4. Problem
PosiBvism
FalsificaBonism
It is difficult to search the characterisaBon of science
as disBnguishing it from other kinds of knowledge.
Science is special because it is derived from the facts.
It is no clear account of how theories can be
‘derived’ from the facts could be found.
Science is what should be falsifiable.
In any realisBc situaBon in science it is not possible
to locate the cause of a faulty predicBon.
5. Kuhn and Lakatos
Kuhn
Lakatos
Both Kuhn and Lakatos tried to solve the problem by focusing
on the theoreBcal framework in which scienBsts work. But…
He stressed the extent to which workers in rival paradigms
‘live in different worlds’.
He ended up with a criterion for characterising science that
was so lax that few intellectual pursuits could be ruled out.
Paul Feyerabend
Described about ‘anarchisBc’ in this chapter
7. About Feyerabend
• Austrian who was based in Berkeley, California
• spent Bme interacBng with Popper and Lakatos in London
• published a book in 1975 with the Btle “Against Method”.
Outline of an Anarchis2c Theory of Knowledge
He challenged all of the aYempts to give an account
of scienBfic method to capture its special status.
• There is no such method.
• Science does not possess features that render it
necessary superior to other forms of knowledge.
• It is the principle ‘anything goes’.
8. Feyerabend’s main line of argument
The advances in physics and astronomy made by Galileo
He offered on the basis of philosophers own ground.
It is aYempt to undermine characterisaBons of method
and progress in science.
(Main Example)
If an account of method and progress in science cannot
even make sense of Galileo’s innovaBons, then it is not
much of an account of science.
9. The advances of science by Galileo
He didn’t accept the facts considered to be borne out
by the senses by his contemporaries.
Galileo’s opinion
1. Reason conquers sense
2. Replace the senses by ‘a superior and beYer
sense’, namely, the telescope
! His rejecBon of the claim that the earth is staBonary
! His rejecBon of the claim that the apparent sizes of
Venus and Mars do not change appreciably during the
course of the year
10. Rotation of earth:Observation
【ObservaBon】
Dropping the stone from the
top of a tower, the stone will
fall to just below the tower.
Earth is
staBonary
If earth moves…
Explain that “earth moves”.
Stone should fall to the
locaBon shiced from
beneath the tower.
12. Rotation of earth:Assumption
The speed will neither increase nor
decrease since the ball will be neither
rising nor falling.
frictionless slope
The horizonal moBon of the ball
persists and remains constant.
13. Rotation of earth:Result
【Before falling】
Stone and tower has a horizontal
movement at the same rate.
【Acer falling】
This stone will fall to just below the
tower. This is the result that stone and
the tower dropped while keeping the
horizontal movement.
That’s why he could deny the argument that
‘The earth is staBonary’.
16. Compatibility of Kuhn and Lakatos
Lakatos
Kuhn
If Feyerabend’s construal of Galileo’s methodology is correct and
typical of science, then posiBvist, inducBvist and falsificaBonist
accounts have serious problem accommodaBoning it.
• His methodology can be accommodated into Feyerabend’s .
• They have in common in terms of ‘incommensurable’.
That methodology is so lax that it can accommodate
almost anything.
Kuhn avoided Feyerabend’s anarchisBc conclusions
essenBally by appealing to social consensus.
17. Conculusion of failed attempts
• AYempts to differenBate scienBfic knowledge and other
forms failed.
• The high status are not jusBfied in our society.
The high regard for science is a dangerous
dogma.(according to Feyerabend)
22. Understanding of human freedom
Feyerabend’s view of freedom : “freedom from constraints”
It ignores the posiBve aspects of the "free".
The posiBve aspects
= The extent to which individuals have access to the means to fulfill their wishes
e.f. ) Freedom of speech
A teacher claims the fascism in university lecture.
• Deny of ‘freedom of speech’ by disturbance of student
⇔ negaBve
• There is a means for the claims to teachers
⇔ posiBve
Since this freedom is not to the student, disturbance of a
teacher is jusBfied.
23. Freedom unconstrained
Individual and Society
Individuals are born into a society that pre-exists them.
The society’s characterisBcs do not choose and connot be in a
posiBon to choose.
also science
ScienBst will be only free to be determined within the range of
certain constraints ( theory, mathemaBcal techniques,
instruments and experimental techniques).
It can be free to pursue the ”subjecBve wishes” among a restricted sense
Author says that Feyerabend’s fanciful speculaBons about a
utopia in which all individuals are free to follow their
inclinaBons in an unrestricted way appear children.
25. Topic
1. Against universal method
2. Telescopic for naked-eye data : a change in standards
3. Piecemeal change of theory method and standards
4. A light-hearted interlude
27. Feyerabend’s claim
Feyerabend’s criBcism
He claims that
“there is a universal, ahistorical method of science
that contains standards that all sciences should live
up to if they are to be worthy of the Btle ‘science’”.
‘universal’ :
Universal is used to indicate that the proposed method is to
apply to all science or putaBve sciences (physics,psychology,
creaBon science or whatever)
‘ahistorical’ :
The term ahistorical signals the Bmeless character of the method.
(It is to be used to appraise Aristotle’s physics as much as Einstein’s
and Democritus’s atomism as much as modern atomic physics.)
28. Author’s criticism
Author’s posiBon
Agree : There is no idea to universal and ahistorical.
Disagree : Deny that ‘there is no universal method’.
Idea of middle way
There are methods and standards in science, but it is intended
to be different for each science ,and it can be varied among a
science, so it is changed to a beYer way.
