Dalrymple rebutted on first afghan war

Monday, January 13, 2014
Myths which the US Decision makers must not believe about
British defeat in First Afghan War
First Afghan War by Agha Humayun Amin (Jul 24, 2014)
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Myths which the US Decision makers must not believe-Surely the
Russians,Iranians,Chinese and Pakistanis will be happiest if US
altogether abandons Afghanistan to the wolves

The fact that more than half of Afghans want the US to stay
further geopolitics dictates that US position and presence be
maintained in Afghanistanfor various substantial reasons.
Wednesday, March 9, 2011

Myths and Misconceptions of Indo Pak Military History-Part
Three
Excerpts
from Sepoy
Rebellion of

1857-59
Reinterpreted
by
Agha.H.Amin

,17 August
1998

This was in response to many questions asked about First Anglo-
Afghan War, British players & related questions about Indian army. I
just tried to put all in book review as they are related although I had
to do it in hurry therefore a bit disjointed.

Hamid
Book Review: William Dalrymple. Return of a King: The Battle for
Afghanistan 1839-42
Hamid Hussain

William Dalrymple's latest work Return of a King is a fascinating
account of First Anglo-Afghan War of 1939-42. Dalrymple is a well known
historian of India and his previous works City of Djins, White Mughals and
The Last Mughal are based on his extensive research spanning several years
while living in India. One crucial factor that differentiates Dalrymple from
other English language historians is his use of local sources mainly in Urdu
and Persian. In telling the story of the First Anglo-Afghan War, he also used
Afghan sources that are now available to English language readers for the

first time. However, all Afghan and Indian sources used by Dalrymple are
not reliable and some are polemics that freely mix fantasy with facts.
Dalrymple sheds some light on two fascinating characters; Mohan Lal and
Shahamat Ali. These two natives were first students of English at Delhi
College and in an all British cast, the two played a very important role as
native political assistants to British.


Sepoy Rebellion of 1857-59 Reinterpreted
Oct 10, 2012
by Agha H. Amin
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
In summary, by 1839, Dost Muhammad Khan had established himself as
ruler of Afghanistan after annihilating other contenders. A former ruler,

Shah Shuja was living in a comfortable exile in Ludhiana as British
pensioner and Maharaja Ranjit Singh was ruling Punjab that included
Peshawar; the former winter capital of Afghan rulers. British fearful of
Russian drive cobbled a plan involving British, Shah Shuja and Ranjit
Singh. British will help Shah Shuja to regain his throne with the help of
Ranjit. Shuja will get his throne, British will get a friendly ruler who will
keep Russians out and Ranjit will keep Peshawar as Shuja will renounce his
claim over the territory conquered by Sikhs. This was the genesis of First

Anglo-Afghan War. Wily ruler of Lahore was the shrewdest of the three
players not allowing the army to take the shortest route that will go through
his own territory. Instead, army had to go through the desolate areas of
Sindh, Baluchistan and over treacherous Bolan Pass to southern
Afghanistan. The journey alone and not any battle devastated the army.
Shah Shuja was easily installed at Kabul by British and Indian bayonets and
Dost Muhammad changed place with Shah Shuja and lived in same quarters
in Ludhiana as pensioner with his slaves and concubines. After a year and a

half of partying and affairs in Kabul, British cut subsidies to border tribes
into half to decrease expenses, the tribes closed passes, annihilated small
force and large camp followers, British sent an army of vengeance to spank
Afghans and returned to India, Shah Shuja was murdered, Dost Muhammad
came back, repeated the previous act of chopping some rebellious heads and
other body parts to become the top dog again and the cycle was completed.


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by Agha H. Amin
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
Dalrymple's story telling style providing extensive details may be boring
to ordinary readers but for those interested in history it is pure delight.
Dramatis Personae segment alone runs seventeen pages. If ordinary reader

overcomes this hurdle then he will enjoy the five hundred page story of a
fascinating chapter of British Empire.
Afghans were not just bystanders but active participants in the game of
intrigue to further their own interests. Dalrymple provides some details of
the Afghan side of the story. To understand the complexities from Afghan
perspective, correspondence of Amir Dost Muhammad Khan with three
powers in 1836 provides a window to modus operandi of Afghan power

players (this is quoted by Mohan Lal; a direct participant with first hand
information). This is a classic example of these power plays and how
desperately Afghan rulers tried to maintain their independence in extremely
difficult situations by playing one power against the other. Dost wrote a
letter to Governor General Lord Auckland stating, "I hope your Lordship will
consider me and my country as your own, and favor me often with the receipt
of your friendly letters. Whatever directions your Lordship may be pleased
to issue for the administration of this country, I will act accordingly". To

Shah of Persia, Dost wrote, 'the chiefs of my family were sincerely attached
to the exalted and royal house of your Majesty, I too, deem myself one of the
devoted adherents of that royal race; and considering this country as
belonging to the kingdom of Persia'. At the same time, he sent a letter to
Czar of Russia stating that 'since Mahomed Shah, the centre of the faith, had
closely connected himself with his Imperial power, desiring the advantage of
such alliance, that he also being a Mahomedan, was desirous to follow his
example, and to attach himself to his Majesty'. In January 1857, Dost

Muhammad signed a treaty with British in Peshawar and said that if he had
the power, he would fight the unbelievers but as he could not do it therefore,
'I must cling to the British to save me from the cursed Persians'.

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
First Anglo-Afghan War was the result of several complex factors.
Underlying fear was that Afghanistan and Persia could become the staging
ground for Russian efforts to undermine East India Company's hold on
India. This war was just one act of a much larger drama on the world stage

what was called 'Great Game' by British and 'Tournament of Shadows' by
Russians.
Many British characters in Dalrymple's account had long association
with India and in many cases several family members were involved in the
expansion of the empire. One of the defenders of Jalalabad garrison was a
gunner Augustus Abbott. He survived the Afghan cauldron and rose to the
rank of Major General. His brother Frederick Abbott (later Major General)

of Bengal Engineers was chief engineer in the same campaign. Third brother
Saunders Abbott also served in Bengal army, fought in Anglo-Sikh wars and
served under Henry Lawrence in Punjab. Fourth brother Keith Abbott was
on the diplomatic playing field of the Great Game and during the time of
First Anglo-Afghan war was consul at Tehran and later at Tabriz. However,
the most famous was General James Abbott. James was also a player in the
Great Game and while his two brothers were in Afghanistan and one in
Persia, he was travelling in the Khanate of Khiva. Later, he became the

young protégé of Henry Lawrence, in charge of Hazara district where he
earned the love and respect of local population. The town of Abbottabad,
where Osama bin Ladin was killed was founded by him.

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
Head of Shah Shuja's contingent Colonel (later General) Abraham
Roberts spent fifty years in India and his son General Frederick Roberts
spent forty four years in India. Frederick followed his father's footsteps and
commanded Kurram Field Force of Indian and British troops in Second
Anglo-Afghan War of 1878-80. He became famous for his march from

Kabul to Kandahar and later titled Baron Roberts of Kandahar. Frederick
won Victoria Cross (VC) in Indian Mutiny and his son also named Frederick
won a post-humous VC in Boer War.

