2. Definition of Power
Power is an of the essentailly contested
concepts in tne study of international relations
(Evans, Newnham, The Penguin Dictionary of
International Relations)
―The concept of Power is one of the most
troublesome in the field of international politics‖
(Robert Gilpin)
Power, like a host of other important concepts in
IR, is an essentially contested concept – it
means quite different things to different people
(Brian C. Schmidt)
At its simplest, power in interstate relations may
be defined as a state’s ability to control, or at
least influence, other states or the outcome of
events. (Key Concepts of IR)
3. dimensions of Power
The internal dimension corresponds to the
dictionary definition of power as a capacity
for action. A state is powerful to the extent
that it is insulated from outside influence or
coercion in the formulation and
implementation of policy. A common
synonym for the internal dimension of
power is autonomy.
4. The external dimension corresponds to the
dictionary definition of power as a capacity
to control the behaviour of others; to
enforce compliance. Such influence need
not be actively exercised; it need only be
acknowledged by others, implicitly or
explicitly, to be effective. It also need not
be exercised with conscious intent; the
behaviour of others can be influenced
simply as a by-product of powerful acts.
dimensions of Power
5. distinction of Power
Structural power confers the power to
decide how things shall be done, the
power to shape frameworks within which
states relate to one another, relate to
people, or relate to corporate enterprises.
6. Relative power is more, or less, if one
party is also determining the surrounding
structure of the relationship. Four separate
but related structures of power in
international relations:
• the knowledge structure refers to the power to influence
the ideas of others;
• the financial structure refers to the power to restrict or
facilitate their access to credit;
• the security structure shapes their prospects for security;
• the production structure affects their chances of a better
life as producers and as consumers.
distinction of Power
7. The first is that the concept of power is primitive in the specific
sense that its meaning cannot be elucidated by reference to
other notions whose meaning is less controversial than is
own. (―Truth‖ is another such primitive concept)…
The second reason is that the concept of power is essentially
contested… in other words, it cannot be disconnected from
what we commonly call the ―value assumptions‖ of the person
making the judgment.
Third, the contestedness of power – the fact that what counts
as power and being powerful is controversial matters. For, as
Stefano Guzzini argues, it has performative role in our
discourse and, more particularly, our political discourse: how
we conceive of power makes a difference to how we think and
act in general and more particularly in political context.
Definition of Power
―i want to begin by suggesting three reasons for
both the trouble and controversy. (Steven Lukes)
8. David Baldwin describes the two
dominant traditions of power analysis in
International Relations: in terms of
elements of national power approach
which depicts power as resources and the
relational power approach, which depicts
power as an actual or potential
relationship.
Tradition of Power
9. National power approach
Proponents of the elements-of-national power
approach equate power with possession of
specific resources.
All of the important resources that a state
possesses are typically combined in some
fashion to determine its overall aggregate
power. The resources that are most often used
as an indicator of national power include the
level of military expenditure, gross domestic
product, size of the armed forces, size of the
territory and population.
10. Relational power approach
This approach was championed by behavioral – oriented
political scientists during the 1950s and 1960s.
According to Robert Dahl, who was an influential
advocate of the relational conception of power, ―A has
power over B to the extent that he can get B to do
something that B would not otherwise do‖.
Fundamental to the relational conception of power is the
ability to demonstrate a change in outcomes.
Power as a set of material resources id deemed to be
less important than the actual ability of Actor A to change
the behavior of actor B.
11. Rather than power being a ―one size fits all‖
category, the relational approach disaggregates
power into a number of component parts in
order to demonstrate how it is exercised in
specific issue –areas. The dimension of power
typically include its scope (the objectives of an
attempt to gain influence over which issue), its
domain (the target of the influence attempt(, its
weight (the quantity of resources) and its costs
(opportunity costs if forgoing a relation).
13. Carr argued that power is indivisible, yet he
claimed that for purposes of discussion it could
be divided into three categories: military power,
economic power, and power over opinion.
