sep-dec-2016

By Order of the Secretary of the Army:
MARK A. MILLEY
General, United States Army
Chief of Staff
Official:
U.S. Army Engineer School
(573) 563-8080/DSN 676-8080
COMMANDANT
BG James H. Raymer
563-6192
<james.h.raymer.mil@mail.mil>
ASSISTANT COMMANDANT
COL Kevin S. Brown
563-6192
<kevin.s.brown28.mil@mail.mil>
DEPUTY COMMANDANT
Mr. James R. Rowan
563-8080
<james.r.rowan4.civ@mail.mil>
REGIMENTAL COMMAND SERGEANT MAJOR
CSM Bradley J. Houston
563-8060
<bradley.j.houston.mil@mail.mil>
REGIMENTAL CHIEF WARRANT OFFICER
CWO5 John F. Fobish
563-4088
<john.fobish.mil@mail.mil>
DEPUTY ASSISTANT COMMANDANT–USAR
COL Kenneth Z. Jennings
563-8045
<kenneth.z.jennings.mil@mail.mil>
DEPUTY ASSISTANT COMMANDANT–ARNG
LTC Bryan M. Carr
563-8046
<bryan.m.carr4.mil@mail.mil>
CHIEF OF STAFF
LTC William C. Hannan
563-7116
<william.c.hannan2.mil@mail.mil>
COMMANDER, 1ST ENGINEER BRIGADE
COL Martin “Dale” Snider
596-0224, DSN 581-0224
<martin.d.snider.mil@mail.mil>
DIRECTOR OF TRAINING AND LEADER DEVELOPMENT
LTC H.W. Hugh Darville
563-4093
<h.w.darville.mil@mail.mil>
DIRECTOR OF ENVIRONMENTAL INTEGRATION
Mr. Robert F. Danner
563-2845
<robert.f.danner.civ@mail.mil>
COUNTER EXPLOSIVE HAZARDS CENTER
COL Charles G. Phillips
563-8142
<charles.g.phillips.mil@mail.mil>
ASSURED MOBILITY BRANCH, MSCoE CDID, RDD
LTC Larry J. Lyle Jr.
563-5055
<larry.j.lyle.mil@mail.mil>
ENGINEER DOCTRINE, MSCoE CDID, CODDD
LTC Matthew Y. McCulley
563-2717
<matthew.y.mcculley.mil@mail.mil>
ORGANIZATION BRANCH, MSCoE CDID, CODDD
LTC Leonard B. Scott IV
563-6282
<leonard.b.scott.mil@mail.mil>
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1621405

0
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MANAGING EDITOR
Diana K. Dean
EDITOR
Rick Brunk
GRAPHIC DESIGNER
Jennifer Morgan
Editorial Assistant
Cynthia S. Fuller
COMMANDANT
Brigadier General James H. Raymer
Headquarters, Department of the ArmyVolume 46 PB 5-16-3 September–December 2016
U.S. ARMY
ENGINEER SCHOOL
Engineer 1
FEATURES
07 Building Bridges and Interoperability in a Strong Europe:
River-Crossing Operations During Exercise Anakonda 16
By Major James M. Kadel and Captain Olufemi O. Apata
11 To Win in a Complex World: A Tribute to the Multirole Bridge
Company
By Captain Jennifer G. Acojedo
15 Airfield Damage Repair: The Way Ahead
By First Lieutenant Ryan A. Menicucci
18 Airfield Damage Repair: A Core Competency of Airborne Brigade
Engineer Battalions
By Captain Brian T. Williams
20 Airborne Engineers and LARP
By Captain Nicolas K. Massie
24 The Airborne Brigade Engineer Battalion: Lightweight, Power-Packed
Support to the Brigade Combat Team
By Captain Stephen C. Kraus
26 Wet-Gap Crossing: Lessons Learned
By Major Sean R. Hill
28 The New Task Force Engineer Planner
By Mr. Timothy J. Brown
30 The Sustainability of U.S. Army Firing Ranges: Heavy Metals and
the Environment
By Captain Matthew Wright, Mr. Adam Bittinger, Mr. Brian Cassidy,
Ms. Kathryn Lawson, Dr. Brooke N. Stevens, and Ms. Chante Vines
36 10th Brigade Engineer Battalion Conducts Assault Breacher Vehicle
Crew Qualification
By Captain Andrew A. Berreth
39 A Human Endeavor: Developing a Multinational Common Operational
Picture
By Captain Nathan I. Foust
42 Training a Brigade Combat Team Military Intelligence Company
By Captain Sarah A. Starr
47 Building Combat Support in the Brigade Engineer Battalion:
Integrating the Capabilities of Military Intelligence and Signal
Companies
By Captain Heather M. Burch and Captain Alan Adame
55 Counter Explosive Hazards Planning Course
By Mr. Jason Lee Smith
59 Engineer Leader Development Through the
Eisenhower Leader Development Program
By Captain David G. Weart and Captain Guillermo J.
Guandique
E RNGINEEThe Professional Bulletin of Army Engineers
Front cover: U.S. Soldiers assigned to 1st
Engineer Battalion, 1st Armored Brigade Combat
Team, 1st Infantry Division departing the area
after setting up man-made obstacles during Deci-
sive Action rotation 16-08 at the National Training
Center, Fort Irwin, California. (U.S. Army photo)
Back cover: U.S. Army photos
DEPARTMENTS
2 Clear the Way
By Brigadier General
James H. Raymer
4 Lead the Way
By Command Sergeant Major
Bradley J. Houston
5 Show the Way
By Chief Warrant Officer Five
John F. Fobish
34 Engineer Doctrine Update
54 Engineer Writer’s Guide
56 Book Review: Gates of Fire
Reviewed by First Lieutenant Marie
Adams
57 Book Review: Starship Troopers
Reviewed by First Lieutenant
Graham J. Jenkins
50 Emplacing Abatis Obstacles
By Captain Johnny J. Perez Jr., Major Ryan P. Hopkins,
and Lieutenant Colonel Angelo N. Catalano
52 The Road To War for OIR Division Engineers
By Captain Travis J. Legris

2 Engineer
Clear the Way
Brigadier General James H. Raymer
Commandant, U.S. Army Engineer School
T
he U.S. Army is poised to adopt
a new operations concept called
Multi-Do ain Battle. It denotes
cross-domain operations in the context
of joint, combined arms maneuver that
create temporary windows of superiority
across multiple domains and allow joint
forces to seize, retain, and exploit the
initiative.1
This new doctrine enables
operations under four conditions that the
Army and the joint force will face:
■ All five domains—land, sea, air, space,
and cyberspace—will be contested.
■ The future battlefield will be more
lethal.
■ Operations will occur in complex,
restrictive terrain and among the population.
■ Units will operate with degraded capabilities, such as the
jamming of communications.
These four conditions can be compared to the conditions
under which U.S. operations have occurred in Afghanistan
and Iraq since 2001. While operations in those two coun-
tries continue to this day, other developments in the last
15 years have caused a critical examination of the U.S.
Army’s current capabilities and doctrine.
An examination of the 1976 edition of Field Manual (FM)
100-5, Operations, which was published when the Army had
just emerged from another long counterinsurgency
reveals how much change has developed in the operations
concept in the past 40 years. The following paragraphs indi-
cate that the Army of today is thinking about future battle-
field conditions along much the same lines as its 1976
predecessor did:
■ Concerning domains, the 1976 edition stated, “The
Army’s primary objective is to win the land battle . . .
we must assume the enemy we face will possess weapons
generally as effective as our own”2
and “Modern battles
are fought and won by air and land forces working
together. The interaction and cooperation between
air and land forces extends into almost every function
in combat.”3
This edition also noted that “The commander
must view the electromagnetic environment as a
battlefield extension, where a different type of combat
takes place.”4
■ Considering the lethality of the
future battlefield, the 1976 edition
predicted that “Because the lethality
of modern weapons continues to in-
crease sharply, we can expect very
high losses to occur in short periods of
time. Entire forces could be de-
stroyed quickly if they are impro-
perly employed”5
and “Great num-
bers of weapons of advanced destruc-
tiveness have been provided by major
powers to client states; arms pur-
chased by minor but affluent nations
have further spread the latest mili-
tary technology throughout the world.
Recent wars between small nations
have developed intensities formerly
considered within the capabilities
of large states only.”6
■ Regarding battlefield terrain, the 1976 edition noted that
“Battle in Central Europe against forces of the Warsaw
Pact is the most demanding mission the U.S. Army could
beassigned.BecausetheU.S.Armyisstructuredprimarily
for that contingency and has large forces deployed in that
area, this manual is designed mainly to deal with the
realities of such operations”7
and “Many areas of the world,
especially Western Europe, have experienced a massive
growth in built-up areas and man-made changes to the
natural landscape. These changes significantly affect
potential future battlefields. Avoidance of built-up areas
is no longer possible. Rather, military operations in
built-up areas are an integral part of combat oper-
ationsandpresentspecialopportunities andchallengesto
commmanders at all levels . . . the larger problem of con-
ducting operations in continuous and contiguous built-up
areas and the principles of these operations are new.
It is a novel and untested dimension of warfare.”8
■ With respect to degraded capabilities, the 1976 edition
states, “The Soviet Army, or armies based on the Soviet
model, applying radio-electronic combat can selectively
deprive adversaries of control of the electromagnetic
environment”9
and “A command post or weapons
system cannot survive on the modern battlefield if it is
easily identified and located by the characteristics of its
electronics emitters. Their survival is dependent on good
defensive (electronic warfare) tactics which conceal
emitters or deceive the enemy as to their identity and
location.”10

