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The Power of Logs
Practices for Network Security

               Deepen Chapagain
             CEO, Nepways Pvt. Ltd.


        Lecturer, DOECE, Pulchowk Campus
Contents

 Introduction to computer security

 General measures taken

 Logs

 Log management:
   Definition
   needs
Contents ….

 What it can do ?

 How to do it ?

 Log management: for small and mid-sized companies

 Log management for large companies

 Something you could try
Security

 Boils down to the CIA triad

 Confidentiality

(Only allowed people should read )

 Integrity

(Only allowed people should update)

 Availability

(available for authorized people)
Measures

 Authentication
   Is some-one – (username)
   Knows something –(password, pin)
   Has something – (card, key, thumb)
 Firewalls
   Write rules to block
   Write rules to allow
   Pass in on le0
 Anti-virus, Anti-XXX

 IDS/ IPS
   Signature based or Anomaly based
   Apply application specific signatures
   Identify unexpected events
   Expect the unexpecteds
All in all

 Perimeter defense with firewall

 Defense with anti-virus

 Authentication

 Analysis with IPS/IDS

 POLICIES for security
But

 Do right people always act right ?
   Wikileaks got all the data from someone inside

 Wrong person can still login ?
   Authentication doesn’t always work

 Wrong device accessing ?
   Similar problem with firewalls

 Malicious attempt ?
Summary

 You can’t just rely on security measures applied

 There have been breaches atop them

 And we have always lost
Not yet
Logs, the super hero

 Record of every activity
   With enough information to track things
   Every devices and applications.
  (Programmers: what about yours ?? )

 System logs
   System is up/down
   Time changed

 Application logs
   Files accessed/ created/ deleted
   Applications started/ stopped
   Configuration changed
 Authentication logs
   Successful/ Failed login

<133> Dec 16 04:46:00 outpost01.Outpost24.cph MSWinEventLo
g     1     Security      1235213   Fri Dec 16 04:45:56 2011
  540      Security      deepen   User      Success Audit
OUTPOST01       LogonLogoff       Successful Network Logon:
  User Name: deepen Domain: OUTPOST24 Logon ID: (0x0,0
x952AA2A9) Logon Type: 3 Logon Process: NtLmSsp            Aut
hentication Package: NTLM Workstation Name: OUTPOST24
   Logon GUID: - Caller User Name: - Caller Domain: -
   Caller Logon ID: - Caller Process ID: -
   Transited Services: -
   Source Network Address: 192.168.15.1 Source Port: 0
 1227421
 Firewall logs

<166>Feb 24 2012 15:17:19: %ASA-6-
106015: Deny TCP (no connection) from 192.168.15.37/59224
to 173.194.69.108/993 flags RST on interface inside

 Device logs

 Etc/Etc
So what can I do with logs

 Look at them and smile

 Continuously have an eye on them

 Setup a mechanism to isolate threats

 Identify whatever is going on

 If there is some problem, call on the logs

 You can’t stop a murderer but if he knows he will be
  caught, he won’t probably do it
2011:12:30 01:12:43 Kathmandu Shyam
singh shot at by Ram Singh near
Indrachowk with a single bore russian rifle
right on his 32 cm chest

2011:12:38 01:21:43 Kathmandu Ram Singh
driving towards Pharping on a Tucson with
number ba 40 cha 1111
Log Management

 Configuring log collection

 Configuring log retention

 Making it usable
   Searchability
   Threat isolation
   Ability to act
   Ability to report
LM issues

 How many servers ?, How many users ?

 How many logs ?
   Depends on the size of network, and activity
   But several millions a day is quite common
   On compressed file, it can be several GBs per day
We need

 Large storage / (probably an automated retention )

 Some tools for searchability
    Indexing for search optimization
    Better search interface to adhere to security needs

 Ability to isolate threats
    Signature based / pattern based

 Ability to act
    Make use of Captured knowledge
Major systems

 Authentication servers

 Application servers

 Firewalls

 Security critical devices

 A Printer ??
Solution

 Central log collection

 Log normalization

 Knowledge

 Correlation across boundaries
Suppose a syslog server
How can you make use of it ?
Primary events

 Available exactly on the logs

 Logs are structured, (though not always)

 Signature based isolation
   Write a pattern to match a failed login

 Normalization
   Write a pattern so that it captures info into normalized fields

 Visibility across system and applications
Example
<133> Dec 16 04:46:00 outpost01.Outpost24.cph MSWinEventLog       1
     Security     1235213     Fri Dec 16 04:45:56 2011   540   Secur
ity     deepen       User    Success Audit       OUTPOST01   LogonLo
goff         Successful Network Logon: User Name: deepen Domai
n: OUTPOST24 Logon ID: (0x0,0x952AA2A9) Logon Type: 3 Logon
Process: NtLmSsp      Authentication Package: NTLM Workstation Na
me: OUTPOST24 Logon GUID: - Caller User Name: -
    Caller Domain: - Caller Logon ID: - Caller Process ID: -
    Transited Services: -
    Source Network Address: 192.168.15.1 Source Port: 0       122742
1