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
Three Broadfoot brothers served in Afghanistan. Lieutenant William
Broadfoot (Bengal European Regiment) served in the forward post of
Bamyan and improved many passes. He was Alexander Burn's military
secretary and killed along with Burns during attack on the residency.
Lieutenant James Broadfoot (Engineers) worked on preparation of advance

of the Army of Indus and later wrote an authoritative account of Ghilzai
tribes. He travelled in disguise with a Lohani merchant caravan from Ghazni
to Dera Ismail Khan through Gomal pass and sketched the area. He was
killed in action in November 1840 at Parwan Darrah along with other
officers when troopers of 2nd
Bengal Light Cavalry bolted. Third brother
Captain (later Major) George Broadfoot (34th
Madras Native Infantry) was
commander of the escort that brought Shah Shuja's family to Afghanistan.
He later converted his escort into sappers and commanded this diverse

contingent consisting of Hindustanis, Gurkhas and Afghans and was among
the defenders of Jalalabad garrison. George was an excellent swordsman and
locals believed that the ghosts of his two slain brothers added extra power to
George's sword cuts. He was killed in action three years later in Second
Anglo-Sikh war at Ferozshah.


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
Captain Robert Warburton's love affair and later marriage with Shah
Jahan Begum is the romantic chapter of the otherwise sanguine first Anglo-
Afghan encounter. The child of this union was Robert Warburton. Father

was born in Ireland and buried in Peshawar while son was born in a Ghilzai
fort in Afghanistan when his mother was on the run and buried in Bromptom
cemetery. Dalrymple mistakenly writes that Warburton commanded Frontier
Force. Punjab Irregular Frontier Force (nick named PIFFERS) consisted of
infantry and cavalry regiments and artillery batteries that kept internal peace
in newly acquired territories in Punjab. It was commanded by regular army
officers. Paramilitary Frontier Scouts were raised to maintain peace in tribal

territories. Warburton raised Khyber Jejailchis (later Khyber Rifles) to
maintain peace in Khyber tribal agency where he was political agent.
Dalrymple asserts that those regiments that served in Afghanistan
mutinied in 1857 because their officers deserted soldiers. There is no
evidence to support this assertion. In general, set back of First Anglo-
Afghan War had an impact on Indian army as the myth of British
invincibility was shattered and affected morale of soldiers. However,

mutiny occurred seventeen years after the Anglo-Afghan War. Poor
senior military leadership was responsible for many humiliating
encounters. In such circumstances, it is not unusual that morale of
officers and men is a casualty. There were cases of both British and
Indian soldiers shying away from the battle and in some cases behavior
of officers was also shameful. However, overall officers performed to the
best of their abilities. On the other hand, in many cases Indian soldiers
bolted leaving their officers on the field.


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
Large part of army of Indus had already left Afghanistan long before
the Afghans rose against British and Shah Shuja. Disaster only struck

the force that retreated from Kabul. This force consisted of 44th
Foot of
British army, Ist Bengal European Infantry of Indian army, four
infantry regiments of Bengal native infantry (2nd
, 27th
, 37th
, & 48th
) and
one Bengal Light Cavalry (2nd
). Total combatants included 690 British,
2800 Indian soldiers and 12'000 non-combatant camp followers
including women and children.
1857 mutiny was a general uprising of Bengal army while Bombay and

Madras armies in general remained loyal. Large number of Bengal
army regiments mutinied regardless of their service in First Anglo-
Afghan War. Of the ten Bengal cavalry regiments seven mutinied and
three disarmed. Of the seventy four infantry regiments of Bengal army,
forty seven mutinied and remainder twenty seven either disarmed or
disbanded. Among those regiments that were part of the Kabul
garrison, 2nd
Bengal Light Cavalry mutinied at Cawnpur, 2nd
Benagl
Native Infantry was disarmed at Barrackpore, 27th
was disarmed at

Peshawar, only part of the 37th
mutinied at Benaras and similarly only
part of the 48th
mutinied at Lucknow.
Major Agha Amin's encyclopedic work based on relevant material on
1857 mutiny provides many interesting details of the military aspect of
the upheaval. 2nd
Bengal Light Cavalry had an interesting
history. Major General Shahid Hamid in his work on Indian cavalry
titled So They Rode and Fought provides little known information that it

was raised in 1787 as Kandahar Horse by Nawab Wazir of Oudh from
Kandaharis settled in Lucknow. In 1796, it became 2nd
Bengal Light
Cavalry. In 1841, two squadrons of the regiment fled when confronted
by a small body of Afghan horsemen at Parwan Darrah leaving their
officers on the field. The exact cause was never established but Agha
Amin's suggestion about the origin of troopers of the regiment which
were mainly Afghans of Kandahar origin is the most likely explanation.
These Kandaharis who had settled in Lucknow did not want to confront

their ethnic kin though separated by a time span of sixty years. The
outraged commander disbanded the whole regiment. A new 11th
Light
Cavalry was raised and all officers of 2nd
transferred to 11th
Light
Cavalry. In 1850, 11th
Cavalry fought gallantly in Multan and one of
the old officers captured the Sikh standard. This performance was
rewarded by renaming 11th
Cavalry to its old number of 2nd
Light
Cavalry.

Dalrymple connects past with the present in his usual style. However, no
two conflicts are same and causes and consequences of every conflict are
unique. East India Company had no interest in a project that didn't
generate revenue and in 1839 First Anglo-Afghan War was the result of
Russophobia. One of the key architects of the policy Lord Palmerston
declared that the purpose was not to make Afghanistan a British
province but install a client ruler that could join hands with British to

keep Russians at bay. The staggering cost of three million sterling
pounds almost bankrupt Indian treasury. Initial force consisted of
21'000 combatants and 38'000 camp followers. Large part of the
military force was already withdrawn to India prior to uprising and at
the time of general revolt, in addition to a small garrison in Kandahar
there were only 4500 combat troops and 14'000 camp followers that
retreated from Kabul. In fact, despite humiliating defeat of this war,
overall British objectives were secured for the next one hundred years.

The country remained a buffer even long after British had gone from
India. Amir Dost Muhammad had learned his own lesson and in 1857
rebellion of Indian army when he could have easily recaptured his lost
territories including the prize of Peshawar, he didn't venture beyond his
own borders. Foreign relations of Afghanistan remained subservient to
British for the next eighty years for a small subsidy paid to Afghan
rulers.

It is too simplistic to assume that somehow if world leaders read the
history, they will avoid blunders. U.S. involvement in Afghanistan was the
direct result of September 11 attacks and presence of Osama Bin Ladin in
Afghanistan. If Bin Ladin was in Timbuktu, U.S. forces would be heading
there and not Afghanistan. Once started, each conflict evolves and after a
while original spark that started the fire becomes irrelevant.


