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JIEDDO Counter-IED Strategic Plan May 2013
JIEDDO Counter-IED Strategic Plan May 2013
JIEDDO Counter-IED Strategic Plan May 2013
JIEDDO Counter-IED Strategic Plan May 2013
JIEDDO Counter-IED Strategic Plan May 2013
JIEDDO Counter-IED Strategic Plan May 2013
JIEDDO Counter-IED Strategic Plan May 2013
JIEDDO Counter-IED Strategic Plan May 2013
JIEDDO Counter-IED Strategic Plan May 2013
JIEDDO Counter-IED Strategic Plan May 2013
JIEDDO Counter-IED Strategic Plan May 2013
JIEDDO Counter-IED Strategic Plan May 2013
JIEDDO Counter-IED Strategic Plan May 2013
JIEDDO Counter-IED Strategic Plan May 2013
JIEDDO Counter-IED Strategic Plan May 2013
JIEDDO Counter-IED Strategic Plan May 2013
JIEDDO Counter-IED Strategic Plan May 2013
JIEDDO Counter-IED Strategic Plan May 2013
JIEDDO Counter-IED Strategic Plan May 2013
JIEDDO Counter-IED Strategic Plan May 2013
JIEDDO Counter-IED Strategic Plan May 2013
JIEDDO Counter-IED Strategic Plan May 2013
JIEDDO Counter-IED Strategic Plan May 2013
JIEDDO Counter-IED Strategic Plan May 2013
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JIEDDO Counter-IED Strategic Plan May 2013

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  • 1. COUNTER-IED STRATEGIC PLAN 2012–2016Cover image: A U.S. Marine with 1st Platoon, India Company, 3rd Battalion,4th Marine Regiment, (3/4) uses a compact metal detector during a trainingexercise at Mojave Viper at Marine Corps Air Ground Combat Center, 29Palms, Calif. (Photo by Lance Cpl. Christopher M. Burke)
  • 2. COUNTER-IED STRATEGIC PLAN 2012–2016JOINT IED DEFEAT ORGANIZATION | iiiForewordAs we continue to address the improvised explosive device threats of today, wemust simultaneously prepare for tomorrow’s counter-IED and counter-threatnetwork effort by institutionalizing the knowledge, capabilities, and experiencewe have amassed during the last decade. Building upon hard-earned lessonslearned, this Counter-IED Strategic Plan extends the focus beyond current opera-tions and establishes an azimuth for the development of future and enduringcounter-IED capabilities.When discussing future threats, it is important we consider both the net-works that employ IEDs as well as the device itself. The IED is the weapon ofchoice for the overlapping consortium of networks operating along the entirethreat continuum — criminal, insurgent, and terrorist alike. Threat networks use IEDs because they are cheap,readily available, easy to construct, lethal, and effective. The IED is a weapon used strategically to cause casualties,create the perception of insecurity, and influence national will. This threat is complex and transnational in nature,representing layers of interdependent, inter-connected global threat networks, and support systems.In the networks that support, supply, and employ IEDs, we see the nexus of narcotic, criminal, insurgent,and terrorist networks supported by the easy flow of dual-use components through legitimate businesses, usinglocal readily available explosive materials, and a generation of combat-experienced IED makers — all interactingand operating in current or emerging conflict areas. They are largely seamless, overlapping, and not confined bygeographical or jurisdictional boundaries. These threat networks are like a virus that breeds and flourishes in a cli-mate of instability.Globalization, the Internet, and social media have extended the transnational reach of these organizations,allowing threat networks to easily spread IED technology. Of great concern is the growth in the use of homemadeexplosives. These IEDs, comprised of fertilizers and other legally produced materials, have been used with devas-tating effects worldwide — from the battlefields of Iraq and Afghanistan to domestic targets such as OklahomaCity and Oslo, Norway. The ubiquitous nature of IED materials, their low cost, and the potential for strategicimpact guarantee the IED will remain a threat and main casualty-producing weapon for decades to come.The mission to disrupt the transnational threat networks employing IEDs, and to defeat the IED itself,requires a comprehensive and seamless effort supported across all levels of our government. This threat must bemet with a whole-of-government approach that integrates efforts and leverages the combined authorities and capa-bilities of all interagency partners. While we are never going to stop all IEDs, a holistic, decisive, whole-of-govern-ment approach will significantly impact the effect the IED has in future operations and to our domestic security.The IED threat and the networks that employ them will endure — they are here to stay. This compel-ling threat requires us to maintain constant vigilance, an enduring counter-threat network, and counter-IEDcapabilities. MICHAEL D. BARBERO Lieutenant General, U.S. Army Director
  • 3. COUNTER-IED STRATEGIC PLAN 2012–2016iv | JOINT IED DEFEAT ORGANIZATION
  • 4. COUNTER-IED STRATEGIC PLAN 2012–2016JOINT IED DEFEAT ORGANIZATION | vTable of ContentsStrategic Vision................................................................................................................1Mission.............................................................................................................................1Assumptions ....................................................................................................................1Strategic Environment — the Current and Enduring Threat...........................................2Meeting the IED Challenge.............................................................................................6Goals and Objectives .....................................................................................................10Future C-IED Research and Development Requirements..............................................12Conclusion ....................................................................................................................13Acronyms........................................................................................................................15The following annexes will be available upon completion:• Annex A: Action Plan• Annex B: Process Integration• Annex C: References
