Presented at 6th International Conference on Security SECCON 2014 Protecting Banking and Financial Infrastructure Brig. Muhammad Farooq Shaukat (Retd.) Country Head of Security – Standard Chartered Bank Topics Covered: • Security Assessment • Managing Security in Banking Sector • Security Management Cycle • Contours of Security Strategy • Threat Matrix • Threat / Risk Assessment • Crime Trend • Impact of Security State – Banking Sector • Security Management • Technological Measures • Facts on ATM Skimming Attacks • Training and Awareness • Essence of Security Management

1. Security Dynamics
In
Banking Sector

2. Aim
The aim of today’s session is to acquaint you with
security dynamics in Banking Sector

3. Country Security Situation

4. Security Assessment
Militancy
• The TTP central shura unanimously decided not to extend
the ‘ceasefire’ but would keep the dialogue option open.
Analysis
• While the Government exhibited flexibility in continuing with
talks amidst violence and releases of prisoners (19) , the TTP
insisted on their demands of ‘demilitarized peace zone’ and
release of more prisoners.
• Although the talks were in progress under announced ceasefire
yet the security matrix of the country did not really improve. We
saw two deadly attacks in Rawalpindi and one train put on fire
near Sibi, among other bombings.

5. Security Assessment
Analysis
• The TTP has little or no control over a wide range of militant
factions or splinter groups and therefore cannot influence them
effectively to reign in their attacks.
• Some analysts opine that withdrawl of ceasefire is perhaps a
way to put more pressure on a government, as the militants
have kept the negotiations option open.’
• Clashes among major splinter groups of militants have
surfaced. Mehsud and Khurasani groups oppose peace talks
and may have influenced TTP shura to roll back ceasefire.

6. Militancy
• Due to truncated leadership, reduced capacity and split among
militants, we are likely to see reduced militant attacks in mid to
long terms while the current situation is likely to remain fluid in
coming days where periodic spike in attacks shall remain a
possibility.
• While the militants shall look to launch a big attack to exert their
writ, it is expected that most of these attacks shall be low in
intensity as well as frequency. However, most of their attacks are
likely to be directed against LEAs and soft targets.
• Balochistan continues to experience low intensity conflict with
occasional spike. The main issues centre around sectarian
killings, kidnappings and attack against Gas Pipelines / Trains
by insurgent.
Security Assessment

7. Managing Security in Banking Sector

8. Security Process Flow
• Detect Procedural
• Deter Physical
• Delay Analysis / Assessment
• Defend Response
• Business Continuity
Philosophy

9. Risk Threat
Threat’s Acuity
Adversary
Capabilities
Intentions
Reasoning

10. 10
POLICIES,
PROCEDURES
& PLANS
RISK
ASSESSMENT
&
RISK
MANAGEME
NT
EFFECTIVE
SYSTEMS
SURVEILLANCE
AWARENESS
&
TRAINING
BUSINESS
CONTINUITY
SECURITY
MANAGEMENT
Security Management Cycle

11. Security
Management
Threat
Assessment
Threat
Identification
Threat Identification
Threat Assessment
Proactive Security Management
Contours Of Security Strategy

12.  Terrorism
 Bomb Threat
 Bomb Attack
 Armed Robbery
 Hostage Situation
 Asset Loss
 Reputation Loss
 Cash Snatching
 Cash Swindling
 Law and Order
 Vandalism
 Arson
 Burglary
Threat Matrix

13. Evaluation of
• Threat of Terrorism
• Branch/Office Location
• Local Political Dynamics
• Crime Rate and Category of Crime
• Pressure Groups/Gangs in the Area
• Vandalism Record/Past History
• Follow up Actions
 Share with Stakeholders
 Periodic Review
Threat / Risk Assessment

14. Demography
Pressure Groups
Slums,
Escape routes
Area Crime History
Ethnic/Political/
Sectarian
Security Assessment - Area
Risk Assessment

15. J
B
FD
A
E
C
H
G
A
Liyari/Kharadar
Lyari, Kharadar, Ranchor,
Lines, old city area, Eidgagh,
Saddar, Jamshed Quarter,Machar
colony
Political Influence : PPP,
Crime : Extortion, Kidnapping,
Drugs mafia, Ethnic violence.
B
Gulistan Johar
Pehlwan goth, Rabia City, Kiran
Society, Saforan Goth, Sani view
Political Influence : MQM, ANP
Crime : Extortion, Land mafia, Ethnic
violence Kidnapping,
C
Landhi
Ashrafi Goth, Muslimabad,
Ajmer Col, Dawood
Chowrangi, Burmee Col.
Political Influence : MQM,
PPP, ANP
Crime : Extortion, land/ Drugs
Mafia
D
Baldia Town / Orangi Town
Ittehad Town, Nai abadi,
Saeedabad, Mohajir Camp,
Rasheedabad
Political Influence : MQM,
ANP,
Crime : Extortion, Sectarian
/Sectarian violence
E
Korangi
Ibrahim Hyderi, Industrial
Area, Korangi Creek
Political Influence : ANP,
MQM, MQM(H)
Crime : Land Mafia, Extortion
Kidnapping
F
Sohrab Goth
Abulhasan Isphani Road, Gulshan Maymar,
Mobina Town, Sohrab Goth
Political Influence : ANP, MQM,
Crime : Land/Drug Mafia, Politics,
G
North Karachi
Kati Phari, Sarjani Town, New Karachi, Nagan
Chowrangi
Political Influence : MQM,
Crime : Land Mafia, Kidnapping, snatching
Extortion
J
Shah Faisal Col.
Natha Khan Goth, Drigh Col, Al-Falah
Society
Political Influence : MQM, ANP,
Crime : Ethnic violence, snatching
H
Nazimabad
Paposh Nagar, Liaquatabad,
Golimar, Orangi, Katti Pahari.
Political Influence : MQM, MQM(H),
Crime : Kidnapping, snatching
Vulnerable Areas
Sohrab Goth
Landhi
Shah Faisal
Glustan-e-Jauhar
Orangi
Nazimabad
Korangi
Lyari
North Karachi

