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Introduction
As emphasized by Nunn (2008) among many others, slavery and its aftermath was a
cornerstone of organized political violence in Africa. According to Nilsson (2013) few
historic events have been as closely associated with European empire building and the
colonisation of Africa as the Berlin conference on West Africa of 1884–85. The Berlin
Conference is frequently described as the occasion when the European powers divided the
African continent among themselves with the help of a map and a ruler (Nilsson, 2013). Prior
to being gobbled up by colonial powers, Africa was divided into a patchwork of ‘tribal’
structures and proto-states (historical kingdoms) with heterogeneous political systems
(Besley, 2013). In this brief period, Europeans partitioned Africa into spheres of influence,
protectorates, colonies, and free-trade-areas. The borders were designed in European capitals
at a time when Europeans had barely settled in Africa and had little knowledge of the
geography and ethnic composition of the areas whose borders they were designing
(Michalopoulos, 2011).
The territorial claims of the Somali republic were viewed by most African leaders as a very
dangerous expansionist adventure and of contravention of the principle of inviolability, which
brought Somalia into diplomatic isolation (Mohamed, 2006). The Somali republic also
experienced political isolation from the rest of Africa. Mealy (2012), explains how the new
republic’s actions were gradually isolating it from the rest of the African and international
community. At the inaugural meeting of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) at Addis
Ababa in May 1963, Somali President Adan Abdulla Osman's speech advocating the swift
amalgamation of a Greater Somalia was poorly received. All 30 African governments signed
the OAU charter, which recognized the sanctity of Africa's colonial borders (Mealy, 2012).
Abdalla's radical argument - that territorial integrity represented an outmoded concept, whose
roots were embedded in colonialism and as such was not necessarily useful or in the best
interests of post-colonial states - fell on deaf ears (Lefebre 1998, in Mealy, 2012).
The Somali state collapsed in 1990 after 20 years of military rule that started in October 1969
after a brief democratic system exercise. With the downfall of the military regime in 1990,
the opposition forces were disturbingly unprepared for the maintenance of law and order and
have completely failed to restore state institutions (Dirshe, 2013). After the collapse of the
central state, Somalia experienced what would be referred in the Hobbesian world as “a war
of all against all.” A confluence of factors including colonial legacy, external intervention,
clannism, poor and failed leadership and fierce competition of state power and resources
contributed to the intractability of the conflict in Somalia. Farah et al (2002) contend that
historical claims to land and resources by different Somali clans play an important and
sometimes powerful role in current political debates in Somalia. In this case, power-sharing
refers to political arrangements which guarantee the participation of representatives of all
significant communal groups in political decision-making, and especially in the executive
(Lijphart, 2004), but also in the legislature, the judiciary, the police and the army. By dividing
power among rival groups, power-sharing institutions reduce the danger that one party
becomes dominant and threaten the security of others (Hartzell & Hoddie, 2003). Power-
sharing also seeks to shelter minorities from the effects of majority rule (Papagianni, 2006).
Power-sharing solutions make for good transitional devices, but in the long run the best
outcome may well be a much more fluid form of democracy that allows for the creation of
flexible coalitions that bridge the ethnic divide (Sisk, 2003). The contemporary interest in
power-sharing as the underlying principle for the organisation of the state has arisen because
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of the belief that sharing power is particularly suited to the peaceful co-existence of ethnic
groups in conflict and for a fair and participatory political system (Ghai, 2005).
According to Lewis (1961), the key to understanding Somali politics is kinship. He observes
that political units are based on kinship and notes that political affiliations and divisions often
correspond to differences in ancestral origin. Lewis (1961) provides a comprehensive
description of the six-clan families in Somalia, including their geographical distribution and
their historical origins. The Somali majority belong to four patrilineal clan families: the
Darod, Hawiye, Dir, and Rahanweyn (Minority Rights Group 2012, in Róisín Hinds, 2013).
These are divided into sub-clans, which can be divided further, illustrating the complexity of
the clan system. Samatar (2013) explains that Somali clannism is earth-shattering and globe-
trotting, coming out as a happy camper wherever Somalis set foot, from Siberia to Senegal
and from the North to the South Pole. Afyare (2010), posits that besides religious Islamic
identity and the national Somali identity, clan identity is very strong among Somali people
and has played a significant role in the conflict. He further argues that clan identity in
Somalia is based on partrilineal descent where Somalis count their name as far back as 20 or
more generations starting from first name of male members of family. Lewis (1995) also
confirms that there are approximately 100 clans in Somalia though, but the size and power of
each clan varies considerably. Somalis use clan in modern ways in order for them to manage
transnational capital through clan networks. Somalis realize and reaffirm clan networks as a
resource in the moments of movement, celebration, and crisis (Kusow 2007).
In spite of her homogeneity of sharing the same language, adhering to the same religion, and
majority of them being from same ethnic group, Somalia experienced one of the longest civil
wars and intractable conflicts in Africa. The conflict has not only made Somalia an insecure
and chaotic country in the world, but also destroyed its social fabric and institutions
necessary for governance and basic human survival. Because of widespread lawlessness,
ineffective government, terrorism, insurgency, crime, and well-publicized pirate attacks
against foreign vessels, Somalia topped the Failed States Index (Messner, 2014). Many
scholars and political analysts describe the political conflict in Somalia as a power struggle
between elites and their cahoots from different rival clans. The opportunistic methods by
which groups and individuals have marshaled support to gain or retain access to public
support have finally destroyed the very institutions of the state (Samatar, 1992). The
manipulation of “clan” identity by external forces and the subservient role of local politicians
to gain power persist today in Somalia (Dirshe, 2013).
In spite of protracted conflict and clan loyalty over state loyalty, Somalia is struggling to
build strong government institutions at federal and state level. But because of long absence of
law and order, there are insurmountable obstacles to the emergence of a sustainable and
democratic Somali State. Somalia’s recent experiment of federalism sparked competition and
warfare among different clans and sub-clans. Because of the predatory behavior of post
colonial regimes and decades of violent armed conflicts, many see clan based federalism as a
zero-sum game in which power gained by the state creates powerful clan hegemonies.
Previous attempts for state building in Somalia have neither addressed hostile political
memories that still impact on Somali clan relations nor reduced tensions in the wider society.
Hence, the realization of genuine and all inclusive power-sharing that reflects the interests of
different clans and groups is still lacking. This study sought to exxamine the challenges faced
in the application of the various power-sharing models concerning management of intractable
clan conflict in Somalia.
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Literature Review
Challenges Faced in the Various Power-sharing Models in Somalia
Norris (2008) holds that power-sharing regimes, which recognize existing community
boundaries, assume that ethnic divisions are intractable and persistent. He argues that power-
sharing regimes then institutionalize ethnic cleavages, which in turn deepen social
differences.
The UN (2007) reports that post-conflict governance and institutional-building is a very
complex undertaking that require establishing safety and security; strengthening
constitutional government; reconstructing infrastructure and restoring services; stabilizing
and equitably growing the economy; and strengthening justice and reconciliation
organizations. Wolff (2011) illustrates that sustainable peace and sustainable states are related
to each other within a broader context than merely the design of political institutions and their
impact on society. He argues that the security, including the issues of disarmament,
demobilisation and re-integration of former combatants (DDR) and, linked to this, security
sector reform (SSR), a functioning system of law and order, including questions of redress for
past crimes, refugee and IDP return and reintegration, a sound economic and fiscal policy,
education reform and the incorporation of local and civil society actors all form part of the
state-building process and have an effect on both the nature of the state that is being built and
the sustainability of peace within it.
Spears (2013), argues that parties to conflict might enter into a power-sharing arrangement
not only to end sectarian conflict but also to divide rival groups. He takes the example of
Somalia, where parties to the once-promising Djibouti agreement, reached June 2008,
approached the settlement not as an opportunity for reconciliation but as a chance to weaken
their adversaries. ‘I have hope for the Djibouti accord,’ stated one member of the Transitional
Federal Government. ‘Even if it fails, we’ve divided the enemy (Spears, 2013). This
indicates that the power-sharing arrangement in Somalia did not come through fair and
reconciliatory process, but, rather divisive political game aimed at closing one door and while
opening another for even more deadly armed conflict. This further highlights the reasons as
to why the political power-sharing failed to end violence and promote peace and harmony
among different clans.