Dalrymple is a master story teller and we owe him thanks for providing a
masterpiece narrative of a forgotten chapter of history. We hope that such
works stimulate interest of local historians to utilize rich research materials
stacked at their doorsteps.
William Dalrymple. Return of a King: The Battle for Afghanistan 1839-
42 (Alfred A. Knopf, 2013); pages. 515

SEPOY REBELLION OF 1857-59
REINTERPRETED
BY MAJOR AGHA H AMIN (RETIRED)

Sepoy Perceptions about EEIC Military Effectiveness
The Bengal Army was the brain child of Lord Clive's military
genius. The Bengal sepoys related to each other by blood
relationship and caste bonds had served the EEIC for some 100 years

when they rebelled in 1857. These men had a very close contact
with the British and had observed them from very close quarters.
Any neutral and unbiased account of the events of 1857 clearly
proves that the Britisher as an officer was never disliked by the
sepoys. As an officer who served in Pakistan Army I can state with
conviction that the British provided excellent leadership to the
Indians. They definitely knew how to lead and inspire the Indian,
leading them from the forefront which I am afraid few of at least

our native post 1947. Generals did either in Burma or in 1965 or in
1971. The sepoy admired and revered the British officer. In 1857 he
was rebelling against the system instituted by the EEIC. Against
policies formulated by men constituting a board of directors in far
off England. The greasing of cartridges with pig or cow fat similarly
was also an administrative decision. The sepoy perceived the British
officer as a fair and brave leader and many British officers
reciprocated these feelings. One of the British commanding officer

committed suicide when his native infantry regiment was disbanded.
Many others resisted disbandment of their units. One troop of 3rd
Light Cavalry the most crucial unit of Bengal Army Sepoys as a
matter of fact loyally fought for the British in 1857.
It appears, however, that sepoy perceptions about EEIC military
effectiveness changed from absolute faith in the invincibility of the
EEIC as a military machine to skepticism from 1804 to 1857.

Before we proceed further we must state that the first major
reverse or defeat which the EEIC suffered in India was in 1780 at the
hands of Hyder Ali and Tipu Sultan who were heading forces whose
fighting Hector Munro and Baillie in 1780 were defeated in a manner
which was described by Fortes Cue the official historian of the
British army in the following words, “The blunders had been flagrant
and from a military point of view, Munro must be held solely

responsible for one of the greatest calamities that has ever befallen
the British arms”469. But this happened with the Madras Army. The
Bengal Army sepoy realized for the first time in 1804 that the that
EEIC was not invincible.

This happened while dealing with the Mahrattas and not the
Afghans who came much later. In 1804 five battalions of sepoys and
about 3000 irregular horse left by the C in C Bengal Army Lord Lake
to keep the Mahratta Holkar in check under the command of Colonel
Monsoon were forced to make a disastrous retreat from Central India
to Agra470.

The results of this reverse were short term since Lord Lake
immediately assumed personal command and defeated the
Mahrattas. However, the harm had been done and the myth of
invincibility of the EEIC as far as the Bengal Army was concerned
was challenged for the first time. Monsoon's retreat was followed by
a much more serious reverse which for many years shattered the
EEIC myth of invincibility. This happened at Bhurtpore, the Hindu
Jat fortress which is the only fort in British Indian history which a

British army in India failed in a siege to capture. Leading the EEIC
army in this case was a man of no less a stature than Lord Lake who
had previously captured Delhi and destroyed Mahratta power in
North India in battle of Laswari. (It must be remembered that
Panipat - 1761 checked the Mahrattas, but this was temporary since
within few years they recaptured Delhi.

It was at Laswari on 01 Nov. 1803 that one European infantry
regiment and a couple of Bengal Army Regiments composed of
roughly 3/4 Hindu soldiers and 1/4 Hindustani Muslims destroyed the
Mahratta Army) 471.

In 1805 Lake failed to capture Bhurtpore. He made a first assault
in January 1805 but failed to capture the fort. The British troops
became so demoralised that the three European regiments i.e. HM
75 Foot, HM 76 Foot and the 1st Bengal Europeans refused orders to
attack and withdrew 472! Almost a thousand casualties were
suffered but repeated British assaults were repulsed. At last on 24

February Lord Lake withdrew his army from Bhurtpore.
Subsequently, the Hindu Jat Raja sued for peace in 1805 due to
reasons of political expediency; but the fact remained that militarily
this Hindu Jat Raja had not been defeated! The EEIC never forgot
this defeat and later on they did capture Bhurtpore but this was
much later i.e. on 18 January 1826.

The force used at Bhurtpore this time was larger than the one
the EEIC used to recapture Kabul in September 1842473 in the first
Afghan War. Another reverse which the EEIC suffered was in the
Nepal war of 1814-16.
General Bal Bhadra,the indomitable Gurkha commander in Anglo Nepal War
of 1814-16

Here their initial advance into Nepal was repulsed. Nepal was
subsequently defeated using the Bengal Sepoys but again the harm
had been done.
General Ochterlony the conqueror of Nepal

The sepoy's confidence in the British officer was a little shaken.
The EEIC retreat from Kabul to Jalalabad in the first Afghan war was
not a big disaster keeping in view the numbers involved.

There were only 700 Europeans in some 5000 troops in the weak
and starved brigade which withdrew from Kabul in January 1842
and which was destroyed by an overwhelming force of some 30,000
Afghans taking advantage of harsh weather and shortage of food in
this EEIC force. The EEIC troops largely composed of Bengal sepoys
did subsequently recapture Kabul in September 1842. But the human

mind is not a computer and the net significant impression produced
on the sepoy was that the EEIC had been forced to retreat. The
extremely tough resistance of the valiant Sikhs in the First and
Second Sikh wars again produced a strong impression on the mind of
the Bengal Army Sepoy.

At Mudki the main British army survived just because the Sikh
general Taj Singh did not attack them,474a otherwise their
destruction was certain.
Battle of Mudki

This was a battle fought on absolutely plain land, unlike
Afghanistan where the Afghans bravery had a deep connection with
adverse mountainous terrain. The impressions of the Sikh wars were
the deepest in convincing the sepoys that the British were not
invincible.

In Afghanistan the mountains, the adverse weather and the
small numbers were an excuse; but at Chillianwala everything
favoured the British and yet they failed!

Tejh Singh the Hindustani Hindu imported by Ranjit Singh from Meerut,UP
in hope that a non Punjabi general wouldbereliable just as Nawaz thought in
case of Musharraf.Tejh Singh turned out to be the traitor who betrayed Sikhs
at Moodki
All these disasters from 1804 till 1849 certainly had an influence
on the mind of the Bengal sepoy and reinforced his decision to rebel
in 1857. The sepoys felt in 1857 that they could meet the Europeans
on the battlefield as an equal.

Their perceptions were however erroneous in one area. This was
about realising that the principals force multiplier of sepoy
efficiency was superior leadership of the British officer. Without
British leadership the military effectiveness of the sepoy reduced by
some 75%. Since the British suppressed the initial rebellions in
Punjab they were able to use Punjab and Frontier's manpower to
create new regiments or in using comparatively new regiments

raised in 1846-49 which were used with as much effect at Delhi as
the Bengal sepoy units at Kabul or Ghazni or at Gujrat.
The British officer of 1857 was the greatest force multiplier of
military effectiveness by virtue of leadership which was far superior
to be “Rebel” leadership in terms of “Resolution” “Tactical
Efficiency” reinforced by an iron frame administrative organisation

created by the EEIC during its 100 year rule in India and its eight
year old rule in the Punjab.
Lack of Foreign Intervention
It has been said that “French” intervention in support of the
American rebels during the American war of Independence played an
important role in the success of the Americans against the British.

The French navy played a decisive role in blocking British
reinforcements and in movement of British ships from one part of
America to the other.
Similarly, in 1971 the Indian intervention played an important
role in the otherwise just and righteous struggle of the Bengalis
against West Pakistan oppression.