Engineer 3
So why are we going “back to the future” by adopting
Multi-Domain Battle 40 years after the 1976 edition of FM
100-5 introduced AirLand Battle (in Chapter 8)?11
Paul H.
Herbert wrote that “Doctrine the times in which
it is written. This was especially true of the 1976 edition
of FM 100-5, Operations, which was a direct response to
the conditions of the early 1970s. Specifically, the condition
of the Army immediately after Vietnam, a major shift
in American defense policy, and a relative decline in the
Army’s budget all the manual’s authors.”12
More
pointedly, Herbert noted that “As planners looked to the
problem of deterring or resisting aggression in Europe, the
most striking issue was the improvement in Soviet and
Warsaw Pact forces, especially their conventional forces.
The Soviet Union had added five tank divisions to its
forces facing NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization]
since 1965 . . . most telling, however, was the gradual
redeployment of Soviet and Warsaw Pact units to bases
closer to the borders, implying the adoption of a preemptive,
nonnuclear strategy. Outside the NATO area, Soviet naval
and air forces were more modern and far-reaching. In
October 1973, Soviet threats to intervene unilaterally in the
Arab-Israeli War demonstrated new Soviet assertiveness
on the world scene.”13
Fast-forward to today, and we see several Russian
actions that have occurred since the Soviet Union dissolved
in late 1991. Following a period of political turmoil and
economic collapse, Vladimir Putin became acting president
of the Russian Federation in December 1999 and has been
the president or prime minister since then. Under his
leadership, Russia invaded Georgia in August 2008, then
invaded Crimea and eastern Ukraine in 2014, and then
deployed a task force to Syria in 2015 to intervene in its
civil war on behalf of the government of President Bashar
al-Assad. The United States has officially stated that,
“While Russia has contributed in select security areas,
such as counternarcotics and counterterrorism, it also
has repeatedly demonstrated that it does not respect the
sovereignty of its neighbors and it is willing to use force to
achieve its goals. Russia’s military actions are undermining
regional security directly and through proxy forces. These
actions violate numerous agreements that Russia has
signed in which it committed to act in accordance with
international norms, including the [United Nations]
Charter, Helsinki Accords, Russia–NATO Founding Act,
Budapest Memorandum, and the Intermediate-Range
Nuclear Forces Treaty.”14
In World Affairs Journal, Stephen J. Blank writes, “Rus-
sia is also building up its military capability. To judge from
its procurements, the current, large-scale, comprehensive
buildup of weaponry through 2025 aims to acquire a multi-
domain, strategic-level reconnaissance–strike complex as
well as a tactical-level reconnaissance–fire complex that
would together give Russia high-tech precision forces that
could conduct operations in space, under the ocean, in the
air, on the sea and the ground, and in cyberspace. This force
would have parity with the United States and NATO in
conventional and nuclear dimensions of high-tech warfare,
and therefore the capability to deter and intimidate NATO.
It would also have strategic stability, which Russia defines
to include nonnuclear strike capabilities, and therefore
sustain nonnuclear and prenuclear (i.e., before con ict
starts) conventional deterrence across the entire spectrum
of including against internal threats, which now
feature prominently in Russia’s defense doctrine.”15
Despite the great hopes at the conclusion of the Cold War
almost 25 years ago, it is clear that Russia has emerged
again as a potential adversary of the United States. While
the President has stated that international sanctions
against Russia over its actions in Ukraine are “not a new
Cold War,”16
the U.S. Army, as part of the joint force, must
still prepare itself to execute the national military strategy
objective to deter, deny, and defeat state adversaries.17
The
introduction of the Multi-Domain Battle concept recognizes
this fact. As professional engineer Soldiers, let us immerse
ourselves in the study and implementation of the required
skills and capabilities, both engineer-specific and combined
arms, to make this new concept a reality.
Endnotes:
1
Herbert Raymond McMaster, Integra-
tion Center, Leader Professional Development No. 99, Profes-
sional Reading Archives, <http://www.arcic.army.mil/LPD
/_archives?articleSeries=99>, accessed on 19 September 2016.
2
FM 100-5, Operations (with included Change No. 1),
29 April 1977.
3
Ibid.
4
Ibid.
5
Ibid.
6
Ibid.
7
Ibid.
8
Ibid.
9
Ibid.
10
Ibid.
11
Ibid.
12
Paul H. Herbert, “Deciding What Has to be Done: General
William E. DePuy and the 1976 edition of FM 100-5, Opera-
tions,” Leavenworth Paper No. 16, U.S. Army Command and
General Staff College, Combat Studies Institute, July 1988, p. 5.
13
Ibid, p. 6.
14
Joint Chiefs of Staff, “The National Military Strategy of
the United States of America 2015,” June 2015, <http://www
.jcs.mil/portals/36/Documents/Publications/2015_National
_Military_Strategy.pdf>, accessed on 20 September 2016.
15
Stephen J. Blank, “Imperial Ambitions: Russia’s Military
Buildup,” World Affairs Journal, May–June 2015, <http://
www.worldaffairsjournal.org/article/imperial-ambitions
-russia%E2%80%99s-military-buildup>, accessed on 19 Sep-
tember 2016.
(Continued on page 6)

Lead the Way
Command Sergeant Major Bradley J. Houston
Regimental Command Sergeant Major
4 Engineer
G
reetings. I recently attended
the U.S. Army Training and
Doctrine Command (TRADOC)
Command Sergeant Major Workshop
at Fort Eustis, Virginia, and would like
to provide the field with an update on
initiatives under the Noncommissioned
Officer (NCO) 2020 Strategy: NCOs
.1
First, I encourage everyone to
read the NCO 2020 Strategy, which
can be found on the TRADOC Web
site at <http://www.tradoc.army.mil
/FrontPageContent/Docs/NCO2020
.pdf>. All leaders must understand
this strategy and ensure that they
are spending time developing their
young NCOs and Soldiers by using
it. To be successful, future leaders
must have a firm grasp on the various lines of effort
that are laid out in the strategy and use them to guide
their efforts as well as those of other leaders in their
units.
Many NCOs believe that the Select, Train, Educate,
and Promote (STEP) initiative is the NCO 2020 strategy.
STEP is certainly a part of the strategy, but the strategy is
much more than that. Ongoing components of this strategy
include—
■ The Army University.
■ Full use of the One Army School System.
■ Common core integration into advanced and senior
leader courses.
■ An overhaul of the Army Structured Self-Development
System.
■ Expanded use of the Army Career Tracker.
■ An overhaul of all career maps.
■ Creation of a digital job book.
Leaders must understand each of these components and
continue to keep junior leaders and Soldiers informed about
thechangesandtherationalebehindthem.Thecombination
of these efforts will create NCOs who are capable of operat-
ing in a complex world while providing first-class leadership
to our Soldiers.
During the workshop, we identified six major core com-
petencies that will comprise common-core instruction.
These major blocks will be resident in
all NCO Professional Development Sys-
tem (NCOPDS) courses, from the Basic
Leader Course to the Master Leader
Course. The topics under these core
competencies will evolve as NCOs prog-
ress through their NCOPDS journey,
with each course building on the previ-
ous one to expand the NCOs’ knowledge
and mastery of the tasks. The six major
competencies that we developed are—
■ Communications.
■ Leadership.
■ Program management.
■ Operations.
■ Training management.
■ Readiness.
These core subject areas the feedback that I
have received from the NCOs who have attended Profes-
sional Military Education at Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri,
during my tenure. They also address many of the areas
where our leaders in the field want junior NCOs to be more
knowledgeable.
Over the next few months, our team in the Directorate
of Training and Leader Development will analyze current
NCOPDS programs of instruction (POIs) to identify com-
monalities with these core subject areas and identify the
time required to implement them. This will be a great oppor-
tunity for us to update POIs for engineer-specific technical
training and to add these common-core subjects. In the end,
we will have a course that will better prepare NCOs for their
future duties and positively impact the operating efficiency
of our organizations. Focusing on our people and developing
them will continue to give the Army the competitive edge
necessary to defeat our adversaries on any future battlefield.
I encourage all NCOs to stay plugged into the TRA-
DOC command sergeant major’s virtual town hall meet-
ings as he provides updates to the field on this evolution
within our NCO cohort. The next town hall meeting is
scheduled for 3 November 2016 and will cover the third
line of effort in the NCO 2020 Strategy—Stewardship
of the Profession. More information can be found on the
TRADOC Web site, <http://www.tradoc.army.mil/#>, and
I will also disseminate the information to engineer
senior leaders.

Engineer 5
Chief Warrant Officer Five John F. Fobish
Regimental Chief Warrant Officer
Show the Way
G
reetings all! I trust that each of
you had the opportunity to take
time off and enjoy a safe, fun-
filled summer with Family and friends.
It is now official: those of us with school-
age kids have begun a new school year,
and it is a very exciting time for the kids.
Just as this is an exciting time for them
as they attend school for the first time or
continue their academic adventure, these
are exciting times across the Army and
the Engineer Regiment as we continue
to move toward Force 2025 and Beyond.
As the Army transitions, a number
of initiatives will shape the force and
our warrant officer cohort. To facili-
tate these initiatives, the Secretary
of the Army and the Army Chief of
Staff established the Army Leader Development Program
(ALDP) some years ago. The program charter was approved
on 21 December 2007 and codified in Department of the
Army Pamphlet 350-58,
,1
and Army Regulation 350-1,
Leader .2
The ALDP provides the management
process for program execution and approval, the incorpora-
tion of new initiatives, and the prioritization of resources.
The Secretary of the Army established the Army Profes-
sion and Leader Development Forum (APLDF) on 1 June
2015. The charters of the ALDP and APLDF identify the
commanding general of the U.S. Army Training and Doc-
trine Command (TRADOC) as the senior responsible offi-
cial and supported commander responsible for directing the
execution of the ALDP to accomplish the end state estab-
lished by the Department of the Army. The purpose of the
ALDP is to critically examine leader development initia-
tives and programs, discuss related issues, develop poten-
tial courses of action, and advise the TRADOC commander
on a way ahead to improve those programs and initiatives.
One initiative is to review warrant officer Professional
Military Education (PME) to determine its sufficiency in
preparing warrant officers for the future operating envi-
ronment. As the ALDP conducted a review of the Warrant
Officer Intermediate Level Education and Warrant Officer
Senior Service Education common core curricula, the War-
rant Officer Continuum of Learning Study was born.
The study identified gaps in the depth and rigor of
the current warrant officer PME, which fails to prepare
senior warrant officers to support com-
manders as they conduct unified land
operations and the Army profession in
support of Army operational require-
ments. Attention also has been focused
on warrant officer technical PME—
Warrant Officer Basic and Advanced
Courses and Warrant Officer Inter-
mediate Level Education—to find gaps
of depth and rigor in those curricula.
Leaders at the U. S. Army Engineer
School are working exhaustively to
ensure that courses contain the req-
uisite depth, rigor, technical acumen,
and industry best practices to meet the
needs of maneuver commanders as they
employ The U.S. Army Operating Con-
cept: Win in a Co plex World,3
while
executing the Army missions on all three levels of war—
tactical, operational, and strategic.
As we endeavor to infuse engineer PME with the desired
depth, rigor, and requisite skills, we are also working to
include those elements of character development that are
critical to our profession by inspiring and motivating war-
rant officers and students to live by the Army Ethic. Each
of us must work diligently to support this effort as individu-
als and as a cohort.
To strengthen our warrant officer technical education,
strong relationships have been established with academia
and industry. We have requested that colleges and uni-
versities review and give credit to warrant officer courses
for participation in their degree programs. This would
award credit for the experience and education of warrant
officers as they attend PME. Positive feedback promises
to make this a reality. More details in the area of curricu-
lum, transferable credits, and credit for experience must be
determined before the program can be approved, piloted,
and codified.
We are fortunate to have strong partnerships with
industry leaders in construction engineering and geospa-
tial engineering. To support the growth and development of
construction technicians, Starbucks®
Corporation provides
a 12-month Training with Industry (TWI) opportunity as
senior project managers for construction engineering tech-
nicians (Military Occupational Specialty 120A) in the cor-
poration’s design and construction department. This train-
ing opportunity enhances the project management skills