Le Sage (2005) notes that one of the most challenging aspects for reconciliation within
Somalia’s divided society and the establishment of a new Somali government will be the re-
establishment of the rule of law in Somalia and the complete reconstruction of the human and
physical infrastructure required to safeguard and administer it. Menkhaus (2010), stresses
that the protracted conflict and power-sharing system had concretized identity clan conflict in
Somalia. He contends that, the years of political manipulation, warfare, atrocities, ethnic
cleansing, and new political configurations (including the consociational system of
representation known as the 4.5 formula) have unquestionably mobilized and hardened clan
identity to an extent that one cannot conduct a serious analysis of Somali politics at either the
national or the local level without treating clan politics as one of the main drivers of
behaviour. In this regard, Menkhaus (2010), revealed the weaknesses of 4.5 power-sharing
formulas which he criticized as one susceptible to political manipulation and concretization
of clan allegiance, but he failed to propose a better or alternative model for reconciliation and
equitable power-sharing in Somalia.
Samatar and Samatar (2003), explain the external factors that perpetuated divisive politics
and subsequent armed conflict that plagued the country. They took the example of Arta
Somali national conference where Somalia’s first “democratically” selected chamber of
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deputies was put into place and the chamber proceeded to elect an interim president from
several competing candidates. Interim President Abdiqasim Salad and his entourage made an
unplanned visit to the ruined capital. Despite the chaos, hundreds of thousands came out to
celebrate what they hoped to be the beginning of a peaceful era. But the promise soon
tumbled as the Transitional National Government (TNG) was hobbled by a combination of
Ethiopian-cum-warlord subversion and the inherent defects of the new team, (Samatar and
Samatar, 2003). Within six months, the Ethiopian strategy became clear. It at once started to
stress the incompleteness of the peace process since warlords were absent, and also declared
that Islamists of the Al-Itihad orientation dominated the interim government. In response,
Salad and his cohorts made several attempts to demonstrate otherwise and to reassure the
Ethiopians leadership.
However, the situation deteriorated to a point of no return once Ethiopia accused President
Salad himself of being a member of Al-Itahad (Samatar and Samatar, 2003). They identified
a four-point strategy that Addis Ababa adopted to destabilize and delegitimize the TNG.
First, Ethiopia convened a meeting for the warlords and, in the process, helped establish an
umbrella structure for them to be named the Somali Reconciliation and Reconstruction
Council (SRRC). Second, Ethiopia intensified military supplies for members of the group.
Third, Ethiopia actively lobbied at the Organization of Africa Unity (OAU, now AU or
African Union) and other international organizations to unseat the TNG.
Finally, Ethiopia intensified its campaign at the IGAD forum to convene an IGAD sponsored
conference to “complete “Arta the process (Samatar and Samatar, 2013). On part of the TNG
leadership, they also identified six critical deficiencies that contributed to the eventual total
failure of the TNG. First, TNG leadership failed to publicly atone for the association
undermined any popular hope for begging of a new political history. Secondly, no broad
vision was articulated for a national mobilization fit for the challenge of the interregnum.
Thirdly, no attention was paid to competence or integrity in the appointment of new team,
reviving memories of the vulgar and cheap horse-trading that crippled the old Somali national
state. Fourthly, no immediate tactics, never mind a strategy, were conceived to reach and win
over the large and relatively talented Diaspora communities. Fifth, no quick advantage was
taken of the international community. And finally, President Salad and his Prime Minister
Galaydh clashed and then turned on each other. Salad accused Galaydh of arrogance, a deficit
of dexterity, and, most damaging, malfeasance, while the later labelled the first as power
hungry and dictatorial, (Samatar and Samatar, 2013).
However, even though their analyses seem to be well articulated and balanced, it is actually a
descriptive work that states the external and internal challenges faced by the power-sharing
government. They did not offer a strategy specifically designed to minimize the role of
foreign country (ies) meddling in the internal affairs of Somalia while consolidating efforts
for nation state-building. They also failed to explore the weaknesses in the power-sharing
system while exaggerating role of Somali Diaspora communities in the restoration of peace
and good governance in Somalia.
Rothchild (1997) contends the various elite power-sharing regimes of hegemonic exchange
and limited democracy accept lower thresholds of participation and contestation than do
polyarchies to achieve political stability in ethnically pluralistic societies. He also observes
that inter-elite bargaining practices have often proven to be inequitable to some ethnic and
regional groups. Nevertheless as long as the major actors perceive they are receiving minimal
benefits from mixed strategy approach, conflict with this dominant class fraction can be kept
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at manageable level. Rothchild’s argument is relevant to the conception of Eno and Eno
(2011), who contend that the 4.5 system represents absolute discrimination and severe ethnic
marginalization. They argue that upon its introduction as an instrument for power-sharing, the
affected communities protested against it forthwith, as well as in many other forums, and
indeed continue to do so to this day.
Power-sharing partners actually face negative incentives: since the pact would terminate with
the constitutional reform necessary to prevent another crisis, none of the parties stand to
benefit from championing reform, (Carl LeVan, 2011). In Somalia, weak political and
judicial institutions coupled with disorganized clan elites have shown ineptitude to decisively
mediate differences and end the cycle of violence and political failures. For instance, ICG
(2013) highlights problems in the semi autonomous region of Somalia, where it took eleven
years to pass a draft constitution as a complex, internally disputed process further delayed by
the machination of political elites torn between sharing up a stable regional based and
competing for power in Mogadishu.
Several major challenges face Puntland’s emerging democracy. The House of
Representatives has no expertise in constitutional matters, while the state’s provisional
constitution is widely seen as having several flaws and has yet to be harmonised with the
Transitional Federal Charter that emerged with the formation of the Transitional Federal
Government (TFG) in 2004. Three systems of law – traditional, Sharia and secular – continue
to operate in parallel. Power still passes through clan lineage ties rather than an elective
democratic process. Citizens lack basic knowledge of their constitutional rights and
obligations. There is a clear and continuing need for the consolidation of peace,
reconstruction and development, (Interpeace and PDRC, 2006).
Sanei (2014), posits that clannism is causing rift between the federal government and regional
states while also frustrating the process of decentralization and power-sharing in Somalia. He
mentions that the attempt to apply undefined “federal system” as a form of governance in
Somalia plays a big role on the never-ending current political conflicts between the regional
administrations and the federal national government. He further explains that the political
immaturity supported by clan interests and mistrust within the “leaders” is another factor that
triggers internal conflicts. Hartzell et al (2001), observe that a state’s general inability to offer
sustained leadership to the society as a whole is likely to result in conflict-creating outcomes.
They hold that state weakness heightens insecurity because there is no effective agency
present that is capable of ensuring implementation of the society’s agreed-upon rules.
In the context of Somalia, Kebede (2013), outlines the challenges facing the Somalia Federal
Government. He articulates that although the SFG enjoys de jure sovereignty over all of
Somalia, it exercises limited de facto authority over only Mogadishu and some parts of the
south. He further notes that clan-based, religious and regional militias, allied with AMISOM,
Kenyan or Ethiopian troops, are beyond the control of the central government. In addition,
some regional towns and rural areas are still under the control of Al-Shabaab. However,
Eriksson (2013), observes that despite the many positive signs of stabilization, Somalia faces
considerable challenges before any form of durable security for the state and its citizens can
be achieved. The military involvement of Kenya, Uganda and Ethiopia have so far been with
the consent of the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS), but it is now on the brink of
causing regional tensions as these states have different political visions for Somalia. A split in
the political alignment poses a challenge for de-escalating the cycle of conflict, (Eriksson,
2013).
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The UNDP (2008), explains that in post‐conflict contexts, absence of critical functional
capacities which may include the capacity to lead multi‐stakeholder processes; engage in
dialogue; mediate and build consensus; and develop and use non‐competitive strategies pose
greatest challenge to the state-building. Brdyen (1999), claims that the restoration of the
governmental structures requires the confidence and investment of the people as Somali
society has spent the past few years denying its leaders the power they might abuse; reversing
that trend will mean convincing the people that it is safe to do so. A power-sharing
arrangement between the prime architects of Somalia’s misery is unlikely to achieve that.
Mengisteab and Daddieh (1999), contend that clan consciousness is partly a product of elite
manipulation, the cooperation and corruption of politicians claiming clan leadership, but at
times the elite themselves are manipulated by politicized clannism. Owen Frazer (2012),
posits that the Somali population is strongly divided along clan lines. There are five major
clans which themselves are broken down into sub-clans and sub-sub-clans although exactly
where dividing lines are drawn is flexible. The major clans favour a federal solution where
distinct units of the country would largely be autonomous and federated into a loose nation,
thus giving them control over a unit of the country. The difficult, is defining these units in a
way that addresses the concerns of smaller clans and minority groups who fear being
disadvantaged by such an arrangement, (Owen Frazer, 2012).