  • 5. COUNTER-IED STRATEGIC PLAN 2012–2016vi | JOINT IED DEFEAT ORGANIZATION
  • 6. COUNTER-IED STRATEGIC PLAN 2012–2016JOINT IED DEFEAT ORGANIZATION | 1Strategic VisionReduce the effectiveness and lethality of IEDs to allow free-dom of maneuver for joint forces, federal agencies, and partnernations in current and future operating environmentsWe will use a synchronized and integrated approach tocoordinate the Department of Defense’s counter-IED effortsand rapidly provide capabilities to counter the IED threatin support of operational commanders. Critical to theseefforts are forces trained in the latest C-IED techniques andprovided with tailored and fused intelligence support. Asauthorized, we will provide support to other federal agen-cies as they analyze, pursue, disrupt, protect, and respond tothe terrorist use of explosives in the United States. We willaggressively seek to maintain the research and developmentadvantages needed to neutralize the IED threat.Above all, we must remain agile and responsive to theneeds of our commanders and warfighters, proactive in ourapproach, and tireless in our pursuit of comprehensive andtimely solutions to the IED threat.MissionLead DoD actions to rapidly provide C-IED capabilities andsolutions in support of Combatant Commanders, the Services,and as authorized, other federal agencies to enable the defeat ofthe IED as a weapon of strategic influence.Assumptions• An enduring global IED threat will drive CombatantCommander requirements for C-IED capabilities.• Homemade explosives will continue to be widelyavailable and employed in IEDs.• Fiscal constraints will likely result in a call for sharedresponsibilities and resources with other federalagencies.• Future C-IED operations will include allies or coalitionpartners, requiring U.S. forces to contribute tomultinational solutions in concert with our allies andpartners.• Deployed units will continue to require a rapid responseto C-IED issues and threats.• U.S. forces will continue to transition securityresponsibilities in Afghanistan; however futureoperations will require C-IED capabilities.• In the event of an IED-related domestic incident, thelead federal agency will require DoD support.• A networked and adaptive adversary aided by the latestinformation technology will continue to evolve andinteract with other violent extremist organizationsto constantly modify the design of IEDs and theirmethods of employment.““In the 20thcentury, artillery was the greatest producer of troop casualties.The IED is the artillery of the 21stcentury.” Lieutenant General Michael Barbero Director, Joint IED Defeat OrganizationEnduringCapabilitiesGoals ObjectivesLines ofOperationEnduringThreatStrategicEnvironmentC-IEDCapabilities SolutionsMeeting theIED Challenge
  • 7. COUNTER-IED STRATEGIC PLAN 2012–20162 | JOINT IED DEFEAT ORGANIZATIONStrategic Environment — theCurrent and Enduring ThreatThe ProblemThe future IED threat consists of an overlapping consortiumof networks spanning the entire threat continuum — fromcriminal gangs to insurgencies to terrorists with global reach— for which the IED is the common weapon of choice.These threat networks operate in an environment charac-terized by the easy flow of dual-use components throughlegitimate businesses and one with access to local, readilyavailable explosive materials. A generation of combat-expe-rienced IED makers with skills for hire, who operate whereweak and corrupt governance and desperate socioeconomicconditions prevail, can easily create political and economicinstability. These networks and devices will be an enduringthreat to our operational forces and to our domestic security.BackgroundThe IED threat is enduring and not new. In 1605, a radi-cal group attempted to blow up the British Parliament andassassinate King James I. Though averted, the attack wasone of the first large-scale attempts touse explosives as a weapon of strategicinfluence — in this case, to change agovernment. In 1919, extremists con-ducted simultaneous attacks in eightU.S. cities, targeting U.S. govern-ment officials including members ofCongress. The next year, anarchistsexploded a bomb on Wall Street thatkilled 38. Throughout World War II,guerrillas and partisans used explo-sives to conduct sabotage. During theVietnam War, the Viet Cong madeextensive use of mines and IEDsagainst U.S. forces, both on land andin rivers, causing 33 percent of allU.S. casualties.The Provisional IRA employedsophisticated improvised mortars and remote-con-trolled IEDs during the conflict in Northern Ireland, andHezbollah made extensive use of explosives against Israeliforces in Lebanon. In March 2004, there was a bombingof a commuter train in Madrid. This had a major strate-gic effect — as it was timed before a national election, andinfluenced Spain’s support to Operation Iraqi Freedom.There also was the failed Times Square attempt in Mayof 2010. In 2011, significant IED-related events occurredin Pakistan, India, Yemen, Somalia, Nigeria, Colombia,Norway, and bomb-making materials were found at home— in San Jose, California.Threat NetworksThough best understood