to certain modes of speaking).
Management – the explicit and observable effort by someone or some group that
has or claims authority to modify the practices or beliefs of speakers.
It is language management then, and specifically governmental manipulation of the language
practice and beliefs of its society, that will be the main focus in this study.
Language management is more than “declared and official documents,”40
signing charters or
passing laws. For Elana Shohamy, understanding language management requires knowledge of
the language ideology or ‘beliefs’ held by the relevant language authority, in order to understand
the mechanisms that contribute to what she calls a “de-facto language policy” (see figure 1).
Language policy is therefore inherently ideological.
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
40
Shohamy (2006). Mechanisms affecting de facto language policies. (p. 57).
Ideology!
Rules!&!
Regulations!
Language!
Education!
Language!
tests!
Language!in!
public!space!
Ideology,!myth,!
propaganda,!
coercion!
DE!FACTO!!
LANGUAGE!POLICY!
Figure 1: List of mechanisms between ideology and practice adapted from Shohamy (2006) p. 58:
!
Mechanisms!
of!language!
planning!
19. 2 LANGUAGE POLICY
13!
For Jan Blommaert language ideologies are “a crucial topic of debate in the study of language
and society,”41
and logically it is the government’s ideology that informs their language
management style.
As set out in the previous chapter, today’s Europe is dominated by a language policy of
Herderian monolingualism whereby language, culture and territory are (or should be) in
harmony. This policy persists largely unchallenged where a language has a hegemonic status,
such as that of English in the United Kingdom, or where a country is geographically insulated
from the influence of other languages besides the prescribed norm. This dominance of
monolingualism “raises questions of social justice”42
wherever there is multilingualism, and
especially minority language groups. “[S]uch an ideology potentially excludes and discriminates
against those who are either unable or unwilling to fit the monoglot standard.”43
John Petrovic uses political theory to set out a framework of the language ideology in the West,
taking John Locke’s theory of liberalism as his starting point. Locke’s conception of civil society
was one of “free men, equal under the rule of law, bound together by no common purpose but
sharing respect for each other’s rights."44
Petrovic elaborates that, for Locke, “freedom is the
non-restriction of options, to the extent that the option one might choose does not interfere with
the freedom of others to pursue their options.”45
This, Petrovic continues, can be conceived of as
negative liberty in the terms of Isaiah Berlin: “the absence of coercion or interference with
agents' possible private actions, by an exterior social-body.”46
Berlin’s alternative concept of liberty is positive liberty, or “the pursuit of liberty understood as
self-realization or as self-determination.”47
Unlike Lockean negative liberty, which insists upon
a minimal state, positive liberty conceives of state intervention as a means of protecting people’s
liberty by creating greater equality of opportunity. The figure below illustrates how Petrovic uses
these opposing views of liberty as a way of viewing language policies.
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
41
The debate is open. (1999). In J. Blommaert (Ed.), Language ideological debates (p.1). Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter.
42
Blackledge, A. (2000). Monolingual ideologies in multilingual states: Language, hegemony and social justice in Western
liberal democracies. (p.26) Sols Sociolinguistic Studies, 1(2). doi:10.1558/sols.v1i2.25
43
ibid. (p.25)
44
Gray, J. (1986). Liberalism. (p.13) Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
45
Petrovic (2014) (p. 26)
46
Berlin, I. (1958). Two concepts of liberty: An inaugural lecture delivered before the University of Oxford on 31 October 1958.
(p.170) Oxford: Clarendon Press.
47
Carter, I. (2012). Positive and Negative Liberty. In E. N. Zalta (Ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Retrieved
from http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2012/entries/liberty-positive-negative/
20. 2 LANGUAGE POLICY
14!
Figure 2: Framework of language policy based on Petrovic’s post-liberal framework
A classical liberal policy strives for maximum individual freedom through minimal state
intervention. This necessarily results in a laissez-faire language policy where no measures are
taken to influence language practice and beliefs. Relying on ‘market forces’ to dictate language
use generally leads to standardisation and domination of the prevailing language (cf. the laissez-
faire language policies of the UK the USA).
On the other hand, language positive liberalism, also termed linguistic autonomy by Petrovic,
involves government intervention to create a level linguistic playing field. Under that umbrella
of equality-creation, however, many aims can exist, each of which can have effects on feelings
of national identity, especially for immigrant and minority groups.
The cases of language management in Iceland and France offer examples where language
positive liberalism can be said to strengthen or maintain monolingualism, whilst showing little
regard for any effect on national identity amongst minority groups. “Motivated by traditional
linguistic purism and homogeneity,”48
assimilationist language policy in Iceland encourages
members of all ethnic groups to adopt Icelandic identity through adopting the Icelandic
language. All non-native children are taught in separate immersive L2 Icelandic classes at school
and A2 level (CEFR) Icelandic is a requirement of citizenship. “Icelandic-ness” is also preserved
in naming laws, which dictate that “forenames shall be capable of having Icelandic genitive
endings or shall have become established by tradition in the Icelandic language. Names may not
conflict with the linguistic structure of Icelandic.”49
Enforcing such language standards and
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
48
Albury, N. (2012). Iceland Applying Spolsky’s Four Determinants of Language Policy (Unpublished master's thesis) (p.51).
University of New England.
49
Icelandic Ministry of the Interior. (1996, May 17). Personal Names. Retrieved from http://eng.innanrikisraduneyti.is/laws-and-
regulations/english/personal-names/
21. 2 LANGUAGE POLICY
15!
vetting the morphology of names puts pressure on immigrant groups to abandon their heritage
language and ultimately take on Icelandic nationality.
Protectionism is a term often attributed to the French and this is true in the domain of language
policy. From the 17th
century on, French authorities strove to codify and strengthen the status of
the French language, which had often been seen as the uniting force of the French people.
However, this policy excluded the use of any of the many native regional languages spoken
within the country – a policy still in force today despite the rise of linguistic human rights.
Protecting the language from foreign influence is another priority in the language management
of the French government. The Académie Française aims to protect the purity of the language
from anglicisms by creating often-ignored French neologisms (cf. l’ordinateur instead of le
computer; le mail instead of le courriel; le logiciel instead of. le software). Perhaps the most
extreme example of language management in the French war for purism was the 1994 loi
Toubon, which introduced 40% minimum quotas of French-language music on French radio.
On the other hand, there are cases of inclusive language policy that encourage multilingualism
through protection of minority language groups. Finland, for example, has an ideology of
national bilingualism incorporating both the Finnish-speaking majority and the Swedish-
speaking minority as two language communities belonging to the nation-state. Public services
are offered in Finnish, Swedish or both languages on a pragmatic basis, depending on the
relative proportion of language groups in each municipality 50
. Similarly, the language policy of
the early Soviet Union was based on an inclusive ideology that accepted languages other than
Russian as native languages of the state. For many of these languages, which had previously
only been spoken, Lenin’s policy was one of graphisation and codification, ostensibly to create a
united national identity embracing linguistic diversity51
.