16. Crime Trend

17. Robberies 2011- 2014
Robbery
Amount
2011 2012 2013 2014
48
31 35
69.6 M
43.07 M
66.6 M
23
71.4 M

18. Robberies- Analysis
• Selection and scrutiny of Guarding / Alarming Company
• Untrained and under verified guards
• Placement of guards
• Inadequate Floor Management
• Insufficient training to staff
• Casualness in Critical timings
• No consideration for critical branches(Bunkers, vantage points)
• Indolent QRF and Response

19. Street Crime
Karachi
Lahore
Peshawar
Quetta
51%
38%
6% 5%

20. 20
Street Crimes
Terrorism
Ethnic /
Sectarian
violence
Kidnap /
Extortion
Robberies
Crime Ratio
14%
20%
22%
40%
4%

21. Region’s Violence Rate
Sind
Balochistan
Punjab
KP/FATA
Islamabad
45%
25%
20%
8 %
2 %

22. Impact of Security State-Banking Sector
Reputation
Staff
Customer
Asset
Business
Impact

23. Physical
Measures
Technological
Measures
Trainings and
Awareness
Threat
Mitigation
Security Management

24.  Guards
 Quality and Strength of Guards During Day
 Remove Night Guards
 Placement of Sentries on Upper Floor/Vantage Point/Roof Tops
 Smart and Trained Vigilance Staff
 QRF
 Efficient Floor Management
 Efficient Night Patrolling
 Proactive Control Room Team
Physical Measures

25. 25
Guards Placement

26. Strength
Routes
knowledge
Communication Training
Placement
in terms of
ETAs
Type of
vehicle
required
Number
of QRF
required
Quick Reaction Force

27. Technological Measures
 Establishment of Effective Control Room (s)
 Effective Remote CCTV Monitoring of All Branches
 Simultaneous Display of Vault Doors and ATM’s
 Effective Alarm System Backed by Efficient Response
 PIR Devices/Motion Detectors
 Vibration Sensors
 Bolt Locks
 Integrated System
 Pop up Alerts for Branch Arming Disarming, Fire Alarms, DVR Faults, Camera
Faults etc.
 Sufficient and Uninterrupted Power Backup.

28. Ensure
uninterrupted
power supply
Ensure security
of Data.
DVR Bolting
Ensure
operational
status of DVR
Vaults/ATM
during silent
hours
External view at
Opening/closing
Placement of CCTV
cameras(Vault, ATM
,banking Hall etc)
Surveillance

29. Alarm System

30. 30
30
What do skimming devices look like?
Spot the difference….. Can you tell now?
 Top photo shows an unadulterated ATM
fascia. The flashing FDI indicator is easily
observed.
 A skimming device has been fitted
over the card reader slot. Although
the device has been given the
appearance of being a standard part
of the terminal it is in fact an
additional fitted piece & clearly is
different from the above photo.
Note: No flashing lead-through light
can be seen and the shape of the
bezel is also clearly different.
Facts - ATM Skimming Attacks

31. 31
Spot the difference….. Can you tell now?
Facts - ATM Skimming Attacks

32. 32
Upon closer inspection of the merchandising unit, you can clearly see the pin
hole camera installed on the bottom side, capturing an image of the keypad and
subsequently, the customers PIN
PIN Capturing Devices

33. 33
PIN Capturing Devices

34.  Criminals tend to attach skimming devices either late at night or early in the
morning and during periods of low traffic
 Despite this skimming devices generally only take a few minutes to install and
therefore can be attached at any time
 Skimming devices are usually attached for a few hours only
 Criminals install equipment on at least 2 regions of an ATM to steal both the ATM
card number and the PIN
 Inspect the front of the ATM closely for unusual or non standard
appearance/items. Scratches, marks, adhesive or tape residues could be
indictors of tampering.
 Familiarize yourself with the look and feel of your ATM fascia. Particularly pay
attention to all of the touch and action points. (keypad, card entry slot, etc.)
 Report any unusual issues immediately
By being vigilant you can play a part in reducing the risk of a skimming attack!
Facts On ATM Skimming Attacks

35. Training & Awareness
• Situational Training
• Guards OJTs
• Anti Robbery, Bomb and Evacuation Drills
• Online Training
• E-Learning Module
• Security Awareness weeks
• Interaction with senior LEA’s
• Security Publications.
• Regular Staff Awareness
 Travel Advisories
 Fortnightly Security Updates
 On Occurrence Security Advice

36. Awareness Week

37. • Be proactive rather than reactive
• Adequate reliance on Technology
• Quality of Manpower & Timely response
• Vertical and Horizontal Staff awareness
Essence of Security Management

38. Thank You