The Vietnamese may not have succeeded the way they did
against USA, had the Chinese and USSR not helped them the way
they did. Similarly the Afghans against USSR may not have been so
successful had the USA not aided them. The foreign intervention
factor plays an important role in the success of a rebellion. In 1857

no such thing happened. Afghanistan was the only country which
could have made the rebellion a success by invading India.
But we must remember that contrary to the prevalent myth
about Afghan invincibility, these gentlemen had been so severely
mauled by the EEIC in September 1842 that they did not dare to
attack the EEIC in 1857, which as a matter of fact was a golden
opportunity for them to attack India. The EEIC was at its lowest ebb

and the Governor General of India and the Chief Commissioner of
Punjab were seriously contemplating about surrendering all area
upto river Indus to Afghanistan.
In June - July 1857 John Lawrence the EEIC Chief Commissioner
of Punjab (including present N.W.F.P.) had become so demoralised
due to the siege of Delhi that he had informed Edward's the
Commissioner of Peshawar that due to fear about security and

survival of the British army at Delhi he was thinking about sending
all British troops in Peshawar valley to Delhi and to invite the ruler
of Afghanistan Dost Muhammad Khan to occupy the Peshawar valley
upto the Indus on the understanding that if he proved faithful
(which he certainly was!), the Peshawar valley would be ceded to
him in perpetuity474. But Dost Muhammad was happier with the
money EEIC was giving him every year.

Secondly, Edward's the EEIC man at Peshawar was a man of
immense resolution. Edwardes declared that rather than obeying
such a defeatist order to abandon Peshawar “he would feel bound by
conscience to resign and explain his reason to the government”475.
Lord Canning the Governor General to whom Lawrence had
requested for clearance regarding the proposal to cede Peshawar
also realised that psychologically and politically such an action

would be fatal since it would be perceived in NWFP and in
Afghanistan as a withdrawal and defeat on the EEIC part.

Canning therefore, decided in favour of Edwardes. Edwardes was
right in understanding the true worth of Dost Muhammad Khan the
so called “Amir of Afghanistan”! Dost Muhammad Khan's price was
an annual subsidy of 12 lakh or 1.2 million Indian rupees per year
476! Just look at the difference in perceptions. The thoroughbred
Britisher, the man who saved the Punjab in 1857 is thinking big. He

thinks that “Dost Muhammad” the King of Afghanistan, the ruler of a
proud race which became independent only in 1722 will accept
nothing less than Peshawar valley from Khyber till Indus!

Edward is a better judge, he beautifully appreciates that 12 lakh
an year will do. Was there any difference between Bahadur Shah
Zafar who was drawing a similar allowance as Dost Muhammad of
Afghanistan? It was Afghan loyalty which saved India for the British
more than Punjab or NWFP loyalty! I give full marks to he EEIC
General Pollock who in 1842 on his own initiative decided to capture

and burn Kabul, despite contrary orders from Ellenborough the
Viceroy of India477. Thus on his orders Kabul was captured and
burnt on September 1842.

This was a good job since it was this severe mauling received in
1842 which most probably restrained Dost Muhammad from
attacking India. Afghanistan thus lost probably the last chance to
regain Peshawar!

Thus we find our brave Muslim Afghan neighbours concluding an
offensive defensive treaty with the EEIC while the Hindu Raja of
Ballabghar and the Mahratta Tantia Topi were fighting alongside
their Muslim Bengal Army Sepoys! Just Rs. 12 lakh per year, cheap
isn’t it! Thus Canning telegraphed Lawrence478:-

“Hold on to Peshawar. give upon nothing”
Money makes the mare go! The Khilafat Leaders of 1918-23 had
not read the history of Afghans and thus naively hoped that the
Afghans would invade India! The Afghans lost a golden opportunity
of attacking British India during the First World War once the pure
white troops holding India were as following479:

a. Eight Infantry Battalions
b. Thirteen Batteries of Artillery
c. Two Cavalry Regiments

A total of some just 15,000 troops! Foolishly the Afghans did
attack India in 1919 when a new king came into power and were
quickly pushed back by the British Indian forces who were back to
the pre war strength.
Logistic Factors

The sepoys were handicapped by logistic factors like shortage of
gunpowder rifles and artillery ammunition i.e. grapeshot canister
etc. These played a significant part in reducing their military
effectiveness whereas the EEIC forces had no such shortage at any
stage in 1857 or 1858.
Lack of Aggressive Leadership

This appears to have been a principal cause of sepoy failure. The
Indian as a general rule have throughout history been handicapped
in this aspect. It appears that outmoded concepts of “fatalism”
“destiny” etc. have had a negative effect on the quality of
leadership in all spheres of India. The general approach of wait for
the events and to be moved by events rather than to move events
has been and still is the hallmark of Indo Pak leadership. Thus we

find the Muslim League without any clear programme right till 1940,
a mere seven years before India got independence.
Lack of aggressive leadership was evident in most of the battles
in 1857. We find the sepoys slowly moving to Badli and taking up a
passive defensive position waiting for the Britishers to come all the
way from Simla and bayonet them. We find the Lucknow sepoys
failing to capture the Lucknow Residency which was an apology of a

fortress. The only leader who was aggressive appears to have been
Maulvi Ahmadullah or Tantia Topi. But unfortunately they had very
limited forces at disposal. Had he been at Delhi perhaps the sepoys
may have done better. The only other two leaders who were
aggressive were Subedar Bakht Khan and Feroz Shah, the Mughal
prince. The sepoy failure to launch an effective attempt to sever
British communications at Delhi and failure to counter attack the
British at Delhi on 15/16 September 1857 when they were most

vulnerable were fundamentally speaking failures produced due to
lack of aggressive leadership. Even the Afghans were very docile in
1857 in the person of Dost Muhammad Khan, while we see that the
British were ready to concede them much more than the Afghans
may have ever imagined.
This lack of aggressiveness is even today a serious drawback in
Indo Pak armies. Thus we see the Pakistanis miserably failing at

Khenm Karan where one aggressive armoured brigade commander or
an aggressive general commanding their First Armoured Division
would have sufficiently demoralised the Indian into abandoning all
territory west of Beas river, just like the EEIC was all set to abandon
all territory west of Indus to the Afghans.
It is a simple fact that General Chaudhri did give an order to the
commander of Indian western command to withdraw in face of the

Pakistani attack at Khem Karan. It was, however, the indomitable
Indian General Harbaksh Singh who saved Amritsar for the Indians by
refusing to view the situation as pessimistically as Chaudri.

Similarly at Chawinda the Indians could easily have by passed the
Pakistani position holding Chawinda. But here again lack of
aggressive and imaginative leadership on Indian part saved Pakistan
combined with resolute leadership on part of General Abrar who was
never promoted after 1965.

Post 1857 British Policy laid the Foundation of Division of
India in1947

The policy of EEIC before 1857 did not view Indians as Muslims or
Hindus or Sikhs. There was no quota or caste system in the Bengal
Army and all Indians regardless of their caste or religion or ethnicity
were recruited as soldiers. As a matters of fact before 1857 the EEIC
did not even bother to exactly find out as to how many Hindus or
Muslims were serving in each Regiment of the Bengal Army. Though
it was common knowledge that some three fourth of the Bengal

infantry consisted of Hindus while Muslims were about one fourth.
Similarly it was an established fact that bulk of the cavalry was
Muslim. But this aspect was simply irrelevant. After 1857 “Religion”
certainly became important. But the British made it so, not the
Indians.
Men like Sir Sayyid Ahmad Khan who were acting as voluntary
consultants for their British masters on how to avoid another mutiny

thus advised the British against mixing Hindus with Muslim troops in
an army unit in the following words; “Government certainly did put
the two antagonistic races into the same regiment, but constant
intercourse had done its work and the two races in a regiment had
almost become one. It is but natural and to be expected, that a
feeling of friendship and brotherhood must spring up between the
men of a regiment, constantly brought together as they are. They
consider themselves as one body and thus it was that the difference

which exists between Hindoos and Mahomeddans had, in these
regiments, been almost entirely smoothed away” 480. We find this
eminent Sayyid suggesting some measures to communalize the
British Indian Army in order to avoid another mutiny!