6 Engineer
of construction technicians with real-world experience in
construction management, while introducing them to the
latest best practices in construction project management
and construction techniques.
The Harris®
Corporation also provides a 12-month
training opportunity for geospatial engineering techni-
cians (Military Occupational Specialty 125D) in its Envi-
ronment for Visualizing Images software program. The
program gives geospatial engineering technicians extensive
exposure to corporate managerial techniques and industrial
procedures in image-processing software development
and programming.
The TWI program at the Environmental Systems
Research Institute allows geospatial engineering techni-
cians to work with the latest ArcGIS™ products—such
as cloud-based mapping, editing and analysis tools, and
ArcGIS for Server—that include a range of client applica-
tions that summarize critical information, bring maps into
mainstream intelligence software, and help field crews col-
lect data. These opportunities enhance the management
skills of geospatial engineering technicians as they direct
the development, collection, and distribution of geospatial
products and data.
All three TWI opportunities also support the objectives
of The Army Warrant Officer 2025 Strategy: In Support of
Force 2025 and Beyond,4
in identifying additional cohort
efforts to support Army priority investments in educa-
tion, training, and leader development and in meeting the
future force objectives by providing support in our highly
specialized roles as the Army’s systems operators, manag-
ers, integrators, and leaders.
Upon completion of these TWI opportunities, warrant
officers are assigned to work in the U.S. Army Engineer
School Department of Training and Leader Develop-
ment as instructor/writers and training developers. They
share the experiences and industry best practices they
have acquired so that they can be integrated into PME
to increase the depth, rigor, and technical expertise of
warrant officer education. This will enable engineer war-
rant officers to fulfill the operational expectations of
Force 2025 and Beyond, meet the objectives of The Army
Warrant Officer 2025 Strategy, and support the full spec-
trum of engineering operations to enable maneuver com-
manders to decisively accomplish their missions within
the Army Operating Concept.
We must take advantage of credentialing, certification,
and TWI opportunities as ways to strengthen our trade
craft. By doing so, we will increase the level of technical
competency throughout the Engineer Regiment and become
engineer warrant officers who are capable of expertly exe-
cuting core competencies and technical skills while think-
ing critically, anticipating and communicating engineer
mission requirements, and providing a level of technical
expertise that will enable the success of the Army to win in
a complex world.
I ask that you continue to network and communicate
with each other and with the Engineer School at its mil-
Suite site at <https://www.us.army.mil/suite/designer>.
This will encourage and strengthen the ties that bind us
together throughout the Engineer Regiment. While serving
in your area of operations, help each other to become capa-
ble, professional, and ethical engineer warrant officers.
Strive to become technologically agile, adaptive, and inno-
vative leaders who maintain Army capability overmatch,
reduce logistical demands for Force 2025 and Beyond,
and ensure that commanders achieve mission success
every time.
Until next time, please be safe, be committed, be compe-
tent, and be that leader of character we all need you to be.
Essayons.
Endnotes:
1
Department of the Army Pamphlet 350-58, Leader Devel-
, 8 March 2013.
2
Army Regulation 350-1, Devel-
, 19 August 2014.
3
The U.S. Army Operating Concept: Win in a Co plex
World, 31 October 2014.
4
The Army Warrant Officer 2025 Strategy: In Support of
Force 2025 and Beyond, <http://www.tradoc.army.mil/tpubs
/misc/WO2025_Strategy_20160329.pdf>, accessed on 13 Sep-
tember 2016.
These are exciting times for the NCO Corps, and I am
convinced that they will continue to be the envy of every
other army in the world. I am honored to play a part in
shaping the future of education for the outstanding profes-
sionals who make up the NCO Corps.
Until next time—Essayons!
Endnote:
1
NCO 2020 Strategy:
World, 4 December 2015, <http://www.tradoc.army.mil
/FrontPageContent/Docs/NCO2020.pdf> accessed on 20 Sep-
tember 2016.
16
Josh Gerstein, “Obama: ‘Not a New Cold War,’” Politico,
30 June 2014, <http://www.politico.com/story/2014/07/obama
-sanctions-russia-ukraine-109510?>, accessed on 20 Septem-
ber 2016.
17
Joint Chiefs of Staff, June 2015.

Engineer 7
I
n June 2016, more than 31,000 military service mem-
bers from 23 nations converged in Poland to participate
in Exercise Anakonda 16. Among these forces was a
multinational military engineer task force that consisted
of members from the United States, Germany, the Neth-
erlands, and the United Kingdom under the command of
the U.S. 18th Military Police Brigade, 21st Theater Sus-
tainment Command. For many participants, the exercise
marked the first opportunity in recent years for North
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) engineer bridging
units to train together in a large, combined arms operation
and to act as part of a multinational engineer bridging task
force in Europe.
Exercise Anakonda 16 provided a unique training envi-
ronment for engineer bridging units to improve interopera-
bility among allied and partner nations using similar bridg-
ing systems. The exercise provided a venue for multiple
nations to mass engineer bridging assets and emplace tacti-
cal bridges to demonstrate NATO readiness. It also provided
a chance for U.S. Army engineers to work with European
allies. Building on these skill sets, a multinational solution
was necessary to meet the tactical bridging requirements of
the mission since no single nation could fulfill these require-
ments on its own on the European continent.
Since 2008, U.S. Army Europe (USAREUR) has pos-
sessed no assigned, in-theater tactical engineer bridging
units. To conduct wet-gap crossing training in Europe for
exercises such as Exercise Anakonda 16, a bridging unit
with equipment needed to be sourced from outside Europe.
This presented some challenges during exercise planning.
To solve this capability gap, USAREUR funded participa-
tion by the 361st Multirole Bridge Company (MRBC), a
subordinate unit of the U.S. Army Reserve 391st Engi-
neer Battalion, 412th Theater Engineer Command, which
By Major James M. Kadel and Captain Olufemi O. Apata

8 Engineer
is USAREUR’s only
regionally aligned
engineer command.
The Total Army
emphasis on leverag-
ing all Army compo-
nents enabled this
effort and undoubt-
edly benefited the
unit and the gain-
ing command.
During the exer-
cise, the 361st MRBC
participated with
bridging units of
other armies to con-
duct a tactical river-
crossing operation
at Chelmno, Poland.
Four countries used two types of tactical bridging systems,
the M3 amphibious bridge and the ribbon bridge, to cross the
Vistula River there. The U.S. 2d Cavalry Regiment crossed
theriveronanM3amphibiousbridgeon8June,whilethePol-
ish 1st Battalion, 17th Mechanized Infantry Brigade, crossed
on an improved ribbon bridge on 15 June. These operations
were the culmination of brigade task force training during
the exercise.
The river crossings comprised a combined arms opera-
tion involving seven countries and approximately 1,200
personnel, including engineer, military police, air defense,
cavalry, and aviation units and local municipal authori-
ties. The 18th Military Police Brigade from USAREUR
served as the brigade level controlling headquarters. With
no engineer brigades stationed in Europe, the 18th Mili-
tary Police Brigade was the only maneuver support brigade
U.S., Dutch, and German engineers complete a ribbon bridge during Exercise Anakonda 16.
Soldiers of the 361st MRBC raft an infantry assault force across the Vistula River.

Engineer 9
headquarters capable of providing mission command to
river-crossing operations during Exercise Anakonda 16.
The exercise provided a tremendous training opportunity
for military police and engineer Soldiers since their training
was integrated into the river-crossing operations. Adding
to the complexity of the mission set, this was the first time
that the 18th Military Police Brigade had provided mission
command of nonorganic multinational and multicomponent
engineer and military police soldiers to conduct a combined
arms river crossing in Europe.
German Army Panzer Pioneer Battalion 130 task-
organized all bridging units under its command, acting as the
crossing area headquarters, designated Task Force 130 for
the exercise. There were two company level tactical bridging
headquarters, organized by the two bridging systems in use.
One of the company headquarters was the M3 Amphibious
Bridge Company, a unit created for the exercise, consisting
of British and German M3 bridge units. The other company
headquarters included the 361st MRBC, with a German
improved ribbon bridge platoon and a standard ribbon bridge
platoon from the Netherlands. The overall bridging capabil-
ity provided by the task force was a span of 370 meters with
M3 bridging and 400 meters with ribbon bridging.
Also included under the 18th Military Police Brigade
were two military police battalions and a platoon of air
defense artillery. The 175th Military Police Battalion, Mis-
souri Army National Guard, was responsible for movement
control during the crossing operations, and the 709th Mili-
tary Police Battalion was responsible for farside movement
and traffic control. A platoon from the 1st Battalion, 174th
Air Defense Artillery Brigade, Ohio Army National Guard,
provided air defense to the crossing site.
When soldiers from NATO countries train together, they
use NATO standardization agreements as the doctrinal
standards for training and assessment. In Exercise Ana-
konda 16, engineer bridging units used NATO Standardiza-
tion Agreement 2395, Deliberate Water Crossing Procedures,1
which outlines the doctrinal methodology, terminology, and
procedures required to conduct what the U.S. Army calls a
deliberate wet-gap crossing.2
While terminology may differ,
most of the underlying concepts are the same, which allowed
a seamless integration of NATO training standards into the
training plans of commanders.
As equipment and personnel converged on Chelmno to
train together on the Vistula River, Task Force 130 orga-
nized assembly areas and water training areas for the two
types of bridges being used. Two locations on the river
allowed simultaneous training and rehearsals by both types
and gave junior leaders from different armies the -
ibility to train their units with other units using the same
bridge systems. Soon, junior leaders saw benefits from
training with other nations, which led to increased effi-
ciency, faster bridge erection, and improved communication
“Exercise Anakonda 16 provided
a unique training environment
for engineer bridging units to
improve interoperability among
allied and partner nations using
similar bridging systems.”
Mechanized infantry forces are rafted across the Vistula River during a combined arms river crossing.

