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Demystifying Advance Persistent
Threats:
Reversing the Course of a Perceived
Asymmetric Cyber Battle


 Rick Doten, CISSP, RKC
 Chief Scientist
 Lockheed Martin
 Center for Cyber Security Innovation


                                    INFORMATION SYSTEMS & GLOBAL SOLUTIONS
                                                                       1
Cyber Security Is like…




Images courtesy PopCap; used with permission   INFORMATION SYSTEMS & GLOBAL SOLUTIONS
Threat Characteristics:
    Advanced Characteristics:
       • Targeted at specific individuals and groups within
  Persistent Characteristics:
            an organization
    • Using unreported exploits (zero day)
Advanced               Persistent                       Threat
    • •• Advanced, custom foris typically the first step to an
            Social Engineering months or years
           Intrusions lasting malware that isn’t detected by
      • antivirus products manipulating people to ensure
            intrusion: people
           Adversaries install multiple backdoors
    • • Coordinated intrusions using a variety of vectors
           continuedthey know which information they are
            Assume access to the targets
            targeting
    • • Intruder will adjustpatient and dedicated (or
           Adversaries are actions based on
       • countermeasuresis a real person behind the actions,
           assigned) there target.
            Because to the
            they will respond quickly to countermeasures
    • Intruder will use least sophisticated exploits and
         techniques first and escalate only as required



        We Never Forget Who We’re Working For®
            … and neither do the bad guys!
                                       INFORMATION SYSTEMS & GLOBAL SOLUTIONS
What APT is Not...


             • Bot nets, Rogue antispyware, DOS and DDOS attacks
             • Categorized by the techniques of intrusion, and not
               considering the people or motive
             • Typically defined as:
                 • Any intrusion not discovered by current security
                   technology
                 • Any intrusion that uses advanced techniques, such as zero
                   day exploits




  One reason for confusion:
    Many Cyber Criminal teams are adopting (buying or bartering) APT-built
    techniques because of their effectiveness.
                                             INFORMATION SYSTEMS & GLOBAL SOLUTIONS
APT campaigns are not about being the anomaly,
but part of the normal:


               • APT campaign will take advantage of trust
                 relationship
               • APT campaign is low and slow, as opposed to broad
                 attempts, aggressive, or obvious
               • APT campaign is patient and will take time to
                 achieve their objectives
               • APT campaign will conceal actions by using
                 legitimate accounts and protocols
               • APT campaign will utilize a current account and
                 enumerate information with those privileges
               • APT campaign will attempt to create new accounts
                 with administrative privilege



                                       INFORMATION SYSTEMS & GLOBAL SOLUTIONS
So, how is PvZ like APT campaigns?




Images courtesy PopCap; used with permission   INFORMATION SYSTEMS & GLOBAL SOLUTIONS
“To protect our infrastructure, we have to be right every
    compromise our infrastructure, the bad guys have to
step; the bad guys onlywe only have to be right once.”
   be right every step; have to be right once.”




                                   INFORMATION SYSTEMS & GLOBAL SOLUTIONS
Cyber Threat Kill Chain


                          Reconnaissance
                          Weaponization
                          Delivery
Intrusion                 Exploit
                          Installation
                          Command and Control
                          Act on Objectives
                              INFORMATION SYSTEMS & GLOBAL SOLUTIONS
Cyber Kill Chain Animation



                                 1.   Reconnaissance
                                 2.   Weaponization
                                 3.   Delivery
                                 4.   Exploitation
                                 5.   Installation
                                 6.   Command & Control
                                 7.   Act on Objectives


 •   No matter where you block the sequence in the
     chain, you stop the attack.
                               INFORMATION SYSTEMS & GLOBAL SOLUTIONS
Threat-focused Risk Reduction


              Target
  Risk   =    Value
                         x   Vulnerability        x        Threat


                                                       Opportunity
              Target
  Risk   =    Value      x   Vulnerability        x      Capability
                                                            Intent
                Our Objectives:

                •   Erode capability
                •   Increase Cost of Intrusion
                •   Understand intent

                                     INFORMATION SYSTEMS & GLOBAL SOLUTIONS
Same Technique works on these Guys!




Images courtesy PopCap; used with permission   INFORMATION SYSTEMS & GLOBAL SOLUTIONS
Attack Vector Escalation
Then




           Email spoofing     Parking lot entry vector    Fake sites that look real

                                                          Compromised sites with
Now




         Man-in-the-Mailbox        Supply Chain
                                                            embedded malware

                                                  INFORMATION SYSTEMS & GLOBAL SOLUTIONS
Benefits of Framework

1.   Reconnaissance      • Articulates Prioritization
2.   Weaponization
3.   Delivery
4.   Exploitation        • Articulates data collection
5.   Installation          requirements
6.   Command & Control
7.   Act on Objectives




                                   INFORMATION SYSTEMS & GLOBAL SOLUTIONS
Putting them Together


                       Detect   Degrade   Deny    Disrupt      Deceive
   Reconnaissance
   Weaponization
   Delivery
   Exploitation
   Installation
   Command &
   Control
   Act on Objectives



              Drives detection, mitigation measures


                                             INFORMATION SYSTEMS & GLOBAL SOLUTIONS
Which is not unlike…




Images courtesy PopCap; used with permission   INFORMATION SYSTEMS & GLOBAL SOLUTIONS
Because in the end, you don’t want…




Images courtesy PopCap; used with permission   INFORMATION SYSTEMS & GLOBAL SOLUTIONS
Questions?