It is true that before 1857 the British generally preferred men
from the northern plains of Oudh, modern UP province etc till 1849.
But there was no specific policy nor any laid down regional
guidelines about recruitment. The recruiting officer could recruit
anyone regardless of any laid down class or caste considerations.
After 1849 when the Punjab (including present NWFP) were annexed
the British extended the recruiting area to north of Sutlej also. But

there was no “Martial Race Theory”. After all the old Bengal Army
had conquered the whole of northern India for the British. It was
amply proved in the First Afghan war that with good leadership an
army comprising two or three odd European regiments and nine or
ten regiments comprised of 75%, Oudh Hindu Rajput, Brahmans led
by British officers could capture Kabul.

The myth of the invincibility of the Muslims had finished with the
success of the brilliant as well as indomitable Sivaji's and his
successors rise inside India.

The myth of Afghan invincibility had been shattered by Ranjit
Singh once he ejected the Afghans from Peshawar, Bannu and
Charsadda first in 1818 and finally in 1823481. The myth of Afghan
invincibility was again shattered once Nott and Pollock occupied and
burnt Kabul in 1842. there was no “Martial Race Theory” in vogue
but after 1857 this theory was created.

After 1857 once the government of India was directly assumed by
the British Crown the British decided to take special precautions to
control India. Thus it was after 1857 that the policy of “Divide and
Rule” was seriously enforced. Recruitment in army was now strictly
controlled by a clear cut policy laying down the number and ratio of
various races and religions in each arm service and regiment. The
Gurkhas who were a non entity in Indian army before 1857 were now
specifically enrolled since racially speaking they had proved to be

the most reliable race on which the British could rely in times of
crisis. Statistically speaking, the rebellion was a combined Hindu-
Muslim effort. Most of the regiments which rebelled in 1857 were
Hindu majority regiments.
It is true that leadership wise the Muslims were more active in
all outbreaks, specially in the decisive Meerut outbreak led by 3rd
Light Cavalry comprising Muslim Ranghars and Hindustani Pathan

Muslims from Rohailkhand and upper Doab. Actually, the northwest
Muslims had proved to be the most loyal subjects of EEIC and at
least half of the loyal native troops which captured and looted Delhi
consisted of Punjabi Muslims and Pathans.

Thus, 1857 was a mixed affair, there were Muslims on both sides
“Rebel” as well as “British”, there were Hindus on both sides, the
Madras Army which stayed loyal had a large percentage of Muslim.
Yet the British very cleverly turned it into a communal affair.

They boosted the ego of the Punjabi Muslims by cleverly
classifying them as a “Martial Race” and degrading the “Hindustani
Muslims” as unreliable soldier material481a. The transfer of Delhi
and Hariana to Punjab province 482 was as another brilliantly
conceived measure to increase the Punjabi - Hindustani hatred.

People of Delhi and Rohtak had to travel all the way to Lahore, the
Provincial capital and the Punjabi's were patted that Delhi had been
made a mere division of Punjab as a reward for “ Punjab Loyalty”.
Thus the “Peel Commission” constituted after 1857 to study and
analyse the future composition of the Indian Army recommended
that the native army should be composed of different nationalities
and castes, and as a general rule mixed promiscuously through each

regiment483! Such system had existed in the Madras and Bombay
armies but these were much smaller as compared to the Bengal
Army. However, India was now viewed as loyal and disloyal. Most
favoured were the races west of Jamuna since these had stood loyal
to the British during the crucial siege of Delhi.

A deliberate policy was laid out to pamper the Punjabis by
establishment of an elaborate irrigation system, tax exemption and
other rewards. After Partition in Pakistan exclusion of Bengalis and
Sindhis was justified on the grounds that they were non martial. In
reality the Bengalis were previously not selected simply because the
Hindustani Hindu Rajput or Jat or Muslim was much taller and
imposing than the Bengali and from 1905 onwards the Bengalis were
viewed as politically unreliable 484!

The British did not immediately do as Sir Sayyid had advised
them, i.e. having one religion regiments. However, they divided
men within a regiment, religion wise at platoon level. From now on
all men from a platoon were to be from the same religion. Before
1857, even platoons were mixed and there was no such communal
divisions. The seeds of separate electorates were thus laid once
Indian Bengal Army was reorganised following the rebellion of 1857!

The quota system was enforced not only in the army but also in
the civil service. Thus Indians were manipulated into looking at each
other as “Hindus”, Sikhs” and “Muslims”. There are many myths

about this policy in present day Indo Pak sub continent. It is
generally, but most incorrectly thought in Pakistan that the British
were anti Muslim. It were the Muslims of Punjab and Frontier who
were the most loyal British subjects of the EEIC in 1857. The British
policy was more subtle. It was pro Muslim in Punjab and Frontier. It
was pro Muslim even in UP as far as the civil government jobs was
concerned.

For example, in 1911 out of the seventeen Indians at various
levels in the elite Indian Civil Service (ICS) there were ten Hindus
and six Muslims. But this is not all, the fact is that all ten Hindus
were there in the ICS because they had gone to England and passed
the ICS examination and duly entered the ICS on their own steam.
Out of the six Muslims in the ICS only one had actually passed the
ICS entrance examination. The other four were men nominated by

the British to the ICS in order to ensure Muslim presence and of
course also keeping in mind the dictates of the “Divide and Rule”
policy. The fifth Muslim ICS among these who came through the
backdoor was a judge who became one after being slowly promoted
through the lower courts 485.
Similarly the Muslim proportion in the provincial Civil Service in
UP was over double their proportion of the population486. Again in

the UP police 49.8% of the officer cadre was Muslim while 42.0
percent of the total police force was Muslim487! Thus UP Muslims
were as a policy discouraged on an all India level from joining the
army but within UP were encouraged to compete with Hindus in the
provincial police and provincial civil service.

In terms of percentage in the army the Muslims were regarded
as the most loyal and reliable race, but only the Punjabi Muslims in
greater numbers and settled districts, Pathan Muslim to a lesser
degree. Followed by the Muslims the Sikhs were considered the most
reliable race in India. (It must be noted that the Gurkhas who were
the most reliable were a non Indian Mongoloid Himalyan race). In
Punjab the Muslim landlords and even common cultivators were
greatly protected by British civil servants who even influenced

legislation to ensure that Muslim estates should not pass into the
hands of Hindu money lenders.
A note must be made here by recording the fact that apart from
the policy of “Divide and Rule” which like most British policy was an
unwritten policy, there were many absolutely genuine Britishers like
Edwardes and S. Thorburn who genuinely admired the Muslims
particularly the Punjabi and the Pathan Muslims, since they had

served most part of their service in Punjab and Frontier. These
Britishers genuinely sympathised with the plight of Muslims in
Punjab. Thorburn as a matter of fact genuinely hated the Hindus and
was bitter about the Hindu money lenders negative role in Muslim
majority Punjab. Thorburn, actually authored a book titled
“Mussulmans and Money lenders” published in 1886488. This book
was instrumental in influencing the opinion of many British civil

servants into becoming more pro Muslim at least as far as Punjab
and Frontier were concerned.
Notable among the British laws was the Punjab Alienation of
Land Act of 1900. This Act greatly helped the Muslim land holders of
Punjab since it forbade the passing land from agricultural to non
agricultural castes. Few people in today's Pakistan that much more
than Muslim League, it was Septimus Smet Thorburn (1844-1924)

who was the actual saviour of Punjabi Muslims and even Pathans at
least in the economic sense!

