Tabakian Pols 7 Fall/Spring 2014 Power 4

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Tabakian Pols 7 Fall/Spring 2014 Power 4

  1. 1. Dr. Tabakian’s Political Science 7 Modern World Governments – Spring/Fall 2014 Supplemental Power Point Material #4
  2. 2. LECTURE HIGHLIGHTS (1) • • • • • • • • • Nation-State’s Primary Goal: Survival Power Theory As Natural Motivator Realism Realpolitik Sovereignty Balance Of Power Power Distribution Hegemony Assumptions Of Realism & Idealism
  3. 3. LECTURE HIGHLIGHTS (2) • • • • • • • The International System Anarchy & Sovereignty Balance Of Power Great Powers & middle Powers Power Distribution Hegemony The Great Power System, 1500-2000
  4. 4. LECTURE HIGHLIGHTS (3) • • • • • • Alliances & Purposes Of Alliances NATO & NATO Expansion Other Alliances Statecraft Rationality American Response To Terrorism
  5. 5. SURVIVAL IS THE GOAL Robert L. Pfaltzgraff defines the national interest as, “…ultimately the prudent use of power to safeguard those interests most vital to the survival of the nation-state.” Through a study of history, realists by studying history, realists are able to produce a generalization about what certain preconditions have to exist for a nation-state to pursue policies of aggression to secure their nation-interest. Nationstates pursue their individual national-interests on a never-ending basis, which in turn leads to a stable international system. Defenders of a competitive security system suggest that states are forever striving to increase their security in relation to that of other states. This would entail ego’s gain as alter’s loss and as a result is prone to security dilemmas. In a cooperative security system, states equate the security of each as a contribution to the collective good. National interests are seen to bolster international interests.
  6. 6. REALISM There is no legitimate authority above the state. This results in the world being anarchical rather than hierarchical as what is commonly observed within individual states. Hedley Bull describes the interstate system as an anarchical society, which is another way of describing the chaotic system of interstate relations that currently exists. Realism was the dominant theory during the Cold War that saw international relations as states constantly vying for power among other self-interested states. It is generally pessimistic about the international system leaving this state of anarchy for in their view conflict and war will always remain a factor in world affairs. Realism explained alliances, imperialism and the resistance to cooperation through the lens of power theory. A fundamental example that realists cite is the constant competitive struggle of the American-Soviet rivalry during the Cold War.
  7. 7. REALIST CONCEPTION OF FORCE E. H. Carr argues that there exist two opposite poles of utopian feelings of right and realist conceptions of force. There is a need for a combination of both utopia and reality so that society can come to a favorable compromise between power and morality. Politics and law is viewed as a ‘meeting place’ for ethics and power where both can come together in order to facilitate continued progress towards a utopian society. Classical realists like Thomas Hobbes, Reinhold Niebuhr and Hans Morgenthau argued that egoism and power politics stemmed from human nature. Structural realists or neo-realists stressed anarchy instead of human nature. Kenneth Walt stated that anarchy allows conflict to brew as “wars occur because there is nothing to prevent them”. He goes on to infer that it is the actions of predator states whose behavior is fostered from human nature or its domestic politics that forces other states to respond in kind if they are to survive.
  8. 8. REALIST OFFENSE / DEFENSE THEORY Offense-defense theory was (1) by Robert Jervis, George laid out Quester and Stephen Van Ever. The theory stresses that wars come about more frequently when states see others as being too weak to defend against attack. Better defenses served to preserve the peace as it became more costly to attack another state for the benefits that would be derived would not outpace the costs associated with an offensive strike. These defensive realists saw states as merely wanting to survive in an anarchic world where if need be great states could be depended upon to guarantee the security of weaker states through the construction of security guarantees. Defensive military postures were further strengthened with the acclimation of nuclear forces that were utilized to deter offensive attacks for the cost of doing so would be cataclysmic.
  9. 9. REALIST OFFENSE / DEFENSE THEORY (2) Kenneth Waltz’s assertion that the United States benefited from possessing a robust nuclear deterrent fits into the offensedefense theory assertion that a super strong defense protects a nation from offensive threats. This has led realism to strive forward optimistically away from Morgenthau’s seemingly dark assertions of human nature. If it were truly human nature to engage in conflict solely for the purpose of acquiring power then nuclear weapons would not serve as such a strong deterrent as the Cold War has demonstrated. Defensive realists like Van Evera claim that war is today seen by the great powers as rarely profitable. Evera further states that war is brought forth from militarism, hypernationalism, or other domestic factors that over exaggerate potential threats or exaggerate their military capacity. Offensive realists like John J. Mearsheimer believe that great powers are forced into competitive actions for anarchy is reality.