Two British think tank organizations namely Overseas Development Institute (ODI) and
Humanitarian Policy Group (HPG) observe that the state-building in Somalia is underpinned
by a peace process characterised by a power-sharing agreement rather than inclusive grass-
roots peace-building. It is based on a short-term and tactical approach that does not seek to
tackle the root causes of conflict, but instead prioritises counter-terrorism objectives. This has
led to rent-seeking forms of governance, with the TFG, despite its behaviour, continuing to
receive international assistance and support, (Owen Frazer, 2012). Baadiyow (2012), blames
the proportional political clan representation model in Somalia as one that has the propensity
to fuel more conflicts. He critiques the model as a system that encourages greater adherence
to group mentality and allegiance to one’s clan, hence deepen divisions. He further argues
that 4.5 model might become an impediment to peaceful transition to democracy. He says
that the planned national population census could ultimately threaten the 4.5 quota altering
power distribution. And because of this sensitivity, political leaders might hinder census to be
performed since it will change the old norm. Kaplan (2010), equally blames the international
community’s approach to state-building which seriously misreads the Somali socio-political
context, showing little understanding for how a top-down strategy impacts the state’s fluid,
fragmented, and decentralized clan structures. He further observes that the international
community has weak institutional memory, causing repetition of the past mistakes of which
he termed as “an unimaginative, uncritical, and template-driven approach to state-building”.
Ernstorfer et al (2007), argue that if the authority of the state has collapsed, and the remaining
structures of government often lose their legitimacy in post-conflict settings, thus leading to
political, societal and economic disintegration on a national and even regional level, the main
task of governments in post-conflict situations is to rebuild economic and political
governance and regain legitimacy and the trust of their populace. In the context of Somalia,
European Union (2013) describes the path that Somalia must follow should sanity to be
restored. She contends that in order to put Somalia back on the path to recovery, re-
establishing the rule of law, re-building viable institutions, providing the foundations for
socio-economic recovery, delivering basic service and promoting justice, human rights and
reconciliation are essential. EU holds that the achievement of the above mentioned issues
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require the implementation of four interconnected areas: reforming security; building state
institutions; improving economic and social recovery, and managing the regional dimension.
According to Hoehne (2010), the representation in Somalia is characterized by multiple
affiliations, shifting alliances and transferable identities based on nation, clan and religion.
Hoehne observed the behaviour of Somali representative in the peace processes and he
concluded that Somali representatives in peace processes commonly wear several ‘hats’,
transferring affiliation as appropriate to whichever role suits their personal interests or those
of their patrons. He argues that efforts to reduce this complexity to simplistic blueprints such
as the 4.5 formula or standardized concepts of federalism have so far proved ineffective.
Wennmann (2011), articulates that state-building in countries such as Afghanistan, Somalia,
and Iraq has shown that the export of a particular model without linkages to context, political
economy, and the people’s experience of life can complicate war-to-peace transitions. He
contends that “top-down‟ state-building has been found to conflict with existing political
orders in a way that it has generated more opposition than support for state-building, with the
result of “spoilers‟ seeking to frustrate demands for structural change. Marangio (2012),
identifies three reasons as to why stabilizing Somalia is far from reality. The first reason she
identifies is renewed impetus that is mainly connected to the need to fight a common enemy -
Al-Shabaab. This solves neither the underlying causes that make Islamist militancy attractive
to Somalis nor the divergence of interests of the international actors involved with respect to
the future of Somalia. Secondly, she says that Somalia continues to have a top-down
approach downplaying the question of social cohesion. Thirdly, she mentions that despite the
inclusion of disarmament tasks in the mandate of AMISOM, the widespread availability of
arms in Somalia continues to threaten security. On top of all this, the international
community’s support for the TFG remains highly problematic.
Byrne (2013), articulates that the top down imposition and support of the TFG failed to allow
the formation of cross cutting cleavages, as by failing to identify extant society, such imposed
institutions cannot be sensitive to the requirement and cleavage structures of that society and
consequently have no foundation. Bryne sees that bottom up as necessary approach that
enables the development of consensuses that transcend the clan structure of Somali society,
thus reducing tension. Harper (2012), explains the way in which democracy has developed in
Somaliland has rooted in a popular consensus that embedded in society rather than imposed
from above. According to the analysis of different scholars, (Kaplan, 2010, Hoehne, 2010;
Wennmann, 2011; Marangio 2012; Byrne, 2013; and Harper, 2012), Somalia has become a
victim of internationally driven top down approaches that promote foreign and irresponsible
local elites dominance leading to weak, unstable institution and vicious cycle of violent
conflict. The top down approaches have disempowered Somali people to peacefully resolve
their difference as the same focused on quick fix solutions rather than grass-root dialogue,
consensus building and equitable power-sharing.
Research Methodology
The researcher used mixed methods under qualitative and quantitative research techniques.
This study used phenomenological research design to collect, analyse and interpret the data.
Moreover, the researcher has used data analysis triangulation to ensure the validity and
completeness of both quantitative and qualitative data collection and analyze is well captured.
The research was conducted in Mogadishu, the capital city of Somalia except one FGD and
one key informant interview which was also conducted in Nairobi, Kenya. Mogadishu
consists of 16 districts. Since the researcher focused on issues pertaining to politics of power-
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sharing, Mogadishu was the suitable research area. This is because Mogadishu is the seat of
all arms of federal government where powering modeling are being practiced. Since clans are
scattered all over Mogadishu, the study was conducted in all the 16 districts of Banaadir
region or Mogadishu to collect the required data from five clans. The study randomly
selected equal representative of different clans namely; Hawiye, Darod, Dir, Digil-Mirifle
and alliance of minority clans. Despite the fact that Hawiye is currently the majority clan in
Mogadishu, good numbers of other clans are also residing in the capital city. The researcher
selected proportional sample from all clans.
In this study, the population was clan elders, women and youth groups, religious leaders,
business people, NGO workers, intellectuals, civil servants, and politicians in Mogadishu
proportionally representing five different clans in Somalia. The researcher attempted to
balance female and male participation in the study. In this regard the target population was
1300 persons and 82 persons from each district. In each of the 16 targeted districts a total of
17 persons from each of the five targeted clans were targeted in the study population. The
sampling size of the study was 845 (169 for each of the five clans).
The study employed stratified random sampling techniques to select 845 respondents
proportionally representing five different clans in Mogadishu, Somalia. The study will target,
women and youth groups; business people; university students; University lecturers; clan
elders, representatives of civil society organizations; senior civil servants; politicians and
influential clan leaders. The table below indicates categories of sample.
Table 1: Respondent categories
Sampled groups Number of persons Percentage
Women 150 17.8
Youth 150 17.8
Elders/ matured men 150 17.8
Business people 150 17.8
University students 110 14.2
University Lecturers 10 1
Traditional Clan elders 25 3
Civil servants 60 7
Parliaments 20 2.4
Civil society 10 1.2
Independent politicians 10 1.2
Total 845 100
In order to ensure equitable representation of all targeted clans in the study, the researcher
selected 20% sample from each of the five clans. Stratified sampling has been utilized to
select all the representative of clans and different sub-sections of targeted population.
Qualitative and quantitative research techniques also come in handy in presentation of
research findings. This thesis comprises statements, figures and tables. Descriptive statistics
are indices that describe a given sample, (Mugenda & Mugenda, 2003). Measures of
distribution such as percentages and frequencies are used. Quantitative data will be analyzed
using Statistical Package for Social Scientists (SPSS). The researcher has also used of coded
information to deduce generalizations from the sampled population. The researcher has
matched each specific objective with a specific data collection method and instrument,
sampling strategy, research `design, and data analysis technique as overleaf;
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Results and Discussion
Challenges Faced In the Application of Power-Sharing Model for Management of
Intractable Clan Conflict.
This chapter discusses the challenges facing the power-sharing models used in Somalia. It
evaluates public perception about the role of political institutions with specific reference to
Parliament and the Executive arm of the government. It gauges the performance of the same
national political institutions. It provides analyses about factors that perpetuate armed conflict
in Somalia and the role of power-sharing models in restoring sustainable peace and
democracy in the country. Finally, it discusses the necessity of civic education and
reconciliation in Somalia.
