LopezReyesRealismPostColdWar

Is Realism relevant in the post-Cold War world?
Eduardo J. Lopez-Reyes
MA Candidate
International Relations Middle East and Arabic
University of Durham, Durham, England

This essay is the result of my own work. Material from the published or unpublished work
of others which is used in the essay is credited to the author in question in the text.
The essay is exactly 3000 words in length.
I have read and understood the Guidance on Plagiarism and Word Limits in the relevant
module booklet.
Eduardo J. Lopez -Reyes 26 April, 2004

1
Realism can be described as “an attitude of mind,” “orientation,” or predisposition
with room for a “number of theories,” rather than a theory with a defined set of
propositions.1
The varying assumptions upon which realism may be based have resulted in
several versions of it, rather than entirely new theories.2
“All, however, emphasize the
egoistic passions and self-interest in (international) politics,” and regardless of the
assumptions used to describe a particular manifestation of realism, one can reliably point to
Niccolo Machiavelli’s basic assumption that “it is essential not to have faith in human
nature,” that “all men are wicked and that they will always give vent to the malignity that is
in their minds when opportunity offers.”3
While modern political correctness may beg to
describe this thinking as pessimistic, the pragmatic value of this risk assessment in the
creation of international policy underlies realism’s pervasiveness after the Cold War. A
thoughtful understanding of Machiavelli’s point of view is that, (as he contended), men are
not necessarily consciously embarking on egoistic missions in all their pursuits, but that
“there are enough egoists to make any other assumption unduly risky.”4
There is no single
form of realism, and “realism per se cannot be tested, confirmed or refuted.”5
It is a
paradigm that contains core assumptions, the most pivotal one being the assumption that
human nature is not morally reliable; a “variety of theories and explanations can be
developed based on the assumptions of realism.”6
Realism remains relevant in post-Cold War international relations because conflict
persists and because realism sharpens, rather than nullifies, “a number of theories” that
attempt to explain current world affairs.7
The end of the Cold War fed the aspirations of
idealist and utopian sentimentalists and their theories, however, the absence of the Soviet
Union has not diminished the risks associated with conflict and the innate desire in women
and men for balance-of-power. Realism persists as a practical paradigm upon which to make
1
Jack Donnelly, Realism and International Relations (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2000), pp.
6-7
2
Stephen G. Brooks, ‘Dueling Realisms’, International Organization, Vol. 51, No.3 (1997), p. 445
3
Donnelly, Realism and International Relations, p. 9
4
5
Michael Mastanduno, ‘Preserving the Unipolar Moment: Realist Theories and US Grand Strategy after
the Cold War’, International Security, Vol. 2, No. 4 (Spring, 1997), p. 50
6
Mastanduno, ‘Preserving the Unipolar Moment: Realist Theories and US Grand Strategy after the Cold
War’, p. 50
7
Donnelly, Realism and International Relations, pp. 6-7

2
diplomatic, geo-political, and military decisions because this agnostic paradigm accounts for
risks others neglect. Regardless of varying assumptions in realism, at their core you will find
skepticism about human nature. Without a compelling reason to believe these risks are non-
existent, other theories are reduced to academic exercises with few practicing policy-makers
on their side of the theoretical aisle.8
Non-realist policy-makers advocate other theories or
interpretive paradigms, but still embrace some level of skepticism. Even the most idealistic
political actors tend to act, at some level, on realism’s core paradigm. The question should
not be whether realism is relevant after the Cold War, but in what form.
“Realists are unanimous in holding that human nature contains an ineradicable core
of egoistic passions; that these passions define the central problem of politics; and that
statesmanship is dominated by the need to control this side of human nature,”
statesmanship “involves mitigating and managing, not eliminating, conflict.”9
There are five
forms of realism: Biological (Classical), Radical, Strong, Hedged and Structural. Realism has been
ubiquitously present across the political spectrum, from “(Frederick) Schuman and (E. H.)
Carr on the Marxist left to (Robert) Strausz-Hupe and (Stefan Thomas) Possony on the
rabidly anti-communist right.”10
During the Cold War realism found a home on the desks of
both Republican and Democratic policy-makers in the United States, “notwithstanding
differences in their foreign policy rhetoric.”11
Its presence throughout different political
climates is not what should compel us to believe that realism remains relevant in the post-
Cold War era however, but rather the persistence of flawed human nature. With its
persistence in mind, it is important to consider criticisms leveled against realism and how
they hold up against reality itself.
Biological (or Classical) Realists believe the world and policies that set the tone of
international relations are “projections of human nature into society.” Radical Realists
embrace extreme views of “anarchy, egoism, and power politics.” Strong Realists leave little
room for other theories to be integrated with realism in order to offer new explanations for
8
9
10
11
Mastanduno, ‘Preserving the Unipolar Moment: Realist Theories and US Grand Strategy after the Cold
War’, pp. 51-2