Yet because of the ever-present possibility of
war breaking out, Carr argued that military
power was the most important form of power in
international politics…‖The supreme importance
of instrument lies in the fact that the ultima ratio
of power in international politics is war‖
15. ―International Politics, like all politics is a struggle
for power‖
―Whatever the ultimate aims of international
politics, power is always the immediate aim‖
When we speak of power we mean man’s
control over the minds and actions of other
men… this is a psychological relation between
those who exercise it and those who over whom
it is exercised.‖
16. Elements of Power
Tangibles include; Population, Territory,
Natural Resources and Industrial
Capacity, Agricultural capacity and Military
Strength and Mobility
Intangibles include; Leadership and
Personality, Bureaucratic Organization
Efficiency, Type of Government, Social
Cohesiveness, Reputation, Foreign
Support and DEPENDENCY
17. Like other classical realists, Morgenthau
equated power with the possession of both
material and non-material resources.
Morgenthau distinguished between two
types of elements that contributed to the
power of a nation: those that are stable
and those subject to a constant change.
18. The stable elements which are largely of a
quantitative nature, included geography, natural
resources (food and raw materials), industrial
capacity, military preparedness and population.
Morgenthau identified four qualitative, non-
material factors that have a bearing on a
national power: national character, national
morale, the quality of government and the
quality of a nation’s diplomacy.
19. Morgenthau signaled out the quality of
diplomacy as the most important factor
contributing to the power of a nation.
According to Morgenthau, ―the conduct of
a nation’s foreign affairs by its diplomats is
for national power in peace what military
strategy and tactics by its military leaders
are for national power in war‖
21. Hard and Soft Power
Power is the ability to influence the behavior of others to
get a desired outcome. Historically, power has been
measured by such criteria as population size and
territory, natural resources, economic strength, military
force, and social stability.
Hard power enables countries to wield carrots and
sticks to get what they want. The Pentagon’s budget for
FY2008 is more than $750 billion and growing, many
times more than the nearest competitor. The United
States has the world’s largest economy, and more than a
third of the top 500 global companies are American.
There is no other global power, and yet American hard
power does not always translate into influence.
22. Trends such as these have made power less tangible and
coercion less effective. Machiavelli said it was safer to be
feared than to be loved. Today, in the global information age,
it is better to be both.
Soft power is the ability to attract people to our side without
coercion. Legitimacy is central to soft power. If a people or
nation believes American objectives to be legitimate, we are
more likely to persuade them to follow our lead without using
threats and bribes.
Legitimacy can also reduce opposition—and the costs—of
using hard power when the situation demands. Appealing to
others’ values, interests and preferences can, in certain
circumstances, replace the dependence on carrots and sticks.
Cooperation is always a matter of degree, and it is profoundly
influenced by attraction.
Militaries are well suited to defeating states, but they are often
poor instruments to fight ideas. Today, victory depends on
attracting foreign populations to our side and helping them to
build capable, democratic states. Soft power is essential to
winning the peace. It is easier to attract people to democracy
than to coerce them to be democratic.
23. Smart Power
Smart power is neither hard nor soft—it is the skillful
combination of both. Smart power means developing
an integrated strategy, resource base, and tool kit to
achieve American objectives, drawing on both hard and
soft power. It is an approach that underscores the
necessity of a strong military, but also invests heavily in
alliances, partnerships, and institutions at all levels to
expand American influence and establish the legitimacy
of American action. Providing for the global good is
central to this effort because it helps America reconcile
its overwhelming power with the rest of the world’s
interests and values.
24. The United States has in its past wielded hard
and soft power in concert, with each contributing
a necessary component to a larger aim. We
used hard power to deter the Soviet Union
during the Cold War and soft power to rebuild
Japan and Europe with the Marshall Plan and to
establish institutions and norms that have
become the core of the international system.
Today’s context presents a unique set of
challenges, however, and requires a new way of
thinking about American power.