Figure 1: Challenges Facing the Power-Sharing Models
Figure 1 above presents the main challenges faced by the power-sharing government in
Somalia. The bar graph indicates that 19.6% (157) of the respondents believed that lack of
strong national government institutions poses dangerous threat to the success of the power-
sharing government. Because of the absence of a strong national government, inter-intra
conflict and division still prevail in Somalia. 18.4% (147) of the respondents exhibited that
that inter and intra clan conflict and fragmentation are a challenge experienced by the power-
sharing government. 16% (128) of the interviewees claimed that corruption and impunity is a
key destabilizing factor in the power-sharing government in Somalia. 13.3% (106) of the
respondent argued that power-hungry elites that propagate their selfish and narrow interest,
cause turbulent political climate that perpetuate instability. 11.1% (89) of the respondents
were of the opinion that warlordism and negative attitude towards strong national government
has detrimental effects on the success of the power-sharing government. 10% (80) of the
interviewees considered that dominance of powerful clans over the minority or marginalized
and abuse of fundamental human rights have brought many challenges to the national
government. 3.6% (28) of the respondents believed that foreign countries dictating and
influencing local issues have obscured solutions and the work of the government. 4.7% (38)
of the interviewees suggested that lack national dialogue and reconciliation has posed serious
challenge to the government’s functions on peace and security. 3.4% (27) of the respondents
considered that the main challenge facing the government is imbalance of clan representation
in the power-sharing government.
In the FGD, the participants lengthily discussed the challenges facing the national
government. The interviewees in the FGD mentioned most of the challenges captured in
Figure 28. They argued that modern state building and consociational power-sharing model
are incompatible by nature because the model (4.5) emphasises diverging identities that
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inflame political centrifugalism rather than promoting cooperation and interdependency. The
interviewees unanimously agreed that poor capacity of national government institutions and
greedy elites who normally pursue their egotistical and clan centric interests. The participants
in the FGDs pointed out that power-sharing model has institutionalized clannism in the
government and inflamed clan segmentation. The interviewees also mentioned that clan
based power-sharing has failed to heal the wounds caused by clan based violent armed
conflict. They noted that the currently existing power-sharing has been stumbling block to
social cohesion and integration as each clan is determined to dominate the other. One of the
participants in the FGD argued:
Marka iyadoo la raacaayo habka 4.5 ee awood wadaaga wasiir loo magacaabo wasaarad,
waxay wasaaraddu isubedeshaa xarun ay beesha wasiirku ka soo jeedo leedahay. Marka
wasiirka la bedelo, wasiirka cusub ee wasaaraddu wuxuu la wareegaa shaqaale fara badan oo
ay wasiirkii hore is hayb yihiin, waxaana badanaa dhacdo wasiirkaan cusubi uu isna qorto
dad beeshiisa ku abtirsaday iyo saaxiibadiisa. Shaqaalahaan faraha badan ayaan intooda
badan lahayn aqoontii iyo kartidii laga rabay, wasaarada shaqada iyo arrimaha bulshada oo
howshaan qaabilsan cid was u sheegtay ma jirto, mana jirto hay’ad kale oo shaqada iyo
shaqaalaha dowladda wax ka qabata”
This means: “When a minister is appointed in accordance to the 4.5 power-sharing model, the
ministry suddenly becomes the centre of minister’s clan; when the minister leaves the office
and has been replaced by another, the later takes over a ministry overwhelmingly dominated
by the clan of his/her predecessor. What t normally happens is that the new minister also
recruits his fellow clan members and friends. Majority of these many employees have neither
the knowledge nor the competency required by the job; the role of the Ministry of Labour and
Social Affairs is disregarded and there is no Civil Service Commission, (FGD, October
2014).
The participants in the FGDs also discussed the challenges posed by the federal state
building. They argued that federalism has both advantages and disadvantages. The
proponents of the ideas on the building block approach argued that federalism is a very
important model that can end mistrust towards a powerful national government. They argued
that federalism improves local governance and delivery of goods and services to the locals,
while also reducing pressure on the national government. The opponents of federalism
models also put forward their counter-narratives on the ills of clan based federalism in
Somalia. They argued that the disadvantage of federalism outweighs its advantage. These
interviewees have considered federalism as a ‘bombshell’ that can cause more shattering and
destabilization as the same increases inter/inter clan power competition and deepening of
distrust between rival clans. They argued that federalism was foreign driven project
propagated by greedy and power- hungry elites. They took Galkayo town, the capital city of
Mudug region, as a classical example on the failure of the federal system. Galkayo town is
divided between two antagonist clan based federal states; one side of the town is under
Puntland state of Majerten of Darod clan while other part of the same town is a capital city of
Galmudud state of Sa’ad/Habargidir of Hawiye clan. This narrative is associated with the
argument put forward by Uluso (2014), who provides conceivable argument on the ills and
futility of the clan based federalism. Federalism devalues patriotism and citizenship,
venerates clan identity, and multiplies number of minorities and human rights violations in
every district. It emboldens neighbouring countries with territorial ambition (Uluso, 2014).
The participants in the FGDs pointed out that the federal model in Somalia remains blurred as
the various roles and powers of national and sub-national government are yet to be agreed.
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The respondents have contended that the absence of policies and laws unambiguously
demarcating powers and roles of different level of government and vagueness of the
provisional national constitutions has opened a Pandora box that activated bickering and
clannism. Some of the participants in the FGDs argued that current formation of sub-national
federal units has created more problems than solutions as each and every clan or sub-clan is
determined to become majority or powerful and determining constituent for formation of new
states. They argued that Article 49 (6) of the provisional national constitutional stipulates,
two or more regions may merge to form Federal Member State. But different actors in the
political divide interpret the same Article different causing confusion and ignition of clan
animosities and contestations. Additionally, the absence of constitutional court in the national
and sub-national states have further enabled contenders to mobilize their support along clan
lines which flames clan centric emotions and fierce power struggle. The interviewees had
lengthy discussion on different and overlapping powers of the national and sub-national
government. They realized the powers of different levels of government were one of the
causes of political contention. They discussed the provisions in the provisional Constitution
were either very limited or vaguely written. The participants in the FGD, further
acknowledged that without passing of the necessary laws specifically written to demarcate
the limits of power of the national and sub-national governments, federalism will become
curse to Somalia.
Figure 2: Powers of national and sub-national states
Some of the interviewees in the FGDs expressed their pessimistic views on the suitability of
constitutional stipulations that necessitate emerging of at least two regions that existed before
1991. They suggested that Parliament should amend the Constitution to allow each of the 18
regions in Somalia to become federal state units. They argued that merging two regions and
more has propensity of triggering clan competitions and recurrence of the violent conflict.
One of the key respondents argued that: Article 49 of the provisional national Constitution
presupposes formation boundaries and federation commission which will demarcate different
boundaries of new federal state. The same Article requires voluntarily merging of two or
more regions. This Article has been ambiguously written as the same is not clearly specifying
the nature and conditions required from merging regions. Therefore, the Constitution is
problematic and state formation is a thorny issue”, (FGD, October 2014).
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The findings have revealed that lack of strong and competent national institutions have
provided laxity leading to competition and confrontation between political contenders. The
findings showed that corruption, impunity, predatory behaviour and conflictual mindset have
perpetuated vicious cycle of conflict that threatens the immature power-sharing governance
in Somalia. This is in line with the narrative of United State Institute of Peace that links
corruption, conflict and peace-building in a post conflict environment. Corruption may not
only keep conflict cycles going by enriching the gangsters, warlords, or individuals who are
responsible for the conflict in the first place, but it can also prevent economic and social
stability because corruption networks (by benefitting some at the expense of others)
strengthen inequalities and divisions in the society (USIP, 2008). Corruption level in federal
government of Somalia has reached a point where country’s image became dented and
functions public institutions stagnated.
The findings also explored that abuses of human rights, lack of dialogue and social
reconciliation are some of key destabilizing factors in Somalia. The research also found out
that 4.5 power-sharing model has ingrained clan identity, disunity and poor national
consciousness. Therefore, power-sharing arrangement has failed to end conflict and restore
peace in the country. The findings have also indicated that prevalence of nepotism and
favouritism in the public institutions has created imbalances and unfair clan representation
which deepened mistrust and division in the society. The findings have shown that the
absence of key government institutions such as civil service commission and presence of
patronage policy that favours one clan against the other has increased mediocrity in the public
offices. This means that peace building process can be undermined by ineffective,
incompetent, or corrupt civil service employed on the basis of ascription that also lack the
necessary resources to effectively deliver public services. When potential spoilers have
control of state resources or positions, it can increase corruption and make it that much harder
to establish functioning governments (USIP, 2008).
