Adapting To The Age Of Anonymous

  • 1,284 views
Uploaded on

SOURCE Barcelona 2011 - Joshua Corman

SOURCE Barcelona 2011 - Joshua Corman

  • Full Name Full Name Comment goes here.
    Are you sure you want to
    Your message goes here
    Be the first to comment
    Be the first to like this
No Downloads

Views

Total Views
1,284
On Slideshare
0
From Embeds
0
Number of Embeds
1

Actions

Shares
Downloads
37
Comments
0
Likes
0

Embeds 0

No embeds

Report content

Flagged as inappropriate Flag as inappropriate
Flag as inappropriate

Select your reason for flagging this presentation as inappropriate.

Cancel
    No notes for slide
  • Rorschach Test: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rorschach_testWe see in Anonymous what we WANT to see.. We project. Our perceptions say more about us than they do about the multitude of subgroups/causes in Anonymous.
  • There isn’t AN anonymous either… there are dozens.It is more of a franchise than an Organization.
  • http://www.csoonline.com/article/682511/the-rise-of-the-chaotic-actor-understanding-anonymous-and-ourselves
  • Family Tree IMG SOURCE: http://2.bp.blogspot.com/-XS0av6GQlIE/TheLlBBprTI/AAAAAAAAAIU/f6aABTtPyVE/s1600/tree.jpg
  • Operation Payback – LOIC-ers
  • IMG Source: http://eandres.glogster.com/Whitchhunt-/
  • IMG SOURCE: http://www.toonpool.com/cartoons/Leviathan_41513#img9Two logical outcomes…A Hobbes-ian Leviathan will rise… to police the brand – borne of necessity and convenienceThe Brand will be contaminated and the MoralAnons will fleeThis is Social Contract Theory 101 stuff…Hobbes: The State of Nature is a State of War…Locke: The State of Nature is a State of Inconvenience…
  • IMG SOURCE: http://www.toonpool.com/cartoons/Leviathan_41513#img9Two logical outcomes…A Hobbes-ian Leviathan will rise… to police the brand – borne of necessity and convenienceThe Brand will be contaminated and the MoralAnons will fleeThis is Social Contract Theory 101 stuff…Hobbes: The State of Nature is a State of War…Locke: The State of Nature is a State of Inconvenience…