26. Power lies at the States have a two kind of power: latent
power and military power. These two forms of power are
closely related but not synonymous, because they are derived
from different kind of assets.
Latent power refers to the socio-economic ingredients that go
into building military power; it is largely based on a state’s
wealth and the overall size of its population. Great powers
need money, technology, a and personnel to build military
forces and to fight wars, and a state’s latent power refers to
the raw potential it can draw on when competing with rival
states.
In international politics, however, a state’s effective power is
ultimately a function of its military forces and how they
compare with the military forces of rival states…Therefore, the
balance of power is largely synonymous with the balance of
military power. I define power largely in military terms… (The
Tragedy of Great Power Politics)
28. Power is not a simple and stable
phenomenon. Indeed, it is very much a
political chameleon, constantly changing
even while it remains the same (John T.
Rourk)
Power Dynamics
Absolute and relative power
Objective and subjective power
Situational power
29. WILLIAM C. WOHLFORTH
The Rules of Power Analysis
Rule No. 1: Be Clear About Definitions of
Power
Rule No. 2: Watch the Goalposts
Rule No. 3: Do Not Rely on a Single
Indicator
Rule No. 4: Consider Latent Power
30. Rule No. 1: Be Clear About Definitions of Power
What have shifted are peoples' views of the real
utility of these resources and capabilities. Current
discussions of the limits of US power are really
focused on the limited usefulness of large amounts
of military and economic capabilities. Political
scientists generally use the term "power" to refer to
a relationship of influence. As Robert Dahl put it,
power is "ability to get B to do something it would
not otherwise have done" or, of course, to prevent B
from doing something it otherwise would have
done).
In international relations, the same term of "power"
is often equated with resources: measurable
elements that states possess and use to influence
others. In popular commentary-, these two
meanings of power are often conflated, with
unfortunate results.
31. To begin with, the challenge of converting power-as resources
into power-as-influence is not a uniquely US problem. All
great powers confront these challenges. If the cause of the
new gloominess concerning US power had to he reduced to
one word, it would be "Iraq." In 2003, fresh from apparent
military- victories in Afghanistan and Iraq, the United States
appeared to be a colossus. Yet in 2007, its inability to
suppress the Iraqi counterinsurgency- and civil war seems to
have revealed feet of clay. All the hard data on US military
superiority—its over one-half of global defense spending,
.some 70 percent of global military R&D, and dominance in
information-intensive warfare—now appear in a new light. The
world's most vaunted military machine is not even able to
tame disorganized Sunni and Shi'a militias in Mesopotamia.
But the example of Iraq exhibits a balance of power dynamic
between states and non-state insurgents, not one between
several different states. There is no reason to believe that
China, Russia, India, or the European Union would perform
any better if faced with the challenges that the US military
confronts in Iraq. Some scholars argue that Iraq demonstrates
new information about the state versus non-state balance.
32. Once an insurgency takes root, governments
rarely prevail. When they do—as in die case of
Britain in South Africa at the turn of the last
century and more recently, Russia in
Chechnya—it is usually the result of deploying
very large military forces willing to use ferocious
violence on a mass scale against innocent
civilians. With a comparatively small force in a
large and populous country, the United States'
inability to foster stability in Iraq is tragic, but not
surprising.
33. Rule No. 2: Watch the Goalposts
The larger problem with conflating power-
as-resources with power-as-influences
that it leads to a constant shifting of the
goalposts. The better die United States
becomes at acquiring resources, the
greater the array of global problems it is
expected to be able to resolve, and the
greater the apparent gap between its
material capabilities and die ends it can
achieve.