3
conflict. They present realism in a “positive light,” more easily associated with
statesmanship than power politics. Hedged Realists accept the vulnerability of human nature
as exposed by realism, but seek to deposit hope in other theories, like idealism. Carr and
John Herz fit this mold. Herz stated that “the human cause will be lost if the liberal idea is
forgotten, even as surely as it is lost if left to the utopian political idealist.”12
Realism then, is
persistently present, even among those compelled to act on idealism. Ken Booth taps into
these competing desires by proposing “Utopian Realism;” realism with a measure of idealism
driving decision-making. Utopian Realism aims for loftier goals but, quite wisely, never
disposes the recognition that human imperfection percolates through policy and
institutions.13
The philosophical dexterity of realism allows it to work with other theories
and helps explain the existence of international cooperation despite international anarchy.14
Structural Realism reigned throughout the Cold War and is significantly invested in the
“anarchy myth,” or the idea that the lack of someone or something imposing order on the
international plane begets anarchy, ironically creating a type of order, in which balancing of
power occurs among sovereign states. While the balance of power creates a type of order,
the lack of an international body consciously imposing it means anarchy still exists.15
Structural realists are also called Neo-Realists, and have dominated the realist arena since
Kenneth Waltz’ “Theory of International Politics” was published. In the spirit of his previous
writings he endorsed the idea that international anarchy carries heavier stock than human
nature explaining conflict. In this volume he implicitly writes that international anarchy
“dictates,” rather than “suggests,” how states will behave. Waltz paved the way for neo-
realists, placing less stock on human nature and more on the existing structure of the
international plane. Waltz’ theoretical departure at this juncture engendered the dominant
version of realism throughout the Cold War.16
12
13
J. Ann Tickner, ‘Re-visioning Security’ in Ken Booth, Steve Smith (eds), International Relations Theory
Today (Cambridge, Polity Press, 1995), p. 188
14
John J. Mearsheimer, ‘The False Promise of International Institutions’, International Security, Vol. 19,
No. 3 (Winter, 1994-1995), p. 12
15
Cynthia Weber, International Relations Theory: A Critical Introduction (London, Routledge, 2001), p.
14
16
Weber, International Relations Theory: A Critical Introduction, pp. 19-20

4
All realism recognizes the weakness of human nature however. Structural realism
minimizes the role of human nature in international politics but never divorces it. Waltz
argued that it was the flawed context rather than the flawed human actor that was
accountable for conflict. He believed that a flawed human being could be deterred by a
good system. It is important to make this distinction because Waltz’ neo-realism reigned
among realists and international relation scholars in general, yet it is the form of realism that
appears to ignore the root belief that human nature is the key to understanding conflict.
Despite this, there is never a complete separation from this concept. Waltz described three
planes of decision-making: man, socio-political institutions, and the international plane,
which he defined as anarchic. Waltz was not convinced that human nature could be “so
directly and causally linked to war as the sole explanation for why” conflict exists at the
international level, but he never considered it completely irrelevant in the shaping of
international relations.17
Perhaps a reason neo-realism distances itself from the human nature root is the
concept’s religious pliability. Reinhold Niebuhr ties the nature of man to “original sin.”18
Machiavelli did not embellish his discourse with religious clairvoyance but the earliest origins
of realism occurred in contexts that were congenial to religion. Neo-realism is befitting of a
strongly secular analysis climate though not necessarily by conscious calculation. This was
most likely a natural evolution in this direction, rather than a conscious choice by Waltz or
any neo-realists. Despite this, neo-realism does not, nor does it attempt to detach, from the
idea that human nature is one cause of international conflict. In Theory of International Politics
Waltz focused on the last of three levels he had originally analyzed to understand conflict in
international relations. However, his intent was to expand the study of this international
plane rather than to pronounce the individual and state planes obsolete in this pursuit.19
Human flaws still affect social, state, and international bodies attempting to establish ideal
order. They epitomize the nature Machiavelli intended to warn Guiliano de’ Medici about in
The Prince.20
Good social organization may prevent the worst of human nature from fully
manifesting or materializing but a genuinely clever character may still corrupt “good” social
17
Weber, International Relations Theory: A Critical Introduction, pp. 17-22
18
19
Weber, International Relations Theory: A Critical Introduction, p. 20
20
Niccolo Machiavelli, The Prince (J. M. Dent & Sons Ltd., 1908), p. viii