in a regional context, the threat ismuch more complex and transnational in nature, represent-ing layers of interdependent, interconnected global networksand support systems. These networksadapt rapidly, communicate quickly,and are unconstrained by political bor-ders. In geographic areas where IEDuse is more likely, most of the popu-lace share similar social, economic,and religious identities. Weak gover-nance and the absence of rule of law,corruption, mass migration, poverty,illiteracy, high unemployment, largepopulations of disaffected youth, andcompetition for water, food, and natu-ral resources are factors that serve tounite and motivate a disaffected popu-lation. These factors, fueled by oppor-tunistic leadership, can lead to theemergence of insurgencies and violentextremist organizations. These extrem-ists often find common cause withexisting criminal elements who are apt to use the circum-stances to gain power and strengthen their illicit activities.The interaction of these networked organizations is enabledby the latest information technologies that provide recruit-ing opportunities, technical expertise, training resources,planning support, funding, and social interaction. Especiallynoteworthy is the essential nature of financial resources thatEnduringCapabilitiesGoals ObjectivesLines ofOperationEnduringThreatStrategicEnvironmentC-IEDCapabilities SolutionsMeeting theIED ChallengeEnduringCapabilitiesGoals ObjectivesLines ofOperationEnduringThreatStrategicEnvironmentC-IEDCapabilities SolutionsMeeting theIED ChallengeEnduringCapabilitiesGoals ObjectivesLines ofOperationStrategicEnvironmentC-IEDCapabilities SolutionsMeeting theIED ChallengeEnduringThreatA GLOBAL THREATFrom January to November 2011,outside of Iraq and Afghanistan:• 6,832 IED events globally,averaging 621 per month• 12,286 casualties• 111 countries• Conducted by individualssupported by 40 regional andtransnational threat networks• Of those totals, 490 eventsand 28 casualties were in theUnited States
  • 8. COUNTER-IED STRATEGIC PLAN 2012–2016JOINT IED DEFEAT ORGANIZATION | 3facilitate these illicit networks. Disparate groups of differ-ing origins easily interact and leverage each others’ abilityto finance their causes, launder money, and transfer fundsaround the globe. Criminal networks have long been ableto effortlessly use and manipulate otherwise legitimate net-works to move money, resources and information.Today’s threat networks have proven to be resilient,adaptive, interconnected, and agile. They have learned tooperate flexibly, aggregating and disaggregating quickly inresponse to countermeasures, extending their reach in physi-cal and virtual dimensions. They adapt technology in shortcycles and rapidly evolve tactics, techniques, and procedures(TTPs). Finally, today’s networks operate unbounded by thelaw of war, rules of engagement, central policy, moral con-straints, or other limitations from a central authority. TheIED is the common weapon of choice for elements along thethreat continuum.Social trends and communications technologies envi-sion more diffuse network hierarchies with amorphous lead-ership structures in the future. The users of IEDs will adaptthe most recent and successful TTPs gained from experi-ences in Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere, and use them forpolitical, ideological, or criminal purposes worldwide. Theywill seek to build the capability for more complex attacks,as seen in the July 2011 coordinated bombings in Mumbai,India. Their fundraising and financial transaction tech-niques will become more sophisticated, they will link withpirates and other criminal enterprises to enable their opera-tions, and they will seek covert support from sympatheticstate and non-state actors.THE IED IS THE WEAPON OF CHOICE FOR ADVERSARIESOPERATING ALONG THE THREAT CONTINUUM.Device TechnologyThe IED will remain the weapon of choice for groups alongthe threat continuum and will remain an enduring globalthreat due to the accessibility of materials and the poten-tial strategic impact resulting from their use. Today’s IEDsare relatively simple “low-tech” devices which routinely usecommand-wire, victim-operated, or radio-controlled trig-gers. Many components are readily available, have legiti-mate commercial uses, and are easily adaptable as parts ofbombs, e.g., circuit boards, cell phones, and simple elec-tronic transmitters and receivers. Homemade explosives,often composed of ubiquitous fertilizers, easily transport-able and convertible to greater-than-TNT explosive power,are predominant in IEDs and have been routinely employedagainst troops and domestic targets. IEDs are highly effec-tive because of the innovative ways the adversary employsthem. They are assembled with no or low amounts of metalcomponents and can be concealed in plastic jugs, walls,wood, or debris. The rudimentary nature of basic IED tech-nology simplifies design and construction techniques, whichcan be easily communicated via the Internet. In currentcombat theaters, more sophisticated devices, particularlyexplosively formed projectiles and advanced triggers, havecaused disproportionate levels of casualties relative to thenumbers employed.Threat Continuum