34. Rule No. 3: Do Not Rely on a Single
Indicator
Current projections of China's economic rise may well be
overstated. Iraq aside, what is most responsible for the
virtual shift to multipolarity is not a word but an acronym:
PPP. PPP stands for the "purchasing power parity"
estimate of countries' exchange rates—the size of their
economies in dollar terms. Although the prices oi many
manufactured products tend to be equalized by
international trade, the price of labor is not, and therefore
labor-intensive products and services tend to be
relatively cheap in poor counties. PPP corrects for this
discontinuity by using prices for a locally selected basket
of goods to adjust the exchange rate for converting local
currency into dollars. As University of Pennsylvania
professor Avery Goldstein notes, "the World Bank's
decision in 1994 to shift to a PPP estimate for China's
economy was crucial in propelling perceptions of that
country's imminent rise to great power status."
35. But forecasts about China's rise should not he based on
predictions on its living standards. They should discuss
China's presence as a great power in international
politics— its ability- to use money to purchase goods and
influence matters abroad. PPP clearly exaggerates this sort
of power. No one knows how much to discount the PPP
numbers for the purposes of making comparisons of
national power. What is certain, economist .Albert Keidel
notes, is that one should not "use projections of national
accounting growth rates from a PPP base. This common
practice seriously inflates estimates of Chinas future
economic size—exaggerating the speed with which China's
economy will overtake that of the United States in total
size." Projections must take into account the fact that
growth will cause prices to converge with international
norms, and thus the PPP to converge with the market
exchange rate. Using such a methodology, Keidel
estimates that it will take until 2050 for China's total
economic size to equal the United States. National power is
a complex phenomenon.
36. Rule No. 4: Consider Latent Power
US military forces are stretched thin, its budget and trade deficits
arc high, and the country continues to finance its profligate ways
by borrowing from abroad—notably from the Chinese
government. These developments have prompted many analysts
to warn that the United States suffers from "imperial overstretch."
And if US power is overstretched now, the argument goes,
unipolarity can hardly be sustainable for long. The problem with
this argument is that it fails to distinguish between actual and
latent power. One must he careful to take Into account both the
level of resources that can he mobilized and the degree to which
a government actually tries to mobilize them. And how much a
government asks of its public is partly a function of the severity of
the challenges that it faces. Indeed, one can never know for sure
what a state is capable of until it has been seriously challenged.
"self-inflicted overstretch"— in which a state lacks the sufficient
resources to meet its current foreign policy commitments in the
short term, but has untapped latent power ;and readily available
policy choices that it can use to draw on this power. This is
arguably the situation that the United States is in today.
37. Gregory Treverton, Seth G.
Jones (RAND)
“Measuring power: how to
predict future balances”,
Harvard International Review,
Summer, 2005
38. Power is an elusive concept. As the political scientist
Hans Morgenthau wrote, "The concept of political
power poses one of the most difficult and
controversial problems of political science."
Understanding the nature of power has long been
central to the study of international relations and to
the work of the US Intelligence Community. The task
is now all the more important and elusive, because
the United States enjoys an unprecedented amount
of economic, military, and technological might in
comparison to other states. Yet it must exercise its
power in a world not only of state-related constraints
on that power, but also of transnational forces and
non-state actors that act as competitors, qualifiers,
constrainers, and, sometimes, enhancers of that
power.
39. State power can be conceived at three
levels:
the level of resources or capabilities,
also known as power-in-being,
the level of power conversion through
national processes, and the
level of power in outcomes, by which we
refer to a state's tendency to prevail in
particular circumstances.
40. The starting point for thinking about--and developing
metrics for--national power is to view states as
"capability containers." Yet those capabilities--
demographic, economic, technological, and others--
become manifest only through a process of
conversion. States need to convert material resources,
or economic prowess, into more usable instruments
such as combat proficiency. In the end, however, what
policymakers care most about is not power as
capability, or even power converted from national
ethos, polities, and social cohesion. They care about
power in outcomes. That third level of power is by far
the most elusive, for it is contingent and relative. It
depends on how the power manifests itself, and
against whom the power is exercised.