Coming back to our main line of discussion, a deliberate policy of
“Divide and Rule” was followed after 1857. Recruitment in the army
was fixed under “Muslim” “Hindu” and “Sikh” lines and further even
among the Muslims and Hindus a clear cut policy was instituted
which slowly and steadily replaced the east of Jumuna races by
north of Ambala races. Muslims were seen as “Hindustani” “Punjabi”
“Trans Indus Pathan” “Independent Transborder Pathan” etc. Even
Muslim Rajputs were specifically divided into “Kaim Khani Rajputs”

and “Ranghars”. The Muslim Pathans were divided into “Afridis”
“Mahsuds” etc. Even Pathans were divided on sectarian lines, i.e.
the “Kurram Milita” was a Shia sect force from Turi Pathan tribe
which was used with devastating success against non Shia sect other
Pathan tribes. These are subtle structure railways, road, canals,
which we see even today. But they also divided us, something which
most people do not realize. They were doing this to Indo Pak sub
continent at a time when other countries like USA were integrating

others races like Irish, Italian, Polish, Russian etc with the main
steam of the Anglo Saxon American society.
It is a strange aspect of history that policy makers never really
visualise the long term effects of their policies. The policy of
“Divide and Rule” adopted as a tangible and deliberate policy after
1857 so devastatingly divided India that even today its deadly
effects can be seen in both India and Pakistan. The divisions were

not merely on religious lines but even within Muslims on sectarian,
ethnic, caste and class lines. A Pandora's Box was opened by the
British and even today both India and Pakistan are merely tragic
victims of this fatal policy!
Lord Canning's views about the policy of “Divide and Rule”
expressed in 1857 are thought provoking; Canning thus said in a
letter dated 9 October 1857:' “the men who fought against us at

Delhi were of both creeds; probably in equal numbers. If we destroy
or desecrate Mussulman Mosques or Brahman Temples we do exactly
what is wanting to band the two antagonist races against
ourselves.....as we must rule 150 million of people by a handful
(more or less small) number of Englishmen, let us do it in the
manner best calculated to leave them divided (as in religion and
national feeling as they already are) and to inspire them with the
greatest possible awe of our power 489.

Canning went further and very subtly defined certain guidelines
regarding employment of various classes after 1857:-

“All exclusion of Mahomeddan, Rajpoots or even of Brahmans
should be a matter of management rather than of rule; and indeed
that it will be right to take an opportunity, though not just yet, to
show by an exception here and there, that the rule does not exist. It
is desirable that no class should feel that it had henceforward
nothing to expect from the government 490”

The post 1857 British Civil Servants were convinced that the
survival of British empire in India lied in carefully widening the
communal divide, particularly the Hindu Muslim divide. The
subsequent British agreement to the right of separate electorate
was also a part of this policy. The Muslim leaders of that time
favoured separate electorate for personal rather than communal
reasons. Regardless of advantages or disadvantages, the Muslim
feudal's aim was to get into the viceregal or provincial council!!

In 1879 the Eden Commission set up to review the reorganisation
of Indian Army observed and duly reported that the principle of
“Divide and Rule” was being enforced as a policy and its
implementation was being constantly scrutinised.
Thus, slowly and steadily they divided the Indo Pak subcontinent
on communal lines. Politicians of pre 1947 failed to realise that

mere religion cannot make a nation. Punjabis, Bengalis, Pathans,
Rajputs and South Indians are too culturally different as a race. Thus
the reason for lack of progress of modern day India and Pakistan
essentially lies in being organised on a fundamentally unrealistic
concept. The ‘two nation theory’ drowned in the Bay of Bengal in
1971 and the Akhand Bharat theory will also be destroyed in the
coming decades. At least we cannot say with satisfaction that the
India of 1857 was sane enough not to believe in the two nation

theory or the Akhand Bharat theory! The grand British aim after
1857 was to make Indians like the Europeans of Thirty years war and
the Crusades as far as bigotry and obscurantism was concerned.
They succeeded in 1947. And since then the leaders of India and
Pakistan have proved to be even more irrational.
Progressive Policies of Dalhousie were reversed

1858 proved to be a major watershed in the history of modern
Indo Pak sub continent. On 2nd August 1858 “The India Act of 1858”
consisting of 85 sections became a law492. Vide this act the British
Crown assumed direct Government of India. The English East India

Company and its private army and navy were abolished. The
progressive anti feudal, anti princely state, and anti outmoded
religious practice's policies of Lord Dalhousie were reversed. The
princely states, which Dalhousie had most correctly regarded as an
anachronism and a contradiction were now left alone. Annexation of
princely states by Dalhousie did antagonise the people but the
principal cause of success of the rebellion was the overwhelming
number of natives in the Indian Bengal Army. Now that the Bengal

Army had been effectively destroyed, what were the princely states?
But these had been loyal and had been of great assistance to the
British during 1857. So these dinosaurs were given a new life. We
salute Nehru and others for abolishing them in post 1947 Indo Pak
sub continent. The outwardly brilliant but essentially pedantic
British policy makers whose opinion mattered drew erroneous
conclusions from essentially fallacious premises. Thus they lost land
revenue by decreasing taxes and condemned India to remain socially

and politically backward. Religion was given undue importance in
the name of Divide and Rule and communal hatred increased after
1857. Enlightenment was no longer a priority and maintenance of
“Law and Order” because the essence of future British policy in
India.
Feudalism was strengthened, since the British realised that
feudals were good partners in controlling India. Their assistance

rendered the British administration more cost efficient and
economical. Small peasants were helped but the Feudals were the
top priority.
The non annexation policy of post 1857 British government in
India created serious problems like the Kashmir problem of 1947-48
which till this day has led to constant conflict in the Indo Pak sub
continent and has consistently ensured that both the countries

should remain economically backward and spend a
disproportionately and irrationally large percentage of their national
income on their armed forces.
About the author
A.H Amin studied at Saint Marys Academy Lalazar and Forman
Christian College Lahore and at Pakistan Military Academy Kakul.
He was commissioned in 11 Cavalry (FF) earlier known as PAVO
Cavalry on 17 March 1983.