among participating units. For instance, leaders
developed a simple yet effective standard
operating procedure for hand and
arm signals by U.S., German, and
Dutch units. This enabled raft com-
manders on the water to over-
come language barriers and com-
municate effectively to guide
the emplacement of ribbon
bridge sections.
On 8 June, the 2d Cav-
alry Regiment moved from its
assembly area to Chelmno, near
the Vistula River crossing site.
The previous day, Soldiers of the
82d Airborne Division had jumped
into Torun, Poland, with elements
from the U.S. Army 173d Airborne Bri-
gade Combat Team and allied paratroop-
ers from the United Kingdom and Poland to seize
farside terrain ahead of the river-crossing operation.
On the morning of 8 June, the M3 Amphibious Company
constructed a 350-meter tactical bridge in approximately
30 minutes to facilitate the movement of Strykers and sup-
port vehicles for the 2d Cavalry Regiment. Military police
Soldiers controlled military traffic on both sides of the cross-
ing area, while local police assisted with civilian traffic.
Once sufficient combat power had been established in a tac-
tical assembly area on the farside of the river, 2d Cavalry
Regiment vehicles continued movement southeast, toward
the city of Torun, where they conducted a forward passage of
lines with paratroopers from the 82d Airborne Division and
the 173d Airborne Brigade Combat Team.
On 15 June, a Polish Army mechanized infantry battal-
ion participated in a second deliberate river-crossing opera-
tion at Chelmno. The ribbon bridge units conducted rafting
operations to put an assault force across the Vistula River
before constructing a bridge. As they did during the 8 June
crossing, military police soldiers controlled movement into
and out of the crossing area, while air defense and aviation
units provided area security. Although ribbon bridge con-
struction took a little longer than the construction of the
M3 amphibious bridge, the training conducted by the U.S.,
German, and Dutch ribbon bridge units contributed to a
smooth and coordinated river crossing.
The integration of military police and air defense soldiers
and other enablers into the river crossing enhanced the real-
ism of the training, enabled a combined arms crossing in
accordance with NATO doctrinal standards, and achieved
the largest river-crossing operation any of the participating
units had ever experienced. The interoperability between
the participating nations and units greatly enhanced NATO
readiness and built cross proficiency in communication sys-
tems, doctrinal terms and graphics, mission command, and
bridging equipment. Junior leaders implemented creative
training scenarios such as nighttime bridging and raft-
ing in blackout conditions to challenge their crews in new
10 Engineer
ways. With limited European tactical bridging
assets available among our NATO allies
and partner nations, the engineer bridg-
ing interoperability builds readi-
ness and enables freedom of move-
ment for land forces in training
and in responding to real-world
scenarios.
Three lessons learned about
bridging operations during
Exercise Anakonda 16 stand
out. First, the individual learn-
ing and training accomplished
are significantly enhanced by
working alongside engineers from
NATO allies and partner nations.
The improvement in unit standard
operating procedures and performance
gained from multinational exercises cannot
be replicated in a typical stateside combat train-
ing center rotation. Second, engineer interoperability is
critical to U.S. Army and NATO readiness since no single
nation can meet the freedom of movement requirements in
Europe. We must be able to integrate procedures, communi-
cations, and standards anywhere in Europe with allied and
partner engineer units. Third, exercises in Europe provide
dynamic opportunities for U.S. Army engineers to partici-
pate in training not readily available at home station or dur-
ing combat training center rotations.
In USAREUR, tactical bridging currently requires a
multinational solution for exercises and real-world freedom
of movement. Tactical bridging training during Exercise
Anakonda 16 successfully achieved enhanced interoperabil-
ity for all units and nations involved and set the stage for
future multinational engineer bridging opportunities.
Endnotes:
1
Standardization Agreement 2395 (Edition 3), Deliberate
Water Crossing Procedures, 24 January 2007.
2
Army Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures 3-90.4, -
, 10 August 2011.
Major Kadel serves as an engineer planner in the USAREUR
Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, Engineer. He holds a bach-
elor of arts degree Northwest Nazarene University,
Idaho.
Captain Apata serves as an engineer planner in the
USAREUR Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, Engineer. He
holds a bachelor’s degree in app -
eral University of Technology, Akure, Nigeria, and a
degree in and services the University
of Maryland.

Engineer 11
By Captain Jennifer G. Acojedo
D
ue to the publicity associated with combat engi-
neers, Military Occupational Specialty (MOS) 12B,
there is a common misconception that the bridge
crewmembers (MOS 12C) from multirole bridge companies
(MRBCs) are secondary to more prominent engineer units.
That myth fuels the healthy, competitive banter that exists
between Soldiers with those MOSs. Fortunately, bridge
crewmembers are aware of the significance of their skill set.
They believe that their capability is a critical aspect needed
to win in a complex world, and leaders across the Engineer
Regiment continue to publicly reaffirm that belief. At a
recent Army Engineer Association breakfast, guest speaker
Colonel Jason L. Smallfield, then U.S. Army Engineer School
assistant commandant, described a combined arms gap
crossing as the Army’s most complex operation. And during
a 36th Engineer Brigade semiannual training briefing,
Major General John Uberti, deputy commanding general
for operations for the U.S. Army’s III Armored Corps, Fort
Hood, Texas, called bridging the “Holy Grail.”
To bridge crewmembers and Soldiers associated with
MRBCs, such comments are always comforting. Since there
is plenty of literature highlighting the historical feats and
unparalleled capabilities of the MRBC, this article is not
meant to inform the uninformed of its significance. Instead,
it sheds light on the inherent challenges of the MRBC, which
are often realized only by Soldiers serving in such units. Rec-
ognizing these challenges will allow a greater appreciation
for the MRBC, whose capability further enables the Engi-
neer Regiment to contribute to the Army mission of winning
in a complex world.
The 50th MRBC is the first Army unit able to construct a 46-meter dry span bridge.

.
12 Engineer
T
he MRBC table of organization and equipment
is composed of almost 200 Soldiers, making it
one of the largest company size elements in
the U.S. Army. From a numerical standpoint, it can
be argued that Soldiers serving in specialty MOSs in
an MRBC have equal or greater levels of responsibil-
ity than Soldiers serving in more prominent units.
For example, MRBCs are authorized two medical
specialists who are responsible for the medical over-
sight of nearly 200 personnel. Sapper companies are
authorized three medical specialists and a senior
medic, who together are responsible for the medical
oversight of about 100 Soldiers. In a garrison environ-
ment, the medical specialist serving in an MRBC and
the senior medic serving in a sapper company have
the same level of responsibility, despite a difference
in pay grade and in the ratio of medical personnel to
assigned Soldiers.
The rating scheme is another inherent challenge.
In an MRBC, staff sergeant squad leaders are known
as section leaders, each of whom is responsible for
21 Soldiers. One of those 21 Soldiers is a staff ser-
geant who serves as the senior boat. Before the
release of the new Department of the Army Form
2166-8, Officer Evaluation Report,1
there was an unspoken consensus that a drawback to
that hierarchy was that staff sergeant section lead-
ers were required to rate staff sergeant senior boats, despite
the fact that both were in the same pay grade. Furthermore,
the Army Select, Train, Educate, Promote (STEP) System
allowed senior boats to complete the Advanced Leaders
Course and Structured Self-Development IV in step with
their raters, the staff sergeant section leaders. The Evalu-
ation Entry System has since corrected these drawbacks by
requiring platoon sergeants to rate senior boats and section
leaders. However, this also means that MRBC platoon lead-
ers must act as senior raters for senior boats and section
leaders, much the same as brigade commanders rate com-
pany commanders and staff captains—a responsibility not
typically bestowed on platoon leaders.
Maintenance
M
RBCs have robust maintenance programs and
one of the largest company size motor pools in the
Army. In addition to being equipped with rolling
stock common to other units, they have MKII bridge erection
boats, ramps, bays, cradles, and dry span bridge launchers,
Soldiers continue the labor-intensive job of assembling a med-
ium girder bridge.
Noncommissioned officers train bridge crewmembers to operate a combat bridge transporter at
Training Area 250, Fort Leonard Wood.

Engineer 13
cranes, and modules. Despite having twice
the amount of vehicles and equipment to
service and maintain, MRBCs are often
allotted the same amount of maintenance
space as smaller units. The challenge of
working in a physically constrained environ-
ment is further exacerbated by the unique
unit inventory. Finding required parts in
outdated or nonexistent technical manuals
makes the routine task of ordering parts
and performing maintenance even more
time-intensive. A prime example is the need
to use a commercial online search engine
to find the proper bilge pump, gauges, and
electrical schematics for the MKII bridge
erection boat—none of which can be found
in the technical manual. Another example
is the lack of a technical manual for the
46-meter dry support bridge and the exper-
tise on using the equipment because it was
so recently fielded. Although the 80-hour
maintenance training provided by the man-
ufacturer is not required for the success
of the MRBC maintenance program, the
$55,000–65,000 training could potentially
improve maintenance efficiency and result in cost savings.
T
he most complex operation that MRBCs are
required to conduct—a combined arms gap cross-
ing—is also one of the Army’s most complex opera-
tions. Although many authorities acknowledge the diffi-
culty of the task, executing it could become a lost art when
considering the infrequency of training. Army Regulation
350-50, states that
“the (combat training centers) are the ‘engine of change’ for
collective training,”2
yet MRBCs do not participate as the
rotational training unit at the National Training Center,
Fort Irwin, California, or the Joint Readiness Training Cen-
ter, Fort Polk, Louisiana. Since MRBCs don’t participate
in combat training center rotations, the annual Reserve
Bridge crewmembers hone their skills in constructing an improved ribbon
bridge capable of withstanding heavy vehicle traffic.
Fast-water training creates realistic operating conditions and challenges the ability of boat operators to maneuver
interior bays and ramps.