Modern-day Belgium is another example of a multilingual society. Since the country’s
independence, Belgium’s language ideology has undergone a shift from a monolingual
francophone regime to multilingual territoriality. Before the struggle for linguistic rights had
resulted in today’s linguistic landscape in Belgium, there existed a state of diglossia in which
non-Francophone citizens’ use of their own languages was limited by the national language
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
50
Saukkonen, P. (2013, April 9). Debates over the status of the Finnish and Swedish languages in Finland tend to ignore the fact
that Finland has developed into a truly multilingual country. [Web log post]. Retrieved from
http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2013/04/09/finland-language-policy-swedish-finnish-schools-pasi-saukkonen/
51
Grenoble, L. A. (2003). An Overview of Soviet Language Policy. In Language policy in the Soviet Union (pp. 35-65).
Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic.
22. 2 LANGUAGE POLICY
16!
policy. In Denmark, where today’s monolingual language policy is closer to that of post-
independence Belgium, i.e. dominated by monolingual ideology, it can be argued that a similar
state of diglossia exists amongst minority language groups.
2.2 Diglossia
The term diglossia, when first coined by Ferguson, was defined as “speech communities where
two or more varieties of the same language are used by some speakers under different
conditions.”52
However, its use was later extended by Fishman. For him, the main criterion for
diglossic contact is a difference in functionality and status of the two languages in question. As
such, diglossia can also be said to exist in societies that employ functionally differentiated
language varieties of whatever kind.53
A so-called “monoglot” speaker in a monolingual society might use a particular sociolect and
regional variety at home or with a close group of friends from their region; a more neutral
variety in the more formal contexts of school or with work colleagues, and near-standard form
with a non-native speaker. Equally, in a multilingual society, entirely different languages might
be used in different contexts. This functional split of language use in complementary contexts
within a society, or diglossia, is common in multilingual societies. Especially amongst minority-
language communities living under a monolingual state language ideology, the necessity to use
the state-sponsored language (the high or H variety) in the public sphere means the minority
(low or L-variety) is restricted to the private sphere of hearth and home.54
The logical question to
ask, if we accept that mechanisms of language management implemented by national
governments can strengthen or weaken diglossia, is whether these measures in turn strengthen or
weaken feelings of national identity.
Since the formation of the two German-speaking communities in Belgium and Denmark, both
states have applied very different language policies to the respective populations. This case study
therefore provides an excellent opportunity to directly compare the impact of two different styles
of national language policy on minority-language communities’ use of language and the
resultant sense of identity.
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
52
Ferguson, C. A. (1996). Diglossia. In T. Huebner (Ed.), Sociolinguistic perspectives: Papers on language in society, 1959-
1994 (p. 25). New York: Oxford University Press.
53
Fishman, J. A. (1967). Bilingualism With and Without Diglossia; Diglossia With and Without Bilingualism. Journal of Social
Issues, 23(2), 29-38. doi:10.1111/j.1540-4560.1967.tb00573.x
54
ibid.
23. 3 A TALE OF TWO COMMUNITIES
17
3 - A tale of two communities
In the first two chapters, a theoretical link was made a) between language, nationality and
identity, and b) between language policy and national identity. For Gellner, “…national
affiliations do not come about through sentimentality and myth. Rather, they emerge because
they are required by the given social context.”55
Therefore, before delving into the study of
our two specific cases, it is necessary to focus on the particular social and political setting56
of the groups in question. This context helps to elucidate how the two German-speaking
communities, starting from rather similar beginnings, have taken different paths up until the
present. In order to define the nature of this divergence, this chapter will look at the
circumstances of the communities’ creation, the language policies that govern them and their
levels of autonomy.
3.1 Shared beginnings
1919 is the key date for both the German-speaking Community of Belgium (referred to in
German as the Deutschsprachige Gemeinschaft, or DG for short) and the German Minority in
Nordschleswig, Denmark. After the end of the First World War, both groups came into being
after the borders between Germany and its neighbours were redrawn according to the Treaty
of Versailles.
In the case of Belgium, the German-speaking communes of today’s community belonged to
Prussia under the German Empire between 1815 and 1919. At Versailles, the cantons were
awarded to Belgium on a provisional basis and in 1925 were permanently integrated into the
Belgian state after a plebiscite confirmed the annexation. The Nazi German government
reclaimed the area in 1940 with mixed response57
, but it was returned to the Kingdom of
Belgium in September 1944 after the Allied forces liberated the region58
. Since 1956, when
the Belgian and German governments concluded discussions about the final border
adjustment, the DG has continued to extend its powers.
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
55
Gellner, E. (1964). Thought and change. (p.10) Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
56
Edwards (2009)
57
Kaiser, C. (n.d.). Eupen Mai 1940. Retrieved May 11, 2015, from http://www.worldwartours.be/eupen-mai-1940.html
58
DGLive. (2006). History of the German-speaking Community. Retrieved May 11, 2015, from
http://www.dglive.be/en/desktopdefault.aspx/tabid-1397/2268_read-27185/
24. 3 A TALE OF TWO COMMUNITIES
18
Geographically, the region is situated at the far Eastern section of the arrondissement of
Verviers, within the province of Liège in the region of Wallonia.
Figure 4: Maps showing Belgium’s language areas and the nine municipalities of the German language area
around the towns of Eupen and Sankt Vith - As published in: Vanden Boer, A. (2009). Does Belgium’s
language policy concerning German fit the population’s needs? Annual of Language & Politics and Politics
of Identity, (3), 27-42.
Figure 3: Map showing the location of the province of Liège in Wallonia and, within it, the arrondissement of
Verviers created using images retrieved on July 23, 2015, from http://www.eupedia.com/belgium/liege-
province.shtml and http://www.annuairepro-verviers.be/
25. 3 A TALE OF TWO COMMUNITIES
19
While the Duchy of Schleswig in Southern Denmark had long been an area of language
contact, it developed in the nineteenth century with the rise of nationalism, into an area of
language conflict, where language was harnessed as an ideological instrument of political
struggle.59
As in the case of Belgium’s German-speaking community, the German minority in
Schleswig, Southern Denmark was formed in the wake of the Treaty of Versailles. While the
region had been under German rule since 1864, the treaty called for a referendum and the
1920 plebiscite saw Schleswig split into two with a new international border transecting it.
Most of the territory came under Danish sovereignty, leaving a significant German minority
of around 25% in the Northern Zone I of the region.60
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
59
Dyhr, M. (1998). Der deutsch-dänische Sprachkonflikt in Schleswig im 19. Jahrhundert [The German-Danish language
conflict in Schleswig in the 19th
century]. In D. Cherubim, S. Grosse, & K. J. Mattheier (Eds.), Sprache und bürgerliche
Nation [Language and civil nation](pp. 101-121). Berlin/New York: De Gruyter.
