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Lattice Energy LLC- Field Failures and LENRs in Lithium-based Batteries-Jan 23 2013

by on Jan 23, 2013

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LENRs are potentially another mechanism for producing so-called field failures that can trigger catastrophic thermal runaways in Lithium-based batteries; may sometimes, but not always, be associated ...

LENRs are potentially another mechanism for producing so-called field failures that can trigger catastrophic thermal runaways in Lithium-based batteries; may sometimes, but not always, be associated with internal electrical shorts.

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  • lewisglarsen Lewis Larsen, President and CEO at Lattice Energy LLC Dear Readers: I must note that from what I have seen and heard from other people (and experienced battery experts in particular) there is a substantial subset (perhaps the majority?) of battery thermal runaways that aren't caused by some sort of external mechanical abuse or external shorting events that are most likely caused by some type of failure in the behavior of a battery pack’s control electronics. No argument with the experts on that point. That said, I am also told by long-experienced battery experts that there is an irreducible, albeit much smaller subset of thermal runaways which were clearly not caused by any sort of external physical or electrical abuse and in which, by any reasonable measure, the control electronics were apparently functioning within spec and were not detecting any anomalies in monitored parameters when a thermal event occurred. This subset is where an LENR ‘nano-fireball’ mechanism could potentially be operating and serve as a proximate cause for runaway events. At the moment, I cannot cite any anomalous post-event forensic isotopic data on runaways which would indicate non-chemical processes at work. However, most if not all runaway investigations have employed EDAX or the equivalent, not SIMS, so at the moment the question is still open. I certainly wish more incident investigators would be on the lookout for telltales of non-chemical processes as possible culprits, but if a runway were in fact caused by just one 100 micron LENR ‘fireball’ at 4,000 to 6,000 Kelvin it might be nearly impossible to locate and measure the minuscule amount of transmuted material left amongst the relatively vast macroscopic mass of debris in a ruined battery cell. That is admittedly a daunting experimental problem. What I can say with great confidence based on voluminous published experimental data concerning LENRs as well as our own theoretical work, is that conditions and reactants that would be very favorable for triggering LENRs in rare instances are absolutely, definitely present on nanometer to micron-sized nanostructures (which include dendrites) inside batteries during the course of microscopic or macroscopic internal electrical shorts. One might reasonably ask, given that LENRs would be rare occurrence at best, why worry at all that they might be happening inside batteries? In my view, depending heavily on their location inside a battery, the answer is that LENRs could serve as an extraordinarily hot ‘match’ with local temperatures that are high enough to potentially be capable of directly initiating even more exothermic metal-oxidation reactions that burn much hotter than a flammable electrolyte fire. Unfortunately, such ‘thermite-like’, pyrotechnic chemical reactions with metals can be nearly impossible to extinguish because they can generate their own Oxygen via dissociation as an advancing flame-front combusts battery materials present inside a casing. In my opinion, that’s where the safety danger lies with regard to LENR-triggered thermal runaways. LENRs may well be a rare, “Black Swan” battery event, but it’s a rather deadly one. Hence, on-board battery systems installed on human-passenger-carrying vehicles such as aircraft and submersibles should ideally be designed with mitigation of this newly recognized type of safety risk in mind. Lew, Feb. 11, 2013 4 months ago
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  • lewisglarsen Lewis Larsen, President and CEO at Lattice Energy LLC Please see following public Lattice document that is available for online viewing in ‘fullscreen’ mode within your web browser or free pdf download on SlideShare.net: “Could LENRs be involved in some Li-ion battery fires?” Lewis Larsen, Lattice Energy LLC July 16, 2010 [68 slides] http://www.slideshare.net/lewisglarsen/cfakepathlattice-energy-llc-len-rs-in-liion-battery-firesjuly-16-2010 Comments about local power densities in LENR-active surface “patches”: Please see discussion that occurs in Slides #17 through #28 in this document, and especially the chart of an adapted Figure from Seidman & Norem (2005) that is presented on Slide #19; in my opinion, some of the data found in that section is eye-opening. Specifically, there is strong reason to believe that effective power densities in nanometer-to-micron-scale LENR-active “patches” on condensed