.
. .
14 Engineer
Component gap-crossing exercise at Fort Chaffee, Arkan-
sas, is the training event best suited to certify the units
because of the operating environment of the event and the
large number of mission-essential tasks executed. This
exercise takes place at a great location for improved rib-
bon bridge (IRB) training because it has four unrestricted
slips and a current strong enough to test the most profi-
cient Army boat operators, guaranteeing that Soldiers and
leaders are exposed to multiple facets of bridging opera-
tions. Historically, only one Regular Army MRBC has been
allowed to participate; the challenge for units is securing
permission to participate. Providing MRBCs with oppor-
tunities to train with maneuver units, other MRBCs, and
enablers is critical to introducing the Army to the complexi-
ties of a gap crossing. Stimulating this dormant capability
has become increasingly important as we transition away
from counter-insurgency operations.
Systems
A
ccording to the Army standardized mission-
essential task list, MRBCs must maintain profi-
.ciency on three systems:
■ Dry support bridge (DSB). The inherent challenge
with the DSB is the long lead time required to receive
parts that must be ordered from its overseas manu-
facturer. Because the equipment was only recently
fielded, there is yet not enough data to identify which
parts need to be included in bench stock to ameliorate
the situation.
■ IRB. The IRB is the Army’s primary assault bridge
and the most-used U.S. bridging system. Unlike training
on the DSB, IRB training requires a body of water. Given
the current locations of Regular Army MRBCs and the
restrictions of environmental regulations, the number
of feasible training sites is limited. If fiscal constraints
are considered, then finding a suitable location becomes
an even greater challenge. However, fast-water locations
are essential to creating the complex and dynamic
environment required for bridge crewmembers to main-
tain training proficiency.
■ Bailey bridge. MRBCs are not equipped with the Bai-
ley bridge, which is only accessible at one of the training
areas at Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri. Most Regular
Army MRBCs conduct training on the Bailey bridge just
once a year.
Every unit in the Army overcomes challenges to accom-
plish the mission. However, because there are only four
Regular Army MRBCs, their challenges and contributions
are often overlooked. Bridge crewmembers do not have the
opportunity to perform their core competencies as often as
Soldiers in other MOSs; and due to the scarcity of MRBCs,
they are not at the forefront of the Engineer Regiment. This
article pays tribute to the Soldiers and leaders whom I had
the privilege of leading as commander of the 50th MRBC. It
also aims to develop a greater appreciation for MRBCs by
recognizing the challenges they overcome to provide a capa-
bility that is needed now more than ever.
The MRBC stands ready to provide the personnel and
equipment to transport, assemble, disassemble, retrieve, and
maintain all standard and nonstandard U.S. Army bridging
systems. MRBCs are specialized units with value and sig-
nificance that are often realized only when the need arises
to conduct a gap crossing. That need gives MRBC Soldiers
the opportunity to showcase their ability to let command-
ers quickly maneuver and respond to maintain momentum
across an obstacle.
Bridge the gap!
For further information about the capabilities of the DSB
and IRB, read “Bridging the Gap—Modernizing Army Bridge
Units,” by Lieutenant Colonel Andrew DiMarco.3
For fur-
ther analysis on the complexities of gap crossings, read Gap
Crossings: Not Just a Tactical , by Major Kristen
N. Dahle.4
Endnotes:
1
Department of the Army Form 2166-8,
Officer Evaluation Report, 17 April 2015.
2
Army Regulation 350-50, The Center Pro-
3 April 2013.
3
Andrew DiMarco, “Bridging the Gap—Modernizing Army
Bridge Units,” Engineer Professional Bulletin, Vol. 34, April–
June 2004, pp. 2–21.
4
Kristen N. Dahle, Gap Crossings: Not Just a Tactical Prob-
, CreateSpace Independent Publishing Platform, 30 Septem-
ber 2012.
Captain Acojedo serves as the of the 50th MRBC,
5th Engineer Battalion, Fort Leonard Wood. She holds a bach-
elor’s degree in engineering the U.S. Mili-
tary Point, New York, and a degree in
engineering Missouri University of Science and
Technology at Rolla. Her education includes the Engi-
neer Officer Basic and Advanced Courses, U.S. Air Assault
School, U.S. Ar y Airborne School, and U.S. Ar y Path-
finder School.
Leaders conduct training and equipment familiarization to
ensure that drivers master the fundamentals of the unique
inventory of the MRBC.

Engineer 15
A
irfield seizure is often the decisive point in contin-
gency operations because airfields enable military
.forces to “fight, sustain, and win.”1
Although the
defending force has the advantages of time and terrain, the
offense can exploit its own advantages
of initiative and surprise to overwhelm
the defending forces. The success of the
offense depends on its speed and surprise.2
Before an assault on an airfield can
begin, the air space must be cleared and
enemy air defense assets neutralized.
Accurate and strategic fires on the airfield
can achieve those goals. One key enemy air
defense asset is the runway itself. Damage
to the airfield disables the enemy ability
to gain air superiority or conduct follow-
on counterattacks. If the runway is dam-
aged as a result of strategic bombing, then
the offensive force must be able to rapidly
repair it to allow aircraft to land and carry
on with the fight. This is where light air-
field repair package (LARP) platoons fit in
the operational picture.
LARP platoons provide rapid runway
repair (RRR) expertise and knowledge
for the task force commander. When a runway is ren-
dered unusable, LARP platoons are capable of repair-
ing the damage to assure mobility for the maneuver
commander. LARP platoons can drop the equipment
By First Lieutenant Ryan A. Menicucci
Paratroopers from the 161st Engineer Support Company demonstrate how
to install fiber-reinforced polymer matting.

16 Engineer
necessary to conduct RRR, deploy by air with the assault-
ing force, provide timely assessment of the runway, and
repair any damage. Although crater repair is the most likely
damage d in contingency operations, RRR includes
obstacles that need to be cleared off the runway. Today, that
encompasses any creative impediment the enemy can think
of, including explosive obstacles.
As the operating environment changes and technology
improves, LARP platoons must be able to adapt to provide
task force commanders with the skills necessary to quickly
open runways. The U.S. Army Engineer Research Develop-
ment Center spent the last decade improving LARP capabili-
ties. Proposed components of the new airfield damage repair
kit were tested during the first 2 weeks of March 2016. Sol-
diers from the 161st Engineer Support Company (Airborne)
and select units from the 82d Airborne Division trained on
the old methods and equipment, then demonstrated how
much quicker and easier the task was with different equip-
ment and methods.
The newly purposed airfield damage repair kit includes
better fiber-reinforced polymer matting with a new asphalt
anchoring system and more attachments for skid steers.
The kit is packed in two plastic boxes and is being tested for
airdrop on a 20-foot platform. The old kit consisted of four
boxes constructed from 2- x 4-inch lumber and plywood and
placed on a 24-foot platform.
An engineer uses a
cone penetrometer to
determine if the surface
is strong enough to sup-
port aircraft landings.
Airborne engineers test the effectiveness of the high-mobility engineer excavator while
filling a crater.

Engineer 17
The new fiber-reinforced polymer matting (also known as
foreign object damage cover) is certified for C-17 or C-130
aircraft. Matting improvements include—
■ Interchangeable half-panels, making assembly easier
and reducing assembly time.
■ New anchor panels, using anchor bolts for a stronger
anchoring system.
■ Improved anchor bushings, making joints stronger and
easing installation.
■ New panels featuring a stronger overall design.
■ Improved anchoring system for asphalt runways.
The new skid steer attachments could provide redun-
dancy for LARP platoons or even reduce the amount of
equipment that is required to repair a crater. New attach-
ments to the skid steer include—
■ Rock saw.
■ Pavement breaker.
■ Bucket loader.
■ Compaction roller.
A full LARP package consists of five to eight plat-
forms, depending on the nature of the repair mission. The
attachments may reduce the number of heavy drops in a
LARP package.
Most skid steer attachments proved capable of accom-
plishing the mission. The pavement breaker was able to
effectively break concrete, and the roller attachment proved
fully capable. Although the compaction roller attachment
was not as effective as a vibratory roller, it was able to com-
pact the middle layer of dirt between two layers of sand grid
to repair large craters. That capability reduces the time
needed to compact dirt during the crater repair process rela-
tive to using a hand tamp. The rock saw very effectively cut
concrete and did not require water while in operation, elimi-
nating one logistical consideration. However, if rebar were
present in the concrete, LARP platoons would need a res-
cue saw, which is included in the airfield damage repair and
RRR kits.
On 17 March 2016, Soldiers and leaders from all over the
world arrived at Sicily Drop Zone, Fort Bragg, North Caro-
lina, as Soldiers from the 161st Engineer Support Company
and the 82d Airborne Division demonstrated the LARP and
incorporated new assets that they had trained on just a week
earlier.3
Special guests included senior representatives from
the 82d Airborne Division; the U.S. Army Engineer School,
Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri; and the Maneuver Support
Center of Excellence, Fort Leonard Wood.
The paratroopers learned new and better methods of
accomplishing their missions. With these recommended
changes, LARP platoons have the ability to adapt to
today’s operating environment and to continue to improve
unit readiness.
Endnotes:
1
Gordon C. Bonham, “Airfield Seizure: The Modern ‘Key to
the Country,’ ” School of Advanced Military Studies, U.S. Army
Command and General Staff College, 22 March 1991, p. 3.
2
Ibid., p. 6.
3
Unified Facilities Criteria 3-270-07, Sand Grid Repair,
30 June 2003, p. 21.
When this article was written, First Lieutenant Menicucci
was a LARP platoon leader in the 161st Engineer Support
Battalion (Airborne), 20th Engineer
Brigade. He holds a bachelor’s degree -
ing and is a graduate of the Engineer Basic Officer Leader
Airborne School.
Paratroopers conduct initial training on the rock saw while squaring a crater.