  • 9. COUNTER-IED STRATEGIC PLAN 2012–20164 | JOINT IED DEFEAT ORGANIZATIONIn the future, devices will adopt ever more sophis-ticated technology, limited only by the terrorists’ imagi-nations. Most fearsome would be weapons of mass effect— chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear — forwhich commercial control measures are not yet developedor in place. Future bomb makers will seek to incorporatesuch enhancements as peroxide- and hydrogen-based explo-sives; nanotechnology and flexible electronics; new formsof power, e.g., microbial fuel cells, non-metallic and solar;advanced communications (Bluetooth, 4G, Wi-Fi, broad-band); optical initiators (using laser or telemetry morethan infrared); and highly energetic and molecular mate-rials. Indicators have shown that terrorist networks whichinnovate with these new technologies are also develop-ing enhanced IED concealment techniques and may evencombine IED use with concurrent cyber attacks. Bombmakers will take advantage of available technology andinnovate in response to countermeasures — weapons willbe more lethal and harder to detect and defeat.Methods of DeliveryToday, threat networks employ a variety of means to deliverIEDs to their targets. These explosives are commonly bur-ied in or alongside roads or in culverts, transported by vehi-cles to a detonation site, or used by suicide bombers. Thecurrent threat also includes a variety of waterborne tech-niques — surface, submersible, and semi-submersible. Insome areas, postal bombs are common. IED users haveresorted to specialized delivery techniques to circumventC-IED measures, such as embedding IEDs in shoes, under-wear, toner cartridges, and cameras. There are efforts toADVERSARIES WILL CONTINUE TO EVOLVE IED LETHALITY AND TACTICAL EMPLOYMENT— FUTURE DEVICES WILL BE OF LARGELY OFF-THE-SHELF TECHNOLOGY.Upper right: Afghan National Security and International Security AssistanceForces conducted a clearing operation in Ormuz district, Helmand province.The operation lead to the discovery of 616 pounds of wet opium, 88 poundsof concentrated fertilizer, narcotics paraphernalia, and a pressure plate.(Photo courtesy ISAF)Middle right: U.S. Air Force Master Sgt. Kevin Bullivant, an explosiveordinance disposal technician with the 466A Explosive Ordnance DisposalTeam, sweeps off the explosive charge of an improvised explosive device foundin a wadi in Jamal, Afghanistan. (Photo by Staff Sgt. Andrew Guffey)Bottom right: The Newseum expanded its FBI exhibit with a section focusingon the FBI’s role in fighting terrorism before and after Sept. 11, 2001. Sixtynew artifacts include Richard Reid’s shoes he tried to ignite while on acommercial flight. (Photo by Jeff Malet, maletphoto)
  • 10. COUNTER-IED STRATEGIC PLAN 2012–2016JOINT IED DEFEAT ORGANIZATION | 5achieve low-detectable methods and greater precision usingsmaller-sized devices. Examples include shipping containersat varied transportation nodes; remotely piloted delivery inall domains — land, sea, air, and space; and even surgicallyimplanted devices on humans and animals.Domestic NexusThe threat of IED usewithin the United States isreal. A free and open soci-ety with guaranteed civilliberties is vulnerable —elements of the same over-seas IED threat continuumand networks seek to strikewithin the borders of thehomeland. While the useof explosives by organizedcrime and other groupswithin the United Statesis not new, the nature oftoday’s threat has uniqueelements.First, the threat islargely from non-stateactors who wish to take thefight to the U.S. homelandis a relatively recent development. An organized, sophis-ticated, and tactically adept network of terrorist-affiliatedindividuals with access to offshore resources is an ever-pres-ent danger. Al-Qaida, its associated groups, and the Tehrik-e-Taliban in Pakistan have made attempts within the pastyear to attack the homeland, often recruiting Americansor Westerners who can pass heightened security measures.Second, the availability of a range of bomb-making tech-nology and components allows motivated and empoweredindividuals to act alone or with only a few accomplices.Third, and particularly worrisome, is the threat of domes-tic radicalization and homegrown extremism —individ-uals who have lived primarily in the United States butare energized by ideology promoted by foreign terroristorganizations.Protecting the home-land, defending interestsabroad, and sustaining strate-gic flexibility require a proac-tive approach that countersthreat networks and antici-pates evolving IED designs,tactics, and technology. In2007, the Homeland SecurityPresidential Directive 19,Combating Terrorist Use ofExplosives in the United States,was signed. This documentand subsequent implementinginstructions direct a whole-of-government approach thatenvisions seamless federal,state, and local governmentefforts to “deter, prevent,detect, protect against, andrespond to explosive attacks.”The Defense Department’s demonstrated C-IED capa-bilities, experience abroad, and international working rela-tionships can have significant impact upon the domesticC-IED effort. Strong partnerships with our allies and allU.S. government agencies to synchronize our counter-threatnetwork capabilities and actions are required. The domes-tic threat evolves and adapts quickly and continuously. U.S.domestic capabilities must evolve more rapidly — it takes anetwork to defeat a network.THE DOMESTIC THREATOn May 25, 2011, the FBI Joint Terrorism TaskForce arrested two al-Qaida in Iraq-affiliated,Kentucky-based Iraqi refugees, Waad RamadanAlwan and Mohanad Shareef Hammadi.• Alwan was arrested for conspiracy to murdera U.S. national while outside the UnitedStates, conspiracy to use a weapon of massdestruction, and attempting to providemateriel support or resources to terrorists.• Hammadi was also arrested for attemptingto provide materiel support or resources toterrorists, as well as knowingly transferring,possessing, or exporting a device designedor intended to launch or guide a rocketor missile.EFFECTIVE SOLUTIONS TO THE DOMESTIC EXPLOSIVES THREAT REQUIRE ASEAMLESS WHOLE-OF-GOVERNMENT APPROACH.