60
Die Gesellschaft für Schleswig-Holsteinische Geschichte [The Society for the History of Schleswig-Holstein]. (2015).
Abstimmungsgebiet [Referendum area]. Retrieved from http://www.geschichte-s-h.de/abstimmungsgebiet/
Figure 5: Map showing the shifting German-Danish border from http://www.geschichte-s-h.de/abstimmungsgebiet/
26. 3 A TALE OF TWO COMMUNITIES
20
3.2 Language policy in Belgium and Denmark
As discussed in the previous chapter, governmental language policy has a direct influence on
the status of minority language speakers, and hence a potential impact on the strength of their
national identity. Typically, language policy dictates that the resources of the state chiefly
support the majority language(s). Other languages that happen to be spoken within the same
country tend to get less support and less respect.61
The difference in language policy
imposed by the Belgian and Danish governments on each German-speaking community is
therefore important both in terms of the community’s language use and identity-construction.
Sabine Kirchmeier-Andersen, Director of the Danish Language Council, claims that
Denmark is one of only nine European countries that have no language policy.62
Beyond
stating that Danish is the official language of Denmark, there is no explicit linguistic
legislation apart from some recommendations to promote Danish as a second language for
foreign students. 63
Yet the initial statement itself is noteworthy, as it covertly perpetuates the
almost uncontested link between territory and language.
Minimalism of linguistic regulation is not an oversight, but a conscious choice. It is therefore
perhaps more useful to think of Denmark as having a laissez-faire language policy. In line
with the country’s liberal constitution, the people are allowed to speak the language (variety)
they please.64
Kirchmeier-Andersen’s Danish Language Council is a purely advisory body
and there is no central protectionist authority equivalent to l’Académie Française65
set up to
police language.
One might expect this linguistic freedom to result in a society where many different varieties
are spoken. The reality, however, is that contemporary Danish is considered “one of the most
standardized languages in Europe.”66
Pedersen posits that the combination of globalisation
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
61
Dorian (1999)
62
Kirchmeier-Andersen, S. (2008, October 15). Hvad skal der blive af dansk? Retrieved from
http://politiken.dk/debat/kroniken/ECE582969/hvad-skal-der-blive-af-dansk/
63
Language Rich Europe. (n.d.). Denmark Country Profile. Retrieved December 15, 2014, from
https://www.teachingenglish.org.uk/sites/teacheng/files/LRE_English_version_final_01.pdf
64
Siiner, M. (2010). Hangovers of globalization: A case study of laissez-faire language policy in Denmark. LPLP Language
Problems and Language Planning, 34(1), 43-62. doi:10.1075/lplp.34.1.03sii
65
Allen, P. (2008, August 16). France's L'Académie Française upset by rule to recognise regional tongues. Retrieved from
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/france/2569651/Frances-LAcadmie-Franaise-upset-by-rule-to-
recognise-regional-tongues.html
66
Pedersen, I. L. (2003). Traditional dialects of Danish and the de-dialectalization 19002000. International Journal of the
Sociology of Language, 2003(159). (p.9) doi:10.1515/ijsl.2003.012
27. 3 A TALE OF TWO COMMUNITIES
21
and the exposure of the language to market forces means national languages must attain a
high “market value” to avoid dominance by English. This, he explains, has resulted in a
particularly pronounced process of de-dialectisation in the Danish case. Urbanisation and
greater mobility accelerated the emergence of a nationwide standard based on the
Copenhagen variety in the 1950s and brought with it marginalisation of regional varieties and
a “hierarchical social structure based on language.”67
Siiner includes the perception of
immigrant languages in Danish society to the debate. These languages, she claims, “are
considered either a nuisance or a threat to the survival of Danish,” 68
which in turn has led to
“generally negative attitude towards multilingualism.”69
Unlike Denmark, the use of language in Belgium is strictly regulated. The federal system
divides the country into three territorial regions (Flanders, Wallonia and Brussels), four
language areas (French, Dutch, German and French & Dutch in Brussels) and three language
communities (French-speaking in Wallonia and Brussels, Dutch-speaking in Flanders and
Brussels, and German-speaking in the German community). The regions and their associated
language communities are responsible for matters concerning the territory (housing, energy
and transport) as well as matters concerning the individual (culture, social welfare and
education). Essentially this language policy, based on the principle of territoriality, is directly
connected to the prevailing language ideology that links language and territory. Bilingual
Brussels is the complicating factor, as home to members of both the French and Dutch
language communities.
In stark contrast, Denmark comprises one territory and one language, indeed one that has
existed in some form for over a thousand years, including long periods of hegemony over its
neighbours. The Danish language, despite striking similarities to neighbouring Swedish and
Norwegian tongues, is unique to Denmark. Even against the backdrop of a broadly laissez-
faire language ideology and the secure place of the Danish language in all areas of Danish
society, the first decade of this century saw a right-wing government addressing the need to
protect the language. At the government’s behest, the Dansk Sprognœvn has issued two
reports - Sprog på spil [Language at stake] and Sprog til Tiden [Language on time], both
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
67
Siiner (2010) (p.46)
68
ibid. (p.48)
69
ibid.
28. 3 A TALE OF TWO COMMUNITIES
22
calling for language parallelism in higher education and other domains to defend against the
threat of English.70
The Belgian state, by contrast, is relatively young. Before independence, its territory had
been under the dominion of numerous third parties. Even since independence, the country’s
sovereignty has been checked by German invasion and occupation. The state consists of three
separate language communities each with its own exclusively monolingual territory. There is
no comparable single locus of linguistic pride or protection, but rather a focus on the
country’s constructed multilingualism and unity, and an effort to accommodate all languages
viewed as being autochthonous.
3.3 Autonomy in Belgium and Denmark
As John Petrovic points out, the idea of autonomy is central to that of positive liberty and
positive language liberalism, equating to “the freedom to conceive of, develop and pursue
one’s goals.”71
In the context of language policy, this translates as the freedom to speak one’s
language. It is therefore important here to evaluate the level of autonomy of both Belgium
and Denmark’s German-speaking communities.
Belgium’s evolution from a centralised to federal state has contributed to increasing
autonomy for the country’s 77,000 strong German-speaking community72
. However, the
process has not been without tension. The reincorporation by Germany of the nine German-
speaking municipalities during the Second World War led to mistrust of German speakers by
the rest of the Belgian population after 1945. German speakers faced accusation of
collaboration with the enemy and were, for some time thereafter, denied any language
rights.73
The division of Belgium into four language areas was set out in law in the language
legislation of 1962/63 and constitutionally embedded in the first state reform of 1968-71.