There is a middle way, according to which there are
historically conBngent methods and standards implicit
in successful sciences.
Opposite opinion : John Worrall(1988)
BeYer according to what standards? It is necessary
to some super-standards.
30. Standards of science
One of Galileo’s Aristotelian
opponents He claims that should be compaBble with the evidence of the
senses when they are used with sufficient care under suitable
condiBons.
Galileo's policy in this situaBon : propaganda and trickery
As evidence to show the validity of the telescope data, it pointed
out the shortcomings of the naked eye data on the "blink of light”.
31. About ‘blink of light’
e.g.) Torch
When viewed at a distance at night, when it is bright compared
with its surroundings, it appears larger than its true size.
A lighted torch can viewed from near or far and at day or night.
Blink is dependent on the size of the apparent observed light source
This aspect of Galileo’s hypothesis can be subject to a direct terrestrial test.
Galileo’s hypothesis
Blink of the light is the result of a brightness, smallness and distance of
the source.
33. The compatibility of other universe theory
Factors that increase the veracity of the telescope data
Data of the telescope was also complies with the opponents
of Copernican theory.
The size of Venus and Mars changes to clarify.
Copernican theory
Ptolemy theory
Tycho Brahe theory
conflict Earth
moves
Earth is
staBonary.
This claim had been common in both.
→ Data of the telescope was also complies with the opponents.
35. Success of “ change of standards”
Common aim : Give a descripBon of the astronomical
observaBon backed by empirical evidence
Galileo presented a observaBon that opponents can not help
but to accept.
e.g. )Light source in the night appears larger than it actually
Opponents should be willing to abandon the ‘criterion of
science itself’ and accept some telescopic data rather than their
naked-eye counterpart.
Share of observaBon
36. The components of the science
and its change
The components of the science
• Aims to arrive at knowledge of some specified kind
• Methods for arriving at those aims
• Standards for judging
• Facts and theories that represent the current state of play
as far as the realisaBon of the aim is concerned
We have already discussed ways in which theories and facts are fallible, and
we illustrated in the previous secBon a change in methods and standards.
The detailed form that the aim of a science takes can change too.
e.g.) The experimental work of Robert Boyle
37. The experimental work of Robert Boyle
" Robert Boyle
He is major contribuBon to the scienBfic revoluBon
of the seventeenth century.
• Two somewhat conflicBng aspects of Boyle’s work
" The old way (mechanical philosophy)
" The new way(pneumaBcs experiment)
38. Old way : mechanical philosophy
The aim of science is ulAmate explanaAon
Mechanical philosophy
The material world is seen as consisBng of pieces of maYer.
An explanaBon of some physical process will be based on the shape of the
material parBcles, moBons, collision and rearrangements associated with the
process
Adequate explanaBons were ulBmate explanaBons.
They appealed to the shapes, sizes, moBons and collisions of
corpuscles, and these noBons were themselves not
considered to be in need of explanaBon.
39. New way : pneumatics experiment
Boyle’s experiments on the physics of air led him to explain a
range of phenomena in terms of the weight and elasBcity of air.
But his explanaBons were not scienBfic explanaBons from the
point of view of the mechanical philosophy. ( not ulBmate)
Appealing to the nature of the air was not acceptable unBl those properBes
themselves had been explained in terms of corpuscular mechanisms.
Later, the aim of ulBmately described in physics has been
recognized as something unaYainable.
Change of the Aims
40. Summary of changes
The “aims”, “methods”, ”standards” and “theory and facts"
to consBtute science gradually change.
However…
If it were typical of science that rival scienBsts see everything
differently from the point of view of their respecBve paradigms, it
would indeed be impossible to capture an objecBve sense.
→But there are no situaBons in science or its history.
We don’t need a universal, ahistorical account of scienBfic
method to give an objecBve account of progress in science.
The objecBve explanaBon that how a method changes is possible.
42. Reaction of defenders of universal method
It can be interpreted as a general assumpAons
that consAtute universal method
Imagined reacAon
It does illustrate a change in standards, an appeal to some higher,
more general standards is involved.
e.g.) Galileo and his rivals of common maYers
They demanded that their account of planetary orbits
should be borne out by appropriate evidence.
43. Author’s opinion
Suppose we do try to formulate some general principles
that any proponent might be expected to adhere to.
“Common-sense scienAfic method”
‘ take argument and the available evidence seriously and do not aim for a kind of
knowledge or a level of confirmaBon that is beyond the reach of available methods’
There is universal method in the commonsense.
However...
Such a universal method is unsuitable for finely describing
the change of the science because of too vague.
44. Status of science
sociologists of science and postmodernists
(call them ‘the levellers’ for short)
establishment of the
reliability of the science
the interest of scienBsts
and groups of scienBsts
(such as social status)
the same way as any other social task does.
→deny the special status about science
Author
There is a commonsense disBncBon.
e.g.)
・The aim to improve knowledge of how chemicals combine
・The aim to improve the social standing of professional chemists.
45. Finally
Philosophers of science have presumed that ‘a disBncBon
between science and other kind of knowledge’ can only be
achieved with universal method. → Failure
1. An account of universal method by adapBng a version of
probability theory (Chapter 12)
2. Counter what it sees as the excesses of the theory-dominated
accounts of science by taking a close look at experiment and
what it involves (Chapter 13)
The pursuit of universal method in the philosophy of science is conBnuing.
Two important movement as follows :