41. the first level of state power
The main categories used to identify the first level of
state power, the level of capability, are gross
domestic product (GDP), population, defense
spending, and a less precise factor capturing
innovation in technology. Using these estimates,
power is summed as a percent of total global power,
and fourteen states hold at least a one percent
share. The United States is at the top of the power
structure, though it is hardly an isolated and
unilateral power. While the United States currently
holds nearly a fifth of total global power, it is closely
followed by the European Union, considered as a
unified actor, and China, which each hold about 14
percent. India, moreover, holds about 9 percent,
while Brazil, South Korea, and Russia each hold
about 2 percent.
42. These numbers, though only estimates, suggest
possible alliances that could match the power of
the United States acting alone or with its
traditional allies. Such a power assessment also
examines the most likely locations for future
conflict, based on six criteria. Projections
indicate that Asia is by far the most dangerous
region, with six of the eight most conflict-prone
bilateral balances involving China. The
assessment also indicates that by 2015, the
level of US power will be closely threatened by
China and India, while the European Union and
all non-US members of the Group of Eight will
experience a slow decline in power.
43. Converting Resources into Power
Carnegie scholar Ashley Tellis and his
colleagues at RAND have recently offered a re-
examination of the concept of "national power."
They began by assuming that a meticulous
detailing of visible military assets is required to
understand the true basis of national power. It
also requires a scrutiny of such variables as the
aptitude for innovation, the nature of social
institutions, and the quality of the knowledge
base. For Tellis and his colleagues, all of these
factors influence a country's capacity to produce
the one element that is still fundamental to
international politics--effective military power.
44. Their core argument is that national power is divided
into three linked realms: natural resources, national
performance, and military capabilities. The first
realm encompasses the level of resources either
available to, or produced by, a country. The second
realm, national performance, is derived from the
external pressures facing a country and the
efficiency of its governing institutions and its society
at large. The third realm, military capabilities, is
understood in terms of operational proficiency or
effectiveness. Military capability is produced as a
result of both the strategic resources available to a
military organization and its ability to convert those
resources into effective, coercive power. These
three realms taken together describe national
power.
45. The Tellis approach is still one of material capabilities,
though it gets to what might be called power-in-being. It is
about usable power, but does not involve power outcomes.
Rather than regard states as simple "containers of
capability," this approach considers ideas, organization,
and politics. Its ultimate objective is to understand the
process by which national resources are converted into
military capabilities--especially those that will improve
combat proficiency. In fact, Tellis' approach can be applied
to any country, and his team has empirically applied the
analysis to China. But since data can easily overwhelm the
exercise, it is imperative at a macro level to focus on the
three or four most critical factors. Therefore, the interplay of
power resources, transformative capabilities, and outcomes
have dominated the discussion.
46. Though many of the issues explored by Tellis and his colleagues are
critical, there is still a need to think about broadening the scope of
indicators. In general, four additional areas are important for power
conversion. The first area encompasses economic issues, including
access to capital. Researchers have generally focused on domestic
economic resources and capabilities. Changes in the global economy,
however, have created an impetus to find new indicators that measure the
ability of states to utilize global resources for domestic activities. For
example, it will become increasingly important to determine the impact of
outsourcing domestic jobs to companies in foreign countries. A second
area involves the institutions and political structures specific to a
given state. Important indicators include the level of corruption and the size
of what is called the "selectorate"--in other words, the size of the group to
which a leader is actually accountable. This indicator matters especially
because it affects the ability of states to allocate and distribute resources. A
third, and related, area incorporates values, trust, social capital, and
other aspects of civil society. That is, how do people cooperate and
interact in political and economic relationships? The final area is social
structure, a measure that includes societal stratification and ethnic and
class divisions.
47. Strategic Resources
What variables will help us to identify the great powers in
the international system in 2020? I
mportant variables include population, human capital,
economic power, technological prowess, and military
capabilities. However, the single most important form of
power in 2020 will continue to be military power.