Transcript

  • 1. Adapting to the Age of Anonymous SOURCE Barcelona - November 17, 2011 Joshua Corman Director of Security Intelligence @joshcorman http://cognitivedissidents.wordpress.com/ ©2011 Akamai
  • 2. About Joshua Corman Director of Security Intelligence for Akamai Technologies •Former Research Director, Enterprise Security [The 451 Group] •Former Principal Security Strategist [IBM ISS] Industry Experience •Expert Faculty: The Institute for Applied Network Security (IANS) •2009 NetworkWorld Top 10 Tech People to Know •Co-Founder of “Rugged Software” www.ruggedsoftware.org Things I’ve been researching •Compliance vs Security •Disruptive Security for Disruptive Innovations •Chaotic Actors •Espionage •Security Metrics2 ©2011 Akamai
  • 3. Agenda• Understanding Anonymous in under 7 minutes• Deconstructing Anonymous• Adapting to Anonymous• Building a Better Anonymous? ©2011 Akamai
  • 4. Understanding Anonymous:The Rise of the Chaotic Actor Joshua Corman @joshcorman Director of Security Intelligence Akamai Technologies 2011 FlashTalks powered by PechaKucha ©2011 Akamai
  • 5. 5 ©2011 Akamai
  • 6. ©2011 Akamai
  • 7. Paradox Slide/Deliberate Disinformation ©2011 Akamai
  • 8. http://www.csoonline.com/article/682511/the-rise-of-the-chaotic-actor-understanding-anonymous-and-ourselves ©2011 Akamai
  • 9. Some men just want to see the world burn… 9 ©2011 Akamai
  • 10. Lots & Lots of Anonymous Sects 10 ©2011 Akamai
  • 11. Your Headline Here (in Title Caps) 11 ©2011 Akamai
  • 12. You Choose Your Own Level of Involvement 12 ©2011 Akamai
  • 13. Anonymous* Unmasked? [*Alleged] ©2011 Akamai
  • 14. You Choose Your Own Level of Involvement 14 ©2011 Akamai
  • 15. You Choose Your Own Level of Involvement 15 ©2011 Akamai
  • 16. Escalation? 16 ©2011 Akamai
  • 17. Anomalous Anonymous? 17 ©2011 Akamai
  • 18. False Flags: Adaptive Persistent Adversaries “Anonymous is God’s gift to the Chinese” – CISO ©2011 Akamai
  • 19. Cyber-Neo-McCarthyism I am not now……nor have I ever been… …a member of Anonymous. ©2011 Akamai
  • 20. Building a Better Anonymous… 20 ©2011 Akamai
  • 21. Building a Better Anonymous… 21 ©2011 Akamai
  • 22. The easy answers Suggested Background ©2011 Akamai
  • 23. Joshua Corman @joshcorman 23 ©2011 Akamai
  • 24. Agenda• Understanding Anonymous in under 7 minutes• Deconstructing Anonymous• Adapting to Anonymous• Building a Better Anonymous? ©2011 Akamai
  • 25. PANEL: Whoever Fights Monsters… ©2011 Akamai
  • 26. ©2011 Akamai
  • 27. ©2011 Akamai
  • 28. ©2011 Akamai
  • 29. ©2011 Akamai
  • 30. Operation Payback(Anonymous Takes Center Stage)August-December 2010Initial Targets • MPAA • RIAA • Intellectual Property OfficesIn December, switched to WikiLeaks “defense” • Financial services: PayPal, Mastercard, Visa • Public personas: Lieberman, Palin • Others: Lawyers, security researchersStats: • 1k-3k attackers in IRC • 1500 copies of LOIC in Hivemind (# in IRC/2) • 1.5 Gbps peak attack traffic (# in IRC/2) • 750 Mbps sustained traffic (# in IRC/4) ©2011 Akamai
  • 31. ©2011 Akamai
  • 32. ©2011 Akamai
  • 33. ©2011 Akamai
  • 34. Discussion ©2011 Akamai
  • 35. ©2011 Akamai
  • 36. ©2011 Akamai
  • 37. ©2011 Akamai
  • 38. ©2011 Akamai
  • 39. http://cognitivedissidents.wordpress.com/2011/11/11/an-anonymous-ink-blot-rorschach/ “An Anonymous Ink Blot Rorschach” What do you see in the Anonymous Ink Blot ? BRANDPOLLUTION ©2011 Akamai
  • 40. BRANDPOLLUTION ©2011 Akamai
  • 41. BRANDPOLLUTION ©2011 Akamai
  • 42. False Cover: Criminal and State Actors “Anonymous is God’s gift to the Chinese” – CISO ©2011 Akamai
  • 43. ©2011 Akamai
  • 44. Agenda• Understanding Anonymous in under 7 minutes• Deconstructing Anonymous• Adapting to Anonymous• Building a Better Anonymous? ©2011 Akamai
  • 45. ©2011 Akamai
  • 46. ©2011 Akamai
  • 47. ©2011 Akamai
  • 48. ©2011 Akamai
  • 49. DDoS is Legion74% of surveyedcompanies experiencedone or more DDoS attacksin the past year, 31% ofthese attacks resulting inservice disruption.11 Forrester Research ©2011 Akamai
  • 50. Some of my data 600• Typical Attack Size: 3-10 Gbps 500• Large Attack Size: 100-200 Gbps 400 Number of Attacks• Attacks are originating from all geographies and are moving between geographies 300 during the attack 200 100 0 2009 2010 2011 ©2011 Akamai
  • 51. July 4th – 7th 2009 DDoS Attack400,000 Korean Bots Attack Key U.S. Government Web Sites Times Above Agency – PROTECTED Peak Traffic Normal Traffic U.S. Government Customer 1 124 Gbps 598x U.S. Government Customer 2 32 Gbps 369x U.S. Government Customer 3 9 Gbps 39x U.S. Government Customer 4 9 Gbps 19x U.S. Government Customer 5 2 Gbps 9x U.S. Government Customer 6 1.9 Gbps 6x New U.S. Government Customer 0.7 Gbps SITE DOWN before Akamai ©2011 Akamai
  • 52. Agenda• Understanding Anonymous in under 7 minutes• Deconstructing Anonymous• Adapting to Anonymous• Building a Better Anonymous? ©2011 Akamai
  • 53. Agenda ©2011 Akamai
  • 54. ©2011 Akamai
  • 55. ©2011 Akamai
  • 56. ©2011 Akamai
  • 57. ©2011 Akamai
  • 58. ©2011 Akamai
  • 59. Discussion ©2011 Akamai
  • 60. Thank You! Barcelona, November 17, 2011 Joshua Corman @joshcormanhttp://cognitivedissidents.wordpress.com/ ©2011 Akamai