25 04:11:10 makalu01 sshd[27128]: Accepted password for deepen
from 10.45.1.210 port 56008 ssh2
Secondary events

 Derived from primary events

 Pattern based identification

 Correlation to identify events
   Twenty failed logins for user adam
   And then a successful login
   All within 5 minutes
Forensic analysis

 You see the article in wiki-leaks

 Go to the log server

 Spot who last accessed the file

 Check the mail logs

 Check the device logs
Example

Wbrb02.abc.com MSWinEventLog                1      Security
         15339 Sat Jan 28 11:05:00 2012            560     Security
         rym      User    Success Audit WBRB02Object Access
Object Open: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object
Name: D:AuditTest Handle ID: 25224 Operation ID:
{1,3528361170} Process ID: 4 Image File Name: Primary User
Name: WBRB02$ Primary Domain: FT Primary Logon ID:
(0x0,0x3E7) Client User Name: rym Client Domain: FT Client
Logon ID: (0x1,0xCCB0105E) Accesses: ReadData (or
ListDirectory) Privileges: - Restricted Sid Count: 0 Access Mask:
0x1 15186
Active response

 When the system detect something fishy on Real time
   Email
   Or send an active response
      http
      ssh
      Or anything
Reporting for compliance

 Having a report of security incidents

 Keeping the records for future reference

 Government policies

 Of course compliance needs
   PCI DSS
   ISO
   HIPAA, FISMA, SOX
For a small enterprise

 Run some resource as a log collector

 Structure the log files so that you can search when
  needed

 Simple grep will do tricks most of the time

 You could have an hour a week … or a day

 You could drill down when something is suspicious
For mid sized enterprise

 You might need a dedicated server

 Specialized application

 Log collection

 Millions of logs every day ?
For large scale businesses

 The solution should be scalabale

 Support hetergenous components

 Searching across different units
Summary needs

 Collects logs from multiple sources

 Support multiple technology

 Normalize and archive securely

 Build views

 Avail search-ability

 Facilitate correlation and alerting

 Facilitate reporting
Try yourself

 Write an application that collects logs

 On windows you can use something like snare or WMI to read the
  logs

 search on the logs for messages like failed login / successful login

 You can find out if your brother tried to login / did so successfully,

 With little more effort you can find out what files he accessed

 If its your machine, then its your right to know what is going on
Tools

 There are many free tools on the internet

 Try Splunk
Queries




          deepen@nlocate.com



                 Thanks a Lot !!

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Power of logs: practices for network security