Though military power is best indicated by defense
budgets, other measurements might include specific
military expenditures such as ground, air, and naval
force spending. While these indicators are easily
quantifiable, however, they do not always correlate well
with military effectiveness. In fact, history demonstrates
that smaller armies have defeated larger opponents
because of better training, doctrine, and strategy.
48. Today, economic power is the ultimate foundation of
military power, and the best indicator of economic power
is GDP. Like defense budgets, however, GDP provides
only a limited picture of power. It says little about the
composition of the economy, such as whether it is
spearheaded by leading sectors, or dominated by old
and declining ones. Therefore, it is often equally
important to consider variables such as human capital
and technology. The best "off the shelf" measure of
human capital is the average year of educational
attainment. When measuring technology, the best
indicator is per capita expenditure on research and
development.
49. Ultimately, however, none of these indicators
provides a complete picture of power in 2020.
Articulating an ideal indicator is difficult and,
perhaps, impossible. But it is likely to have
something to do with "quality": the ability of
states to convert these components into outputs
and make use of them. What truly determines
power in the end is a state's ability, through unity
and purpose, to mobilize and pursue national
ambitions.
50. Instruments of Power
Why do we evaluate and forecast levels of power? Power
assessment is crucial to understanding future national security
threats and developing useful instruments to address them. It is
argued, for example, that future threats to the United States will be
caused by a combination of economic, military, environmental, and
other variables. An abbreviated list of these threats includes
terrorism, pollution, transnational organized crime, demographic
changes, and even new health threats such as Severe Acute
Respiratory Syndrome.
Therefore, a menu of "old" and "new" power instruments will be
needed to combat these threats. In fact, several "old" power
instruments need to change--one of which is the military. In the past,
the military focused on conventional and nuclear warfare. In the
future, it will need to focus on countering asymmetric forces.
Economic instruments are equally in need of change; smarter
government instruments would not stifle markets and innovation, but
would provide social protection to populations.
51. More interesting, perhaps, are the implications for diplomacy as a
traditional instrument of power. Diplomacy in the United States has
traditionally been about selling the American way of life to foreign
governments and populations. A better approach might be to
promote local groups, institutions, and policies that are compatible
with US goals. For example, the US government might initiate a
policy of providing assistance to groups abroad that support ideals
and policies compatible with US interests, even when these groups
do not explicitly support, and perhaps even oppose, the United
States.
This strategy may help to legitimize the United States abroad and
help it better achieve policy change through diplomacy and
cooperative efforts. Moreover, it might be beneficial for the United
States to adopt a policy of "strategic restraint." Exercising restraint in
the United States' use of hard power abroad will decrease
counterbalancing and increase regional cooperation.
52. Improving Our Ability to Forecast
Power
Several variables and indicators provide
information about the current state of
power distribution, especially the softer
forms. Such variables--which include
cultural attractiveness, political outcomes
and rulings, knowledge generation and
use, and governance effectiveness--might
be incorporated in predicting distributions
of power.
53. The first of these variables, cultural attractiveness, includes the
"consumption" of US culture, the prevalence of English, the spread
of US-style institutions, and the allure of US universities. It would be
interesting to conduct an opinion poll that asked respondents
questions such as: If you could live anywhere in the world, other
than your own country, where would you live and why? Would your
choice be most influenced by economic, political, or cultural factors?
Equally interesting would be an indicator of knowledge generation
and use. This includes a variety of research and development
expenditures (total amounts, basic research levels, military research
levels), the extent of education at the college level and beyond, the
quality of education, and knowledge infrastructure, such as
computers, telephones, and the prevalence of networked users. A
third variable is the set of political outcomes, such as UN votes and
World Trade Organization dispute rulings, that determine which
states win and which lose, while additional indicators may include
the influence of non-state actors, governance effectiveness, and
measures of globalization.