The findings have shown that federalism has propensity of empowering local communities to
actively participate in the issues affecting their lives. The findings reveal that the
disadvantage of federalism outweighs its advantages. The findings indicate that clannism and
power struggle has been increased by the federal state formation processes. This is because
the federal state formation has become quick fix and elite pact affairs rather than bottom–up,
consensual and legitimate process. Balthasar (2014), confirms the predicament in the sub-
national state formation which increased inter/intra group competition and relapse to violent
conflicts. The situation in the south remains tense, with different political entities popping up
and laying claim of overlapping territories. In March, such divergent political interests and
the proclamation of several competing federal member states caused the outbreak of violent
unrest in Baidoa. While certain parallels with the process that led to the formation of the
Interim Jubba Administration (IJA) in 2013 can be drawn, the increasing clan connotation of
recent political development is likely to complicate matters (Balthasar, 2014).
The findings have shown that federalism is a bone of contention as the power and duties of
the national and sub-national levels of government remain unclear. The findings have further
demonstrated that the absence of policies and laws delimiting roles and responsibilities of
different government layers has provided political elites, the occasion to thrust their egoistic
approach leading to confrontation and sympathy for Al-Shabab. The political elites in
Garowe, Galkayo, Adado, Baidoa and Kismayo are preoccupied with negotiating their shares
in a Federal Somali State and mobilizing their respective communities instead of providing
services to their constituencies. The fact that the nature and the process of Somalia’s federal
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agenda remain ill-defined and has already led to much confusion and hostility (Balthasar,
2014). The findings have revealed that the institution at the national government level
remains weak and incapacitated to quell the chaotic situations and to prevent more fissures.
Roles and Capacities of Executive, Legislature and Judiciary arm of the National
Government
The respondents were given multiple choices about the roles and performance rates of
different arms of the government. The rationale of this question was to assess public
perception on the core functions and capacities of the Executive, Legislature and Judiciary to
deliver the necessary goods and services to the people.
Figure 3: Core Functions of the Executive
As per figure 3 above, 36.5% (292) of the respondents agreed that the role of executive arm
of the government was to provide visionary leadership to this fractured country in the Horn of
Africa. 26.5% (212) of the respondents confirmed that the core function of the Executive is
to develop national policies and laws governing the country. 13.5% (108) of the interviewees
agreed that key responsibility of the executive is to build national institutions capable of
delivering the required goods and services to the citizens and other people in the country.
11.7% (93) of the interviewees identified that the work of the Executive is to organize and
facilitate national dialogue and reconciliation. Finally, 11.8 (95) of the respondents accepted
that the role of the Cabinet is to provide equitable distribution of power and resources so as to
avert contestation and hostility between different groups and clans in the country.
The provisional national Constitution confirms that the Executive has powers and duties to
build government institutions, develop policies and laws, set economic development agenda
and provide leadership. Article 99 of provisional national Constitution (2012) clearly
stipulates the core function of the Executive including formulation and implementation of
policies; preparation of draft laws and tabling them before the federal Parliament;
implementing national laws, ensuring national security and protecting state interests and
setting a national development plan. The respondents were given choices to identify the key
functions of the parliament. The bar graph below summarizes answers from the respondents.
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Figure 4: Core Functions of the Parliament
This bar graph indicates that 45.5% (363) of the respondents accepted that the work of
Parliament is to draft and pass good laws for the society. Additionally, 33.8% (269) of the
interviewees agreed that the core function of the Parliament is to oversee and control the
Executive, which creates the necessary checks and balances in the government. Finally,
20.7% (168) of the respondents were of the opinion that key responsibility of the
parliamentarians is to protect and safeguard the common interests of their constituencies and
citizens of the nation as a whole.
The findings have shown some of the key responsibilities of the Parliament. These findings
were relevant to the parliamentary duties enshrined in provisional national Constitution
(2012). Article 61 in the same Constitution describes the responsibilities of member of the
Federal Parliament as representing constituency and upholding best interest of the nation as a
whole. Additionally, Article 69 unequivocally specifies the powers of the Federal Parliament
and among others. Parliament has legislative duties including the duty to prepare, pass,
amend or reject any law table before it, except laws related to the annual budget, which is
work of the Council of Ministers. The same Article in the Constitution gives Parliament
power to hold the government accountable and monitor national institutions and to ensure
implementation of national laws; summon the Prime Minister, members of the Council of
Ministers and the Chairmen of the Independent Commissions and Offices. Article 69 also
bestows Parliament the power to give a vote of confidence in the Prime Minister and the
Council of Ministers, and in government projects, by a simple majority vote of the total
members (50%+1). It also give Parliament power to carry out a vote of no confidence in the
Prime Minister and his deputy or deputies by a simple majority vote of the total members
(50% +1) that should be conducted show of hands. Additionally, Article 69 (f) of the
provisional national Constitution stipulates the power of the Parliament in electing and
dismissing the President of the Federal Republic as provided for by the Constitution.
This shows that Parliament is the most single powerful institution in Somalia, but question
that beg to be answered was whether the Parliament was correctly using its constitutional
powers or has became a rubber stamp for the executive. The participants in the FGDs
unanimously agreed that parliament is either overusing and abusing some powers such as
initiating a motion of no confidence against the premier while poorly performing and failing
to use its legitimate power including drafting and passing laws, oversight and scrutiny role on
the work of the Executive. The respondents were also asked to identify the primary
responsibility of the Judiciary arm of the government. The respondents expressed their views
on the role of Judiciary in restoring peace and security in Somalia.
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Figure 5: Core function of the Judiciary
As per figure 5 above, 25.3 % (202) of the respondents accepted that key function of
Judiciary is to preserve and protect rule of laws and justice for all citizens. Notably, 25.6%
(205) of the interviewees have mentioned that the main responsibility of the Judiciary is to
reinforce laws, punish culprits and lawbreakers. Similarly, 24.4% (195) of the respondents
have exhibited that primary work of the judiciary sector of the government is to protect
human rights of all people in the republic. Furthermore, 14.4% (115) of the interviewees have
indicated that Judiciary has a role to play in protecting the Constitution and promoting
constitutional practices in the country. Lastly, 10.4% (83) of the respondents have agreed that
judiciary’s work is to mediate and resolve disputes.
The findings confirmed the duties of the judiciary as stipulated in the provisional Constitution
that has many provisions clearly explaining the core functions and structures of the Judiciary.
Article 107 of the provisional Constitution (2012) presupposes that judicial proceeding shall
be open to the public, except cases touching about national security, ethics, protection of
witnesses, juvenile and rape which can be held in private. The Article presupposes the use of
due process of law by prohibiting the court to take judicial decision unless all parties have
had the opportunity to their case and reasons must be given for any judicial ruling.
This means that the core function of the judiciary was to promote rule of law and protection
of justice for all. Similarly, the Constitution has bestowed powers to the Judiciary that
guaranteed transparency in the judicial proceedings and protection of privacy when deemed
necessary. On the protection of Constitution and resolution of disputes, Article 109C
describes adjudication the powers of the constitutional court. Clause (e & d) gives the court
the powers to resolve any disputes between the Federal Government and the Federal Member
State governments, or among the Federal Member State governments; to hear and decide
cases arising out of disputes between organs of the Federal Government, concerning their
respective constitutional powers and duties. Due to the federal system being adopted in
Somalia, it is worthy for one to note that there are three level of courts namely the
constitutional court at both national and sub-national level, the federal government courts and
federal member state level courts. This implies that the constitutional not only guarantees the
protection of rights of citizens but equally decentralizes the judicial services to the people.
Despite the fact that the findings are aligned with provisions in the constitutions, the question
one must ask is whether these arms of government are effectively performing their core
functions mandated to them by the Constitution which is the supreme law of the land.
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Performances of the executive, parliament and the judiciary arms of government in
Somalia
In order to interrogate more on this topic, the respondents were asked to provide necessary
rating on the performance of these public institutions using scale of failed, poor, fair, good
and excellent.