18 Engineer
J
oint forcible entry (JFE) operations allow the United
States to project capability and military force into any
region of the world.1
They serve as a deterrent and
viable military option for U.S. policy enforcement. The sei-
zure of airfields is vital to the success of the JFE mission.2
This type of mission requires paratroopers to—
■ Neutralize enemy forces and any air defense weaponry
defending the airstrip.
■ Preserve the airstrip for the introduction of follow-on
forces.
Once the lodgment is established, aircraft landing
sequences can be used to begin building combat power.
In Europe, units such as the 173d Airborne Brigade,
capable of conducting JFE operations, provide a unique
skill set to reassure allies; they train to fight an enemy
that is able to obstruct or damage an airfield. Since U.S.
Army combat engineers can emplace an effective crater-
blocking obstacle in a few minutes, it is reasonable to assume
that a near-peer opponent can just as quickly damage an air-
strip with effective obstacles before an airborne insertion.
Airborne combat engineers must possess airfield damage
repair (ADR) capabilities, which directly contribute to the
success of JFE operations. Without a dedicated and priori-
tized ADR element, an airfield seizure operation could lose
all momentum within the first few hours, eliminating any
potential for a deterrent effect. In light of the operational
environment in Europe and the ever-present need for light,
fast airfield seizure equipment and skills, the 54th Bri-
gade Engineer Battalion (BEB) (Airborne), 173d Airborne
Brigade, began developing its expedient ADR capability
through training and materiel procurement.
I
n early 2015, before the unit transformation to a dedi-
cated BEB, Soldiers of the 173d Brigade Special Troops
Battalion (Airborne) participated in multiple exer-
cises to hone their ADR and crater repair techniques. The

Engineer 19
British 16th Air Assault Brigade Exercise Pegasus Gaul in
the United Kingdom, from 9 to 17 May 2015, brought Brit-
ish paratroopers and U.S. airborne engineers from the 37th
BEB and 173d Brigade Special Troops Battalion (Airborne)
together to establish a common understanding of ADR and
crater repair. At Exercise Eagle Phoenix, 18–24 May 2015,
the Slovenian Rodovski Battalion and the 173d Brigade
Special Troops Battalion (Airborne) constructed multiple
concrete pads in the Pocek Training Area, Slovenia, as part
of a joint crater demolition and repair training event. Both
of these opportunities provided 173d Airborne Brigade
engineers a unique perspective into allied engineering and
reinforced the North Atlantic Treaty Organization trend
of shifting the focus of combat engineer training toward
conventional warfare instead of counterinsurgency. As the
173d Brigade Special Troops Battalion (Airborne) cased
its colors and transformed into the 54th BEB in Vicenza,
Italy, in June 2015, the headquarters and engineer com-
panies quickly embraced the organization’s role in provid-
ing enhanced engineer expertise to the brigade. Along with
the previously understood roles of mobility, countermobil-
ity, and survivability, the battalion assumed the task of
ADR, which was a more significant airfield seizure engi-
neer responsibility than had previously been placed on the
special troops battalion. In December 2015, Exercise Dag-
ger Resolve incorporated airborne engineers from the 27th
Engineer Battalion; the 37th BEB from Fort Bragg, North
Carolina; and 54th BEB engineers from Vicenza with con-
struction engineers from the 15th Engineer Battalion,
Grafenwoehr, Germany. The forces assembled in Italy for
a week of academic training and the development of tac-
tics, techniques, and procedures, with a follow-on heavy-
equipment airborne drop and field-training exercise in
Hohenfels, Germany. The training was especially useful in
developing unit standard operating procedures and estab-
lishing a shared understanding between Europe-based
engineer organizations and the XVIII Airborne Corps best
practices for field landing strip (FLS) clearance and ADR.
I
n April 2016, Company B, 54th BEB, was tasked with
FLS clearance and crater repair in support of the 173d
Airborne Brigade JFE exercise, Saber Junction 16. Along
with U.S. Air Force combat controllers from the 321st Spe-
cial Tactics Squadron, airborne engineers from Company B
cleared the dirt FLS of wire obstacles, mines, and unex-
ploded ordnance in preparation for C-130 airlands. On the
simulated airstrip, Company B encountered a deliberate
crater with a 25-foot diameter and an approximate depth
of 8 feet. With real-world due to land in less than
12 hours, Company B engineers worked through the night
to repair the dirt airstrip.
Although the FLS clearance, crater repair, and combat
controller integration were successful and essential to the
173d Airborne Brigade mission in Saber Junction 16, the
exercise shed light on several organizational oversights
regarding ADR preparedness. To execute the crater repair
during the exercise, the 54th BEB relied on notionally air-
dropped platforms to introduce equipment into the theater
for a variety of reasons, mostly related to worn or outdated
equipment. Also, each airborne BEB is expected to conduct
clearance and repair operations regardless of the airstrip
surface type. This requires the addition of a vibratory roller
and a water distributor, which were provided by the 15th
Engineer Battalion to execute crater repair and airstrip
maintenance during Saber Junction 16.
E
quipping units for ADR goes well beyond the usual
authorized vehicles and includes the acquisition of
ADR kits, forward air supply boxes, concrete saws,
pavement breakers, foreign object debris covers, and a
litany of other tools and expendable items. Determining
how many resources and how much training time to com-
mit to crater repair presents a significant challenge for all
airborne BEBs and engineer companies. While the autho-
rized hydraulic, electric, pneumatic, petroleum-operated
equipment kit includes vast equipment and has a variety
of uses, it does not fit the bill for an expeditious package
for airfield seizures. The accompanying power packs are
too heavy to move rapidly; and with 13 or more containers,
the product is not conducive to streamlined repair opera-
tions. The 54th BEB experience during Saber Junction 16
proved that a more expeditious and consolidated ADR pack-
age is needed and should be provided to airborne BEBs.
The 54th BEB sent representatives to the ADR Limited
Objective Experiment at Sicily Drop Zone, Fort Bragg, from
29 February to 18 March 2016. The combined airborne
engineer element tested various equipment packages for
crater repair and used an improved ADR kit created by the
U.S. Army Engineer Research and Development Command.
That package should be incorporated as an issued property
book item to all airborne engineer companies. While govern-
ment purchase card procurements and operational needs
statement requests can be used to fund additional equip-
ment for ADR, a more methodical approach across the Engi-
neer Regiment is required.
“Airborne combat engineers must possess airfield
damage repair (ADR) capabilities, which directly
contribute to the success of JFE operations.”

20 Engineer
T
he 37th Brigade Engineer Battalion (BEB), along
with its parent unit, 2d Brigade Combat Team
(BCT), 82d Airborne Division, Fort Bragg, North
Carolina, assumed global response force (GRF) responsibil-
ity in October 2014. The GRF, supported by a BCT from the
82d Airborne Division, is prepared to deploy shortly after
initial notification. The GRF and its enablers will remain
mission-ready as long as it is designated as the GRF-1. U.S.
Forces Command usually rotates airborne BCTs on a regu-
lar basis as a component of this pool of available forces. Dur-
ing its stint, 37th BEB executed three joint forcible-entry
(JFE) exercises requiring the repair of a seized landing strip
to allow the task force to rapidly build combat power via air-
landed forces. To accomplish this task, the battalion built
and equipped a light airfield repair package (LARP) consist-
ing of engineer equipment that can be heavy-dropped and
used to support airfield damage repair (ADR).
Each mission required different techniques to succeed,
but the 37th BEB found a common problem set with each—
how can airborne engineers rapidly clear, assess, and repair
any type of landing surface and make it ready to accept C-17
cargo planes to allow their task force to rapidly build combat
power? The 37th BEB provides a niche capability to 2d BCT
to conduct expeditionary airfield repair during JFE opera-
tions. Given the austere nature of the environment during
a JFE operation and the limited availability of equipment,
supplies, and materials, airborne BEB airfield repair is typi-
cally an expeditionary, temporary solution to get initial air-
lands on the objective. The 37th BEB solution to the prob-
lem set is to equip and organize the LARP as a scalable and
tailorable capability set that can be modified based on the
threat and landing surface type.
The ability to conduct a short-notice JFE is a strategic
capability for the United States in an increasingly unstable
By Captain Nicolas K. Massie

Engineer 21
world. JFE provides an opening in any theater by seizing an
airfield and opening it to receive airlanded forces. During
Operation Serval, French airborne forces parachuted into
Mali during the night of 28 January 2013 in response to the
seizure of towns north of the Niger River by Islamic mili-
tants. The French 2d Foreign Legion was tasked with seiz-
ing a damaged airfield in Mali to build combat power. The
objective was an airfield outside Timbuktu that had been
rendered unusable by parked aircraft, disabled heavy equip-
ment, and dirt berms placed on the airfield. The French
forces, including airborne engineer assets, cleared and
repaired the runway to allow the buildup of combat power to
help Malian forces stabilize the region. Their problem set was
the same as the one confronting the 37th BEB. The French
determined the engineer equipment that was required
to repair the semi-improved field landing strip (FLS).
This allowed them to deliver the right equipment without
unnecessarily reducing the available combat power during
the JFE.
Armed with this historical perspective, the 37th BEB
began tackling this problem during two large JFE exercises
while on GRF duty. During Combined Joint Access Exer-
cise (CJOAX) 15.1, conducted with the United Kingdom 3d
Battalion, Parachute Regiment, 2d BCT was tasked with
conducting an airborne assault to seize suspected chemical
weapons. The objective consisted of a large semi-improved
FLS with an accompanying airfield terminal complex. The
37th BEB planned to execute four key engineer phases:
■ Assembly of the minimum force.
■ Clearance and assessment of the FLS.
■ Repair of the FLS.
■ Maintenance of the FLS after repeated airlands.
Intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets are
critical for determining the status and type of obstacles on
an FLS and for helping to drive the decision making process
for equipment that airborne sappers will personally take
into the fight. With maneuver forces providing security,
37th BEB determined the minimum force to be one squad
of sappers for clearance and a two-man assessment team.
The assessment team would quickly assemble and mark
Airborne engineers use a high-mobility engineer excavator during repair of a concrete FLS.
“. . . [the] 37th BEB executed three
joint forcible entry (JFE) exer-
cises requiring the repair of a
seized landing strip to allow the
task force to rapidly build combat
power via airlanded forces.”

22 Engineer
obstacles for clearance, based on the task force time con-
straint of receiving airlands by parachute hour + 2. Once on
the ground, sappers from Companies A and B would assem-
ble and begin preparing the equipment and demolitions
needed for clearance. As maneuver forces began clearing the
airfield terminal complex and larger area of enemy forces,
sappers would begin their systematic clearance of the FLS.
The 37th BEB determined through its mission analysis that
the full LARP complement of equipment was required to
repair and maintain the FLS.
Each piece of engineer equipment
played a critical role in the repair and
maintenance of the FLS. As aircraft
landed and delivered combat power, the
FLS began to deteriorate. Working with
the British engineers proved that, in
the future, ADR will be a combined mis-
sion with our allies. Coordinating with
U.S. Air Force special tactics squadron
personnel, who are responsible for cer-
tifying the readiness of the FLS, proved
critical since the of airlands must
cease during maintenance operations.
The chemical weapons were recovered
after 2d BCT combat power reached a
critical mass via airlands, and the mis-
sion was a success.
After action reviews revealed a trade-
off of assumed risks and capabilities
using a menu of available LARP equip-
ment: for every piece of engineer equip-
ment heavy-dropped, one less maneu-
ver, fires, or mission command vehicle
could be dropped. This is because there is
a fixed amount of platform space within
the aircraft. The greater the ADR capa-
bility delivered, the fewer lethal effects
could be achieved on the drop zone.
A paratrooper demonstrates the capabilities of the rock saw attachment for the skid steer loader.
A paratrooper uses a British roller during a joint FLS repair exercise.