Served in various command , staff and instructional appointments in
the army , finally commanding an independent tank squadron and
retiring from the army on 05 March 1994.
His writings were published in Pakistan Armys leading institutional
journals , notably Pakistan Army Journal and Command and Staff
College Quettas Citadel Journal.
He also authored three major tactical publications “ Tactical Handling
of Recce Troop “ (1986) , “ Tactical Handling of Recce Support
Group” *(1989 and the “ The RFS Concept “ (1990).
His recommendations regarding creation of army command groups as
published as an article in 1998 were accepted by the Pakistan Army in
2007 when army commands were created.
His books are essential reading in more than 200 leading libraries of
the world including Library of Congress USA , Combined Arms
Research Library of US Army Command and General Staff College
,Fort Leavenworth which is worlds largest military library ,US Army
War College Carlisle Library,Defence Intelligence Agency Library of
USA , Columbi University Library , US Armor School Fort Knox
Library,LUMS Library etc.

He wrote extensively for various journals and newspapers and also
served as Assistant Editor Defence Journal , Executive Editor Globe,
Founding Editor Journal of Afghanistan
Studies and presently as Editor in Chief for “Intelligence Review”.
He also actively worked as an associate of two leading think
tanks www.orbat.com of Ravi Rikhye and as Fellow of Alexandrian
Defense Group ,USA.
Major Agha H Amin has been invited to lecture and present papers at
various institutions including US Army Centre of Military History etc .
He headed Afghan Toll and Transoxiana two consulting firms which
played keyrole in various Asian Bank and World Bank electric
transmission line studies, notably CASA 1000,Uzbekistan Afghanistan
Pakistan line and Turkmenistan-Shibirgan –Mazar Sharif line.

List of Publications and writings
Books
 Development of Taliban Factions in Afghanistan and Pakistan-Co
authored with Prof. Dr. Andre deGeorges and Colonel David Osinski
 Pakistan's Military Failures -1947 to 2014
 Tank Battles around Chawinda-Comedy of higher Command Errors
 How the English East India Company Conquered India
 Atlas of Battle of Chillianwallah-13 January 1849
 Sepoy Rebellion of 1857-59 Reinterpreted
 Pakistan Army through eyes of Pakistani Generals
 Handling of Tanks in Indo Pak Wars
 Atlas and Military History of India Pakistan Wars (Volume 1)
 The Indian Army in the First World War
 Intelligence Review-Volume 1
 Stanley A. McChrystal , Michael Hastings -Understanding USAs
Afghan War
 Energy Review (March 2014) (Volume 1)
 No More Free Ice Cream Cups for NATO ,EU and USA-Future Wars
Scenarios
 Military Leadership and Decision Making

 Atlas of Battle of Chawinda
 The Indian Army in Second World War
 Pakistan Army, 1971 India Pakistan War and after
 Atlas of Battle of Chamb 1971
 Atlas of Battles of Assal Uttar and Lahore-1965
 USA, ISI, AL QAEDA and TALIBAN Anatomy of Grand US Strategic
Failure
 IED,Drones and Suicide Bomber Warfare
in Afghanistan and Pakistan
 Counter Terrorism Strategy for Islamic World
 Pakistans Grand Strategic Failures from Jinnah to Zardari 1916-
2013
 A British Siege Bloodier than Sevastopol
 Myths ,Distortions and Misconceptions of India Pakistan History
 Intelligence Review-Volume Two (Volume Two-November-
December 2013)
 Bolan Pass-A Pictorial Journey
 Khojak Pass
 Distortions, Misconceptions, Twists, Myths and Lies about history
 Taliban War in Afghanistan
 The Lucknow Campaign 1857-1858
 History: December Issue ,Volume Two (Volume 2)
 The Kashmir and Northern Area War of 1947-48
 Pakistan Army in East Pakistan Understanding a bitter conflict
 The Tank Attack that Failed
 Eftikhar Khan Pakistan's half European Commander and Battle of
Chamb 1971

 Operation Grand Slam and 1965 War-Akhtar Hussain Malik,Yahya
Khan and Ayub Khan
 Atlas of 1857-59 WAR
 Why Indian Army and Pakistan Army Failed in 1965 War
 Border Trade Zone Concept
 Military and Security Review-Volume 1
 History (Volume 1)
 The Essential Clausewitz
 Mans Role in History
 Books on Pakistan Reviewed
 Central India Campaign,Hugh Rose ,Tantia Topi and Jhansi Rani
 The FATA and Swat Wars
 Taliban War in Afghanistan-A Writers Transformed Perceptions from
2001 to 2011
• Professional Papers
1. Tactical Handling of Recce Troop-1986-Military Paper.
2. Tactical Handling of Recce Support Group-1989- Military
Paper.
• Pakistan Army Journal
1. Orders and Obedience -March 1991.
2. The Siege of Delhi -December 1991.
3. Resolution Cardinal Command Virtue -June 1992.

4. Intangible Forces behind a Military Manoeuvre-June 1993.
• Citadel Magazine-Command and Staff College Quetta
1. Plain as well as subtle aspects of military decision making-
1/94.
2. Obedience and Disobedience-Another View -2/97.
3. The Armoured Thrust-An Operational Analysis - 1/98.
4. The Relationship of Organisation to Doctrine and Conduct of
War- 2/98.
• Friday Times
• When the Ranghars Rebelled-February 12-18-1999.
• Defence Journal
1. Book Review-History of the Pakistan Army by
BrianCloughley- July 1999.
2. The Sepoy Rebellion- Serialized from July 1999 till April 2002
in 22 issues.
3. The Battle of Chhamb-1971 -September 1999.
4. The Battle of Bara Pind-Jarpal -October 1999.
5. The War of Lost Opportunities- -April and May 2000 .
6. Chillianwalla-The Forgotten British Reverse in India-July 2000.
7. Stray Reflections on Geopolitics and History writing-July 2000.

8. Handling of Armour in Indo Pak Wars-A Case Study-August
and October 2000.
9. Behind the Scenes-Book Review- August 2000.
10. Grand Slam-Battle of Lost Opportunities- September 2000.
11. History of Baluch regiment-Volume –1-Book Review-October
2000.
12. 1971 War-Tank Ambush at Kushtia- November 2000.
13. The Arms Bazaar-Reflections on Pakistani Arms Market-
November 2000.
14. Pakistan Army-1965-71-November 2000.
15. History of Baluch regiment-11-Book Review-November 2000.
16. Hunger Poverty and development-Book Recview-November
2000.
17. Stray Reflections on Commencement of Writing Pakistan Army
Till 1965- Dec 2000.
18. Ethnicity, Religion, Military Performance and Reliability-British
Recruitment.
19. Policy and the Indian Army-December 2000 and February
2001.
20. Realism, Heroism, Bravery, Boldness or Cowardice-January
2001.
21. The 1971 War-An Examination of the Strategic Concept-
January 2001.
22. Some Reflections on 1971 War-A Different Perspective-
February 2001.
23. Some Reflections on 1971 War-A Different Perspective-
February 2001.

24. The Battle of Chawinda-The Comedy of Higher Command
Errors-March 2001.
25. Hitler's Greatest Defeat-Book Review-March 2001.
26. The Relationship of Organisation to Doctrine and Conduct of
War-April 2001.
27. The Forgotten Regiments- May 2001.
28. Indo Pak War s-A Strategic Summing up- May 2001.
29. Francois's Disobedience at Tannenberg- June 2001.
30. When the 62nd Punjabis saved the Suez Canal- July 2001.
31. The Anatomy of Indo Pak Wars-A Strategic and Operational
Analysis-August 2001.
32. Gap between perception and reality in higher leadership-
August 2001.
33. 1965 Analysed- September 2001.
34. Audit of Warfare- October 2001.
35. Battle of Ravi Sutlej Corridor- December 2001.
36. The Western Theatre in 1971 War- February 2002.
37. Why Indo Pak Armies Failed in War-May 2004
38- Ongoing Taliban War in Afghanistan-October 2007
• Daily Nation
1. Misperceptions, Contradictions and Enigmas-The Pakistani
Political Scene-23 June 2001.
2. Expectations and Catch 22- 14 July 2001.
3. Endless Sycophancy Goes on- 16 July 2001.
4. The Chemistry of Agra Summit- 21 July 2001.