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
70
Jørgensen, J. N. (2013). Challenges facing Danish as a medium-sized language. In F. X. Vila (Ed.), Survival and
development of language communities: Prospects and challenges (pp. 38-58). Bristol: Multilingual Matters.
71
Petrovic (2014), (p. 32)
72
DG.be. (2015). Die Deutschsprachige Gemeinschaft [The German-speaking Community]. Retrieved from
http://www.dg.be
73
Markusse, J. D. (1999). German-speaking in Belgium and Italy: Two different autonomy arrangements. 1 Acta
Universitatis Carolinae Geographica, 62, 59-73.
29. 3 A TALE OF TWO COMMUNITIES
23
Nine municipalities make up the German language area in the East of Belgium: Amel,
Büllingen, Burg-Reuland, Bütgenbach, Eupen, Kelmis, Lontzen, Raeren, St. Vith. 74
23th October 1973 marked another watershed moment for the community with the
establishment of the Rat der Deutschsprachigen Gemeinschaft (The Council of the German-
speaking community in Belgium),75
the predecessor of today’s parliament.
The first state reform of 1970 saw further recognition of the German-speaking community’s
status with the inclusion of the DG in the creation of the three cultural communities. In 1980,
however, the second state reform saw a divergence in the development of autonomy between
Flanders and Wallonia on the one hand and the German-speaking community on the other.
While the expanded federal system granted Flanders and Wallonia regional status with
greater competencies beyond culture, social welfare and education76
the German-speaking
community was not acknowledged in the same way.
This discrepancy is now present in the politics of the DG, where the regionalist ProDG party
is the second largest presence in the parliament and provides the community’s minister
president. One of ProDG’s 2014 manifesto promises was to fight for “equal status for the
region within Belgium” and “the transferal of provincial competencies as well as spatial
planning, housing construction, employment from the Walloon region to the DG.” 77
By comparison, the equivalent Danish party, the Schleswigsche Partei (Schleswig Party), has
no representation in the national or regional government. The party along with Der Bund
Deutscher Nordschleswiger (Union of German Nordschleswigers) have more modest
ambitions, focussing on strengthening German-language schools and supporting the wider
use and recognition of the German language in the public sphere78
. One current example is
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
74
Rat der Deutschsprachigen Gemeinschaft [Parliament of the German-speaking community]. (n.d.). Provinzen und
Gemeinden [Provinces and communes]. Retrieved December 10, 2014, from
http://www.dgparlament.be/desktopdefault.aspx/tabid-3990/7170_read-41454/
75
Parlament der Deutschsprachigen Gemeinschaft. (n.d.). Die institutionelle Entwicklung. Retrieved May 28, 2015, from
http://www.dglive.be/desktopdefault.aspx/tabid-1054/1533_read-20394/
76
Vogl, U., & Hüning, M. (2010). One Nation, One Language? The Case of Belgium. Dutch Crossing, 34(3), 228-247.
doi:10.1179/030965610x12820418688570
77
ProDG. (2014).Wahlprogramm [Election programme]. Retrieved June 24, 2015, from http://prodg.be/wahlprogramm/
[author’s translation]
78
Bund Deutscher Nordschleswiger. (2015). Sprachpolitische Forderungen der deutschen Minderheit [The German
minority’s demands in language policy]. Retrieved from
http://www.bdn.dk/files/$misc/Sprachpolitische%20Forderungen2015-HV-Endfassung.pdf
30. 3 A TALE OF TWO COMMUNITIES
24
the campaign for bilingual Danish-German place-name signs, which has so far been
unsuccessful79
.
The 15,000 Nordschleswig Germans in Denmark have no autonomy and are governed by the
central government in Copenhagen. The maintenance of 15 German-language schools by the
German School and Language Association for Nordschleswig (Deutscher Schul- und
Sprachverein für Nordschleswig) is made possible not through specific powers being granted
to the minority, but by the liberal nature of the Danish constitution. Article 76 states that
“parents or guardians making their own arrangements for their children or wards to receive
instruction equivalent to the general primary school standard shall not be obliged to have
their children or wards taught in a publicly provided school.”80
Linguistic autonomy in the domain of education has arguably been the top priority for
language policy in both countries and in both German-speaking communities. This is not
surprising given that the “language policy adopted by an education system is without doubt
one of the most powerful forces in language management.”81
Fishman explains that “because
education is generally obligatory, it focuses on the young, and its sway […] continues
uninterrupted for many years […], education [is] a very useful […] mechanism.”82
Education,
then, is broadly seen as the key to transmitting language and, by proxy, identity from one
generation to the next.
The fight for linguistic autonomy in education has played a pivotal role in the history of
linguistic conflict in Belgium. From 1830 and Belgian independence on, the struggle to
introduce Dutch instead of French as the language of instruction in Flanders was pivotal in
the construction of today’s very present Flemish, Dutch-speaking identity. The Catholic
University of Leuven itself played host to such conflict in 1968 when Dutch-speaking
students demanded linguistic equality and separation of the French- and Dutch-speaking
universities, with the rally cry of “Leuven Vlaams - Walen Buiten” (Leuven is Flemish,
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
79
Nissen, G. (2015, April 28). Zirkus Hadersleben. Retrieved from
http://www.nordschleswiger.dk/news.4460.aspx?newscatid=16&newsid=79521&h=Zirkus-Hadersleben
80
Danish Constitution. (2011). Retrieved from
http://www.thedanishparliament.dk/Publications/My_Constitutional_Act_with_explanations/Chapter%208.aspx
81
Spolsky. (2009) (p. 90)
82
Fishman, J. A. (2006). Language Policy and Language Shift. In T. Ricento (Ed.), An introduction to language policy:
Theory and method (p. 320). Malden, MA: Blackwell Pub.
31. 3 A TALE OF TWO COMMUNITIES
25
Walloons out). It was precisely this process of gaining rights in education for the Dutch-
speaking community that allowed German-speaking community the same autonomy.83
Michael Byram, in his study of the German School of Tingleff (Nordschleswig), notes a
mirroring of this struggle, whereby the political organisations of the German minority
(Schleswigsche Partei and the Bund Deutscher Nordschleswiger) concentrated from their
inception on maintaining control of language policy in education as their priority. This gave
rise to the aforementioned Schul- und Sprachverein für Nordschleswig, whose name alone
clearly links schooling with the language84
.