Figure 6: Performance of Three Arms of Government
As per figure 6 above, 42.5% (340) of the respondents exhibited that performance of public
offices in the Executive, Judiciary and the Parliament were poor and far below the threshold
required from the government. In extreme cases, 12% (96) of the interviewees reported that
the Executive, Parliament and the Judiciary have failed to fulfil their duties and function
required from them. 23.3% (186) of the respondents indicated that the performances of the
Executive, Judiciary and the Parliament were fair, whereas 17.4% (139) of the respondents
considered the work of these public institutions as good and acceptable. 4.9% (39) of the
interviewees argued that the Executive, Parliament and Judiciary have done exceptionally
well and excellent work.
Table 2: Performance of Government
Variable Frequency Percentage
Failed 96 12%
Poor 340 42.5%
Fair 186 23.3%
Good 139 17.4%
Excellent 39 4.9%
Total 800 100%
Source: Field data, 2014
The researcher has managed to interrogate further this performance question by asking the
respondents to provide reasonable justifications for their answers. 15% (126) of the
respondents noted because of rampant corruption and misappropriation of public resources,
the performance of the Executive, Legislature and the Judiciary remains poor and below
expected threshold. 14.3% (114) of the respondents contended that clan imbalances and abuse
of power-sharing arrangement has affected the government’s performance and ability
delivery. 13.38 (107) of the respondents believed that despite the local and external support
and goodwill, the public offices in three arms of the government remain weak and
dysfunctional. 12.5% (100) of the interviewees mentioned that the government was not
consistently paying the salary of the employees which adversely affected the performance of
the public offices in all the sectors. 9.3% (74) of the interviewees noted that the government
was neither capable of defeating extremist groups nor decisively with criminality in her
controlled areas. 7.3% (58) of the respondents claimed that the government was unable to
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resolve clan conflict and wrangling that emanate misunderstanding and competition within
senior officers and politicians.6.5% (52) of the interviewees expressed their concerns about
the new state formation and inabilities of the government to restore peace, security and good
governance in the country, as the clan hostility and struggle for power have increased and
leaders either failed or fueled this centrifugal politics.
5.4% (43) of the respondents argued that government has not provided basic services
necessary for human survival such as health care, water and other development work. 5%
(40) of the interviewees have felt that there were wide spread injustice in the government
which negatively affected public credibility of the government. 4.3% (34) of the respondents
have argued that performance of the government was poor because there were many
incompetent and uneducated civil servants that could not effectively deliver the work
required by the public offices. 3.3% (26) of the respondents argued that foreign countries
meddling in the local affairs have negatively impacted in the performance of the federal
government. On other hand, 3.7% (29) of the respondents have mentioned that government
has restored freedom of speech and assembly in her areas of control, unlike where the
insurgencies rule.
The participants of FGDs have discussed about the performance of public institutions, they
have articulated that the Executive, Legislature and the Judiciary performance vis a vis tasks
required imply incompetence. The participants in the FGDs have noted that the Federal
Government has demonstrated poor coordination and capacity to deal authoritatively with
huge security, political and socio-economic challenges. The participants in the FGD,
unanimously agreed that despite the fact that the country has experienced protracted conflict
and widespread criminal behavior, foreign interferences and meddling in the local affairs
have further complicated the solutions and prolonged the instability. They argued that:
Although the AMISOM (African Mission in Somalia) came after approval by the UN
security Council and Peace and Security Council of African Union, and have done great job
in terms fighting against Alshabab and restoring to some extent security in Mogadishu and
some other towns in the south and central regions, they somewhat became part of the
problem. They also brought the competition and political differences that exist between their
respective countries and leaders. Countries like, Ethiopia, Kenya, Djibouti and Uganda have
got their own security, strategic and economic interest and each country want shape the
political and governance system in post-conflict Somalia. They groomed different illegitimate
political elites to become self-styled leaders in the new states, (FGD, September, 2014).
The participants in FGD have similarly pointed out that the Government has shown
ineptitude and lack of political willingness to address the issues that crippled the country to
recover from the destruction and disintegration caused by the intractable clan conflict and the
resultant organized criminality. The interviewees have mentioned that the government has
been plagued by confrontation and instability instead of cooperation and consistency. The
interviewees have expressed their frustration and lack of trust towards Parliament and the
Judiciary of which they described as a dysfunctional, corrupt and ineffectual. The participants
in the FGDs have particularly shown their anger and loss of hope about the parliamentarians
and judges who they allegedly had come to power through nepotism, corruption and unfair
selective manner. One of the participants cited a Somali saying:
Hal xaaraan ah nirig xalaal ah ma dhasho unofficial translation is a looted camel cannot
deliver a legitimate calf. This means that a person who was selected or elected through
preferential treatment, corruption and misappropriation cannot build a good and accountable
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governance system in this conflict riddled country. The Somali leaders in the arms of the
federal and regional state were equally blamed for fraud and a result showed inability or
unwillingness to rebuild national institution and reform the culture of mismanagement and
self-centeredness (FGD, September 2014).
The findings have revealed that performance of the government has become too weak due to
political infighting, corruption and lack of stability. The findings have also explored that
without proper reform and streamlining of the public institutions the performance of
government to serve her citizens will remain a myth. This is in agreement with the idea from
Rondinelli (2006) of Duke University in USA, who argued that effective reconstruction
requires governments to create a strong state quickly and in such a fashion as to strengthen
the capability of the governing authority, not only to provide security, eliminate violent
conflict, protect human rights, generate economic opportunities, but also to extend basic
services, control corruption, respond effectively to emergencies, and combat poverty and
inequality.
The findings showed that misuse of power-sharing arrangement and relegation of clan
balances and arithmetical representation have propensity to cause discontent and eventually
relapse of armed violent clan conflict. The findings noted that the government has
incompetent and unskilled workforce employed through favouritism and disreputable
manner, and the necessity for overhaul reform of public sector and civil servant has been
inferred. The findings exhibited that the government is unable to defeat the extremists and
other organized groups either militarily or devising of counter-ideological narrative or other
viable security strategies. The findings also demonstrated that the ongoing sub-national state
formation has been wrongly approached as the process of electing state leaders were
embarked on the support of external forces without addressing clan grievances, establishing
adequate safety and security or organizing genuine dialogue and reconciliation. This is in
agreement with description of Balthasar (2014), from European Union Institute of Security
Studies who contended that the resulting tug-of-war among Somali actors has not only
hampered with political progress, but has also led to increased factionalism. After a (UN-
endorsed and IGAD-sponsored) conference in Ethiopia in August 2013 granted legitimacy to
Ahmed Mohamed Islam ‘Madobe’ and his IJA, regional elites have been propelled into
convening state-formation conferences in order to legitimise and/or protect their regional
claims. As a result, through an ad hoc process more typical of power politics than
constitutional implementation, additional sub-national polities have come to the fore,
exacerbating local tensions and highlighting clan-related cleavages.
The findings revealed that the performance of the government has generally been rated as
poor because the government in incapable of providing the much needed goods and services
to the people. The findings also contend that there are wide spread injustices and impunity
which affected people’s trust of the government and more specifically judiciary. The
findings e further showed that foreign interventions that intrude internal affairs of the country
have not only adversely affected the performance of the government institutions, but also
increased clan power competition and flare ups. On the positive side of the situation, findings
illustrate that the government has managed to restore civil political rights in her controlled
areas. More specifically, the government has been commended for creating an environment
conductive for freedom of speech and association of civilians. However, the findings shown
that there are pervasive levels of corruption and mismanagement of public funds which
unfavourably impact on the performance of all sectors of the federal government.
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In a nutshell, the findings demonstrated that overall government performance remains poor
and unsatisfactory. This poor government capacity required consistency and well devised
recovery and reconstruction strategies aimed at rebuilding and restoring safety and security,
good governance, revitalizing economy, providing basic services to the citizens and
organizing civic dialogue and social reconciliation. This is compatible with US department
of state model for essential government tasks in post conflict reconstruction.
The primary causes of clan and group competitions
The researcher asked the respondents to outline the primary causes of clan and group
competitions in Somalia. The rationale for this interrogation was to identify the main factors
that drive or generate inter/intra clan or group struggle which sometimes degenerate into
bloody and protracted conflict. The bar graph below summarises responses from the
interviewees that participated in this study.
Figure 7: Cause of clan competition
As per the evidence presented in the bar graph above, 18.4% (148) of the respondents argued
that political motivation is the primary cause of clan conflict and competition. 18.8% (151) of
the interviewees agreed that the main cause of clan and group skirmishes and struggle is as a
result of extreme poverty and high unemployment rate in the country. 13.3% (107) of the
respondents asserted that the major driver of clan and group contestation is the availability of
uneducated and unemployed armed youth coupled with abundance and the easy accessibility
of small arms and light weapons.
