Three issues at the core of this lecture: causes for the Color Revolutions, successes of the Color Revolutions, regional trends re-enforced by the Color Revolutions in Western Eurasia.

1. COLORS OF HOPE
CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES
OF COLOR REVOLUTIONS
IN POST-SOVIET COUNTRIES
Mykhailo Minakov
Associate Professor , University of Kyiv-Mohyla Academy
Fulbright Scholar, Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute
April 11, 2013

2. PHENOMENON OF COLOR REVOLUTIONS
Three issues at the core of this lecture:
• causes for the Color Revolutions
• successes of the Color Revolutions
• regional trends re-enforced by the Color Revolutions in Western
Eurasia

3. PHENOMENON OF COLOR REVOLUTIONS
measuring success of the Color Revolutions:
• causes vs consequences: have the Revolutions outcomes
solved those issues that caused these events?
• expectations vs outcomes: have the Color Revolutions’
supporters got what they expected?
• expectations vs outcomes: what regional trends were re-
enforced by the Color Revolutions in Western Eurasia?

4. LIMITATIONS
• Color Revolutions are a complex object for scholarly research
constructed by the media and political groups supporting or opposing
the civil movements and associated changes of regimes in Serbia,
Georgia, Ukraine and other countries of the region
• Scholars can with difficulties avoid partisan interpretations of the Color
Revolutions due to biases inherent in the concept itself
• It is possible to measure successes of the Color Revolutions by
assessing their outcomes across the expectations of their champions
and participants

5. PHENOMENON OF COLOR REVOLUTIONS
A tsunami of ‘revolutions’ in Eurasia from West to East
• Serbia – ‘bulldozer revolution’ (2000)
• Georgia – ‘rose revolution’ (2003)
• Ukraine – ‘orange revolution’ (2004)
• Kyrgyzstan – ‘tulip revolution’ (2005)
• Lebanon – ‘cedar revolution’ (2005)
• Kuwait – ‘blue revolution’ for women’s suffrage (2005)
• Burma – ‘saffron revolution’ (2007)
• Iran – ‘violet revolution’ (2009)
• Tunisia – ‘jasmine revolution’ (2011)
• Russia – ‘birch revolution’ or ‘snow revolution’ (2011 – 2012)

6. SERBIA, 2000
«BULLDOZER REVOLUTION»

7. GEORGIA, 2003
«ROSE REVOLUTION»

8. UKRAINE, 2004
«ORANGE REVOLUTION»

9. KYRGYZSTAN, 2005
«TULIP REVOLUTION»

10. LEBANON, 2005
«CEDAR REVOLUTION»

11. BURMA, 2007
«SAFFRON REVOLUTION»

12. IRAN, 2009
«VIOLET REVOLUTION»

13. TUNISIA, 2011
«JASMINE REVOLUTION»

14. RUSSIA, 2011-2012
«BIRCH (SNOW) REVOLUTION»

15. DEFINITIONS OF COLOR REVOLUTIONS
• minimalist definition of revolution (change of regime without
change of socio-economic system)
• special role of civil society – both as idea and as driving force
• special role of external players (Russia, USA and EU countries)
• chronology: following the velvet revolutions and preceding the
Arab Spring
• global democratization framework

16. CHRONOLOGY OF COLOR REVOLUTIONS
• A continuation of the velvet revolutions in Eastern Europe in
1989-1991?
• A new phenomenon in Eurasia (with continuations in Africa and
Arabia)?
• Paradox of global democratization?

17. PARADOX OF GLOBAL DEMOCRATIZATION
• Growth in number of democratic political regimes, along with
increasing dissatisfaction with the quality of existing regimes
• Growth in global demand for democratization of regimes
• Freedom House: more democratic countries – increase from 42
countries (24%) in 1974 to 89 countries (46%) in 2009
• Freedom House: fewer non-free countries – decrease from 64
(41%) in1974 to 47 (24%) in 2009
• World values survey: In almost all countries of the world, the vast
majority of the population supports democratic values

18. PARADOX OF GLOBAL DEMOCRATIZATION
• Growth in public distrust of existing regimes (both democratic and
non-democratic countries)
• voter passivity and volatility
• lower participation in political parties
• lower trust in political institutions
• lower trust in and respect for elites
• slowdown of democratization after crisis of 2008
There are two simultaneous global processes: an increase in democratic
countries and a decrease of satisfaction with democracy as practiced by
most regimes.

19. «COLOR REVOLUTION»
HOW THE TERM WAS COINED
• Western journalists: 2003
• Post-Soviet journalists: 2004
• Politicians: Askar Akayev used it to describe processes in
Kyrgyzstan in the beginning of 2005
• Scholars: political scholar Michael McFaul, ‘Transition from Post-
communism’ (2005): term Color Revolutions used to describe the
political processes in Serbia, Georgia and Ukraine

20. CAUSES OF COLOR REVOLUTIONS - VERSIONS
Michael McFaul: Color Revolutions continue the process that started at
the end of the 1980s as democratic revolutions
• in 1989, the West managed to consolidate democracies only in
Central and Eastern Europe, failed in non-Baltic FSU and Balkans
• non-controlled behavior of elites in non-Baltic FSU and Balkans led to
harsh disparities in society and thus to civic uprisings
McFaul, Michael (2005) ‘Transitions from Postcommunism’, in: Journal of Democracy
Volume 16, Number 3 pp 5-19.