  • 11. COUNTER-IED STRATEGIC PLAN 2012–2016Meeting the IED ChallengeIEDs have emerged as the threat weapon of choice and areone of the greatest challenges facing coalition forces in thecurrent theaters of operation. The ubiquitous nature andlethal effect of IEDs used by insurgents directly threatendeployed forces’ freedom of maneuver and the ability ofindigenous governments to provide for the safety and secu-rity of their populations. There is no single solution todefeat the IED because there is no single enemy IED net-work. A range of efforts — supported by a whole-of-govern-ment approach — to neutralize threat networks and devicesis required.Defeating the device is an unceasing effort, mak-ing use of the latest technological advances, to counter theadaptive adversary’s adjustments to friendly C-IED capa-bilities. To have a decisive and lasting impact on the adver-sary’s use of IEDs, friendly actions must focus on defeatingthe adversary’s network. This requires the fusion of informa-tion, analysis, and partner support. It also requires a focusedapproach that is agile, adaptive, innovative, persistent, andrelentless.To defeat the threat, we must continually identifylikely capability gaps and focus our supporting communi-ties of interest to develop solutions. Leveraging the researchand development (RD) community in this endeavorensures innovation that addresses these future challengesand provides a venue to discover and develop C-IED-relatedresearch and technology related to the C-IED mission.This strategic plan’s vision and mission describe the“ends” of this strategy — the requisite C-IED capabilitiesand solutions in the hands of the warfighters, supportingCombatant Commanders, the Services, and as authorized,other federal agencies to enable the defeat of the IED as aweapon of strategic influence. The “ways” are a set of endur-ing capabilities employed via three lines of operation, whichin an interagency and multinational context, may be con-sidered as lines of effort. The third leg of the strategy, the“means” are the resource allocation processes used to ensurecapability to rapidly respond to emerging IED threats.EnduringCapabilitiesGoals ObjectivesLines ofOperationEnduringThreatStrategicEnvironmentC-IEDCapabilities SolutionsMeeting theIED ChallengeEnduringCapabilitiesGoals ObjectivesLines ofOperationEnduringThreatStrategicEnvironmentC-IEDCapabilities SolutionsMeeting theIED ChallengeEnduringCapabilitiesU.S. Marine Corps Lance Cpl. Christopher Smith, left, a combat engineer with 2ndPlatoon, Lima Company, 3rd Battalion, 5th Marine Regiment, looks for a potentialimprovised explosive device during a census patrol in Sangin, Helmand province,Afghanistan. (Photo by Lance Cpl. Dexter S. Saulisbury)6 | JOINT IED DEFEAT ORGANIZATION
  • 12. COUNTER-IED STRATEGIC PLAN 2012–2016JOINT IED DEFEAT ORGANIZATION | 7Enduring CapabilitiesAn effective C-IED effort requires specific and focusedcapabilities to address both the threat networks and theirdevices. Joint forces must be enabled to counter an adver-sary’s use of increasingly sophisticated and ever-evolvingIEDs. With assistance from the RD community, themateriel response must rapidly harness the latest technolo-gies and concepts to enable engineering, procurement, andfielding of effective and timely C-IED systems. Joint forcefreedom of maneuver requires well-trained forces withunique skill sets who are able to develop situational under-standing, be proactive, and employ advanced technology.The exploitation of threat networks and devices by leverag-ing all available all-source information and intelligence isessential.The U.S. military is not the only group affected byIEDs. Allies and partner nations are also vulnerable, and theU.S. homeland continues to be an attractive target. A com-prehensive, long-lasting solution to the IED and the adver-sary networks requires cultivating a culture of cooperation,collaboration, information exchange, and when necessary,mutual support and assistance on the part of internationaland interagency national security and public safety partners.To counter this enduringthreat, the five enduring capabilitiesdescribed below must be integrated.These enduring capabilities must bescalable, affordable, adaptable, expe-ditionary, appropriate for domesticapplication, and support a whole-of-government approach.• Rapid acquisition and field-ing is the scalable ability to employ authorities, flexibleresources, streamlined processes, and effective oversightto drive the RD community to rapidly anticipate,identify, develop, and integrate emerging technologiesand concepts into effective fielded C-IED solutions.• Operations-intelligence-information fusion andanalysis is an expeditionary and scalable network andanalytical capability enabling DoD, other federal agen-cies, and coalition partners to understand threat-networkactivities globally. This fused, analytic capability lever-ages all available, all-source information and intelligence,to provide the most accurate, effective, time-sensitiveinformation and counter-network support to CombatantCommanders and, as authorized, other federal agencies.• Training is the ability to develop, define, and set C-IEDand attack-the-network training standards for joint forcesin response to Combatant Commanders’ requirementsand integrate those standards into appropriate joint andDoD concepts and doctrine in support of CombatantCommander requirements, to provide training and tobuild partner C-IED and counter-network capacity.• Weapons technical intel-ligence (WTI) is the ability toconduct relevant and timely col-lection, analysis, and technicaland forensic exploitation of cur-rent and emerging IED tech-nologies to swiftly enable forceprotection, component and mate-riel sourcing, targeting, coun-tering of threat networks, andexpeditious support to prosecution.