  10. 10. REALISM – BALANCE OF POWER Realists affirm that power can serve to deter threats, but too much power can force other actors to respond harshly, sparking a ‘security dilemma’, which is a situation when actors begin pursuing more power, resulting in an environment that is less safe. Realists, especially classical realists are assumed to be warmongering theorists that are only concerned with acquiring more power. This is not the case at all as most of the school are actually cautious, humble, favoring alliances and multilateralism. Hans Morgenthau states that, “Political realism refuses to identify the moral aspirations of a particular nation with the moral laws that govern the universe.” This assumes that realists do not think in terms of righting wrongs, but only in terms of power in all its forms including is acquisition, preservation and maintaining the balance of power. Realism promotes the balancing of state power.
  11. 11. REALISM – RELATIVE GAINS Realism does not discount the possibility of cooperation between states. Two concerns are listed as inhibiting cooperation: relativegains consideration and concerns about cheating. As states are concerned with balances of power, they are more likely to be motivated by relative gains when presented with opportunities to cooperate with other actors. Joseph Grieco and Stephen Krasner argue that the anarchical system forces states to favor relative instead of absolute gains. States are always focused on acquiring more power than other actors. Relative gains assures a given state that acquired gains are at the expense of other actors, thus allowing them to be more powerful. This produces short-term gains that forego any greater long-term potential for the international system. Absolute gains serves to “lift all boats”, or in other words produce greater long-term gains for all participant actors.
  12. 12. REALISM – MUTUAL DETERRENCE Both the US and the Soviets have acted irrationally at the same time, threatening to use nuclear weapons, while at the same time assuming that the other side would remain rational and not provoke the situation. This actually happened during the Berlin crises, including other successive events, yet there has never been a nuclear strike launched between the two superpowers. Deterrence has worked because neither side really knew what the other side was thinking. A problem with deterrence is that the more times bluffs are made it may lead to a time when someone is going to make the call. At this point there are only three alternatives: resort to nuclear war, retreat, resort to conventional war. Realists argue that the struggle for power remains constant in the international system. The only variable is the makeup of the balance of power. This may be bipolar, or multipolar, which in turn determines whether war or peace.
  13. 13. NEO-REALISM / REALISM (1) Classical realism focuses on human nature, whereas neorealism has taken this assumption and applied it the existing anarchic realm of “self-interested, competitive, mutually suspicious and antagonistic states.” Neo-realism sees the international political system as one unit with interconnecting linkages existing between structural and units. In contrast to old realism’s contention that human nature is the drive for selfinterest, neo-realists looks at the entire system to understand how single actors, or states, base their actions. States are seen as individual units that pursue their self-interests with the most important one being their survival. Kenneth Waltz suggests that neo-realism’s definition of the international system being the structure of study represents its break with classical realism. Neorealists also state that states want to enhance their security and not power as argued by realists.
  14. 14. NEO-REALISM / REALISM (2) Kenneth Waltz contends that neo-realism is markedly different from traditional realism in four customs: 1. Neo-realism accepts the international system as being the determining factor guiding state action; 2. Neo-realism can alter causal relations; 3. Neo-realism defines power differently; and 4. Neo-realism handles units in another fashion. Realists see the world as that of interacting states, whereas neorealists can only study interacting states by first differentiating structural-unit level causes and effects. Realists may think of causes going in one direction, from the interacting states to the outcome produced. Neo-realists in turn look at the entire structure that serves as a conduit shuttling gives and takes between states. Outcomes can affect how a state bases its policies for instance.
  15. 15. NEO-REALISM / REALISM (3) Neo-realists like Kenneth Waltz dismissed human nature as a catalyst for state action. He focused instead on the international system and argued that the anarchic situation was a byproduct of competing states seeking to preserve their national interests, which was primarily survival. This led states to accept self-help as its primary method for protecting its primary national interest. There is no legitimate authority above the state. This has caused weaker states to join together in order to serve as an effective balance against stronger states. Waltz argued that weaker states might be tempted to bandwagon, or join with more powerful states if after a cost-benefit analysis that it served their best interest. Contrary to Morgenthau, he claimed that bipolarity would preserve international stability more so than multipolarity. Realists are prone to equate the power of a state according to its military capacity. Neo-realists are prone to take into consideration all of the capabilities in possession of the state.