  • 1. The Power of Logs Practices for Network Security Deepen Chapagain CEO, Nepways Pvt. Ltd. Lecturer, DOECE, Pulchowk Campus
  • 2. Contents  Introduction to computer security  General measures taken  Logs  Log management:  Definition  needs
  • 3. Contents ….  What it can do ?  How to do it ?  Log management: for small and mid-sized companies  Log management for large companies  Something you could try
  • 4. Security  Boils down to the CIA triad  Confidentiality (Only allowed people should read )  Integrity (Only allowed people should update)  Availability (available for authorized people)
  • 5. Measures  Authentication  Is some-one – (username)  Knows something –(password, pin)  Has something – (card, key, thumb)
  • 6.  Firewalls  Write rules to block  Write rules to allow  Pass in on le0
  • 7.  Anti-virus, Anti-XXX  IDS/ IPS  Signature based or Anomaly based  Apply application specific signatures  Identify unexpected events  Expect the unexpecteds
  • 8. All in all  Perimeter defense with firewall  Defense with anti-virus  Authentication  Analysis with IPS/IDS  POLICIES for security
  • 9. But  Do right people always act right ?  Wikileaks got all the data from someone inside  Wrong person can still login ?  Authentication doesn’t always work  Wrong device accessing ?  Similar problem with firewalls  Malicious attempt ?
  • 10. Summary  You can’t just rely on security measures applied  There have been breaches atop them  And we have always lost
  • 12. Logs, the super hero  Record of every activity  With enough information to track things  Every devices and applications. (Programmers: what about yours ?? )  System logs  System is up/down  Time changed  Application logs  Files accessed/ created/ deleted  Applications started/ stopped  Configuration changed
  • 13.  Authentication logs  Successful/ Failed login <133> Dec 16 04:46:00 outpost01.Outpost24.cph MSWinEventLo g 1 Security 1235213 Fri Dec 16 04:45:56 2011 540 Security deepen User Success Audit OUTPOST01 LogonLogoff Successful Network Logon: User Name: deepen Domain: OUTPOST24 Logon ID: (0x0,0 x952AA2A9) Logon Type: 3 Logon Process: NtLmSsp Aut hentication Package: NTLM Workstation Name: OUTPOST24 Logon GUID: - Caller User Name: - Caller Domain: - Caller Logon ID: - Caller Process ID: - Transited Services: - Source Network Address: 192.168.15.1 Source Port: 0 1227421
  • 14.  Firewall logs <166>Feb 24 2012 15:17:19: %ASA-6- 106015: Deny TCP (no connection) from 192.168.15.37/59224 to 173.194.69.108/993 flags RST on interface inside  Device logs  Etc/Etc
  • 15. So what can I do with logs  Look at them and smile  Continuously have an eye on them  Setup a mechanism to isolate threats  Identify whatever is going on  If there is some problem, call on the logs  You can’t stop a murderer but if he knows he will be caught, he won’t probably do it
  • 16. 2011:12:30 01:12:43 Kathmandu Shyam singh shot at by Ram Singh near Indrachowk with a single bore russian rifle right on his 32 cm chest 2011:12:38 01:21:43 Kathmandu Ram Singh driving towards Pharping on a Tucson with number ba 40 cha 1111
  • 17. Log Management  Configuring log collection  Configuring log retention  Making it usable  Searchability  Threat isolation  Ability to act  Ability to report
  • 18. LM issues  How many servers ?, How many users ?  How many logs ?  Depends on the size of network, and activity  But several millions a day is quite common  On compressed file, it can be several GBs per day
  • 19. We need  Large storage / (probably an automated retention )  Some tools for searchability  Indexing for search optimization  Better search interface to adhere to security needs  Ability to isolate threats  Signature based / pattern based  Ability to act  Make use of Captured knowledge
  • 20. Major systems  Authentication servers  Application servers  Firewalls  Security critical devices  A Printer ??
  • 21. Solution  Central log collection  Log normalization  Knowledge  Correlation across boundaries
  • 23. How can you make use of it ?
  • 24. Primary events  Available exactly on the logs  Logs are structured, (though not always)  Signature based isolation  Write a pattern to match a failed login  Normalization  Write a pattern so that it captures info into normalized fields  Visibility across system and applications
  • 25. Example <133> Dec 16 04:46:00 outpost01.Outpost24.cph MSWinEventLog 1 Security 1235213 Fri Dec 16 04:45:56 2011 540 Secur ity deepen User Success Audit OUTPOST01 LogonLo goff Successful Network Logon: User Name: deepen Domai n: OUTPOST24 Logon ID: (0x0,0x952AA2A9) Logon Type: 3 Logon Process: NtLmSsp Authentication Package: NTLM Workstation Na me: OUTPOST24 Logon GUID: - Caller User Name: - Caller Domain: - Caller Logon ID: - Caller Process ID: - Transited Services: - Source Network Address: 192.168.15.1 Source Port: 0 122742 1 25 04:11:10 makalu01 sshd[27128]: Accepted password for deepen from 10.45.1.210 port 56008 ssh2
  • 26. Secondary events  Derived from primary events  Pattern based identification  Correlation to identify events  Twenty failed logins for user adam  And then a successful login  All within 5 minutes
  • 27. Forensic analysis  You see the article in wiki-leaks  Go to the log server  Spot who last accessed the file  Check the mail logs  Check the device logs
  • 28. Example Wbrb02.abc.com MSWinEventLog 1 Security 15339 Sat Jan 28 11:05:00 2012 560 Security rym User Success Audit WBRB02Object Access Object Open: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: D:AuditTest Handle ID: 25224 Operation ID: {1,3528361170} Process ID: 4 Image File Name: Primary User Name: WBRB02$ Primary Domain: FT Primary Logon ID: (0x0,0x3E7) Client User Name: rym Client Domain: FT Client Logon ID: (0x1,0xCCB0105E) Accesses: ReadData (or ListDirectory) Privileges: - Restricted Sid Count: 0 Access Mask: 0x1 15186
  • 29. Active response  When the system detect something fishy on Real time  Email  Or send an active response  http  ssh  Or anything
  • 30. Reporting for compliance  Having a report of security incidents  Keeping the records for future reference  Government policies  Of course compliance needs  PCI DSS  ISO  HIPAA, FISMA, SOX
  • 31. For a small enterprise  Run some resource as a log collector  Structure the log files so that you can search when needed  Simple grep will do tricks most of the time  You could have an hour a week … or a day  You could drill down when something is suspicious
  • 32. For mid sized enterprise  You might need a dedicated server  Specialized application  Log collection  Millions of logs every day ?
  • 33. For large scale businesses  The solution should be scalabale  Support hetergenous components  Searching across different units
  • 34. Summary needs  Collects logs from multiple sources  Support multiple technology  Normalize and archive securely  Build views  Avail search-ability  Facilitate correlation and alerting  Facilitate reporting
  • 35. Try yourself  Write an application that collects logs  On windows you can use something like snare or WMI to read the logs  search on the logs for messages like failed login / successful login  You can find out if your brother tried to login / did so successfully,  With little more effort you can find out what files he accessed  If its your machine, then its your right to know what is going on
  • 36. Tools  There are many free tools on the internet  Try Splunk
  • 37. Queries deepen@nlocate.com Thanks a Lot !!