• Whole-of-government approach is the ability to rap-idly synchronize counter-threat network capabilities andactions among joint, interagency, intergovernmental,international, and other federal agencies’ C-IED stake-holders. This is done through collaborative planning,information sharing, and cooperative capability devel-opment to reduce the impact of IEDs on operationalforces and the threat to the homeland.These essential enduring capabilities are synergis-tic and provide a comprehensive response to a complex anddynamic threat.ENDURING CAPABILITIES• Rapid Acquisition and Fielding• Operations-Intelligence-Information Fusion and Analysis• Training• Weapons Technical Intelligence• Whole-of-government ApproachEnduringCapabilitiesGoals ObjectivesLines ofOperationEnduringThreatStrategicEnvironmentC-IEDCapabilities SolutionsMeeting theIED ChallengeEnduringCapabilitiesGoals ObjectivesLines ofOperationEnduringThreatStrategicEnvironmentC-IEDCapabilities SolutionsMeeting theIED ChallengeEnduringCapabilitiesGoals ObjectivesLines ofOperationEnduringThreatStrategicEnvironmentC-IEDCapabilities SolutionsMeeting theIED ChallengeEnduringCapabilitiesGoals ObjectivesLines ofOperationEnduringThreatStrategicEnvironmentC-IEDCapabilities SolutionsMeeting theIED ChallengeEnduringCapabilitiesEnduringCapabilities
  • 13. COUNTER-IED STRATEGIC PLAN 2012–20168 | JOINT IED DEFEAT ORGANIZATIONLines of OperationThe five enduring capabilities are employed through threemutually supporting lines of operation — Attack theNetwork, Defeat the Device, and Train the Force. The linesof operation (LOOs) are the “ways” that provide the orga-nizing construct and focus of effort for this strategic plan.They serve to integrate the C-IED enduring capabilities,synchronize internal operations, and increase agility. Thethree LOOs are defined as:• Attack the Network enables offensive operationsagainst complex networks of financiers, IED makers,trainers, and their supporting infrastructure. Attackthe Network is focused on information fusion, exten-sive partner collaboration, and expanding analyti-cal support to combatant commands. Key to DoD’sAttack the Network effort is the C-IED Operations/Intelligence Integration Center (COIC), which har-nesses, masses, and fuses information, analysis, technol-ogy, interagency collaboration, and training support.COIC support enables more precise attacks to defeatviolent extremist networks. Personnel with unique skillsets can be forward deployed to provide timely analysis,accurate information, and responsive support to forcesin theater. COIC’s extensive reachback capability sup-ports commanders’ with all-source information fusionand analysis.• Defeat the Device provides technologies to detect IEDcomponents, neutralize the triggering devices, and miti-gate the effects of an IED blast to ensure freedom ofmaneuver and effective operations for commanders. Aunique process of accelerated requirements determina-tion and acquisition gives DoD the ability to rapidlyresearch, develop, produce, integrate, assess, and fieldproven materiel and non-materiel C-IED initiatives tocounter known, newly deployed, and emerging IEDthreats. The goal is to provide fielded solutions to thewarfighter between four and 24 months from require-ments identification.EnduringCapabilitiesEnduringCapabilitiesGoals ObjectivesLines ofOperationEnduringThreatStrategicEnvironmentC-IEDCapabilities SolutionsMeeting theIED ChallengeThe arm of a Talon robot grasps a mortar tail during an operationscheck on the robot at Forward Operating Base, Azizullah, Afghanistan.The robot is used to interrogate IEDs when explosive ordnance disposalpersonnel need to investigate an IED from a safe distance. (Photo by StaffSgt. Stephen Schester)Cpl. Sean Connell launches a Raven unmanned aerial vehicle, providing ademonstration of the system to then-Chief of Staff of the Army Gen. GeorgeW. Casey Jr. at the National Training Center in Ft. Irwin, Calif.(Photo by D. Myles Cullen)
  • 14. COUNTER-IED STRATEGIC PLAN 2012–2016JOINT IED DEFEAT ORGANIZATION | 9ATTACKTHE NETWORKAtNTRAINTHEFORCETtFDEFEAT THEDEVICEDtDRapidAcquisition FieldingOps/Intel/Info Fusion AnalysisTrainingWeapons TechnicalIntelligenceWhole-of-GovernmentApproachENDURINGCAPABILITIES• Train the Force enables deploying forces to combatIED employment by attacking the network, integrat-ing equipment and systems for the individual and battlestaffs, and enhancing their knowledge and proficiencyof C-IED TTPs. Focused C-IED training provides themost up-to-date tactics and technologies to troops at theindividual and unit level. Commanders and staffs areeducated and trained to integrate Attack the Networkand Defeat the Device tools and enabling resources. Tobe successful, joint forces must understand threat net-works and how to attack and defeat them.
  • 15. COUNTER-IED STRATEGIC PLAN 2012–201610 | JOINT IED DEFEAT ORGANIZATIONGoals and ObjectivesOur overarching goal is to mitigate the effects of IEDson the commander’s freedom of maneuver and to enablethe defeat of these devices as weapons of strategic influ-ence. JIEDDO’s role, as an integral part of the whole-of-government approach — to lead, advocate, and coordinateall DoD C-IED actions in support of the CombatantCommander — provides for unifying goals today and inthe future. These goals embrace a larger C-IED communityof action while continually seeking innovative solutions tothe C-IED problem set.This strategy has five principal goals with support-ing objectives that institutionalize C-IED within DoDand, as authorized, provide support and assistance to otherfederal agencies to meet the evolving IED threat. Thesegoals directly support and are tied to the JIEDDO LOOsof Attack the Network, Defeat the Device, and Train theForce. This provides for clear, consistent, effective, and effi-cient resource provision that builds C-IED capability. Wesynchronize operations and intelligence fusion, require-ments identification and validation, rapid acquisition ofdesired capabilities, and training to enhance proficiency,while partnering with other DoD organizations, the inter-agency and multinational entities. These goals and objec-tives will be validated annually and can be changed ormodified as required.We will track and assess the accomplishment of thesegoals through action plans based on published goals andobjectives that are reviewed on a quarterly basis to assessprogress.Goal 1: Rapidly identify, validate, and prioritize immedi-ate and future C-IED requirements to enable CombatantCommanders to effectively attack complex IED production andsupport networks; detect and neutralize IEDs; and employ atrained force capable of addressing the IED threat.