3.4 ‘Official’ identities in Belgium and Denmark
The website of the German-speaking community in Belgium states that “The people [of the
German-speaking community] are loyal Belgians and generally devoted to the monarchy;
they feel respected by the state since German was recognised as one of the working and
constitutional languages. The political autonomy of the German-speaking community has
contributed significantly to the German-speaking population considering itself a fully valid
part of the Belgian state.”85
Similarly, ‘the official website of the Denmark’ makes a proclamation about the identity of
the members of the German Minority, namely that “minority members regard themselves as
Danish citizens with a German identity and strong ties to the region of North Schleswig. At
the same time, the minority considers itself as a bridge between Danes and Germans.”86
It is also interesting to note the stark semantic difference between the official names of the
two minority groups. Whilst, in Belgium, the community (die Deutschsprachige
Gemeinschaft Belgiens) defines itself by its language – deutschsprachig – whilst confirming
its belonging to Belgium. In Denmark, by contrast, the community’s name is die Deutsche
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
83
Parlament der Deutschsprachigen Gemeinschaft. (2006). The institutional development. Retrieved from
http://www.dglive.be/en/desktopdefault.aspx/tabid-1398/2269_read-27186/
84
Byram, M. (1986). Minority education and ethnic survival: Case study of a German school in Denmark. Clevedon, Avon,
England: Multilingual Matters.
85
Rat der Deutschsprachigen Gemeinschaft [Parliament of the German-speaking community]. Die Menschen in der
Deutschsprachigen Gemeinschaft [People in the German-speaking community]. (n.d.). Retrieved December 11, 2014, from
http://www.dgparlament.be/desktopdefault.aspx/tabid-3982/7162_read-41444/
86
Denmark.dk. (n.d.). The German Minority in Denmark. Retrieved December 15, 2014, from
http://denmark.dk/en/society/greenland-the-faroes-and-the-german-minority/the-german-minority-in-denmark/
32. 3 A TALE OF TWO COMMUNITIES
26
Minderheit in Dänemark [the German minority in Denmark], which emphasizes the group’s
German – non-Danish- ethnicity and its minority status within Danish society.
These observations are evidently anecdotal and, at best, represent the primary identity trends
within each community. They reflect the desired perception of the communities by their
ruling authorities and are not supported by any empirical evidence. In order to gain more
insight into the reality on the ground, a questionnaire was be designed to address these
questions, focussing on language use, identity and perceptions of language policy. By
studying the responses of members of both German-speaking communities, I intend to shed
more light on the link between language policy and identity in these communities and hence
determine to what extent the official versions of identity are representative of the
communities’ members. In the following chapter I will detail the design and distribution
process for the questionnaire, before presenting the most salient findings.
33. 4 METHODOLOGY
27
4 - Methodology
4.1 Questionnaire Design
A questionnaire was designed to gather data on the effect of diverging language policies in
the two communities. Two community-specific versions of the questionnaire were created,
focusing on the areas of language use, identity and attitudes to language policy. An English
translation is included in the appendix, but the questionnaire was distributed to respondents in
German to maximise comprehension. The language used for the questions is designed to be
as straightforward and unambiguous as possible to avoid confusion and trigger clear
responses.
The questionnaire starts with a short series of introductory questions to assess the age,
gender, nationality, the respondent’s place of birth and time living within the respective
community. These questions determine how representative the final results are, but no
personal details about respondents are taken and the results are anonymous.
In the main body of the questionnaire, respondents are asked to disclose details of their
everyday language use, to reflect on how they see themselves and the labels they use to self-
identify, and finally to give their opinion on the language policy imposed in their area.
The section on language use primarily gathers details on the respondents’ mother tongue, the
frequency of its use and the main language used at home. This section also aims to gauge
respondents’ use of languages other than German and to give an idea of which language
(German or the majority language) is used in different everyday situations.
Given the very diffuse and contentious understanding of identity, especially for a non-
academic target group (see discussion in Ch. 1), it was paramount to avoid ambiguity in the
identity-related questions whilst resisting the tendency to oversimplify the complex nature of
individual identity. The questions posed are designed so that they can be answered
unambiguously.
Rather than demanding that individuals categorise themselves with a single label,
respondents are invited to rank their top three identity labels from a list of options ranging
from close family member to citizen of the respective country. To allow a direct comparison
34. 4 METHODOLOGY
28
to be drawn between the most salient categories for the study, respondents are also asked
separately whether they feel like a citizen of the state they live in and a member of their
minority-language community. The respondents are also asked to disclose whether they feel
pride in being a national of their state and in their German-speaking community, and are
asked to elaborate if they have particularly strong feelings of affinity or disengagement with
the community. While the questionnaire design does not go into sufficient detail to evaluate
the full complexity of individual identity, its main aim is to provide a snapshot of the
communities’ identities as a whole, and is therefore necessarily based to some extent on
generalisation.
The final section asks respondents to describe their level of satisfaction with the language
policy they live under and how well informed they feel about language policy. It also asks in
which areas there is a need for more support for the German language.
4.2 Questionnaire Distribution
Given the strong German-language school networks in both German-speaking communities,
the original intention was to distribute the questionnaire to older school students via their
teachers. Headteachers of German-language schools were contacted by e-mail and then by
telephone. However, after initial inquiries, it soon became clear that the take-up rate was low
and this strategy was unlikely to reach enough respondents for a representative sample. This
was especially marked in the Danish case where almost exclusively negative responses were
received. The survey was therefore opened up to a wider target group by contacting local
cultural and social groups.
Despite these efforts, it proved difficult to reach a significant audience given a lack of
financial resources and limitations on time. The final number of responses number 259
German-speakers from Belgium and 60 from Denmark. The data gathered cannot be said to
be truly representative as the samples are too narrow. The aim, nonetheless, is to glean an
idea of the general trends in language use and identity within both communities.
35. 5 - FINDINGS
29
5 - Findings
5.1 Sample
Before analysing the most salient findings from the data collected, it is worth pointing out the
limitations of the study inherent in the sample. As well as a significant difference in sample
sizes between the two communities, there are discrepancies in the make-up of the samples,
both in terms of gender and age distribution. This is set out in the tables below. The Belgian
results show a bias in favour of younger respondents, likely due to the more positive response
to the study from the Belgian schools contacted. However, the significantly greater
proportion of female respondents in the Belgian sample is more difficult to explain. In any
case, the nature of the sample sizes and discrepancies mean that any conclusions drawn from
the study cannot be claimed to be more than tendentious.
Figure 6: Data on the make-up of the data samples
Figure 7: Graph showing the age distribution of the data samples
The larger numbers of non-nationals and non-Danish born respondents suggests that more
cross-border commuting occurs in the Danish case than in Belgium.
In terms of the geographical distribution of respondents, both samples show an even spread
of results across the entirety of the German-speaking areas (see figure 8). The map of
Belgium
(259 respondents)
Denmark
(60 respondents)
Male/Female (%) 38 : 62 47 : 52
Belgian/Danish-born 89% 52%
Nationals 96% 62%
Resident for over 10 years 93% 65%
Age Distribution
of Belgian Respondents
Age Distribution
of Danish Respondents
36. 5 - FINDINGS
30
southern Denmark also shows that a minority of respondents were residents of Germany,
supporting the idea that some respondents commute from across the German border to work
in the region.