54. It might be useful to build on these variables and indicators in
several ways. First, they could be incorporated into the set of factors
from which aggregate power indices are computed. In fact, the
system of flexible weighting that already exists should make this
incorporation easy. In addition, it might be useful to create an
absolute power index in contrast to the current index of relative
power. Although states are characterized by their percentage of
system power, many states and non-state actors have been
increasing their absolute power in ways that affect overall system
behavior. For instance, when non-state actors such as terrorist
groups achieve significant absolute power, including the ability to do
harm, that fact may be more important than their relative power,
which is likely to be modest. On the other hand, the relative power of
the United States, while enormous in absolute terms, has limits--
limits that have become visible in Iraq. Indicators or thresholds for
absolute power would be helpful.
55. Second, it may be useful to simplify and
improve the user interface for addressing
power. It might be helpful, for instance, to
add a basic report capability focused on
the indices of power and the component
elements of it. It might also be worth
considering a specialized form to simplify
the controlling of weighting and index
construction.
56. Forecasts, however, will only be as good as the underlying
model. There are at least three areas where the foundations
of any power model can be enhanced. First, it would be useful
to turn attention to the production function in the economic
model. The quality of economic growth forecasts is
fundamental to most of what the model does. It would be
helpful to better represent that production function in a way
that builds more extensively on current theories of
endogenous growth. Another critical change involves the
development of the education sub-model. Returns to
education, both in terms of quality and prevalence, may have
important implications for models of future power structures.
Third, an area that needs significant work is the
representation of debt and its impact on countries. Significant
power shifts could occur in the international system as a result
of exchange rate changes and financial crises.
57. relying only on the base case. The most intuitive set of scenarios would
build on different assumptions of economic growth rates. For example, the
RAND Corporation has applied a technique called "fault lines" to China. The
analysis asked what major "fault lines," or adversities, might seriously affect
China's ability to sustain rapid economic growth. It identified such factors as
unemployment, poverty, social unrest, corruption, epidemic diseases, as
well as water resources and pollution. It then asked how these adversities
might occur, and by how much they would affect China's growth.
Wild cards--exogenous shocks to the system--are also important to
consider. Future shocks might include energy system shocks, financial
shocks, collapses of key regimes, or lethal terrorist attacks. One way RAND
has looked at shocks is "breaking" continuities--searching for factors where
predictions of continuity seem dubious, even if predicting exactly how, let
alone when, that continuity might break is elusive. Breaking is especially
likely when two measures of continuity are uneasy partners. For
example, several years ago, work on the Asian Futures model included
exogenous shocks in Korea and China. In Korea, the heavily armed
confrontation is sustained even as North Korea declines economically but
does not collapse. Similarly, in the China-Taiwan conflict, the stand-off goes
up and down in temperature while China does not accept de facto
Taiwanese autonomy, and Taiwan does not declare de jure independence.
58. In sum, there are a number of steps that must be
taken if we are to better understand power and
forecast international distributions of power.
These include strengthening indices of relative
and absolute power, enhancing the foundations
of the power model, and developing future
scenarios. If taken, these steps can provide
policy makers with a more useful set of variables
to measure power, and ultimately improve their
ability to understand the future security
environment.
59. Power resources of the Major U. S.
contenders, 1990
Source of Power United States Soviet Union Europe Japan China
Tangible
Basic resources strong strong strong medium strong
Military strong strong medium weak medium
Economic strong medium strong strong medum
Science/
Technology
strong medium strong strong weak
Intangible
National
Cohesion
strong medium weak Strong strong
Universalistic
Culture
strong medium strong medium medium
International
Institutions
strong medium strong strong medium
60. Sources of
power
United States Japan China Russia European
Union
India
tangible
Basic
resources
strong medium strong strong strong Strong to
medium
Military strong weak medium strong medium medium
Economic strong strong strong and
medium
medium and
strong
strong medium to strong
Science/
Technology
strong strong medium medium strong
Intangible
National
Cohesion
strong strong strong medium weak weak and
medium
Universalistic
Culture
strong medium medium medium strong medium
International
Institutions
strong strong medium medium strong medium
Power resources of the Major U. S.
contenders, 2008 – moja procena
61. Sources of
power
United States Japan China Russia European
Union
India
tangible
Basic
resources
Military
Economic
Science/
Technology
Intangible
National
Cohesion
Universalistic
Culture
International
Institutions
Power resources of the Major U. S.
contenders in the future?