21. PARTISANS ON CAUSES OF COLOR REVOLUTIONS
Color Revolutions as a result of the Western impact
• «Optimists»:
• internal causes were predominant
• the Western impact was limited
• «Pessimists»:
• a Western conspiracy was the main cause of revolutions
• CSOs were manipulated by Western governments
• conspiracy theory: irrational horror in face of global democratization and
propaganda of authoritarianism

22. COLOR REVOLUTIONS – OPTIMISTS VERSIONS
• leaders in power provided limited freedoms sufficient to
preserve some public trust and legitimacy of their regimes :
• controlled elections
• systemic opposition parties
• tolerance towards presence of NGO sector
• systemic contradiction between moderate authoritarianism and
long-term regime goalsf : semi-authoritarian regimes could not
reproduce themselves in the presence of stronger electoral
transparency, civic activism and political competition
Carothers, Thomas (2006) ‘The Backlash against Democracy Promotion’, in: Foreign
Affairs, Vol. 85, No. 2 (Mar. - Apr., 2006), p. 59-60.

23. COLOR REVOLUTIONS – OPTIMISTS VERSIONS
• high role of civic spirit without definite political ideology
• new social strata and identities in contradiction with political
regimes rooted in late SU models
• widespread acknowledgement of need to re-establish republic in
post-Soviet states
Poh Phaik Thien (2009) ‘Explaining the Color Revolutions’, in: International Relations,
e-document, checked 14.07.2011: [http://www.e-ir.info/?p=1973]
Fischer, Sabine (2008) Crises and conflicts in post-socialist societies: the role of ethnic,
political and social identities, Stuttgart, Ibidem-Verl.

24. COLOR REVOLUTIONS – OPTIMISTS VERSIONS
• civic spirit (not politics) as engine of civil unrest
• absence of a single political ideology among the revolutionaries, attempts at re -
integration of societies : civic movements as supporters of nationalism,
socialism, and liberalism to create equal conditions for political competition in
revolutionary countries
• change in political ecology of post-Soviet countries caused by contradictions
between growing social fragmentation based on new collective identities and
rigid political system
• Color Revolutions as constituent assemblies of new republics; attempt to
establish new social contract
Poh Phaik Thien (2009) ‘Explaining the Color Revolutions’, in: International Relations, e-document,
checked 14.07.2011: [http://www.e-ir.info/?p=1973]
Fischer, Sabine (2008) Crises and conflicts in post-socialist societies: the role of ethnic, political and
social identities, Stuttgart, Ibidem-Verl.

25. COLOR REVOLUTIONS – PESSIMISTS VERSIONS
• priority given to external causes of the revolutions
• honest results of elections are not possible in post-Soviet
countries
• to defend their liberties, post-Soviet citizens need the West
and its mechanisms of influence
• CSOs are an instrument of external players
Лукьянов Федор (2010) ‘Бесцветная эволюция’, в: Dialogues.ua, проверено
14.07.2011: [http://dialogs.org.ua/ua/issue_full.php?m_id=18155]

26. COLOR REVOLUTIONS – PESSIMISTS VERSIONS
• special role of foreign organizations with interest to control the
CIS; citizens manipulated from the outside
• regimes unstable and in need of ‘being reloaded’ with new, more
effective elite groups coming to rule
• CSOs as an instrument of external players
Petra Stykow (2010) ‚Bunte Revolutionen – Durchbruch zur Demokratie oder Modus der
autoritären Systemreproduktion?‘ In: Politische Vierteljahresschrift, #51:1, 137-162.
Herd, Graeme P. (2005) ‘Colorful Revolutions and the CIS : ‘Manufactured’ Versus
‘Managed’ Democracy?’ in: Problems of Post-Communism, Vol.52, #2, 3 – 18.

27. COLOR REVOLUTIONS AND INTERNATIONAL
PROMOTERS OF DEMOCRACY
International organizations claimed to be part of the Western conspiracy
• main institutions: National Endowment for Democracy (NED), National
Democratic Institute (NDI), International Republican Institute (IRI), International
Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES), Open Society Institute, Freedom
House
• result of their activities: CSOs built their capacity to effectively advocate free and
transparent elections, civil liberties, and group interests that were never taken
into account by power elites
• the West helped CSOs and the opposition to become effective competitors in
elections
• Western organizations used the Color Revolutions to fundraise for themselves in
their own countries
• the West supported elites (through loans to governments) and CSOs
simultaneously

28. COLOR REVOLUTION KEY FACTORS
• determinist trap of quest for causes in socio-political
phenomena
• conditions instead of causes
• key factors as indicators for higher possibility of revolutions

29. COLOR REVOLUTION KEY FACTORS
• Position of power elites
• how dependent are elites on international aid and trade?
• do elites keep their assets in the Western banks?
• do authorities permit existence of NGOs?
• do power elites adhere to democratic principles?