Figure 8: Map showing the geographical distribution of respondents
5.2 Language Use
For the purposes of the study, ‘native language’ or ‘mother tongue’ was defined in the
questionnaire as the language(s) spoken at home before the age of 5 years. This was
complicated by the fairly widespread use of regional dialect in both communities. Ripuarian
and Moselle Franconian dialects are both used in the German-speaking community. These
dialects, collectively referred to as Plattdeutsch (Low German), were mentioned by several of
the Belgian respondents. Equally, many older respondents noted the Danish Sønderjysk
dialect in the questionnaire. It was decided to consider Platt as German and Sønderjysk as
Danish in the analysis. Whilst this oversimplifies the linguistic situation of both communities,
limitations on space made more nuanced analysis impossible.
The samples from both communities found German to be the most common single native
language amongst respondents. However, while 46% of members of the respondents from
Denmark identified German as their single mother tongue, 90% of those surveyed from the
DG said their mother tongue was German. Full bilingualism (either German – French or
German - Danish) was found to be significantly more common amongst German-speaking
Danes (24%) than German-speaking Belgians (6%).
Belgium' Denmark'
37. 5 - FINDINGS
31
Figure 9: Chart showing the mother tongue of respondents from Belgium and Denmark
Considering language spoken at home, there is again a stark difference between the two
communities, with the vast majority (83%) of Belgian German-speakers using solely
German, and fewer than half as many Danes doing the same (39%). Indeed, one in three
respondents from Denmark said Danish was spoken in their homes, perhaps suggesting a
language shift away from the heritage language.
Figure 10: Chart showing the showing the language used in respondents’ homes
However, use of a language other than German is a reality for all respondents and is equally
common in both communities, with around 80% of people using a foreign language either
every day or often.
46%!
23%!
24%!
7%!
Mother'tongue'
(DK'respondents)'
German!
Danish!!
Both!German!&!
Danish!!
Other!
90%!
2%!
6%!2%!
Mother'tongue'
(BE'respondents)'
German!
French!
Both!German!&!
French!
Other!
46%!
23%!
24%!
7%!
Mother'tongue'
(DK'respondents)'
German!
Danish!!
Both!German!&!
Danish!!
Other!
90%!
2%!
6%!2%!
Mother'tongue'
(BE'respondents)'
German!
French!
Both!German!&!
French!
Other!
38. 5 - FINDINGS
32
Figure 11: Chart showing the frequency of foreign language use
Differences in the language use of the communities become more pronounced when looking
at the use of language across a range of different domains. Within the German-speaking
community in Belgium, German is the main language of use in all areas. German is used least
in the workplace (71%), on public transport (76%) and at supermarkets (78%), but even here
at least one in seven people use the minority language under these circumstances (see figure
overleaf). German is used almost exclusively at church, at the town hall and with close
friends, perhaps showing the importance of language in the creating and maintaining sense of
local community or ‘groupness’.
55%26%
19%
Frequency of foreign language
use
(BE respondents)
Every day
Often
Occasionally
Never
54%
24%
22%
Frequency of foreign language
use
(DK respondents)
Every day
Often
Occasionally
Never
40. 5 - FINDINGS
34
The picture is drastically different amongst the German minority in Denmark. The data
suggests that there is a clear case of functional diglossia, in Fishman’s terms. The minority
language is assigned to low functions, whilst Danish functions as the H-language. For
example, German is used by fewer than 5% of respondents in public or official situations (the
supermarket, town hall, at the doctor’s, with neighbours and on public transport).
Conversely, over 50% of respondents use German when listening to radio or watching TV, at
church and with close neighbours. German was also frequently used at work by around 56%
of those surveyed. However, this figure may reflect the fact that many of respondents were
reached via German-language schools and cultural networks. German in Nordschleswig, it
seems, is broadly confined to the private sphere and pockets of community life (sports/leisure
and Church), while Danish is used in all other areas of public life.
42. 5 - FINDINGS
36
5.3 Identity
German-speaking Community of Belgium
The data shows respondents have strong ties to the Belgian state, the family and to the
language community. The majority of German-speaking Belgians in the survey identify
themselves in first place as Belgian (37%) or as a member of their family unit (35%).
Nonetheless, a sense of belonging to the minority-language community also plays an
important role. When aggregating the data for first, second and third most common identity
labels, we see that 85% of respondents identify as Belgian on some level and 81% as a
member of the German-speaking community. Many of the respondents, it seems, see
themselves first as Belgian and then as members of the German-speaking community.
Figure 14: Graph showing the identity label preferences amongst the Belgian community
Perhaps unsurprisingly, very few respondents (13%) identified strongly with the francophone
Wallonia region under whose governance the community falls. The community’s on-going
campaign to gain further powers and autonomy from Wallonia is likely a factor contributing
to this low level of attachment.
37.1! 35.1!
14.4!
4.5! 4.5! 3.0! 1.5!
22!
7!
39.5!
19!
2.5! 4! 6!
25.7!
15.2!
26.7!
17.8!
6.3! 4.7! 3.7!
0.0!
10.0!
20.0!
30.0!
40.0!
50.0!
60.0!
70.0!
80.0!
90.0!
100.0!
Belgian! Member!of!
my!close!
family!
Member!of!
the!DG!
CiUzen!of!
my!town!
Other!! Inhabitant!
of!Wallonia!
Member!of!
my!local!
community!
Percentage'
"When'thinking'about'my'own'idenNty,'I'see'myself'as..."'
(Belgian'respondents)''
Third!
Second!
First!
43. 5 - FINDINGS
37
Figure 15: Chart showing level acceptance of Belgian identity
Figure 16: Chart showing level of identification with membership of the DG
The strength of respondents’ identification with the minority-language community appears
even stronger when faced with more direct questions. When asked to declare how far they
agree with the statements above, 92% of German-speaking Belgian respondents agreed or
strongly agreed that they saw themselves as Belgian citizens, while even more (97%)
identified as members of the German-speaking community.
Figure 17: Chart showing pride in membership of the DG
92.4% agreement
96.9% agreement
87% agreement
50.4 36.6 11.2 1.8
0% 50% 100%
"I am proud to be a member of the German-speaking community"
Strongly Agree
Agree
Disagree
Strongly disagree87% agreement
44. 5 - FINDINGS
38
A sense of pride in belonging to the DG was expressed by 87% of respondents. The most
frequently cited reason for this pride was the community’s multilingualism, but other
frequently mentioned sources of this pride include: the group’s autonomy and its special or
exotic nature, as well as an affinity to the German language and culture. Amongst the
minority of respondents who did not feel pride in being a member of the community, the
most frequently cited reasons were the high level of spending per capita to fund the local
administration and a tendency to be inward looking. Others expressed the view that they
could not derive any pride from the arbitrariness of where they happened to be born.