  16. 16. UTOPIAN REALISM Utopian theories of the interwar period were discredited primarily because of its normative bias towards international law, organization and collective security as a means to construct a balance of power that would forever maintain equilibrium of peaceful relations between nation-states. Woodrow Wilson accepted the fate of his utopian dream as it was fully discredited by political scientists following the failure of the United States to fully participate in the League of Nations. Diplomacy has its limits. Without the threat of force, diplomacy collapses. Robert L. Pfaltzgraff details why normative theory by itself has failed to adequately explain why countries or its leaders tend to result to conflict or using force to solve problems that a moralist would rather deal with diplomatically. Ken Booth presents utopian realism as more of an “…attitude of mind than a ‘theory’ with powers of explanation and prediction. But it is based upon both normative (‘utopian’) and empirical (‘realist’) theories.”
  17. 17. REALPOLITIK Based on practical and material factors rather than on theoretical or ethical objectives, foreign policy maintains the advancement of the national interest as its sole principle. Realpolitik, an extreme variation of realism makes no excuses for its disallowance of morality as a factor in determining foreign policy. Such foreign policy is based solely on calculations of power and the national interest foremost, avoiding armament races and war if only the major players of an international system are free to adjust their relations in accordance to changing circumstances or are restrained by a system of shared values or both. Hegemony accords the international community with stability, thus avoiding anarchy through its willingness to supersede its interests for those of a hegemonic power. Thus, it remains a given that a Hegemon’s foreign policy be conditioned in a high level of foresight, restraint and maturity to quell any likelihood of international instability by maintaining its power hold.
  18. 18. BALANCE OF POWER Theorists of the school of International Relations see the international system as consisting of a balance of power structure. This has preserved the existence of the modern state system for over 400 years following the conclusion of the Thirty Years’ War in 1648. States understand that conflict or cooperation is an integral part of the state of nature in the international system. The number of actors within the system and the distribution of power among participants affects this balance of power. Three traditions reign prominently in international affairs: 1. Realism focuses on the anarchic situation facing states and that conflict will always remain a distinct possibility. 2. Liberalism serves to identify ways that these conflictive tendencies may be reduced or eliminated. 3. The radical tradition serves to propose methods to transform the entire world that may not coincide with conventional wisdom.
  19. 19. HEGEMONY Hegemony is the net result of an absence of counterbalancing actors in relation to that of a superpower. However, it remains to be determined what future outcomes may be brought about with respect to a previous counterbalancing superpower state seeking respectability as a counterbalance to a Hegemon. Hegemony accords the international community with stability, thus avoiding anarchy through its willingness to supersede its interests for those of a hegemonic power. Thus, it remains a given that a Hegemon’s foreign policy be conditioned in a high level of foresight, restraint and maturity to quell any likelihood of international instability by maintaining its power hold. The United States is a hegemonic power that currently enjoys majority power over its peers in the international community.
  20. 20. POWER THEORY (1) To exert power one must first possess adequate reserves to draw upon. This is defined simply as “capacity of power”. Achieving higher positions is dependent on various factors that may include: education; wealth; profession; charisma and other talents either developed or engrained from birth. This “capacity of power” is not determined according to a single resource, ability or possession. It is instead a combination of different variables that serve to make up the individual. This is just like a battery consisting of energy resources drawn upon when it comes time to draw power in order to achieve a set objective. Just like a battery powering a flashlight so does one’s individual “capacity of power” serve to assist one in achieving a set goal or in this case influencing or affecting political behavior to maintain, expand or protect one’s standing in order to survive in society.
  21. 21. POWER THEORY (2) Our example of “capacity of power” is applicable to individual capacity of power and all associations up to the nation state as all combined units consist of individuals pursuing their set of priorities or self-interest that is in turn based on survival. Drawing upon these reserves allows one to pursue agendas of self-interest. Power is the ultimate pursuit, as the ultimate goal of humanity is survival. Individual participants in pursuit of these goals join together in common pursuits under the umbrella of common interest. These resulting “spheres of interest” in turn join under broader umbrellas that also offer another distinct set of common goals that in turn competes with respective peers.