5
structures. The realist reluctant to embrace intangible assumptions about human nature may
consider the idea that men and women may be predisposed to certain behaviours, so the
human flaw concept finds a suitable Darwinian explanation. “The prevailing wisdom among
many intellectuals has been that evil has nothing to do with human nature and must be
attributed to political institutions.”21
Waltz focused his argument largely on the international
plane in Theory of International Politics, although his concern was for the lack of rather than the
deficiency of political institutions. More importantly however, is that he did not intend to
abandon the belief in human nature as an ingredient for conflict.
Although it seems structural realism minimizes the role of human nature, it is still
present in all realism. Stemming from religious, sociobiological, or psychological beliefs, the
post-Cold War world would have to uproot it in order for all realism to be rendered
irrelevant.22
Given the consistent flaws of human nature and the variety of political settings
in which realism has asserted its strengths, we should consider the criticisms that have been
leveled against it.
Structural realism provokes the most pronounced criticism. Its concern nurtured
questions about the “Unipolar Predicament.”23
Without a state to counterbalance US
hegemony, why would structural realism, or realism, be relevant? “The main charge against
this theory is that it not only failed to anticipate change, but led those who believed in it to
expect the opposite: stability.”24
The basis of this criticism is well-founded on the fact that
structural realism was well-invested in the concept of bipolarity, and so long as the US and
the Soviet Union existed, the paradigm was relevant. The current unipolar environment, the
argument goes, requires us to pursue other forms of realism or entirely different theories and
paradigms altogether when considering questions in international relations.
This criticism is weaker than it appears because the language of structural realism was
21
Steve Pinker, All About Evil
[http://pinker.wjh.harvard.edu/articles/media/2000_10_29_nytbookreview.html] 22 April 2004
22
John Lewis Gaddis, ‘International Relations Theory and the End of the Cold War’, International Security,
Vol. 17, No. 3 (Winter 1992-1993), pp. 9-10
23
Robert Kagan, ‘America’s Crisis of Legitimacy’, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 83, No. 2 (March/April 2004), p.
69
24
William C. Wohlforth, ‘Realism and the End of the Cold War’, International Security, Vol. 19, No. 3
(Winter 1994-1995), p. 101

6
never defined clearly to begin with, a weakness of structural realism that provides better
grounds for criticism. “Ambiguity surrounds the definition of bipolarity, but its most
common meaning is the concentration of capabilities in two powers.”25
But must balance of
power occur strictly between nation-states? The Arab World and Islam are defined largely
by commonalities in culture, language, and religion. The geo-political lines drawn during
British and French colonial periods among Arab and Islamic communities are irrelevant by
comparison. Could the Arab World be emerging as a balancing power? It lacks elements
that define “world power” in Waltz’ realism: “Great power rank depends on how states
score on a combination of attributes – size of population, resource-endowment, economic
capability, military strength, political stability and competence.” Any objective assessment of
these traits in the Arab World will inevitably lead to state-level analysis, effectively moving it
back to the nation-state plane neo-realists are less enamored with. The Arab World and
Islam would hardly fit realism’s definition of “world-power.” Structural realists could
strengthen their argument by exploring different concepts of what a "balancing power"
might be. Considering other elements relevant, such as legitimacy, could raise an actor on the
international plane a notch closer to "balancing power" or could demote a power off the
scale.26
Even if redefined, human nature continues to play a role, and conflict persists.
The argument that a post-Cold War unipolar world has rendered realism null is
based on the specific interpretation of international relations that structuralism offers.
However, conflict inevitably occurs and triggers new alignments of power. Even US
President William J. Clinton “argued that the West (did) not have problems with Islam, but
only with violent Islamic extremists.” However past and present history suggests a new,
possible, bipolar scenario. “In 1991, for instance, Barry Buzan saw many reasons why a
societal cold war was emerging ‘between the West and Islam.’” Similarly, members of the
Islamic community, such as Egyptian journalist Mohammed Sid-Ahmed, were making
similar observations; he said in 1994: “There are unmistakable signs of a growing clash
between Judeo-Christian Western ethic and the Islamic revival movement…” Samuel P.
Huntington goes on to observe that “if Muslims allege that the West wars on Islam and if
25
Wohlforth, ‘Realism and the End of the Cold War’, p. 101
26
Kagan, ‘America’s Crisis of Legitimacy’, p. 66