The German Minority in Denmark
The data from the Danish sample shows significantly different identity trends in comparison
to those identified in the Belgian results. Firstly, family is by far the most significant primary
identity for German-speakers in Nordschleswig, accounting for 38% of respondents, while
minority-group membership and attachment to the region Nordschleswig accounted for 17%
each. National Danish identity was the primary label for only 14% of those surveyed.
Figure 18: Graph showing the identity label preferences amongst the German minority in Denmark
38.1!
16.7! 16.7! 14.3! 11.9!
2.4! 0.0!
9.8!
36.6!
19.5!
2.4!
19.5!
4.9! 7.3!
10.3!
10.3!
38.5!
7.7!
15.4!
5.1!
12.8!
0.0!
10.0!
20.0!
30.0!
40.0!
50.0!
60.0!
70.0!
80.0!
90.0!
100.0!
Member!of!my!
close!family!
Member!of!the!
German!
minority!
Inhabitant!of!
Nordschleswig!
Other! Danish! CiUzen!of!my!
town!
Member!of!my!
local!
community!
"When'thinking'about'my'own'idenNty,'I'see'myself'as..."''
(Danish'respondents)''
Third!
Second!
First!
45. 5 - FINDINGS
39
Even when aggregating first, second and third most common identities, the national identity
was only the fourth most prevalent, with only 47% of the German-speaking Danish
respondents ranking their ascribed national identity highly. Instead attachment to
Nordschleswig and to the German-speaking minority group is much higher with 71% and
62% respectively. Michael Byram, suggests that the popularity of the label
“Nordschleswiger” amongst the minority solves for them the awkwardness of having to
choose between “Danish’ and ‘German’. This is reflected in responses to Q21* (see
Appendix) from the third of Danish participants who, when asked to indicate whether they
identified primarily with either their nationality or the German minority, stated “neither of the
above”. Many such answers detail a feeling of cleavage between two nationalities and
identity labels. The term “gespalten” (divided) occurred several times in the responses, and
the examples below illustrate the tendency of some parts of the community to experience
some form of identity confusion, against the general European trend of the primacy of
national identity.
“Ich weiß es nicht ganz. Das ist sehr verwirrend. In Dänemark wird man als Deutsche
gesehen und in Deutschland als Dänin. Ich fühle mich jedoch als beides…”
[I don't know exactly. It's very confusing. In Denmark, you're seen as a German
and in Germany as a Dane. However, I see myself as both…]
“Ich habe zwar einen dänischen Pass, aber kann mich nicht 100%-ig mit dieser
Nationalität identifizieren. Vielmehr fühle ich mich als eine Mischung aus beidem -
Deutschland und Dänemark.”
[I do have a Danish passport but cannot identify 100% with that nationality. I
feel a lot more like a mixture of both Germany and Denmark.]
Other common responses mentioned a strong affinity to a European or regional identity,
again suggesting a rejection of the national norm, or indeed a focus on more universal and/or
individual labels.
“Ich bin als erstes MENSCH - danach Frau/Mutter/Oma - und dann Sønderjyde”
[I am first a PERSON - then a woman, mother, grandma - and then a Sønderjyde*
]!
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
*
Sønderjyde is the Danish term for an inhabitant of Nordschleswig
46. 5 - FINDINGS
40
The comparatively low level of attachment to the national identity is confirmed by the results
of the more direct questions. Only around 64% of the Danish respondents agreed (21%) or
strongly agreed (43.2%) that they see themselves as Danish citizens, meaning over a third of
those questions reject their national identity. Identification with German-speaking minority in
Denmark was much higher at 84% of respondents agreeing (27%) or strongly agreeing (57%)
with the statement.
Figure 18: Chart showing level of identification with Danish identity
Figure 19: Chart showing level of identification with membership of the German minority in Denmark
Pride in membership of the minority group (figure 20) was however slightly lower amongst
Danish respondents with 84% of respondents agreeing or strongly agreeing that they are
proud to be a member of the German minority. Pride in this membership was predominantly
based on historical community support functions (taking care of one another) and the
academic success of the German-language school system.
43.2 20.5 18.2 18.2
0% 50% 100%
"I see myself as a Danish citizen"
Strongly Agree
Agree
Disagree
Strongly disagree
63.6% agreement
56.8 27.3 13.6 2.3
0% 50% 100%
"I see myself as a member of the German minority"
Strongly Agree
Agree
Disagree
Strongly disagree
84.1% agreement
47. 5 - FINDINGS
41
Figure 20: Chart showing level of pride in membership of the German minority in Denmark
5.5 Language Policy
Perceptions of Belgian language policy
Half of the Belgian respondents were satisfied with the status of German in Belgium, but
around three quarters would like the Belgian government to do more to support the language
community.
Figure 21: Chart showing level of satisfaction with Belgian language policy
Figure 22: Chart showing demand for more government support for the DG
20.0 30.7 34.2 15.1
0% 50% 100%
"I am satisfied with the official language status of the
German language in Belgium."
Strongly Agree
Agree
Disagree
Strongly Disagree
50.7% agreement
34.2 39.6 23.1 3.1
0% 50% 100%
"I would like the Belgian government to do more to
support the German-speaking community."
Strongly Agree
Agree
Disagree
Strongly Disagree73.8% agreement
44.2 32.6 11.6 11.6
0% 50% 100%
"I am proud to be a member of the German minority"
Strongly Agree
Agree
Disagree
Strongly disagree76.7% agreement
48. 5 - FINDINGS
42
Levels of satisfaction with the current support for the German language were fairly high
ranging from 74.6% in education to 43.1% on the internet. Satisfaction is especially high in
the domains of education and public administration (64.9%) and culture (61.9%), but lower
in justice and on the internet.
Figure 23: Chart showing levels of satisfaction with Belgian policy support across domains
Perceptions of Danish language policy
Perhaps surprisingly, a greater proportion (60.9%) of Danish respondents said they were
satisfied with the status of German in Denmark then counterparts in Belgium. A similar
proportion as in the Belgian community (71.7%) expressed a wish for more governmental
support for the German minority.
28.4
18.7
13.0 12.4 8.0 7.8 4.1
46.2
46.2
48.9
42.7
45.3
40.6
39.0
17.8
23.6 30.9
32.9
30.7 39.3
38.1
7.6 11.6 7.2
12.0 16.0 12.3
18.8
0.0
50.0
100.0
Percentageofrespondents
Levels of satisfaction with the Belgian government's
support of the German language in various fields
Very Dissatisfied
Dissatisfied
Satisfied
Very Satisfied
49. 5 - FINDINGS
43
Figure 24: Chart showing level of satisfaction with Danish language policy
Figure 25: Chart showing demand for more government support for the German minority in Denmark
Looking at language policy in different domains, Danish respondents showed similar levels
of satisfaction to their Belgian counterparts, ranging between 65.2% in education and 37.0%
on the internet. The main difference was the satisfaction with language support in public
administration (47.8%), which was over 17% lower than the data from the community in
Belgium.