Engineer 23
This led the 37th BEB to the understanding that
LARP requires a balance between initial com-
bat power and ADR capabilities.
Operation Dragon Spear, the second major
JFE in which the 37th BEB participated, had a
mission similar to that of CJOAX 15.01. The 2d BCT
was tasked to conduct an airborne assault in the
National Training Center, Fort Irwin, California.
The 37th BEB determined during mission analy-
sis that there were no major repair requirements.
Knowing the advantages of increased combat power,
the Company A commander determined that only a
light airfield maintenance package was needed in
order to allow the FLS to sustain airlands.
CJOAX 15.1 and Operation Dragon Spear high-
lighted the need for a scalable and tailorable LARP
based on the mission set. Both missions allowed the
37th BEB to use current equipment. The problem set
required 37th BEB to face another challenge: How
do airborne engineers repair concrete- and asphalt-
paved landing strips that are capable of handling
C-17 cargo planes? The U.S. Army Corps of Engi-
neers Engineer Research and Development Center
(ERDC) helped provide the answer. In March 2016,
ERDC sponsored training for all BEBs and airborne
engineer units on a new ADR kit that includes skid
steer loaders with multiple attachments for cut-
ting and paving concrete and asphalt landing strips
and matting that supports C-17 airlands. Using the
ERDC-recommended crater repair process, ADR kit,
and skid steer loaders with the new attachments,
the 37th BEB was ready to test a new LARP that
was even more scalable than before. During Opera-
tion Eagle Talon, conducted in April 2016, the 37th BEB
performed an airborne assault to repair a concrete-surfaced
landing strip that had crater and spall damage. In low vis-
ibility and with minimal training, the 37th BEB paratroop-
ers repaired two craters with the C-17–capable matting and
several small spalls in less than 12 hours. Key to the success
of this mission was the use of high-mobility earth excava-
tors, with hydraulic and pneumatic attachments, and skid
steer loaders, with rock saws that are used to square off cra-
ters to be repaired. The 37th BEB rented the skid steer load-
ers, which are not issued pieces of equipment, to replicate
the future LARP recommended by the U.S. Army Corps of
Engineers. Skid steer loaders have the added advantage of
saving platform space on the aircraft, increasing the initial
combat power that a BCT can deliver to a drop zone. Build-
ing on the 37th BEB experience on GRF duty, modifications
to the list of LARP equipment have been proposed.
2 BCT ended its GRF responsibility in December 2015.
Based on two major JFE exercises and several smaller air-
borne assaults, the 37th BEB solution was to increase the
scalability and tailorability of the LARP to increase ini-
tial combat power on the drop zone. Over the course of
14 months, the 37th BEB established these key points for
any JFE that requires the LARP:
■ There is a real-world need for airborne engineer units
that can deploy and repair semi-improved, asphalt- and
concrete-surfaced landing strips.
■ Intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets are
critical for determining the type and amount of obstacles
on, and damage to, the FLS.
■ Coordination between Services and allies is increasingly
important to maximize the combat effects of engineers on
the drop zone.
■ Engineer equipment, such as the high-mobility earth
excavator and skid steer loader, provide engineers with
versatility on the drop zone while maximizing platform
space available for maneuver, fires, and mission com-
mand equipment.
Captain Massie serves
and Headquarters served as
der is a senior-rated -
Captains Career Course
and the U. a bachelor’s degree
in civil engineering University
degree in engineering University of
Science and Technology at Rolla. He is a licensed professional
engineer in North Carolina.
A paratrooper uses a rock saw to square off a crater in a con-
crete FLS.

24 Engineer
T
he airborne brigade engineer battalion (BEB) pro-
vides mobility, countermobility, and survivability
support to the brigade combat team (BCT) through
a scalable insertion of combat power supplied to the opera-
tional environment through a variety of delivery methods—
most notably, airborne assault—focused on the maneu-
ver commander’s intent and needs. The three significant
parts of the BEB that are critical to providing this combat
power are its two line engineer companies and the engineer
staff. Through proper integration, these elements seam-
lessly interweave into operational planning and execution
from the company level to the BCT staff, ensuring effici-
ent utilization.
The most critical key to success is the integration of the
engineer leaders and units at the appropriate level in order
to best allocate and implement the relatively limited engi-
neer combat power available to support the commander’s
operational needs. At the BCT level, the BEB commander
serves as the senior engineer, directly advising the BCT
commander on the proper use of forces. The BEB staff serves
as the workhorse of engineer planning. Successful synchro-
nization with the assistant brigade engineer cell on the BCT
staff ensures that resources are appropriately allocated and
weighted toward the decisive operation. Given the “three
by two” structure of maneuver battalions to engineer com-
panies, an effective way to align habitual relationships is
to assign each sapper platoon to a maneuver battalion. The
sapper platoon leaders serve as the task force engineers for
the battalions they support, providing engineer expertise
to the battalion staff during the planning and execution of
operations. Platoon leaders wear two hats, balancing their
duties as platoon leaders and task force engineers. More
recently (despite being authorized fewer personnel and dif-
ferent equipment), the BEB route clearance platoon began
supporting the cavalry squadron as a dismounted sapper
platoon. The light-equipment platoons of Companies A and
B support the BCT according to a conditions-based priority of
support. The direct-support artillery battalion, Company D
from each maneuver battalion, and the brigade support
battalion are consistent customers for the light-equipment
platoons. Finally, the lowest official support link is the one
between the sapper squad leaders and each company
commander in the maneuver battalions. This link provides
every key maneuver leader with a direct habitual relation-
ship with an engineer element. This leads to gained respect;
a familiarity with tactics, techniques, and procedures; and
comfort through integrated planning and training.
By Captain Stephen C. Kraus

Engineer 25
Airborne sappers bring scalable mobility support to the
operational environment, from airborne assault to ground
convoy. The main objective of airborne engineers in a
joint forcible entry is to open a ight landing strip so that
increased combat power can arrive via fixed-wing aircraft
through airlands. As a result, the personnel and equipment
required to open a ight landing strip must be delivered via
parachute. Sappers bring detection and clearance exper-
tise and limited explosive capabilities to the objective to
clear mechanical and explosive obstacles from the mini-
mum operating strip to allow aircraft to land. The light-
equipment platoon, predominantly composed of equipment
operators, provides the light airfield repair package. The
package is designed to repair craters, cuts, and spall in
dirt, asphalt, or concrete runways. The initial objective is
typically to provide the most expeditious repair required
to land the first aircraft as quickly as possible so that
the lodgment can be expanded, allowing follow-on forces,
equipment, and supplies to be delivered. The light airfield
repair package can also clear earthen, vehicular, or other
obstacles that are too large to be cleared by dismounted
sappers. The synchronization of assets between sapper and
light-equipment platoons, typically performed at the com-
pany or battalion level, is required to efficiently leverage the
assets on the ground.
Following this initial objective, sappers focus on support-
ing their maneuver battalion follow-on assault objectives,
either in the vicinity of the lodgment or in an offset loca-
tion. From their rucksacks, sappers can provide mechanical,
ballistic, and explosive breaching support tailored for urban
objectives. Limitations include the lack of proper explosive
lane clearance tools, such as the antipersonnel obstacle
breaching system and Bangalore torpedoes, to clear assault
lanes through mine-wire or similar obstacles. Such systems
would need to be tested and certified to be air dropped or
delivered later via ground lines of communication.
The BCT will often move into a defensive posture imme-
diately after a joint forcible parachute assault to wait for
additional combat power and to prepare for follow-on objec-
tives. Engineers support the maneuver commander with
countermobility efforts by aiding in engagement area devel-
opment, erecting tactical wire obstacles according to the
obstacle overlay published by the assistant brigade engineer
and developed largely by the engineer staff. This is where
the synchronization of the task force engineer, BEB staff,
and assistant brigade engineer cell is critical in ensuring
that there is a nested plan that ties in unit boundaries. Sap-
pers erect concertina wire and antivehicular wire obstacles
to create the specific obstacle effects desired.
Assisting in the development of the engagement area,
sappers can employ their M-7 Spider antipersonnel muni-
tions to create a networked system that is tied into the
maneuver commander’s direct- and indirect-fire effects in
the expected enemy avenue of approach. This system can
also be used to close lanes following the retrograde of friendly
reconnaissance forces operating ahead of the forward edge of
the battle area. In support, the light-equipment platoon can
construct antitank ditches to shape the terrain in favor of
friendly forces. Performing this mission depends on when
the appropriate assets will be available on the ground. For
example, the deployable universal combat earthmover is
often part of the light airfield repair package and cannot
be drawn away until the landing strip is operational.
Therefore, antitank ditches are usually constructed using a
bulldozer brought to the lodgment via ground assault con-
voy when conditions allow. Again, the task force engineer
is key to ensuring that the maneuver commander’s coun-
termobility needs are supported at the right time with the
right equipment.
The successful allocation of resources to support BCT
survivability efforts depends on the agreed-upon defended
asset list. This list is a compilation of the survivability needs
that BCT leaders decided to act upon, based on the limited
number of blade assets and time available. It is just a seg-
ment of the critical asset list, which lists all the survivability
needs of the BCT, regardless of blade assets and time. The
engineer staff, together with the assistant brigade engineer
cell, proposes the defended asset list to the BCT commander,
who ultimately decides the priority of support. A technique
that can work well for streamlining survivability opera-
tions is the creation of Dig, which works under the
operational control of the BEB headquarters company com-
mander. This task force encompasses both light-equipment
platoons from the line companies and any other dig assets
that may be available from inorganic units. The headquar-
ters company commander manages the overall implemen-
tation of the dig assets, with task force engineers clearly
dictating their maneuver commander requirements and
ensuring that linkup operations are executed in their par-
ticular areas.
The airborne BEB provides the BCT commander with
a variety of tools to enable the mission on the ground,
starting with the opening of the ight landing strip. This
enables the force projection and logistics of critical ele-
ments that are unable to arrive via parachute and also
serves as the only large-volume exfiltration point to ret-
rograde personnel or elements, as required in humanitar-
ian assistance or rescue operations. The key to success is
the integration of engineer leaders and units at all levels
into the maneuver company, battalion, and brigade lead-
ership and staff structure. Through this integration, the
synchronized allocation of combat power in support of
mobility, countermobility, and survivability tasks can be
effectively employed.
When this article was written, Captain Kraus was the -
-
sion. He is a senior-rated a graduate of the Sap-
U.S. Pathfinder School. He holds a bachelor’s degree in
civil engineering Point,
New York, and a degree in engineering
University of Science and Technology at Rolla.
He is transitioning to work with the New England District, U.S.