Additionally, 15% (120) of the respondents argued that zero-sum conflict attitude is the
primary factor that cause and perpetuate clan and group hostility and collision. External
forces were identified as motivators of clan and group confrontations and perpetuation of the
conflicts as 10.6% (84) of the interviewees have indicated that foreign forces are major
destabilizing factor that fuel clan and group conflict in Somalia. Furthermore, the
incompetency of the national and sub-national states in southern and central part of the
country has been identified as cause of conflict. In fact 9% (72) of the respondents argued
that the lack of monopoly of legitimate coercive forces by the government has rendered
spoilers the incentives to mobilize their clansmen against other perceived contenders leading
to fierce inter/intra clan or group competition. Moreover, 8.2% (65) of the respondents
mentioned that wrong policy and approaches have caused clan and group contestations.
Amazingly, only 3.8% (31) of the respondents identified extremist ideology as the cause of
clan and group competition. Similarly 2.8% (22) of the respondents agreed that scarcity of
available resources cause clan and group rivalry.
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Apart from the questionnaires, the researcher has managed to organize a focus group
discussion on the same topic. The participants in the FGDs articulated their feelings about the
cause of inter-intra clan conflicts. They have argued that poor capacity of the national
government, to provide leadership and necessary framework that consolidate and
accommodate various political and economic interests, from rival clans and groups has
motivated clan based elites, to set in motion what usually provoke reaction from others. The
sub-national state formations that were initiated certain political clan and sub-clan leaders
without proper consultation and consent from other local clans in the area who normally
consider such a exclusionary decision not only as breach to their rights but also provocative
and deliberate attempt from their rival to dominate them. The participants in the FGDs
claimed that poverty; unemployment and lack of economic opportunities have increased
vulnerabilities of youngsters of being used as combatants in deadly clan and group
confrontations instigated by notorious warlords, organized criminal groups and conflict
profiteers. The participants in the FGDs specifically mentioned the role of business people in
the cause and perpetuation of clan and groups conflict. It was noted that conflict
entrepreneurs play key role in financing and providing other necessary resources to the clan
militia leaders and their sycophantic supporters. The examples about charcoal traders who
acted as accomplices of Alshabab’s brutal rule coupled with monstrous and murderous
behaviour in Somalia and beyond were narrated. The participants in the FGDs also mentioned
about the capital city as part of the problem currently persisting in Somalia. One of the key
informants argued that:
Previously Mogadishu was a cosmopolitan city where all clans in Somalia had representation,
invested and built properties, but this reality was turned upside-down when the clan erupted
in 1991, Hawiye did manage to evict other clans from Mogadishu and occupied the city
including the government offices and private properties. Other clans were forced to seek
refuge in their ancestral land. When the power- sharing government was initiated it was
agreed that status of capital city shall be discussed and act of parliament will be passed;
unfortunately 14 years down the line, neither status of the capital city were discussed nor any
law on same issue were passed. The reason is Hawiye has dominated the city, they consider it
as their political centre and they want status quo to prevail; other clans have neither
representation nor do they regard the town as a neutral city; this means that some citizens
suffer discrimination in their own capital city and which makes Mogadishu a bone of
contention and source of clan and group competition. The best alternative is to move the
capital city from Mogadishu to preferably western regions or the former British protectorate
known as Somaliland. That can be a beginning of political reconfiguration in Somalia (FGD,
September, 2014)
The findings revealed that the conflict in Somalia has political cause more than other issues
and these calls for political resolution for the Somali impasse. Additionally, the findings
showed that absolute poverty and high unemployment rate are some of the main driving
forces behind persistent incidences of clan confrontation. Moreover, the findings discovered
that lack of skills and formal knowledge coupled with abundance of readily available small
arms and light weapons has enabled notorious clan leaders to mobilize youth and use them to
participate in deadly clan and group conflicts and other criminal activities. This highlights the
necessity of creating programs specifically designed to address youth demobilization
disarmament and rehabilitation (DDR), skills trainings, employment creation and youth led
conflict transformation initiatives. This is consistent with United Nations Policy for Post-
Conflict Employment Creation, Income Generation and Reintegration (2009) which
recognizes both importance and challenges of both engagements in the productive economy.
The policy outlines that creating youth employment that taps into the positive energy and
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skills of youth is a particularly difficult challenge, as youth often find themselves trapped in a
vicious cycle of violence, poverty, illiteracy and social exclusion. It is essential to recognize
the needs of specific target groups but such a focus can fuel resentment in communities, if not
framed within an overall strategy that respects community-based expectations and equity
(UN, 2009).
The findings further discovered that external influences and wrong policies have caused more
grievance and division as opposite to viable solution for pacification. The findings have
outlined that the inabilities of the central government to provide the necessary framework for
managing clan and groups competitions have increased externally driven patronage policy
which also promoted clannism and contestation. The findings uncovered that there are
conflict entrepreneurs who are determined to maintain the current instability and crises, so
that their infamous and harmful profit making will continue. The findings indicated that
capital city of Somalia or Mogadishu remains a bone of contention because of dominance of
one clan at the expense of the other aggrieved clans. The findings emphasized the need for
initiating a new capital city that is more neutral, secure and acceptable to all clans and
political actors in Somalia.
The findings indicated that the formation of new sub-national states is flawed and wrongly
approached which increased division, animosity and propensity for further fragmentation and
disintegration in Somalia. This is in agreement with the Balthasar (2014) who concluded that
formation of state in the context of weak central government is a dangerous political
undertaking that can easily backslide into more clan competition fragmentation. He argued
that although state formation might bring short-term stabilisation in some areas, it increases
the likelihood of intra-clan quarrels and inter-clan competition. This is particularly the case
for those areas in which federal member states are yet to be established. Moreover, a
weakened FGS would also render Somalia’s fragmentation and exposure to internecine
internal conflict more likely (Balthasar, 2014). The findings discovered that because of
protracted conflict in Somalia there is suspicion and mistrust among different groups which
endorses negative perception and zero sum attitudes. The means that there is need for social
cohesion and reconciliation where negative attitudes and behaviour that augment wrong
perception towards other are gradually changed. This further underscores that any peace and
statebuilding approach may not promote cooperative and consensual solutions to the
contentious issues at national, regional or local level, will definitely ignite more competitions
and conflicts in this troubled country in the horn Africa.
National dialogue and Reconciliation
The interviewees were asked give their views about role of dialogue and reconciliation in the
country. With the aim of examining the advantage of communal dialogue and peaceful
management of the conflict, the respondents were given multiple choices questions. Below is
a bar graph recapitulating main findings from the respondents who participated in this study.
Figure 8: Dialogue and reconciliation
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The figure 8 above indicates that 30.3% (242) of the respondents noted that dialogues and
reconciliation are necessary because they promote consensus and building process where
people are able to debate over thorny issues that divide them and finally agree on common
grounds which envision the future. Equally, 30% (240) of the respondents believed that
dialogue and reconciliation are significant for power-sharing at local and regional level as the
same have chances of taking divergent views and interests into account. Additionally, 22.2%
(178) of the respondents have mentioned that dialogue and reconciliation can restore trust
among different rival clans. Furthermore, 11.3% (90) of the interviewees argued that dialogue
reconciliation can help the restitution of properties looted or forcefully taken by one group or
the other. Finally 6.3% (50) of the respondents claimed that dialogue and reconciliation can
promote public legitimacy of the government.
In FGD, the respondents equally underscored the importance of national dialogue and
reconciliation of rival clans who aggrieved each other during the period of turmoil. The
respondents also indicated that the current confusion engulfed in the statebuilding process
which arose out of failure to properly address grievances from different clans. They argued
that the initiative of federating will not be possible without prior transparent and open
dialogues for the actors and group in the area. The respondents articulated that the
reconciliation is necessary for power-sharing not only for the pronounced four and half (5.4)
model but also for the unpronounced clan based power-sharing used in regional and local
level which is vital for trust building between former antagonists. The participants in the
FGDs mentioned that all inclusive and consultative process that focus on institution building
and best restorative practices are required to put the pieces together. The Participants in the
FGDs have contended that reconciliation and dialogue are necessary for creating people
driven process that increase ownership and public legitimacy for nation statebuilding
processes. The participants mentioned about the Somali customary law and religion in the
social reconciliation and conflict transformation which encourage open dialogue and
resolution of differences. The respondents asserted that: Conflict is not a new phenomenon
in Somalia, because Somalis used flight over pasture, water, camel and land ownership and
those conflicts were being resolved without external help. Somali customary law or Xeer
which emphasises restorative justice and relationship building such as forgivingness,
intermarriage and togetherness needs to be revived and remoulded so that it can address the
contemporary conflict situations in the country (FGD, August, 2014).