             INFORMATION SYSTEMS & GLOBAL SOLUTIONS
Thank You!

Rick Doten, CISSP, RKC
Chief Scientist
Lockheed Martin
Center for Cyber Security Innovation
eric.a.doten@lmco.com




                                       INFORMATION SYSTEMS & GLOBAL SOLUTIONS
                                                                          18

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Doten apt presentaiton (2)

  • 1. Demystifying Advance Persistent Threats: Reversing the Course of a Perceived Asymmetric Cyber Battle Rick Doten, CISSP, RKC Chief Scientist Lockheed Martin Center for Cyber Security Innovation INFORMATION SYSTEMS & GLOBAL SOLUTIONS 1
  • 2. Cyber Security Is like… Images courtesy PopCap; used with permission INFORMATION SYSTEMS & GLOBAL SOLUTIONS
  • 3. Threat Characteristics: Advanced Characteristics: • Targeted at specific individuals and groups within Persistent Characteristics: an organization • Using unreported exploits (zero day) Advanced Persistent Threat • •• Advanced, custom foris typically the first step to an Social Engineering months or years Intrusions lasting malware that isn’t detected by • antivirus products manipulating people to ensure intrusion: people Adversaries install multiple backdoors • • Coordinated intrusions using a variety of vectors continuedthey know which information they are Assume access to the targets targeting • • Intruder will adjustpatient and dedicated (or Adversaries are actions based on • countermeasuresis a real person behind the actions, assigned) there target. Because to the they will respond quickly to countermeasures • Intruder will use least sophisticated exploits and techniques first and escalate only as required We Never Forget Who We’re Working For® … and neither do the bad guys! INFORMATION SYSTEMS & GLOBAL SOLUTIONS
  • 4. What APT is Not... • Bot nets, Rogue antispyware, DOS and DDOS attacks • Categorized by the techniques of intrusion, and not considering the people or motive • Typically defined as: • Any intrusion not discovered by current security technology • Any intrusion that uses advanced techniques, such as zero day exploits One reason for confusion: Many Cyber Criminal teams are adopting (buying or bartering) APT-built techniques because of their effectiveness. INFORMATION SYSTEMS & GLOBAL SOLUTIONS
  • 5. APT campaigns are not about being the anomaly, but part of the normal: • APT campaign will take advantage of trust relationship • APT campaign is low and slow, as opposed to broad attempts, aggressive, or obvious • APT campaign is patient and will take time to achieve their objectives • APT campaign will conceal actions by using legitimate accounts and protocols • APT campaign will utilize a current account and enumerate information with those privileges • APT campaign will attempt to create new accounts with administrative privilege INFORMATION SYSTEMS & GLOBAL SOLUTIONS
  • 6. So, how is PvZ like APT campaigns? Images courtesy PopCap; used with permission INFORMATION SYSTEMS & GLOBAL SOLUTIONS
  • 7. “To protect our infrastructure, we have to be right every compromise our infrastructure, the bad guys have to step; the bad guys onlywe only have to be right once.” be right every step; have to be right once.” INFORMATION SYSTEMS & GLOBAL SOLUTIONS
  • 8. Cyber Threat Kill Chain Reconnaissance Weaponization Delivery Intrusion Exploit Installation Command and Control Act on Objectives INFORMATION SYSTEMS & GLOBAL SOLUTIONS
  • 9. Cyber Kill Chain Animation 1. Reconnaissance 2. Weaponization 3. Delivery 4. Exploitation 5. Installation 6. Command & Control 7. Act on Objectives • No matter where you block the sequence in the chain, you stop the attack. INFORMATION SYSTEMS & GLOBAL SOLUTIONS
  • 10. Threat-focused Risk Reduction Target Risk = Value x Vulnerability x Threat Opportunity Target Risk = Value x Vulnerability x Capability Intent Our Objectives: • Erode capability • Increase Cost of Intrusion • Understand intent INFORMATION SYSTEMS & GLOBAL SOLUTIONS
  • 11. Same Technique works on these Guys! Images courtesy PopCap; used with permission INFORMATION SYSTEMS & GLOBAL SOLUTIONS
  • 12. Attack Vector Escalation Then Email spoofing Parking lot entry vector Fake sites that look real Compromised sites with Now Man-in-the-Mailbox Supply Chain embedded malware INFORMATION SYSTEMS & GLOBAL SOLUTIONS
  • 13. Benefits of Framework 1. Reconnaissance • Articulates Prioritization 2. Weaponization 3. Delivery 4. Exploitation • Articulates data collection 5. Installation requirements 6. Command & Control 7. Act on Objectives INFORMATION SYSTEMS & GLOBAL SOLUTIONS
  • 14. Putting them Together Detect Degrade Deny Disrupt Deceive Reconnaissance Weaponization Delivery Exploitation Installation Command & Control Act on Objectives Drives detection, mitigation measures INFORMATION SYSTEMS & GLOBAL SOLUTIONS
  • 15. Which is not unlike… Images courtesy PopCap; used with permission INFORMATION SYSTEMS & GLOBAL SOLUTIONS
  • 16. Because in the end, you don’t want… Images courtesy PopCap; used with permission INFORMATION SYSTEMS & GLOBAL SOLUTIONS
  • 17. Questions? INFORMATION SYSTEMS & GLOBAL SOLUTIONS
  • 18. Thank You! Rick Doten, CISSP, RKC Chief Scientist Lockheed Martin Center for Cyber Security Innovation eric.a.doten@lmco.com INFORMATION SYSTEMS & GLOBAL SOLUTIONS 18