62. Ballance of Power
Indicates the relative distribution of power
among states into equal or unequal
shares.
Traditionally, it refers to a state of affairs in
which no one state predominates over
others.
Prescriptively, it refers to a policy of
promoting a power equilibrium on the
assumption that unbalanced power is
dangerous.
63.
64. Ballance of Power
Prudent states that are at a disadvantage
in the balance of power will (or at least
should) form an alliance against a
potentially hegemonic state or take other
measures to enhance their ability to
restrain a possible aggressor.
One state may opt for a self-conscious
balancing role, changing sides as
necessary to preserve the equilibrium.
65. Certain conditions of BoP
a multiplicity of sovereign states
unconstrained by any legitimate central
authority;
continuous but controlled competition over
scarce resources or conflicting values;
an unequal distribution of status, wealth,
and power potential among the political
actors that make up the system.
66. equilibrium
a kind of compromise among states that find its order
preferable to absolute chaos, even though it is a system
that favours the stronger and more prosperous states at
the expense of sovereign equality for all of them
Great powers play the leading roles in balance of power
systems because of their preponderant military force and
their control of key technologies.
hegemonic state will often try to justify its position either
by providing certain public goods for other states (such
as a beneficial economic order or international security),
or because it embraces values that are common to a set
of states. Great powers reap a disproportionate share of
the benefits of the system, but they also bear a greater
responsibility as its regulators
67.
68. key distinctions
Unipolarity; one state or superpower
dominates the international system.
Bipolarity; two states or blocs of states are
roughly equal in power.
Multipolarity refers to a situation in which
there are at least three great powers.
71. Other distinction
Subjective and an objective balance of power.
One of the great difficulties of evaluating the
balance of power in the 21st century is that
power resources are unevenly distributed
among the great powers and there is no simple
correspondence between possession of a
resource and the ability to control outcomes as a
consequence. For example, whilst the United
States is overwhelmingly dominant in terms of
military power, economic power is much more
evenly distributed between the United States,
Western Europe, and Japan
72.
73. Literatura
Vojin Dimitrijević, Radoslav Stojanović, Međunarodni odnosi, Službeni list SRJ,
Beograd, 1996, str. 357- 362; 367- 368;
Džozef S. Naj, Jr., Kako razumevati međunarodne sukobe, Stubovi kulture, Beograd,
2006, str. 92- 96; 283- 294; 302- 310; 324- 327; 333-336;
Rejmon Aron, Mir i rat među nacijama, Izdavačka knjižarnica Zorana Stojanovića,
Sremski Karlovci, Novi Sad, 2001, str. 83-104; 203-296;
Dejvid Lendis, Bogatstvo i siromaštvo nacija, Stubovi kulture, Beograd, 2004;
Mankur Olson, Moć i razvoj, Stubovi kulture, Beograd, 2006;
Dragan R. Simić, Poredak sveta, Zavod za udžbenike i nastavna sredstva, Beograd,
1999, str. 223- 232;
Nova srpska politička misao, tema broja: "Moć", Nova edicija, Vol. XIII (2006) No. 1-
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Džozef S. Naj, Paradoks američke moći, BMG, Beograd, 2004, str. 19- 116;
Henri Kisindžer, Da li Americi treba spoljna politika, BMG, Beograd, 2003
Čarls V. Kegli, Jr., Svetska politika – trend i transformacija, Centar za studije
Jugoistočne Evrope, Fakultet političkih nauka, Diplomatska akademija, Beograd,
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Michael Barnett, Raymond Duvall, ―Power in International Politics‖,
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Old Tendencies‖, World Politics, Vol. 31, No. 2, pp. 161-194;
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