5. Old Carrots in New Bottles- August 05 2001
6. Superkamikaze in USA-26 September 2001- 26 September
2001.
7. First Global Low Intensity War-03 October 2001 -03 October
2001.
8. Short term gains.Long Term Faux Pas-–08 Nov 2001.
9. Games Superpowers Play- 25 December 2001.
10. Fourth Round or Web of Conspiracies- 09 January 2002.
11. Kargil to 2002-28 January 2002.
12. On Different Breeds of Wolves-06 February 2002.
13. A Conspiracy against Pakistan-19 March 2002.
14. The Fourth Military Government-29 April 2002.
15. A Distorted Geopolitical Scenario-17th May 2002.
16. Reducing Pakistan to Size-24th May 2002.
17. Indo Pak Strategic Equation-31 May 2002
18. What USA seeks to destroy -22 June 2002
19. Essence of the Matter – 21 August 2002
20. Dual Central Position-19 April 2003
21. Tejh Singh of Meerut -25 May 2003
22. The Kargil Conspiracy-09 June 2003
23. Betrayal at Camp David-23 June 2003
24. Wars of Opportunism-28 June 2003
25. The so called new US way of war-19 July 2003
26. The future of Indo Pak Conflict-23 August 2003
27. USA's Strategic Failure-30 August 2003
28. Russia's Strategic Opportunity-06 September 2003
29. Strategic Brilliance-13 September 2003

30. Terrorism or Just War-03 October 2003
31. The Gathering Storm-21 October 2003
32. The Age of Strategic Anarchy-18 November 2003
33. Why Pakistan does not need generals-31 December 2003
34. The Last Remedy-18 January 2004
35. Why Waziristan cannot be conquered-24 January 2004
36. USA's culminating point-14 February 2004
37. Strategy of Opportunism-24 February 2004
38. 2004-Pakistan's Turning Point-06 March 2004
39. Collaboration par excellence-20 March 2004
40. Pakistan's non NATO faux pas-03 April 2004
41. Second Wana-12 May 2004
42. Grand Intelligence Beheading-17 May 2004
43. History Repeated-22 June 2004
44. Afghanistan Kargil and Clifton Bridge-27 June 2004
45. An indigenous Struggle-19 March 2005
46. USA in Afghanistan-A Long Term Strategic View-12 May 2009
47. US Strategic Plan-28 May 2009
• Globe
1. Interpol-Some Basic Facts -September 2000.
2. At Cold War's End-Book Review -September 2000.
3. Cheka-Lenin's Secret Police -October 2000.
4. Superpowers Defeated-Book Review -February 2001.

5. Indian Muslim Politics-Serialised from February 2001 till
September 2001.
6. The Comfort Women-Book Review- March 2001.
7. Life of a Soviet Spy -March 2001.
8. Word and Term Power - serialised from March 2001till
September 2001.
9. Country Study-Afghanistan/Taliban -March 2001.
10. A Conspiracy against Pakistan -March 2001 .
11. Man's Role in History - Serialised from April 2001till September
2001.
12. The Dynasty-Book Review -April 2001.
13. The Fearful State-Book Review -April 2001.
14. The Law of Desire-Book Review -April 2001.
15. Wordpower and Term Power -May 2001.
16. A Princess Remembers-Book Review- May 2001.
17. Shiekh Mujeebs Six Point Formula-Book Review- May 2001.
18. A Woman Speaks-Book Review- May 2001.
19. Conflict and Violence in Singapore and Malaysia-Book Review-
June 2001.
20. The Jews-Story of a People-Book Review -June 2001.
21. Chekhov-Book Review- June 2001.
22. The Destruction of Democracy in Pakistan-A Historic Analysis-
June 2001.
23. Ethnicity and Politics in Pakistan-Book Review -July 2001.
24. From Martial Law to Martial Law-Book Review -July 2001.
25. From Plassey to Pakistan-Book Review -July 2001.

26. Pakistan-Constitutional and Political Dilemmas-Book review-
August 2001.
27. Narcotics and Global Economy-August 2001.
28. The Southern Rules-August 2001.
29. Khaki Shadows-Book Review- September 2002.
30. The Mughal Nobility under Aurangzeb-Book Review-September
2002.
31. Imperial Rule in Punjab-Book Review-September 2002.
32. Makran Coastal Highway-September 2001.
• Frontier Post
1. The War of Defamation- 19 January 2001.
2. 5 Minutes over Islamabad-October 2008
• Dawn
The Forgotten Regiments- February 4 , 2001.
• News
1. Terrorism or Another Jewish Conspiracy- 22 September 2001.
2. Afghanistan-Myth and Reality- 12 November 2001.
3. Afghan Jihad-Second Round- 16 November 2001.
JOURNAL OF AFGHANISTAN STUDIES
1. Resolving the Durand Line Question-January 2005

AFGHANISTAN TIMES
1. Afghanistan – A Strategic Analysis
2. Kargil- A military Analysis
Interviews /Transcript talks of
various personalities
1. Major General Naseerullah Babar –Military Career-Defence
Journal-April 2001.
2. Major General Naseerullah Babar –Political Career-Globe-May
2001.
3. French Ambassador meets Senior columnists of Karachi-
Globe-April 2001.
4. His Excellency Mr Peter Tejler-Ambassador of Sweden-Globe-
May 2001.
5. HisExcellency Mr Numata-Ambassador of Japan-Globe-June
2001
6. Admiral Tasnim-Defence Journal-May 2001.
7. Group Captain Cecil Chaudhry-Defence Journal-June 2001.
8. Brigadier Taj-Defence Journal-July 2001
9. Maj Gen Hidayat ullah Niazi- Defence Journal-August 2001
10. Maj Gen Tajammul Hussain Malik- Defence Journal-
September 2001

11. Lieutenant General Imtiaz Warraich- Defence Journal-October
2001.
12. Lieutenant General Ali Kuli Khan- Defence Journal¬-December
2001.
13. Brig Shamim Yasin Manto-Defence Journal- February 2002.
14. Flight Lieutenant Raffat Jamil- Defence Journal- March 2002.
15. Brigadier Z.A Khan
• Research for following Interviews aired on ARY Digital between
January and April 2002:--
1. Imran Khan.
2. Chief Justice Sajjad Ali Shah,
3. Senator Iqbal Haider
4. Mr Altaf Saleem,Minister for Privatisation
5. Lieut Gen Hamid Gul
6. Finance Minsister Shaukat Aziz
7. Ex Finance Minister Sartaj Aziz
8. Senator Aitizaz Ahsan
9. Mr Hafeez Shaikh
10. Mr Imtiaz Ahmad Shaikh
11. Lieutenant General Moin Haider
12. Senator Ijaz Shafi
13. General Pervez Musharraf

Dalrymple rebutted on first afghan war

Dalrymple rebutted on first afghan war

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