The respondents have mentioned that dialogue and reconciliation is very important for
restoring justice and addressing many grievances caused by the protracted social conflict
where different clan sub-clans engaged violent armed conflict other neighbour group. The
respondents that argued the dialogue and reconciliation can complement local and
international efforts for restoring peaceful, democratic and accountable government in
Somalia. The respondents asserted that Somalia should move out of the temporary power-
sharing arrangement to more permanent power-sharing. They argued that alliance building
and party system strictly regulated on basis of their political ideology and fair representation
of all clans and regions in the republic can moved out unhealthy political clan competitions.
The findings exhibited that dialogue and reconciliations are essential for initiating a inclusive
and representative process that promote consensus which can replace the culture of
competition of win-lose or zero sum attitude. This is compatible with the discourse postulated
by Bar-Tal and Bennink from Tel Aviv University of Israel and Utrecht University, The
Netherlands respectively. They argued that a stable and lasting peace is characterized by
mutual recognition and acceptance, invested interests and goals in developing peaceful
relations, fully normalized-cooperative political, economic and cultural relations based on
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equality and justice, non-violence, mutual trust, positive attitudes, and sensitivity and
consideration of the other party’s needs and interests (Bar-Tal and Bennink, 1993)
The findings revealed that dialogues and reconciliation are needed to strengthen the power-
sharing arrangement while rebuilding confidence and trust between rival clans. The findings
showed the necessity of dialogue and reconciliation for restitution of properties confiscated
during the civil war. The findings also indicated that dialogue and reconciliation have the
likelihoods of restoring indigenous mechanisms for conflict management and communal
driven peace and statebuilding processes. The findings showed the necessity of taking the
country out of the messy clan conflict by adopting party system. The findings indicated that
any future political party must be based on democratic ideological values not clan allegiance.
The findings denoted that the potential political party must have a national outlook that
transcends clannism and other sectarian politics. This concurs with the Balthasar (2014)
observations about the need for genuine political parties with convincing party programmes
and an active followership that extends beyond a handful of Mogadishu-based politicians. He
argued that such parties could prove to be valuable vehicles in attempts to transcend the sub-
national purview of political entities, overcome age-old clan-based disputes, and provide
viable platforms for national dialogue. Lastly, the findings strongly highlighted the
connotation of addressing past grievance and historical injustice. This concurs with Lederach
(1997) reconciliation model which combines four variables of Truth, Justice, Mercy and
Peace.
In a nutshell the importance of dialogue and reconciliation in divided Somali society where
the need salient of rule of law and legitimacy governance at national, regional and local level
cannot be overestimated. The findings stressed about challenges facing the government on
absence of civic dialogue, social reconciliation and trust building. Without public
engagement and active participation, peace and statebuilding processes in Somalia will not be
only become futile efforts but also relapse of conflict and fragmentation nation state. This is
in agreement with Jibril (2014) argument that warned against a quick-fix, shot-gun wedding
type Federalism, and any process that overlooked the importance of dialogue, public
consultations and is not underpinned by a spirit of reconciliation. He advised all parties,
including the Federal Government to uphold and respect all principles relevant to the
formation of civil administrations including the projected federation within the framework of
the Provisional Constitution (Jibril, 2014).
Conclusion
The objective of the study was to assess challenges faced in the application of power-sharing
model for management of intractable clan conflicts in Somalia. During the application of
power-sharing models many challenges including increased clan allegiance and reduced
national loyalty were experienced. The power-sharing strengthened clan supremacy and
clanocracy rather than meritocracy. The power-sharing failed to transform inter and intra clan
relationships from rivalry to cooperative, harmonious and peaceful competition. Instead the
power-sharing widened segmentation, fragmentation and sectarian politics making the
government dysfunctional and incompetent outfit.
The power-sharing government has failed to manage adequately two primary causes of clan
conflicts in Somalia. The first is a political one where the power-sharing government was
supposed to deal with many issues including ensuring inclusivity and proportional
representation; creating accountable, transparent and credible system; restoring peace,
security and rule of law by reforming and capacitating public institutions; organizing national
dialogues and socio-emotional reconciliation processes where different rival groups sit down
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and discuss thorny issues; preparing political parties and centripetal political system that help
the country move from fixed segmentary clan politics to cooperative and peaceful alliance
building stage.
The second issue that the power-sharing government has failed to address is the economic
one. The power-sharing was initiated to fix economic problems including; high
unemployment rates, absence basic services such as health care, water, education to the
citizens, lack of demobilization, disarmament and rehabilitation clan based militia and
excombatants; absence centres for market-driven skill training to youth; rehabilitation and
investment for productive sectors of livestock, agriculture and fishery; lack of rehabilitation
public infrastructure including, agricultural canal, airport, roads and industries; ever
increasing inflation caused by dollarization, absence of local currency among other.
The failure of power-sharing to deal with the primary political and economic causes has not
only adversely affected government’s legitimacy and credibility but also concretized
warlordism and factionalism. The greedy elites backed by foreign actors and conflict
entrepreneurs took advantage of the vacuum created by the feeble government to advance
their political agenda by mobilizing loyal clan and sub-clans against the others perceived as
‘enemies’. The vagueness of provisional constitution, chaotic formation of new federal
states, and absence of constitutional court at national and sub-clan government has opened a
Pandora box where clan contestation and violent conflict recurred. This can only be reversed
through civic education, dialogue, reconciliation for rebuilding lost trust, restoring damaged
relationship, creating confidence and cooperative polity.
Recommendations
The objective of the study was to assess challenges faced in the application of the various
power-sharing models concerning management of intractable clan conflict in Somalia. The
capacities of national and sub-national governments remain poor and frail. With this
weakness and incompetence, the public offices will continue suffering credibility problems.
In order to reverse terrible inability, a program for institutional capacity building that focuses
on three distinct but interrelated areas must be initiated. The first capacity development of the
program should focus on human resource capacity where the civil servant are given well
tailored and specialized training that is designed to produce competent cadres. The capacity
building training of both technical and managerial aspects of the job for senior public officers
in public institutions is required. The second areas of capacity development should
concentrate on building solid systems, policies and legal framework where the workers are
given enough exposures on the application of those system and policies. The government
should ask UN and other partners from international community and friendly countries to
help rehabilitate good system, policies and laws that can propel the country out of the current
mess. The third areas of capacity development should also focus on equipment and
infrastructure where public institutions are provided necessary working materials, office
equipment and adequate space for operation. The currently dilapidated structured public
institutions need to overhaul rehabilitation and refurnishing.
Somalia has been without effective and competent government for more than two decades.
More than 70% of Somali population are below thirty (30) years of age. This means that
majority of Somali population have never seen peace and good government. As a result
violence has become habitual incidences. In order to deal with this chronic problem, there is
need to conduct nationwide dialogue and civic education primarily on the issues of
constitution and federal system of governance.
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The national and sub-national governments are always at loggerheads causing unnecessary
political and clan centric tensions. The roles and powers of different governments remain
blurred. The constitution provides scanty powers for the national government while vaguely
mentioning the power of sub-national government and concurrent or residual powers.
Therefore, the parliament must pass law unequivocally demarcating the roles and powers of
different levels of government.Because of clan conflict where many people were forcefully
evicted out of Mogadishu and their properties illegally occupied by other fellow citizens,
many people view Mogadishu as both unsafe for them to come back and invest again or
irreparable for the town to restore its lost glory. Therefore, it is advisable for Mogadishu to
remain a commercial city only while political seat of the government is moved from
Mogadishu to the Northern regions preferably Hargeisa which was second capital after
Mogadishu. This can partially address the grievances of northern people who are pushing for
secession from the rest of Somalia.
The violations of human rights, corruption and impunity have prevailed in Somalia. Because
of capacity of the national and sub-national governments law enforcement has been weak. In
order to address past injustices and stem out criminality, it is necessary to establish
international criminal tribunal for Somalia. This will definitely increase deterrence of future
crime which will also contribute to restoration of peace and security in Somalia.
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