7
Westerners allege that Islamic groups war on the West, it seems reasonable to conclude that
something very much like a war is underway.” This portent observation was made in 1996.27
Despite criticism against structural neo-realism that seems to gain ground with the
fall of the Soviet Union, the emergence of a new rival is likely. Human nature and conflict
persist despite the end of the Cold War. If anything, the criticism against structural realism
would be more appropriately placed against the ambiguities in defining structure and power
and whether the balance must take place between two nation-states. Balance-of-power
between two civilizations, as Huntington proposed, may seem apocalyptic, however history
validates his views; Islam and Christianity (both Orthodox and Western) hold an impressive
record of international conflict spanning “fourteen hundred years.” The Cold War pales in
comparison. The criticism that realism becomes moot with the end of the Cold War hardly
fits in a broader historical context.28
The criticisms raised against realism at the broader, general level usually evolve
around three arguments: realism failed to predict the end of the Cold War, it lacks a
“correlation between independent and dependent variables,” and patterns of state behaviour
do not harmonize with “realist expectations and explanations.”29
A combination of factors
lead to the end of the Cold War, and to single out a paradigm or theory for explanatory
purposes may be unrealistic. “However it may appear to critics of realism, realist theories do
not rule out an event-series involving the emergence of deep superpower détente and the
relatively peaceful contraction of Soviet power;” additionally, realism’s core tackles “event-
series” and state behaviour variables based on their origin because “decision-makers’
assessments of power are what matter;” for any theory “to explain state behaviour, it must
specify the mechanism through which capabilities are translated into actions. That
mechanism can only be the assessments of the people who act on behalf of states.”30
27
Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order (London, Simon and
Schuster, 1996), pp. 209-217
28
Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of the World Order, p. 209
29
Wohlforth, ‘Realism and the End of the Cold War’, p. 93
30
Wohlforth, ‘Realism and the End of the Cold War’, pp. 95-7

8
The perennial quality of realism rests in its nature as an orientation and its
recognition in all its incarnations that the nature of man bears an effect on all levels of
analysis in international relations. Assuming the existence of human flaw, error, egoism and
wickedness ultimately leads to safer decisions and actions. Critics of realism may not be as
willing to be shaped by this instinct, yet the pervasiveness of realism is undeniable because
even the most utopian idealist will act with a measure of caution and would not deposit blind
faith in other human actors. Our reluctance to analyze recognizing our own flawed nature
misplaces the cause of war and conflict on purely abstract concepts that are nonetheless
created by humans, such as the state. Even then, no reasonable human being invests full
faith in fellow human beings completely, as humans will err, even if not with intent.
Furthermore, how do we interpret the meaning of “good” in a variety of contexts from
whence the actors could arise? What is just, right, and moral to one actor is corrupt to
another. It is impossible to conceive of international relations unaffected by human nature
and its tendency to promote parochial interests at the expense of others.
So long as all forms of realism remain faithful to its root cynicism regarding human
nature, each of its existing forms will remain useful and new forms may emerge. So long as
humans remain the actors in the international arena, from the decisions made in households
to the decisions made in international organizations, human flaw will keep realism in healthy
business.

Bibliography:
1. Stephen G. Brooks, ‘Dueling Realisms’, International Organization, Vol. 51, No.3 (1997)
2. Robert Cooper, The Breaking of Nations (London, Atlantic Books, 2003)
3. Jack Donnelly, Realism and International Relations (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press,
2000)
4. Steve Forde, ‘International Realism and the Science of Politics: Thucydides, Machiavelli,
and Neorealism’, International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 39, No. 2 (June 1995)
5. John Lewis Gaddis, ‘International Relations Theory and the End of the Cold War’,
International Security, Vol. 17, No. 3 (Winter 1992-1993)
6. Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order (London,
Simon and Schuster, 1996)
7. Robert Kagan, ‘America’s Crisis of Legitimacy’, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 83, No. 2
(March/April 2004)
8. Charles W. Kegley, Jr., ‘How Did the Cold War Die? Principles for an Autopsy’, Mershon
International Studies Review, Vol. 38, No. 1 (April, 1994)
9. Niccolo Machiavelli, The Prince (J. M. Dent & Sons Ltd., 1908)
10. Michael Mastanduno, ‘Preserving the Unipolar Moment: Realist Theories and US Grand
Strategy after the Cold War’, International Security, Vol. 2, No. 4 (Spring, 1997)
11. John J. Mearsheimer, ‘The False Promise of International Institutions’, International
Security, Vol. 19, No. 3 (Winter, 1994-1995)
12. J. Ann Tickner, ‘Re-visioning Security’ in Ken Booth, Steve Smith (eds), International
Relations Theory Today (Cambridge, Polity Press, 1995)
13. Cynthia Weber, International Relations Theory: A Critical Introduction (London, Routledge,
2001)
14. William C. Wohlforth, ‘Realism and the End of the Cold War’, International Security, Vol.
19, No. 3 (Winter 1994-1995)
Internet Sources:
Steve Pinker, All About Evil
[http://pinker.wjh.harvard.edu/articles/media/2000_10_29_nytbookreview.html] 22 April
2004

LopezReyesRealismPostColdWar

Recommended

Recommended

More Related Content

What's hot

What's hot (20)

Similar to LopezReyesRealismPostColdWar

Similar to LopezReyesRealismPostColdWar (12)

LopezReyesRealismPostColdWar