23.9 47.8 21.7 6.5
0% 50% 100%
"I would like the Danish government to do more
to support the German minority."
Strongly Agree
Agree
Disagree
Strongly disagree
71.7% agreement
6.5 54.3 34.8 4.3
0% 50% 100%
"I am satisfied with the official language status
of the German language in Denmark."
Strongly Agree
Agree
Disagree
Strongly disagree60.9% agreement
50. 5 - FINDINGS
44
Figure 26: Chart showing levels of satisfaction with Danish government support across domains
10.9
6.5 4.3 6.5 4.3
8.7 8.7
54.3
50.0
50.0 45.7
45.7 39.1
28.3
28.3
32.6 37.0
28.3
39.1
37.0
52.2
6.5
10.9 8.7
19.6
10.9
15.2
10.9
0
50
100
Percentageofrespondents
Levels of satisfaction with the Danish government's
support for the German language in various fields
very dissatisfied
dissatisfied
satisfied
very satisfied
51. 5 - FINDINGS
45
5.5 Summary of results
Language Use:
• German was the most frequent language used in all the domains in Belgium, whereas
Danish respondents tend to use German only in the private sphere and community-
specific activities.
• Over 80% of German-speaking Belgians in the survey use only German at home, while
this is only the case for around 40% of Danish respondents.
• Full bilingualism was much more common among Danish respondents (1 in 4) compared
to their Belgian counterparts (1 in 20).
Identity:
• The data suggests that national identity is an important label of identity for a majority
(85%) of members of the German-speaking community of Belgium, of whom 92%
identify as Belgian citizens.
• The national label is less significant for those surveyed in Denmark. Less than half of the
group (47%) ranked “Danish” as one of their top three labels and 1 in 3 (36.4%) rejected
the label altogether.
• The data suggests identification with the minority language community was important in
both communities, but ranked higher in the Danish sample, given the absence of a strong
national identity. However, pride in the community is stronger amongst Belgians
respondents.
Language Policy:
• Despite having fewer language rights, satisfaction with government language policy was
higher amongst Danish respondents than the Belgian sample.
• Belgian and Danish respondents showed similar levels of support (around 70%) for
further provisions for the German-speaking communities.
• Both communities tend to be satisfied with language policy for education and dissatisfied
with online provision.
• Over half of the Danish group expressed dissatisfaction with the support for the use of
German in the public administration.
52. 6 CONCLUSION
46
6 - Conclusion
Drawing on the theoretical framework elaborated, particularly Petrovic’s theory of post-
liberal language policy, and the findings outlined in chapter 5, there are some tentative
conclusions that can be drawn. It seems clear that the difference in governance and language
management between the Belgian and Danish authorities is reflected in the language use and
identity of the respective German-speaking communities.
In Belgium, the state’s trajectory towards federalisation, regional autonomy and
territorialised societal multilingualism has been largely successful in overcoming the
language conflict of the twentieth century and giving rise to a German-speaking community
dubbed “the best protected minority in Europe”87
. Building on the theory put forward by
Petrovic (ch 2.1), the data gathered suggest that a Belgian language ideology of positive
liberalism has put protections in place that allow the community to use German in practically
all domains of life despite the speakers’ regular contact with French. The Belgian
government’s inclusion of the community in the national concept is comparable to the
inclusive ideology in Finland (see p.15). However the mechanisms employed to do so are
different. Granting advanced levels of autonomy seems to have engendered a scenario that
goes against the mainstream one-nation, one-language blueprint, whereby it is perfectly
possible to be both a proud Belgian and a native German speaker. In fact, in the DG, it is
unusual not to be (see figure 15).
Conversely, the negative liberalism that prevails in the ideology of the Danish government
has had the opposite effect on the German-speaking community in Denmark. Without any
significant intervention the minority German speakers are exposed to market forces. The
state’s inaction has effectively coerced the minority into speaking the majority language in all
public domains, restricting German to the private sphere, the political and educational
networks of the minority and the community-dominated activities of Church and leisure. The
politics of exclusion have had the effect of alienating the German-speaking Danes from their
own nationhood, as outlined by Shohamy88
. The data suggests that Danish nationality does
not feature strongly in their identities, and indeed a third of members reject the label
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87
Gilles, P. (2011). Language policies at the Germanic-Romance language border: The case of Belgium, Luxembourg and
Lorrain. In B. Kortmann & J. V. Auwera (Eds.), The languages and linguistics of Europe: A comprehensive guide (p. 566).
Berlin: De Gruyter Mouton.
88
Shohamy. (2006) (p. 23)
53. 6 CONCLUSION
47
altogether (see figure 18). And while their Belgian counterparts presented as confident in
their identity, Danish respondents often referred to division and confusion in their identity,
and so revert instead to alternative labels that do not tie them to a territory or language.
Perhaps the most surprising findings came from the data regarding perceptions of language
policy. It was clear that both minorities valued education above all in the maintenance of
their language within the respective nation-states and, in the Danish case in particular, had
taken pains to build German-language schooling networks. This was reflected in both groups
high rate of satisfaction with language policy in education.
The Belgian group, with its much wider protections and freedoms in terms of language use,
was much more demanding about further governmental support than the comparatively
unheeded Danish group. This might initially seem counter-intuitive, but it is also reflected in
the focus of activism within the communities; in Belgium, campaigns centre on extending
political powers, while the Danish equivalent is about the right to erect bilingual street signs.
A “snowball effect” can be observed whereby the authority’s granting of one set of rights
makes way for the community to demand and expect the granting of further freedoms. Where
the authorities have been recalcitrant in granting rights or support to the minority in
Denmark, the idea of a more inclusive language policy is seemingly subdued.
As reiterated throughout the study, the theories, findings and resulting conclusions reflect
tendencies within the communities and not the entire picture. Furthermore, to claim that the
identity of the communities is entirely based on the language policies in place since 1920
would be blinkered. As discussed, the historical and political context of the two countries is
without doubt influential in the construction of the language ideologies in play. As Gellner
insists89
, one cannot be fully considered without the other. The work presented is a crude
glimpse of the complexities of identity for two communities faced with shifting state and
language borders; its crudeness was confirmed by the justified frustration of some
respondents at the questionnaire’s limitations. However, it is the hope that the comparison
between the two cases presented succeeds in exemplifying how language policy plays a key
role in the formation of collective identity of linguistic minorities, whilst laying a foundation
for more detailed and nuanced field work into the intricacies of identity and language policy.
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89
Gellner, E. (1964). Thought and change. (p.10) Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