matter surfaces can be > 10*21 Watts per cubic meter for up to 300 nanoseconds or thereabouts (which is Lattice’s estimated approximate maximum lifetime for such “patches” before they destroy themselves). Such enormous local power densities on small length-scales are what produces distinctive crater-like structures with dimensions ranging from a few nanometers up to several hundred microns that are commonly observed in random locations in post-experiment SEM images of LENR-active surfaces (please see examples provided in the document). Interestingly and significantly, nuclear transmutation products (shifts toward heavier stable isotopes and/or different ‘anomalous’ elements that were not previously present) ‘resulting from neutron captures on substrate materials such as Pd, Ni, T, and W can often be detected in and around such “craters” with SIMS. Odd structures suggesting local boiling of molten metal have even been observed on the surfaces of LENR-active pure Tungsten glow-discharge cathodes post-experiment (Cirillo et al. in Italy and others). In the case of a hypothetical occurrence of LENRs in a failed battery cell, post-failure forensic analysis of elemental composition with only EDAX could potentially misidentify elemental nuclear transmutation products as ‘contaminants’ that could plausibly have occurred during the manufacturing process. By contrast, detection of significant isotopic shifts in compositionally expected elements or unexpected ‘new’ elements with SIMS could provide strong supporting evidence that non-chemical processes had in fact occurred. Enormous local power densities on short time-scales are what enable LENR-active patches to briefly hit temperatures of ~4,000 to 6,000 degrees Kelvin. Amazingly, this heating is roughly equivalent to the surface temperature of the Sun. Given all this local thermal mayhem, I guess we probably shouldn’t be surprised that just a single tiny LENR nano plasma ball that suddenly erupts in the ‘wrong place’ inside an unlucky battery cell is potentially capable of triggering a field-failure and subsequent, decidedly macroscopic thermal runaway event driven by highly exothermic chemical reactions which may include thermal fratricide of adjacent cells if they are not adequately thermally isolated from each other. 4 months ago
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  • lewisglarsen Lewis Larsen, President and CEO at Lattice Energy LLC Dear Readers: See: Feb 7, 2013 Bloomberg News, “NTSB’s 787 Findings May Lead to Boeing Battery Redesign.” Bloomberg’s reporters did a nice job on this news story. As they allude, it does appear more-or-less inevitable that some sort of redesign of the Dreamliner’s battery pack will be mandatory to improve aircraft safety. In particular, certain types of rare (1 in every 4 to 5 million battery cells) but very damaging battery failure modes, one of the worst possible is called a “field failure,” are simply not mitigated by traditional methods of safety engineering and testing (which is what Boeing and its manufacturing partners faithfully performed). So, in effect, Boeing et al. inadvertently did not prepare and engineer the Dreamliner’s battery system to readily handle “Black Swan” field-failure-triggered thermal runaway events with aplomb, which is exactly what happened in the JAL and ANA battery smoke/fire incidents. That said, I think that the Dreamliner’s present Lithium-based battery safety problems are readily fixable with some better-informed reengineering by Boeing. Speaking to that particular point, at a breakfast meeting on Feb. 6, NTSB Chairman Hersman made some clarifying statements in which she wisely suggested that regulators should not “categorically' rule-out the use of Lithium-based batteries on aircraft such as the Dreamliner. In my opinion, a non-trivial probability of Li-ion battery fires and even thermal runaway events should not a priori forbid their use, as long as aircraft systems integrators can successfully engineer surrounding subsystems (e.g., robust thermal isolation of a battery pack from the rest of an electronics bay; or using materials that can prevent a battery pack external casing melt-through in spite of extremely high temperatures; or aggressive external venting of emitted hot gases and smoke when a problem condition is detected) to assuredly handle a genuine worst-case scenario such as a catastrophic thermal runaway event that may be hot enough to trigger metal-oxidation reactions that can completely combust virtually all internal battery materials. Thus, it would seem that with well thought-out local subsystem reengineering around the Dreamliner’s battery packs, a worst-case battery problem would most likely not be able to significantly compromise passenger/crew safety or flight capabilities of an affected aircraft. Lew Feb. 8, 2013 4 months ago
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Lattice Energy LLC- Field Failures and LENRs in Lithium-based Batteries-Jan 23 2013 Lattice Energy LLC- Field Failures and LENRs in Lithium-based Batteries-Jan 23 2013 Document Transcript