  22. 22. POWER THEORY (3) Power equals resources (capacity of power) times compliance squared, divided by force. Every accounting of power theory is taken into consideration in the construction of this formula. We have explored the contention that the pursuit of self-interest encourages man to engage in political behavior. This serves as the foundation for rational choice theory, which in turn has led us to power theory. One may argue that the pursuit of power maintains the never ending cycle of political: conflict; compromise; alliances; and wars.
  23. 23. POWER THEORY (4) Many have countered this argument with a direct assault on the statement that “there is no morality in politics”. These critics are both right and wrong. It is true that morality has no direct correlation with political science if the pursuit of self-interests and power resources maintains utmost priority. On the other hand they may be correct if one party sells their pursuit as a moral cause in order to achieve their agenda. For example, one may argue that good may come from conflict even if it leads to the destruction of a nation-state and the slaughtering of thousands or millions of people if the seed of democracy is planted and nurtured to maturity.
  24. 24. ASSUMPTIONS OF REALISM & IDEALISM
  25. 25. THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM • States interact within a set of longestablished “rules of the game” governing what is considered a state and how states treat each other. • Together these rules shape the international system.
  26. 26. ANARCHY & SOVEREIGNTY (1) • Realists believe the international system exists in a state of anarchy. – Term implies the lack of a central government that can enforce rules. – World government as a solution? – Others suggest international organizations and agreements. • Despite anarchy, the international system is far from chaotic. – Great majority of state interactions closely adhere to norms of behavior.
  27. 27. ANARCHY & SOVEREIGNTY (2) • Sovereignty: A government has the right, in principle, to do whatever it wants in its own territory. • Lack of a “world police” to punish states if they break an agreement makes enforcement of international agreements difficult. • In practice, most states have a harder and harder time warding off interference in their affairs.
  28. 28. ANARCHY & SOVEREIGNTY (3) • Respect for the territorial integrity of all states, within recognized borders, is an important principle of IR. – Impact of information revolution/information economies and the territorial state system. • States and norms of diplomacy. • Security dilemma. – A situation in which states’ actions taken to ensure their own security threaten the security of other states. • Arms race. • Negative consequence of anarchy in the international system.
  29. 29. BALANCE OF POWER (1) • Refers to the general concept of one or more states’ power being used to balance that of another state or group of states. • Balance of power can refer to: – Any ratio of power capabilities between states or alliances. – Or it can mean only a relatively equal ratio. – Alternatively, it can refer to the process by which counterbalancing coalitions have repeatedly formed in history to prevent one state from conquering an entire region.
  30. 30. BALANCE OF POWER (2) • Theory of balance of power: – Counterbalancing occurs regularly and maintains stability of the international system. – Does not imply peace, but rather a stability maintained by means of recurring wars that adjust power relations – Alliances are key: • Quicker, cheaper, and more effective than building one’s own capabilities. – States do not always balance against the strongest actor. • Bandwagoning.
  31. 31. GREAT POWERS & MIDDLE POWERS (1) • The most powerful states in the system exert most of the influence on international events and therefore get the most attention from IR scholars. – Handful of states possess the majority of the world’s power resources.
  32. 32. GREAT POWERS & MIDDLE POWERS (2) • Great powers are generally considered the half-dozen or so most powerful states. – Until the past century, the club was exclusively European. – Defined generally as states that can be defeated militarily only by another great power. – Generally have the world’s strongest military forces and the strongest economies. • U.S., China, Russia, Japan, Germany, France, and Britain. • U.S. the world’s only superpower. • China the world’s largest population, rapid economic growth and a large military, with a credible nuclear arsenal.
  33. 33. GREAT POWERS & MIDDLE POWERS (3) • Middle Powers: – Rank somewhat below the great powers. – Some are large but not highly industrialized. – Others may be small with specialized capabilities. – Examples: midsized countries such as Canada, Italy, Spain, the Netherlands, Poland, Ukraine, South Korea, and Australia, or larger or influential countries in the global South such as India, Indonesia, Brazil, Argentina, Mexico, Nigeria, South Africa, Israel, Turkey, Iran, and Pakistan.