30. COLOR REVOLUTION KEY FACTORS
• Situation in the opposition
• how effective is the political opposition in coordinating between
themselves?
• how effective is the opposition in communicating with society?
• are there strong popular leaders in the opposition?
• is there an economic basis for the opposition?
• Depth of influence of foreign actors on political situation
• influence of official diplomatic representative offices on the authorities
• influence of non-official political foreign actors on politicians and oligarchs
• coordination of international aid providers with CSOs

31. COLOR REVOLUTION KEY FACTORS
• Recognition of regime’s illegitimacy by vast majority of
population
• are citizens ready to stand up for their interests?
• what is the level of support for/distrust of government?
• what is the level of support for/distrust of the opposition?
• are there influential trusted leaders in the opposition to the
authorities?

32. PROMISES OF COLOR REVOLUTIONS
• transcendentalist vs consequentialist
• consequences of actions based on expectations/promices
• measurability of (non)fulfilled expectations

33. PROMISES OF COLOR REVOLUTIONS
• special role of rising expectations
• consequences of actions based on expectations/promices
• measurability of (non)fulfilled expectations

34. EXPECTATIONS/PROMISES OF COLOR REVOLUTIONS
• new leaders and elites to rule and to fulfill civic expectations
• honest elections, honest political competition
• local self-government and participatory democracy
• anti-corruption, transformation of State-as-a problem into State-as-a-
solution
• more political liberties and economic rights (freedom of speech, SME)
• factor of fear: less fright-inducing regimes
selected from speeches of M.Saakashvili, V.Yushchenko,
and several leaders of Kyrgyz revolutionary groups

35. COLOR REVOLUTION OUTCOMES
• Mart Laar (Estonia, 2007): Color Revolutions had a positive impact on
development of revolutionary countries (Georgia) and their neighbors
(Moldova)
• Theodor Tudoroiu (USA, 2007): in all revolutionary countries the
leaders’ promises were not fulfilled
Laar, Mart (2007) Escape from Moscow, in: Project Syndicate http://www.project-
syndicate.org/commentary/laar2/English
Theodor Tudoroiu (2007) ‘Rose, Orange, and Tulip: The failed post-Soviet revolutions’,
in: Communist and Post-Communist Studies, #40:3, 315-342.

36. COLOR REVOLUTION OUTCOMES
• Color Revolutions in former Soviet Union (Economist, 2008):
• Color Revolutions had confusing consequences
• Color Revolutions were a street fight between the Western Light
and the Eastern Shadow
• although the revolutions did not lead to positive results, the post -
revolutionary countries are ‘in better places than they would be
without revolutions’
• Andrei Ryabov (Russia, 2010): none of the revolutionary countries
launched ‘a principally new model of their development’
‘Colour revolutions in the former Soviet Union. A bit faded but still bright enough’, in: Economist
http://www.economist.com/node/10498474?story_id=10498474
Рябов, Андрей (2010) ‘Промежуточные итоги и некоторые особенности постсоветских
трансформаций’, в: Dialogues.ua, проверено 13.07.2011:
[http://dialogs.org.ua/ua/issue_full.php?m_id=19457

37. COLOR REVOLUTION OUTCOMES
Measured by :
• quality of elites and stability of political regimes
• quality of democracy
• economic freedoms

38. COLOR REVOLUTION OUTCOMES
Quality of elites
• Temporary effect: the change of names of those in power did not
change practices
• social lifts remained out of work
• political groups use force more often
• medium-term process: strengthening of institution of the
presidency, weakening of the parliament

39. COLOR REVOLUTION OUTCOMES
Quality of elites
• none of the post-revolutionary elites had a clear goal of development
• Georgia: contradictory Westernization
• Ukraine: self-isolation
• Kyrgyzstan: no vision of future
• split nations :
• Georgia: lost provinces (South Ossetia, Abkhazia), national consolidation
through war with Russia
• Ukraine: East and West - cultural diversity with political representation
• Kyrgyzstan: South and North, tribal groups in parliament

40. COLOR REVOLUTION OUTCOMES
Failed states index (Foreign Policy / Fund for Peace)

41. COLOR REVOLUTION OUTCOME
Civil liberties and political rights (Freedom House)

42. COLOR REVOLUTION OUTCOME
Press freedom index (Reporters without Borders)

43. COLOR REVOLUTION OUTCOME
Corruption perception index (Transparency International)

44. COLOR REVOLUTION OUTCOME
Economic freedom of the world (Fraser Institute)

45. COLOR REVOLUTIONS GENERAL OUTCOMES
• Unfulfilled expectations/promises
• Short term slow down in slide toward authoritarianism in revolutionary
countries
• Medium term reaction of counter-revolutionary countries that promoted
authoritarianism throughout the region
• No change in socio-economic model of development
• No decrease in corruption and separation between private sector and
government
• Increased conflictogenic situation in the FSU region
• Increasing chances for repeating of Revolutions

46. THANK YOU!