• Objective 1.1: Support the validation of current andemerging Combatant Commanders’ requirements toensure priority capability gaps are being addressed.• Objective 1.2: Determine both current and futurerequired capabilities by identifying threat-focused oper-ational needs and capability gaps to rapidly respond todynamic C-IED needs.• Objective 1.3: Prioritize acquisition decisions to sup-port C-IED requirements to ensure investments aremade with the greatest impact for the warfighter.• Objective 1.4: Ensure resources are justified andapplied to ensure congressional approval of resourceallocation to rapidly develop and field C-IEDcapabilities.• Objective 1.5: Conduct assessments that enable transi-tion, transfer, terminate, or continue decisions within24 months from initiatives origination to institutional-ize C-IED capabilities and ensure the JIEDDO invest-ment is leveraged for the future.• Objective 1.6: Direct, monitor, and modify, as nec-essary, activities regarding the WTI process as theypertain to the collection, technical and forensic exploi-tation, and analysis of IED components to swiftlyenable force protection, targeting, component andmateriel sourcing, and expeditious support to prosecu-tion. Establish the standards, processes, and proceduresrequired for application of forensics to WTI collection,analysis, and exploitation.Goal 2: Provide operations and intelligence fusion, analy-sis, training, and sensitive activity support to CombatantCommanders, federal agencies, and coalition partners to enablefreedom of maneuver from IEDs and to enhance a collectiveability to counter threat networks and supporting activities.• Objective 2.1: Staff, train, and equip a scalable, deploy-able, highly qualified workforce to sustain CombatantCommander integration support and global contin-gency operations.• Objective 2.2: Provide operationally relevant andtimely operations-intelligence fusion, analytical sup-port, and training integration to enable CombatantCommanders to attack threat networks.EnduringCapabilitiesOperation IED ChallengeEnduringCapabilitiesOperation IED ChallengeEnduringCapabilitiesGoals ObjectivesLines ofOperationEnduringThreatStrategicEnvironmentC-IEDCapabilities SolutionsMeeting theIED ChallengeEnduringCapabilitiesGoals ObjectivesLines ofOperationEnduringThreatStrategicEnvironmentC-IEDCapabilities SolutionsMeeting theIED Challenge
  • 16. COUNTER-IED STRATEGIC PLAN 2012–2016JOINT IED DEFEAT ORGANIZATION | 11• Objective 2.3: Innovate and improve informationtechnology infrastructure and analytical methods toenhance global collaboration in fully established or aus-tere environments.• Objective 2.4: Build partnerships to enable globalthreat information sharing, analysis, and collaborationto leverage and focus a whole-of-government effort.• Objective 2.5: Maintain a global knowledge base ofcurrent and future IED threats to provide solutions tocounter friendly vulnerabilities.• Objective 2.6: Provide sensitive activities supportto enable Combatant Commanders’ and, as autho-rized, other federal agencies’ counter-threat networkoperations.Goal 3: Rapidly seek, develop, and acquire C-IED solutionsto fulfill validated requirements that ensure a CombatantCommander’s ability to effectively attack complex IED produc-tion and support networks; detect and neutralize IEDs; andemploy a trained force capable of addressing the IED threat.• Objective 3.1: Develop, procure, implement, evaluateand deploy C-IED solutions to enable offensive opera-tions against networks; ensure freedom of maneuver andeffective operations for commanders; and enable deploy-ing forces to mitigate the impact of IED employment.• Objective 3.2: Aggressively seek innovative C-IEDsolutions requiring research and technology matura-tion and prioritize within DoD to advance capabilitiesrequired for the future.• Objective 3.3: Conduct continuous evaluation ofC-IED capabilities based on identified requirements,goals, and objectives to determine effectiveness.• Objective 3.4: Underwrite risk by understanding thefuture threat, rapidly applying resources, and synchro-nizing DoD efforts.• Objective 3.5: Provide effective management and over-sight of JIEDDO contracts.Goal 4: Lead DoD C-IED training and training capabilitydevelopment that support the Joint Staff’s, the Services’, andCombatant Commanders’ efforts to prepare joint forces to suc-cessfully attack the network and defeat the device in contempo-rary and future operating environments.• Objective 4.1: Develop and execute a synchronizedC-IED training plan supporting Joint Staff, Service,Combatant Command, and, as directed, partner nationand interagency C-IED training requirements.• Objective 4.2: Develop C-IED training programs andcapabilities, and transition those that are enduring tothe Services.• Objective 4.3: Collect and incorporate C-IED afteraction reviews, lessons learned, and TTPs into C-IEDtraining.Goal 5: Build a joint, interagency, intergovernmental, andinternational C-IED community of action through collabora-tive planning, information sharing, and cooperative capabil-ity development for discrete IED problem sets (e.g., homemadeexplosives, domestic threat, partner C-IED capabilitydevelopment).• Objective 5.1: Assist Combatant Commanders todevelop international and interagency partner C-IEDcapability and capacity building to mitigate the effectsof IEDs.• Objective 5.2: Seek opportunities to expand the role ofinternational and interagency partners to synchronizeC-IED capabilities and to share information, intelli-gence, and technology.• Objective 5.3: As authorized, assist the C-IED effortsof other federal agencies — as part of the whole-of-government approach — to provide for defense sup-port of civil authorities and to support interagencyorganizations when directed, to augment and enhanceC-IED capabilities to protect U.S. citizens and nationalinfrastructure.GOALS AND OBJECTIVES ENABLE US TO TRANSFORM STRATEGIC GUIDANCEINTO SPECIFIC, EFFECTIVE, AND MEASURABLE ACTIONS.