  34. 34. POWER DISTRIBUTION (1) • The concept of the distribution of power among states in the international system. – Can apply to all the states in the world or to just one region. • Neorealism, or structural realism – 1990s adaptation of realism. – Explains patterns of international events in terms of the system structure (distribution of power) rather than the internal makeup of individual states. – Neoclassical realists.
  35. 35. POWER DISTRIBUTION (2) • Polarity refers to the number of independent power centers in the system. – Multipolar system: Has five or six centers of power, which are not grouped into alliances. – Tripolar system: With three great centers of power. – Unipolar system: Has a single center of power around which all others revolve (hegemony). • Power transition theory: – Holds that the largest wars result from challenges to the top position in the status hierarchy, when a rising power is surpassing or threatening to surpass the most powerful state.
  36. 36. POWER DISTRIBUTION (3)
  37. 37. HEGEMONY (1) • Is the holding of one state of most of the power in the international system. • Can dominate the rules and arrangements by which international political and economic relations are conducted. • This type of state is a hegemon.
  38. 38. HEGEMONY (2) • Hegemonic stability theory: – Holds that hegemony provides some order similar to a central government in the international system: reducing anarchy, deterring aggression; promoting free trade, and providing a hard currency that can be used as a world standard. – After WWII – U.S. hegemony. – Hegemons have an inherent interest in the promotion of integrated world markets. • U.S. ambivalence – Internationalist versus isolationist moods. – Unilateralism versus multilateralism.
  39. 39. THE GREAT-POWER SYSTEM, 15002000 (1) • Treaty of Westphalia, 1648: – Rules of state relations. – Originated in Europe in the 16th century. – Key to this system was the ability of one state, or a coalition, to balance the power of another state so it could not gobble up smaller units and create a universal empire.
  40. 40. THE GREAT-POWER SYSTEM, 15002000 (2) • Most powerful states in 16th-century Europe were Britain, France, Austria-Hungary, and Spain. – Ottoman Empire – Hapsburgs – Impact of industrialization – Napoleonic Wars – Congress of Vienna (1815) – Concert of Europe – UN Security Council – WW I – WW II and after
  41. 41. ALLIANCES • A coalition of states that coordinate their actions to accomplish some end. – Most are formalized in written treaties. – Concern a common threat and related issues of international security. – Endure across a range of issues and a period of time.
  42. 42. PURPOSES OF ALLIANCES • Augmenting their members’ power: – By pooling capabilities, two or more states can exert greater leverage in their bargaining with other states. – For smaller states, alliances can be their most important power element. – But alliances can change quickly and decisively. – Most form in response to a perceived threat. • Alliance cohesion: – The ease with which the members hold together an alliance – Tends to be high when national interests converge and when cooperation within the alliance becomes institutionalized and habitual. • Burden sharing: – Who bears the cost of the alliance
  43. 43. NATO • One of the most important formal alliances. • North Atlantic Treaty Organization: – Encompasses Western Europe and North America. – Founded in 1949 to oppose and deter Soviet power in Europe. – Countered by the Warsaw Pact (1955); disbanded in 1991. – First use of force by NATO was in Bosnia in 1994 in support of the UN mission there. • European Union formed its own rapid deployment force, outside NATO. • Biggest issue for NATO is its recent and eastward expansion, beyond the East-West Cold War dividing line. – Russian opposition.
  44. 44. NATO EXPANSION
  45. 45. OTHER ALLIANCES • U.S.-Japanese Security Treaty: – U.S. maintains nearly 50,000 troops in Japan. – Japan pays the U.S. several billion dollars annually to offset about half the cost of maintaining these troops. – Created in 1951 against the potential Soviet threat to Japan. – Asymmetrical in nature • U.S. has alliances with other states: South Korea and Australia: • De facto allies of the U.S.: those with whom we collaborate closely – Israel. • Commonwealth Of Independent States (CIS).
  46. 46. REGIONAL ALIGNMENTS (1) • In the global South, many states joined a nonaligned movement during the Cold War. – Stood apart from the U.S.-Soviet rivalry. – Led by India and Yugoslavia. • Undermined by the membership of Cuba • Organization of African Unity.