26 Engineer
I
n February 2016, the 4th Infantry Division executed
Division Warfighter Exercise 16-03 at Fort Carson, Col-
orado. The exercise involved the division main, the divi-
sion tactical command post, brigade response cells, and vari-
ous other training audiences in support of the division. The
event offered the division an opportunity to exercise mission
command over all its subordinate units. During the second
phase of the operation, the 299th Brigade Engineer Battal-
ion, 1st Stryker Brigade Combat Team, 4th Infantry Divi-
sion, conducted a wet-gap crossing. Rather than focusing on
the engineer equipment park, the locations of the holding
areas, or the call forward area discussed in Field Manual
3-90.12, ,1
this
article delves into the tactical issues surrounding the wet-
gap crossing. The training revealed the following lessons:
■ Methods to defeat the unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV)
threat posed by near-peer competitors today.
■ The importance of a well-executed deception plan.
■ The importance of designating different units to assume
the large scope of missions surrounding a gap-crossing
operation.
Addressing these issues will lead to improved tactics, tech-
niques, and procedures.
U
nits today face an inevitable UAV threat from
near-peers. When the enemy sees engineer forces
approaching a wet gap, it interprets the action as
a clear sign of intent to begin bridging operations. In recent
near-peer adversaries have often swarmed friendly
forces with UAVs to target their positions with effective
fires. For this exercise, we adapted our tactics, techniques,
and procedures as we approached the river. We also coor-
dinated with the division electronic warfare (EW) cell for
preplanned EW attacks. Once the scouts of our lead maneu-
ver battalion moved close to the river, a number of small,
adversary UAVs appeared and began observing our friendly
forces. The enemy fires brigade began an initial volley of fire.
The number of UAVs deployed indicated that there was at
least a battalion size element on the farside objectives; this
triggered our EW attack. The locations of the integrated
fires command and fires brigade were within range of all
planned crossing sites. This, along with the enemy ten-
dency to target friendly breaching assets, led us to believe
that we would have a very small window in which to defeat
the UAVs before the enemy used indirect fire to destroy the
bridging assets. Our EW attack denied the enemy the use of
its UAV assets, which prevented it from reporting informa-
tion rapidly and accurately. This made the enemy unable to
place effective, accurate fires on our advancing maneuver
and bridging forces.
UAVs offer major advantages to units. Deploying numer-
ous UAVs has diminished the need for human observers to
be stationed in observation points forward of the front line
of enemy troops. If no countermeasures are in place, a near-
peer force commands a significant advantage. Using our own
EW assets, units must develop tactics, techniques, and pro-
cedures to defeat the enemy UAV threat before it can effec-
tively identify friendly positions and call for fire.
Deception Plan
F
rom the initial stages of planning, we recognized
the importance of a deception plan. A psychological
operations platoon with sound projection platforms
that emitted audible cues was attached to our brigade.
The brigade deception plan also included a false crossing
party of engineer and infantry Soldiers moving on a decep-
tion site obscured by smoke. These actions played a critical
role in deceiving the enemy, who committed ground forces
to defeat the friendly force wet-gap crossing at the decep-
tion site. This countermove by the enemy, coupled with the
defeat of the enemy UAV threat, enabled our forces to move
to the nearside objective. We then established a support-by-
fire position without facing a direct-fire threat greater than
a company size element from the exit bank at the actual
crossing sites.
By Major Sean R. Hill
“Conducting an opposed wet-
gap crossing is one of the most
difficult tactical operations
that our Army faces.”

Engineer 27
The deception operation must contain elements of units
that would actually conduct a wet-gap crossing. Previous
simulations and international exercises prove that if a unit
attempts a wet-gap crossing deception but fails to send engi-
neer assets to that deception crossing, the enemy immedi-
ately recognizes the deception and will not commit forces to
address the false crossing site. Without an enemy commit-
ment to address the deception operation, the deliberate wet-
gap crossing operation quickly falters.
Unit Designation
F
inally, we learned the importance of the size of the
bridgehead and the designation of different brigades.
A unit must designate subordinate units as the
crossing force, breakout force, and nearside security force.
The many tasks assigned to each unit spread over multiple
crossing sites required more than one brigade combat team
(BCT). During the exercise, the enemy air assets assaulted
the division infantry BCT to secure the farside objective.
The Stryker BCT was designated as the crossing force to
secure the bridgehead, as well as part of the breakout force
to secure follow-on objectives. As the crossing force, the
Stryker BCT identified critical friendly zones and plotted
the points around the crossing sites to protect the crossing
forces and the bridges. The bridgehead was established, and
the entire division armored BCT crossed the river over the
four established ribbon bridges. The immediate forward
movement with the brigade, and emplacement within the
bridgehead, of an air defense platoon with radar and antiair-
craft weapons platforms proved critical to the success of the
bridgehead. We also recognized a need for improvement; a
higher-level headquarters was needed to relieve the Stryker
BCT of its security tasks. With the Stryker BCT responsible
for securing the bridgehead and continuing maneuver for-
ward as one of the breakout forces, the security of the cross-
ing site bridges required a company (+) element to remain at
the crossing sites.
Conducting an opposed wet-gap crossing is one of the
most difficult tactical operations that our Army faces. We
must look ahead at the challenges that we face from near-
peer threats and then for ways to defeat those threats. The
use of UAVs in place of human observers is a technique that
our enemy uses to its advantage. However, with detailed
and careful planning, units can and should use EW and psy-
chological operations deception to deceive and confuse the
enemy. A detailed plan must be crafted to designate each
unit, detailing all the tasks associated with the wet-gap
crossing operation.
Endnote:
1
Field Manual 3-90.12, -
ations, 1 July 2008.
Major Hill serves as the training and operations officer for
the 299th Brigade Engineer Battalion, Fort Carson, Colorado.
Staff
College and holds degree in public policy George-
town University, Washington, D.C.
Essential Task List
T
he specific addition of crater repair tasks as key col-
lective mission-essential tasks for airborne BEB com-
panies would bolster the requirement for additional
equipment and create a greater emphasis on additional
equipment funding. For airborne units outside the continen-
tal United States, the reliance on self-sufficiency in equip-
ment and crater repair expertise is paramount to supporting
the airborne infantry brigade combat team abroad. While
the 20th Engineer Brigade remains the Army proponent for
ADR, the decentralized training of the 173d Airborne Bri-
gade in Europe requires that Company A and Company B
of the 54th BEB maintain ADR proficiency and equipment
readiness. In 54th BEB training events, airborne BEBs
have enough personnel to complete the required crater
repair tasks. Most of the training deficits relate directly to
equipment shortfalls. Evolving the formation forward from
simple dirt field landing strip repairs using sand grid and
compaction, the way ahead for 54th BEB ADR training
involves the acquisition of additional concrete-cutting saws,
concrete-breaking equipment, and foreign object damage
covers and accessories. Training the force for concrete
repairs and C-17-capable landings requires the use of foreign
object damage covers and anchoring bolts and an increased
emphasis on ADR within the mission-essential task list of
engineer companies.
A
DR is a critical component in establishing an air
head during JFE operations. Historical references
.indicate that FLS clearance and airstrip repair are
plausible requirements when inserting paratroopers to seize
an airfield. The geographical position and mission set of the
173d Airborne Brigade require an enhanced focus on self-
reliance and leader proactivity when confronting challenges,
so the 54th BEB is concentrating its efforts on equipping the
force with ADR vehicles and equipment and codifying the
airborne BEB role in ADR.
Endnotes:
1
Joint Publication 3-18, Joint Forcible Entry Operations,
27 November 2012.
2
Ibid.
is currently studying design and
Massachusetts Institute of Technology as
part of the Advanced Civil Schooling
served -
ter’s degree in civil engineering University of Sci-
ence and Technology at Rolla.

28 Engineer
T
he brigade engineer battalion (BEB) is a great addi-
tion to the brigade combat team (BCT). It provides a
more robust engineer capability for the BCT to deal
with the elements of decisive action. However, the modified
table of organization and equipment (MTOE) for the BEB
does not address the engineer planning shortfall in the
maneuver battalion and cavalry squadron staffs. It is not
necessary to revert to old task force engineer solutions to
resolve this shortfall; the engineer community needs new
solutions. A permanent engineer planner is needed in each
maneuver battalion and cavalry squadron staff that is not
associated with a BEB platoon or company.
The old solutions for task force engineer planner do not
allow engineer platoon leaders and company command-
ers to do their jobs. Having a platoon leader or a company
commander serve as a task force engineer puts these offi-
cers in the tough position of deciding whether to act as
staff officers or as leaders of their units. Field Manual 3-34,
Engineer Operations, states that “The engineer staff offi-
cer at each echelon is responsible for engineer logistics
estimates, and the engineer staff officer plans and monitors
engineer-related sustainment support for engineering capa-
bilities operating at that echelon.”1
Being a task force engi-
neer is especially tough for platoon leaders because they do
not have the staff or the experience to properly support the
maneuver task force.
Although a company commander has an executive officer
and operations sergeant to assist in planning, the job puts
unnecessary strain on the company because two of its lead-
ers are tied to the main command post of the maneuver bat-
talion. Having a company commander serve as the task force
engineer is a temporary solution at best because the BCT
task organization changes as the mission changes. In addi-
tion, this always leaves two BCT elements—a maneuver
element and a reconnaissance element—without an engi-
neer planner. These two elements of a BCT need a constant
battalion/squadron engineer planner.
The maneuver and reconnaissance elements of a BCT
need a constant battalion/squadron engineer planner to
ensure that the engineer effort across the BCT is
The New Task Force
Engineer Planner

sep-dec-2016

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