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Session: Encryption Bil Corry lasso.pro
Caveat Emptor ,[object Object]
I only have a rudimentary understanding of cryptography
When in doubt, hire a professional
Encryption is strong, yet fragile ,[object Object]
Easy to get wrong = broken implementation = insecure encryption
When there's a breach, keys have to be swapped out
Advice from Experts ,[object Object]
Do not implement an encryption scheme using low-level APIs (OpenSSL, etc)
Use a high-level API such KeyCzar, GPGME, or cryptlib ,[object Object]
http://www.gnupg.org/gpgme.html
http://www.cs.auckland.ac.nz/~pgut001/cryptlib/
High-Level APIs ,[object Object]
Safe defaults for key lengths, algorithms, and modes
Allow for key rotation and versioning
Automated generation of initialization vectors and other setup requirements
Encryption Gone Bad ,[object Object]
Unix: /dev/urandom
Windows: CryptGenRandom or RtlGenRandom from ADVAPI32.DLL
Encryption Gone Bad (cont) ,[object Object]
CCM, EAX, GCM, OCB – fatal if IV reused ,[object Object],ECB-encrypted image of Tux  Plaintext image of Tux  Image of Tux encrypted in other (chained) modes  From: http://www.subspacefield.org/security/security_concepts/
Encryption Gone Bad (cont) ,[object Object]
Encryption Gone Bad (cont) ,[object Object]
Wordpress Cookie Integrity Vulnerability
Amazon Web Services v1 – lacked structure for data
Types of Encryption ,[object Object]

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Introduction To Encryption in Lasso 8.5

  • 1. Session: Encryption Bil Corry lasso.pro
  • 2.
  • 3. I only have a rudimentary understanding of cryptography
  • 4. When in doubt, hire a professional
  • 5.
  • 6. Easy to get wrong = broken implementation = insecure encryption
  • 7. When there's a breach, keys have to be swapped out
  • 8.
  • 9. Do not implement an encryption scheme using low-level APIs (OpenSSL, etc)
  • 10.
  • 13.
  • 14. Safe defaults for key lengths, algorithms, and modes
  • 15. Allow for key rotation and versioning
  • 16. Automated generation of initialization vectors and other setup requirements
  • 17.
  • 19. Windows: CryptGenRandom or RtlGenRandom from ADVAPI32.DLL
  • 20.
  • 21.
  • 22.
  • 23.
  • 24. Wordpress Cookie Integrity Vulnerability
  • 25. Amazon Web Services v1 – lacked structure for data
  • 26.
  • 28.
  • 29.
  • 30.
  • 31. DES
  • 32. 3DES
  • 33. AES
  • 34. Symmetric Example [ Encode_Hex( Cipher_Encrypt('Data', -Cipher='CAST5-CBC', -Key='supersecretpassword') ); '<br>'; Cipher_Decrypt( Decode_Hex('D7BF2BE2EA29D2C9'), -Cipher='CAST5-CBC', -Key='supersecretpassword' ); ] LP8: D7BF2BE2EA29D2C9 Data
  • 35.
  • 36. Encrypt with public key to send over insecure channel that only can be decrypted with the private key
  • 37. Encrypt with the private key, the public key can decrypt to verify the authenticity of the signer
  • 38.
  • 39. Asymmetric Example Currently in Lasso, you would need to use [os_process] to use PGP or similar command-line tool to sign/encrypt using public/private keys.
  • 40.
  • 41. Used as an integrity check, storing passwords
  • 42.
  • 43. SHA-1
  • 45.
  • 46. it is infeasible to find a message that has a given hash,
  • 47. it is infeasible to modify a message without changing its hash,
  • 48. it is infeasible to find two different messages with the same hash.
  • 49. Hash Example [ encode_hex( cipher_digest('Data',-digest='RIPEMD160') ) ] LP8: 934C399FC545B1C385E96CC30EFE8321B84F107C
  • 50.
  • 51.
  • 52. Iterate hash 1000 times or more – key strengthening
  • 53.
  • 54. Protects integrity and authenticity
  • 55. Secret key used to create MAC and validate its authenticity
  • 56. HMAC is MAC using a specific algorithm (RFC 2104)
  • 57. HMAC Example [Encrypt_HMAC( 'Data', 'supersecretpassword', -Digest='SHA1',-Cram) ] LP8: 13c6e2d6bafbbed0723a00a61f79cde424cb83b7
  • 58.
  • 59. Do not use JavaScript encryption
  • 60.
  • 61.
  • 62.
  • 63. Use a unique salt for every hash
  • 64. Use key strengthening of at least 1000 for hashes of passwords
  • 66.
  • 67. Use the same salt for all passwords
  • 68. Use MD5 for anything
  • 70. Re-use keys for different purposes
  • 71. Create your own cipher
  • 72. CarTalk: The Puzzler 2007-12-17 Imagine you have a friend who lives in Russia where the KGB spies on everyone and everything and you want to send a valuable object to this friend. So you have a box which is more than large enough to contain the object and you have several locks with keys. Now this box, I suppose you could call it a strongbox, has a lock ring which is more than large enough to have a padlock attached to it. In fact it's large enough to accommodate several locks. But your friend does not have to the key to any lock that you have. Now you can't send a key in the mail because the KGB will intercept it and they will copy it. And you can't not lock the box, because the object is very valuable. So you have to send it through the mail. You can't hand deliver it. You want to lock it so that your friend can open it, but the KGB can't. The question is, how would you do it? From: http://www.cartalk.com/content/puzzler/transcripts/200750/
  • 73. CarTalk: The Puzzler Answer 2007-12-17 RAY: So the question is how do you package your valuable objects so that the KGB cannot open it, but your friend can? Now instead of a key, I would have mailed a hacksaw. But in the spirit of the puzzler that wouldn't have been fair. TOM: Sure. RAY: You put the valuable thing in the box. You put as many locks as you want on the clasp, making sure you leave room for at least one more. TOM: Yeah. RAY: You mail the thing to Russia. Your friend gets it. He doesn't have a key to any of these locks that you put on it. He puts another lock on it for which he has the key. He mails it back to you. You remove all of your locks and you can't get it open now. But you don't have to. TOM: He can. RAY: When you mail it back to him. From: http://www.cartalk.com/content/puzzler/transcripts/200750/answer.html