  47. 47. REGIONAL ALIGNMENTS (2) • China loosely aligned with Pakistan in opposition to India (which was aligned with the Soviet Union). – Relationships with India warmed after the Cold War ended. • Middle East: General anti-Israel alignment of the Arab countries for decades. – Broke down in 1978 as Egypt and Jordan made peace with Israel. – Israel and war with Hezbollah and Hamas. – Israel and Turkey formed a close military alliance. – Israel largest recipient of U.S. foreign aid. – Egypt. – Iran. – Bush administration: emphasis on spreading democracy.
  48. 48. CURRENT ALIGNMENT OF GREAT AND MIDDLE POWERS
  49. 49. STRATEGY: STATECRAFT (1) • The art of managing state affairs and effectively maneuvering in a world of power politics among sovereign states. • Key aspect of strategy: What kinds of capabilities to develop, given limited resources, in order to maximize international influence. – Example of China
  50. 50. STRATEGY: STATECRAFT (2) • Deterrence: – Uses a threat to punish another actor if it takes a certain negative action. • Compellence: – Refers to the use of force to make another actor take some action (rather than refrain from taking an action). • Arms race: – A reciprocal process in which two (or more) states build up military capabilities in response to each other.
  51. 51. RATIONALITY (1) • Most realists assume that those who wiled power while engaging in statecraft behave as rational actors. • Two implications for IR: – Implies that states and other international actors can identify their interests and put priorities on various interests. • National interest. – Implies that actors are able to perform a costbenefit analysis – calculating the costs incurred by a possible action and the benefits it is likely to bring.
  52. 52. RATIONALITY (2) There is no legitimate authority above that of a nationstate. Survival is the ultimate goal. Nations are known to pursue policies of necessity, though it may cause international concern. Engaging in defensive weapon capabilities may be seen as offensive by another nation-state. In March of 1983 President Reagan proposed that the United States develop an antiballistic missile defense system. The system, often derisively described as Reagan’s “Star Wars” plan, was an ambitious attempt to create a large-scale shield against nuclear missile attacks.
  53. 53. RATIONALITY (3) The proposal was very controversial as it depended on untried technology, would be very expensive, and might be viewed by the Soviet Union as an effort to protect the United States so that it could launch an initial strike against the Soviet Union without fear of massive retaliation. This footage consists of two parts. First, we have Reagan’s proposal. The second part consists of a series of excerpts from an NBC News report on Reagan’s speech and the controversy it created.
  54. 54. RATIONALITY (4 It is the responsibility of every national leader to pursue policies that are in their national interest. Survival is the ultimate pursuit of man (and woman). One can only depend on oneself in a world “wrought with anarchy”. America’s enemies also engage national defense policies that threaten our national security. Do nations like Iran have the right to develop nuclear weapons and the means to deliver a warhead? Enjoy this video example.
  55. 55. THE PRISONER’S DILEMMA • Game theory – Zero-sum games • One player’s gain is by definition equal to the other’s loss – Non-zero-sum games • It is possible for both players to gain (or lose) • Prisoner’s Dilemma – Rational players chose moves that produce an outcome in which all players are worse off than under a different set of moves. – They all could do better, but as individual rational actors they are unable to achieve this outcome. – Applications to the study of International Relations.
  56. 56. TERRORISM (1) 911 introduced the world to “Asymmetrical Warfare” - Using the resources of a nation state to attack its institutions. This is a compilation of clips during September 11, 2001. What caused the nation to come together? How were we able to acquire international support? Did we overspend the goodwill bestowed by our international peers?
  57. 57. 911
  58. 58. TERRORISM (2) On September 14, 2001, President George W. Bush visit rescue workers where New York World Trade Center once stood. He remarked, "I'm shocked at the size of the devastation, It's hard to describe what it's like to see the gnarled steel and broken glass and twisted buildings silhouetted against the smoke. I said that this was the first act of war on America in the 21st century, and I was right, particularly having seen the scene.“ 911 forever changed American Foreign Policy and introduced the concept of “preemption”. This is the policy of striking another nation-state or other entity before them initiate their attack.
  59. 59. GEORGE W. BUSH
  60. 60. TERRORISM (3) 911 introduced the world to “Asymmetrical Warfare” - Using the resources of a nation state to attack its institutions. A sudden outpouring of support from the international community, even from nation-states originally hostile to the United States was the norm. This showing of support was before the United States began to implement its new policy of preemption. The author of this video is anonymous. It is titled “Global Compassion”. Does the United States still maintain the degree of heartfelt international support today? Why or why not?
  61. 61. GLOBAL TRIBUTE

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