  • 17. COUNTER-IED STRATEGIC PLAN 2012–201612 | JOINT IED DEFEAT ORGANIZATIONFuture C-IED Research andDevelopment RequirementsHarnessing the innovative potential of the RD communityto meet a dynamic, complex, and adaptive threat is especiallyimportant. DoD will “cast a net into the future” to acceler-ate the most promising C-IED solutions to combat the ever-evolving threat. We can find capability gaps by consideringCombatant Commanders’ requirements over time, extrapo-lating the technical and tactical threat trends, and conduct-ing a comparative analysis of the most fruitful possibilitiesgiven existing systems and promising new technologies. DoDwill close these future capability gaps by engaging the pub-lic and private RD sectors to refinecapabilities and develop new systems,technologies, and tactics.These sectors consist of awide variety of organizations andrepresent the Services, government agencies, commercialfirms, the defense industry, research laboratories, and aca-demia. These multifaceted entities can be selectively engagedto address issues across the IED spectrum. An effective DoDC-IED RD strategy can play to each of their strengthsand develop a true synergy across the community of interest.The elements of this strategy will include research funding,collaborative development, policy direction, developmentalcontracts, information sharing, and venture capital invest-ment. The end result of these efforts is the first, but mostimportant, step in future capabilities development to com-bat an adaptive threat — understanding the most promis-ing short-, medium-, and long-term opportunities for RDinvestments. The goal is to promote an informed and agileresearch and acquisitions processthat stays ahead of the threatand develops timely and effectiveC-IED solutions to safeguardour troops, our citizenry, andour international partners.FUTURE RD CAPABILITY GAPS 2012• Pre-detonation• Counter-threat Network• Detection• Counter-device• Homemade Explosives• Information Integration and Fusion• Weapons Technical IntelligenceU.S. Army Spc. John “Rocky” Montoya scanshis sector while on a combat patrol to sweepfor roadside bomb triggermen in the Alingardistrict in Afghanistan’s Laghman province.Montoya is a M2 gunner assigned to theLaghman Provincial Reconstruction Team.(Photo by Staff Sgt. Ryan Crane)12 | JOINT IED DEFEAT ORGANIZATION
  • 18. COUNTER-IED STRATEGIC PLAN 2012–2016JOINT IED DEFEAT ORGANIZATION | 13JOINT IED DEFEAT ORGANIZATION | 13ConclusionThe armed forces of the United States and partner nationswill continue to be engaged throughout the world. In futureoperations, joint forces will encounter improvised explosivedevices employed by determined adversaries. These cost-effective, adaptive weapons and the violent extremist organi-zations that use them are sure to evolve over time. The IEDthreat will not be limited to overseas operations; intelligencetrends indicate the potential use of these weapons within theU.S. homeland. This is not unprecedented.In executing this strategy, we will build enduringcapabilities to meet the enduring IED threat by with aswift C-IED response. It is the synergy of rapid acquisitionand fielding, operations and intelligence fusion and analy-sis, training, weapons technical intelligence, and a whole-of-government approach that coupled with a single focuson the global IED threat ensures our ability to meet thewarfighters’ requirements. Using the battle-tested LOOs —Attack the Network, Defeat the Device, and Train the Force— we detect, prevent, protect, and mitigate IEDs and theireffects. We seek to achieve the stated goals and objectives ofthis document through our annual planning process, begin-ning with threat and capability gap analyses, proceedingthrough the capability acquisition process, and ending withC-IED investment decisions leading to desired solutions.JIEDDO continually assesses these efforts in support of theCombatant Commanders.The global IED threat must be met with a coher-ent and focused approach that collaboratively and continu-ally seeks effective solutions. This strategy sets the path forthe C-IED effort in collaboration with partner nations, theinteragency, and intergovernmental organizations to enablethe defeat of the IED as a weapon of strategic influence.EnduringCapabilitiesGoals ObjectivesLines ofOperationEnduringThreatStrategicEnvironmentC-IEDCapabilities SolutionsMeeting theIED ChallengeLance Cpl. Arturo Valtierra, a mortarman with Redemption II, WeaponsCompany, 2nd Battalion, 1st Marine Regiment, scans for IEDs during a footpatrol to a local Afghan National Police near Patrol Base Gorgak, GarmsirDistrict, Helmand province, Afghanistan. (Photo by Sgt. Jesse Stence)
  • 19. COUNTER-IED STRATEGIC PLAN 2012–201614 | JOINT IED DEFEAT ORGANIZATION
  • 20. COUNTER-IED STRATEGIC PLAN 2012–2016JOINT IED DEFEAT ORGANIZATION | 15AcronymsC-IED: Counter-improvised explosive deviceCOIC: C-IED Operations/Intelligence Integration CenterDoD: Department of DefenseEFP: Explosively formed projectileIED: Improvised explosive deviceJIEDDO: Joint IED Defeat OrganizationLOOs: Lines of operationRD: Research and developmentTTPs: Tactics, techniques, and proceduresWTI: Weapons technical intelligence
  • 21. JOINT IED DEFEAT ORGANIZATION(877) 251-3337www.jieddo.dod.milJanuary 1, 2012

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